CHAPTER VI. Destruction of the Enemy’s Armies

The destruction of the enemy’s armed forces is the means to the

end—What is meant by this—The price it costs—Different points of view

which are possible in respect to the subject.

1, only to destroy as many as the object of the attack requires.

2, or as many on the whole as is possible.

3, the sparing of our own forces as the principal point of view.

4, this may again be carried so far, that the assailant does nothing

towards the destruction of the enemy’s force _except when a favourable

opportunity offers_, which may also be the case with regard to the

object of the attack, as already mentioned in the third chapter.

The only means of destroying the enemy’s armed force is by combat, but

this may be done in two ways: 1, directly, 2, indirectly, through a

combination of combats.—If, therefore, the battle is the chief means,

still it is not the only means. The capture of a fortress or of a

portion of territory, is in itself really a destruction of the enemy’s

force, and it may also lead to a still greater destruction, and

therefore, also, be an indirect means.

The occupation of an undefended strip of territory, therefore, in

addition to the value which it has as a direct fulfilment of the end,

may also reckon as a destruction of the enemy’s force as well. The

manœuvring, so as to draw an enemy out of a district of country which

he has occupied, is somewhat similar, and must, therefore, only be

looked at from the same point of view, and not as a success of arms,

properly speaking—These means are generally estimated at more than they

are worth—they have seldom the value of a battle; besides which it is

always to be feared that the disadvantageous position to which they

lead, will be overlooked; they are seductive through the low price

which they cost.

We must always consider means of this description as small investments,

from which only small profits are to be expected; as means suited only

to very limited State relations and weak motives. Then they are

certainly better than battles without a purpose—than victories, the

results of which cannot be realised to the full.

On War · 第 6 / 23 章