THE FORCE--REAL AND IMAGINARY
_22nd July, 1915. Imbros._ Had a jolly outing to-day. Left for Cape
Helles by trawler just before 10 o'clock. Aspinall, Bertier and young
Brodrick came with me. Lunched at 8th Army Corps Headquarters with
Stopford and handed him a first outline scheme of the impending
operations. We read it through together and he seems to take all the
points and to be in general agreement. Left Aspinall behind to explain
any questions of detail which might not seem clear, whilst I went a tour
of inspection through the Eski Lines of trenches held by the 6th and 7th
Manchesters of the 42nd Division. These Eski Lines were first held about
the 7th or 8th May and have since been worked up, mainly by the energy
of de Lisle, into fortifications, humanly speaking, impregnable. General
Douglas, Commander of the Division, came round with me. He reminds me
greatly of his brother, the late Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
excellent at detail; a conscientious, very hard worker. When I had seen
my Manchester friends I passed on into the Royal Naval Division Lines.
There General Paris convoyed me through his section as far as
Zimmerman's Farm, where I was joined by Bailloud with his Chief of Staff
and Chief of Operations. Together we made our way round the whole of
the French trenches winding up at de Tott's Battery.
After this whopping walk, we left by pinnace from below de Tott's
wondering whether the Asiatic Batteries would think us game worth their
powder and shot. They did not and so we safely boarded our trawler at
Cape Helles. Didn't get back to Imbros Harbour till 9 p.m. Being so
late, boarded the ever hospitable _Triad_ on chance and struck, as
usual--hospitality. Hunter-Weston is really quite ill with fever. He did
not want to see anyone. As we were sitting at dinner I saw him through
the half open door staggering along on his way to get into a launch to
go aboard a Hospital ship. He is suffering very much from his head. The
doctors prophesy that he will pull round in about a week. I hope so
indeed, but I have my doubts. Aspinall reports that Stopford is entirely
in accord with our project and keen.
_23rd July, 1915. Imbros._ Spent day in camp trying to straighten things
out: (1) the personal, (2) the strategical and (3) the administrative
arrangements.
(1) Hunter-Weston has to go home and I have begged for Bruce Hamilton in
his place, and have told them I would have a great champion in him. He
and Smith-Dorrien were my best Brigadiers in South Africa. They stood on
my right hand and on my left all the way between Bloemfontein and
Pretoria, and I never quite made up my mind as to which was the better.
Bruce is a fighting man with an iron frame, and, in Gallipoli, his
chief crab, his deafness, will be rather a gain to him.
(2) Bailloud, with his own War Minister in the background, is doing all
he knows to get 20,000 of my new troops allotted to a side show, not for
strategy's sake, but for the tactical relief of his troops from the
shelling. I quite sympathize with his reason as, after all, he is
responsible for his own troops and not for the larger issue. But, to
take one objection only, the Navy could not land a force at Besika Bay
and at the same time carry out landings at Suvla and Anzac. Again, since
Bailloud urged these views, the guns fixed up at de Tott's Battery have
already begun to gain mastery over the fire from the site of Troy. When
we have one of the new 14-inch gunned monitors moored off Rabbit Island
we shall get cross fire observations and give the Turkish Asiatic guns
the clean knock out. Amphibious operations are ticklish things: allied
operations are ticklish things: but the two together are like skating on
thin ice arm in arm with two friends who each want to cut a figure of
his own.
(3) Slovenly bills of lading. Bertie Lawrence, who was sent to Mudros in
June when things were growing desperate, was here yesterday and has made
a report on the present business situation which, though less chaotic,
is still serious. There are not launches enough to enable people to get
about. There are not lighters enough to work the daily transhipment of
300 tons. But the worst trouble lies in the bills of lading. Sometimes
they arrive a week after their ships. Usually cargo shipped at Malta or
Alexandria is omitted. Half the time we can't lay hands on vital plant,
tackle, supplies, munitions, because we have no means of knowing what
is, or is not, on board some ship in the harbour. The trouble is of old
date but has reached its climax owing to our shortage of rounds for our
18-pounders.
We were notified a new fuse key would be required for the new shells on
the 12th June. The shells arrived but the keys were not despatched till
the 15th July! The vouchers are all wrong, and there, in idleness, lies
the stuff that spells success. A soldier is not a conjurer that he
should be handed over a fully laden ship and told to ferret out a fuse
key.
_24th July, 1915._ Last night the Turkish Commander drove his troops
into their tenth attack upon our extreme left where they were beaten off
as usual with a loss of several hundreds--this time we only suffered
about a dozen casualties. Together with Braithwaite, I rode over to "K"
Beach at 11 a.m. to inspect part of the 11th Division there encamped.
General Hammersley, Divisional Commander, met me. Also Colonel Malcolm,
his General Staff Officer and Major Duncan. The first Brigade I looked
at was Sitwell's--the 34th. A fine looking lot of men:--
8th Northumberland Fusiliers,
5th Dorsets,
9th Lancashire Fusiliers,
1 Coy. 11th Manchester Fusilers.
Next I passed on to Haggard's Brigade--the 32nd. On parade were--
9th West Yorkshires,
6th Yorkshires,
8th West Riding Regiment,
6th York and Lancashires.
Lastly I inspected the 67th and 68th Companies R.E. of the 134th
Fortress Company, as well as the Field Ambulance. Officers and men
looked splendid. I was glad indeed to be able to congratulate Hammersley
on his command. The doctors tell me, that, short as has been their stay,
a large number of the men are already infected by the prevalent disease.
Well, they don't look like that,--and it won't kill them that's certain,
for I have had it on me strong for the best part of two months. But it
knocks out the starch from its victims, and if fair play existed in
moonlit lands, every white man here should be credited with 25 per cent.
extra kudos for everything that he does with his brains or his body
under the shadow of this pestilence.
Have got a reply from the War Office (Q.M.G.2) making light of my
shipping troubles and saying the War Office has always cabled full
advices. What can I say to that? As the lamb thought to himself when the
wolf began to growl.
_25th July, 1915._ Spent most of the day in camp. Church Parade at 9
a.m. Charles Lister came over from "K" Beach to lunch. He is a
fascinating creature and has made a name for himself with the Naval
Division, where standards are high, as being the keenest of the keen
and the bravest of the brave. Hammersley, Malcolm and Aitkin called in
the evening, but I had gone for a stroll and missed them.
The great Turkish attack timed by all our spies for the 23rd has never
come off but, as showing the fine spirit which animates the Anzacs, it
is worth noting that on that day not one soul reported sick. They would
not go near the doctors for fear they might be made to miss a battle.
Last night the French took a small trench, and though the Turks had a
dash at it in the morning, they were easily beaten off. Twice out of
three times we gain something when we fight and the third time we lose
no ground.
Given, therefore, the factors of the problem, men, munitions and the
distance to be covered (two to three miles), the result pans out like a
proposition by Euclid. No question of breaking through is involved as in
any other theatre, but merely a question of pushing back a very clearly
limited number of yards. The men have in their hearts a reservoir of
patience which will never run dry so long as they are sure of the Will
to Win at their backs. They need have no qualms about G.H.Q. here, but
politicians are more--shall we say, mercurial? And the experts from
France are throwing cold water on our cause by day and night. Therefore,
as the Fleet is not going to have a dash, it is just as well we are
about to try the one great effort and get it done quickly. We will gain
a lot of ground; so much is certain, and it's as sure as anything can
be in war that somewhere we shall make good a key to the position.
_26th July, 1915._ Stifling. Am sticking out about the lack of proper
advices of shipments. Ammunition _makes_ itself scarce enough without
being _made_ scarce. Rare and curious articles are worth careful
booking; that's the text of my cable.
_27th July, 1915. Imbros._ Hard at it. Altham came in to see me and
spent an hour and a half. A man of business! Mahon arrived at mid-day.
Very cheery but he feels that he is the only Lieutenant-General
executively employed with troops who has so small a command as a
Division. He says that either he should be given a Corps, or that
his Lieutenant-General's rank should be reverted to that of
Major-General. I quite agreed. I feel as strongly as he does that, as a
Lieutenant-General, he is clean out of his setting in a Major-General's
appointment and has blocked the way to a go-ahead young Corps Commander,
because that Corps Commander must, by K.'s decision, be his senior.
Still, there didn't seem to be anything to be done, so after my telling
him how things stood here, and hearing with great pleasure the fine
account he gave me of his Irish Division, we adjourned to lunch. Colonel
King, his G.S.O. (1), also lunched and seemed to be a very nice fellow.
After lunch they both went off to the G.S. to be posted.
Admiral Wemyss came over from Mudros and saw me. He is senior to de
Robeck but has waived that accident of rank seeing we are at war. An
interesting man and a Keyesite; i.e., he'd go right through the Straits
to-morrow,--or go under. He is one of those men, none too common in the
Services, whose mind has gained breadth in the great world without
losing its keenness. These rival tenets are straining the fabric of the
Fleet, but, as I constantly tell our General Staff, my course is as
clear to me as a pikestaff. I back the policy of the _de facto_ Naval
Commander-in-Chief--my own coadjutor. There is a temptation to do wrong,
but I resist it. What would it not be to me were the whole Fleet to
attack as we land at Suvla! But obviously I cannot go out of my own
element to urge the Fleet to actions, the perils of which I am
professionally incompetent to gauge.
At 5.30 p.m. I went off riding with de Robeck, Ormsby Johnson and
Freddie Maitland. We cantered over to Seaplane Camp; passed the time of
day to the men there and over-hauled some of the machines. Coming back,
we passed through part of the 11th Division Camp; all very ship-shape
and clean. Freddie Maitland and I dined on board the _Beryl_ with Sir
Douglas Gamble. He seems highly pleased with everyone and everything; I
wouldn't go quite so far! There we met de Robeck, Keyes, Altham, Ellison
and Captain Stephens. Got back at 11.
_28th July, 1915._ A cable from K. about Hunter-Weston's breakdown,
telling me the Prime Minister thinks that Bruce Hamilton is too old for
active work and heavy strain. Instead I am to have Davies. I know Joey
Davies--everyone does. But I also know Bruce Hamilton. There is no
tougher man or more resolute fighter in the Army. In my letter to K. I
said, "The only man I can think of who would really inspire me with full
confidence in these emergencies, excursions and alarms, would be Bruce
Hamilton. Bruce Hamilton is a real fighting man, and his deafness here
would be a great asset as he would be able to sleep through the shell
and rifle fire at night."
The older Officers will be sorry indeed to hear Bruce Hamilton is
barred. Shaw, the new Commander of the 13th Division, will be especially
disappointed.
Admiral Gamble came off to see me and afterwards dined. I was very
careful as I don't want to be quoted about the Sister Service. Gamble
sings praise of our outfit, but I can't help wondering how, when and
where he has got it into his head that we have small craft in abundance!
_29th July, 1915. Imbros._ Stuck to camp, and lucky I did so, for the
cipher of a queer cable from S. of S. for War came in and called for as
much thought as is compatible with prompt handling. The message begins
with a ripe sugar plum:--
* * * * *
"At this stage of the operations which you have conducted with so much
ability and in which your troops have so greatly distinguished
themselves, we" (this "we" is a new expression; the S. of S. always says
"I") "consider it advisable to summarize what we are placing at your
disposal for the effort which we hope will bring your operations to a
successful termination.
"We have sent you out" and then the cable launches out into an inventory
of the forces entrusted to me which, though very detailed, is yet
largely based on what we call the widow's cruse principle. As to the
demnition total, "we" tells "me," categorically, (as the Lawyers say
when they describe the whiteness of soot) that I have "a total of about
205,000 men for the forthcoming operations." The A.G. who brought me the
cable could make nothing of it. Braithwaite then came over and he could
make nothing of it. We can none of us see the point of pretending to
_us_ that my force has been kept up to the strength all the time, or of
adding bayonets to the French or of assuming to _us_ that _we_ possess
troops which Maxwell has told me time and again he requires for Egyptian
defence. Were these figures going to the enemy Chief they might
intimidate him--coming here they alarm me. There is a "We" at the other
end of the cable which knows so little that it tells me, who know every
gun, rifle and round of ammunition I have at my disposal, that I have
double that number to handle. We won't defeat the enemy by paper
strengths. As far as sentiments go, the cable is by chalks the heartiest
handshake we poor relations to the West have had since we started. From
the outset we've been kicked by phrases such as, if you don't hurry up
we will have to "reconsider the position," etc., etc. Now, the "Wees"
wind up with a really wonderful paragraph:--
* * * * *
"We should like to hear from you after considering your plans whether
there is anything further in the way of personnel, guns or ammunition we
can send you, as we are most anxious to give you everything you can
possibly require and use. You will realize that as regards ammunition we
have had to stop supplying France to give you the full output, which
will be continued as long as possible; in the short time available
before the bad weather intervenes the Dardanelles operations are now of
the highest importance."
The position seems now, to me, extraordinarily delicate. Are we to let
the mistakes in this flattering cable slide, and build upon its
promises, or, are we to pull whoever believes these figures out of their
fool's paradise? Well, I feel we must have it out and although deeply
grateful for the nice words and for the splendid effort actually being
made, we _cannot_ let it be assumed by _anyone_ that our vanishing Naval
and Territorial Divisions are complete and up to strength. As to
ammunition, I asked plainly over a fortnight ago, for what I thought was
necessary to rapid success. I was told in so many words that France
would not spare it; though it would have been a small affair to them.
Now; as if these cables had no existence, they ask if there is "anything
in the way of _personnel, guns or ammunition you can possibly require
and use_." The truth is, I don't like this cable; in spite of its
flowery opening I don't like it at all. As to personnel, I ask for young
and energetic commanders, Byng and Rawlinson, and am turned down. Next I
ask for an old and experienced Commander, Bruce Hamilton, and am turned
down. Next I say that Reed, who would be a good staff officer to some
Generals, is not well suited to Stopford; I am turned down. I try to get
a business man to run Mudros and have been turned down till just the
other day. In all these points the War Office are supreme and are acting
well within their rights. But they show some want of consistency in
talking to me all of a sudden, as if it was a matter of course I should
be met half way in my wishes.
So there and then we roughed out this reply:--
* * * * *
"Your Nos. 6583 and 6588. Your appreciation of our efforts will afford
intense gratification and encouragement to everyone.
"In regard to what we should like if it is available in the shape of
guns and ammunition, please see my No. M.F. 444, of 13th July, which
still holds good. As to the final paragraph of your No. 6583, I did not
realize that you were stopping supplies to France in order to give us
full output, since a fortnight ago your No. 6234 stated that it was then
impossible for you to send the ammunition I asked for, and that it would
be impossible to continue supplies even on a much lower scale, since it
would involve the reduction of supplies to France. Naturally, I have
always realized that you, and not I, must judge of the comparative
importance of the demands from the Dardanelles and from France.
"With regard to numbers, the grand total you mention does not take into
account non-effectives or casualties; it includes reinforcements such as
LIVth and part of the LIIIrd Divisions, etc., which cannot be here in
time for my operation, and it also includes Yeomanry and Indian troops
which, until this morning, I was unaware were at my unreserved disposal.
For the coming operation, the number of rifles available is about half
the figure you quote, viz., 120,000. I am only anxious, in emphasizing
this point, to place the statement regarding my strength on the correct
basis, and one which gives a true view of the position.
"What I want in a hurry is as much additional high explosive shell as
you can send me up to amounts asked for in my No. M.F. 444, and as many
of the 4.5-inch and 6-inch howitzers asked for in that telegram as there
is ammunition for. I am despatching a ship immediately, and its time of
arrival at Marseilles will be telegraphed later.
"With regard to sending the IInd Mounted Division unmounted, I am at
once telegraphing Maxwell to obtain his views."
The Mail bag went out this morning.
Hankey is now busy going over the Peninsula. I have not seen much of
him. A G.S. Officer has been told off to help him along and to see that
he does not get into trouble. I am not going to dry nurse him. He showed
me of his own free will a copy of a personal cable he had sent to Lord
Kitchener in which he says, speaking of his first visit to Anzac,
"Australians are superbly confident and spoiling for a fight." This is
exactly true and I feel it is good that one who has the ear of the
insiders should say it. I wrote Wolfe Murray a week ago that he was a
successor to those Commissioners who were sent out by the French
Republic in its early days. Actually, I am very glad to have him. Lies
are on the wing, and he, armed with the truth, will be able to knock
some of them out hereafter when he meets them in high places.
I have been bothered as to how to answer a letter from a statesman for
whom I cherish great respect, who has always been very kind to me and
whom I like very much. He writes:--
* * * * *
"It may interest you to know the Cabinet has entrusted the
superintendence of the Dardanelles business to a comparatively small and
really strong committee drawn equally from the two parties. We most
thoroughly understand the extreme difficulty of your task and the
special conditions of the problem in front of you and the Admiral. All
we ask from you is complete confidence and the exact truth. We are not
babes and we can digest strong meat. Do not think that we ever want
anything unpleasant concealed from us, nor do we want you ever to swerve
one hair's breadth from your own exact judgment in putting the case
before us, certainly never on the pleasant side; if you ever swerve pray
do so on the unpleasant side.... If you want more ammunition say so...."
"Could you eat a bun, my boy?" said the old gentleman to the little boy
looking in at the shop window. "Could I eat ten thousand b ... buns and
the baker who baked them?" So the dear little fellow answered. If I want
more ammunition indeed? If ...? I fear the "comparatively small and
really strong committee." They fairly frighten me. There they sit, all
wishing us well, all evidently completely bamboozled. "If you want more
ammunition, say so!" Anyway, my friend means me well but my path is
perfectly clear; I have only one Chief--K.--and I correspond with no one
but him, or his Staff, whether on the subject of ammunition or anything
else....
As to the letter, I know it is entirely kind, genuine and inspired by
the one idea of helping me. But I've got to say no thank you in some
unmistakable manner. So I have replied:--
* * * * *
"I am grateful for your reassuring remarks about your Committee having
confidence in my humble self. For my part I have confidence in the
_moral_ of my troops and in the devotion of the Navy which are the two
great and splendid assets amidst this shifting kaleidoscope of the
factors and possibilities of war.
"I am not quite sure that I clearly understand your meaning about
cabling home the exact truth. Is there any occasion on which I have
failed to do so? I should be very sorry indeed to think I had
consciously or unconsciously misled anyone by my cables. There is
always, of course, the broad spirit of a cable which depends on the
temperament of the sender. It is either tinged with hope or it has been
dictated by one who fears the worst. If you mean that you would prefer a
pessimistic tone given to my appreciations, then I am afraid you will
have to get another General."
_30th July, 1915._ Gascoigne of "Q" branch lunched. On getting news of
the decisive victory on the Euphrates I caused a _feu de joie_ to be
fired precisely at 5 p.m. by all the troops on the Peninsula. At the
appointed hour I walked up the cliff's edge whence I clearly heard the
roll of fire. The question of whether musketry sounds will carry so far
is settled. Evidently the Turks have taken up the challenge for it was
quite a long time before the distant rumbling died away. In the cool of
the evening took a walk. Commandant Bertier and la Borde dined.
Stopford, now commanding at Helles, has endorsed a report from the
Commander of the 42nd East Lancs Division saying that out of a draft of
45 recruits just come from home three have been cast as totally unfit
and nine as permanently unfit through blindness. Stopford says that he
can't understand this, as the second line Battalion, from which these
poor fellows were selected, contained good soldiers and tall fellows
quite lately when they were under his command in England. Have cabled
the facts home; also the following, showing the result of the
Admiralty's attitude towards their own Naval Division now Winston has
departed:--
* * * * *
"(No. M.F. 505). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. The
effective strength of the Marine Brigade is now reduced to 50 officers
and 1,890 rank and file. In addition, only five battalions, Royal Naval
Volunteer Reserve Battalions, are now remaining in the Division, as the
Anson Battalion has been withdrawn for special work in connection with
the forthcoming operations. Moreover, 300 men, stokers, from this
division have been handed over to the Navy for work in auxiliary
vessels, see my telegram No. M.F.A. 1377, of 11th July. I have
consequently decided to reduce the division to eight battalions and to
reorganize it into two brigades as a temporary measure. Can you give me
any idea when the reinforcements for this division are likely to be
despatched and when they may be expected here? I should like to see the
division again at its strength of 12 battalions, and do not want to lose
it, as it contains a very valuable war-trained nucleus, but unless it is
brought under army administration, it does not appear likely that it can
be maintained."
_31st July, 1915. Imbros._ Quiet day spent in trying to clear my table
before sailing for Mitylene to see the new Irish Division. The grand
army with which some War Office genius credited us appear to have served
their purpose. At our challenge they have now taken to their heels like
Falstaff's eleven rogues in buckram suits. The S. of S. (cabling this
time as "I" and not as "We,") says, "it is not worth while trying to
reconcile numbers by cable and it is difficult to make up accurate
states."
Do not let me forget, though, that a slice of solid stuff is sandwiched
into this cable--we are to get some 4.5 shell _via_ Marseilles; H.E. we
hope: also, two batteries of 4.5 howitzers: also that the A.G. has been
trying hard to feed the 29th Division. The Territorials are the people
who are being allowed to go to pot--not a word of hope even, and before
the eyes of everyone.
_1st August, 1915. Imbros._ The usual rush before leaving. No time to
write. Sent two cables, copies attached. The first to the War Office, in
answer to one from the A.G. wherein he plumes himself upon the
completeness of the 29th Division. That completeness, alas, is only so
relatively; i.e., in comparison with the sinking condition of the
Territorial Divisions:--
* * * * *
"We are deeply grateful to you for the drafts you have despatched for
the XXIXth Division as the fighting existence of that fine formation has
been prolonged by their timely arrival, but I fear that you are very
wide of the mark in your assumption that these drafts have completed the
Division.
"As I have ventured to point out incessantly since my arrival here,
constant large numbers of casualties must occur between the demands for
and the arrival of drafts owing to the length of the sea voyage. It was
for this very plain reason that it was doubly necessary to have here the
10 per cent. margin granted in the case of battalions going to France.
We must always be considerably under establishment in the absence of
some such margin.
"I fully realize, in saying this, that it may be quite impossible to
meet such demands as I suggest, but I feel bound to let you know the
only possible terms on which any unit in this force can ever be up to
establishment.
"At the present moment, excluding 1,700 drafts coming on _Simla_ and
_Themistocles_, the actual infantry strength of the XXIXth Division is
219 officers and 8,424 other ranks."
The second cable is to K. The War Office Army has melted into thin air
and it only remains to express my heartfelt thanks for the real Army:--
* * * * *
"With reference to your No. 6645. Very many thanks. You have done
everything for us that man can do. The ship will probably not reach me
in time but since I know that the ammunition is actually _en route_ for
me, and that it will (D.V.) arrive, I need not husband what we have, but
can fire freely if I see great results thus obtainable. The Turk, at any
rate, where he knows that he is fighting for Constantinople, is a
stubborn fighter, and the difficulty is not so much in the taking of
positions as in the maintaining of them.
"Hence the extra ammunition you are sending me will come in the nick of
time. The ship will arrive at Marseilles 7 p.m. 4th August, as I
telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General yesterday. Many thanks for the
two batteries of 4.5-inch howitzers, they are worth their weight in gold
to us."
At 5 p.m. embarked on H.M.S. _Chatham_ (Captain Drury Lowe) with George
Lloyd of the General Staff and young Brodrick. At 6 p.m. sailed for
Mitylene.
_2nd August, 1915. H.M.S. "Chatham," Mitylene._ We opened Mitylene
Harbour at 5.30 a.m. So narrow was the entrance, and so hidden, that at
first it looked as if the _Chatham_ was charging the cliffs; next as if
her long guns must entangle themselves in the flowering bushes on either
side of the channel; then, as we sailed out over a bay like a big
turquoise, I felt as though we were at peace with all men, making a
pilgrimage to the home of Sappho, and that we had left far behind us
these giant wars. But only for a moment!
After early breakfast, where I met Captain Grant of H.M.S. _Canopus_,
left in a steam pinnace to inspect the 30th Brigade under
Brigadier-General Hill.
Inspected:--
H.M.T. _Alaudia_, 9.30 a.m.
6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
Col G. Downing, 7th R.D.F., in command.
H.M.T. _Andania_, 10.30 a.m.
6th R. Inniskilling Fusiliers,
5th Royal Irish Fusiliers,
Lt.-Col. M. Pike, 5th R.I.F., in command.
H.M.T. _Canada_, 11.30 a.m.
6th Royal Irish Fusiliers,
Lt.-Col. F. A. Greer in command.
H.M.T. _Novian_, 12 p.m.
5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
Lt.-Col. H. Vanrennan in command.
The Royal Irish Fusiliers and Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers had not got
back on board ship by the time I was ready for them, so I hurried off
by motor launch to a landing in another part of the Bay and, walking
through a village, caught them resting by their piled arms after a route
march. All of these men looked very well and cheery. The villagers were
most friendly and had turned out in numbers, bringing presents of
flowers and fruit. Not more than 60 per cent. of the men are Irish, the
rest being either North of England miners or from Somerset.
In the evening, crossed the glassy bay and motored to pay a
double-barrelled visit to the Military and Civil Governors. Topping the
watershed, yet another pleasure shock. Through the sea haze Mitylene
shines out like an iridescent bubble of light. Never had I seen anything
so vivid in its colour and setting as this very ancient, very small,
very brilliant city of Mitylene. Rio de Janeiro, Sydney, the Golden Horn
are sprawling daubs to flawless Mitylene.
Hesketh Smith and Compton Mackenzie were with us. The Governors very
polite. The soldier man is a Cretan and seemed a good sort. We took tea
at the Hotel and then made our way back to the _Chatham_. Found messages
from G.H.Q. to say all's well and stuff being smuggled in without hitch
at Anzac. At 7 p.m. we sailed for Imbros; a breeze from the West
whipping up little waves into cover for enemy periscopes. So the moment
we left the harbour we took on a corkscrew course, dodging and twisting
like snipe in an Irish bog, to avoid winding up our trip in the dark
belly of a German submarine. Soon emerged from the sea a huge piled up
white cloud, white and clear cut at first as the breast of a swan upon
a blue lake, slowly turning to deep rose colour flecked here and there
with gold. As it swallowed up the last lingering colours of the sunset,
the world grew grey, then black, and we were, humanly speaking, safe.
_3rd August, 1915. Imbros._ Anchored at Imbros roadstead 5.30 a.m.
Braithwaite not up yet so Altham got first innings about transport and
supply.
Next the G.S. All our preliminaries are working on quite smoothly
towards the climax and, so far, it seems likely the Turks have no notion
of the scheme.
Girodon steamed over from Helles to see me and went back again in the
evening. He is the mirror of French chivalry, modesty and good form,
besides being an extraordinary fine soldier.
The 33rd Brigade, sent by me to gain wisdom at Helles, have now been
brought here so that the whole 11th Division can start off together.
Just as the peculiar foggy air of Lancashire is essential to the weaving
of the finer sorts of tissues, so an atmosphere of misunderstandings
would really seem to suit the War Office.
In the cable telling me I would have 205,000 troops for my push, the S.
of S. had informed me categorically that the 8,500 Yeomanry and mounted
troops in Egypt, as well as 11,500 Indian troops and the Artillery
stationed there _were mine_.
As the present garrison of Egypt numbers over 70,000 and as the old
peace garrison of Egypt was 5,000 and as, further, there is no question
of serious attack on Egypt from outside, it seemed to us there might be
men in this part of the message. Leaving the Indian troops out of the
account, for the moment, I therefore wired to Maxwell and asked him if
he thought he would be able to organize a _portion_ of the 8,500 mounted
men, in order that, at a pinch, they might be able to come and reinforce
us here. So the matter stood when I got another cable from the S. of S.
telling me 5,000 drafts are "_en route_ or under orders" to join the
29th Division and that the War Office are "unable to carry out your
views about additional marginal drafts." S. of S. then goes on:--
* * * * *
"Maxwell wires that you are taking 300 officers and 5,000 men of his
mounted troops. I do not quite understand why you require Egyptian
Garrison troops while you have the LIIIrd Division at Alexandria, and
the LIVth, the last six battalions of which are arriving in five or six
days, on the _Aquitania_.
"When I placed the Egyptian Garrison at your disposal to reinforce at
the Dardanelles in case of necessity, Maxwell pointed out that Egypt
would be left very short, and I replied that you would only require them
in case of emergency for a short time, and that the risk must be run. I
did not contemplate, however, that you would take troops from the
Egyptian Garrison until those sent specially for you were exhausted. How
long will you require Maxwell's troops, and where do you intend to send
them? They should only be removed from Egypt for actual operations and
for the shortest possible time."
We may read this cable wrong but it seems to us to embody a topsy-turvy
tactic! To wait till one part of your forces are killed off (for that is
the plain English of "exhausted") before you bring up the other part of
your forces.
It is not easy to know what to do. The very best we can do, it sometimes
seems to me, is to keep quiet rather than add one iota to the anxieties
of people staggering under a load of responsibilities and cares. In the
good old days the Gordons fought in two decisive battles in two
Continents within a few months and no one worried the War Office about
drafts! The 92nd carried on--had to carry on; they fell to quarter
strength--still they were the Gordons and they carried on, just as if
they counted a thousand rifles in their ranks. Now, I am quite prepared
to do that to-day--_if that is the policy_. If that _were_ the policy;
not one grouse or grumble should ever cross my lips. But that is _not_
the policy. Press and People believe a Division is a unit made up in
scientific proportions of different branches and numbering a certain
number of rifles. They are told so; the War Office keep telling them so;
they believe it, and, in fact, it is an absolute necessity of this
modern trench war that it should be so. Although the Gordons got no
_drafts_ between the battle of Kandahar and the battle of Majuba Hill,
they got six months' _rest_; which was even better. In those days, apart
from sieges, a battle was an event, here it is the rest or respite that
is an event. Even British soldiers can't stick day and night fighting
for ever. The attack spirit begins to ebb _unless_ it is fed with fresh
blood. Whether K.'s mind, big with broad views, grasps this new factor
with which he has never himself come into personal contact, God knows.
But for his sake, every bit as much as for my own, it is up to me to
keep hammering, hammering, hammering at drafts, drafts, drafts.
Dined with the ever hospitable and kind hearted de Robeck on _Triad_.
The Navy are still divided. Some there are who would wish me to urge the
Admiral to play first fiddle in the coming attack. This _I will not do_.
I have neither the data nor the technical knowledge which would justify
me to my conscience in doing so.
_4th August, 1915. Imbros._ Have been out seeing the New Army at work.
Some of the XIth Division were practising boat work in the evening and
afterwards a Brigade started upon a night march into the mountains. The
men are fit, although just beginning to be infected with the Eastern
Mediterranean stomach trouble; i.e., the so-called cholera, which saved
Constantinople from the Bulgarians in the last war.
_5th August, 1915. Imbros._ The day so longed for is very near now. O
that it had come at the period of our victories! But there is time
enough still, and the first moves of the plan are working smooth as
oiled machinery. For the past few nights there has been steady flow
into Anzac of troops, including a Division of the New Army. This has
taken place, without any kind of hitch, under the very noses of the
Turkish Army who have no inkling of the manoeuvre--as yet! The Navy
are helping us admirably here with their organization and good sea
discipline. Also, from what they tell me, Shaw and the 13th Division of
the New Army are playing up with the clockwork regularity of veterans.
All this marks us up many points to the good, before even the flag
drops. For, given the fine troops we have, the prime factors of the
whole conception; the factors by which it stands or falls; are:--
* * * * *
(1) Our success in hoodwinking the Turks; i.e., surprise.
(2) Our success in getting the 13th Division and the Indian Brigade
unnoticed into Anzac.
(3) Our success in landing the Divisions from Imbros, Lemnos and
Mitylene, at moments fixed beforehand, upon an unknown, unsurveyed,
uncharted shore of Suvla. Of these three factors (1) and (2) may already
be entered to our credit; (3) is on the knees of the Navy.
The day before the start is the worst day for a Commander. The operation
overhangs him as the thought of another sort of operation troubles the
minds of sick men in hospitals. There is nothing to distract him; he has
made his last will and testament; his affairs are quite in order; he has
said _au revoir_ to his friends with what cheeriness he can muster.
Looking back, it seems to me that during two months every conceivable
contingency has been anticipated and weighed and that the means of
dealing with it as it may arise is now either:--embodied in our
instructions to Corps Commanders, or else, set aside as pertaining to my
own jurisdiction and responsibility. To my thinking, in fact, these
instructions of ours illustrate the domain of G.H.Q. on the one hand and
the province of the Corps Commander on the other very typically. The
General Staff are proud of their work. Nothing; not a nosebag nor a
bicycle has been left to chance.[1]
Davies and Diggle, his A.D.C., lunched and the Admiral came to haul me
out for a walk about 6 p.m.
Have written K. by this evening's Mail bag about the sickness of the
Australians, and indeed of all the troops here, excepting only the
native Indian troops, and also about our Medical _band-o-bast_ for the
battle. No question about it, the Dardanelles was the theatre of all
others for our Indian troops.
Have now seen all the New Army units except six Battalions of the 10th
Division.
French has written me a very delightful letter.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: See Appendix III containing actual instructions, together
with a brief explanatory heading.--IAN H., 1920.]