THE OCCUPATION OF THE COLUMBIA.
This subject had begun to make a lodgment in the public mind,
and I brought a bill into the Senate to enable the President to
possess and retain the country. The joint occupation treaty of
1818 was drawing to a close, and it was my policy to terminate
such occupation, and hold the Columbia (or Oregon) exclusively, as
we had the admitted right to do while the question of title was
depending. The British had no title, and were simply working for
a division--for the right bank of the river, and the harbor at
its mouth--and waiting on _time_ to ripen their joint occupation
into a claim for half. I knew this, and wished to terminate a
joint tenancy which could only be injurious to ourselves while it
lasted, and jeopard our rights when it terminated. The bill which I
brought in proposed an appropriation to enable the President to act
efficiently, with a detatchment of the army and navy; and in the
discussion of this bill the whole question of title and of policy
came up; and, in a reply to Mr. Dickerson, of New Jersey, I found
it to be my duty to defend both. I now give some extracts from that
reply, as a careful examination of the British pretension, founded
upon her own exhibition of title, and showing that she had none
south of forty-nine degrees, and that we were only giving her a
claim, by putting her possession on an equality with our own. These
extracts will show the history of the case as it then stood--as it
remained invalidated in all subsequent discussion--and according to
which, and after twenty years, and when the question had assumed
a war aspect, it was finally settled. The bill did not pass, but
received an encouraging vote--fourteen senators voting favorably to
it. They were:
Messrs. Barbour, Benton, Bouligny, Cobb, Hayne, Jackson (the
General), Johnson of Kentucky, Johnston of Louisiana, Lloyd of
Massachusetts, Mills, Noble, Ruggles, Talbot, Thomas.
"Mr. Benton, in reply to Mr. Dickerson, said that he had not
intended to speak to this bill. Always unwilling to trespass
upon the time and patience of the Senate, he was particularly so
at this moment, when the session was drawing to a close, and a
hundred bills upon the table were each demanding attention. The
occupation of the Columbia River was a subject which had engaged
the deliberations of Congress for four years past, and the minds
of gentlemen might be supposed to be made up upon it. Resting
upon this belief, Mr. B., as reporter of the bill, had limited
himself to the duty of watching its progress, and of holding
himself in readiness to answer any inquiries which might be
put. Inquiries he certainly expected; but a general assault, at
this late stage of the session, upon the principle, the policy,
and the details of the bill, had not been anticipated. Such an
assault had, however, been made by the senator from New Jersey
(Mr. D.), and Mr. B. would be unfaithful to his duty if he did
not repel it. In discharging this duty, he would lose no time
in going over the gentleman's calculations about the expense of
getting a member of Congress from the Oregon to the Potomac;
nor would he solve his difficulties about the shortest and best
route--whether Cape Horn should be doubled, a new route explored
under the north pole, or mountains climbed, whose aspiring
summits present twelve feet of defying snow to the burning
rays of a July sun. Mr. B. looked upon these calculations and
problems as so many dashes of the gentleman's wit, and admitted
that wit was an excellent article in debate, equally convenient
for embellishing an argument, and concealing the want of one.
For which of these purposes the senator from New Jersey had
amused the Senate with the wit in question, it was not for Mr.
B. to say, nor should he undertake to disturb him in the quiet
enjoyment of the honor which he had won thereby, and would
proceed directly to speak to the merits of the bill.
"It is now, Mr. President, continued Mr. B., precisely two and
twenty years since a contest for the Columbia has been going
on between the United States and Great Britain. The contest
originated with the discovery of the river itself. The moment
that we discovered it she claimed it; and without a color of
title in her hand, she has labored ever since to overreach us in
the arts of negotiation, or to bully us out of our discovery by
menaces of war.
"In the year 1790, a citizen of the United States, Capt. Gray,
of Boston, discovered the Columbia at its entrance into the sea;
and in 1803, Lewis and Clarke were sent by the government of
the United States to complete the discovery of the whole river,
from its source downwards, and to take formal possession in the
name of their government. In 1793 Sir Alexander McKenzie had
been sent from Canada by the British Government to effect the
same object; but he missed the sources of the river, fell upon
the _Tacoutche Tesse_, and struck the Pacific about five hundred
miles to the north of the mouth of the Columbia.
"In 1803, the United States acquired Louisiana, and with it an
open question of boundaries for that vast province. On the side
of Mexico and Florida this question was to be settled with the
King of Spain; on the north and northwest, with the King of
Great Britain. It happened in the very time that we were signing
a treaty in Paris for the acquisition of Louisiana, that we were
signing another in London for the adjustment of the boundary
line between the northwest possessions of the United States and
the King of Great Britain. The negotiators of each were ignorant
of what the others had done; and on remitting the two treaties
to the Senate of the United States for ratification, that for
the purchase of Louisiana was ratified without restriction;
the other, with the exception of the fifth article. It was this
article which adjusted the boundary line between the United
States and Great Britain, from the Lake of the Woods to the
head of the Mississippi; and the Senate refused to ratify it,
because, by possibility, it might jeopard the northern boundary
of Louisiana. The treaty was sent back to London, the fifth
article expunged; and the British Government, acting then as
upon a late occasion, rejected the whole treaty, when it failed
in securing the precise advantage of which it was in search.
"In the year 1807, another treaty was negotiated between the
United States and Great Britain. The negotiators on both sides
were then possessed of the fact that Louisiana belonged to the
United States, and that her boundaries to the north and west
were undefined. The settlement of this boundary was a point
in the negotiation, and continued efforts were made by the
British plenipotentiaries to overreach the Americans, with
respect to the country west of the Rocky Mountains. Without
presenting any claim, they endeavored to '_leave a nest egg
for future pretensions in that quarter_.' (_State Papers_,
1822-3.) Finally, an article was agreed to. The forty-ninth
degree of north latitude was to be followed west, as far as the
territories of the two countries extended in that direction,
with a proviso against its application to the country west of
the Rocky Mountains. This treaty shared the fate of that of
1803. It was never ratified. For causes unconnected with the
questions of boundary, it was rejected by Mr. Jefferson without
a reference to the Senate.
"At Ghent, in 1814, the attempts of 1803 and 1807 were renewed.
The British plenipotentiaries offered articles upon the subject
of the boundary, and of the northwest coast, of the same
character with those previously offered; but nothing could be
agreed upon, and nothing upon the subject was inserted in the
treaty signed at that place.
"At London, in 1818, the negotiations upon this point were
renewed; and the British Government, for the first time,
uncovered the ground upon which its pretensions rested. Its
plenipotentiaries, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Goulbourn, asserted
(to give them the benefit of their own words, as reported by
Messrs. Gallatin and Rush) 'That former voyages, and principally
that of Captain Cook, gave to Great Britain the rights derived
from discovery; and they alluded to purchases from the natives
south of the river Columbia, which they alleged to have been
made prior to the American Revolution. They did not make any
formal proposition for a boundary, but intimated that the
_river_ itself was the most convenient that could be adopted,
and that they would not agree to any which did not give them the
_harbor_ at the _mouth_ of the _river_ in common with the United
States.'"--_Letter from Messrs. Gallatin and Rush_, _October_
20th, 1820.
To this the American plenipotentiaries answered, in a way
better calculated to encourage than to repulse the groundless
pretensions of Great Britain. 'We did not assert (continue these
gentlemen in the same letter), we did not assert that the United
States had a perfect right to that country, but insisted that
their claim was at least good against Great Britain. We did not
know with precision what value our government set on the country
to the westward of these mountains; but we were not authorized
to enter into any agreement which should be tantamount to an
abandonment of the claim to it. It was at last agreed, but, as
we thought, with some _reluctance_ on the part of the _British_
plenipotentiaries, that the country on the northwest coast,
claimed by either party, should, without prejudice to the claims
of either, and for a _limited_ time, be opened for the purposes
of trade to the inhabitants of both countries.'
"The substance of this agreement was inserted in the convention
of October, 1818. It constitutes the third article of that
treaty, and is the same upon which the senator from New Jersey
(Mr. Dickerson) relies for excluding the United States from the
occupation of the Columbia.
"In subsequent negotiations, the British agents further rested
their claim upon the discoveries of McKenzie, in 1793, the
seizure of Astoria during the late war, and the Nootka Sound
Treaty, of 1790.
"Such an exhibition of title, said Mr. B., is ridiculous, and
would be contemptible in the hands of any other power than
that of Great Britain. Of the five grounds of claim which she
has set up, not one of them is tenable against the slightest
examination. Cook never saw, much less took possession of
any part of the northwest coast of America, in the latitude
of the Columbia River. All his discoveries were far north of
that point, and not one of them was followed up by possession,
without which the fact of discovery would confer no title. The
Indians were not even named from whom the purchases are stated
to have been made anterior to the Revolutionary War. Not a
single particular is given which could identify a transaction
of the kind. The only circumstance mentioned applies to the
locality of the Indians supposed to have made the sale; and that
circumstance invalidates the whole claim. They are said to have
resided to the '_south_' of the Columbia; by consequence they
did not reside _upon it_, and could have no right to sell a
country of which they were not the possessors.
"McKenzie was sent out from Canada, in the year 1793, to
discover, at its head, the river which Captain Gray had
discovered at its mouth, three years before. But McKenzie missed
the object of his search, and struck the Pacific five hundred
miles to the north, as I have already stated. The seizure of
Astoria, during the war, was an operation of arms, conferring
no more title upon Great Britain to the Columbia, than the
capture of Castine and Detroit gave her to Maine and Michigan.
This new ground of claim was set up by Mr. Bagot, his Britannic
Majesty's minister to this republic, in 1817, and set up in
a way to contradict and relinquish all their other pretended
titles. Mr. Bagot was remonstrating against the occupation, by
the United States, of the Columbia River, and reciting that it
had been taken possession of, in his Majesty's name, during
the late war, '_and had_ SINCE _been_ CONSIDERED _as forming
a part of his Majesty's dominions_.' The word '_since_,' is
exclusive of all previous pretension, and the Ghent Treaty,
which stipulates for the restoration of all the captured posts,
is a complete extinguisher to this idle pretension. Finally,
the British negotiators have been driven to take shelter under
the Nootka Sound Treaty of 1790. The character of that treaty
was well understood at the time that it was made, and its terms
will speak for themselves at the present day. It was a treaty
of concession, and not of acquisition of rights, on the part of
Great Britain. It was so characterized by the opposition, and so
admitted to be by the ministry, at the time of its communication
to the British Parliament.
[Here Mr. B. read passages from the speeches of Mr. Fox and Mr.
Pitt, to prove the character of this Treaty.]
"Mr. Fox said, 'What, then, was the extent of our rights before
the convention--(whether admitted or denied by Spain was of
no consequence)--and to what extent were they now secured to
us? We possessed and exercised the free navigation of the
Pacific Ocean, without restraint or limitation. We possessed
and exercised the right of carrying on fisheries in the South
Seas equally unlimited. This was no barren right, but a right
of which we had availed ourselves, as appeared by the papers on
the table, which showed that the produce of it had increased,
in five years, from twelve to ninety-seven thousand pounds
sterling. This estate we had, and were daily improving; it
was not to be disgraced by the name of an acquisition. The
admission of part of these rights by Spain, was all we had
obtained. Our right, before, was to settle in any part of the
South or Northwest Coast of America, not fortified against us
by previous occupancy; and we were now restricted to settle in
certain places only, and under certain restrictions. This was an
important concession on our part. Our rights of fishing extended
to the whole ocean, and now it, too, was limited, and to be
carried on within certain distances of the Spanish settlements.
Our right of making settlements was not, as now, a right to
build huts, but to plant colonies, if we thought proper. Surely
these were not acquisitions, or rather conquests, as they must
be considered, if we were to judge by the triumphant language
respecting them, but great and important concessions. By the
third article, we are authorized to navigate the Pacific Ocean
and South Seas, unmolested, for the purpose of carrying on our
fisheries, and to land on the unsettled coasts, for the purpose
of trading with the natives; but, after this pompous recognition
of right to navigation, fishery, and commerce, comes another
article, the sixth, which takes away the right of landing,
and erecting even temporary huts, for any purpose but that of
carrying on the fishery, and amounts to a complete dereliction
of all right to settle in any way for the purpose of commerce
with the natives.'--_British Parliamentary History_, Vol. 28, p.
990.
"Mr. Pitt, in reply. 'Having finished that part of Mr. Fox's
speech which referred to the reparation, Mr. Pitt proceeded to
the next point, namely, that gentleman's argument to prove, that
the other articles of the convention were mere concessions, and
not acquisitions. In answer to this, Mr. Pitt maintained, that,
though what this country had gained consisted not of new rights,
it certainly did of new advantages. We had, before, a right to
the Southern whale fishery, and a right to navigate and carry on
fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, and to trade on the coasts of
any part of Northwest America; but that right not only had not
been acknowledged, but disputed and resisted: whereas, by the
convention, it was secured to us--a circumstance which, though
no new right, was a new advantage.'--_Same_--p. 1002.
"But, continued Mr. Benton, we need not take the character of
the treaty even from the high authority of these rival leaders
in the British Parliament. The treaty will speak for itself. I
have it in my hand, and will read the article relied upon to
sustain the British claim to the Columbia River.
"'ARTICLE THIRD OF THE NOOTKA SOUND TREATY.
"'In order to strengthen the bonds of friendship, and to
preserve, in future, a perfect harmony and good understanding
between the two contracting parties, it is agreed that their
respective subjects shall not be disturbed or molested, either
in navigating or carrying on their fisheries in the Pacific
Ocean, or in the South Seas, or in landing on the coasts of
those seas in places not already occupied, for the purpose of
carrying on their commerce with the natives of the country, or
of making settlements there; the whole subject, nevertheless, to
the restrictions and provisions specified in the three following
articles.'
"The particular clause of this article, relied upon by the
advocates for the British claim, is that which gives the right
of _landing_ on parts of the Northwest Coast, not already
_occupied_, for the purpose of carrying on _commerce_ and making
_settlements_. The first inquiry arising upon this clause is,
whether the coast, in the latitude of the Columbia River, was
unoccupied at the date of the Nootka Sound Treaty? The answer is
in the affirmative. The second is, whether the English landed
upon this coast while it was so unoccupied? The answer is in
the negative; and this answer puts an end to all pretension of
British claim founded upon this treaty, without leaving us
under the necessity of recurring to the fact that the permission
to _land_, and to _make settlements_, so far from contemplating
an acquisition of territory, was limited by subsequent
restrictions, to the erection of temporary huts for the personal
accommodation of fishermen and traders only.
"Mr. B. adverted to the inconsistency, on the part of Great
Britain, of following the 49th parallel to the Rocky Mountains,
and refusing to follow it any further. He affirmed that the
principle which would make that parallel a boundary to the
top of the mountain, would carry it out to the Pacific Ocean.
He proved this assertion by recurring to the origin of that
line. It grew out of the treaty of Utrecht, that treaty which,
in 1704, put an end to the wars of Queen Anne and Louis the
XIVth and fixed the boundaries of their respective dominions in
North America. The tenth article of that treaty was applicable
to Louisiana and to Canada. It provided that commissioners
should be appointed by the two powers to adjust the boundary
between them. The commissioners were appointed, and did fix
it. The parallel of 49 degrees was fixed upon as the common
boundary from the Lake of the Woods, "_indefinitely to the
West_." This boundary was acquiesced in for a hundred years.
By proposing to follow it to the Rocky Mountains, the British
Government admits its validity; by refusing to follow it out,
they become obnoxious to the charge of inconsistency, and betray
a determination to encroach upon the territory of the United
States, for the undisguised purpose of selfish aggrandizement.
"The truth is, Mr. President, continued Mr. B., Great Britain
has no color of title to the country in question. She sets up
none. There is not a paper upon the face of the earth in which
a British minister has stated a claim. I speak of the king's
ministers, and not of the agents employed by them. The claims
we have been examining are thrown out in the conversations and
notes of diplomatic agents. No English minister has ever put
his name to them, and no one will ever risk his character as a
statesman by venturing to do so. The claim of Great Britain is
nothing but a naked pretension, founded on the double prospect
of benefiting herself and injuring the United States. The
fur trader, Sir Alexander McKenzie, is at the bottom of this
policy. Failing in his attempt to explore the Columbia River,
in 1793, he, nevertheless, urged upon the British Government
the advantages of taking it to herself, and of expelling the
Americans from the whole region west of the Rocky Mountains. The
advice accorded too well with the passions and policy of that
government, to be disregarded. It is a government which has lost
no opportunity, since the peace of '83, of aggrandizing itself
at the expense of the United States. It is a government which
listens to the suggestions of its experienced subjects, and
thus an individual, in the humble station of a fur trader, has
pointed out the policy which has been pursued by every Minister
of Great Britain, from Pitt to Canning, and for the maintenance
of which a war is now menaced.
"For a boundary line between the United States and Great
Britain, west of the Mississippi, McKenzie proposes the latitude
of 45 degrees, because that latitude is necessary to give the
Columbia River to Great Britain. His words are: 'Let the line
begin where it may on the Mississippi, it must be continued
west, till it terminates in the Pacific Ocean, _to the south of
the Columbia_.'
"Mr. B. said it was curious to observe with what closeness every
suggestion of McKenzie had been followed up by the British
Government. He recommended that the Hudson Bay and Northwest
Company should be united; and they have been united. He proposed
to extend the fur trade of Canada to the shore of the Pacific
Ocean; and it has been so extended. He proposed that a chain of
trading posts should be formed through the continent, from sea
to sea; and it has been formed. He recommended that no boundary
line should be agreed upon with the United States, which did not
give the Columbia River to the British; and the British ministry
declare that none other shall be formed. He proposed to obtain
the command of the fur trade from latitude 45 degrees north; and
they have it even to the Mandan villages, and the neighborhood
of the Council Bluffs. He recommended the expulsion of American
traders from the whole region west of the Rocky Mountains, and
they are expelled from it. He proposed to command the commerce
of the Pacific Ocean; and it will be commanded the moment a
British fleet takes position in the mouth of the Columbia.
Besides these specified advantages, McKenzie alludes to other
'_political considerations_,' which it was not necessary for him
to particularize. Doubtless it was not. They were sufficiently
understood. They are the same which induced the retention of the
northwestern posts, in violation of the treaty of 1783; the same
which induced the acquisition of Gibraltar, Malta, the Cape of
Good Hope, the Islands of Ceylon and Madagascar; the same which
makes Great Britain covet the possession of every commanding
position in the four quarters of the globe."
I do not argue the question of title on the part of the United
States, but only state it as founded upon--1. Discovery of the
Columbia River by Capt. Gray, in 1790; 2. Purchase of Louisiana in
1803; 3. Discovery of the Columbia from its head to its mouth, by
Lewis and Clarke, in 1803; 4. Settlement of Astoria, in 1811; 5.
Treaty with Spain, 1819; 6. Contiguity and continuity of settlement
and possession. Nor do I argue the question of the advantages of
retaining the Columbia, and refusing to divide or alienate our
territory upon it. I merely state them, and leave their value to
result from the enumeration. 1. To keep out a foreign power; 2. To
gain a seaport with a military and naval station, on the coast of
the Pacific; 3. To save the fur trade in that region, and prevent
our Indians from being tampered with by British traders; 4. To open
a communication for commercial purposes between the Mississippi and
the Pacific; 5. To send the lights of science and of religion into
eastern Asia.