THE FRENCH PLAN
_2nd September, 1915. Imbros._ An ugly dream came to me last night. My
tent was at Imbros right enough, and I was lying in my little camp bed,
and yet I was being drowned, held violently under the Hellespont.
The grip of a hand was still on my throat; the waters were closing over
my head as I broke away and found myself wide awake. I was trembling and
carried back with me into the realms of consciousness an idea that some
uncanny visitor had entered my tent. Already the vision was fading. I
could visualize the form of the presence, but the face remained hidden
in shadow. Never had I suffered from so fearful a dream. For hours
afterwards I was haunted by the thought that the Dardanelles were fatal;
that something sinister was a-foot; that we, all of us, were pre-doomed.
Dreams go by contraries. Strange that so black a night should be
followed by a noon so brilliant--so brilliant beyond compare.
K. cables the French are going to send three or four Divisions to work
with us along the Asiatic mainland. From bankrupt to millionaire in 24
hours. The enormous spin of fortune's wheel makes me giddy!
These French Divisions will be real Divisions: _must_ be; they have no
others.
O, Hallelujah!
"The sending of a force of three or four Divisions to operate on the
Asiatic mainland, independent as regards command, but in close relation
with the British forces on the Peninsula, is being considered by the
French Government. They will require an exclusively French military base
at Mitylene, and us to help with transport and fleet.
"So far I have not discussed any details with the French, and have
simply told them we shall be delighted to have the help, which would be
given by such an expedition, towards the solution of the Dardanelles
problem.
"Presumably they would require their two divisions now at Cape Helles.
What forces would you require to relieve them? I have asked Sir John
French if the XXVIIth and XXVIIIth Divisions could be spared for this
purpose.
"Wire me any points that you think I had better settle with the French
authorities."
_Deo volente_ we are saved; Constantinople is doomed. How clearly stand
forth the mosques and minarets of the Golden Horn.
Mr. Murdoch, an Australian journalist, paid me a visit to thank me for
having stretched a point in his favour by letting him see the
Peninsula. Seemed a sensible man.
Glyn and Holdich dined: both clever fellows in different ways. Dawnay
and Glyn after dinner left for England. Dawnay goes to explain matters
first hand to K. Next to my going home myself, or to K. himself coming
out here, this is the best I can do. Dawnay is one of the soundest young
officers we have, but he is run down physically (like most of us) and
jaded. He should benefit by the trip and so should the rumour-mongers at
home.
_3rd September, 1915. Imbros._ Two cables: one to say that the news
about the French Divisions must be kept dark; the other, in reply to a
question by me, refusing to let me consult de Robeck on the matter. So
Braithwaite and I had to make out our cable expressing our delight and
thankfulness, and advising how the troops might best be used entirely on
our own.
The cable took some doing but got it off my chest by mid-day and then
sailed with Ellison, Braithwaite and Val by the _Arno_ to Suvla. We
landed this time on Lala Baba instead of at our usual Ghazi Baba. Every
five minutes the Turks plumped one six-incher on to the beach. But
nobody now seems to mind. A lot of Generals present; Byng, Mahon,
Marshall, Maude and Peyton. Mahon took me up to the top of Lala Baba and
showed me the disposition of his division. He kindly asked us all to tea
at his Headquarters but as someone added that Ashmead-Bartlett was
going to take a cinema photo of the scene I thought I would not be thus
immortalized. The Scottish Horse were bivouacking on the beach; they
have just landed but already they have lost a member or two of their
Mess from shell fire. No wonder they looked a little bewildered, but
soon they will shake down. When we got back to the _Arno_ we found she
had been hit by shrapnel, but no damage.
Things at Suvla are pulling together. No one gave me more confidence
than Maude. His mind travels beyond the needs of the moment. He is
firmly convinced that no very out-of-the-way effort by the Allies is
needed to score a big point in the War Game and that our hold-up here is
not a reality but only a hold-up or petrefaction of the brains of the
French and of our Dardanelles Committee. I longed to tell him he was
doing them both, especially the French, an injustice, and that four
splendid divisions were as good as on their way, but I had to content
myself with saying to him and to all the Generals that I was overjoyed
at a piece of news received yesterday.
_4th September, 1915. Imbros._ Life would be as ditchwater were it not
stirred to its depths by K.'s secret cable. Sailed over with Freddie at
11.30 to "K" Beach and inspected the 88th Brigade. Had given orders to
the _Arno_ to stand by and to take me over to Anzac in the afternoon,
but the weather was so bad that I could not get off to her in the motor
boat.
At 7.15 p.m. the V.A. sent his picket boat for me and Freddie and I went
on board the _Triad_. At 10 p.m. she started for Mudros.
_5th September, 1915. H.M.S. "Triad." Mudros._ Anchored at Mudros at 6
a.m. Breakfast over, was met by Altham, Colonel McMunn and Captain
Stephens who took me ashore. There I met Lindley, now commanding the
troops on the island; also General Legge (commanding the 2nd Australian
Division); Lord Dudley and Colonel Forster. Lindley seems pleased at
having been given this command; says he feels like a man out hunting who
has a bad fall but alights on his feet, and Altham tells me he is doing
the work very well. Dudley, too, seemed full of business and contented
with his lot.
The moment I got through the reception stunt I set myself to work like a
nigger at the Red Cross stunt:--that's how people talk now-a-days. Saw
the 15th Stationary Hospital; the 110th Indian Field Ambulance; "C"
Section of No. 24 British Indian Hospital; ate a hearty lunch; inspected
1st Australian Stationary Hospital. Walking round a Hospital and seeing
whether things are clean and bright is a treat but trying to cheer
people up and give a fillip to all good works--that implies an
expenditure of something vital and leaves a man, after a few hours,
feeling the worse for wear.
By 4.45 the day's task was well over so refreshed myself by some right
soldier business reviewing the 4th Gurkhas under Major Tillard--a
superb battalion--1,000 strong!!! Had forgotten what a full battalion
looks like. At 5.45 wound up by inspecting a huge Convalescent Depot
under Colonel Forde and got back to the _Triad_ just in time for dinner.
Wemyss dined also.
_6th September, 1915. H.M.S. "Triad." Mudros._ After breakfast sailed
over to Mudros West; Lindley met me, also a host of doctors. Walked to
No. 3 Australian Hospital with an old acquaintance whose Italian name
slips my memory at the moment; then to No. 2 Australian Stationary
Hospital; then to Convalescent Depot of Lowland Division. At 12.30 ran
down to my launch and was swiftly conveyed to lunch on board the
_Europa_ with Admiral Wemyss. Such a lunch as a lost voyager may dream
of in the desert. Like roses blooming in a snowdrift, so puffs and pies
and kickshaws of all rarest sorts appeared upon a dazzling white
tablecloth, and then--disappeared. We too had to disappear and sail back
to Mudros West again. Horses were waiting and I rode to No. 18
Stationary Hospital and made a thorough overhaul of it from end to end;
then tea with the Officers of No. 1. In No. 3 Australian General were
eighty nurses; in No. 3 Canadian Stationary seven nurses; in No. 1
Canadian Stationary twenty-four nurses. Since Lady Brassey descended in
some miraculous manner upon Imbros, they were the first white women I
had seen for six months. Their pretty faces were a refreshing sight: a
capable crowd too: all these Hospitals were in good order, but the sick
and wounded in charge of the girls looked the happiest--and no wonder.
The Canadian Medicos are fresh from France and discoursed about
_moral_. Never a day passed, so they said, in France, but some patient
would, with tears in his eyes, entreat to be sent home. Here at Mudros
there had never been one single instance. The patients, if they said
anything at all, have showed impatience to get back to their comrades in
the fighting line. We discussed this mystery at tea and no one could
make head or tail of it. In France the men got a change; are pulled out
of the trenches; can go to cafes; meet young ladies; get drinks and
generally have a good time. On the Peninsula they are never safe for one
moment (whether they are supposed to be resting or are in the firing
line) from having their heads knocked off by a shell.
Returned to the _Triad_ in time for dinner.
Admiral vexed as his motor boat has gone ashore. Bowlby is with it
trying to get it off.
The French Admiral commanding the Mediterranean Fleet has just sailed
in.
_7th September, 1915. Imbros._ At 9.30 left the _Triad_ to call on
Admiral de la Perriera on board the _Gaulois_. Thence to _H.M.S. Racoon_
(Lieutenant-Commander Hardy) and started back for Imbros, where we
arrived in time for tea.
_8th September, 1915. Imbros._ Trying to clear a table blocked with
papers as a result of my two days' trip. Have written to K. as the Mail
bag goes to-morrow. Have told him I have had a nice letter from Mahon,
thanking me for allowing him to rejoin his Division and saying he hopes
he may stay with them till the end. Have given him all my Mudros news
and have sent him a memo. submitted to me by Birdwood showing how much
of the sickness on the Peninsula seems due to the War Office having hung
up my first request for a Field Force Canteen.
Here is one of the enclosures to Birdwood's memo.:--
* * * * *
"N. Z. and A. Division.
I desire to draw attention to the remarkable drop in the sick
evacuations from this Brigade as shown by the following figures:--
August 28 -- 59.
" 29 -- 64.
" 30 -- 58.
" 31 -- 17.
Sept. 1 -- 2.
" 2 -- 6.
I am convinced that this amelioration, and the observable improvement in
the condition of the men are largely to be attributed to the
distribution, on August 30 and 31 of Canteen Stores, providing a welcome
change of dietary.
I strongly recommend that every effort be made to maintain such Canteen
supplies.
(_Sd._), MONASH."
_9th September, 1915. Imbros._ At 9.30 Admiral de la Perriera returned
my call. At 11.50 Braithwaite, Freddy and I went aboard the _Gaulois_.
[Illustration: FISH FROM THE ENEMY, _"Central News" phot._]
A five course lunch and I had to make a speech in French.
When I got back I found that General Marshall, commanding the 53rd
Division, had come over from Suvla to stay with me. Lancelot Lowther
dined; he told us all the important things he was doing.
_10th September, 1915. Imbros._ Lancelot Lowther left with the Mails at
7 a.m., glad, I suspect, to shake from his feet the sand of these
barbaric Headquarters.
Not easy to get Marshall to loosen his tongue about the battle of the
21st, and he would not, or could not, add much to my knowledge. The
strength of Marshall depends not on what he seems but upon what his
officers and men know. He has got his chance amidst the realities of
war. In peace, except by a miracle, he would never have risen above the
command of a Battalion. The main reason I cannot draw him about the
battle of the 21st is, beyond doubt, that he does not want to throw
blame on others.
Marshall is a matter-of-fact, unemotional sort of chap, yet he told the
sad tale of young O'Sullivan's death in a way which touched our hearts.
O'Sullivan was no novice where V.C.s were the stake and the forfeit
sudden death.
_11th September, 1915. Imbros._ Ran across in the motor boat to see the
86th Brigade under Brigadier-General Percival. Went, man by man, down
the lines of the four battalions--no very long walk either! These were
the Royal Fusiliers (Major Guyon), Dublin Fusiliers (Colonel O'Dowda),
Munster Fusiliers (Major Geddes), Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Pearson).
Shade of Napoleon--say, which would you rather not have, a skeleton
Brigade or a Brigade of skeletons? This famous 86th Brigade is a
combination. Were I a fat man I could not bear it, but I am as
unsubstantial as they themselves. A life insurance office wouldn't touch
us; and yet--they kept on smiling!
_12th September, 1915. Imbros._ The C.O.'s, Geddes, Pearson, Guyon and
O'Dowda, lunched: an ideal lot; young, ardent, on the spot. Marshall
left by the Suvla trawler. Windy day, but calmer in the evening and at
night rained a little.
_13th September, 1915. Imbros._ Crossed again with Freddie Maitland and
inspected the 87th Field Ambulance (Highland Territorials from Aberdeen)
under Colonel Fraser. Became so interested the dinner hour was
forgotten--a bad mark for a General. Much pleased with the whole show:
up to date, and complete in all respects. Got back lateish. Altham
dined. Sat up at business till midnight.
Dictated a long letter to Callwell, Director of Military Operations at
the War Office, on the suicidal behaviour of the Military Censor. In
South Africa, my Chief of the Staff's latchkey let many a clandestine
tit-bit slip through to keep interest alive in England. K. regularly,
when the mails came back to roost, went for me, but the messages had got
home and done their duty as good little tit-bits should. The B.P. cannot
work up the full steam of their war energy when the furnaces of their
enthusiasms are systematically damped down; shut off from any breath
from outside. Your sealed pattern censor sees nothing beyond the
mischief that may happen if the enemy gets to know too much about us; he
does not see that this danger is negligible when compared with the
keenness or dullness of the nation.
General Headquarters,
Medtn. Expeditionary Force,
13th September, 1915.
"Dear Callwell,
"I am about to commit an atrocity by writing to an overworked man on a
subject which may seem to him of secondary importance. Still, to the
soldiers out here, the said subject means encouragement or
discouragement coming to them through the medium of their home
letters,--so vital a factor in victory or failure that the thought
emboldens me to proceed.
"Our misfire of last month came within only a fine hair's breadth of the
grand coup and caused us proportionately bitter disappointment at the
moment. Yet, looking back over the whole affair in a more calm and
philosophical spirit, any General, I think, would now be bound to admit
that in some respects at least fortune had not been too unkind.
"The Australians and New Zealanders have been extricated from what by
all the laws and traditions of war, was, in theory, an untenable
position; their borders have been enlarged; the heights they hold have
become more elevated and commanding; they have been entirely released
from shelling on the one flank and, on the other, the shelling has
dwindled away to next door to nothing. North of them again we have
captured a more or less practicable winter harbour, and have extended
our grip on the coastline. From the extreme South point of Anzacs to
their extreme North was formerly 2-3/4 miles. From the extreme South
point of Anzacs to our extreme North point (along which there is
inter-communication) is now 13 miles. Thus we force the enemy to
maintain a much larger number of troops on the Peninsula (where he is
already slowly bleeding to death under the stress of his supply and
transport difficulties) or else dangerously to weaken parts of his line.
"As to the fighting by which this has been accomplished, there is
nothing from beginning to end that any army need be ashamed of. Every
word I sent home in my Proemial cables might have been published without
raising a blush to the cheek of the most ardent Imperialist. In saying
this I do not, of course, assume that raw troops could tackle a totally
strange and uncomfortable proposition with the swift directness and
savvy of veterans. The feat performed by the Australians and New
Zealanders was of the class of the storming of the heights of Abraham,
only it was infinitely, infinitely more difficult in every respect.
"On the other side, still assuming the philosophical mantle, consider
what might have happened. Had the Australians and New Zealanders been
average troops, they would perhaps have burst through the first series
of wire entanglements and trenches, but they would not have stormed the
second, still less the third, fourth, fifth or sixth lines. Again, had
the Turks got the smallest inkling of our intention, the landing at
Suvla Bay would have failed altogether, and the New Armies would have
been virtually smashed to pieces without being able to show any _quid
pro quo_.
"We soldiers out here have then it seems to me, much for which to thank
God on our bended knees. That, at least, is my personal attitude.
"How is it then that our letters from home are filled with lamentations
and that, having just gained a proportionately very large accretion of
territory, we see headlines in the papers such as 'The Gallipoli
standstill,' whereas it does not seem to occur to anyone to speak about
'The French standstill'?
"Well, I will tell you. The system upon which the Press Bureau
approaches the eagerly attentive ear of the British Public is the
reason.
"Why I begged the War Office to change the method by which I sent copies
of my Proemial cables to Maxwell was that I found he (animated, of
course, by the best intentions) was improving the successes and
minimising the failures. The finishing touch was given when, one day, he
inserted the phrase 'The enemy is demoralized and has to submit by day
and by night to our taking his trenches.' Obviously, even the most
stupid fellaheen after reading such a sentence must, in the course of
time, begin to ask himself how, if trenches are being easily taken by
day and by night, we still remain on the wrong side of Achi Baba!
"Turning now to the Press Bureau and our landing, there was nothing in
that landing, as I have just said, which need have caused sorrow to a
soul in the British Isles excepting, of course, the deplorable heavy
casualties which are inseparable now from making any attack. But, on the
23rd of August a correspondent cables to an American paper a sensational
story of a decisive victory, which the Press Bureau must have known to
be a tissue of lies. Had the lies taken the shape of disasters to the
British there would not, from the point of view of us soldiers, have
been the smallest objection to publishing them. Suppose Mr. X, for
instance, had said that the landing did not succeed, and had been driven
off with immense slaughter? Apart from the fact that such a cable would
have made many poor women in England unhappy for a few hours, the
fabrication would have done us positive good: when the truth was known
the relief would have been enormous, we would have gained handsome
recognition of what had actually been done, and German inspired lies
would have been discounted in future.
"But there is no _moral_ in the world that can stand against a carefully
engineered disappointment. When you know perfectly well that the spirits
of the people are bound to be dashed down to the depths within a few
days, it is unsound statesmanship surely so to engineer the Press that
you raise those selfsame spirits sky high in the meantime. To climb up
and up is a funny way to prepare for a fall! If you know that your
balloon must burst in five minutes you use that time in letting out gas,
not in throwing away ballast. If you want to spoil a man's legacy of
£500 tell him the previous evening he has been left £50,000!
"As I began by saying, do please forgive me, my dear Callwell, for
taking up your most precious time. But you are more in touch with this
particular business than anyone else at the War Office and, from your
large mindedness, I feel sure you will be able to spare me some
sympathy, and perhaps even get some recognition for the general
principle I herewith put forward:--
* * * * *
"(1). Do not too curiously censor false alarmist reports put about by
the enemy. Let the papers publish them with a query and then smash them
as soon as this can be done with positive certainty.
"(2). Mercilessly censor any report which you think is, even in the
smallest degree, overstating your own case.
"The system needs courage but, with the British Public, it would pay!
"Yours sincerely,
(_Sd._), "IAN HAMILTON."
As suspense had, by now, become unbearable, cabled home asking S. of S.
to "let me know, as soon as you can safely do so," when the new
divisions may be expected. I tell him I have "informal" news from the
French but dare not take action on that.
_14th September, 1915. Imbros._ Mails in with Ward as King's Messenger.
Captain Vitali (Italian liaison officer) and Captain Williams dined.
Vitali is worried about his status. He was told in the first instance he
was to be liaison officer between General Cadorna and myself. On this
understanding we agreed to his coming to our Headquarters. Once he was
here the Italian Government (not Cadorna he is careful to explain) said
he must be permanently attached to us. Vitali feels himself in a false
position as he thinks that,--had we known, we might not have let him
come. Personally, I am quite glad to have him; but we did not have much
talk as, immediately after dinner, Braithwaite brought me the decipher
of Lord K.'s answer to my reminder to him. This has greatly saddened me
and takes up the whole of my thoughts.
"(No. 7843, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.
Reference your No. M.F. 630. I have just returned from France where I
went to settle up the questions asked in that telegram which were in a
very indefinite state owing apparently to a decision having been arrived
at by the French Government without reference to their military
advisers. The outcome of my meeting with Millerand, Joffre and Sarrail
was that the French force of four Divisions proposed to be sent to the
Dardanelles cannot leave until the result of the approaching offensive
in France is determined. If it be as successful as hoped for your
position in the Dardanelles would naturally be affected favourably. It
is hoped that the issue will be clear in the first few days of October,
and if indecisive, that by 10th October two of our Divisions may be at
Marseilles for embarkation to be followed closely by the four French
Divisions. The embarkation and transport of so large a force would, it
is thought, take about a month, but this has still to be worked out in
detail, so that by about the middle of November would be the time when
all would be ready.
"In the meantime, as transport is available, I shall continue to send
you reinforcements and drafts of which you are fully informed, up to
20th instant, and on which you should alone calculate.
"Sarrail, backed by General Bailloud, is greatly in favour of the French
expedition being employed independently on the Asiatic shore.
"Joffre greatly doubts the wisdom of this course, and Millerand
requested me to ask you to state fully and confidentially, for his
personal information, your opinion on this matter.
"Joffre's objections appear to be that a landing in Asia opens up a very
wide field if the force be not immediately successful, and that in that
case more troops, munitions and drafts would be eventually required than
he could spare with due regard to the safety of France.
"Secondly, he is not very confident of Sarrail's leadership,
particularly as the plans Sarrail has made seem to be worthless. Joffre
is having careful plans worked out by his Staff for the expedition on
the Asiatic shore which, he says, though unfinished, do not look
promising. The same objection on his part would not, I gather, be felt
if the French troops were given a definite area and objective on the
Gallipoli Peninsula, where the scope of their activities, and
consequently the support required from France, could be limited."
Where's the use of M. Millerand's consulting me over what lies on the
far side of a dead wall? Had he asked me to show why action here should
have priority over action in France, then I might have been of some use.
But that is settled: the four French Divisions earmarked for the East
will not now be sent until _after_ "the results of the coming offensive
in France have been determined." "If the success of this push equals
expectations you will reap the benefit." If indecisive then, "by the
10th October," two British Divisions and four French Divisions will be
at Marseilles ready to sail out here: "about the middle of November
would be the time when everything would be ready." There are altogether
too many ifs and ands and pots and pans about Millerand's question.
When a man starts going West who can foretell how long it will take him
to arrive at the East?
(1) If the push in the West is victorious we will score, says K. That is
so. Far as the Western battlefield lies from the scene of our struggle,
the report of a German defeat in France would reverberate Eastwards and
would lend us a brave moral impetus. But the point I would raise is
this:--did K., as representing a huge Eastern Empire, press firmly upon
Millerand and Joffre the alternative,--_if the push in the East is
victorious the West will score_?
What express strategical gain do they expect from pushing back the
Germans? A blow which merely destroys a proportion of men and material
without paralysing the resources of the enemy is a blow in the air. War
cannot be waged by tactics alone. That is a barbaric method. To bend
back the German lines in the West, or to push the first line back on to
the second or third, or twentieth, has of itself but slight strategical
or economic import.
Here, on the other hand, we have literally in our grasp a clear cut gift
offered us by the Gods. The impossible part, the landing, is done. All
that remains is so many fresh men and so many thousand shell. The result
is not problematical, but mathematical. Napoleon is the only man who has
waged a world war in the world as we know it to-day. Napoleon said, I
think it was on the famous raft, "Who holds Constantinople is master of
the world." And there it lies at the mercy of the Briton--could he only
convince Joffre that the shortest cut to freeing his country from the
Germans lies through the Dardanelles.
The principles which should underlie Entente strategy will be clear to
military historians although obscured to-day by jealousies and
amateurishness: just the usual one, two, three they are, in this
order:--
* * * * *
(a) Hold the sea.
(b) Hold the West.
(c) Smash the Turk.
A couple of miles won by us here gives England wheat and Russia rifles;
gives us the whip hand in the Balkans plus security in a couple of
Continents. A couple of miles lost by us here leaves the German with a
strengthened grip upon all the real world objectives for which he went
to war: it leaves us with a ruined prestige in Asia. But what is all
that to Joffre to whom, as a good Frenchman, the Balkans; the bracing up
of the Russian Army; all the Odessa corn; Asia and Africa thrown in, do
not count against _one departement_ of _la Patrie_.
(2) If the push in the West is indecisive then our push is only to be
postponed. Postponed! The word is like a knell. To write it gives me a
feeling of sick despair. Only postponed! As well cable at once, _only_
ruined!!
(3) But there is a third eventuality not mentioned by Lord K. How if our
attack upon the main strength of the entrenched Germans is beaten off?
To Joffre France comes first and the rest nowhere--every time: that
is natural. But our Higher Direction are not Frenchmen--not yet!
Armageddon is actually being fought _here_, at the Dardanelles, and the
British outlook is focused on France. We are to sit here and rot away
with cholera, and see the winter gales approach, until the big push has
been made in the West where men can afford to wait--where they are
healthy--where time is all on their side. And this push in the West is
against the whole German Empire linked to all its own vast resources by
a few miles of the best railways in the world. We _can_ attack here with
more men and more munitions than the enemy the very moment we care to
accept the principle that, _at this moment_, Constantinople and the
heartening up of Russia and ascendency amongst the Balkan States are not
only the true positive objectives of our strategy, but are the sole
strategical stunts upon the board. We can do so because of our sea
power. We can borrow enough howitzers, aeroplanes, munitions and drafts
from the West; apply them here and then, if necessary, return them. We
are not exploiting our own special characteristics, mobility and sea
power!
[Illustration: MARSHALL LIMAN VON SANDERS _"Exclusive News" phot._]
Easy to preach patience to a nation in agony? Yes, for the whole agony
of the whole world is more important even than the agonies of France.
We've got to win the war and win it quick. There's only one way to do
that. The resources of the Entente are not equal to carrying on two
offensives at the same moment. If our Army in the West will just sit
tight awhile, we here will beat the Turks, and snip the last economic
lien binding the Central Powers to the outside world.
Once more, our game is to _defend_ in the West until the _attack_ in the
East has borne economic fruit in the shape of ships and corn: political
fruit in the sentiment of the Balkans: military fruit in the fillip
given to the whole force of the Entente by actual tactical contact
between the British soldiers and the rank and file of the Ruskies. The
collapse of the Central Powers,--eclipsed in full view of all Asia and
Africa by the smoke from the funnels of the British Fleet at anchor in
the Golden Horn is what we are after here. Even if French and Joffre do
drive the German main hordes back to the Rhine the scope of their scoop
would be far less than ours, for we by getting to Constantinople can
starve those main armies stiff.
How few of our people know anything of the Russians. At least, I have
been attached for eight months to the Armies which fought against them
in the field; have visited Russia and Siberia and have done two peace
manoeuvres as their guest. To send superior officers to Russia only
produces jealousy; to send supplies only breeds dishonesty. But with
50,000 British soldiers as yeast we could leaven 5,000,000 Muscovites;
we could fire their inert masses with our ardour; this is the best of
all uses to which 50,000 British soldiers could at present be put.
From the early days when he told me the New Army should go to Salonika,
K. had an intuition at the back of his big mind that victory would dawn
in the East. But he is no longer the K. of K., the old K. of Khartoum
and Pretoria. He still has his moments of God-sent intuition. First, he
had _absolute_ knowledge that the Germans would come through Belgium: I
repeat this. The assumption was not uncommon perhaps, but he _knew the
fact_! Secondly, when everyone else spoke of a six weeks' war; when
every other soldier I can think of except Douglas Haig believed he'd be
back before the grouse shooting was over; K. went nap on a three years'
war. Pray heaven he was wrong; but, right or wrong, he has already
proved himself to have been nearer the mark than anyone else. Thirdly,
he had a call (by heavenly telepathy, I suppose) that his New Armies
must go out to the East. There is no more question about this than there
is about Belgium and the three years' duration. He has told me so; time
and again.
Why then does he not act accordingly if he's in the Almighty know?
Because he can't. With the one exception of the Battle of Paardeberg, he
never in his palmiest days pretended to be a man of action. But now he
has lost his faculty of forcing others to act. He makes a spurt but he
can't stay the distance. He has met Millerand, French and Joffre in
Council and allowed the searchlights of his genius to be snuffed out!
That is what surprises me:--He, who once could deflect Joe Chamberlain
and Milner from their orbits; who twisted stiff-necked Boers round his
little finger; who bore down Asquith, Winston, Prince Louis and Beatty
in Valetta Harbour--East _versus_ West--Mediterranean _versus_ North
Sea--who, from 8 p.m. to 2 a.m., withstood, wrestled with and overthrew
Haldane's arguments in favour of his taking up the succession to the
Duke of Connaught, and that although he had one arm tied to his side by
having taken the King's shilling. What a marvel he was and now--
Ichabod!
There is something so tragical in what home letters let us guess that
the pity of it almost makes me forget our own stillborn projects.
_15th September, 1915. Imbros._ Altham and Major Hood left G.H.Q. for L.
of C. Headquarters. Had another hour with Altham before he got aboard
his destroyer. Gave an interview to Buchanan, A.M.S. After lunch,
Braithwaite, Val, Wells, Deedes, Freddie and myself went off to Suvla
aboard H.M.S. _Scourge_ (Lieutenant-Commander Tupper). On landing,
Braithwaite branched off to see the G.S. Byng has a keen sense of
humour; is energetic and by his looks and manner attracts all ranks. No
one could wish a better corps commander and I have never in all my
experience known anyone take greater and more minute trouble with his
field days and manoeuvres than he did in Egypt the year before the
war. But his sojourn on the Western front has given him inflated
standards as to the number of guns and stocks of H.E. shell which are
essential to success; especially with troops who have suffered heavy
losses. Perhaps he is right. This para. from a letter written to the
great man to-night explains more generally what I feel:--
* * * * *
"Maude is burning to get on and do something and I heard him myself ask
Byng when he was going to let him have a dash. As to Byng, I think
myself he is not quite sure yet about the spirit of his men. I have been
trying to spur him on for the last day or so, although only by very
gentle hints, as I think, with a man of Byng's great reputation, one
must leave him to himself for as long as possible. I daresay he may be
quite right and very wise. Still, these reinforcements have brought the
Suvla Bay troops up to no less than 37,000 men, and I am most anxious
they should do something soon a little more rapid than sapping out
slowly towards the enemy's lines--which they are doing."
After my talk with Byng, we went on to meet Fanshawe and de Lisle. Maude
came along with me as far as the crestline. I asked him about his
Division. He replied: "Sir Ian, may I be frank with you about the
Division?" At these ominous words I shivered. They positively gave me
the shivers. So I braced myself up when I answered, "But of course!"
Maude then said, "If you give the order now, and will arrange for a
little artillery support, my Division will storm and hold on to any
thousand yards of Turkish trench you like to point out; to-morrow." I
could have embraced him, but I had to go steady and explain to him that
a Corps Commander must judge all his Divisions and that, taking the
situation as a whole, Byng did not think it fair on the men to let them
have a dart yet--not, at least, till they had more munitions at their
back. Byng has had wide experiences in the West and he looks on it as
trying the men unfairly to ask them to attack without a preliminary
bombardment on a scale which we cannot at present afford. "Yes," said
Maude, "that is all very well but after all you must remember the Turks
have neither the artillery nor the munitions the Germans have at their
command on the Western front."
"Well," I replied, "you put your points to Byng and you know I am a man
who never yet in my life refused a good brave offer like yours." He has
a great admiration for Byng and so, though sadly, he went away.
Fanshawe met me at the South end of the Division trenches, as bright and
keen as a new nail. His men, too, seem full of go. Fanshawe hopes to
carry the whole ridge whenever he gets the order. The 11th Division
promise to be as fine a unit as any in the Army once they get their gaps
filled in.
_16th September, 1915. Imbros._ We had quite a lively morning here. At
7.30 an enemy's biplane dropped four bombs on our Headquarters camp and
got away with hardly a shot fired at it. At 7.50 an enemy's Taube came
over and dropped bombs near my Signal Tent, also a little summer shower
of small steel darts: five men were wounded. At 8.10 a.m. yet another
enemy biplane circled round but was kept at a respectful distance by the
ship's guns.
Gave an interview to Colonel Stewart, Armoured Car Squadron.
Vice-Admiral Foumet and Staff called on me in the forenoon. He replaces
Admiral Nicol gone sick. Mails went out this evening. Freddie and I
gave tone to our debilitated constitutions by dining with the ever
hospitable V.A. on the _Triad_.
A cable from Dawnay saying Lord K. "would not regard unfavourably" a
withdrawal from Suvla Bay.
Dawnay left under the cloud of the 21st August. He it was who
rough-drafted the cable (in very much stronger terms than my final
version) suggesting that we might have to draw in our horns if we were
not kept up to strength. Since then our skies have cleared; the spirit
of the men has risen to set fair and we have got drafts enough, not for
a big push but certainly to enable us to be delighted should the Turks
attempt any sort of an attack, either at Suvla or anywhere else. The
Turks, in fact, are strictly on the defensive both actually and in their
spirit.
_17th September, 1915. Imbros._ Had been going to Anzac to inspect and
then to bring Birdie back to stay with me. But the weather was too bad.
He got here all right as the wind is from the North and he was able to
climb aboard under the lee of Nibrunesi Point. Just as well, perhaps, we
did not go, for one way or another a good deal of extra work had to be
got through. One thing; two cables from Maxwell to the War Office have
been repeated to us here; inadvertently we think; divertingly for sure.
The story is this:--
* * * * *
A few days ago we were offered the 51st and 53rd Sikhs who, despite
their titles, are half Mahomedan. After consulting Cox, Birdie and
other Indian Army Officers I cabled back saying we would gladly have
them "as soon as transport can be arranged," unless French is willing to
exchange them for two purely non-Mahomedan units. Here are the
collateral cables from Maxwell to the War Office:--
* * * * *
"Both the 51st and 53rd Sikhs have already been disembarked. They had
better remain off ship as long as possible, I think, since they are
reported to be feverish. The troopship can wait at Port Said. The men on
the canal, I should like to point out, barely get two nights in bed per
week."
"I have been asked by Hamilton to send him a double Company of Patiala
Sikhs to reinforce the 14th Sikhs. I can do this, and if you concur I
think it is a better arrangement than to send him the 51st and 53rd
Sikhs."
The Sikhs meant for Gallipoli are gone; we shall never see them more;
they mount guard by night against the ghosts of the Suez Canal.
Another thing; a Correspondent writes in and tells us that for the
honour of his profession he feels bound to let us know that Mr.
Ashmead-Bartlett has secretly sent home an uncensored despatch _per_, of
all people in the world, Mr. Murdoch!
I had begun to wonder what had come over Mr. Murdoch and now it seems he
has come over me!
The next paper on the table was my draft cable of advice for M.
Millerand. Joffre wants his four Divisions to land on the Peninsula;
Sarrail wishes them to work along the Asiatic side. No doubt the views
of the French Generals are being coloured by their wish to stand as
clear as they can of British command. So I have been careful to sweep
away _that_ obstacle by offering to stand down. Now they can fix up the
problem on its merits:--
* * * * *
"Closest consideration has been given to your No. 7843, cipher. Until
now I have consistently opposed a landing on the Asiatic side of the
Straits with less than 6 divisions--see my telegram No. M.F. 349 of 19th
June. On Gallipoli Peninsula area and difficulties of supply limited
liabilities of the opposing forces whereas mainland of Asia gave scope
for the deployment of large forces by the enemy. Now, however, the
situation is clearing up and there has been a great change in the
conditions.
"The Turks had formerly 10,000 to 12,000 men on Asiatic shore with large
reserves on the Peninsula available to cross over there if necessary.
Now Anatolia and Syria have been drained of troops to oppose us on the
Peninsula where the Turks have far longer front to hold, namely, 9-1/2
miles instead of 2-1/2, whilst our position and strength at Suvla and
Anzac are more threatening to their communications than was our position
at Anzac in June. If, therefore, we can be strong enough to maintain
pressure on whole Turkish line on the Peninsula it is unlikely that
Turks could detach troops to oppose French landing on Asiatic shore.
Assuming even that the Turks were enabled to release every soldier from
Thrace by a definite understanding being arrived at with Bulgaria, I
calculate they might gather a total of five divisions but of these
probably only one or at most two would be on Asiatic side at beginning
of the operations and would probably be scattered so that opposition in
strength to surprise landing is improbable. Moreover, only one of the
divisions is composed of good Nizam troops, others believed to be not up
to establishment. The Asiatic coast down to Yukeri Bay is now heavily
trenched but I do not think much has been done below that point.
Supposing, therefore, French bring good divisions at war strength and
succeed in keeping their destination secret, they appear to have a good
chance of obtaining good covering positions without much loss and of
thence advancing on Chanak defeating any Turkish forces sent against
them. Degree of their success would depend on whether the entrenched
positions which have been prepared on the Kum Kale--Ehren Keui road
could be turned by the good road which leads from Yukeri through Ezine
and Ishiklar to Chanak, as it is unlikely that Turks would be able to
quickly organize new defensive positions with entirely new line of
supply. The distance of landing place from objective is a secondary
consideration. It is easier to march and fight 100 miles than to take
three lines of trenches. In the one case there is room for manoeuvre
at which Turks are bad while in the other case siege warfare results at
which the Turks stand supreme. Once Ehren Keui reached, the Turks
between that place and Kum Kale would be forced to retire and Kum Kale
would become our base, thereby greatly shortening line of supply.
Supposing Turks endeavoured to make bridgehead on Chanak promontory, the
country is so big that large forces would be necessary and once the
Turks were cut off from North their supply difficulties would be most
serious. French possession of Chanak should be equivalent to victory,
but as Turks are stubborn fellows it is better to confine anticipations
to commencement of results which I consider would be as
follows:--Cutting off of Turkish supply line Chanak to Akbashi Liman.
Narrows would be useless to Turks. Nagara communications could be cut.
Our 15-inch howitzer could be used to batter Kilid Bahr forts. Allied
Fleets should be able to enter Marmora without loss.
"Turning to alternatives. If French were held up and unable to reach
Chanak, at least the last Turkish reserves would have been used up and I
think happy termination of operations though postponed would begin to
come clearly into view. Supposing the worst happened and that the French
were compelled to fall back after landing. In that case a clear road for
retirement to a bridgehead would be open. Positions covering landing
could be taken up and there they would continue to draw towards them
considerable Turkish forces which would otherwise be available for use
on Peninsula.
"Finally, greater difficulties beset all other schemes. The notorious
military disadvantages of independent command would be less harmful if
the respective armies were separated by the Straits than if they were
mixed up together on Peninsula. As Achi Baba is now one of the
strongest fortresses in Europe, it would be unpopular to palm off the
Cape Helles end upon the French. Moreover, all the French here are, and
always have been, dead set on Asia. If the French were employed at Suvla
they would have to fight side by side with the British, a situation
which, with co-equal commanders, would be a military absurdity. Were
that course decided upon, I would ask the Allied Governments to make up
their minds which General had the most daring, brains and experience,
and if it were the Frenchman I would serve under him loyally.
"As to making the attempt to the North of the Gulf of Xeros: a landing
there is certain to be opposed, and the Turkish reinforcements which are
always held ready in the neighbourhood of Uzunkiupru and Keshan could
arrive in strength very quickly and imperil the whole project. A further
objection lies in the distance of the French intermediate base and great
strain it would throw on Allied Fleets. Finally, it is all-important
that absolute secrecy should be maintained. I suggest that it should be
allowed to leak out that the destination of the French is Enos, this
would probably have the effect of tricking Turkish troops in Thrace, as
Enos is a destination which would gain most credence."
Birdie has at last worn off the fine edge of his keenness; he looks a
little tired: General Russell, the New Zealander, dined also and was in
great form.
_18th September, 1915. Imbros._ A cable to say that the French
Government are anxious to form two bases each capable of supplying three
Divisions: one to be at Mudros, the other at Mitylene. Is it business?
In spite of delay, in spite of lost chances, is it business?