THE BEGINNING OF THE END
_3rd October, 1915. Imbros._ Church Parade. Inspected escort, men of the
Howe and Nelson Battalions and a contingent from the 12th and 26th
Australian Infantry. At 12.15 Bailloud, Brulard and Girodon arrived from
Mudros for a last conference. Everything is fixed up. We are going to
help the derelict division of French in every way we can. Bailloud, for
his part, promises to leave them their fair share of guns and trench
mortars. Whenever I see him I know he is one of the best fellows in the
world. We went down and waved farewells from the pier. He was quite
frank. He does not think the Allies have either the vision or the heart
to go through with Gallipoli: he begins to suspect that the big push on
the Western Front is going to yield no laurels: so Salonika hits his
fancy.
Lieutenants Weston and Schemallach of the Australians and Lieutenant
Gellibrand of the Naval Division lunched. A Mr. Unsworth came to talk
over gifts for the Australian troops. He seems a capital chap; full of
go and goodwill to all men.
_4th October, 1915. Imbros._ Vague warnings have taken shape in an
event. A cable from K. telling me to decipher the next message myself. I
have not drafted out an average of fifty telegrams a day for Lord K. for
six months at a stretch without knowing something of his _modus
scribendi_. The Staff were pleasantly excited at the idea that some new
move was in the wind. I knew the new move--or thought I did.
Well, not that: not exactly that; not this time. But the enemies of our
enterprise have got our range to a nicety and have chucked their first
bomb bang into the middle of my camp.
A "flow of unofficial reports from Gallipoli," so K. cables to me, is
pouring into the War Office. These "unofficial reports" are "in much the
same strain" (perhaps they spring from the same source?). "They
adversely criticize the work of the Headquarters Staff and complaints
are made that its members are much out of touch with the troops. The War
Office also doubt whether their present methods are quite satisfactory."
K. therefore suggests "some important changes in your Headquarters
Staff; for instance, if you agreed, Kiggell from home to take
Braithwaite's place with you. Should you, however, decline and desire to
remain as at present, may we assume that we are quite safe in regarding
these unofficial reports as not representing the true feelings of the
troops?"
So----! On the face of it this cable seems to suggest that a man widely
known as a straight and capable soldier should be given the shortest of
shrifts at the instance of "unofficial reports"; i.e., camp gossip.
Surely the cable message carries with it some deeper significance!
I am grateful to old K. He is trying to save me. He picked out
Braithwaite himself. Not so long ago he cabled me in his eagerness to
promote him to Major-General; he would not suggest substituting the
industrious Kiggell if he didn't fear for me and for the whole of this
enterprise.
K. wants, so he says, "some important change"; that cannot mean, surely,
that he wants a sufficiently showy scapegoat to feed the ravenous
critics--or does it? Perhaps, he's got to gain time; breathing space
wherein to resume the scheme which was sidetracked by the offensive in
France and smashed by the diversion to Salonika. Given time, our scheme
may yet be resumed. The Turks are in the depths. Sarrail with his six
divisions behind him could open the Narrows in no time. I see the plan.
K. must have a splendid sacrifice but by the Lord they shan't have the
man who stood by me like a rock during those first ghastly ten days.
The new C.R.E., General Williams, and Ellison turned up for lunch.
Williams gave us the first authentic news we have had about those Aden
excursions and alarms.
An amusing aftermath of the evacuation by the French and Irish
Divisions. When the last of Bailloud's troops had embarked the Turks
dropped manifestoes from aeroplanes along the lines of the Senegalese
calling upon these troops to make terms and come over now that their
white comrades had left them to have their throats cut. I have cabled
this queer item to the S. of S. Evidently the enemy were quite well
aware of our withdrawal. Then _why_ didn't they shell the beaches? At
French Headquarters they believe that the Turks were so glad to see our
backs that they hardly dared breathe (much less fire a shell) lest we
should change our minds.
_5th October, 1915._ First thing another cable from K. saying, "I think
it well to let you know" that it is "quite understood by the Dardanelles
Committee that you are adopting only a purely defensive attitude at
present." Also:--"I have no reason to imagine you have any intention of
taking the offensive anywhere along the line seeing I have been unable
to replace your sick and wounded men." But, if he knows I _can't_ take
the offensive, why trouble to cable me that the Dardanelles Committee
expect me to adopt "only a purely defensive attitude"? I realize where
we stand; K., Braithwaite and I,--on the verge. We are getting on for
two months now since the August fighting--all that time we have been
allowed to do nothing--literally, allowed to do nothing, seeing we have
been given no shell. What a fiasco! The Dardanelles is not a sanatorium;
Suvla is not Southend. With the men we have lost from sickness in the
past six weeks we could have beaten the Turks twice over. Now Government
seem to be about to damn everything--themselves included.
But after all, who am I to judge the Government of the British Empire?
What do I know of their difficulties, pledges, and enemies--whether
outside or inside the fold?
I have no grouse against Government or War Office--still less against
K.--though many hundred times have I groused.[14]
Freely and gratefully do I admit that the individuals have done their
best. Most of all am I indebted--very deeply indebted--to K. for having
refrained absolutely from interference with my plan of campaign or with
the tactical execution thereof.
But things are happening now which seem beyond belief. That the
Dardanelles Committee should complacently send me a message to say we
"quite understand that you are adopting only a purely defensive
attitude at present" is staggering when put side by side with the carbon
of this, the very last cable I have sent them. "I think you should know
immediately that the numbers of sick evacuated in the IXth Corps during
the first three days of October were 500 men on the 1st instant; 735 men
on the 2nd instant and 607 men on the 3rd instant. Were this rate kept
up it would come to 45 per cent. of our strength evacuated in one
month."
Three quarters of this sickness is due to inaction--and now the
Dardanelles Committee "quite understand" I am "adopting only a purely
defensive action at present." I have never adopted a defensive attitude.
They have forced us to sit idle and go sick because--at the very last
moment--they have permitted the French offensive to take precedence of
ours, although, on the face of it, there was no violent urgency in
France as there is here. Our men in France were remarkably healthy; they
were not going sick by thousands. But I feel too sick myself--body and
soul--to let my mind dwell on these miseries.
Sealed my resolution (resignation?) by giving my answer about
Braithwaite. Though the sins of my General Staff have about as much to
do with the real issues as the muddy water had to do with the death of
the argumentative lamb, I begin by pointing out to the War Office wolf
that "no Headquarters Staff has ever escaped similar criticism."
Grumblings are an old campaigner's _vade mecum_. Bred by inaction;
enterprise and activity smother them. A sickness of the spirit, they
are like the flies that fasten on those who stay too long in one place.
Was Doughty Wylie "much out of touch with the troops" when he led the
Dublins, Munsters and Hampshires up from "V" beach and fell gloriously
at their head? Was Williams "out of touch" when he was hit? Was Hore
Ruthven? "As to Braithwaite," I say, "my confidence in that Officer is
complete. I did not select him; you gave him to me and I have ever since
felt most grateful to you for your choice."
Now--I feel better.
The plot thickens. A cable just come in from the S. of S. for War:--
* * * * *
"The following statement has been made in letter to Prime Minister,
Australia, by Mr. Murdoch: 'The fact is that after the first day at
Suvla an order had to be issued to officers to shoot without mercy any
soldier who lagged behind or loitered in advance.' Wire me as to the
truth or otherwise of this allegation."
Murdoch must be mad. Or, is there some method in this madness?
Mr. Murdoch was not a war correspondent; he is purely a civilian and
could hardly have invented this "order" on his own. No soldier could
have told him this. Someone not a soldier--someone so interested in
discrediting the Dardanelles Campaign that he does not scruple to do so
even by discrediting our own troops must have put this invention about,
_per_ Murdoch. Doubtless we strike here upon the source of these
"unofficial statements" which have been flowing into the War Office.
All I remember of his visit to me here is a sensible, well-spoken man
with dark eyes, who said his mind was a blank about soldiers and
soldiering, and made me uncomfortable by an elaborate explanation of why
his duty to Australia could be better done with a pen than with a rifle.
He was one week at the Press Correspondents' camp and spent, so they
tell me, a few hours only at Anzac and Suvla, never once crossing to
Helles. If then his letter to his Prime Minister is a fair sample of the
grounds upon which Braithwaite has been condemned, Heaven help us all!
As a relief to these disagreeable thoughts, a Taube dropped a couple of
bombs into camp. She flew so high that she was hard to see until the
bursting shrapnel gave us her line. As she made tracks back through the
trackless blue, the ships gave her a taste of some big projectiles,
12-inches or 9.2. The aerial commotion up there must have been
considerable.
At noon, sailed over to Suvla in H.M.S. _Savage_. We took our lunch on
board. As we came into harbour the Turks gave us a shell or two from
their field guns, then stopped. Young Titchfield, the Duke of Portland's
son, met us at the beach and brought us along to Byng's Headquarters,
where I met also de Lisle and Reed. After hearing their news I started
off with the whole band to make a tour of the trenches held by the 88th
Brigade, under General Cayley. On the way I was taken up to "Gibraltar"
observation post to get a bird's-eye view of the line. Besides my old
friends of the 29th Division I saw some of the new boys, especially the
1st Newfoundland Battalion under Colonel Burton, and the 2/1st Coy. of
the London Regiment. This was the Newfoundlanders' first day in the
trenches and they were very pleased with themselves. They could not
understand why they were not allowed to sally forth at once and do the
Turks in. The presence of these men from our oldest colony adds to the
extraordinary mix-up of people now fighting on the Peninsula. All the
materials exist here for bringing off the biblical coup of Armageddon
excepting only the shell.
In the course of these peregrinations I met Marshall of the 53rd
Division, Beresford, commanding the 86th Brigade, and Colonel Savage,
R.E.
After tea with Byng, including the rare treat of a slice of rich cake,
we went down to our friend H.M.S. _Savage_. The wind had risen to a
fairly stiff gale, and the sea was beginning to get very big. Those
field gun shells had caused the _Savage_ to lie a desperate long way out
to sea; we had a very stiff pull in the teeth of the waves, and every
one of us began to think that salt water rather than the bullet was
going to end our days. However, we just managed by the skin of our teeth
and the usual monkey tricks, to scramble up on board. As I said in my
wrath when I first stood on the firm deck, I would sooner have a hundred
shells fired at me by the Turks.
Captain Davidson commanding H.M.S. _Cornwallis_ dined; everyone liked
him very much.
_6th October, 1915._ Left General Headquarters soon after 11 o'clock for
Helles, taking with me Aspinall and Freddie. Lunched with Davies at 8th
Corps Headquarters.
Afterwards rode across to Royal Naval Division and saw Paris. Then went
with Bertie Lawrence, commanding 52nd Division, to his lines. Our route
lay up Achi Baba Nallah and along the trenches to the Horse Shoe; then
along Princes Street trench up the Vineyard, and back along the Krithia
Nallah to the Headquarters of the 156th Brigade. There we mounted our
horses and rode back to Corps Headquarters. I brought Steward back with
me to dine and sleep the night. Colonel Tyrrell and Major Hunloke
(King's Messenger) also dined.
_7th October, 1915._ Wasted energy brooding over the addled eggs of the
past. Are the High Gods bringing our new Iliad to grief in a spirit of
wanton mischief? At whose door will history leave the blame for the
helpless, hopeless fix we are left in--rotting with disease and told to
take it easy?
That clever fellow Deedes dined; also Rowan Hamilton, son of my old
Simla friend the Colonel of that name.
_8th October, 1915. Imbros._ At 11 a.m. Ellison, Taylor, Gascoigne and
Freddie sailed with me for Anzac. There we lunched with the ascetic
Birdie and Staff off bully beef, biscuits and water. Then, the whole lot
of us, together with de Crespigny, Birdie's Staff Officer, hurried five
miles an hour down the communication trench to the Headquarters of the
Indian Brigade. After greetings we shoved on and saw the 2nd Lovat
Scouts under Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling and met, whilst going round
their line, Major Morrison Bell and Captain Oppenheim. They seemed in
very good fettle, and it would have been hard to find a finer lot of
men. Taking leave of the 2nd Lovat Scouts, we worked along the trenches
of the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, under Colonel Mitchell, until we came
to the 1st Lovat Scouts under Colonel Bailey. Lovat himself was sick,
but Peyton commanding the 2nd Mounted Division turned up just when the
inspection was at an end. He had got lost in the trenches, or we had.
Next time the way was lost there was no mistake as to who had made the
mistake. Birdie and I were pushing along as fast as we could leg it back
towards Anzac. In the maze of trenches we came to a dividing of the
ways. Two jolly old Sikhs were sitting at the junction. I asked if the
road to the left led to the Headquarters of the Indian Brigade. They
said, "Yes," so on we went, I leading, Birdie following. The trench got
shallower and shallower until, in a little grove of trees, it petered
out entirely. But it seemed to begin again in the other side and so we
crossed through the trees. Once there we found that the supposed trench
was only a shallow scratching up of the earth, and that we were standing
within a hundred yards of the Turkish lines just about half way between
them and the Lovat Scouts! I shouted to Birdie and we turned and ran for
it--for our lives, I mean. Luckily the Turks were slow at spotting us,
all except one who was a rank bad shot: so tumbling back into the
trenches from which we had emerged, we saved ourselves by the skin of
our teeth. I could not have been smarter about dodging two or three
bullets had it been the beginning of our enterprise and had the high
minarets of Constantinople glittered before my eyes.
When we got back to where the two old Sikhs were sitting, as placid as
idols, Birdie gave them his opinion of their ancestors. On reaching the
Australian and New Zealand Division we were done to a turn, but Godley
revived us with tea and then we made our way back to our destroyer and
to Headquarters. It was dark when we arrived and a bad storm was setting
in--wind and rain--which went on till midnight.
Replies have come in to our enquiries as to Mr. Murdoch's statement to
the Prime Minister of Australia that British Officers had been ordered
to "shoot without mercy any soldier who lagged behind or loitered." As
the Secretary of State seems to take this charge seriously, I thought it
well, before I sent my answer, just to make sure that no subordinate had
said, or done, or written anything which could plausibly be twisted into
this lie. The Generals have denied indignantly; are furious, in fact, at
the double insult to their men and to themselves.
Have cabled accordingly:--
* * * * *
"(No. M.F.A.B. 4491). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of
State for War. With reference to your No. 8554 M.O. 414 of the 5th inst.
I have _pro forma_ made full enquiries and I find that there is no
truth whatever in the allegation made by Murdoch."
_9th October, 1915._ Had made my _band-o-bast_ for running over to
Helles, but the Vice-Admiral cabled he wanted to see me if he could at
11.45. Anyway the sea is still a bit rough for the crossing and landing.
A lot of damage was done last night to the Anzac piers, two of them
being clean washed away. Peter Pollen is off colour. Freddie and I dined
on board the _Triad_.
Whilst at dinner got full reports both from Suvla and Anzac as to the
effects of the storm. The southerly gale, which not only washed away the
piers but sunk the water lighters at Anzac, has done no harm at Suvla
except that three motor lighters have been driven ashore. The Admiral is
clear that, during southerly gales we shall have to supply both Anzac
and Suvla by the new pier just north of Ari Burnu. The promontory is
small but last night it gave complete protection to everything in its
lea. By sinking an old ship we can turn Ari Burnu into quite a decent
little harbour.
_10th October, 1915._ Made my deferred visit to Helles, going over this
morning in the _Arno_ with Braithwaite, Val and Alec McGrigor. Looked in
at the Clearing Hospital and cast an eye over Lancashire Landing. Then,
in company with Jimmy Watson and Colonel Ayres, walked up to Corps
Headquarters where we had a fine lunch with Davies, de Rougemont and the
melancholy Yarr. Afterwards rode across to the Headquarters of the
Royal Naval Division and on to their trenches, some 3-1/2 miles.
Generals Mercer and Paris followed us through their trenches. The Hood
and Hawke Battalions were in the firing line where we talked to great
numbers of old comrades of all ranks. Glad to meet Freyberg again (the
man who swam to light the flares at Enos). Kelly of the Hood Battalion
too, I saw, and Fairfax of the Hawke, also Commander King of the Drake
Battalion and Burrows, a gunner who was running a bombing school with
much zeal on a piece of ground specially patronized by the Turks as a
target for their own shelling practice. Got back to Helles by the Saghur
Dere and the Gulley. Going down the Gulley, nearly lost two of our
attendant Generals, a shrapnel bursting between them with a startling
loud report caused by the high banks of the Gulley on either side.
In the Gulley we met a swarm of old friends from Kent; Brigadier-General
Clifton-Browne, an officer whose command I had inspected both at
Potchefstroom and near Canterbury, with a Brigade of West and East Kent
and Sussex Yeomen. They made a brave showing, but he tells me some of
them have caught this wretched enteritis already. Amongst others, I
spoke to Douglas, commanding the East Lancashire Division, Major Edwards
of the Sussex Yeomanry, Major Sir S. Scott and Colonel Whitburn of the
West Kent Yeomanry, Colonel Lord Guilford, East Kent Yeomanry. A
cheerier crowd no one could wish to meet. If these are the type of men
who spin black yarns for home wear, I can only say that not the most
finished actors could better disguise their despair. General King, R.A.,
rode part of the way back with us.
After all this hard exercise, got back to the _Arno_ in a lather of
sweat about 6 o'clock carrying Davies with me. Leslie Wilson, commanding
the Hawke Battalion, had gone sick to-day, so sent him a telegram after
dinner to the Hospital ship _Somali_, telling him his trenches had been
found in apple-pie order.
_11th October, 1915._ Bad night with this beastly complaint. De Robeck
came up at 11 o'clock to see me. He has had a message from the Admiralty
asking him what number of extra troops could be maintained on the
Peninsula if the units there now were brought up to strength. The
Admiral asked me for the figures and the A.G. brought them over. My
force as a whole is as near as may be to half strength. Half of that
half are sick men. We have 100,000 men on the Peninsula, 50,000 of whom
are unfit: if the unfits were up to strength there would be 200,000 men
on the Peninsula as well as excitement and movement which would greatly
reduce the disease. Bearing in mind that the Anzacs have been well
supported by their Governments and that their units are fairly strong,
these figures show what wait-and-see-sickness has meant to British
Regiments.
The tone of this Admiralty question had seemed cheerful: almost as if
the Higher Direction were thinking of putting us on our legs but, in
the evening, another cable from K. gave a different and a very ominous
complexion to the future:--
"From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. What is your estimate
of the probable losses which would be entailed to your force if the
evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula was decided on and carried out in
the most careful manner?
"No decision has been arrived at yet on this question of evacuation, but
I feel that I ought to have your views.
"In your reply you need not consider the possible future danger to the
Empire that might be thus caused."[15]
If they do this they make the Dardanelles into the bloodiest tragedy of
the world! Even if we were to escape without a scratch, they would stamp
our enterprise as the bloodiest of all tragedies! K. has always sworn by
all his Gods he would have no hand in it. I won't touch it, and I think
he knew that and calculated on that when he cabled. Anyway, let K., cat
or Cabinet leap where they will, I must sleep upon my answer, but that
answer will be NO!
Just as I am turning in, a cable from the S. of S. saying, "there is an
idea that Sir John Maxwell is not sending you as many troops as he might
from Egypt. Have you any complaints on this score?" Rather late in the
day this "idea." Certainly, I have never made any "complaints" and I
don't mean to do so now. The War Office have only to look up their
returns and see how many men are being maintained to defend us from the
Senoussi!
Maxwell has never had less than 70,000 troops in Egypt, a country which
might have been held with 10,000 rifles--ever since we landed here, that
is to say. My troops can sail back to Egypt very much faster than the
Turks--or the Senoussi for that matter--can march to the Canal.
In the same cable the S. of S. asks what is the cause of the sick rate
and remarks that, "some accounts from the Dardanelles indicate that the
men are dispirited." Small wonder if they were! When they see two
Divisions taken away from the Peninsula; when their guns can't answer
those of the enemy; when each unit finds itself half-strength, and
falling--why then, tumbling as they do to the fact that we won't get
through till next year, they _ought_ to be unhappy. But the funny thing
is that the Cabinet, the Secretaries of State, are the people who are
"dispirited" and _not_ the people out here. If the P.M. could walk round
the trenches of the Naval Division at Helles, or if K. could exchange
greetings with the rank and file at Anzac and Suvla, they would find a
sovereign antidote for the blues and would realize that it was they who
were down-hearted and _not_ the men at the Dardanelles. There was an
old French Colonel, killed at Gravelotte; he had studied the classic
world battles and he shows that it was never the front line who gave way
first, but always the reserves:--they, the reserves, watched bloodshed
in cold blood until they could stand it no longer and so took to their
heels whilst the fighting men were still focussed upon victory. Not the
enemy in front but the friends behind are the men who spread despondency
and alarm.
Charley Burn has arrived on the _Imogene_ with Dawnay.
Davies went back to Helles after tea. Dawnay says K. was most interested
in him and most charming to him all through his stay until his last
interview just before he started on his return journey. K.'s manner
then, he said, had changed--so much so as to give him an impression that
the great man was turning, or was being turned, against all of us out
here. K.'s conduct at the first meetings is in full harmony with his
message sent to Braithwaite for me by Fitz about a fortnight ago, saying
I possessed his fullest confidence. The change of manner was marked and
Dawnay is sure he made no mistake about it. But nothing has happened
since the date of Dawnay's arrival and departure save a very well
engineered withdrawal of the 10th and the French Divisions for which, in
point of fact, we have all been rather expecting congratulations. Dawnay
thinks some queer things are happening. He could--or would--say nothing
more.
_12th October, 1915. Imbros._ Early in the morning got off my answer to
K.'s evacuation cable. The elements, the enemy and ourselves are the
three factors of the problem. Were I to measure my problem by the night
flitting of the Irish and French Divisions (who lost neither man nor
beast in the process), I could guarantee that we would shoot the moon
with the balance of the force smoothly, swiftly and silently. That is to
say, supposing the Turks and the weather remain constant. But these are
two most inconstant things: no one can tell how a Turk will behave under
any given conditions; the Turks themselves do not know how they will
behave: the weather now is written down by the meteorologists for sudden
changes; for storms. Unsettled weather is due and ought to be reckoned
upon. Imagine a blow coming up from the South when the evacuation is
half way through. That does not seem to be, and is not, any great
stretch of imagination. Well then, having so imagined, we get a disaster
only equalled in history by that of the Athenians at Syracuse: a
disaster from which the British Empire could hardly hope to recover.
Twice backwards and forwards to the General Staff Marquee with the draft
of my guesses, my first being that we would probably lose 35 to 45 per
cent. But the General Staff have also been consulting their oracle and
were clear for 50 per cent. Months of the most anxious calculations will
not get a white man one whit forrarder in seeing into the brains of an
Asiatic Army or in forecasting Mediterranean weather. Safest to assume
that both brains and weather will behave as the German General Staff
would wish them to behave rather than as they chanced to behave when the
French and Irish went off a few days ago. So have ended by taking the
Staff's figure because any figure being, in any case, the wildest of
shots, their shot best suits my views on the issue.
"From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Our losses would
depend on such uncertain factors, enemy's action or inaction, weather,
question whether we could rely on all troops covering embarkation to
fight to the last, that impossible to give you straight answer
especially until I have permission to consult Admiral. Once discussing
this very problem with General Gouraud, we came to the conclusion that
at Cape Helles we must sacrifice two divisions out of total of six
divisions and Cape Helles easiest of three places to get away from. My
opinion now is that it would not be wise to reckon on getting out of
Gallipoli with less loss than that of half the total force as well as
guns, which must be used to the last, stores, railway plant and horses.
Moral of those who got off would fall very low. One quarter would
probably get off quite easily, then the trouble would begin. We might be
very lucky and lose considerably less than I have estimated. On the
other hand, with all these raw troops at Suvla and all these Senegalese
at Cape Helles, we might have a veritable catastrophe."
Do the men toying with the idea of bringing off our men not see that
thereby the Turks will be let loose somewhere; not nowhere? Do they not
see that if they are feeling the economic pinch of keeping their side of
the show in being, the Turks, much weaker economically, must be feeling
it much more--!
* * * * *
It was a relief to get this perilous stuff off my chest, and in a
brighter frame of mind, sailed for Anzac on the destroyer _Lewis_. We
took biscuits and bully beef with us but the hospitable sailors insisted
on regaling us with a hot meal. Sat in cabin all the way as usual
writing up my record. Freddie tells me that these studious habits of
mine have started the shave that I spend my time composing poetry,
especially during our battles!
At Anzac Birdwood took us round the trenches and underground passages
about Russell's Top and Turk's Head, held by the 5th Brigade, 2nd
Division, under Legge. Half way up to Russell's Top was the 3rd Battery
Australian Field Artillery:--talked with Major King, the C.O. Next unit
was the 20th Infantry Battalion under Major Fitzgerald. Colonel Holmes,
commanding the 5th Infantry Brigade, and Wilson, his Brigade Major, took
us through their cave dwellings. Ex-westerners say that in France they
have nothing to touch these Australian tunnellings. In one place they
are boring into a crater only 20 feet from the Turkish trench. There is
nothing unusual in the fact, but there is in the great depth they are
going down so as to cross the danger zone far below the beaten track of
mines and counter-mines. On the steep slope in another place there is a
complete underground trench running parallel to, and only a short
bomb-throw from, a Turkish trench. We went through it with a lantern.
Sandbags, loopholes, etc., all are there, but blind! They are still
veiled from view by several feet of clay. To-morrow night the Anzacs are
going to chip off the whole upper crust of earth, and when light dawns
the Turks will find a well equipped trench, every loophole manned,
within bombing range of their own line.
Other notables met with were Major Murphy of the 20th Infantry
Battalion, Major Anderson (an old friend) commanding the Australian
Field Artillery, and Captain Perry Oakdene, the Engineer Officer on the
job. Saw Birdie and returned in the destroyer about 6.30. The day had
been so quiet that it would have been almost dull had it not been for
the sightseeing--hardly a shot was fired by Turk or Anzac with either
gun, trench mortar or rifle.
Bishop Price, the Bishop of North China, and Charlie Burn, King's
Messenger, dined. The quietness of the Bishop was remarkable.
Have cabled the S. of S. for War in answer to his enquiries about the
causes of the sickness, and as to whether Maxwell is not holding up my
share of troops in Egypt, saying:--(1) that "constant strain and
infection by dust and flies" have caused the sickness but that the men
are getting better; (2) that "we have been under the impression that
drafts meant for us and due to us have been retained in Egypt; also,
that men discharged fit from Hospitals have been held back, but I have
represented this last point to Maxwell personally as I always feel I am
not the person to gauge Maxwell's needs. On 27th September, I asked him
to send up all available Australian--New Zealand Army Corps drafts and
reinforcements, and, as you already know, am at present in telegraphic
correspondence about these reinforcements coming straight here without
being kept in Egypt for training at all."
At 10.40, after clearing my table, went with Ellison, Taylor, and
Freddie on board H.M.S. _Lefroy_ (Commander Edwards) and steamed for "V"
Beach. Enjoyed a fine luncheon with Brulard and then started off for the
trenches. At Morto Bay we were met by Captain de Bourbon, a big handsome
man with the characteristic Bourbon cut of countenance. He took us first
to the _château_ whence we worked down along the trenches to where our
extreme right overlooks the Kerevez Dere. General Faukard was here and
he thinks that we ought easily to get complete mastery of both sides of
the Kerevez Dere as soon as we get the means and the permission to shove
ahead again. When we do that the advance will let our Fleet another half
mile up the Straits and the "spotting" for the ships' guns will double
their value in the Narrows. From the Kerevez Dere we worked along the
fire trenches towards the French centre and then, getting to a sheltered
strip of country, walked back across the open to the second line. From
the second line we made our way, still across the open, to the third
line, over a heather covered strip. No one ever moves here by daylight
except in double quick time as there is always danger of drawing a shell
either from Asia or from Achi Baba and so it was that "Let the dead
bury the dead" had been the motto and that we met many corpses and
skeletons. Merciful God, what home tragedies may centre in each of these
sinister bundles. But it is the common lot--only quicker. Here, too, we
found excavations made by the French into a burial ground believed to be
of the date 2,500 B.C. The people of that golden age had the sentimental
idea of being buried in couples in big jars. A strange notion of our
Allies unburying quiet people who had enjoyed dreamless rest for 2,000
years whilst, within a few yards, their own dead still welter in the
parching wind.
[Illustration: CREMATING THE ENEMY DEAD _"Central News" phot._]
Had meant to run across and see Davies but time had slipped away and so
we made tracks for H.M.S. _Lefroy_, and on back here to G.H.Q., where a
letter from Callwell was laying in wait as a refresher after my
fatigues.
Callwell begins by saying he encloses a document written by my late
visitor, Mr. K. A. Murdoch, although "there are certain statements in
this which are palpably false," and although Dawnay has pointed out to
him at the War Office "a number of passages in it which are wholly
incorrect as matters of actual fact." He says, Lord K., "who has not had
time to read it yet," thinks I ought to be given a chance of defending
myself.
Callwell goes on to write about the Press Censorship and my plea for
publicity and then says he dislikes the Salonika stunt "because I am not
quite clear of where we are going to, and the immediate result at the
present is to take away from you troops that you can ill spare." Also,
because "we may be involving ourselves in operations on a great scale in
the heart of the Balkans, the result of which it is very difficult to
foresee."
Godley dined. Captain Davidson, R.N., the Senior Naval Officer in
harbour now, is a real Godsend. He looks after us as if we were Admirals
of the Fleet.
Have now read, marked, learnt and inwardly indigested Callwell's
enclosure; viz., the letter written by Mr. K. A. Murdoch to the Prime
Minister of Australia. Quite a Guy Fawkes epistle. Braithwaite is "more
cordially detested in our forces than Enver Pasha." "You will trust me
when I say that the work of the General Staff in Gallipoli is
deplorable." "Sedition is talked round every tin of bully beef on the
Peninsula." "You would refuse to believe that these men were really
British soldiers ... the British physique is very much below that of the
Turks. Indeed, it is quite obviously so. Our men have found it
impossible to form a high opinion of the British K. men and
Territorials. They are merely a lot of childlike youths, without
strength to endure or brains to improve their conditions." "I shall
always remember the stricken face of a young English Lieutenant when I
told him he must make up his mind for a winter campaign." "I do not like
to dictate this sentence, even for your eyes, but the fact is that after
the first day at Suvla an order had to be issued to Officers to shoot
without mercy any soldier who lagged behind or loitered in an advance."
Well, Well! I should not worry myself over the out-pourings of our late
guest, who has evidently been made a tool of by some unscrupulous
person, were it not that Mr. Asquith has clothed the said out-pourings
in the title, number, garb and colour of a verified and authentic State
paper. He has actually had them printed on the famous duck's egg
foolscap of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and under his authority,
as President and Prime Minister, they have been circulated round the
Government and all the notables of the Empire without any chance having
been offered to me (or to K.) of defending the honour of British
Officers or the good name of the British Rank and File. K. tells
Callwell I should be given the opportunity of making a reply. Not having
read it himself he has not yet grasped the fact that he also should have
been given the opportunity of making a reply to the aspersions upon his
selections. As for me, by the time my answer can get home and can be
printed and circulated the slanders will have had over a month's start
in England and very likely two months' start in Australia, where all who
read them will naturally conclude their statements must have been tested
before ever they were published in that impressive form.
Here we see an irresponsible statement by an ignorant man and I
instinctively feel as if it were being used as one more weapon to force
Asquith's hand and to ruin our last chance. I only hope it may not prove
another case of, "Behold, how great a matter a little fire kindleth!"
Certain aspects of this affair trouble my understanding. The covering
note (dated 25th September) which encloses the letter to the Prime
Minister of Australia (dated 23rd September) is addressed by Mr. Murdoch
to Mr. Asquith by name. In that covering note Mr. Murdoch says, "I write
with diffidence, and only at Mr. Lloyd George's request." Within three
days (so great the urgency or pressure) Mr. Asquith causes--as he,
President of the Committee of Imperial Defence, alone can cause--the
covering note as well as the seven or eight thousand words of the letter
to be printed and circulated round the big wigs of Politics, as well as
(to judge by the co-incident hardening of the tone of this mail's
papers) some of the Editors. Not one word to me as to Mr. Murdoch's
qualifications or as to the truth or falsity of his statements, until
these last have been a week in circulation. Then, I receive; first, a
cable saying unofficial reports had come in censuring my General Staff
and that I had better, therefore, let Braithwaite go; secondly, a cable
asking me whether the absurd story of my having ordered my own soldiers
to be shot "without mercy " is well-founded; thirdly, a bad last, the
libellous letter itself.
Yet Mr. Asquith did know the paper contained _some_ falsehoods. He _may_
have attached weight to Mr. Murdoch's tale of the feelings of French
soldiers at Helles (although he never found time to go there): he _may_
have believed Mr. Murdoch when he says that Sir John Maxwell "has a poor
brain for his big position"; that "our men feel that their reputation is
too sacred to leave in the hands of Maxwell"; that Sir William Birdwood
"has not the fighting quality or big brain of a great General"; that
General Spens was "a man broken on the Continent" (although he never was
broken and never served on the Continent); that "Kitchener has a
terrible task in getting pure work from the General Staff of the British
Army, whose motives can never be pure, for they are unchangeably
selfish"; that "from what I saw of the Turk, I am convinced he is ... a
better man than those opposed to him" (although, actually, Mr. Murdoch
saw nothing of the Turks). The P.M. may have taken these views at their
face values: even, he _may_ have swallowed Mr. Murdoch's picture of the
conscientious Altham "wallowing" in ice whilst wounded were expiring of
heat within a few hundred yards; but _Mr. Asquith has seen the K. Army_
and, therefore, _he cannot have believed_ that these soldiers have
suddenly been transformed into "merely a lot of childish youths without
strength to endure or brains to improve their conditions."
Once more; these reckless scraps of hearsay would not be worth the paper
they are printed on were it not that they are endorsed with the letters
C.I.D., the stamp of the ministerial Holy of Holies. Only the Prime
Minister himself, personally, can so consign a paper. Lord K. and I were
both members of the C.I.D., and members of long standing. For the
President to circularize our fellow members behind our backs with
unverified accusations is a strange act, foreign to all my ideas of Mr.
Asquith. On this point Callwell is quite clear: the Murdoch letter was
published to the C.I.D. on the 28th ult. and Callwell writes on the 2nd
inst., and says Lord K. "has not had time to read it yet."[16] But
nothing else is clear. In fact, the whole thing is foreign to all my
ideas of Mr. Asquith. He does not need to work the C.I.D. oracle in this
way. As P.M. he has only to speak the word. He does not work the Press
oracle either: not his custom: also he likes K. The whole thing is a
mystery, of which I can only say with Hamlet--"miching mallecho; it
means mischief."
_14th October, 1915. Imbros._ Colder than ever. We are told that the
winter will kill the flies and that with their death we shall all get
hearty and well. Meanwhile, they have turned to winged limpets.
Being Mail day as well as rough, stuck to camp. My friend England sailed
into harbour in the _Chelmer_ and came up to lunch. In the evening he
took Godley back to Anzac. Duncannon came to dinner. I have made him
liaison officer with the French in place of de Putron who has gone to
Salonika with Bailloud.
As to the Murdoch unpleasantness, I began an _exposé_ to be sent to the
Governor General of Australia; another to the Secretary of the C.I.D.
But Pollen, Braithwaite and Dawnay (the last of whom had been shown the
document whilst he was at home, though he had said nothing to me about
it) thought this was to make much ado about nothing. They cannot believe
Lord K. will trouble himself about the matter any further and they think
it best handled in lighter vein. Is K. still the demi-God, that is the
question? Anyway, there is simply no time this Mail to deal with so many
misstatements, so that has settled it.
"GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
"MEDTN. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
_"14th October, 1915._
"DEAR CALLWELL,
"I have read Mr. Murdoch's letter with care, and I have tried to give it
my most impartial consideration and not to allow myself in reply to be
influenced in any way by the criticisms he may have felt himself bound
to make upon myself personally.
"What does this letter amount to? Here we have a man, a journalist by
profession, one who is quick to seize every point, and to coin epithets,
which throw each fleeting impression into strongest relief. He comes
armed with a natural and justifiably enthusiastic admiration for
everything connected with the Commonwealth to which he belongs, and
ready to retail to his Minister or his public anything that can
contribute to show the troops they have sent in an heroic light.
"Here he obtains his first sight of war and of the horrors and hardships
inseparable from it. He finds men who have just been through some of
the hardest fighting imaginable and who have suffered terrible losses;
he finds probably that very many of those whom he hoped to see,
certainly many of those of whose welfare their motherland would wish to
hear, are killed, wounded or laid up with illness,--he finds all this
and he becomes very deeply depressed. In such an atmosphere Mr. Murdoch
composes his letter, a general analysis of which shows it to be divided,
to my mind, into two separate strata.
"First an appreciation in burning terms of the spirit, the achievements,
the physique and all soldierly qualities of the Australian Forces.
Secondly, a condemnation, as sweeping and as unrelieved as his praise in
the first instance is unstinted, of the whole of the rest of the force.
I myself as C.-in-C., my Generals, my Staff, Lines of Communication, Sir
John Maxwell and General Spens at the Base, even the British soldiers
collectively and individually, are all embraced in this condemnation
which is completed by the inclusion of the entire direction of the
Forces at home, both Naval and Military.
"Where all are thus tarred with the same brush, I am content to leave it
to the impartial reader to decide what reliance can be placed on Mr.
Murdoch's judgment. My own feeling certainly is that in his admiration
for the Australian Forces, and in his grief at their heavy losses (in
both of which feelings I fully share) he has allowed himself to belittle
and to criticize us all so that their virtues might be thrown into even
bolder relief.
"With Mr. Murdoch's detailed points I do not propose to deal, nor do I
think you expect me to do so. On every page inaccuracies of fact abound.
The breaking of Spens on the Continent, a theatre of war he has never
visited; the over-statement of our casualties by more than 40 per cent.;
the acceptance as genuine of a wholly mythical order about the shooting
of laggards--really the task would be too long. As to the value of Mr.
Murdoch's appreciation of the strategical and tactical elements of the
situation you can yourself assess them at their true value.
"Finally, I do not for one moment believe the general statement put
forward to the effect that the troops are disheartened. Neither that
statement nor the assertion that they are discontented with the British
Officers commanding them has the slightest foundation in fact.
"Believe me,
"My dear Callwell,
"Yours very sincerely,
(_Sd._) "IAN HAMILTON.
"P.S.--I attach correspondence showing how Mr. Murdoch's visit arose. I
believe I exceeded my power in giving him permission to come but I was
most anxious to oblige the Australian Prime Minister and Senator Pearce.
You will see that he promises faithfully to observe any conditions I may
impose. The only condition I imposed was that he should sign a
declaration identical with that which I attach. He signed and the paper
is in my possession."
CORRESPONDENCE.
"Dear Sir,
"On the advice of Brigadier-General Legge I beg to request permission to
visit Anzac.
"I am proceeding from Melbourne to London to take up the position of
managing editor of the Australian news cable service in connection with
the _London Times_ and at the Commonwealth Government's request am
enquiring into mail arrangements, dispositions of wounded, and various
matters in Egypt in connection with our Australian Forces. I find it
impossible to make a complete report upon changes that have been
suggested here until I have a better knowledge of the system pursued at
base Y, and on the Mainland, and I beg of you, therefore, to permit me
to visit these places.
"I should like to go across in only a semi-official capacity, so that I
might record censored impressions in the London and Australian
newspapers I represent, but any conditions you impose I should, of
course, faithfully observe.
"I beg to enclose (_a_) copy of general letter from the Prime Minister
and (_b_) copy of my instructions from the Government. I have a personal
letter of introduction to you from Senator Pearce, Minister of Defence.
"May I add that I had the honour of meeting you at the Melbourne Town
Hall, and wrote fully of your visit in the Sydney _Sun_ and Melbourne
_Punch_; also may I say that my anxiety as an Australian to visit the
sacred shores of Gallipoli while our army is there is intense.
"Senator Millen asked me to convey his most kindly remembrances to you
if I had the luck to see you and in case I have not I take this
opportunity of doing so.
"As I have only four weeks in which to complete my work here and get to
London a 'collect reply by cable to C/o Colonel Sellheim, Australian
Intermediate Base, Cairo, would greatly oblige.
"I have the honour to be,
"Sir,
"Your obediently,
(_Sd._) "KEITH A. MURDOCH.
"C/o Colonel Sellheim, C.B.,
"A.I.F. Intermediate Base,
"Cairo.
"_August 17, 1915._"
"COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA,
"PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT,
"MELBOURNE.
_"July 14th, 1915._
"This letter will serve to introduce Mr. Keith Arthur Murdoch, a well
known journalist, of Melbourne, who is proceeding to Europe to undertake
important duties in connection with his profession.
"Mr. Murdoch is also undertaking certain inquiries for the Government of
the Commonwealth in the Mediterranean Theatre of War. And for any
facilities which may be rendered him to enable him the better to carry
out these duties I shall be personally obliged.
(_Sd._) "ANDREW FISHER,
"_Prime Minister._"
"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE,
"MELBOURNE,
"_July 2nd, 1915._
"Mr. Keith A. Murdoch,
"Alfred Place, Melbourne.
"The Minister desires that you furnish a report upon the following
matters together with any suggestions for improvements.
"1. Arrangements for the receipt and delivery of letters, papers and
parcels to and from members of the Australian Imperial Force.
"2. Arrangements for the receipt and delivery of cablegrams to and from
members of the Australian Imperial Force.
"3. Arrangements for notifications to the Department in Australia of the
disposition of Australian Wounded in Hospitals.
"4. Suggested despatch of special expert corps to Hospitals.
"5. Frauds by impersonation at cable offices.
(_Sd._) "T. TRUMBLE,
"_Acting Secretary for Defence._"
When I got this, I hesitated. Evidently the writer was not accredited as
a war correspondent and his remark about having written me up in the
_Sun_ and in _Punch_ did not count for much. But I was anxious then, as
ever, that as many journalists as possible should be put into a position
for seeing the fine things the troops had done and were doing; I noted
the emphasis laid by the writer upon his acceptance of the censorship,
and so I took upon myself to exceed my powers and asked Braithwaite to
cable to Mr. Murdoch:--
* * * * *
"This cable is your authority to come to G.H.Q. at once whence you will
be sent to Anzac.
C.G.S., Medforce."
Mr. Murdoch landed on the 2nd instant and on that date signed the
following declaration:--
* * * * *
DECLARATION TO BE USED BY WAR CORRESPONDENTS.
I, the undersigned, do hereby solemnly undertake to follow in every
particular the rules issued by the Commander-in-Chief through the Chief
Field Censor, relative to correspondence concerning the forces in the
Field, and bind myself not to attempt to correspond by any other route
or by any other means than that officially sanctioned.
Further, in the event of my ceasing to act as correspondent with the
British Forces, I will not during the continuance of the War join the
forces of any other Power in any capacity, or impart to anyone military
information of a confidential nature or of a kind such that its
disclosure is likely to prejudice military operations, which may have
been acquired by me while with the British Forces in the Field, or
publish any writing, plan, map, sketch, photograph or other picture on
military subjects, the material for which has been acquired by me in a
similar manner, unless first submitted by me to the Chief Field Censor
for censorship and passed for publication by him.
(_Signature of Correspondent_)................
* * * * *
_15th October, 1915. Imbros._ Bitter cold. The whole camp upside down
and all the Staff busy with their shift of quarters to the other side of
the Bay.
Altham has been at Salonika and came over to report how things were
going there. Remembering the accusation of "wallowing" in ice, I nearly
touched him for a Vanilla cream.
As to Salonika, he tells me that, so far, the occupation has been a
travesty of any military operation. No plan; no administration; much
confusion; troops immobile and likely to sit for weeks upon the beach.
The Balkan States Intelligence Officers are on the spot and grasp the
inferences. Until the troops landed they were not quite sure whether
some serious factor was not about to be sprung upon them: now they are
quite sure nothing can happen, big or small, beyond our letting a lot of
our bayonets go rusty. Sarrail has been implored by the Serbians to push
his troops up into their country, but he has been wise enough to
refuse. How can he feed them? On the top of it all, the conduct of the
Greeks seems fishy. As to the Bulgarians, they have already thrown off
the mask. Although Salonika is going to be our ruin, I can still spare
some pity for Sarrail.
Have heard from Birdie who at last gives me leave to see his Lone Pine
section. Until now I have never been able to get him to let me go there.
Too many bombs, he says, to make it quite healthy for a
Commander-in-Chief.
_16th October, 1915. Imbros._ Had just got into bed last night when I
was ferreted out again by a cable "Secret and personal" from K. telling
me to decipher the next message myself. The messenger brought a note
from the G.S.--most of whom have now gone across to the other side of
the Bay--to ask if I would like to be awakened when the second message
came in. As I knew the contents as well as if I had written it out
myself, I said no, that it was to be brought me with the cipher book at
my usual hour for being called in the morning. When I had given this
order, my mind dwelt awhile over my sins. Through my tired brain passed
thought-pictures of philosophers waiting for cups of hemlock and various
other strange and half-forgotten antique images. Then I fell asleep.
Next morning, Peter Pollen came in with the cipher book and the
bow-string. I got K.'s message pat in my dreams last night and here it
is, to a word, in black and white:--
* * * * *
"The War Council held last night decided that though the Government
fully appreciate your work and the gallant manner in which you
personally have struggled to make the enterprise a success in face of
the terrible difficulties you have had to contend against, they, all the
same, wish to make a change in the command which will give them an
opportunity of seeing you."
How far we have travelled, in spirit, since K. sent me his September
greetings with spontaneous assurances of complete confidence! Yet, since
then, on the ground, I have not travelled at all--have indeed been under
the order of the Dardanelles Committee to stand still.
Charles Munro is to relieve me and brings with him a Chief of Staff who
will take Braithwaite's place. On my way back I "might visit Salonika
and Egypt" so as to be able to give the Cabinet the latest about the
hang of things in these places.
When I go, Birdie is to take my place pending Munro's arrival.
De Robeck must give me a cruiser so that we may start for home
to-morrow. The offer of a jaunt at Government expense to Salonika and
Egypt leaves me cold. They think nothing of spending some hundreds of
pounds to put off an awkward moment. What value on earth could my views
on Salonika and Egypt possess for people who have no use for my views on
my own subject!
After breakfast, read K.'s cable over once more. "A War Council," it
seems, decided to make the change. Did the War Council also appoint
Munro? K. did not appoint him--anyway. Munro succeeded me at Hythe. In
1897 I was brought home from Tirah to Hythe by Evelyn Wood in order that
I might keep an eye on the original ideas which, from India under Lord
Roberts, had revolutionized the whole system of British musketry. I left
Hythe on the outbreak of the South African War and during that war Munro
went there.
He was born with another sort of mind from me. Had he been sent out here
in the first instance he would never have touched the Dardanelles, and
people who have realized so much may conclude he will now clear out. But
it does not follow. Munro's refusal to attempt a landing in the first
instance would have served as the foundation stone for some totally
different policy in the Near East. That might perhaps have been a good
plan. But to start a campaign with me and try to carry it on with Munro
has already been tried and found hardly fair to either of us. The
intention of whoever selected Munro is so to use him as to force K. to
pull down the blinds. But they may be mistaken in his character.
One thing is sure: whenever I get home I shall do what I can to convince
K. that the game is still in his hands if only he will shake himself
free from slippery politics; come right out here and run the show
himself. Constantinople is the only big big hit lying open on the map at
this moment. With the reinforcements and munitions K., as
Commander-in-Chief, would have at his command, he can bring off the coup
right away. He has only to borrow a suitable number of howitzers and
aeroplanes from the Western front and our troops begin to advance.
Sarrail has missed the chance of twenty generations by not coming here.
Let K. step in. In the whole of the Near East his name alone is still
worth an Army Corps. My own chance has gone. That is no reason why my
old Chief should not himself make good. I told the War Council we held
at Suvla before the battle of the 21st August that if the Government
persisted in refusing me drafts and munitions--if they insisted on
leaving my units at half-strength--then they would have to get someone
cleverer than myself to carry out the job. Well, it has come to that
now. K. looms big in the public eye and can insist on not being starved.
He must hurry up though! Time enough has been lost, God knows. But even
to-day there is time. Howitzers, trench mortars, munitions, men, on a
scale France would hardly miss,--the Asiatic side of the Straits would
be occupied--and, in one month from to-day, our warships will have
Constantinople under their guns. If K. won't listen to me, then, having
been officially mis-informed that the War Council wish to see me (the
last thing they _do_ wish), I will take them at their word. I will
buttonhole every Minister from McKenna and Lloyd George to Asquith and
Bonar Law,--and grovel at their feet if by doing so I can hold them on
to this, the biggest scoop that is, or ever has been, open to an
Empire.
Rather a sickly lunch. Not so much the news as the Benger's on which we
all feasted for our stomach's sake. Birdie came over at 4 p.m. with
Ruthven. Both his A.D.C.s are sick. I am going to ask him to take on
young Alec McGrigor. Peter and Freddie will come home with Braithwaite
and myself. What a true saying,--a friend in need is a friend indeed.
Were I handing over to Birdie for good I should feel unalloyed happiness
in his well-deserved success.
At tea Ellison, Braithwaite, Bertier, Colonel Sykes and Guest appeared.
They looked more depressed than I felt. I had to work like a beaver
before I could brighten them up. "I'm not dead yet," I felt inclined to
tell them, "no, not by long chalks." What I did say to one or two of
them was this:--"My credit with Government is exhausted; clearly I can't
screw men or munitions out of them. The new Commander will start fresh
with a good balance of faith, hope and charity lodged in the Bank of
England. He comes with a splendid reputation, and if he is big enough to
draw boldly on this deposit, the Army will march; the Fleet will steam
ahead; what has been done will bear fruit, and all our past struggles
and sacrifices will live."
Dined with Freddie on the _Triad_. De Robeck and Keyes were all that
friends can be at such a moment.
_17th October, 1915. H.M.S. "Chatham"_ (_At sea_). A pretty beastly day
within and without. For the within part, all sorts of good-byes to put
pain into our hearts; for the without, a cold drizzle chilling us all to
the bone.
At 10.30 Brulard and his Staff came over; also Generals Byng and Davies
with their Staffs. After bidding them farewell; a function whereat I was
grateful to the French for their lightness of touch, I rode over with
Braithwaite and the A.D.C.s to the new Headquarters at Kephalos to say
good-bye to my own Staff. Although I had meant to live there until we
drove the Turks far enough back to let us live on the Peninsula, I had
found time to see my little stone hut built by Greek peasants on the
side of the hill:--deliciously snug. To-day, this very day, I was to
have struck my tent and taken up these cosy winter quarters; now I move,
right enough, but on the wrong road.
The adieu was a melancholy affair. There was no make-belief, that's a
sure thing. Whatever the British Officer may be his forte has never lain
in his acting. So, by 2.30, I made my last salute to the last of the old
lot and boarded the _Triad_. A baddish wrench parting from de Robeck and
Keyes with whom I have been close friends for so long. Up to midnight de
Robeck had intended coming home too. Keyes himself is following me in a
day or two, to implore the Cabinet to let us at least strike one more
blow before we haul down our flag, so there will be two of us at the
task.
I wrung their hands. The Bo'sun's whistle sounded. The curtain was
falling so I wrung their hands once again and said good-bye; good-bye
also to the Benjamin of my personal Staff, young Alec, who stays on with
Birdie. A bitter moment and hard to carry through.
Boarded the _Chatham_ (Captain Drury-Lowe) and went below to put my
cabin straight. The anchor came up, the screws went round. I wondered
whether I could stand the strain of seeing Imbros, Kephalos, the camp,
fade into the region of dreams,--I was hesitating when a message came
from the Captain to say the Admiral begged me to run up on to the
quarter deck. So I ran, and found the _Chatham_ steering a corkscrew
course--threading in and out amongst the warships at anchor. Each as we
passed manned ship and sent us on our way with the cheers of brave men
ringing in our ears.
* * * * *
FAREWELL ORDER BY GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON.
"GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
"MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
_"October 17th, 1915._
"On handing over the Command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to
General Sir C. C. Munro, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to say a few
farewell words to the Allied troops, with many of whom he has now for so
long been associated. First, he would like them to know his deep sense
of the honour it has been to command so fine an Army in one of the most
arduous and difficult Campaigns which has ever been undertaken;
secondly, he must express to them his admiration at the noble response
which they have invariably given to the calls he has made upon them. No
risk has been too desperate; no sacrifice too great. Sir Ian Hamilton
thanks all ranks, from Generals to private soldiers, for the wonderful
way they have seconded his efforts to lead them towards that decisive
victory, which, under their new Chief, he has the most implicit
confidence they will achieve."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 14: I think I hardly knew _how_ often till I came to read
through my diary in cold print. But all the time I was conscious, and am
still more so now, of K.'s greatness. Still more so now because, when I
compare him with his survivors, they seem measurable, he remains
immeasurable.
I wish very much I could make people admire Lord K. understandingly. To
praise him wrongly is to do him the worst disservice. The theme can
hardly be squeezed into a footnote, but one protest must be made all the
same. Lord Fisher gives fresh currency to the fable that K. was a great
organizer. K. hated organization with all his primitive heart and soul,
because it cramped his style.
K. was an individualist. He was a Master of Expedients; the greatest
probably the world has ever seen. Whenever he saw _any_ organization his
inclination was to smash it, and often--but not always--he was right.
This may sound odd in Anglo-Celtic ears. But most British organizations
are relics of the past. They are better smashed than patched, and K.
loved smashing.--IAN H., 1920.]
[Footnote 15: Lord K.'s reason for putting in this last paragraph may be
obscure unless I make it clear. As explained in a previous footnote,
Lord K. knew that I knew his strong personal view that the smashing blow
to our military reputation which would be caused by an evacuation of the
Dardanelles must, in course of time, imperil our hold upon Egypt.
Therefore, for the moment, it was necessary to warn me that the problem
must be considered in the purely military, tactical, aspect.--IAN H.
1920.]
[Footnote 16: Lest anyone should imagine there is any privilege or
secrecy attached to this document it may be well to explain that all the
best passages came back to me from Melbourne in due course; often with
marginal comment.--IAN H., 1920.]
APPENDIX I
STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR HUGH SIMPSON BAIKIE,
EX-COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH ARTILLERY AT CAPE HELLES.
The first landing of British troops at Cape Helles took place on 25th
April, 1915. On arriving at that place during the first week in May, I
found that heavy fighting had occurred without ceasing from the time of
the disembarkation. Having come straight from the Headquarters Staff of
the 2nd Army in France, where the question of artillery ammunition was a
constant source of anxiety to all the higher commanders, I at once set
to work to discover what reserves remained in the hands of G.H.Q. and
what the daily expenditure had been since the landing. The greatest
difficulty was experienced in obtaining figures of expenditure from the
units, so constant had been the fighting, which still continued, and so
great the casualties, and consequent confusion in reckoning expenditure.
Yet, after some delay, sufficient information was obtained to enable me
to demonstrate with certainty that, if such severe fighting continued,
the Force would soon be in danger of losing their artillery support.
On the 4th May a cable was sent, I believe, to Lord Kitchener saying
that ammunition was becoming a very serious matter owing to the
ceaseless fighting; pointing out that 18 pr. shell were a vital
necessity and that a supply promised by a certain ship (I believe the
S.S. _Funia_) had not turned up. A day or two later, a cable was
received by G.H.Q. saying munitions were never calculated on a basis of
prolonged occupation of the Peninsula, and that the War Office would
have to reconsider the whole position, if more was wanted. If I remember
aright, the cable finished by saying, "It is important to push on." A
few days later a cable was received saying the War Office would not give
us more ammunition until we submitted a return of what was in hand. The
compilation of that cut-and-dried return in the midst of a desperate
battle was a distracting and never-to-be-forgotten effort, but there was
no help for it: no return, no shells; that was the War Office order. The
ammunition still in hand lay mostly in the holds of the ships at Mudros,
60 miles away, and did not lend themselves to easy counting; while the
actual expenditure was, for reasons already given, an intricate problem
indeed.
Continuous cables on the subject of ammunition passed during the next
few days between G.H.Q. and the War Office, all of which passed through
my hands and some of which I drafted for superior authority. I cannot
remember their sequence and not always their purport, but I distinctly
remember about the 10th or 11th May a cable being received from Lord
Kitchener saying ammunition for Field Artillery was being pushed out
_via_ Marseilles. I think the figures given were about ten or twenty
thousand rounds of 18-pr. and some one thousand rounds of 4.5 howitzer
H.E., but I am not sure.
The fact that does remain indelibly impressed on my mind is that I am
convinced from the cables that passed through my office that no
provision had been made by the War Office to keep up a regular supply of
artillery ammunition to the Dardanelles Expedition. The W.O. authority
appeared to have given a bonus of ammunition when the Expedition sailed,
and to have been somewhat taken aback and annoyed by the fact that a
sure and continuous supply should afterwards be demanded.
On 29th May I left G.H.Q. on appointment as Brigadier-General to command
all the artillery at Cape Helles, in which capacity I served till
September, i.e. through all the big attacks and counter-attacks of June,
July and August. In this capacity I was brought face to face with all
the deficiencies in artillery _matériel_ and ammunition, of which the
following were the most important.
Although there was only one Battery of 4.5 and one Battery of 6-in.
howitzers at Helles there was always an extreme deficiency of howitzer
H.E. ammunition. So great was the shortage that immediately on taking up
my command I found it necessary to issue a most stringent order that no
howitzer on Cape Helles was ever to fire H.E. without my personal
authority. When the Turks attacked, 18-prs. and 15-prs. were to support
the Infantry with shrapnel; howitzers were only to be used with my
personal permission and then were only to fire shrapnel. All howitzer
H.E. was to be used exclusively for supporting British attacks by
bombarding the Turkish trenches before and during such activities.
Throughout the above months, constant appeals were made to me by
Infantry Commanders to bombard the Turkish trenches with H.E. in order
to retaliate for the loss our men had suffered from the Turkish guns
using H.E. Such requests I had invariably to refuse.
There were fifty-six 18-prs. at Helles, when I assumed command on the
29th May, and subsequently they were increased to seventy-two at the end
of July. Except for 640 rounds of H.E., which was fired off during the
4th June battle, no more H.E. arrived till the end of July.
Never during my command did the total number of rounds of 18-pr.
ammunition at Helles ever reach 25,000. Before one of our attacks, with
very careful previous husbanding, the total used perhaps to reach 19,000
to 23,000. The total amount I could therefore allot justifiably for the
artillery preparation before an attack of our four British Infantry
Divisions never exceeded 12,000 rounds; as from 6,000 to 7,000 must
necessarily be kept in reserve to assist in beating off the determined
hostile counter-attacks. As I remarked at the beginning of this paper,
artillery ammunition was a constant anxiety to the higher commanders on
the Western Front also, but never, I believe, had Infantry to attack
with so little artillery support as the above. My position in France did
not give me any inside knowledge of the details of artillery supply, but
in one action at St. Eloi (near Ypres) on 14th or 15th February, in
which only 27th Division was concerned, the artillery of this Division
(so the C.R.A. informed me) alone fired 10,000 18-pr. rounds in one
night. At a similar action at the same place by the same division about
a month later the divisional artillery fired, I believe, a slightly
larger amount. Again, at Neuve Chapelle, in February, 1915, each
Division had its own divisional artillery and the ammunition expenditure
worked out to 150 rounds per 18-pr. gun. These official figures were
shown me a few days after the battle by the G.O.C., 2nd Army.
In comparing the ammunition expenditure of France in 1915 and in the
Dardanelles, the enormous discrepancy in the number of 18-prs. per
Division must be taken into account. Reckoning on the scale of the
number of 18-prs. allotted to a British Division in France, we had at
Helles little more than sufficient 18-prs. for one Division, yet with
this number we had to give artillery support to four Divisions. As to
the French artillery at Helles, they could always reckon on being able
to expend 40,000 to 45,000 rounds when their two Divisions attacked.
The complete absence of H.E. was severely felt, as shrapnel were of
little use for destroying trenches, machine gun emplacements, etc.
Therefore, in each and every British attack, success was jeopardized and
our infantry exposed to cruel losses, because, firstly, there was not
sufficient ammunition to prepare their attack, and, secondly, there was
no H.E. (except for howitzers) to destroy the machine guns in their
emplacements. The latter, therefore, inflicted great losses on our
Infantry in their advance.
Our unfortunate position did not escape the notice of the French, who
used at times generously to place under my command some of their field
guns and howitzers, but in the latter they were also lamentably
deficient, and in ammunition they were, themselves, during May and early
June, none too well provided, although towards July their reserves grew
more sufficient. The British deficiency in ammunition, however, was so
great, and created so much merriment among the French that they
christened the British Artillery, "Un coup par pièce"; with which term
of endearment I was always personally greeted by the French Artillery
General and his Staff, with all of whom I was great friends.
At the battle of 28th June the French were unable to spare us the
howitzers or ammunition we begged of them. The failure of the gallant
156th Brigade of the 52nd Division to take the H.12 trenches was
essentially due to lack of artillery ammunition, especially of H.E.
Allowing for losses that must have been suffered under any condition, I
believe that some 700 or 800 Scottish casualties were due to this cause.
Before the action the Corps Commander sent for me to say that he did not
consider that enough guns and ammunition had been allotted to this
portion of the Turkish trenches. I replied that I agreed, but that there
were no more available and that to reduce the bombardment of the
hostile trenches on the left of our front would gravely prejudice the
success of the 29th Division in that quarter and that I understood
success there was more vital than on our right flank. After consultation
with the G.O.C. 29th Division, the Corps Commander agreed with my
allotment of the artillery. We then did our utmost to obtain the loan of
more guns, howitzers or ammunition from the French without success and
with the result that the attack was beaten off.
So successful had been the attack on our left with its capture of five
successive lines of Turkish trenches that we had actually some
ammunition to spare. In the afternoon it was agreed that there should be
another attack on H.12, preceded by a very short but very intense
bombardment from every gun and howitzer we possessed. All artillery
arrangements for this were completed before 2.30 p.m., from which hour
all the guns waited alert and ready for the Infantry to inform us of the
hour they wished us to commence fire. I was in direct telephonic
communication with the commander of the 52nd Division, having had a
private wire laid on to his Headquarters the previous day. Suddenly, to
my horror, I received a telephone message from my Artillery Group
Commander, Colonel Stockdale, saying the Infantry were making the
assault and that he had no time to do more than fire half a dozen shots!
In the attacks of 12th and 13th July, the French placed some thirty or
forty guns and howitzers under British command, and on account of the
shortage of British ammunition their guns undertook the whole of the
artillery preparation, our artillery confining itself to covering fire
during and after the Infantry advance. The counter-attacks were so
violent and the calls for artillery support were so incessant that
towards the afternoon of the 13th July the British gun ammunition began
to get alarmingly low, until finally only about 5,000 rounds of 18-pr.
ammunition, including all rounds in Battery charge, remained at Helles.
The French were reluctant to supply further artillery support, fearing
further attacks on themselves. This was the most anxious night I spent
on the Peninsula--all but a limited number of rounds were withdrawn from
most Batteries and were placed in horsed ammunition wagons, which
perambulated from one side of the British position to the other
according to where it seemed most likely the next Turkish attack would
take place. These measures were successful and no Battery actually was
left without one round at a critical moment, but the position throughout
that night was a most dangerous one. Every hour a wire was sent to
G.H.Q. giving expression to our crying needs, but there was next to
nothing at Mudros, while desperate fighting still went on without a
minute's respite. At 11 p.m. that night a trawler did, to the joy of
every gunner, reach Helles with 3,000 rounds of 18-pr., but on the
arrival of my Staff Officer to unload it, it was found that the fuses
were of a new pattern never issued before and that the existing fuse
keys would not adjust the fuses. As no new pattern fuse keys had been
sent from home the Batteries had to manufacture their own, which was
successfully accomplished after two days' delay.
During June two Batteries, and during July two more Batteries of 5-inch
howitzers, manned by Territorials, arrived at Helles. During the last
week of July the first two Batteries were sent to Anzac. Some of these
howitzers were very old and worn by corrosion, and were consequently
inaccurate.
The Gun History sheets of some of them showed they had been used at the
Battle of Omdurman, seventeen years before, and had been in use ever
since. After the big British attacks of 6th and 7th August, their
ammunition began to run short. On demand about 500 or 700 rounds were
sent up from Mudros--on arrival each shell was found to be of only 40
lb. weight, whereas former shells were of 50 lb. weight. Their fuses
were also of new pattern, which existing fuse keys would not fit and, to
crown all, no range tables had been sent for this new pattern of shell.
In spite of continual letters and telegrams to the War Office, when I
left Helles in September no new pattern fuse keys or range tables had
ever arrived from England; consequently these shells remained stacked on
the Peninsula while the Batteries only fired occasionally for want of
ammunition!
On another occasion, when we were in the greatest straits for 15-pr.
ammunition, many hundreds of rounds arrived at Helles, which on being
landed were discovered by my Staff only to be suitable for the Ehrhardt
R.H.A. guns in Egypt, no such guns being in the Dardanelles.
As for heavy artillery, practically speaking, there was none! Only one
6-inch Howitzer Battery (4 howitzers) and one 60-pr. Battery (4 guns)
were in action at Helles up to July when four more guns of the latter
calibre were landed. Unfortunately, however, the 60-prs. were of little
use, as the recoil was too great for the carriages and the latter broke
down beyond repair by our limited resources after very few rounds. At
the beginning of August only one 60-pr. gun remained in action.
Consequently, we had no heavy guns capable of replying to the Turkish
heavy guns which enveloped us on three sides, and from whose fire our
infantry and artillery suffered severely.
As to spare parts, spare guns and carriages, such luxuries were
practically non-existent. No provision appears to have been made by the
War Office to replace our guns or their parts, which became
unserviceable through use or through damage by the hostile artillery. As
the British were holding the lower slopes of the Achi Baba position, and
as all our gun positions could be seen into by the Turks with powerful
spectacles from their observation posts on the top of Achi Baba, our
equipment suffered severely. During June and July one 6-inch howitzer
and twenty-five 18-prs. (out of a total of seventy-two) as well as one
or two 60-prs., were put out of action by direct hits from the hostile
artillery. Such guns were withdrawn to the field workshops on "W" Beach,
but as these workshops were exposed to the enemy's artillery fire from
three sides, the guns were often further damaged while under repair.
Damaged guns had sometimes to wait for days in this workshop until other
guns had been damaged in a different place by the hostile artillery.
Then possibly one efficient gun could be made up of the undamaged
portions of one, two or more guns. Batteries often, therefore, remained
for days short of guns on account of the lack of spare parts.
When I assumed command of the artillery at Helles, there were two
Batteries of mountain guns (10-prs.) in action, but they were of a
prehistoric pattern. In 1899 the Khedive of Egypt possessed in his Army,
in which I was then serving, mountain guns which were more up-to-date in
every respect. So inaccurate were these 10-prs. that they had to be
placed close behind the front trenches lest they should hit our own
Infantry, the result being a very heavy casualty list in officers and
men amongst their Territorial personnel. Many of these lives could have
been saved, had reasonable modern weapons been supplied. These obsolete
old guns wore out so quickly that the two Batteries quickly melted into
one Battery, and when they finally left Helles for Anzac at the end of
July, I believe only 3 guns and their detachments were left in being.
As for anti-aircraft guns, they did not exist at all and the hostile
aeroplanes used to fly over and drop bombs _ad lib._ without fear of
molestation, the only saving clause being that the enemy appeared to
possess almost as few aeroplanes as the British.
In no point of their equipment did the force at Helles suffer so much in
comparison with their comrades in France as in the matter of aeroplanes
which, at the Dardanelles, were hopelessly deficient not only in the
numbers but also in quality. There were not sufficient pilots and there
were no observers at all. Brave and efficient as the naval pilots were,
they could not be expected to be of any use as artillery spotters unless
they had been thoroughly trained for this important duty. This
deficiency had to be made good at all costs by drafting young artillery
subalterns from their Batteries and sending them to the Air Force, where
their lack of training and experience in operation was at first severely
felt, although later these lads did magnificent work. Thus Batteries
were deprived of their trained subalterns just at the moment when the
latter were most required on account of the severe casualties suffered
in the landing and during the subsequent early operations. But few of
the aeroplanes were fitted with wireless and the receivers on the ground
could not take in messages over a distance longer than 5,000 yards.
Consequently, each aeroplane had to return within this radius of the
receiver, before its observation could be delivered, thus immensely
curtailing the usefulness and efficiency of the aeroplane observation.
Owing to the above conditions, aeroplanes could only be used for the
counter-batteries firing on hostile artillery.
As regards trench mortars, the supply was hopelessly inadequate. I
cannot give the exact figures, but I believe there were not a dozen at
Helles during the whole period I was there, and these were of such an
indifferent type as to be practically useless, and for this reason no
one bothered about them. No provision appears to have been made for the
supply of such necessities of trench warfare by the Home Authorities.
This appears to be indefensible, as I believe very early in the
operations their provision was specially asked for by G.H.Q. The
absolute failure to supply such articles of vital necessity eventually
led to the French C.-in-C. at Helles lending the British two demizel
trench mortars and large quantities of ammunition. These were manned by
artillery detachments, and by their magnificent work and the constant
demand from the Infantry for their services, it was conclusively proved
what an invaluable aid a sufficient supply of these weapons would have
been.
From the very first it was apparent to me that the number of British
guns at Helles was not sufficient to prepare and support simultaneous
Infantry attacks of the whole British Force at this end of the
Peninsula. In June I drew up a memorandum to G.H.Q. pointing this out
and asking for a big increase of guns, howitzers and ammunition. What
happened to this I cannot say. I only know that the guns and ammunition
asked for never materialized.
The whole story of the artillery at Helles may be summed up in the
following sentences: insufficiency of guns of every nature;
insufficiency of ammunition of every nature, especially of H.E.;
insufficient provision made by the Home Authorities for spare guns,
spare carriages, spare parts, adequate repairing workshops, or for a
regular daily, weekly or monthly supply of ammunition; guns provided
often of an obsolete pattern and so badly worn by previous use as to be
most inaccurate; lack of aeroplanes, trained observers and of all the
requisites for air observation; total failure to produce the trench
mortars and bombs to which the closeness of the opposing lines at Helles
would have lent themselves well--in short, total lack of organization at
home to provide even the most rudimentary and indispensable artillery
requisites for daily consumption; not to speak of downright carelessness
which resulted in wrong shells being sent to the wrong guns, and new
types of fuses being sent without fuse keys and new types of howitzer
shells without range tables. These serious faults provoked their own
penalties in the shape of the heavy losses suffered by our Infantry and
artillery, which might have been to a great measure averted if
sufficient forethought and attention had been devoted to the "side-show"
at the Dardanelles.
After commanding the starved artillery at Helles it was my good fortune
to command the artillery of the 21st Army Corps at the third Battle of
Gaza, in November, 1917, and also at the great Battle of 19th
September, 1918, in which the Turks in Palestine were finally crushed,
and I think it may add emphasis to what I have said if I contrast the
artillery support of the two campaigns and show the results which
ensued. On the night before the third Battle of Gaza, the artillery
under my command (to support three Divisions) consisted of the
following, viz.:--19-1/2 Batteries (i.e., 78 guns and howitzers) of
heavy artillery, comprising 8-inch howitzers, 6-inch guns, 6-inch
howitzers and 60-pr. guns--all of the most modern and up-to-date type.
The Field Artillery comprised 108 18-prs. and 36 4.5 howitzers while in
addition there were 8 modern mountain howitzers and guns. There was not
an artillery weapon in the whole Army Corps that was not efficient and
up-to-date, while immediately behind the front line existed perfectly
organized workshops capable of executing any repairs. There was ample
provision of spare guns, carriages and parts, and an abundance of trench
mortars which, though they would have changed the whole face of the
Peninsula conflict, could not be used in Palestine owing to the breadth
of No Man's Land. Ammunition for every nature of gun and howitzer was
pressed upon us in profusion--over a thousand rounds per gun was buried
and concealed near every Battery, while immediately behind the fighting
line huge reserves were available for immediate use if required. At the
advanced railhead, G.H.Q. literally built mountains of ammunition as a
further supply; all this in addition to vast quantities stored in depôts
in Egypt and on the banks of the Suez Canal. So great was the
superabundance of shell, that hundreds of tons were left lying on the
ground after the nine days' Battle at Gaza; which it took months to
remove. At the battle of the 19th September, 1918, in Palestine
conditions were exactly the same. There was an absolute _embarras de
richesse_ of every artillery requisite. This wealth of artillery
material was supported in Palestine by a full complement of artillery,
aeroplanes, pilots and observers, the latter being all thoroughly
trained and efficient. In addition, by a sufficiency of fighting
aeroplanes with most efficient pilots, our artillery were adequately
guarded from sunrise to sunset from any hostile aeroplane observation.
In short, our air supremacy was undisputed and absolutely protected our
own artillery against damage and molestation from the hostile guns. On
the other hand, the enemy's artillery lay at our mercy directly their
gun positions were discovered.
The whole science of artillery and aeroplane co-operation had, of
course, been vastly extended and perfected since Gallipoli days, but the
point I wish to make is this: that in 1917 and 1918 the Palestine Front
was fitted out on the same scale, proportionately, as the Western Front;
whereas in 1915 this was not the case in the Dardanelles as regards
artillery, for instance, only one Division (the 29th) at Helles having
18-pr. guns and the Naval Division having been given no artillery at
all!
To put the matter shortly, whereas at Helles I had under my command no
more than 88 to 95 guns and howitzers of all natures with scarcely any
ammunition or aeroplanes to support four British Divisions; in Palestine
at Gaza I had at least 230 guns and howitzers (one-third of which were
of heavy calibre) with an abundance of ammunition and a sufficiency of
aeroplanes to support the attack of one and a half Divisions, the
remaining one and a half Divisions at Gaza being in reserve. At the
battle of 19th September, 1918, in Palestine I had, to the best of my
recollection, about 360 guns of all calibres to support four Divisions.
The terrible casualties suffered by our Infantry at Helles are well
known, and my feelings as Artillery Commander unable to give them
anything like the support they would have had in France or Flanders may
be guessed. But this was made up to me afterwards when I commanded the
artillery at Gaza, that strong fortress which was captured by the 21st
Army Corps, with certainly under 3,000 casualties and I believe with
under 2,000 killed and wounded. At Gaza the Turks were simply crushed by
our overwhelming artillery, fed from inexhaustible Ordnance parks and
dumps. Before the Infantry attack commenced the position was subjected
to a continuous bombardment night and day for six days and six nights
from every available gun and howitzer. The Infantry then attacked and
took a large portion of the position with a loss of, I believe, under
1,000 men. The Turks counter-attacked, but they melted away under the
tremendous artillery barrage and never attempted another during this
battle. Next night our Infantry tried to extend their conquest but the
Turks had meanwhile brought up an old Gallipoli Division, the 7th, which
held them at bay and inflicted upon them serious losses which, I
believe, increased their casualties to between two and three thousand.
The Corps Commander then decided to let the Infantry stand where they
were, to submit the Turks to a further three days' and three nights'
bombardment, at the end of which our Infantry advanced again only to
find that the Turks were evacuating the whole of the Gaza position.
After the Battle of 19th September, 1918, many Infantry commanders of
Divisions, Brigades and Battalions have told me the Turks appeared
crushed by the terrific artillery bombardment (under cover of which our
men advanced) and offered a resistance which, in comparison with our
experiences of Gallipoli, can only be called feeble.
The cardinal fact that remains in my mind is that in Palestine the 21st
Army Corps always had enough (and more than enough) of every artillery
requisite for whatever number of Divisions the Army Corps was composed
of; whereas, in Gallipoli, the VIIIth Army Corps at Helles, which was
composed of four British Divisions, never had enough Field Artillery or
ammunition to support more than one Division, and never possessed
sufficient heavy artillery to support more than one Infantry Brigade.
The material part of my statement ends here, and it only remains for me
to remind you that all the grievous shortcomings I have exposed were
actually made good by the heroism, devotion and sufferings of the
Officers and men of the Artillery at Helles, both Regular, Territorial,
Australian and New Zealand. Rest was impossible, as no Battery could
ever be withdrawn from the line and all field Batteries were under rifle
fire. If placed outside that range, they were destroyed by flanking fire
from Turkish guns in Asia. No dug-outs were possible, as dug-outs were
understood in France, as there was no timber or roofing for their
construction. All ranks were thus exposed night and day to continuous
fire, and were sometimes killed as they slept in their valises by stray
bullets, thousands of which were fired unaimed every night by the Turks
in the hopes of inflicting casualties; water for drinking and washing
was almost as precious as guns and shells. The joys of a canteen, as was
at that time supplied by the War Office to our Army in France, were
unknown; bare rations washed down by a limited allowance of water were
our only form of food; everyone suffered more or less from dysentery,
spread by the millions of flies which settled on every mouthful we ate
and made life almost insupportable by day. No Man's Land was one vast
litter of unburied corpses. Yet no man's spirit ever wavered and all
ranks remained as bright, as hopeful and as cheerful as on the day of
the first great landing. If shells were scarce, complaints were
non-existent; all were upheld by the wonderful religion of
self-sacrifice. It will ever remain my greatest pride that I had the
astonishing good fortune to be associated with such a body of officers
and men; to them I owe a debt of gratitude that is beyond redemption,
and to them alone is due the credit for any success which the artillery
at Helles may have attained in what was one of England's greatest
tragedies, but was also one of England's greatest glories.
APPENDIX II
DARDANELLES EXPEDITION
NOTES BY LIEUT.-COLONEL CHARLES ROSENTHAL,[17] COMMANDING 3RD
AUSTRALIAN FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, 1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,
RELATING TO ARTILLERY AT ANZAC, FROM 25TH APRIL TO 25TH AUGUST,
1915. (_Compiled from personal diary._)
During the early hours of 25th April, 1915, the 3rd Australian Infantry
Brigade landed on Gallipoli Peninsula, close to Gaba Tepe, at a point
now known as Anzac Beach, followed by other troops of 1st Australian
Division and Australian and New Zealand Division.
Arrangements had been made for artillery to land about 10 a.m. on the
same morning, but owing to delays in disembarkation of Infantry, and
enemy shelling of transports necessitating ships temporarily leaving
their allotted anchorage, it was after mid-day before the vessels
carrying guns were actually in correct position for disembarkation.
I did not wait for the naval boats to come alongside, but after issuing
necessary instructions to Battery Commanders concerning the landing of
the guns, I disembarked in a ship's boat manned by a volunteer crew from
my Brigade Ammunition Column, accompanied by two officers and sixteen
men of my Headquarters' Staff.
Immediately on landing I reported to my C.R.A., and was by him informed
that the Divisional Commander had decided no artillery should land
during the day. This decision absolutely nonplussed me, and on asking
the reason I was informed the position was not considered sufficiently
secure to ensure the safety of guns, if emplaced. With this decision I
did not agree and urged, without result, that the safety of guns was
surely secondary to the proper supporting of the troops already
committed.
In view of the above decision instructions were at once sent off to the
ships ordering Colonel Johnstone, Commanding 2nd A.F.A. Brigade, and
Major Hughes, acting for me in command of 3rd A.F.A. Brigade, to defer
disembarkation of guns. Colonel Johnstone, however, by this time had one
18-pr. gun well on the way to the shore. Permission was given for it to
be landed and it was brought into action close to the beach against guns
at Gaba Tepe, undoubtedly temporarily silencing them.
In the meantime the Indian Mountain Battery attached to 1st Australian
Division, which had landed early in the day, was in action doing
splendid work though suffering severe casualties.
By the order of Colonel White, G.S.O. (1), 1st Australian Division, I
spent the afternoon in collecting Infantry stragglers and getting them
forward again to the firing line. At 5 p.m. I reported completion of
this task and then proceeded to thoroughly reconnoitre the right flank,
overlooking Gaba Tepe, which had seemed to me, from observations made
from the ship, to be a suitable area for emplacing of guns.
I returned to Divisional Headquarters just before dark, and informed the
C.R.A. and Divisional Commander that I had found suitable places for
batteries and could use them effectively.
I had in my reconnaissance conferred with three Battalion Commanders
(one of whom was killed a couple of days later), who were delighted to
hear that the artillery they were so anxiously waiting for was to come
up in support.
After much discussion and persuasion the Divisional Commander agreed to
allow me to land two of my three 18-pr. batteries. This approval was
shortly afterwards altered to permission to land two guns only, and
finally all approval was cancelled, though no information of these
decisions officially reached me.
During the night, in anticipation of early arrival of guns, my
Headquarters personnel worked untiringly in preparing a track from the
beach to the selected sites for guns, and it was not till 5.30 a.m. on
26th that I learned approval to land guns had been cancelled overnight.
During the morning of 26th April one gun of 1st Battery, 1st Brigade,
and one gun of 4th Battery, 2nd Brigade, were landed, hauled up the
steep hill to their positions, and came into action on the extreme right
of ridge overlooking Gaba Tepe.
Later in the day the 7th Battery of my Brigade came into action on the
same ridge and the single guns of 1st and 4th Batteries were withdrawn
for return to their respective Brigades.
During the afternoon there also came ashore, apparently without order,
two guns of 3rd Battery, 1st Brigade, and 8th Battery, 3rd Brigade, but
were returned to their respective ships by the C.R.A.
My guns were placed absolutely in the Infantry front trenches, on the
sky line, no troops of any kind being in advance of them. It would have
been quite useless to take up positions behind the Infantry line in the
normal way, owing to the configuration of the ground, for in such cases
the lowest range at which the crest could be cleared was 3,000 yards,
while our targets were from 500 to 1,000 yards distant. Indeed at night,
shrapnel shell with fuse set at zero was frequently used.
Each gun fired during the 26th about 400 rounds, over open sights, and
caused very heavy casualties to the enemy.
The whole battery covered a front of 187°, necessitating each gun being
personally controlled by an officer and each with its own particular arc
of fire.
The supply of ammunition was very difficult. It had to be delivered by
hand to the guns over a bullet-swept area, the distance from the beach
to the guns being about half a mile, while in this distance the hills
rose 400 feet.
By the afternoon of the 3rd May, two guns of 8th Battery, 3rd Brigade,
were in action, and 2nd Brigade also had guns in position on the left
flank of 1st Australian Divisional Front.
The Australian and New Zealand Division also had 18-prs. in action
together with two 4.5-inch Howitzer Batteries, the latter being the only
howitzers available up to this time at Anzac.
I was wounded on 5th May, evacuated to Cairo, and did not rejoin my
command at Anzac till 26th May. During this interval gun positions, as
well as Infantry trenches, had been much improved, and the enemy country
in our immediate front which, when I left on 5th May, gave no signs of
life, was now well traversed by trenches.
I found in my sector that the guns of my Brigade were now all in action,
and the remainder of the artillery of the Division was also emplaced.
About this time 6-inch howitzers were made available and later emplaced,
one for left sector, one for the centre, and one for the right, but with
very limited quantities of ammunition. Another 6-inch howitzer was
landed on 17th June.
I had made continual urgent representations for two 4.7-inch guns for
right flank to deal with innumerable targets beyond the range of
18-prs., but it was not till 11th July that one very old and much worn
gun arrived, and was placed in position on right flank, firing its first
round on 26th July.
On 24th June a Scottish Territorial Howitzer Battery (the 5th Battery,
City of Glasgow Lowland Howitzer Brigade) arrived and came under my
command.
On 14th July a heavy battery was organized for right flank, consisting
of the two 6-inch howitzers and the 4.7-inch gun before mentioned, but
ammunition was still very scarce.
On 15th July a 5-inch Howitzer Brigade under Colonel Hope Johnstone
commenced to arrive and was complete in position by 18th July.
On 28th July the 4th Battery of Lowland Brigade arrived.
About this time some alterations were made in artillery dispositions and
grouping in preparation for impending battle at Suvla Bay and Lone Pine,
commencing on 6th August, and on 30th July the artillery of right sector
under my command was as follows:--
3rd A.F.A. Brigade (18-prs.).
Heavy Battery (two 6-inch howitzers and one 4.7-inch gun).
2 Mountain Guns.
Two 5-inch Howitzer Batteries, Lowland Brigade.
One 5-inch Howitzer Battery, 69th Brigade.
When leaving Australia in 1914 I had urged that a battery of 5-inch
howitzers (which I commanded prior to the outbreak of war), together
with stocks of ammunition held by Australia, should accompany 1st
Australian Division. This was not approved. On arrival at Gallipoli
Peninsula, when the need for howitzers was at once apparent, I again
re-opened the question, particularly on the 29th May, when the C.R.A.
agreed to press for them to be sent forward. The Divisional Commander,
on 25th June, cabled Australia definitely asking for this battery, which
was at once forwarded, but arrived at the Peninsula too late to be of
any service.
Two Australian Field Batteries (together with a Brigade of Infantry)
were transferred to Cape Helles on 5th May and did not rejoin the
Australian Division at Anzac till 18th August.
With the limited number of guns available it was exceedingly important
that transfers might be made very rapidly from one part of our front to
another, and on 2nd June I put forward a proposal which was approved
immediately to make a road along the entire front just behind the crest
on which infantry trenches were sited. This road was completed in about
two weeks and was a great boon alike to gunners and Infantry.
Up to 24th August no anti-aircraft guns had been provided, but specially
constructed emplacements had been made for 18-prs. to be used against
aircraft, and though never successful in bringing down an enemy 'plane
they certainly made good enough shooting to cause enemy aviators to
treat them with respect. About 20th August three 3-pr. Hotchkiss arrived
for anti-aircraft purposes. They were of obsolete pattern and had been
manufactured for the Japanese Government many years before. In fact the
only range tables provided were printed in Japanese, but thanks to the
fact that one of my Sergeants (who was a Master Mariner) spoke Japanese,
we succeeded in preparing serviceable range tables.
Two Japanese trench mortars were also used from Infantry trenches with
excellent effect, but owing to ammunition supply becoming soon exhausted
and no fresh supplies being available they had to be discarded. A good
supply of these weapons, together with full supplies of ammunition,
would have been invaluable in bombarding enemy front line trenches.
The ammunition supply at all times up to the operation of 6th August was
a difficult problem. Frequently we had to be rationed to a very small
allowance per battery per day, and the guns of the heavy battery were
for some time not permitted to fire more than two rounds per day and
then only by special permission of the C.R.A.
On 20th June I was first informed that H.E. for 18-pr. was to be
supplied, and shortly afterwards a small supply for experiment was
landed at Anzac. I think I am right in saying my share was 15 rounds per
battery.
On 2nd August our first supply of H.E. arrived, but only 150 rounds per
battery.
During the first few months of the campaign, when our stocks of
ammunition were desperately low, our guns and gunners had to suffer
considerable casualties without being able to effectively reply.
Our batteries were of necessity in many cases under direct observation
of the enemy, and only the splendid work of the detachments in building
earthworks for their protection made it possible to carry on.
Under the protection of the banks of a small ravine near the beach, our
artificers established a workshop, and the extraordinary ingenuity and
skill displayed in the repairing and replacing of damaged guns earned
for the artificers our most grateful appreciation and thanks.
On 25th August I was evacuated suffering from enteric.
These notes only apply to the right sector, which I commanded.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 17: Now Major-General Sir Charles Rosenthal, K.C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O.--IAN H. 1920.]
APPENDIX III
The Dispatch of a Commander-in-Chief is not a technical document. In it
the situation should be set forth, as briefly and clearly as may be,
together with a few words indicative of the plan of G.H.Q. for coping
with it. After that comes a narrative which ends with thanks to those
individuals and units who have earned them. A Dispatch should be so
written that civilians can follow the facts stated without trouble: it
should not be too technical. But when the Military Colleges and
Academies at Camberley, Duntroon, Kingston, West Point and in the
European and Japanese capitals set to work in a scientific spirit to
apportion praise or blame they are more influenced by the actual
instructions and orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief _before and
during the battle_, than by any after-the-event stories of what
happened. They are glad to know the intentions of the Commander, but his
instructions i.e., the actual steps he took to give practical effect to
those intentions, are what really interest them.
When I came to write my Dispatch of the 11th December, so much about the
actual course of events at Suvla was still obscure, that it had become
desirable either to write the narrative in a more technical form than
was customary or else to publish my actual instructions simultaneously
with the Dispatch. I chose the latter course. The authorities had raised
objections to several passages in the Dispatch, and in every case but
one, where they had wished me to add something which was not, in my
opinion, correct, I had met them. No objection had been raised to the
inclusion of my instructions. At 9 p.m. on the night of the 6th January
(the Dispatch being due to appear next morning) I received a letter by
Special Messenger from the War Office telling me the Press Bureau were
wiring to all those to whom the Dispatch had been issued to suppress the
instructions!
Whatever the reason of this action may have been, its result was clear
enough: my Dispatch was eviscerated at the very moment it was stepping
on to the platform. Had I known that these instructions, now given, were
to have been cut out, my Dispatch would have been differently written.
IAN H., 1920.
SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS.
TO VICE-ADMIRAL, COMMANDING
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON,
_17th July, 1915._
SIR,--I have the honour to forward a series of tables drawn up to show
in detail the men, animals, vehicles, stores, etc., which it will be
required to land in connection with the forthcoming operations. I shall
be grateful if you will let me know as early as possible if you consider
that any part of the programme indicated presents especially serious
difficulties or is likely to require modification.
In informing me of the results of your consideration, I shall be obliged
if you will let me know what craft you intend to use in carrying out the
disembarkations referred to in tables B, C, D and E, so that detailed
arrangements with regard to embarkation and to the allocation of troops,
etc., to boats may be prepared.
2. Immediately after the disembarkation of the details referred to in
the attached tables it will be necessary, if the operations are
successful, to land 5,000 to 7,000 horses in order to render the force
sufficiently mobile to carry the operations to a conclusion. Details as
to disembarkation of these horses will be forwarded to you later. In the
meantime the horses will be collected at Alexandria, and should
subsequently be brought up to Mudros or Imbros, to begin arriving on
August 6th.
It will also be necessary to land the remaining portions of the units
referred to in the tables (first line transport, etc.), and, further,
the remaining units of the formations to which they belong. In this
latter category will be included three batteries of heavy artillery with
mechanical transport. It will not be required to land any of the above
until after August 7th, and details as to numbers, order of
disembarkation, etc., will be forwarded to you later.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(_Signed_) IAN HAMILTON,
_General, Commanding_
_Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._
* * * * *
TABLE A.
TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND GRADUALLY
AT ANZAC COVE BEFORE THE MORNING OF THE 3RD OF AUGUST. IT WILL BE
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THESE DISEMBARKATIONS BY NIGHT, AND THE MOVEMENTS
CAN BEGIN AS SOON AS IT IS CONVENIENT TO THE NAVAL TRANSPORT
AUTHORITIES.
+------------------------+------------+--------+----------+
Unit. | From | To |Personnel.|
+------------------------+------------+--------+----------+
69th Howitzer Bde. |Mudros |Anzac | 312 |
R.F.A. | |Cove | |
| | | |
1/3rd City of Glasgow 5" | Helles |Anzac | 78 |
| | | |
10th Heavy Battery |On board |Anzac | 11 |
R.G.A. |ship at |Cove | |
|Mudros | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
One F.A. Bde. (11th |On board |Anzac | 33 |
Division, "A" Bde.) |ship at |Cove | |
|Mudros | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
Reinforcements for Units |Alexandria |Anzac | 7,000 |
of A.N.Z.A.C. | |Cove | to |
| | | 8,000 |
| | | |
Mule Corps |Helles |Anzac | 50 |
| |Cove | |
| | | |
Ammunition Park |Mudros |Anzac | 65 |
| |Cove | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
+------------------------+------------+--------+----------+
+--------------------+--------+------------------------------+--------------
| Vehicles. |Animals.| Stores. | Remarks.
+--------------------+--------+------------------------------+--------------
|16 guns, 16 wagons, | Nil | |
|4 water carts | | |
| | | |
|4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 | Nil | |
|water cart | | |
| | | |
|4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 | Nil | |I.G.C. has
|water cart, 2 | | |already been
|G.S. wagons | | |instructed to
| | | |arrange for
| | | |this move.
| | | |
|16 guns, 32 wagons, | Nil | |I.G.C. has
|telegraph cart, 4 | | |already been
|water carts | | |instructed to
| | | |arrange for
| | | |this move.
| | | |
| Nil | Nil | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Nil | 200 | |By August 1st.
| | | |
| | | |
| Nil | Nil |S.A. Ammn. 5,500,000 rounds |
| | |Mk. VII (_a_) (225 tons), |
| | |760,000 rounds Mk. VI (30 |
| | |tons) |
| | |Gun Ammunition (_b_) 10 pr. |
| | |2,700 (19 tons), 18 pr. 5,500 |
| | |(70 tons), 4.5" How. 1,600 |
| | |(45 tons), 5" How. 10,000 |
| | |(330 tons), 6" How. 1,200 |
| | |(70 tons), 60 pr. 1,000 (30 |
| | |tons) |
+--------------------+--------+------------------------------+---------------
_a_ If possible, an additional 3,000,000 S.A.A. should be
landed, so that half the reserve for the whole Northern Force may be ashore
before operations begin (see Table "C" Remarks).
_b_ If possible, the following additional gun ammunition should
also be landed, so that the full reserve for the whole Northern Force may be
ashore before operations begin:--
10 pr. 3,000 rounds}
18 pr. 10,000 rounds} See Table "C" Remarks.
6" Howitzer 1,000 rounds}
TABLE B.
TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT ANZAC
COVE ON THE NIGHTS OF AUGUST 3RD/4TH, AUGUST 4TH/5TH AND AUGUST 5TH/6TH.
---------------------+------+-------+----------+---------+---------------------
Unit. | From.| Date. |Personnel.|Vehicles.| Remarks.
---------------------+------+-------+----------+---------+---------------------
6 Battalions (_a_), |Mudros|Night, | 4,650 | Nil |Machine guns and
13th Division | |August | | |other equipment
| |3rd/4th| | |carried by hand.
| | | | |
Bearer Sub-Division, |Mudros|Night, | 100 | Nil | --
personnel Anzac | |August | | |
| |3rd/4th| | |
| | | | |
7 Battalions (_a_), |Mudros|Night, | 5,425 | Nil |Machine guns and
13th Division | |August | | |other equipment
| |4th/5th| | |carried by hand.
| | | | |
Bearer Sub-Division, |Mudros|Night, | 125 | Nil | --
1 Field Ambulance, | |August | | |
13th Division | |4th/5th| | |
| | | | |
4 Battalions, 10th |Mudros|Night, | 3,100 | Nil |Machine guns and
Division | |August | | |other equipment
| |5th/6th| | |carried by hand.
| | | | |
29th Indian Brigade |Imbros|Night, | 2,000 | Nil | Ditto.
and Field Ambulance | |August | | |
| |5th/6th| | |
| | | | |
Bearer Sub-Divisions,|Mudros|Night, | 255 | Nil | --
2 Field Ambulance, | |August | | |
13th Division | |5th/6th| | |
| | | | |
3 Field Companies |Mudros|Night, | 525 | Nil |Machine guns and
R.E. (_a_), 13th | |August | | |other equipment
Division | |5th/6th| | |carried by hand. All
| | | | |tools carried by hand.
---------------------+------+-------+----------+---------+---------------------
_a_ These units to move from Helles to Mudros as follows:--
1 Brigade } Night,
1 Field Company} 28th/29th July.
1 Brigade } Night,
1 Field Company} 29th/30th July.
1 Brigade } Night,
1 Field Company} 30/31st July.
TABLE C.
TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT NEW
BEACH DURING THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 6TH/7TH, BEGINNING ONE HOUR AFTER DARK
(9.30 P.M.). ALL TROOPS WILL COME FROM IMBROS, BUT HORSES WILL COME
DIRECT EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE STATED.
-----------------+----------+-------+---------------+--------------------------
Unit. |Personnel.|Horses.| Vehicles. | Remarks.
-----------------+----------+-------+---------------+--------------------------
1 Inf. Bde. and | 3,050 | 36 | Nil |Personnel only to be
Sig. Sec.(_a_) | | | |disembarked in the order
| | | |shown. Animals of Mountain
1 Bearer Sub-Div.| 40 | Nil | Nil |Batteries as soon as there
| | | |is sufficient light,
| | | |followed by horses of one
1 Inf. Bde. and | 3,065 | 36 | Nil |18-pr. Battery (82) and of
Sig. Sec. and 1 | | | |H.Q. F.A. Brigade (10).
W/T Station | | | |Animals of remaining units
| | | |to follow in the order
1 Bearer Sub-Div.| 40 | Nil | Nil |shown. Supplies and forage
| | | |for 7 days for these
Field Co. R.E. | 175 | 16 |4 tool carts |troops and animals to be
| | | |dumped on the beach as
2 Mountain Batts.| 100 | 80 | Nil |soon as possible, will
(_b_) | | | |amount to about 250 tons.
| | | |S.A.A. 4,000,000 will also
Div. H.Q. and | 125 | 28 |2 cable wagons,|have to be landed besides
Sig. Co. | | |1 water cart, |that carried by the
| | |2 limbd. R.E. |troops, say, 150 tons.
| | |wagons |
| | | |
1 Inf. Bde. and | 3,840 | 44 | Nil |Artillery reserve
Pioneer Bn. and | | | |ammunition will also be
Sig. Sec. and 1 | | | |required as follows:--
W/T Station | | | |To come by trawler from
| | | |Mudros
7 Bearer Sub-Divs| 300 | Nil | Nil | 10 pr. 3,000 rds. (20 tons)
| | | | 18 pr. 10,000 rds. (130 tons)
| | | | 60 pr. 1,000 rds. (30 tons)
2 Platoons Div. | 62 | Nil |62 bicycles |(See notes to Table A.) If
Cycl. Co. | | | |reserve S.A.A. and gun
| | | |ammunition can be put
2 Field Cos. R.E.| 350 | 32 |8 tool carts |ashore at Anzac Cove
| | | |before operations begin
1 F.A. Bde. ("L" | 550 | 251 |16 guns, 44 |this will also be done.
Bde.) (_c_) | | |wagons, 1 |But the above-mentioned
| | |telephone |reserves must also be
| | |wagon, 5 water |landed at New Beach in
| | |carts |case the congestion on the
| | | |road from Anzac makes its
| | | |forwarding a matter of
| | | |great difficulty.
Ammn. Park | 65 | Nil | Nil |
Personnel (11 | | | |
Div.) | | | |
| | | |
9 Tent Sub.-Divs.| 350 |84 |30 ambulance |
| |horses |wagons, 9 water|
| |or |carts, 3 |
| |144 |Maltese carts |
| |mules | |
| | | |
4 Casualty | 360 | Nil | Nil |
Clearing Stations| | | |
| | | |
Bde. Ammn. Col. | 60 | 62 |8 ammunition |
| | |wagons, 1 water|
| | |cart, 4 S.A.A. |
| | |wagons |
2 Bns. for Beach | 1,000 | Nil | Nil |
Parties | | | |
| | | |
Mule Corps | 150 | 300 |150 mule carts |
| | | |
Wireless Sec. | 18 | 16 |2 two-horse |
| | |vehicles |
-----------------+----------+-------+---------------+--------------------------
_a_ Helles to Imbros, night July 31st/August 1st.
_b_ Helles to Imbros, night August 1st/2nd.
_c_ Animals in remarks columns (82 and 10) come from Imbros, remainder
from Mudros in horse-ships.
TABLE D.
TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT ANZAC COVE
BEGINNING AT DAWN AUGUST 7TH.
ORDER OF LANDING AS SHOWN. ALL THESE TROOPS WILL COME FROM MUDROS.
----------------------------+----------+-------+---------+---------------------
Unit. |Personnel.|Horses.|Vehicles.| Remarks.
----------------------------+----------+-------+---------+---------------------
Medical personnel, tent sub-| 900 | Nil | Nil |All spare stretchers
divisions A. and A.N.Z.A.C. | | | |to be carried by
Field Ambulance | | | |hand.
| | | |
Bearer Sub-Divisions of 1 | 125 | Nil | Nil |
Field Ambulance, 10th Div | | | |
| | | |
One 18-pr. Battery and H.Q. | 120 | 92 | Nil |
F.A. Bde. ("A" Bde.) | | | |
| | | |
10th Heavy Battery R.G.A. | 110 | 70 | Nil |
| | | |
Three 18-pr. Batteries ("A" | 300 | 246 | Nil |Guns and personnel
Brigade) | | | |already ashore, (See
| | | |Tables A and B.)
Mules of Mule Corps | * | 400 | Nil |* Sufficient personnel
| | | |to look after mules.
----------------------------+----------+-------+---------+---------------------
TABLE E.
TABLE SHOWING UNITS TO BE READY TO LAND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THOSE SHOWN IN
TABLES A, B, C AND D. UNITS WILL PROBABLY BE REQUIRED IN THE ORDER SHOWN EITHER
AT NEW BEACH OR ANZAC COVE AS CIRCUMSTANCES MAY DICTATE.
-----------------+------+----------+--------+---------------+------------------
Unit. | From |Personnel.|Animals.| Vehicles. |Remarks.
-----------------+------+----------+--------+---------------+------------------
Divl. H.Q. 10th |Mudros| 125 | 28 |2 limbered R.E.|
Divn. | | | |wagons, 1 water|
| | | |cart, 2 cable |
| | | |wagons |
| | | | |
3 Battalions 10th|Mudros| 2,325 | 40 |6 water carts |S.A.A. 2,600,000
Divn. | | | | |rounds besides
| | | | |that carried on the
| | | | |men.
| | | | |
6 Battalions 10th|Port | 4,650 | 76 |12 water carts |
Divn. |Iero | | | |
| | | | |
H.Q. Divl. R.E. |Mudros| 525 | 30 |12 tool carts, |
| | | |3 water carts |
| | | | |
3 Field Cos. R.E.| -- | -- | -- | -- |
10th Division | | | | |
| | | | |
Bearer Sub- |Mudros| 250 | -- | -- |
Divisions of 2 | | | | |
Field Ambulances,| | | | |
10th Divn. | | | | |
| | | | |
15th Heavy |On | 121 | 70 |4 guns, 4 |
Baattery R.G.A. |board | | |wagons, 1 water|
|ship--| | |cart, 2 G.S. |
|Mudros| | |wagons |
| | | | |
Tent Sub-Division|Mudros| 350 |54 |15 ambulance |
of 10th Divn. | | |horses |wagons, 12 |
| | |or 84 |carts |
| | |mules | |
| | | | |
Mule Corps |Mudros| 150 | 300 |150 carts |
-----------------+------+----------+--------+---------------+------------------
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.
With reference to your G.288 of 15th July, the Navy is being asked to
provide transport for the following ammunition to be landed at Anzac by
the 3rd August:--
* * * * *
_For A. and N.Z.A.C._--Sufficient S.A.A. to bring the amount on shore up
to 500 rounds per rifle and 27,500 per machine-gun.
_For other Troops._--300 rounds per rifle and 24,000 rounds per
machine-gun (in addition to what the troops will carry on landing).
These will come to 10,000,000 rounds in all, and arrangements are being
made to begin landing this ammunition as soon as possible.
2. The following artillery ammunition will also have to be gradually
landed and stored, and should all be ashore, if possible, by August
3rd:--
10 pr. 5,700 rounds
18 pr. (probably 15 per cent. H.E.) 15,500 "
4.5-in. Howitzer probably half H.E. 1,600 "
5-in. Howitzer majority H.E. 10,000 "
6-in. Howitzer majority H.E. 1,200 "
60 pr. probably two-thirds H.E. 1,000 "
All of this ammunition is not yet arrived, and the proportion of H.E.
shell is not yet ascertainable from England. The arrangements suggested
in your paragraph 2 (iii.) of your letter are noted, and will be
followed as far as possible.
3. With regard to the marking of ammunition-boxes, the necessary
arrangements are being prepared. You will be informed of the
arrangements and of the system of marking in due course.
Consignments of Mark VI. and Mark VII. will be sent separately as you
suggest.
4. The above figures do not include the periodical replenishment
referred to in paragraph 2 (iv.) of your letter. Dispatch of
consignments on this account and consignments for the reserve will be
notified to you separately.
(_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
_Major-General, C.G.S.,_
_Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._
Enclosed a copy of tables forwarded to Vice-Admiral, showing troops,
animals, stores, etc., which the Navy is being asked to land at Anzac.
_22nd July, 1915._
GENERAL OFFICES COMMANDING,
9TH CORPS.
The General Commanding wishes me to send you the following outline of
his plans for the next general attack, for the exclusive information of
yourself, your Divisional Generals, and such Officers of your Corps
Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters as you may consider it
necessary to take into your confidence. I am to add that it is Sir Ian's
wish that as few officers as possible should be made acquainted with it.
2. The general plan is, while holding as many of the enemy as possible
in the southern theatre, to throw the weight of our attack on the
Turkish forces now opposite the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
It is hoped, by means of an attack on the front and right flank of these
forces, to deal them a crushing blow, and to drive the remnants south
towards Kilid Bahr. It will then be the object of the General Commanding
to seize a position across the peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos with a
protected line of supply from Suvla Bay.
3. The strength of the enemy north of Kilid Bahr at the present time is
about 30,000 men. Of these some 12,000 are permanently maintained in the
trenches opposite the Anzac position, and the majority of the remainder
are held in reserve at Boghali, Kojadere and Eski-Keui. It is believed
that there are about three battalions in the Anafarta villages, a
battalion at Ismail Oglu Tepe (New map 1/20,000), a battalion near
Yilghin Burnu, and small parties of outposts at Lala Baba (Sq. 104.L.)
and Ghazi Baba (Sq. 106.N.). The hills due east of Suvla Bay towards Aji
Liman are believed to be held only by a few Gendarmerie, but
information on this point is at present not precise. The hills near
Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain one 4.7-in. gun,
one 9.2-in. gun, and three field guns, protected by wire entanglements
and infantry trenches, but it is believed that the main defences are
against attack from the south or west, and that there is no wire on the
northern slopes of the hills; also that the guns can only be fired in a
southerly direction.
4. The success of the plan outlined in paragraph 2 will depend on two
main factors:--
(a) The capture of Hill 305 (Sq. 93.W.).
(b) The capture and retention of Suvla Bay as a base
of operations for the northern army.
5. The operations from within the present Anzac position against the
enemy on Hill 305 will be carried out by the Australian and New Zealand
Corps, temporarily reinforced by the following units of the 9th Army
Corps:--
13th Division (less 66th, 67th and 68th Brigades, R.F.A.).
29th Infantry Brigade (10th Division).
29th Indian Brigade.
69th Howitzer Brigade, R.F.A.
6. The landing near Suvla will be entrusted to you, and you will have at
your disposal:--
11th Division.
10th Division (less 29th Brigade).
Highland Mountain Artillery Brigade.
1st/4th Lowland Howitzer Brigade.
The disembarkation of your command, which may be expected to be opposed,
though not in great strength, will be after dark at a point immediately
south of Lala Baba. The first troops to disembark will be the 11th
Division, which will have been concentrated at Imbros previously to the
attack, and will be brought across under cover of darkness in destroyers
and motor-lighters. It is expected that approximately 4,000 men will be
disembarked simultaneously, and that three infantry brigades and the
mountain artillery brigade will be ashore before daylight.
Your first objectives will be the high ground at Lala Baba and Ghazi
Baba, and the hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe. It will
also be necessary to send a small force to secure a footing on the hills
due east of Suvla Bay. It is of first importance that Yilghin Burnu and
Ismail Oglu Tepe should be captured by a coup-de-main before daylight in
order to prevent the guns which they contain being used against our
troops on Hill 305 and to safeguard our hold on Suvla Bay. It is hoped
that one division will be sufficient for the attainment of these
objectives.
Your subsequent moves will depend on circumstances which cannot at
present be gauged, but it is hoped that the remainder of your force will
be available on the morning of the 7th August to advance on Biyuk
Anafarta with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of Hill 305 so
as to assist General Birdwood's attack.
7. The operations from within the present Anzac position will begin
during the day immediately preceding your disembarkation (the
reinforcements for General Birdwood's force having been dribbled ashore
in detachments at Anzac Cove on the three previous nights). The
operations will begin with a determined attack on the Turkish left
centre, Lonesome Pine and Johnston's Jolly (see enlarged map of Anzac
position), with the object of attracting the enemy's reserves to this
portion of the line. The Turks have for long been apprehensive of our
landing in the neighbourhood of Gaba Tepe, and it is hoped that an
attack in force in this quarter will confirm their apprehensions. At
nightfall the Turkish outposts on the extreme right of the enemy's line
will be rushed, and a force of 20,000 men will advance in three or more
columns up the ravines running down from Chunuk Bair. This advance,
which will begin about the same time as your first troops reach the
shore, will be so timed as to reach the summit of the main ridge near
Chunuk Bair about 2.30 a.m. (soon after moon-rise).
Latest photographs show that the Turkish trenches on this ridge do not
extend further north than Chunuk Bair, and it is unlikely that the
higher portions of the ridge are held in great strength.
As soon as a lodgement has been effected on this ridge a portion of the
attacking force will be left to consolidate the position gained and the
remainder will advance south-west against the enemy's trenches near Baby
700, which will be attacked simultaneously by a special detachment from
within the Anzac position.
An advance by your force from the east will, as already indicated in
paragraph 6, be of great assistance in the event of this attack being
checked.
8. The landing of sufficient transport to secure the mobility of your
force will be a matter of considerable difficulty. No animals or
vehicles of any kind will be able to land in the first instance, and
machine-guns, tools and necessary medical and signalling equipment must
be carried by hand. All men will land with two iron rations (one day's
meat ration only is advised); infantry will carry 200 rounds S.A.A. and
machine-gun sections 3,500 rounds in belt boxes. Packs and greatcoats
will not be taken ashore. Before dawn it is hoped to land enough horses
to secure the mobility of the mountain artillery brigade and one battery
R.F.A., and it is hoped that within the first 24 hours the
disembarkation of all the personnel, horses and vehicles enumerated in
the attached table will be complete.
One brigade R.F.A. 11th Division, 1/4th Lowland 5th Howitzer Brigade
(two batteries) and the 10th Heavy Battery, will be landed at Anzac
before the operations commence, and their personnel and horses will
disembark on the morning following your disembarkation, and will then be
directed along the beach to join your command.
Water is plentiful throughout the Anafarta Valley, but pending the
disembarkation of water carts a number of mules with special 8-gallon
water bags will be attached to the units of your command.
(_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
_Major-General, C.G.S._,
_Mediterranean Expeditionary Force_.
P.S.--This letter is never to be out of an officer's possession, and if,
as is probable, you require to send it to your Brig.-Gen. G.S., it must
be sent to Mudros in charge of an officer.
TABLE.
|Animals. | Vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
11TH DIVISION.
Divl. H.Q. and Signal Co. 28 1 cart, 2 cable wagons.
3 Infantry Brigades 108 Nil.
Pioneer Battalion 8 Nil.
2 F.A. Brigades 506 32 guns, 88 wagons, 2
telegraph wagons,
10 carts.
1 Heavy Battery R.G.A. 45 4 guns, 4 wagons, 2
G.S. wagons, 1 cart.
3 Field Coys. R.E. 48 12 tool carts.
2 Platoons Divl. Cyclist Co. Nil 62 bicycles.
3 Field Ambulances 144 30 ambulances, 12 carts.
10TH DIVISION.
Divl. H.Q. and Signal Co. } -- Transport on
1-1/2 Infantry Brigades } approximately the same
Pioneer Battalion } scale
3 Field Cos. R.E. } as that for 11th
3 Field Ambulances } Division.
29th Indian Brigade and Indian Field Ambulance.
2 Mountain Batteries (80 mules).
2 Battalions (of 500 men each) for Beach parties.
Mule Corps with 300 mules and 150 carts.
3 Casualty Clearing Stations.
Organization Orders for Troops Landing at Anzac.
1. Troops landing at Anzac are to land equipped as follows:
* * * * *
F.S. equipment, including respirator;
Pack and waterproof sheet;
No blanket.
Officers' kit reduced to what they can carry.
No transport of any kind will be available to move baggage or equipment.
Ammunition S.A.A. 200 rounds per rifle or person; 3,500 rounds per
machine-gun in belt boxes.
No regimental reserve S.A.A.
Gun, limbers and wagons filled with fused shell.
Water bottles--filled.
Rations--iron rations one day meat and biscuit, two days' groceries.
Sufficient to provide breakfasts.
(Fuel will be issued on shore.)
Tools--infantry. Regimental reserve distributed to individuals and
carried on person; Brigade reserve entrenching tools distributed to
units, by them to individuals and carried on person.
Engineers--tools for road making and entrenching work--carried on
person.
Other arms--usual allotment.
Signal company cable and equipment usually carried in carts to be
transferred to barrows.
Ambulances--all available stretchers and equipment of dressing stations
only. Tent sub-divisions in readiness to rejoin early.
A.S.C.--Small allowance of distributing equipment, to be brought by
advance parties of S. and T. personnel.
Establishments.
2. No horses, attendants or drivers are to land. Brigade Sections of
Signal Companies are to land with the brigades they serve.
Tent sub-divisions of field ambulances are not to land.
Equipment carried in technical vehicles is to be transferred to vehicles
which can be hand-propelled or else carried on person.
3. Troops should disembark into lighters, etc., in complete units,
companies, platoons, and so on, unless much space is sacrificed in so
doing.
4. All troops should land wearing two white 6-inch armlets and a white
patch on back of right shoulder.
5. No lights or noise are to be permitted while disembarking; troops
will move into the lighters or horseboats as quickly as possible.
6. On disembarking troops will be met by staff officers and guides, and
will be marched off direct to the ground allotted to them--in no case
more than 1,200 yards from the beach. All kit brought must be removed by
the troops, and must be taken out of the lighters at the same time as
the troops leave.
Special parties to assist with the machine-gun and other loads are to be
detailed in the load of each lighter.
7. No lights or talking are permitted on the beach or till the troops
reach their allotted area. Fires are not to be lit in any area till 4.15
a.m., and must be extinguished by 8 p.m. Green wood is not to be used;
the smoke it causes will draw shell fire.
8. No troops are to leave the area allotted to them between 4 a.m. and 8
p.m. except on special duty with the authority of the Brigade Commander.
Piquets will be placed under area arrangements at intervals round the
area to prevent men straying independently.
9. Troops may be exposed to desultory shelling during the day or night.
This is never aimed, and the best protection against it is to move into
the bottom of the gully in which the troops are bivouacked.
10. Troops are not to use any portion of the iron ration with which they
land. Issues will be made under brigade arrangements of rations and
extras to last the period of their stay.
11. Water is issued on ration at one gallon fresh water per day. This
includes water for all purposes. For bathing, the sea is available, but
may only be visited after 9 p.m. daily.
12. Latrines for immediate use are dug and marked in each area;
additional latrines are to be prepared by units and the strictest
orders issued to prevent fouling the ground. Latrines are to be made
very deep, as space is much restricted.
13. Casualties of any kind after treatment in the field ambulance
affiliated to the brigade will be taken to the casualty clearing station
in Anzac Cove for removal to Hospital Ship.
Urgent cases at any time; others as far as possible between 7.30 and
8.30 p.m. and between 6 and 9 a.m.
14. The following is to be practised by all troops after landing:--
* * * * *
Falling in once during the night in any close formation, and to remain
so closed up for a period of at least half an hour, during which passing
of commands (messages from front to rear and back again and to the
flanks) is to be practised.
The troops must be accustomed to the starlight, which may be expected
during night operations.
15. If aeroplanes pass overhead troops are not to look up, as this will
give away the position of bodies of troops and probably draw shell fire.
16. Troops landing should be provided with Maps 1/20,000 of the area in
which operations are to take place. These maps to be in bulk, and not
issued till after landing.
Maps 1/10,000 of the Anzac area showing roads and bivouacs will be
issued to unit commanders on arrival.
17. Telephone lines will be found laid from Anzac Headquarters to points
suitable for Brigade or higher Headquarters. On arrival brigades will
join up these points to Anzac.
An officer and two orderlies per brigade will also be detailed to remain
at Anzac Headquarters.
Staffs of formations higher than brigades will be located within easy
reach of Anzac Headquarters.
* * * * *
G.S.R. Z. 18/2.
_Instructions for G.O.C. 9th Army Corps._
Reference Sheet Anafarta Sagir Gallipoli Map 1/20,000.
1. The intentions of the General Commanding for the impending
operations, and a rough outline of the task which he has allotted to the
troops under your command, were communicated to you in my G.S.R. Z. 18,
dated 22nd instant.
2. In addition to the information contained in paragraph 3 of the above
quoted letter, small numbers of Turkish mounted troops and Gendarmerie
have been reported in the country north of Anzac, and three guns with
limbers, each drawn by six oxen, have been seen moving into Anafarta
Sagir. An aeroplane photograph has also disclosed the presence of a few
trenches on Lala Baba. A sketch of these trenches, which have apparently
been constructed for some months, is attached. It is believed that the
channel connecting the Salt Lake with Suvla Bay is now dry.