SARI BAIR AND SUVLA
_6th August, 1915. Imbros._ O! God of Bethel, by whose hand thy people
still are fed,--I am wishing the very rare wish,--that it was the day
after to-morrow. Men or mice we will be by then, but I'd like to know
which. K.'s New Army, too! How will they do? What do they think? They
speak--and with justice--of the spirit of the Commander colouring the
_moral_ of his men, but I have hardly seen them, much less taken their
measure. One more week and we would have known something at first hand.
Now, except that the 13th Division and the 33rd Brigade gained good
opinions at Helles, all is guess work.
Went down to "K" Beach to see the 11th Division go off. Young Brodrick,
who was with us, proved himself much all there on the crowded pier and
foreshore; very observant; telling me who or what I had not noticed,
etc. First the destroyers were filling up and then the lighters. The
young Naval Officers in charge of the lighters were very keen to show me
how they had fixed up their reserves of ammunition and water. Spent
quite a time at this and talking to Hammersley and Malcolm, his G.S.O.
(1); also to Coleridge, G.S.O. (2), and to no end of Regimental
Officers and men. Hammersley has been working too hard; at least he
looked it; also, for the occasion, rather glum. Quite natural; but I
always remember Wolseley's remark about the moral stimulus exerted by
the gay staff officer and his large cigar. The occasion! Yes, each man
to his own temperament. Some pray before battle; others dance and drink.
The memory of Cromwell prevails over that of Prince Rupert with most
Englishmen but Prince Rupert, _per se_, usually prevailed over Cromwell.
To your adventurous soldier; to our heroes, Bobs, Sir Evelyn, Garnet
Wolseley, Charles Gordon (great psalm-singer though he was) an occasion
like to-night's holds the same intoxicating mixture of danger and desire
as fills the glass of the boy bridegroom when he raises it to the health
of his enigma in a veil. But I don't know how it is; I used to feel like
that; now I too am terribly anxious. Disappointed not to see Stopford
nor Reed. They were to have been there. Besides the men on the beetles
there are men packed like herrings upon the decks of the destroyers. I
had half a mind to cruise round in the motor launch and say a few words
to them Elandslaagte fashion, but was held back by feeling that the rank
and file don't know me and that there was too long an interval before
the entry into the danger zone.
The sea was like glass--melted; blue green with a dull red glow in it:
the air seemed to have been boiled. Officers and men gave me the "feel"
of being "for it" though over serious for British soldiers who always,
in my previous experience, have been extraordinarily animated and gay
when they are advancing "on a Koppje day." These new men seem subdued
when I recall the blaze of enthusiasm in which the old lot started out
of Mudros harbour on that April afternoon.
The _moral_ of troops about to enter into battle supplies a splendid
field of research for students of the human soul, for then the blind
wall set in everyday intercourse between Commander and commanded seems
to become brittle as crystal and as transparent. Only for a few
moments--last moments for so many? But, during those moments, the
gesture of the General means so much--it strikes the attitude of his
troops. It is up to Stopford and Hammersley to make those gestures.
Stopford was not there, and is not the type; Hammersley is not that type
either. How true it is that age, experience, wisdom count for less than
youth, magnetism and love of danger when inexperience has to be
heartened for the struggle.
Strolled back slowly along the beach, and, at 8.30, in the gathering
dusk, saw the whole flotilla glide away and disappear ghostlike to the
Northwards. The empty harbour frightens me. Nothing in legend stranger
or more terrible than the silent departure of this silent Army, K.'s new
Corps, every mother's son of them, face to face with their fate.
But it will never do to begin the night's vigil in this low key. Capital
news from the aeroplanes. Samson has sent in photographs taken
yesterday, showing the Suvla Bay area. Not more than 100 to 150 yards
of trenches in all; half a dozen gun emplacements and, the attached
report adds, no Turks anywhere on the move.
[Illustration: SUVLA FROM CHUNUK BAIR]
_7th August, 1915. Imbros._ Sitting in my hut after a night in the G.S.
tent. One A.D.C. remains over there. As the cables come in he runs
across with them. Freddie Maitland runs fast. I am watching to see his
helmet top the ridge of sand that lies between. The 9th Corps has got
ashore; some scrapping along the beaches but no wire or hold-up like
there was at Sedd-el-Bahr: that in itself is worth fifty million golden
sovereigns. The surprise has come off!
I'd sooner storm a hundred bloody trenches than dangle at the end of
this wire. But now, thank God, the deadliest of the perils is past. The
New Army are fairly ashore. That worst horror of searchlights and of the
new troops being machine gunned in their boats has lifted its dark
shadow.
At Anzac, the most formidable entrenchment of the Turks, "Lone Pine,"
was stormed yesterday evening by the Australian 1st Brigade; a desperate
fine feat. At midnight Birdie cabled, "All going on well on right where
men confident of repelling counter-attack now evidently being prepared:
on left have taken Old No. 3 Post and first ridge of Walden Point,
capturing machine gun: progress satisfactory, though appallingly
difficult: casualties uncertain but on right about 100 killed; 400
wounded."
At Helles a temporary success was scored, but, during the early part of
the night, counter-attacks have brought us back to "as you were."
Fighting is going on and we ought to be pinning the enemy to the South
which is the main thing.
From Suvla we have no direct news since the "All landings successful"
cable but we have the repetition of a wireless from G.H.Q. IXth Corps to
the Vice-Admiral at 7.58 a.m. saying, "Prisoners captured state no fresh
troops have arrived recently and forces opposed to us appear to be as
estimated by G.H.Q. Apparently one Regiment only was opposed to our
advance on left."
I have caused this cable to be sent to Stopford:--
* * * * *
"4.20 p.m. G.H.Q. to 9th Corps. Have only received one telegram from
you. Chief glad to hear enemy opposition weakening and knows you will
take advantage of this to push on rapidly. Prisoners state landing a
surprise so take every advantage before you are forestalled."
_8th August, 1915. Imbros._ Another night on tenter hooks: great news: a
wireless from a warship to tell us the Suvla troops are up on the
foothills: two cables from Stopford: many messages from Anzac and
Helles.
"2.12 a.m. IXth Corps to G.H.Q. As far as can be ascertained 33rd
Brigade hold line the sea about 91.I.9 to Suvla East corner[2] of Salt
Lake to Lala Baba inclusive. North of Salt Lake 31st and 32nd Brigade
extended East of Asmak 117.U. preparatory. 34th Brigade advancing having
followed retreating enemy towards line diagonally across 117.X. and
117.D. One battalion latter Brigade occupy high ground about square
135.X."
"5.10 a.m. IXth Corps to G.H.Q. Yilghin Burnu is in our hands. No
further information."
Awful work at Lone Pine. Desperate counter-attacks by enemy, but now
Birdie thinks we are there to stay. Bulk of Turkish reserves engaged
there whilst Godley's New Zealanders and the new 13th Division under
Shaw are well up the heights and have carried Chunuk Bair. Koja Chemen
Tepe not yet; but Chunuk Bair will do: with that, we win!
At Helles we have pushed out again and the East Lancs Division have
gallantly stormed the Vineyard which they hold. The Turks are making
mighty counter-attacks but their columns have been cut to pieces by the
thin lines of the Lancashire Fusiliers. Neither from Helles nor from the
Southern area of Anzac are the enemy likely to spare men to reinforce
Sari Bair or Suvla.
At 11.30 I ordered the _Arno_ for mid-day sharp. Then happened one of
those aquatic incidents which lend an atmosphere all their own to
amphibious war. Rear-Admiral Nicholson, in local naval command here, had
ordered the _Arno_ to fill up her boilers. Some hitch arose, some d--d
amphibious hitch. Thereupon, without telling me, he ordered the
Commander of the _Arno_ to draw fires, so that, when my signal was sent,
a reply came from the Rear-Admiral saying he was sorry I should be
inconvenienced, but he thought it best to order the fires to be drawn;
otherwise the boilers might have suffered. When, at a crisis, a boiler
walks into the middle of his calculations, a soldier is simply--boiled!
I could not altogether master my irritation, and I wrote out a reply
saying this was not a question of convenience or inconvenience but one
of preventing a Commander-in-Chief from exercising his functions during
battle. I sent the signal down to the signal tent and about an hour
later Braithwaite came over and said he had taken it upon himself to
tone it down.[3] Just as well, perhaps, but here I was, marooned upon an
island!
No other ship could be signalled. As a rule there was a destroyer on
patrol about Helles which could be called up by wireless, but to-day
there was no getting hold of it. I began to be afraid we should not get
away till dark when, at about 3.30 p.m. Nicholson signalled that the
_Triad_ was sailing for Suvla at 4.15 p.m., and would I care to go in
her, the _Arno_ following after she had watered. We were off like a
shot, young Brodrick, Captain Anstey and myself for Suvla. Braithwaite
remained to carry on with Anzac and Helles. The moment I quit my post I
drop out and he takes up the reins. His hands are capable--fortunately!
To-day's cables before I left were right from Helles; splendid from
Anzac and nothing further from Suvla.[4]
As we sailed in, that bay, always till now so preternaturally deserted
and silent, was alive and bustling with ships and small craft. A launch
came along from the _Chatham_ and I jumped in whilst we were still going
pretty fast and shot off to see de Robeck. He seemed to think things
naval were going pretty well and that Rear-Admiral Christian had been
coping quite well with his share, but suggested that, as he was under a
severe strain, I had better leave him alone. As to the soldiers' show,
he said what Turks were on the ground, and there weren't many, had been
well beaten--but--but--_but_; and all I could get him to say was that
although he was well aware the fighting at Helles and Anzac demanded my
closest attention; still, that was in practised hands and he had felt
bound to wireless to beg me to come up to Suvla and see things for
myself.
Roger Keyes said then that the landings had come off, on the whole, A.1.
Our G.H.Q. idea, which the Navy had shared, that the whole of the troops
should be landed South of Lala Baba had been sound. The 33rd Brigade had
landed there without shot fired; the 32nd had been sharply, but not
very seriously opposed; the Brigade (the 34th) which we, to meet the
wish of the Corps, had tried to land for them opposite Hill 10 inside
the Bay, instead of with the others as we had originally arranged, had
only been able to find depth at the mouth of the Salt Lake; had suffered
loss from rifle fire and had been thrown into disorder by the grounding
of some lighters. The long wade through the water and mud had upset the
cohesion of the Brigade.
Aspinall now turned up. He was in a fever; said our chances were being
thrown away with both hands and that he had already cabled me strongly
to that effect. Neither the Admiral's message nor Aspinall's had reached
me.[5]
Not another moment was to be lost, so Keyes took us both in his motor
boat to H.M.S. _Jonquil_ to see Stopford. He (Stopford) seemed happy and
said that everything was quite all right and going well. Mahon with some
of his troops was pressing back the Turks along Kiretch Tepe Sirt. There
had been a very stiff fight in the darkness at Lala Baba and next
morning the Turks had fought so hard on a little mound called Hill 10
that he (Stopford) had been afraid we were not going to be able to take
it at all. However, it had been taken, but there was great confusion and
hours of delay in deploying for the attack of the foothills. They were
easily carried in the end but by that time the men were so thirsty and
tired that they did not follow up the beaten enemy.
"And where are they now?" I asked.
"There," he replied, "along the foot of the hills," and he pointed out
the line, north to south.
"But they held that line, more or less, yesterday," I said.
"Yes," said Stopford, and he went on to explain that the Brigadiers had
been called upon to gain what ground they could without serious fighting
but that, actually, they had not yet occupied any dominating tactical
point. The men had been very tired; he had not been able to get water up
to them or land his guns as quickly as he had hoped. Therefore, he had
decided to postpone the occupation of the ridge (which might lead to a
regular battle) until next morning.
"A regular battle is just exactly what we are here for" was what I was
inclined to say, but what I did say was that most of this was news to
me; that he should have instantly informed me of his decision that he
could not obey my cabled order of yesterday afternoon to "push on
rapidly." Stopford replied that he had only made up his mind within the
past hour or so; that he had just got back from the shore and was going
to send me a full message when I arrived.
Now, what was to be done? The Turks were so quiet it seemed to me
certain they must have taken the knock-out. All along the beaches, and
inland too, no end of our men were on the move, offering fine targets.
The artillery which had so long annoyed Anzac used to fire from behind
Ismail Oglu Tepe; i.e., within point blank range of where our men were
now strolling about in crowds. Yet not a single shell was being fired.
Either, the enemy's guns had been run back over the main ridge to save
them; or, the garrison of Ismail Oglu Tepe was so weak and shaken that
they were avoiding any move which might precipitate a conflict.
I said to Stopford, "We must occupy the heights at once. It is
imperative we get Ismail Oglu Tepe and Tekke Tepe _now_!" To this he
raised objections. He doubted whether the troops had got their water
yet; he and Reed were agreed we ought to get more guns ashore; the
combination of naval and military artillery was being worked out for the
morning; orders would all have to be re-written. He added that, whilst
agreeing with me on principle as to the necessity for pushing on, there
were many tactical reasons against it, especially the attitude of his
Generals who had told him their men were too tired. I thought to myself
of the many, many times Lord Bobs, French, every leader of note has had
to fight that same _non possumus_; of the old days when half the victory
lay in the moral effort which could impel men half dead with hunger,
thirst and sleeplessness to push along. A cruel, pitiless business, but
so is war itself. Was it not the greatest of soldiers who said his
Marshals could always find ten good reasons for putting off an attack
till next day!
So I said I would like to see the G.O.C. Division and the Brigadiers
personally so as to get a better grip of things than we could on board
ship in harbour. Stopford agreed; nothing, he said, would please him
more than if I could succeed where he had failed, but would I excuse him
from accompanying me; he had not been very fit; he had just returned
from a visit to the shore and he wanted to give his leg a chance. He
pointed out Hammersley's Headquarters about 400 yards off and said he,
Hammersley, would be able to direct me to the Brigades.
So I nipped down the _Jonquil's_ ladder; tumbled into Roger Keyes'
racing motor boat and with him and Aspinall we simply shot across the
water to Lala Baba. Every moment was priceless. I had not been five
minutes on the _Jonquil_ and in another two I was with Hammersley.
Under the low cliffs by the sea was a small half-moon of beach about 100
by 40 yards. At the North end of the half-moon was Hammersley. Asked to
give me an idea of the situation he gave me much the same story as
Stopford. The 9th West Yorks and 6th Yorks had done A.1 storming Lala
Baba in the dark. There had been marching and counter-marching in the
move on Hill 10. The Brigadier had not been able to get a grip of his
Battalions to throw them at it in proper unison and form. A delay of
precious hours had been caused in the attack on Yilghin Burnu by a
Brigadier who wanted to go forward finding himself at cross purposes
with a Brigadier who thought it better to hold back. At present all was
peaceful and he expected a Staff Officer at any moment with a sketch
showing the exact disposition of his troops. He could not, he feared,
point me out the Brigade Headquarters on the ground. The general line
held followed the under features of the hills.
Malcolm, G.S.O.1, was then called and came up from the far end of the
little beach. He was in the act of fixing up orders for next morning's
attack. I told both Officers that there had never been a greater crisis
in any battle than the one taking place as we spoke. They were naturally
pleased at having got ashore and to have defeated the Turks on the
shore, but they must not fly away with the idea that with time and
patience everything would pan out very nicely. On the contrary, it was
imperative, absolutely imperative, we should occupy the heights before
the enemy brought back the guns they had carried off and before they
received the reinforcements which were marching at that very moment to
their aid. This was no guess: it _was_ so: our aeroplanes had spotted
Turks marching upon us from the North. We might be too late now; anyway
our margin was of the narrowest.
Hammersley assured me that sheer thirst, and the exhaustion of the
troops owing to thirst, had been the only reason why he had not walked
on to Ismail Oglu Tepe last night. After Yilghin Burnu had been
carried, there was nothing to prevent the occupation of the heights as
the Turks had been beat, but no one could fight against thirst.
I asked him how the water question stood. He said it had been solved by
the landing of more mules; there was no longer any serious supply
trouble. All the troops were now watered, fed and rested. They had been
told they should gain as much ground as they could without committing
themselves to a general action, but they had not, in fact, made much
progress. Thereupon, I pressed again my view that the Division should
get on to the ridge forthwith. Let the Brigade-Majors, I said, pick out
a few of their freshest companies and get on to the crest right now.
Hammersley still clung to the view that he could not get any of his
troops under weigh before daylight next morning. The units were
scattered; no reconnaissance had been made of the ground to their front;
that ground was jungly and blind; it would be impossible to get orders
round the whole Division in time to let the junior ranks study them.
Hammersley's points were made in a proper and soldierly manner. Every
General of experience would be with him in each of them, but there was
one huge danger rapidly approaching us; already casting its shadow upon
us, which, to me as Commander-in-Chief, outweighed every secondary
objection. We might have the hills at the cost of walking up them
to-day; the Lord only knew what would be the price of them to-morrow.
Helles and Anzac were both holding the Turks to their own front, but
from Asia and Bulair the enemy were on the march. Once our troops dug
themselves in on the crest no number of Turks would be able to shift
them. But; if the Turks got there first? If, as Colonel Malcolm said, it
was impossible to get orders round the Division in time,--a surprising
statement--was there no body of troops--no Divisional reserve--no
nothing--which could be used for the purpose of marching a couple of
miles? Seemingly, there was no reserve! Never, in all my long soldiering
had I been faced with ideas like these. I have seen attack orders
dictated to a Division from the saddle in less than five minutes. Here
was a victorious Division, rested and watered, said to be unable to
bestir itself, even feebly, with less than twelve hours' notice! This
was what I felt and although I did not say it probably I looked it, for
Malcolm now qualified the original _non possumus_ by saying that
although the Irish and the 33rd and 34th Brigades could not be set in
motion before daylight, the 32nd Brigade, which was concentrated round
about Sulajik, would be ready to move at short notice.
The moment had now come for making up my mind. I did so, and told
Hammersley in the most distinct terms that I wished this Brigade to
advance _at once and dig themselves in on the crestline_.[6] If the
Brigade could fix themselves upon the heights overlooking Anafarta Sagir
they would make the morning advance easy for their comrades and would be
able to interfere with and delay the Turkish reinforcements which might
try and debouch between the two Anafartas during the night or march down
upon Suvla from the North. Viewed from the sea or studied in a map there
might be some question of this hill, or that hill, but, on the ground it
was clear to half an eye that Tekke Tepe was the key to the whole Suvla
Bay area. If by dawn, I said, even one Company of ours was well
entrenched on the Tekke Tepe height we should have the whip hand of the
enemy in the opening moves next morning.
Hammersley said he understood my order and that the advance should be
put in hand at once. Malcolm hurried off; I left a little before 6.30
and went, _via_ the _Chatham_, back to the _Triad_. The _Arno_ had by
now come in, but de Robeck has kindly asked me not to shift quarters if
Anzac and Helles troubles will permit me to stay the night at Suvla.
All was dead quiet ashore till 11 p.m. I was on the bridge until then
and, seeing and hearing nothing, felt sure the Brigade had made good
Tekke Tepe and were now digging themselves in.
Captain Brody dined. The scraps of news picked up from the sailormen,
mainly by young Brodrick, confirm what the soldiers had told us about
the landing inside Suvla Bay along the narrow strip of land West of the
Salt Lake. The attacks on Hill 10 went to pieces, not against the Turks,
but by mishap. The first assault made by one or two Companies succeeded,
but the assailants were taken for Turks and were attacked in turn and
driven off by others of our men. A most distressing affair.
If there was hesitation and mix-up in the general handling, the
Regimental folk atoned and there were many incidents of initiative and
daring on the part of battalions and companies.
Mahon with some of his Irish and a Manchester Battalion are fighting
well and clearing Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Until this morning bullets from
that ridge were falling on "A" Beach; now the working parties are not in
any way disturbed.
_9th August, 1915. Imbros._ With the first streak of dawn I was up on
the bridge with my glasses. The hills are so covered with scrub that it
was hard to see what was going on in that uncertain light, but the
heavyish shrapnel fire was a bad sign and the fact that the enemy's guns
were firing from a knoll a few hundred yards East of Anafarta Sagir was
proof that our troops were not holding Tekke Tepe. But the Officer of
the Watch said that the small hours passed quietly; no firing ashore
during the hours of darkness. Could not make head or tail of it!
As the light grew stronger some of ours could be seen pushing up the
western slopes of the long spur running out South-west from Anafarta.
The scrub was so thick that they had to climb together and
follow-my-leader along what appeared to be cattle tracks up the hill. On
our right all seemed going very well. Looking through naval telescopes
we thought--we all thought--Ismail Oglu Tepe height was won. Very soon
the shrapnel got on to those bunches of men on our left and there was
something like a stampede from North to South. Looking closer we could
see the enemy advancing behind their own bursting shrapnel and rolling
up our line from the left on to the centre. Oh for the good "Queen
Bess," her high command, and her 15-inch shrapnel! One broadside and
these Turks would go scampering down to Gehenna. The enemy
counter-attack was coming from the direction of Tekke Tepe and moving
over the foothills and plain on Sulajik. Our centre made a convulsive
effort (so it seemed) to throw back the steadily advancing Turks; three
or four companies (they looked like) moved out from the brush about
Sulajik and tried to deploy. But the shrapnel got on to these fellows
also and I lost sight of them. Then about 6 a.m., the whole lot seemed
suddenly to collapse:--including the right! Not only did they give
ground but they came back--some of them--half-way to the sea. But others
made a stand. The musketry fire got very heavy. The enemy were making a
supreme effort. The Turkish shell fire grew hotter and hotter. The
enemy's guns seemed now to be firing not only from round about Anafarta
Sagir, but also from somewhere between 113 and 101, 2,500 yards or so
South-west of Anafarta. Still these fellows of ours; not more than a
quarter of those on the ground at the outset--stuck it out. My heart
has grown tough amidst the struggles of the Peninsula but the misery of
this scene well nigh broke it. What kept me going was the sight of Sari
Bair--I could not keep my eyes off the Sari Bair ridge. Guns from all
sides, sea and land, Turks and British, were turned on to it and
enormous explosions were sending slices off the top of the high mountain
to mix with the clouds in the sky. Under that canopy our men were
fighting for dear life far above us!
Between 7.30 and 8.0 the Turkish reinforcements at Suvla seemed to have
got enough. They did not appear to be in any great strength: here and
there they fell back: no more came up in support: evidently, they were
being held: failure, not disaster, was the upshot: few things so bad
they might not be worse. By 8.0 the musketry and the shelling began to
slacken down although there was a good deal of desultory shooting. We
were holding our own; the Welsh Division are coming in this morning; but
we have not sweated blood only to hold our own; our occupation of the
open key positions has been just too late! The element of
surprise--wasted! The prime factor set aside for the sake of other
factors! Words are no use.
Looked at from the bridge of the _Triad_--not a bad observation
station--the tendency of our men to get into little groups was very
noticeable: as if they had not been trained in working under fire in the
open. As to the general form of our attack against the hills on our
right, it seemed to be what our French Allies call _décousu_. After a
whole day's rest and preparing, there might have been more form and
shape about the movement. Yet it was for the sake of this form and shape
that the Turkish reinforcements have been given time to get on to the
heights. Our stratagems worked well, but there is a time limit set to
all make-believes; the hour glass of fate was set at forty-eight hours,
and now the sands have run out.
Before going over to Anzac I had to get hold of Stopford so as to hear
what news had come in from Hammersley and from Mahon. If only Mahon is
pushing forward to Ejelmer Bay and can occupy the high range to the East
of it that would make amends for much. After breakfast, therefore, at
8.30 got into a launch and landed at Ghazi Baba with young Brodrick as
my only companion. Our boat took us into a deep, narrow creek cut by
nature into the sheer rock just by Ghazi Baba--a name only; there is
nothing to distinguish that spot from any other. Along the beach
feverish activity; stores, water, ammunition, all the wants of an army
being landed. Walking up the lower slope of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, we found
Stopford, about four or five hundred yards East of Ghazi Baba, busy with
part of a Field Company of Engineers supervising the building of some
splinter-proof Headquarters huts for himself and Staff. He was absorbed
in the work, and he said that it would be well to make a thorough good
job of the dug-outs as we should probably be here for a very long time.
I retorted, "Devil a bit; within a day or two you will be picking the
best of the Anafarta houses for your billet."
From the spot he had selected the whole of Suvla Bay and the Salt Lake
lay open; also the Anafartas and Yilghin Burnu. But, being on a lower
spur of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, his post was "dead" to the fighting taking
place along the crest of Kiretch Tepe Sirt itself. I remarked on this
and asked what news of the Irish, saying that now we were certainly
forestalled at Yilghin Burnu and, apparently, on Tekke Tepe also, it was
doubly essential Mahon should make a clean sweep of the ridge. Stopford
said he was confident he would be able to do so, aided as he would be by
the fire from the ships in the harbour--a fire which enfiladed the whole
length of this feature.
As to this morning's hold up, Stopford took it philosophically, which
was well so far as it went, but he seemed hardly to realize that the
Turks have rushed their guns and reinforcements here from a very long
way off whilst he has been creeping along at the rate of a mile a day.
Stopford expected Hammersley would be in to report progress in person;
he will keep me well posted in his news and he understands that the
Welsh Division will be at his disposal to help the 11th Division.
As Stopford could give me no recent news from Mahon I suggested I should
go and find out from him personally how matters then stood. Stopford
said it was a good idea but that he himself thought it better not to
leave his Headquarters where messages kept coming in. I agreed and
started with George Brodrick to scale the hill.
About half a mile up we struck a crowd of the Irish Pioneer Regiment
(Granard's) filling their water bottles at a well marked on the map as
Charak Cheshme. In their company we now made our way Northwards along a
path through fairly thick scrub as high as a man's waist. We were moving
parallel to, and about 300 yards below, the crestline of the ridge. When
we had gone another mile a spattering of "overs" began to fall around
like the first heavy drops of a thunderstorm. So wrapped in cotton wool
is a now-a-days Commander-in-Chief that this was the first musketry fire
I could claim to have come under since the beginning of the war. To sit
in a trench and hear flights of bullets flop into the sandbag parapet,
or pass harmlessly overhead, is hardly to be under fire. An irregular
stream of Irishmen were walking up the path along with us; one of them
was hit just ahead of me. He caught it in the thigh and stretcher men
whipped him off in a jiffy. At last we got to a spot some 2-1/2 miles
from Suvla and had not yet been able to find Mahon. So I sat down behind
a stone, somewhere about the letter "K" of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and sent
young Brodrick to espy the land. He found that we had pulled up within a
couple of hundred yards of the Brigade Headquarters, where portions of
the 30th, 31st and 34th Brigades (sounds very formidable but only five
Battalions) were holding a spur and preparing to make an attack. General
Mahon was actually in the Brigade Headquarters (a tiny ditch which only
held four or five people) and came back to where I was sitting. He is
angry, and small wonder, at the chaos introduced somehow into the Corps.
He is commanding some of Hammersley's men and Hammersley has the bulk of
his at the far extremity of the line of battle. He besought me to do my
utmost to get Hill and his troops back to their own command.
I told him G.H.Q. had always understood Stopford would land his,
Mahon's, two Brigades intact at A Beach. When the naval people could not
find a beach at A, they, presumably with Stopford's concurrence, had
most unluckily dumped them ashore several miles South at C Beach. This
was the cause of the mix-up of his Division which Stopford, no doubt,
would take in hand as soon as he could. Mahon seemed in fighting form.
He said he could clear the whole of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, but that he did
not want to lose men in making frontal attacks, so he was trying to work
round South through the thick scrub so as to shift the enemy that way.
He had reckoned five or six hundred men were against him--gendarmes. But
there were more than there had been at daylight. My talk with Mahon made
me happier. Here, at least, was someone who had an idea of what he was
doing. The main thing was to attack before more Turks came down the
coast. My own idea would certainly have been to knock the Turks out by a
bayonet charge--right there. So far they had not had time to dig a
regular trench, only a few shallow scrapings along a natural fold of the
ground. If Mahon wished to make a turning movement, then, I think, he
would have been well advised to take it by the North where the ground
over which he must advance was not only unentrenched and clear of brush,
but also laid quite open to the supporting fire of the Fleet. But I kept
these views to myself until I could see Stopford; said good-bye to Mahon
and wished him luck; found Brodrick had wandered off on his own to see
the fun at close quarters; legged it, all alone, down the open southern
slope of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt and got down into ground less open to
snipers' fire from the scrub-covered plain.[7] Then, still quite alone,
I made my way back South-west towards Ghazi Baba on Suvla Bay. After a
little I was joined by two young Irish soldiers. I don't know who or
what they took me for; certainly not for the Generalissimo. They came
along with me and discussed identical adventures from diametrically
different standpoints. One, in fact, was an optimist; the other a
pessimist. One found fault with the war for not giving him enough
hardship and adventure; the other was entirely fed up with adventures
and hardships. This seems a trivial incident to jot down amidst issues
so tremendous, but life is life, and my chat with these youngsters put
some new life into me. Nearing the shore, I again struck Stopford's
Headquarters, now beginning to look habitable. Braithwaite, and one or
two others of my Staff turned up from Imbros at that moment. He shoved
some cables into my hand and hastened off to interview Reed. Helles and
Anzac have been duly warned we are both here for a few hours; all the
component parts of my machine, its cranks, levers, pulleys, are
assembled at Imbros, and G.H.Q. simply cannot be left under a junior
much longer. Meanwhile I told Stopford about Mahon and the gendarmes.
When I said that the sooner the Kiretch Tepe nettle was grasped the less
it would sting, he informed me he had issued an order that Commanders
were not to lose men by making frontal attacks on trenches but were to
turn them.
So here is a theory which South African practice proved to be more often
wrong than right being treated as an axiom at Gallipoli!
We next went into the question of digging a defensive line of trenches
half-way between Corps Headquarters and Mahon's force. Here we were in
accord. No man knows his luck and the tide may turn any moment. Both at
Liao-Yang and the Shaho the Japanese began to dig deep trenches directly
they captured a position.
Young Brodrick rejoined me here; rather anxious at having lost me. He
had found Mahon with the Brigade Staff. He had been shown the exact
positions on a rough sketch map made by one of the Officers. We had
three Battalions in the firing line and two in reserve. The gendarmerie
had been reinforced and were now estimated at 700 without machine guns
or artillery. We had a mountain battery shelling the gendarmes and a
monitor occasionally gave them a big fellow. The Brigade Staff had said
nothing to him about a battalion working round to the South. I repeated
this to Stopford and begged him to make a push for it here.
By now Braithwaite had finished with Reed, so we hurriedly discussed his
budget of news. Hammersley is expected but he has not turned up yet.
Indeed the situation is still by no means free from anxiety although the
arrival of the Welsh Division gives confidence. A battalion of the 32nd
Brigade did get up on to Tekke Tepe last night, it seems, but were
knocked off this morning before they had time to entrench.[8] Seeing
they should have had several hours time to dig in, that seems strange.
Braithwaite handed me a bunch of signals and wires; also the news of
what I had known at the back of my mind since morning,--the fact that we
had not got Sari Bair! Then we started back to see de Robeck and Keyes.
For the first time in this expedition Roger Keyes seemed down on his
luck: we had often before seen him raging, never dejected. These awful
delays:--delay in landing the Irish; delay in attacking on the 7th;
delay all night of the 7th; delay during the day of the 8th and night of
the 8th, have simply deprived him of the power of speech,--to soldiers,
that is to say, though, to shipmates, no doubt...!
Now for Anzac. Since dawn a fever about Anzac had held me. Shades of
Staff College Professors, from you no forgiveness to a Chief who runs
about the mountain quitting his central post. But the luminous shade of
Napoleon would better understand my desperation. Some Generals are just
accumulators of the will of the C.-in-C. When that is the case, and when
they run down, there is only one man who can hope to pump in energy.
Exact at noon Roger Keyes and I pushed off in the racing motor boat. On
our way we stopped at "C" beach and picked up Commander Worsley. Next to
Anzac, but at the Cove, found that Birdwood had left word he would meet
me at the ex-Turkish Post No. 2,--so, as the water was shoal in spots,
we rowed down there in a dinghy, along the shore where our lives would
not have been worth half a minute's purchase just three days ago.
After scrambling awhile over the new trenches, Birdwood, Godley and I
sat down on a high spur above Godley's Headquarters which gave us a
grand outlook over the whole Suvla area, and across to Chunuk Bair. Here
we ate our rations and held an impromptu council of war; Shaw,
commanding the new 13th Division, joining in with us. All three Generals
were in high spirits and refused to allow themselves to be damped down
by the repulse of the morning's attack on the high ridge. They put down
that check to the lethargy of Suvla. Had Stopford taken up any point on
the watershed yesterday when it was unoccupied except by some fugitives,
the whole Turkish position on the Peninsula would have become so
critical that they could not have spared the numbers they have now
brought up to defend "Q" and Koja Chemen Tepe. The Anzac Generals
allowed that they themselves had got into arrears in their time tables,
but they had been swift compared to Suvla.
Even as Godley was holding forth, messages came to hand to say that the
Turks were passing from the defensive to the offensive and urging fresh
attacks on the New Zealanders holding Chunuk Bair. Godley is certain the
Turks will never make us quit hold. Shaw, who also has some of his men
up there, is equally confident. Birdwood thinks Chunuk Bair should be
safe, though not so safe as it would have been had we held on to that
ridge at "Q" where Baldwin's delay from causes not yet known, lost us
the crestline this morning. Birdie said he could have cried, and is not
quite sure he didn't cry, when the bombardment stopped dead and minute
after minute passed away, from one minute to twenty, without a sign
of Baldwin and his column who had been booked to spurt for the top on
the heels of the last shell. Unaided, the 6th Gurkhas got well astride
the ridge, but had to fall back owing to the lack of his support. None
the less, these Anzac Generals are in great form. They are sure they
will have the whip hand of the Narrows by to-morrow.
[Illustration: GENERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. _"Elliott and
Fry" phot._]
Birdie was offered my last reserves, the 54th Essex Territorials under
Inglefield. But he can't water them. The effort to carry food, water and
cartridges to the firing lines is already overtaxing the Corps. If
Inglefield's men were also pushed in they simply could not be kept
going. When communication trenches have been dug and brushwood and rocks
flattened out, it will be easier. Till then, the Generals agreed they
would rather the extra pressure was applied from Suvla. Birdwood and
Godley were keen, in fact, that the Essex Division should go to Stopford
so that he might at once occupy Kavak Tepe and, if he could, Tekke Tepe.
All that the Anzacs have seen for themselves, or heard from their own
extreme left or from aeroplanes, leads them to believe that the Turkish
reinforcements to the Suvla theatre came over the high shoulder of Tekke
Tepe or through Anafarta Sagir about dawn this morning and that the
enemy are in some strength now along the ridge between Anafarta Sagir
and Ismail Oglu Tepe with a few hundred on Kiretch Tepe Sirt: the
Turkish centre was a gift to us yesterday; certainly yesterday forenoon;
now it can only be won by hard fighting. But the Turks have not yet had
time to work round on to the high ridges east of Suvla Bay and although
a few Turks did pass over Kavak Tepe, it seems to be now clear of any
enemy. There is no sign of life on the bare Eastern slope of that
mountain. Probably one half of the great crescent of hills which
encircles the Suvla plain and, in places, should overlook the Narrows,
still lies open to an advance.
So together we composed a message to Stopford and Godley sent it off by
telephone--now rigged up between the two Corps Headquarters: the form
was filled in by Godley; hence his counter signature:--
* * * * *
TO:--G.O.C., IXth Corps.
Sender's number. Day of month. In reply to
N.Z.G. 103 9 number AAA
After speaking to Birdwood and Godley
think most important use fresh troops could
be put to if not urgently required to reinforce
would be the occupation as early as possible
of the commanding position running through
square 137-119 AAA Ismail Oglu Tepe are
less vital to security of base.
SIR IAN HAMILTON.
_From_
_Place_ Fisherman's Hut.
_Date_ 2 p.m. 9th August, 1915.
A. J. GODLEY,
Maj. Gen.
* * * * *
Took leave of the Anzacs and the Anzac Generals about 4.30 p.m. The
whole crowd were in tip-top spirits and immensely pleased with the
freedom and largeness of their newly conquered kingdom. We of the G.H.Q.
were bitten by this same spirit; Suvla took second place in our minds
and when we got on board the _Arno_ the ugly events of the early morning
had been shaken, for the moment, out of our minds. But, on the sail
home, we were able to look at the Peninsula as a whole. Because the
Anzacs, plus the 13th Division of the New Army, had carried through a
brilliant stroke of arms was a reason, not for shutting our eyes to the
slowness of the Suvla Generals, but for spurring them on to do likewise.
There is nothing open to them now--not without efforts for which they
are, for the time being, unfit--but Kavak Tepe and the Aja Liman
Anafarta ridge. So, on arrival at 6 p.m., wrote out the following
message from myself to General Stopford:--
* * * * *
"I am in complete sympathy with you in the matter of all your Officers
and men being new to this style of warfare and without any leaven of
experienced troops on which to form themselves. Still I should be wrong
if I did not express my concern at the want of energy and push displayed
by the 11th Division. It cannot all be want of experience as 13th have
shown dash and self-confidence. Turks were almost negligible yesterday
once you got ashore. To-day there was nothing to stop determined
commanders leading such fine men as yours. Tell me what is wrong with
the 11th Division. Is it the Divisional Generals or Brigadiers or both?
I have a first-rate Major General I can send at once and can also supply
two competent Brigadiers. You must get a move on or the whole plan of
operations is in danger of failing, for if you don't secure the AJA
LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge without delay the enemy will. You must use your
personal influence to insist on vigorous and sustained action against
the weak forces of the Turks in your front, and while agreeing to the
capture of W Hills and spur mentioned in C.G.S. letter to you of to-day,
it is of vital importance to the whole operation that you thereafter
promptly take steps to secure the ridge without possession of which
SUVLA BAY is not safe. You must face casualties and strike while the
opportunity offers and remember the AJA LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge is your
principal and dominant objective and it must be captured. Every day's
delay in its capture will enormously multiply your casualties. I want
the name of the Brigadier who sent the message to say his left was
retiring owing to a strong attack and then subsequently reported that
the attack in question has never developed. Keep Birdwood informed as he
may be able to help you on your right flank."
[Illustration: LIEUT. GEN SIR A. J. GODLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. _"Elliott
and Fry phot."_]
This message seemed so important that it was sent by hand of
Hore-Ruthven and another Officer by special destroyer. Braithwaite tells
me that, when he was at 9th Corps Headquarters to-day he showed General
Stopford the last two paragraphs of this memo which I had written when
toning down the wording of a General Staff draft:--
* * * * *
"C.G.S.
"(1) I do not think much good rubbing it into these fellows, there are
very few Turks opposed to them. We have done it, and that was right, but
we must not overdo it.
"(2) But the men ought to be made to understand that really the whole
result of this campaign may depend on their quickly getting a footing on
the hills right and left of Anafarta. Officers and rank and file must be
made to grasp this.
"(3) If Lindley and his new men were kept intact and thrown in on the
Anzac flank, surely they ought to be able to make a lodgment.
(_Initialled_), "IAN H."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 2: Must have meant south-east?--IAN H., 1920.]
[Footnote 3: Long afterwards--long after the Dardanelles Commission had
finished their Report--I had the curiosity to get permission to look at
the log of the _Exmouth_ (Rear-Admiral Nicholson) to see how my cable
had been translated. Here it is, very much Bowdlerized:--"Sent 11.45,
received 11.59. Sir I. Hamilton to Rear-Admiral 3. Urgent. 'Understand
_Arno_ drawing fires. Can this be stopped and _Arno_ sent (to)
_Mercedes_ to water at once? _Arno_ specially put at my disposal by
Vice-Admiral and I may require her at any moment.'" The _Mercedes_ was
the ship with our military drinking water.]
[Footnote 4: There is a hiatus in my diary here which I must try and
bridge over by a footnote especially as my story seems to run off the
rails when I say that "nothing further" had come in from Suvla. At 10.50
a.m. a further cable did come in from Suvla:--
* * * * *
"Approximate position of troops under General Hammersley this morning.
Two battalions 33rd Brigade sea to S.E. corner of Salt Lake: will be
moved forward shortly to connect if possible with Anzac troops. Two
battalions 33rd holding Yilghin Burnu. Position on Hill 500 yards East
Yilghin Burnu not yet certain. From Yilghin Burnu 31st Brigade holds
line through Baka Baba crossroads, thence North to about 118 0 2. 32nd
and 34th Brigades ordered forward from Hill 10 (117 R) where they spent
night to line 118 M.R.W. to fill gap with Tenth Division. Detailed
information of Tenth Division not yet definite: will report later.
Consider Major-General Hammersley and troops under him deserve great
credit for result attained against strenuous opposition and great
difficulty."
Manifestly, the data in this cable were not enough to enable me to form
any opinion of my own as to the credit due to anyone; but every soldier
will understand that it was up to me to respond:
"To G.O.C. 8th Corps.
"From General Sir Ian Hamilton.
"You and your troops have indeed done splendidly. Please tell Hammersley
how much we hope from his able and rapid advance."
I made no written note of this 10.50 a.m. cable (or of my reply to it)
at the time and, eighteen months later, no mental note of it remained,
probably because it had only added some detail to the news received
during the night. But I had reason to regret this afterwards when I came
to read the final Report of the Dardanelles Commission, paragraph 89.
There I see it stated that "with regard to this message" (my pat on the
back for Hammersley) "Sir Frederick Stopford informed us that the result
of the operations on the night of the 6th and day of the 7th was not as
satisfactory as he would have liked but he gathered from Sir Ian
Hamilton's congratulations that his dispositions and orders had met with
the latter's approval"
As to my actual feelings that forenoon, I do remember them well. At
sunrise victory seemed assured. As morning melted into mid-day my mind
became more and more uneasy at the scant news about the Irish Division
and at the lack of news of a further advance of the 11th Division. This
growing anxiety drove me to quit my headquarters and to take ship for
Suvla.]
[Footnote 5: The Admiral's wireless had said, so I was told:--"It is
important we should meet--shall I come to Kephalos or are you coming to
Suvla?" As stated in text I did not get this cable at the time nor did I
ever get it. Four years later the signal logs of the only ships through
which the message could have passed; viz., _Triad_, _Exmouth_,
_Chatham_, were searched and there is no trace of it. So I think it must
have been drafted and overlooked.--IAN H., 1920.
Aspinall's cable:--"Just been ashore where I found all quiet AAA. No
rifle fire, no artillery fire and apparently no Turks AAA. IXth Corps
resting AAA. Feel confident that golden opportunities are being lost and
look upon the situation as serious." I received this next morning from
Braithwaite.--IAN H., 1920.]
[Footnote 6: Looking to the distance of Sulajik, the Brigade might have
been expected to move in about an hour and a half. But, as I did not
know at the time, or indeed till two years later, this Brigade was _not_
concentrated. Only two battalions were at Sulajik; the other two, the
6th East Yorks and the 9th West Yorks, were in possession of Hill 70,
vide map.--IAN H., 1920.]
[Footnote 7: My Aide-de-Camp, George Brodrick, has permitted me to use
the following extract from a letter of his written to his father, Lord
Midleton, at the time.
* * * * *
"I went to Suvla with Sir Ian in the afternoon of August 8th, and we
arrived to find 'Nothing doing.' The beaches and hillsides covered with
our men almost like a Bank Holiday evening at Hampstead Heath. Vague
shelling by one of our monitors was the only thing which broke the peace
of a most perfect evening--a glorious sunset.
"We went over to the Destroyer where General Stopford had his
Headquarters, and I fancy words of exhortation were spoken to him. We
slept on the Triad, Admiral de Robeck's Yacht. I had a camp bed on the
Bridge, so as to hear any happenings during the night. About dawn our
Monitors started to shell the heights behind Anafarta and a sort of
assault was made; the Turkish battery opened with shrapnel, and our
fellows did not seem to get very far.
"We went ashore on 'A' beach about 8 a.m. and walked up to Stopford's
Headquarters, as he had gone ashore the night before. They all seemed a
very lifeless crew, with but little knowledge of the general situation
and no spirit in them. We made our way on across some rocky scrubby
country towards Brigade Headquarters; fairly heavy rifle fire was going
on, and after about two miles bullets began to ping unpleasantly all
round us. I persuaded Sir Ian to lie down behind a rock, much against
his will, and went on myself another 150 yards to where the Brigade
Staff were sitting in a dip behind a stone wall. They told me that about
800 Turks were in front of them with no machine guns. We had 3
Battalions in the firing line and two in reserve and yet could not get
on."]
[Footnote 8: Only one Company we hear now.--IAN H., 15.8.15.]