PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
It has already been shown that the theory of the constitution,
and its practical working, was entirely different in the election
of President and Vice-President--that by the theory, the people
were only to choose electors, to whose superior intelligence
the choice of fit persons for these high stations was entirely
committed--and that, in practice, this theory had entirely failed
from the beginning. From the very first election the electors were
made subordinate to the people, having no choice of their own, and
pledged to deliver their votes for a particular person, according
to the will of those who elected them. Thus the theory had failed
in its application to the electoral college; but there might be a
second or contingent election, and has been; and here the theory of
the constitution has failed again. In the event of no choice being
made by the electors, either for want of a majority of electoral
votes being given to any one, or on account of an equal majority for
two, the House of Representatives became an electoral college for
the occasion, limited to a choice out of the five highest (before
the constitution was amended), or the two highest having an equal
majority. The President and Vice-President were not then voted for
separately, or with any designation of their office. All appeared
upon the record as presidential nominees--the highest on the list
having a majority, to be President; the next highest, also having a
majority, to be Vice-President; but the people, from the beginning,
had discriminated between the persons for these respective places,
always meaning one on their ticket for President, the other for
Vice-President. But, by the theory of the constitution and its
words, those intended Vice-Presidents might be elected President
in the House of Representatives, either by being among the five
highest when there was no majority, or being one of two in an
equal majority. This theory failed in the House of Representatives
from the first election, the _demos krateo_ principle--the people
to govern--prevailing there as in the electoral colleges, and
overruling the constitutional design in each.
The first election in the House of Representatives was that of Mr.
Jefferson and Mr. Burr, in the session of 1800-1801. These gentlemen
had each a majority of the whole number of electoral votes, and an
equal majority--73 each--Mr. Burr being intended for Vice-President.
One of the contingencies had then occurred in which the election
went to the House of Representatives. The federalists had acted
more wisely, one of their State electoral colleges (that of Rhode
Island), having withheld a vote from the intended Vice-President
on their side, Mr. Charles Colesworth Pinckney, of South Carolina;
and so prevented an equality of votes between him and Mr. John
Adams. It would have been entirely constitutional in the House of
Representatives to have elected Mr. Burr President, but at the same
time, a gross violation of the democratic principle, which requires
the will of the majority to be complied with. The federal States
undertook to elect Mr. Burr, and kept up the struggle for seven
days and nights, and until the thirty-sixth ballot. There were
sixteen States, and it required the concurrence of nine to effect an
election. Until the thirty-sixth Mr. Jefferson had eight, Mr. Burr
six, and two were divided. On the thirty-sixth ballot Mr. Jefferson
had ten States and was elected. General Hamilton, though not then in
public life, took a decided part in this election, rising above all
personal and all party considerations, and urging the federalists
from the beginning to vote for Mr. Jefferson. Thus the democratic
principle prevailed. The choice of the people was elected by the
House of Representatives; and the struggle was fatal to those who
had opposed that principle. The federal party was broken down, and
at the ensuing Congress elections, was left in a small minority.
Its candidate at the ensuing presidential election received but
fourteen votes out of one hundred and seventy-six. Burr, in whose
favor, and with whose connivance the struggle had been made, was
ruined--fell under the ban of the republican party, disappeared from
public life, and was only seen afterwards in criminal enterprises,
and ending his life in want and misery. The constitution itself,
in that particular (the mode of election), was broken down, and
had to be amended so as to separate the presidential from the
vice-presidential ticket, giving each a separate vote; and in the
event of no election by the electoral colleges, sending each to
separate houses--the three highest on the presidential lists to the
House of Representatives,--the two highest on the vice-presidential,
to the Senate. And thus ended the first struggle in the House of
Representatives (in relation to the election of President), between
the theory of the constitution and the democratic principle--triumph
to the principle, ruin to its opposers, and destruction to the
clause in the constitution, which permitted such a struggle.
The second presidential election in the House of Representatives was
after the lapse of a quarter of a century, and under the amended
constitution, which carried the three highest on the list to the
House when no one had a majority of the electoral votes. General
Jackson, Mr. John Quincy Adams, and Mr. William H. Crawford, were
the three, their respective votes being 99, 84, 41; and in this
case a second struggle took place between the theory of the
constitution and the democratic principle; and with eventual defeat
to the opposers of that principle, though temporarily successful.
Mr. Adams was elected, though General Jackson was the choice of the
people, having received the greatest number of votes, and being
undoubtedly the second choice of several States whose votes had been
given to Mr. Crawford and Mr. Clay (at the general election). The
representatives from some of these States gave the vote of the State
to Mr. Adams, upon the argument that he was best qualified for the
station, and that it was dangerous to our institutions to elect a
military chieftain--an argument which assumed a guardianship over
the people, and implied the necessity of a superior intelligence
to guide them for their own good. The election of Mr. Adams was
perfectly constitutional, and as such fully submitted to by the
people; but it was also a violation of the _demos krateo_ principle;
and that violation was signally rebuked. All the representatives who
voted against the will of their constituents, lost their favor, and
disappeared from public life. The representation in the House of
Representatives was largely changed at the first general election,
and presented a full opposition to the new President. Mr. Adams
himself was injured by it, and at the ensuing presidential election
was beaten by General Jackson more than two to one--178 to 83. Mr.
Clay, who took the lead in the House for Mr. Adams, and afterwards
took upon himself the mission of reconciling the people to his
election in a series of public speeches, was himself crippled in
the effort, lost his place in the democratic party, joined the
whigs (then called national republicans), and has since presented
the disheartening spectacle of a former great leader figuring at
the head of his ancient foes in all their defeats, and lingering on
their rear in their victories. The democratic principle was again
victor over the theory of the constitution, and great and good were
the results that ensued. It vindicated the _demos_ in their right
and their power, and showed that the prefix to the constitution,
"We, the people, do ordain and establish," &c., may also be added
to its administration, showing them to be as able to administer as
to make that instrument. It re-established parties upon the basis
of principle, and drew anew party lines, then almost obliterated
under the fusion of parties during the "era of good feeling," and
the efforts of leading men to make personal parties for themselves.
It showed the conservative power of our government to lie in the
people, more than in its constituted authorities. It showed that
they were capable of exercising the function of self-government.
It assured the supremacy of the democracy for a long time, and
until temporarily lost by causes to be shown in their proper place.
Finally, it was a caution to all public men against future attempts
to govern presidential elections in the House of Representatives.
It is no part of the object of this "Thirty Years' View" to dwell
upon the conduct of individuals, except as showing the causes and
the consequences of events; and, under this aspect, it becomes the
gravity of history to tell that, in these two struggles for the
election of President, those who struggled against the democratic
principle lost their places on the political theatre,--the mere
voting members being put down in their States and districts, and the
eminent actors for ever ostracised from the high object of their
ambition. A subordinate cause may have had its effect, and unjustly,
in prejudicing the public mind against Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay. They
had been political adversaries, had co-operated in the election, and
went into the administration together. Mr. Clay received the office
of Secretary of State from Mr. Adams, and this gave rise to the
imputation of a bargain between them.
It came within my knowledge (for I was then intimate with Mr.
Clay), long before the election, and probably before Mr. Adams
knew it himself, that Mr. Clay intended to support him against
General Jackson; and for the reasons afterward averred in his public
speeches. I made this known when occasions required me to speak of
it, and in the presence of the friends of the impugned parties. It
went into the newspapers upon the information of these friends, and
Mr. Clay made me acknowledgments for it in a letter, of which this
is the exact copy:
"_I have received a paper published on the 20th ultimo, at
Lemington, in Virginia, in which is contained an article stating
that you had, to a gentleman of that place, expressed your disbelief
of a charge injurious to me, touching the late presidential
election, and that I had communicated to you unequivocally, before
the 15th of December, 1824, my determination to vote for Mr.
Adams and not for General Jackson. Presuming that the publication
was with your authority, I cannot deny the expression of proper
acknowledgments for the sense of justice which has prompted you to
render this voluntary and faithful testimony._"
This letter, of which I now have the original, was dated at
Washington City, December 6th, 1827--that is to say, in the very
heat and middle of the canvass in which Mr. Adams was beaten by
General Jackson, and when the testimony could be of most service
to him. It went the rounds of the papers, and was quoted and
relied upon in debates in Congress, greatly to the dissatisfaction
of many of my own party. There was no mistake in the date, or
the fact. I left Washington the 15th of December, on a visit to
my father-in-law, Colonel James McDowell, of Rockbridge county,
Virginia, where Mrs. Benton then was; and it was before I left
Washington that I learned from Mr. Clay himself that his intention
was to support Mr. Adams. I told this at _that_ time to Colonel
McDowell, and any friends that chanced to be present, and gave it
to the public in a letter which was copied into many newspapers,
and is preserved in Niles' Register. I told it as my _belief_
to Mr. Jefferson on Christmas evening of the same year, when
returning to Washington and making a call on that illustrious man
at his seat, Monticello; and believing then that Mr. Adams would
be elected, and, from the necessity of the case, would have to
make up a mixed cabinet, I expressed that belief to Mr. Jefferson,
using the term, familiar in English history, of "_broad bottomed_;"
and asked him how it would do? He answered, "Not at all--would
never succeed--would ruin all engaged in it." Mr. Clay told his
intentions to others of his friends from an early period, but as
they remained his friends, their testimony was but little heeded.
Even my own, in the violence of party, and from my relationship
to Mrs. Clay, seemed to have but little effect. The imputation of
"bargain" stuck, and doubtless had an influence in the election. In
fact, the circumstances of the whole affair--previous antagonism
between the parties, actual support in the election, and acceptance
of high office, made up a case against Messrs. Adams and Clay which
it was hardly safe for public men to create and to brave, however
strong in their own consciousness of integrity. Still, the great
objection to the election of Mr. Adams was in the violation of the
principle _demos krateo_; and in the question which it raised of the
capacity of the _demos_ to choose a safe President for themselves.
A letter which I wrote to the representative from Missouri, before
he gave the vote of the State to Mr. Adams, and which was published
immediately afterwards, placed the objection upon this high ground;
and upon it the battle was mainly fought, and won. It was a victory
of principle, and should not be disparaged by the admission of an
unfounded and subordinate cause.
This presidential election of 1824 is remarkable under another
aspect--as having put an end to the practice of caucus nominations
for the Presidency by members of Congress. This mode of
concentrating public opinion began to be practised as the eminent
men of the Revolution, to whom public opinion awarded a preference,
were passing away, and when new men, of more equal pretensions,
were coming upon the stage. It was tried several times with success
and general approbation, public sentiment having been followed,
and not led, by the caucus. It was attempted in 1824, and failed,
the friends of Mr. Crawford only attending--others not attending,
not from any repugnance to the practice, as their previous conduct
had shown, but because it was known that Mr. Crawford had the
largest number of friends in Congress, and would assuredly receive
the nomination. All the rest, therefore, refused to go into it:
all joined in opposing the "caucus candidate," as Mr. Crawford
was called; all united in painting the intrigue and corruption of
these caucus nominations, and the anomaly of members of Congress
joining in them. By their joint efforts they succeeded, and justly
in the fact though not in the motive, in rendering these Congress
caucus nominations odious to the people, and broke them down. They
were dropped, and a different mode of concentrating public opinion
was adopted--that of party nominations by conventions of delegates
from the States. This worked well at first, the will of the people
being strictly obeyed by the delegates, and the majority making
the nomination. But it quickly degenerated, and became obnoxious
to all the objections to Congress caucus nominations, and many
others besides. Members of Congress still attended them, either as
delegates or as lobby managers. Persons attended as delegates who
had no constituency. Delegates attended upon equivocal appointments.
Double sets of delegates sometimes came from the State, and either
were admitted or repulsed, as suited the views of the majority.
Proxies were invented. Many delegates attended with the sole view
of establishing a claim for office, and voted accordingly. The
two-thirds rule was invented, to enable the minority to control
the majority; and the whole proceeding became anomalous and
irresponsible, and subversive of the will of the people, leaving
them no more control over the nomination than the subjects of kings
have over the birth of the child which is born to rule over them.
King Caucus is as potent as any other king in this respect; for
whoever gets the nomination--no matter how effected--becomes the
candidate of the party, from the necessity of union against the
opposite party, and from the indisposition of the great States to go
into the House of Representatives to be balanced by the small ones.
This is the mode of making Presidents, practised by both parties
now. It is the virtual election! and thus the election of the
President and Vice-President of the United States has passed--not
only from the college of electors to which the constitution
confided it, and from the people to whom the practice under the
constitution gave it, and from the House of Representatives which
the constitution provided as ultimate arbiter--but has gone to an
anomalous, irresponsible body, unknown to law or constitution,
unknown to the early ages of our government, and of which a large
proportion of the members composing it, and a much larger proportion
of interlopers attending it, have no other view either in attending
or in promoting the nomination of any particular man, than to get
one elected who will enable them to eat out of the public crib--who
will give them a key to the public crib.
The evil is destructive to the rights and sovereignty of the people,
and to the purity of elections. The remedy is in the application of
the democratic principle--the people to vote direct for President
and Vice-President; and a second election to be held immediately
between the two highest, if no one has a majority of the whole
number on the first trial. But this would require an amendment of
the constitution, not to be effected but by a concurrence of two
thirds of each house of Congress, and the sanction of three fourths
of the States--a consummation to which the strength of the people
has not yet been equal, but of which there is no reason to despair.
The great parliamentary reform in Great Britain was only carried
after forty years of continued, annual, persevering exertion. Our
constitutional reform, in this point of the presidential election,
may require but a few years; in the meanwhile I am for the people to
_select_, as well as _elect_, their candidates, and for a reference
to the House to choose one out of three presented by the people,
instead of a caucus nomination of whom it pleased. The House of
Representatives is no longer the small and dangerous electoral
college that it once was. Instead of thirteen States we now have
thirty-one; instead of sixty-five representatives, we have now above
two hundred. Responsibility in the House is now well established,
and political ruin, and personal humiliation, attend the violation
of the will of the State. No man could be elected now, or endeavor
to be elected (after the experience of 1800 and 1824), who is not
at the head of the list, and the choice of a majority of the Union.
The lesson of those times would deter imitation, and the democratic
principle would again crush all that were instrumental in thwarting
the public will. There is no longer the former danger from the House
of Representatives, nor any thing in it to justify a previous resort
to such assemblages as our national conventions have got to be. The
House is legal and responsible, which the convention is not, with
a better chance for integrity, as having been actually elected by
the people; and more restrained by position, by public opinion, and
a clause in the constitution from the acceptance of office from
the man they elect. It is the constitutional umpire; and until the
constitution is amended, I am for acting upon it as it is.