What we have said about the defensive battle throws a strong light upon
the offensive also.
We there had in view that class of battle in which the defensive
appears most decidedly pronounced, in order that we might convey a more
vivid impression of its nature;—but only the fewer number are of that
kind; most battles are _demirencontres_ in which the defensive
character disappears to a great extent. It is otherwise with the
offensive battle: it preserves its character under all circumstances,
and can keep up that character the more boldly, as the defender is out
of his proper _esse_. For this reason, in the battle which is not
purely defensive and in the real _rencontres_, there always remains
also something of the difference of the character of the battle on the
one side and on the other. The chief distinctive characteristic of the
offensive battle is the manœuvre to turn or surround, therefore, the
initiative as well.
A combat in lines, formed to envelope, has evidently in itself great
advantages; it is, however, a subject of tactics. The attack must not
give up these advantages because the defence has a means of
counteracting them; for the attack itself cannot make use of that
means, inasmuch as it is one that is too closely dependent upon other
things connected with the defence. To be able in turn to operate with
success against the flanks of an enemy, whose aim is to turn our line,
it is necessary to have a well chosen and well prepared position. But
what is much more important is, that all the advantages which the
defensive possesses, cannot be made use of; most defences are poor
makeshifts; the greater number of defenders find themselves in a very
harassing and critical position, in which, expecting the worst, they
meet the attack half way. The consequence of this is, that battles
formed with enveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which
should properly result from an advantageous relation of the lines of
communication, are commonly the result of a moral and physical
preponderance (Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena). Besides, in the first battle
fought, the base of the assailant, if not superior to that of the
defender, is still mostly very wide in extent, on account of the
proximity of the frontier; he can, therefore, afford to venture a
little.—The flank-attack, that is, the battle with oblique front, is
moreover generally more efficacious than the enveloping form. It is an
erroneous idea that an enveloping strategic advance from the very
commencement must be connected with it, as at Prague. (That strategic
measure has seldom anything in common with it, and is very hazardous;
of which we shall speak further in the attack of a theatre of war.)
As it is an object with the commander in the defensive battle to delay
the decision as long as possible, and gain time, because a defensive
battle undecided at sunset is commonly one gained: therefore the
commander, in the offensive battle, requires to hasten the decision;
but, on the other hand, there is a great risk in too much haste,
because it leads to a waste of forces. One peculiarity in the offensive
battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position of the
enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things that are unknown
(Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena, Katzbach). The more this is the
case, so much the more concentration of forces becomes paramount, and
turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding. That the principal
fruits of victory are first gathered in the pursuit, we have already
learnt in the twelfth chapter of the 4th Book. According to the nature
of the thing, the pursuit is more an integral part of the whole action
in the offensive than in the defensive battle.