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GALLIPOLI DIARY
BY GENERAL
SIR IAN HAMILTON, G.C.B.
AUTHOR OF "A STAFF OFFICER'S SCRAP-BOOK," ETC.
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II
NEW YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
1920
PRINTED BY
UNWIN BROTHERS, LTD.--WOKING--ENGLAND
* * * * *
[Illustration: _"Central News" phot._
BRAITHWAITE, SIR IAN AND FREDDIE MAITLAND]
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
XIII. K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 1
XIV. THE FORCE--REAL AND IMAGINARY 25
XV. SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 52
XVI. KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 86
XVII. THE LAST BATTLE 120
XVIII. MISUNDERSTANDINGS 144
XIX. THE FRENCH PLAN 163
XX. LOOS AND SALONIKA 196
XXI. THE BEGINNING OF THE END 234
APPENDIX I. STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL
SIR H. S. BAIKIE 279
APPENDIX II. NOTES BY LIEUT.-COL. C. ROSENTHAL RELATING
TO ARTILLERY AT ANZAC 292
APPENDIX III. SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS RELATING
TO THE SUVLA OPERATIONS 298
APPENDIX IV. INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GEN. H. DE LISLE 335
INDEX 339
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
BRAITHWAITE, SIR IAN, AND FREDDIE MAITLAND _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
MAJOR-GEN. SIR G. F. ELLISON, K.C.M.G. 6
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. G. HUNTER-WESTON, K.C.B., D.S.O 22
SUVLA FROM CHUNUK BAIR 54
GENERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, BART., G.C.M.G., K.C.B. 80
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. J. GODLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. 84
GENERAL BAILLOUD 146
FISH FROM THE ENEMY 170
MARSHAL LIMAN VON SANDERS 182
CREMATING THE ENEMY DEAD 256
MAP
SUVLA AND ANZAC _At end of Volume_
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|Transcriber's Note: Some tables were too wide to place as in the |
|original. They have been split, with the right hand side positioned|
|directly below the left hand side. |
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* * * * *
GALLIPOLI DIARY
CHAPTER XIII
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY
_11th July, 1915._ Worked in my office from early morning till 12.45.
The whole scheme for to-morrow's attack is cut and dried, according to
our cloth: time tables fixed and every round counted.
Freddy Stopford and his Staff turned up from Mudros. Stopford in very
good form. The first thing he did was to deliver himself of a personal
message from Lord K. He (Stopford) wrote it down, in the ante-room, the
moment he left the presence and I may take it as being as good as
verbatim. Here it is:--
"Lord Kitchener told me to tell you he had no wish to interfere
with the man on the spot, but from closely watching our actions
here, as well as those of General French in Flanders, he is certain
that the only way to make a real success of an attack is by
surprise. Also, that when the surprise ceases to be operative, in
so far that the advance is checked and the enemy begin to collect
from all sides to oppose the attackers, then, perseverance becomes
merely a useless waste of life. In every attack there seems to be a
moment when success is in the assailant's grasp. Both the French
and ourselves at Arras and Neuve Chapelle lost the opportunity."
Well said! K. has made Stopford bring me in his pocket the very text for
what I wanted to say to him. Only my grumbling thoughts find expression
by my pen but I have plenty of others and my heart has its warm corner
for K. whenever he cares to come in.
As I told Stopford, K. has not only anticipated my advice but has dived
right down into this muddle of twentieth century war and finds lying at
the bottom of it only the old original idea of war in the year 1. At our
first landing the way was open to us for just so long as the _surprise_
to the Turks lasted. That period here, at the Dardanelles, might be
taken as being perhaps twice as long as it would be on the Western front
which gave us a great pull. The reason was that land communications were
bad and our troops on the sea could move thrice as fast as the Turks on
their one or two bad roads. Yet, even so, there was no margin for
dawdling. Hunter-Weston and d'Amade had tried their best to use their
brief _surprise_ breathing space in seizing the Key to the opening of
the Narrows--Achi Baba, and had failed through lack of small craft, lack
of water, lack of means of bringing up supplies, lack of our 10 per
cent. reserves to fill casualties. At that crucial moment when we had
beaten the local enemy troops and the enemy reinforcements had not yet
come up, we could not get the men or the stuff quick enough to shore.
Still, we had gained three or four miles and there were spots on the
Peninsula where, to-day, three or four miles would be enough. Also,
supposing he had to run a landing, his (Stopford's) action would take
place under much easier conditions than Hunter-Weston's on April 25th.
First and foremost, in our "beetles" or barges, conveying 500 men under
their own engines, we had an instrument which reduced the physical
effort three quarters. This meant half the battle. When we made our
original landing at Anzac we could only put 1,500 men ashore, per trip,
at a speed of 2-1/2 miles per hour, in open cutters. Were a Commander to
repeat that landing now, he would be able to run 5,000 men ashore, per
trip, at a speed of five miles per hour with no trouble about oars,
tows, etc., and with protection against shrapnel and rifle bullets. As
to the actual landing on the beach, that could be done--we had proved
it--in less than one quarter of the time. Each beetle had a "brow" fixed
on to her bows; a thing to be let down like a drawbridge over which the
men could pour ashore by fours; the same with mules, guns, supplies,
they could all be rushed on land as fast as they could be handled on the
beaches. Secondly, we had already been for some time at work to fix up
the wherewithal to meet our chronic nightmare, the water trouble.
Thirdly, the system of bringing up food and ammunition from the beaches
to the firing line had now been practically worked out into a science at
Helles and Anzac where Stopford would be given a chance of studying it
at first hand.
As to place, date, command, and distribution of forces, these were still
being considered; still undetermined; and I could say no more at
present. Braithwaite was away at Helles but, if he would go over to the
General Staff, he would find Aspinall, my G.S. (1), and the Q. Staff who
would give him the hang of our methods and post him in matters which
would be applicable to any date or place.
There was more in this message as taken down by Stopford. After going
into some details of trench warfare, K.'s message went on:--
* * * * *
"It is not the wish of the Cabinet that Sir Ian Hamilton should make
partial attacks. They (the Cabinet) consider it preferable that he
should await the arrival of his reinforcements to make one great effort,
which, if successful, will give them the ridge commanding the Narrows.
It is not intended, however, that Sir Ian should do nothing in the
meantime and if he gets a really good opportunity he is to seize it."
There is something in this reminds me of Kuropatkin's orders to
Stakelberg, yet I am glad to find that our spontaneously generated
scheme jumps with the views of the Cabinet, for, there is only one
"ridge commanding the Narrows" (Kilid Bahr is a plateau), and it is that
ridge we mean to try for by "one great effort."
In my reply I shall merely acknowledge. Sari Bair is my secret; my Open
Sesame to the cave where the forty thieves of the Committee of Union
and Progress have their Headquarters. It makes me uneasy to think the
Cabinet are talking about Sari Bair.
A battle is a swirl of "ifs" and "ands." The Commander who enters upon
it possessed by some just and clear principle is like a sailing ship
entering a typhoon on the right tack. After that he lives from hand to
mouth. How far will wise saws cut ice? How much nearer do you get to
shooting a snipe by being _told_ how not to take your aim? Well thought
out plans and preparations deserve to win; order and punctuality on the
part of subordinates tend to make the reality correspond to the General
Staff conception; surprise, if the Commander can bring it off, is worth
all K. can say of it; the energy and rapidity of the chosen troops will
exploit that surprise for its full value--bar, always, Luck--the Joker;
and Wish to Fight and Will to Win are the surest victory getters in the
pack. The more these factors are examined, the more sure it is that
everything must in the last resort depend upon the _executive_
Commander; and here, of course, I am referring to an _enterprise_, not
to a huge, mechanically organized dead-lock like the western front.
Stopford was away in G.H.Q. Staff tents all afternoon; afterwards both
he and Adderley, his A.D.C., dined. Stopford likes Reed who is, indeed,
a very pleasant fellow to work with. Still, I stick to what I wrote
Wolfe Murray:--the _combination_ of Stopford and Reed is not good; not
for this sort of job.
_12th July, 1915. Imbros._ Had meant to start for Helles an hour before
daylight to witness the opening of the attack by the French Corps and
the Lowland Division. But am too bad with the universal complaint to
venture many yards from camp.
Stopford and Staff breakfasted. He has fallen in love with our ideas.
After lunch he and his party left for Mudros. Am forcing myself to write
so as to ease the strain of waiting: the battle is going on: backwards
and forwards--backwards and forwards--I travel between my tent; the
signal station, and the G.S. map tent.
A delightful message from K., thanking me for my letters: patting me on
the back; telling me that Altham is coming out to run the
communications, and Ellison to serve on my Staff.
Thank heavens we are at last to have a business man at the head of our
business! As to Ellison, K.'s conscience has for long been smiting him
for not having let me take my own C.G.S. with me in the first instance.
But Braithwaite has won his spurs now in many a hair-raising crisis, so
K. may let his mind rest at ease.
[Illustration: MAJ.-GEN. SIR G. F. ELLISON, K.C.M.G. _F.A. Swaine phot._]
Freddie Maitland and I dined with the Vice-Admiral who kept a signaller
on special watch for my messages from the shore--but nothing came in.
He, the Admiral, wants to take all the 600 stokers serving in the Royal
Naval Division back to the ships. This will be the last straw to the
Division. We had the treat of being taken off the _Triad_ in the
Admiral's racing motor boat and when we got ashore found good news which
I have just cabled home:--
* * * * *
"In the southern section we attacked at daylight to-day with our right
and right centre. After heavy fighting lasting all day the troops
engaged, namely, the French Corps and the LIInd Lowland Division, have
succeeded in carrying the two strongly held and fortified lines of
Turkish trenches opposite to them. The ground covered by the advance
varies in depth from 200 to 400 yards, and if we can maintain our gains
against to-night's counter-attacks the effect of the action will be not
only to advance but greatly to strengthen our line. Full details
to-morrow."
_13th July, 1915. Imbros._ Still feeling very slack. Nothing clear from
Helles. My cable best explains:--
* * * * *
"Troops have been continuously engaged since my last cable, but
situation is still too confused to admit of definition, especially as
telephone wires all cut by shell or rifle fire.
"So far as can be gathered the sum total of the engagements taking place
in a labyrinth of trenches is satisfactory up to the hour of cabling and
we have taken some 200 prisoners. I hope I shall be able to send
definite news to-morrow morning."
Oh, energy, to what distant clime have you flown? I used to be
energetic; not perhaps according to Evelyn Wood's standards--but
still--energetic! Yet, see me to-day, when a poor cousin to the
cholera--this cursed enteritis--lays me by the heels; fills me with
desperate longing to lie down and do nothing but rest. More than half my
Staff and troops are in the same state of indescribable slackness and
this, I think, must be the reason the Greeks were ten long years taking
Troy.
Some newspaper correspondents have arrived. I have told them they may do
whatever they d--d well please. Ashmead-Bartlett is vexed at his
monopoly being spoiled. Charlie Burn, who came with the King's bag,
lunched. The Vice-Admiral, Roger Keyes, and Flag-Lieutenant Bowlby
dined; very good of them to leave their own perfectly appointed table
for our rough and ready fare. The A.D.C.s between them managed to get
some partridges, opulent birds which lent quite a Ritzian tone to our
banquet.
As was expected, the Turks counter-attacked heavily last night but were
unable to drive us out except in one small section on our right. To-day,
fighting is still going on and the Naval Division are in it now. We have
made a good gain and taken over 400 prisoners and a machine gun. We are
still on the rack, though, as there are a lot of Turks not yet cleared
out from holes and corners of our new holding, and ammunition is running
very short. If our ammunition does not run out altogether and we can
hold what we have, our total gain will be 500 yards depth.
Since June 4th, when we had to whang off the whole of our priceless 600
rounds of H.E., we have had _none_ for 18-prs. on the Peninsula--not one
solitary demnition round; nor do we seem in the least likely to get one
solitary demnition round. Hunter-Weston and his C.R.A. explain forcibly,
not to say explosively, that on the 28th June the right attack would
have scored a success equally brilliant to that achieved by the 29th
Division on our left, had we been able to allot as many shell to the
Turkish trenches assaulted by the 156th Brigade--Lowland Division--as we
did to the sector by the sea. But we could not, because, once we had
given a fair quota to the left, there was not enough stuff in our
lockers for the right. Such is war! No use splitting the difference and
trying to win everywhere like high brows halting between Flanders and
Gallipoli. But I _am_ sick at heart, I must say, to think my brother
Scots should have had to catch hold of the hot end of the poker. Also to
think that, with another couple of hundred rounds, we should have got
and held H. 12. H. 12 which dominates--so prisoners say--the wells
whence the enemy draws water for the whole of his right wing.
To-day the old trouble is a-foot once again. Hunter-Weston tells us the
Turkish counter-attacks are being pressed with utmost fury and are
beginning to look ugly, as we can give our infantry no support from our
guns although the enemy offer excellent artillery targets. When K. is
extra accommodating it is doubly hard to be importunate, but it's got to
be done:--
* * * * *
_General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener._
"With reference to my telegrams No. M.F. 328 of 13th June and No. M.F.
381 of 28th June. Each successive fight shows more clearly than the last
how much may hang on an ample supply of ammunition, more especially high
explosive howitzer ammunition. In my telegram No. M.F. 381 I said that I
hoped we might be able to achieve success with the ammunition already
promised, and I adhere to that opinion; but every additional 100 rounds
means some reduction of risks and greater assurance of success. I raise
this question again because I gather from what I hear that matters in
the other theatre of operations may possibly be at a standstill without
much prospect of any vital alteration before the autumn fairly sets in.
If this should be the case it is for you to consider whether a larger
and more regular supply of ammunition should be sent to me in order to
give this force the utmost chance of gaining an early success. Judging
from the increased effect of the bombardments before the last two
attacks on facilitating the Infantry advance I am led to hope that this
success would not be long delayed under the cumulative effect of
unremitting bombardment. If, therefore, any change in the general
situation should make it possible to allow me temporary preferential
claim to all the ammunition I should like, I would ask for the following
amounts to be here by 1st August, in addition to those accompanying the
troops and already promised, namely, 4.5-inch howitzer, 3,000 rounds;
5-inch howitzer, 7,000 rounds; 6-inch howitzer, 5,000, and 9.3-inch
howitzer, 500 rounds, all high explosive. I should also ask for a
monthly supply on the following scale, first consignment to arrive
before 15th August:--
"18-pr. 300,000
"4.5-inch howitzer 30,000
"5-inch howitzer 30,000
"6-inch howitzer 24,000
"60-pr. 15,000
"9.2-inch howitzer 6,000
"The howitzer ammunition to be all high explosive, the 60-pr. to be
one-third shrapnel and two-thirds high explosive, and the 18-pr. to be
half of each.
"The above monthly scale includes ammunition for the following
additional ordnance which I should like to get, namely, two batteries of
4.5-inch howitzers for each of the Xth and XIth Divisions (since 5-inch
howitzers are found to be too inaccurate to bombard the enemy trenches
even in close proximity to our own), one battery of 6-inch howitzers and
four 9.2-inch howitzers.
"On the assumption already made it might be possible for you to arrange
to forward to Ordnance Stores, Marseilles, the ammunition asked for to
be here by 1st August. Time would thus be gained to accumulate the
supply required, and I could arrange with the Vice-Admiral to send a
fast steamer of 1,000 tons hold capacity to bring the consignment of
high explosives from Marseilles. To get the steamer coaled, to arrive at
Marseilles, coal again and be ready to receive the ammunition, would
take seven days.
"Please understand that this suggestion is only prompted for the
following reasons: (1) My growing belief that ample artillery might,
within a limited period, lead to quite a considerable success in this
theatre, and (2) because the reports which reach me seem to indicate
that an offensive is not likely to be undertaken elsewhere at present
(and I have mainly asked for offensive ammunition).
"The monthly supply above detailed I should not expect would be required
for more than two months."
If our Government really--whole-heartedly--_will_ that there should be a
complete success in the East, they must, equally, with whole hearts and
braced-up _will_, resist (for a while) the idea of any offensive in the
West. In saying this I speak of the A.B.C. of war. The main theatre is
where the amphibious power wishes to make it so. This cable of mine sent
to a man like Lord K. is a very strong order. But now is the time to
speak up and let him realize that he must let the fields of France lie
fallow for the summer if he wishes to plough the Black Sea waves in
autumn.
_14th July, 1915. Imbros._ Wrote letters in the morning, and in the
evening went for a ride to the Salt Lake and there inspected the new
aeroplane camp on the far side of the water.
Last night more counter-attacks, all driven off. The French right is now
actually on the mouth of the Kereves Dere where it runs into the sea. We
have made about 500 prisoners and have captured a machine gun.
Hunter-Weston had to transfer the command of the 52nd Division,
temporarily, to Shaw, the new Commander of the 13th Division.
Baikie is crying out to us for shells as if _we_ were bottling them up!
There are none.
_15th July, 1915. Imbros._ The answer has come in from the War
Office:--the answer, I mean, to mine of the day before yesterday in
which it is suggested that _if_ our rich brethren were off their feed
for the moment, some crumbs of high explosive might be spared:--
* * * * *
"We have great difficulty in sending you the amounts of ammunition
mentioned in our No. 5770, cipher, and even now the proportion of 18-pr.
high explosive will be less than stated therein. In response, however,
to your No. M.F. 444, we are adding 1,000 rounds 4.5-inch, 500--5-inch,
500--6-inch and 75--9.2-inch. It will be quite impossible to continue to
send you ammunition at this rate, as we have reduced the supply to
France in order to send what we have to you, and the amounts asked for
in the second part of your telegram could not be spared without stopping
all operations in France. This, of course, is out of the question."
"This, of course, is out of the question." "Stopping all operations in
France" is the very kernel of the question. If half the things we hear
about the Bosche forces and our own are half true, we have no prospect
of dealing any decisive blow in the West till next spring. And an
indecisive blow is worse than no blow. But we can _hold on_ there till
all's blue. Now H.E. is offensive and shrapnel is defensive. I ought to
attack at once; French mustn't. Therefore, we should be given, _now_,
dollops of H.E.
This talk does not come through my hat. Some of the best brains on the
Western field are in touch with those of some of my following here. The
winning post stares us in the face; my old Chief gallops off the course;
how can I resist calling out? And then I get this "of course" cable (not
written by K. I feel sure) which shows, if it shows anything, that "of
course" we ought never to have come here at all! Simple, is it not? In
war all is simple--that's why it's so complex. Never mind; my cable has
not been wasted. We reckon the 1,100 extra rounds it has produced may
save us 100 British casualties.
Rode over to "K" Beach and inspected the 25th Casualty Clearing Station,
Commandant Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie. Walked through the different
hospital wards talking to some twenty officers and two hundred men;
mostly medical cases. Did not think things at all up to the mark. Made
special note of the lack of mosquito nets, beds, pyjamas and other
comforts. For weeks past Jean has been toiling to get mosquito nets
bought and made up, which was simple, and to get them out to us, which
seems impossible. Too bad when so much money is being spent to see men
lying on the ground in their thick cord breeches in this sweltering
heat, a prey to flies and mosquitoes.
Discussing the landing of the New Divisions in Suvla Bay and the
diversion to be made by Legge on the right by storming Lone Pine,
Birdwood makes it clear in a letter just to hand, that he has told his
two Divisional Generals everything. I had not yet gone into some of
these details with Hunter-Weston, Stopford or Bailloud, all Corps
Commanders, for I am afraid of the news filtering down to the juniors
and from them, in the mysterious way news does pass, to the rank and
file of both services. Thence to the Turks is but a step. Were the Turks
to get wind of our plan, there would be nothing for it but to change the
whole thing, even now, at the eleventh hour.
Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Fuller, my late G.S.O. (1) in the Central
Force, came over to lunch. He is now G.S.O. (2) of the 9th Corps.
At 5.30 p.m. rode over to "K" Beach for the second time and inspected
the Indian Brigade under Brigadier-General Cox. They had to be pulled
out some time ago and given a rest. On parade were the 5th, 6th and 10th
Gurkha Battalions with the 14th Sikhs. Walked down both lines and
chatted with the British and Indian Officers. The men looked cheerful
and much recovered. In the evening Charlie Burn, King's Messenger, and
Captain Glyn came to dinner. Glyn has been sent out as a sort of
emissary, but whether by K. or by the Intelligence or by the Admiralty
neither Braithwaite nor I are quite able to understand.
Cabled the War Office _insisting_ that the lack of ammunition is
"disturbing." Also, that "half my anxieties would vanish" if only the
Master-General of Ordnance would see to it himself that the fortnightly
allowance could be despatched regularly. I could hardly put it stronger.
_Midnight._--Just back from G.S. tent with the latest. So far, so good.
Bailloud and Hunter-Weston have carried two lines of Turkish trenches,
an advance of two to four hundred yards. But the ammunition question has
reached a crisis, and has become dangerous--very dangerous. On the whole
Southern theatre of operations, counting shell in limbers and shell
loaded in guns, we have 5,000 rounds of shrapnel. No high explosive--and
fighting is still going on!
_Hi jaculis illi certant defendere saxis._
To whomsoever of my ancestors bequeathed me my power of detachment deep
salaams! How many much better men than myself would not close their eyes
to-night with a battle on the balance and 5,000 rounds wherewith to
fight it? But I shall sleep--D.V.; I can't create shell by taking
thought any more than Gouraud could retake the _Haricot_ by not drinking
his coffee.
_16th July, 1915. Imbros._ Forcing myself to work though I feel
unspeakably slack; wrangling with the War Office about doctors, nurses,
orderlies and ships for our August battles. A few days ago I sent the
following cable and they want to cut us down:--
* * * * *
"It seems likely that during the first week of August we may have 80,000
rifles in the firing line striving for a decisive result, and therefore
certain that we shall then need more medical assistance. Quite
impossible to foresee casualties, but suppose, for example, we suffered
a loss of 20,000 men; though the figure seems alarming when put down in
cold blood, it is not an extravagant proportion when calculated on basis
of Dardanelles fighting up to date. If this figure is translated into
terms of requirements such a battle would involve conversion of, say, 30
transports into temporary hospital ships, and necessitate something like
200 extra medical officers, with Royal Army Medical Corps rank and file
and nurses in proportion. If my prognosis is concurred in, these should
reach Mudros on or about 1st August. Some would D.V., prove superfluous,
and could be sent back at once, and in any case they could return as
soon as possible after operations, say, 1st September. Medical and
surgical equipment, drugs, mattresses in due proportion. In a separate
message I will deal with the deficiencies in ordinary establishment, but
I think it best to keep this cable as to specified and exceptional
demands distinct."
_17th July, 1915. Imbros._ After lunch felt so sick of scribble,
scribble, scribble whilst adventure sat seductive upon my doorstep that
I fluttered forth. At 2 o'clock boarded H.M.S. _Savage_
(Lieutenant-Commander Homer) and, with Aspinall and Freddie, steered for
Gully Beach. We didn't cast anchor but got into a cockleshell of a small
dinghy and rowed ashore under the cliffs, where we were met by de Lisle.
Along the beach men were either bathing or basking mother-naked on the
hot sand--enjoying themselves thoroughly. I walked on the edge of the
sea, as far as the point which hides the gully's mouth from the Turkish
gunners, and was specially struck by the physique and class of the 6th
East Lancashires under Colonel Cole Hamilton. Then mounted and rode to
the Headquarters of General Shaw, commanding the 13th (new) Division.
Shaw was feeling his wounds; he had already been once round his lines;
so I would not let him come again. But Colonel Gillivan, G.S.O.1, Major
Hillyard, G.S.O.2, Captain Jackson, G.S.O.3, Colonel Burton, A.A. and
Q.M.G., joined us. First we went to the Headquarters of the 39th Brigade
commanded by Brigadier-General Cayley (the Brigade Major is Captain
Simpson). Then I went and looked at the trenches J.11-12-13, where I met
Colonel Palmer of the 9th Warwicks, Colonel Jordan, D.S.O., of the 7th
Gloucesters, Colonel Nunn of the 9th Worcesters, Colonel Andrews of the
7th North Staffordshires. We tramped through miles of trenches. The men
were very fit and cheery. It was the day when they were relieving one
another by companies from the reserve and there was a big crowd in the
Ravine. De Lisle told me that one week had made the most astonishing
difference to the savvy of these first arrivals of the New Army. At
first there was confusion, loss of energy and time; by the end of the
week they had picked up the wrinkles of the veterans. There was a good
lot of shelling from the Turks but, humanly speaking, we were all quite
snug and safe in the big gully or moving down the deep communication
trenches. No one, not even the new 13th Division, paid the smallest
deference to the projectiles.
Now began one of these semi-comic, semi-serious adventures which seem to
dog my footsteps. Just as I got into the little dinghy, two bluejackets
pulling and a Petty Officer steering, the Turks began to shell H.M.S.
_Savage_ as she lay about a hundred yards out. She did not like it, and,
instead of waiting to let us get aboard, Commander Homer thought it
wiser to sheer off about half a mile. When she quitted the Turks turned
their guns on to our cockleshell, and although none of the shot came
near us they still came quite near enough to interest the whole gallery
of some thousands of bathing Tommies who, themselves safe in the dead
ground under the cliff, were hugely amused to see their C.-in-C. having
a hot time of it. After ten minutes hard rowing we got close to the
destroyer and she, making a big circle at fairly high speed, came along
fast as if she was going to run us down, with the idea of baffling the
aim of the enemy. Not a bad notion as far as the destroyer was concerned
but one demanding acrobatic qualities of a very high order on the part
of the Commander-in-Chief. Anyway just as she was drawing abreast and I
was standing up to make my spring a shell hit her plump and burst in one
of her coal bunkers, sending up a big cloud of mixed smoke and black
coal dust. The Commander was beside himself. He waved us off furiously;
cracked on full steam and again left us in the lurch. We laughed till
the tears ran down our cheeks. Soon, we had reason to be more serious,
not to say pensive. The _Savage_ showed a pair of clean heels this time
and ran right away to Helles. So there we were, marooned, half a mile
out to sea, in a tiny dinghy on which the Turks again switched their
blarsted guns. The two bluejackets pulled themselves purple. They were
both of them fat reservists and the mingling of anxiety and exertion,
emotion and motion, made the sweat pour in torrents down their cheeks.
Each time a shell plunked into the water we brightened up; then,
gradually, until the next one splashed, our faces grew longer and
longer. At last we got so far away that the Turks gave us up in disgust.
How much I should like to see that battery commander's diary.
Altogether, by the time we had boarded the _Savage_, we had been in that
cursed little dinghy for just exactly one hour, of which I should think
we were being gently shelled for three quarters of an hour. On board the
destroyer no harm to speak of: only one man wounded.
Cast anchor at Imbros at 9 p.m. General Legge and Captain H. Lloyd came
over to stay the night. Mail from England.
Have cabled again to stir them up about the hospital ships.
_18th July, 1915._ Church Parade. Inspected troops. Wrote in camp all
the afternoon. Walked out to the lighthouse in the evening and watched
the shells bursting over Gully Beach where we were yesterday. How often
have I felt anxious seeing these shrapnel through the telescope. On the
spot, as I know from yesterday's experience, their bark is worse than
their bite. Colonel Ward of the Intelligence came to dinner and Captain
Doughtie, commanding H.M.S. _Abercrombie_, paid me a visit.
_19th July, 1915._ Too much office work. Mr. Schuler, an Australian
journalist and war correspondent, turned up. Seems a highly intelligent
young fellow. He had met me on tour in Australia. Gave him leave to go
anywhere and see everything. The Staff shake their heads, but the future
is locked away in our heads, and the more the past is known the better
for us.
Braithwaite has heard from the War Office that the Brigade of Russians
which had started from Vladivostock to join us here has been
counter-ordered. The War Office seem rather pleased than otherwise that
this reinforcement has fallen through. Why, I can't imagine. As they are
sending us a big fresh force of Britishers, they probably persuade
themselves that 5,000 Russians would be more trouble than they are
worth, but they forget the many thousands of shortage in my present
formations. Since they fixed up to send me the new Divisions I must have
lost ten thousand rifles, but as all my old Divisions remain at the
Dardanelles _in name_, they are being regarded at home, we strongly
suspect, as a sort of widow's cruse, kept full by miracles instead of
men and still, therefore,--Divisions!
In the evening the Vice-Admiral came over and we rode together down to
the Naval Seaplane Camp. The King's Messenger left at 5 p.m.
_20th July, 1915. Imbros._ Wrote double quick, then galloped over to
Kephalos to see the New Army, _sub rosa_. The men we struck were A.1.
They belong to the 32nd and 34th Brigades of the 11th Division. The 33rd
has gone to Helles to get salted.
Hunter-Weston is still staying with the Admiral. He has had a hard time
and a heavy responsibility and is quite worn out. I devoutly trust he
may be on his legs again ere long. Have put in Stopford to act for him
at Helles. This should teach the young idea how to shoot. With every
aspect of the command and administration of the Southern theatre of
operations thus under his immediate orders he has a rare chance of
learning how to do it and how not to do it.
_21st July, 1915._--Just signed a letter to the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff and as it gives the run of my thoughts at the moment I
spatchcock the opening and final paras:--
* * * * *
"My dear Wolfe Murray,
"How do you manage to find time to write these charming letters of yours
with your own hand? They come like a gift from some oriental potentate
and carry with them the same moral obligations; i.e., that they ought to
be returned in kind. But to-day the time limit interposes, and I know
you will pardon me for once if I dictate.
[Illustration: _F. A. Swaine phot._ LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. HUNTER-WESTON,
K.C.B., D.S.O.]
"I am immensely interested in what you say with reference to the 29th
Division being below strength, namely, that we are getting short of men.
Well,--though one of the keenest voluntary service people existing, I
have always envisaged the fact that during a war we might be driven
to compulsion. Also in writing out fully my views on this subject (views
which I was not permitted by late Chiefs of the General Staff to
publish) I have always, for that reason, pressed for National
Registration. It does no one any harm, and rubs into the mind of the
young man that, under certain conditions, the State has first pull on
his pocket, labour, life and everything else. But, of course, if your
own wish that the 29th Division should take out 10 per cent. extra for
drafts (like the regiments do in France), had been carried into effect,
they would never have fallen as low as they actually did.
* * * * *
"Freddy Stopford and Reed have been staying with me for 24 hours, and
the former is now in command of the 8th Corps on the Peninsula,
Hunter-Weston having gone sick. He asked to stay with the Admiral for a
couple of days' rest, and the very moment he got safe on board ship the
overstrain of the past month told on him and he went down with a sharp
go of fever. I earnestly pray he will get right again quickly for there
are not many Commanders of his calibre. Freddy Stopford will now have a
good chance of getting the hang of this sort of fighting generally,
surrounded as he will be by Hunter-Weston's experienced Staff. After
sending my last letter I rather repented of one or two harsh things I
said about Reed. There is some truth in them, but I need not have said
them. I hope he will do very well out here."
Now since that letter was written (yesterday) in comes a cable from K.
saying Winston can't leave England but that Hankey starts in his place.
K. says he is sure I will give him every facility.
A pretty stuffy cable in from the War Office on the Hospital ships and
medical personnel and material wrangle which is still going on. I,
personally, have checked every item of my estimate with closest personal
attention, although it took me hours in the midst of other very pressing
duties. This is not Braithwaite's pidgin but Woodward's and there was no
help for it. Our first landing found out a number of chinks in our
arrangements, and now, my Director of Medical Services is (quite
naturally) inclined to open his mouth as wide as if ships were drugs in
the market. So I have tried very hard, without too much help, to hit the
mean between extravagance and sufficiency. Now the War Office, who would
be the first to round on me if anything went wrong with my wounded,
query my demands as if we had just splashed off a cable asking for the
first things that came into our heads!
I am all for thrift in ships, but thrift in the lives of my wounded
comes first; my conscience is clear and I have answered sticking to my
point,--firmly! They say the thing is impossible; I have retaliated by
saying it is imperative.