1. A large river which crosses the direction of the attack is always
very inconvenient for the assailant: for when he has crossed it he is
generally limited to one point of passage, and, therefore, unless he
remains close to the river he becomes very much hampered in his
movements. Whether he meditates bringing on a decisive battle after
crossing, or may expect the enemy to attack him, he exposes himself to
great danger; therefore, without a decided superiority, both in moral
and physical force, a general will not place himself in such a
position.
2. From this mere disadvantage of placing a river behind an army, a
river is much oftener capable of defence than it would otherwise be. If
we suppose that this defence is not considered the only means of
safety, but is so planned that even if it fails, still a stand can be
made near the river, then the assailant in his calculations must add to
the resistance which he may experience in the defence of the river, all
the advantages mentioned in No. 1, as being on the side of the defender
of a river, and the effect of the two together is, that we usually see
generals show great respect to a river before they attack it if it is
defended.
3. But in the preceding book we have seen, that under certain
conditions, the real defence of a river promises right good results;
and if we refer to experience, we must allow that such results follow
in reality much more frequently than theory promises, because in theory
we only calculate with real circumstances as we find them take place,
while in the execution, things commonly appear to the assailant much
more difficult than they really are, and they become therefore a
greater clog on his action.
Suppose, for instance, an attack which is not intended to end in a
great solution, and which is not conducted with thorough energy, we may
be sure that in carrying it out a number of little obstacles and
accidents, which no theory could calculate upon, will start up to the
disadvantage of the assailant, because he is the acting party, and
must, therefore, come first into collision with such impediments. Let
us just think for a moment how often some of the insignificant rivers
of Lombardy have been successfully defended!—If, on the other hand,
cases may also be found in military history, in which the defence of
rivers has failed to realise what was expected of them, that lies in
the extravagant results sometimes looked for from this means; results
not founded in any kind of way on its tactical nature, but merely on
its well-known efficacy, to which people have thought there were no
bounds.
4. It is only when the defender commits the mistake of placing his
entire dependence on the defence of a river, so that in case it is
forced he becomes involved in great difficulty, in a kind of
catastrophe, it is only then that the defence of a river can be looked
upon as a form of defence favourable to the attack, for it is certainly
easier to force the passage of a river than to gain an ordinary battle.
5. It follows of itself from what has just been said that the defence
of a river may become of great value if no great solution is desired,
but where that is to be expected, either from the superior numbers or
energy of the enemy, then this means, if wrongly used, may turn to the
positive advantage of the assailant.
6. There are very few river-lines of defence which cannot be turned
either on the whole length or at some particular point. Therefore the
assailant, superior in numbers and bent upon serious blows, has the
means of making a demonstration at one point and passing at another,
and then by superior numbers, and advancing, regardless of all
opposition, he can repair any disadvantageous relations in which he may
have been placed by the issue of the first encounters: for his general
superiority will enable him to do so. It very rarely happens that the
passage of a river is actually tactically forced by overpowering the
enemy’s principal post by the effect of superior fire and greater
valour on the part of the troops, and the expression, _forcing a
passage_ is only to be taken in a strategic sense, in so far that the
assailant by his passage at an undefended or only slightly defended
point within the line of defence, braves all the dangers which, in the
defender’s view, should result to him through the crossing.—But the
worst which an assailant can do, is to attempt a real passage at
several points, unless they lie close to each other and admit of all
the troops joining in the combat; for as the defender must necessarily
have his forces separated, therefore, if the assailant fractions his in
like manner, he throws away his natural advantage. In that way
Bellegarde lost the battle on the Mincio, 1814, where by chance both
armies passed at different points at the same time, and the Austrians
were more divided than the French.
7. If the defender remains on this side of the river, it necessarily
follows that there are two ways to gain a strategic advantage over him:
either to pass at some point, regardless of his position, and so to
outbid him in the same means, or to give battle. In the first case, the
relations of the base and lines of communications should chiefly
decide, but it often happens that special circumstances exercise more
influence than general relations; he who can choose the best positions,
who knows best how to make his dispositions, who is better obeyed,
whose army marches fastest, etc., may contend with advantage against
general circumstances. As regards the second means, it presupposes on
the part of the assailant the means, suitable relations, and the
determination to fight; but when these conditions may be presupposed,
the defender will not readily venture upon this mode of defending a
river.
8. As a final result, we must therefore give as our opinion that,
although the passage of a river in itself rarely presents great
difficulties, yet in all cases not immediately connected with a great
decision, so many apprehensions of the consequences and of future
complications are bound up with it, that at all events the progress of
the assailant may easily be so far arrested that he either leaves the
defender on this side the river, or he passes, and then remains close
to the river. For it rarely happens that two armies remain any length
of time confronting one another on different sides of a river.
But also in cases of a great solution, a river is an important object;
it always weakens and deranges the offensive; and the most fortunate
thing, in this case is, if the defender is induced through that to look
upon the river as a tactical barrier, and to make the particular
defence of that barrier the principal act of his resistance, so that
the assailant at once obtains the advantage of being able to strike a
decisive blow in a very easy manner.—Certainly, in the first instance,
this blow will never amount to a complete defeat of the enemy, but it
will consist of several advantageous combats, and these bring about a
state of general relations very adverse to the enemy, as happened to
the Austrians on the Lower Rhine, 1796.