In the book on the defence, it has been sufficiently explained how far
defensive positions can compel the assailant either to attack them, or
to give up his advance. Only those which can effect this are
subservient to our object, and suited to wear out or neutralise the
forces of the aggressor, either wholly or in part, and in so far the
attack can do nothing against such positions, that is to say, there are
no means at its disposal by which to counter-balance this advantage.
But defensive positions are not all really of this kind. If the
assailant sees he can pursue his object without attacking such a
position, it would be an error to make the attack; if he cannot follow
out his object, then it is a question whether he cannot manœuvre the
enemy out of his position by threatening his flank. It is only if such
means are ineffectual, that a commander determines on the attack of a
good position, and then an attack directed against one side, always in
general presents the less difficulty; but the choice of the side must
depend on the position and direction of the mutual lines of retreat,
consequently, on the threatening the enemy’s retreat, and covering our
own. Between these two objects a competition may arise, in which case
the first is entitled to the preference, as it is of an offensive
nature; therefore homogeneous with the attack, whilst the other is of a
defensive character. But it is certain, and may be regarded as a truth
of the first importance, that _to attack an enemy thoroughly inured to
war, in a good position, is a critical thing_. No doubt instances are
not wanting of such battles, and of successful ones too, as Torgau,
Wagram (we do not say Dresden, because we cannot call the enemy there
quite aguerried); but upon the whole, the danger is small, and it
vanishes altogether, opposed to the infinite number of cases in which
we have seen the most resolute commanders make their bow before such
positions. (Torres Vedras.)
We must not, however, confuse the subject now before us with ordinary
battles. Most battles are real “_rencontres_,” in which one party
certainly occupies a position, but one which has not been prepared.