MISUNDERSTANDINGS
_25th August, 1915. Imbros._ Davies left for Helles at mid-day. Was to
have gone with him but heard that Bailloud with Captain Lapruin would
like to see me, so stayed to receive them.
Have got K.'s answer to my cable pointing out the probable results of
his declared intention of sending us no "reinforcements of importance"
during an indeterminate period.
"(No. 7315, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.
Your No. 578. You will, I hope, fully discuss the situation described by
you with Birdwood and the Generals who have just joined you, and, when a
thorough examination on the ground of the whole state of affairs has
been made, give me the opinion at which you arrive.
"It has been a sad disappointment to me that the troops have not been
able to do better, and that the drafts and reinforcements sent out to
you and Egypt, excluding any you have drawn from Egypt, amounting from
6th August to 47,000, have not proved sufficient to enable you to
contemplate holding your positions."
Braithwaite and I have been electrified by this reference to 47,000
drafts and reinforcements: it is so much Greek to us here: had there
been any question of reinforcements coming to us on that scale, my 578
of 23rd August would never have been sent.
On the heels of this has followed another:--
* * * * *
"(No. 7319, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. My
No. 7315. I hope that the result of your deliberations will reach me by
Friday morning, as the decision to be taken is one of considerable
importance."
I have replied off the reel:--
* * * * *
"(No. M.F. 588). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. With
reference to your telegrams Nos. 7315 and 7319. I feel sure you cannot
think I would be capable of sending a telegram of such import as my No.
M.F. 578 without the deepest consideration and sense of my personal
responsibility which remains unaffected by any amount of conferences
with my subordinate commanders. I was careful in this instance, however,
to discuss the situation on the spot with both Corps Commanders
concerned and I then cabled you my considered opinion. I constantly
visit both Suvla and Anzac and have personally thoroughly examined the
state of affairs. In view of your telegram No. 7172, cipher, I do not
understand your allusion to 47,000 drafts and reinforcements from 6th
August as we have not been advised of any such number as 47,000. I felt
bound to lay the case plainly before you as to what might have to be
undertaken, though I do not contemplate giving up any position one hour
before I need. If the present wastage from sickness continues, however,
and if my cadres are allowed to fall below their present attenuated
strength I may be compelled to undertake such a step as I have
indicated."
Bailloud arrived at tea time. Away from Piépape he is another person. At
dinner, he cracked jokes even about serious things like the guns of
Asia.
Brodrick was carried off to the Hospital ship. The doctors think there
should be no real danger. We shall all miss him very much; as an aide he
has been A.1.; sympathetic and thoughtful.
Braithwaite dined to meet Bailloud.
_26th August, 1915._ After clearing my table and taking early lunch,
started off in the _Arno_ with C.G.S., Pollen, Freddie and Val. Sailed
for Suvla and went up straight to see Byng, brought by the whirl of
Fortune's wheel from a French chateau to a dugout. During the two days
he has been here, he has been working very hard. I hope he may not too
regretfully look back towards _la belle France_. Our old "A" Beach was
being briskly shelled as we walked down to our boats. Between Hill 10
and the sea there were salvoes of shrapnel falling and about every
thirty seconds a big fellow, probably a six incher, made a terrible
hullaballoo. The men working at piling up stores "carried on."
[Illustration: GENERAL BAILLOUD _"Exclusive News" phot._]
When we got back to G.H.Q. there was a heavy thunderstorm in progress.
Mail bag closed 9.30.
During our inspection at Suvla this "Personal" from K. to myself has
been deciphered:--
* * * * *
"(No. 7337, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.
Personal. I considered it advisable, that as the decision the Government
may have to come to on your No. 578 is one of grave importance, the
Generals out there should previously fully consider the situation on the
Gallipoli Peninsula; hence my No. 7315. It was intended to obviate any
possibility of overlooking points and in such cases two or more heads
sometimes elucidate matters that might otherwise be missed or not given
due weight to. It was in no way intended thereby to detract from the
importance of your views on the subject or to minimise your personal
responsibility for them.
"I have no idea of the French Generals' views on the matter, and you
were apparently not fully considering the drafts and reinforcements that
were being sent out.
"A detailed telegram is being sent you from the office of the 47,000 men
mentioned in my No. 7315.
"I hope that the return of Younghusband's Brigade from Aden to Egypt
will still further increase these in a day or two (less one battalion).
"But you should look on the forces in Egypt and your own as a whole,
allowing, of course, for the proper defence of Egypt, when you take the
general situation at the Dardanelles into consideration.
"Do you think the Navy could do anything more than they are already
doing to help the situation? I hear it is thought that they could land
heavy naval 6-inch guns on positions such as those in square 92 M and
other points, and might threaten from Aja Liman the main road of Turkish
supplies between Karna Bili and Solvili (by gunfire from ships) and also
bring a heavy and effective shell fire on the Turkish positions at and
behind Anafarta. There is a cabinet to-morrow."
I would much like to sleep over this cable--so plain seemingly; really
so obscure. At face value, how splendidly it simplifies the Dardanelles
problem! Had I been, all along, as this cable seems to make me, the
C.-in-C. of the Eastern Mediterranean with Maxwell administering my
Egyptian Base, then, humanly speaking, this entry would have been dated
from Constantinople. But am I? I can't believe it even now, with the
words before me. Anyway, whether by my own fault or those of others, one
thing is certain, namely, that up to date there has been
misunderstanding. Now, the Cabinet of to-morrow forces me to send a
momentous wire without too much time to think it over. To clear my brain
let me set down the sequence of facts as they have so far appeared to
me:--
* * * * *
Less than a week ago--20th inst.--K. cables me he is sending certain
units to Egypt and certain other units to the Dardanelles. The units and
their ships are named. He says there is going to be a big push in
France and that I must look to these troops, earmarked for the
Dardanelles, plus any I "can obtain from Egypt" to carry on. He winds up
by saying, "It is hoped the troops going to Egypt will enable Maxwell to
send you more fighting men on your demand."
This same assumption that the G.O.C., Egypt, and myself are two equals
each having equal command over his own troops, is fully borne out by
another cable of the 21st August. My cable of 23rd August is based on
these messages; i.e. on the idea that we must carry on here for a good
long time to come with very little to help us. Then comes K.'s of the
25th telling me he is sorry 47,000 drafts and reinforcements he has sent
to Maxwell and myself since 6th August are not going to be enough to
enable me to hold on. But no one can make head or tail of these 47,000
drafts and reinforcements; no one can run them to ground. He has
notified me the units and the ships, but the total coming to Maxwell
_and_ myself don't tot up to that figure, much less the portion of them
detailed for the Dardanelles.[11] Now comes to-day's cable in which
Egypt is spoken of as being mine, and the fatness thereof. Taking this
message _per se_, any one might imagine I could draw any troops I liked
from that country provided that _I_ thought _I_ was leaving enough to
defend the Suez Canal: and, apparently, the 47,000 men are about to
make an effort to materialize inasmuch as we are told that details are
being wired us. Finally, Younghusband's Brigade sails to help us!
_27th August, 1915. Imbros._ As there is a Cabinet to-day I had to get
off my answer last night. In it I have made a desperate effort to
straighten out the tangle:--
* * * * *
"(No. M.F. 589). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. On
returning from Suvla I have just found your No. 7337, cipher. I hope
there may be no misunderstanding as to meaning or intention of my No.
M.F. 578. I asked in my No. M.F. 562 for such drafts and reinforcements
as I considered necessary for the campaign to be brought to a conclusion
before the winter began. You told me in your No. 7172 that you could
spare no more reinforcements beyond those mentioned therein, and that if
I could not achieve success with these I must remain on the defensive
for some considerable time. I explained situation in my No. M.F. 578,
and said that the question was one of arithmetic and measurement. I was
anxious to hold all I had got and to gain more, but I required all my
available force at the present time merely to hold what I had got. I
pointed out that meanwhile a large proportion of my troops were urgently
in need of rest, and sickness was so great that unless reinforcements
were sent out my force would soon be too small for the number of yards
of front to be held. In that case, i.e., if reinforcements could not be
spared, but in that case only, it would be necessary to contract my
line. This welcome news of 47,000 reinforcements, however, alters the
whole situation. Such a number will do much to complete my diminished
cadres, and should materially lessen sick rate by giving more chance of
taking tired troops out of the trenches. Byng can certainly remain where
he is at present, and will even be able to rest some of the tired XXIXth
Division, while the arrival of the Australian Brigade will give General
Birdwood a similar chance of resting some of his troops.
"General Birdwood meanwhile is to make a further advance to-morrow on
the left flank, to gain possession of important tactical feature, which
will eventually help an advance when the time arrives. Byng is getting
everything in order and has infected all around him with his own energy
and cheeriness and has quickly grasped the whole situation.
"In communication with Maxwell I find I can have seven Territorial Force
units and the Scottish Horse, and now I have your welcome news of
Younghusband's Brigade. Please believe I am the last man in the world to
give up anything we have gained except under direct necessity, which I
trust may now never arise. The Navy is supporting me to its full
capacity. The guns of the four ships in Suvla Bay take on the Turkish
positions you mention almost as well as and certainly more safely than
if they were landed and placed where you suggest. Moreover, Navy cannot
lend those guns unless I supply the detachments to work them from the
Naval Division, and the latter is fully employed at present and cannot
spare the men. We are constantly sending ships round to Aja Liman to
fire at enemy positions from there, but I know you realize that one must
not rely too much upon effective fire on land targets from ships which
are not moored, as is the case in Suvla Bay.
"I have not consulted the French General about the situation in the
North as he is at the Southern end and on the right of the line there.
He thinks more of Asia than of these operations in which he has no
troops engaged, but I discussed the matter with him only last night.
Before I sent my No. M.F. 578 I discussed every point closely for two
hours with the Corps Commanders."
In the evening my A.G. brought me the promised details of the 47,000
drafts and reinforcements. He has gone into the detail in proper A.G.
spirit, namely, as an arithmetician rather than a tactician. The result
has given us a shock! 10,000 men of the 54th Division and 4,000 drafts
are shown in the War Office cable as being still due to come to me as
reinforcements whereas they had actually landed on the Peninsula; had,
indeed, been shown in my total fighting strength of 68,000 in my
original cable, M.F. 578 of 23rd August, and are, too many of them, alas
already _hors de combat_. Here is the passage sent four days ago:--"The
total casualties including sick since 6th August amount to 40,000, and
my total force is now only 85,000 of which the fighting strength is
68,000." In this 68,000 were included 14,000 of the men shown in
_subsequent_ War Office cables as being drafts and reinforcements on
their way to the Dardanelles!
So my A.G. has become a bit suspicious about the balance of the 47,000.
On paper, he says, it looks as if I might expect to draw from Egypt and
England 30,000 reinforcements, but--he remarks sententiously--"we know
by now that paper is one thing and men are different." As to
Younghusband's Brigade, it turns out they cannot be employed here: too
many Mahomedans. Have sent the following reply:--
* * * * *
"(No. M.F. 595). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for
War. With reference to your telegram No. 7337, cipher. Have now received
details of the 47,000 drafts and reinforcements in your No. 7354 cipher,
and I find that this figure includes nearly 10,000 men of the LIVth
Division and 4,234 drafts, all of whom had been landed on the peninsula
when I wrote my No. M.F. 578, and were reckoned in the total fighting
strength of 68,000 mentioned in that telegram. The statement, however,
shows that I can expect from England and Egypt during the next six weeks
a total of some 29,000 reinforcements, including new formations and two
battalions of non-fighting lines of communication troops.
"This is a better situation than I was led by your 7172, cipher, to
expect, and you may rely on me to do the best I can with this addition
to my present very depleted strength. I hope, however, you realize that
whereas my British Divisions are now more than 55,000 rifles below their
establishment only 17,000 of these 29,000 are drafts, and before the
last of the drafts can arrive these divisions will have lost another 25
per cent. of their remaining number by normal wastage.
"In regard to Younghusband's Brigade, I learn that the three battalions
are practically half Mahomedans, and I am advised that it is better if
it can be avoided not to use Mahomedans so near the heart of Islam.
Would it not be possible to exchange these for some Hindu regiments in
France?"
These cables give us an uncomfortable feeling that the people at home
wish to regard us as stronger than we are--a different thing from
wishing to add to our strength.
On the other hand, another sort of message has come in which sheds a ray
of hope across our path so darkened at many other points:--
"(No 7372, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.
Although it is understood that we do not at present see our way to
change the recent decision not to send any fresh complete divisional
units, we wish to have all the material possible on which to form a
judgment from time to time. Therefore, will you please telegraph me your
opinion, from the point of view of the military and strategical
situation now existing on the peninsula, as to the prospects there are,
after the experience you have recently had, of our achieving the main
objective of turning the Turks out and what force you would consider
would be required to do this."
Taylor of the G.S. lunched. A big parcel mail came in. Brodrick is to be
sent to Alexandria.
_28th August, 1915. Imbros._ Braithwaite and I both feel we must take
time to think over last night's last cable and I have wired to say so.
Cox's attack on Knoll 60 to the North-east of Kaiajik Aghala came off
well. The New Zealanders under Russell and the Connaught Rangers did
brilliantly. Fighting is still going on.
A reply from the War Office to mine of last week wherein I pointed out
that the once splendid 5th Battalion Royal Scots had fallen from a
strength of 1,000 down to 289. They have had no one since the campaign
began. To-day the Battalion is just over 250--a Company! Now I am
officially told that "no reinforcements can be found for the 1/5th
Battalion of Royal Scots." This is the Battalion which did so well about
11 o'clock on the dreadful night of the 2nd May. I shall cable the Lord
Provost of Edinburgh. If we could get into touch with the human beings
of Edinburgh they would help us to keep a battalion like the Royal Scots
on their legs even if they had to break up half a dozen new formations
for the purpose.
Freddie and I dined with de Robeck on board H.M.S. _Triad_. The V.A. was
well pleased with my cable of the 26th.
_29th August, 1915. Imbros._ Last night two cables:--
* * * * *
"(No. 7414, cipher. C.I.G.S.). From War Office to General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Reference your No. M.F.Q.T. 2737.
The two Territorial Force battalions originally detailed--_see_ my No.
7172 of 20th August--to sail in the _Orsova_ will be taken by the
_Ceramic_. Of these, the 2/5th Devons is only about 700 strong and
contains a large percentage of recruits, while the 1/6th Royal Scots
contains about 40 per cent. partially trained men and a new Commanding
Officer who has only just been appointed. Until it has had further
training neither battalion is fit for anything more than garrison duty.
I suggest that under these circumstances the _Ceramic_ should proceed
direct to Egypt."
"(No. 7401, cipher, 554/A.3.). From War Office to Inspector-General of
Communications, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. We are receiving from
Malta and Alexandria very large demands for materials and explosives for
making grenades. The supply of these seriously interferes with our
manufacture of grenades. At present we are hoping to send you 30 to
40,000 grenades weekly and this figure will be increased. When the
materials already sent out to Malta and Alexandria have been used up,
can the manufacture of grenades at those places cease? Please reply at
once; the matter is urgent."
Do what I will my pen carries me away and I find myself writing like an
ill-conditioned "grouser." As an old War Office "hand" I ought to
know--and I do know--the frightful time of stress under which Whitehall
labours. But, just look at these two cables, you innocent and peaceful
citizen of a thousand years hence! The residue of the famous 47,000
rifles sent me by the Adjutant-General are now being valued by the
official valuer, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In all our
calculations the 2/5th Devons has hitherto masqueraded as an efficient
battalion at full strength. Figures are sometimes more eloquent than
words!
As to the second cable, that deals us a worse blow. Seeing clearly, at
last, we should extract no hand grenades from the War Office, we turned
to Maxwell and Methuen, who have interested themselves in our plight and
have been making us so many that, with what we ourselves can add to
their manufacture, we are at last beginning to make things hum in the
Turkish trenches. Then in comes this War Office cable to crush our
nascent industry and give us in exchange some pious aspirations.
There is no good making any trouble about the hand grenades. As to the
two raw battalions, I am asking they be sent, raw and weak as they are,
as I can train them in the trenches much better and more quickly than
they could be trained in Egypt or England.
Church Parade; office work; sailed over to "K" Beach; inspected Clearing
Stations and walked up to site for new camp. Then back to G.H.Q., to
meet the V.A. and Roger Keyes. They remain the best of friends always.
This evening we were all in good form owing to the news from Anzac.
Knoll 60, now ours throughout, commands the Biyuk Anafarta valley with
view and fire--a big tactical scoop.
_30th August, 1915. Imbros._ Still good news from Anzac. Seeing that the
stunt was on a small scale, we seem to have got into the Turks with a
vengeance. In falling back as well as in counter-attacking after we had
taken Hill 60, the enemy were exposed to the fire from our trenches
along the Kaiajik Dere. Birdie declares that they have lost 5,000. We
have taken several machine guns and trench mortars as well as some fifty
prisoners. Have sent grateful message to all on the spot.
At 10.30 four Russian Officers made their salaams. They are to report
how things are going, and they seem to have the usual quick Slav faculty
for grasping essential points combined, no doubt, with the usual Slav
slackness which lets them go again. I told them everything I knew. They
told us that our landing had saved the whole Army of the Caucasus; that
the Grand Duke knew it and that His Imperial Highness bitterly regretted
that, first of all, sheer lack of supplies; afterwards the struggles in
Galicia and Poland, had prevented Istomine and his Army Corps from
standing by to help.
At 1.30 the C.G.S., Deedes, Val., Freddy and I crossed to Helles in the
_Arno_. Had a hard afternoon's walking, going first to 8th Corps
Headquarters; next to the Royal Naval Division and last to the 52nd
Divisional Headquarters. Returned to the 8th Corps Headquarters and
there met Bailloud. He is now full of good cheer. Got back to
Headquarters without adventure or misadventure.
Have cabled home a suggestion made to me by Mahon, that the 16th Irish
Division at home might be used to fill up the gaps in the units of the
10th Division out here.
_31st August, 1915._ After early lunch, left in the _Arno_ for Suvla. With
me were Braithwaite, Manifold, Freddy and Val. Walked up to the 9th
Corps Headquarters and saw Byng. I am very anxious indeed he should work
his men up into the mood for making a push. He charms everyone and he is
fast pulling his force together. Maude, Fanshawe, and de Lisle seem to
be keen to do something, but Byng, though he also is keen, has the
French standards for ammunition in his head. He does not think we have
enough to warrant us in making an attack. Also, he does not realize yet
that if he is going to wait until we are fitted out on that scale he
will have to wait till doomsday.
Walked to de Lisle's Headquarters and saw him, and on to the 11th
Divisional Headquarters where I met Fanshawe and Malcolm. With them I
climbed back on to Karakol Dagh and sat me down on the identical same
stone whereon I sweated blood during that confused and indecisive battle
of the 21st August. From the Karakol Dagh I got a very fair idea of our
whole trench system. On either flank we hold the hills; elsewhere we are
on the flat. The 11th Division have recovered and only need drafts to be
as good a formation as any General could wish to command. In the evening
I left in the _Arno_ carrying off with me de Lisle and Captain Hardress
Lloyd to dine and stay the night. Quentin Agnew also dined.
My first feeble little attempt to act on K.'s assumption that Egypt and
its army are mine has fallen a bit flat. The War Office promptly agreed
to my taking these two weak, half-trained battalions, the 1/6th Royal
Scots and 2/5th Devons, to be trained in my trenches. That was
yesterday. But the Senoussi must have heard of it at once, for Maxwell
forthwith cables, "The attitude of the Senoussi is distinctly dangerous
and his people have been latterly executing night manoeuvres round our
post at Sollum." To me, the night manoeuvres of these riff-raff seem
ridiculous. But distance, perhaps, has lent its enchantment to my view.
The quibble that the troops in Egypt are mine has been broken to pieces
by my first touch! I have renounced the two battalions with apologies
and now I daresay the Senoussi will retire from his night manoeuvres
round Sollum and resume his old strategic position up Maxwell's sleeve.
_1st September, 1915. Imbros._ Remained at Headquarters working. Wrote,
amongst other things, to K. as follows:--
* * * * *
"I have just finished two days' hard physical exercise going round
visiting Egerton and Paris with Davies, and Fanshawe and de Lisle with
Byng. At Helles everything is quite right although they have only troops
enough there for the defensive. They are getting a lot of stores in,
and the really only anxious feature of the situation is the health of
the men who are very, very tired right through, having had no sort of
relief for months, and who go sick in large numbers.
* * * * *
"Fanshawe is first class. Full of go and plans, he will, if the Lord
spares him, be a real treasure. Maude and Mahon I am going to see after
Mail-day, and then I shall hope to inspect our new captured position on
the left of Anzac.
"I do not know if they showed you the cable saying Hammersley has gone
home very ill with a clot of blood in his leg. He has to lie perfectly
prostrate and still, so I am told, as the least movement might set it
loose and it would then kill him. Evidently he was not really fit to
have been sent out on service. And this was the man, remember, on whom,
under Stopford, everything depended for making a push.
"This Suvla Bay country, a jungle ringed round by high mountains, is
essentially a country for Boers or for Indian troops. De Lisle and
others who have watched them closely in India, say that a native soldier
on the Peninsula (although there, too, he goes to pieces if he loses his
Officers and under too prolonged a strain) is worth at least two Indian
soldiers in France. The climate suits him better, but, most of all, the
type of enemy is more or less the sort of type they are accustomed to
encounter. Not _Sahibs_ and _Ghora Log_ in helmets but _Mussalman Log_
in turbans. As to the South Africans there can be no two opinions, I
think, that they would stand these conditions better than those of
Northern Europe. Indeed, we have one or two Boers serving now with the
Australians, and they have done extremely well."
Some of K.'s questions take my breath away. I wish very much indeed he
could come and spend a week with me. Otherwise I feel hopeless of making
him grasp the realities of the trenches. On the 30th of August he
cables, "If required, I could send you a fresh consignment of junior
Officers. Or have you sufficient supernumerary Officers to fill all
casualties?" I have replied to him that, in my four regular Divisions, I
am short of 900 effective Officers in the Infantry alone. To meet my
total shortage of 1,450 Officers I have twenty-five young gentlemen who
have lately been sent out here to complete their training!
De Lisle and Hardress Lloyd sailed back to Suvla in the evening.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 11: As will be seen further on the 47,000 actually panned out
at 29,000, of whom two battalions were at once diverted to Egypt, whilst
two other battalions turned out to be non-fighting formations.--IAN H.,
1920.]