LETTER 6.
_Difficulties of the conquest of Mexico. The acquisition of
California._
NOVEMBER 2, 1846.
SIR: The conquest of Mexico is talked of as a thing settled, and
yet, how few have examined the nature of the undertaking and the
difficulties to be encountered and overcome! To form some idea
of these, we must take into consideration the number of the
inhabitants and the extent of the country to be conquered. It is
true, the warlike character and resources of such a country, may
not be in proportion, as is the case with the Chinese, from
unwillingness to keep pace with other nations in the arts of
peace and war. The Mexicans are not in this condition; they
either have adopted or may adopt all the improvements in war, at
least, of modern European nations. Their military strength ought
to bear some proportion to their numbers and resources. If the
Indian population is destitute of patriotism, their religious
feelings and the influence of the priesthood, over them, ought,
in some measure, to supply the deficiency. Let us now consider,
what we may expect to encounter in the invasion of Mexico.
The population is estimated at eight millions; of these, five
millions are contained in a comparatively small space, of which
the capital is the centre. Four fifths of this number are Indian
peasantry; the others, either of the pure Spanish race or mixed
with the Indian. The whole Mexican territory is said to be a
million and a half of square miles—the whole of the portion
containing the five millions does not exceed three hundred
thousand square miles. The two roads, as already mentioned, are
from Saltillo and from Vera Cruz. Let us see what States and
population General Taylor would have to pass through, and then
we may form some idea of the kind of resistance he may meet, if
any defence at all be attempted:
_States._ _Chief
Cities._
Zacatecas, 272,000 Zacatecas, 40,000
Guanawhato, 500,000 Guanawhato, 60,000
San Louis, 250,000 San Louis, 25,000
Queretaro, 200,000 Queretaro, 30,000
Guadelahara, 800,000 Guadelahara, 90,000
Mexico, 1,500,000 Mexico, 200,000
──────
3,522,000
All the above States must be traversed or passed through—they
must be occupied in such a manner as to keep open the line of
march of the army. We must not think that our marches will be
similar to an insurrectionary movement among themselves. A
Mexican General, at the head of a column, approaches the city
of Mexico, or Guadelahara, a _pronunciamento_ takes places
among the soldiers and citizens, and they invite the insurgent
army to enter as friends and countrymen. If we look for such
_pronunciamentos_ in favor of an American invading army,
especially of heretics, we will be disappointed. There was
nothing of this at Monterey, and the further we penetrate to
the interior, the less there will be, of this kind of
fraternization.
But did not Cortez take the city of Mexico with only nine
hundred men? Not exactly; Cortez had, as his allies, two hundred
thousand Indian warriors, twenty thousand of whom were
Tlascalans, the bravest of that region. The taking the city
occupied seventy days, after a terrific slaughter. He divided
his army into four divisions, of fifty thousand each, entering
the city at different points, and leveling the houses in the
way, until the different armies met in the great square. Even if
the Mexican armies should avoid pitched battles, they can
fortify strong natural positions, and being well provided with
artillery, and having good engineers, it would be strange if
they did not avail themselves of these advantages. We must
expect hard fighting in the mountain passes which abound and
also in taking towns entirely constructed of brick or stone, and
incombustible. General Whitlock attempted to take the city of
Buenos Ayres, which had little to no defence, except the
barricades across the streets and the flat roofs of the houses;
his army was twelve thousand strong, and was repulsed with great
loss. The Texan mode of burrowing through the houses had not
then been invented. I do not say, that General Taylor would not
be able to reach Mexico, but it would be very hard fighting.
Let us now consider what it is to be overcome on the Vera Cruz
line of march.
_States._ _Chief
Cities._
Mexico, 1,500,000 Mexico, 200,000
[!]Michuacan, 450,000 Valladolid, 25,000
[!]Wahaca, 600,000 Wahaca, 40,000
Puebla, 900,000 Puebla, 60,000
Vera Cruz, 200,000 Vera Cruz, 15,000
Chiapa, 100,000 Chiapa, 3,000
Tobasco, 75,000 Tobasco, 5,000
──────
4,347,000
! I have endeavored to accommodate the spelling to the
pronunciation.
The army, by way of Vera Cruz, would have to pass through four
millions, and would meet with greater difficulties on the way
than that from Saltillo. I am supposing that while the invading
army advances from this latter place, the States along the other
road will remain passive; and so of the army taking its march
from Vera Cruz, that the northern States will not take part. But
this will not be the case. It will, therefore, be necessary to
take both roads at once, and advance with two armies
simultaneously, at an enormous expense and loss of life. It is
true, we may find efficient allies in the discords among the
Mexicans themselves, which may prevent them from uniting against
us. The Indians may remain perfectly passive; the men of
property, tired of internal revolutions, and despairing of ever
seeing a settled government in their country, may desire to seek
security and peace under the wings of the American eagle. These
dissensions and jealousies, although of a different kind from
those which favored the conquest by Cortez, may lead to the same
result. If they were a patriotic and united people, the attempt
to conquer them would seem to me hopeless. Yet, when we consider
the force they can bring into the field in defence of their
homes, and as they believe, of their altars, instigated by
hatred towards us, and that sense of degradation, which even the
dullest of the human race must feel at the idea of subjugation
by a foreign enemy, we cannot but expect a powerful resistance.
They ought to be able to arm and embody two hundred thousand men
for defence. This is a very different affair from marching an
army a thousand miles to attack Texas. They would be called out
to defend the very soil on which they exist, and it seems
incredible, that they would not respond to the call.
And should we make ourselves masters of the capital, will this
be the conquest of the whole country? When Cortez took the city,
he, at the same time, overturned the dynasty and Empire of
Montezuma, which had become odious to the surrounding nations.
It was, in fact, those nations which overthrew that empire,
under the guidance and with the aid of the Spaniards, little
thinking, that they were only fighting for a change of masters.
And suppose, that notwithstanding our signal success in taking
the Metropolis, the Mexican Congress retiring to some other city
should still persist in refusing to make peace on our terms, or
on any terms, what are we then to do? We must go on to conquer,
and hold each separate State, or we must retire, without either
conquering the country or conquering a peace. We should bring
back laurels and glory, but foiled and baffled in the objects
for which we made such mighty efforts. And I confess, I should
be sorry to annex such a population, incapable of defending
themselves, incapable of self-government, and who must be our
dependants, or rather bondsmen. The conquests and annexation of
nations on the soil of Italy, gave strength to Rome, but when
she acquired distant provinces as dependencies, and established
colonies, the government became hopelessly corrupt, and the
empire fell by its own weight. It is not so much the annexation
of territory, as of people unfitted for republican government,
that I dread. If it be necessary to govern them as dependencies,
a degree of corruption will be so rapidly introduced into our
Government, that its whole character will be changed, and
republican virtue will hardly be a name among us.
These, after all, are but speculations, and may prove to be
visionary. Our scope of vision into the future is very limited.
The great event of the war, in my estimation, is the taking of
California. As respects Mexico, it was a mere waif or derelict,
liable to be seized by the first comer; and, in fact, we were
only about a week before the British squadron, who were utterly
astonished to see our flag flying at Monterey and San Francisco,
when it was their design to place St. George’s Cross there. It
was merely a question as to who should occupy the country, and
surely, in such an alternative, no American can hesitate to say,
that possession should be taken by us. It was lost to Mexico, at
any rate; and, in the hands of Great Britain, would have been an
endless source of vexation to us, and, perhaps, lead to ultimate
rupture with that country. We have now a sea coast on the
Pacific corresponding to that on the Atlantic. Our republic
stretches from sea to sea, and in time, a land communication
will be established between the two, reducing the distance more
and more every day. The Republic thus fronts Europe on the east,
and Asia on the west, with an ocean boundary, beyond which we
cannot go. Here let our proud progress be stayed! Let us be
content with filling up the vast space, and improving our
condition and the condition of our fellow men. An immense
commerce must spring up in less than half a century, from our
Pacific coast, with the five hundred millions of people, who
inhabit the shores washed by the western and Indian oceans!
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LETTER 7.
_The War will make us better acquainted with each other._
DECEMBER 5, 1846.
There is one advantage we shall derive from the war: we shall
become better acquainted with our southern neighbor, and she
will become better acquainted with us. Even in a geographical
point of view, in spite of all the writers, from Humboldt down
to the latest, and in spite of all the map makers, the American
public, is very imperfectly acquainted with Mexico. In nothing
is this more remarkable than in the extent of surface, distance
of places, and in the amount of population, of which we have no
adequate conception. The ignorance of the Mexicans respecting
the United States is, of course, still greater. When Santa Anna
invaded Texas he actually spoke of marching to Washington in
case our Government interfered! We have very little idea of the
distance from the Rio Grande to the capital of Mexico; but the
thousands who have marched over it in various directions, and
the numerous publications giving accounts of military
expeditions, will render the country more familiar to our people
than it could be in the usual course of things, in fifty years.
In our imaginations, it has been a region of romance, associated
with gold and silver, with a climate and beauty of an earthly
paradise. Our soldiers and volunteers will return with very
different impressions; taken as a whole, it is vastly inferior
to the United States, in natural wealth, in fertility of soil,
in climate, and in everything calculated to minister to human
happiness. That incessant craving for the delights of the land
of Montezuma, will be effectually cured, and with it, that wild
spirit of conquest, which has prevailed until now, in the
southern and western portions of the confederacy. It will be
effectually cured, and nothing else would have cured it. We
shall rest satisfied that our own is, incomparably, a finer
country, and, in fact, one of the most favored portions of the
Globe. We have no _tierras calientes_, where the vegetable
growth is, indeed, most luxuriant, but man looses all his
energy, and becomes little better than a vegetable. Their
_tierras templadas_, or temperate lands, in general, are barren
rocks or dry plains, which cannot be cultivated without
irrigation. And when we look at the population, their want of
well ordered government, the barbarous ignorance and indolence
of the masses, their religious, or rather superstitious bigotry,
their robberies and assassinations in cold blood, where is the
American who would not prefer his own country? We have, no
doubt, many things among us to deplore and to amend; but what
are these in comparison to the state of things continually
presented in those countries which are said to be “blessed of
God and cursed of man?” I do not assent to the first part of
this expression, for, I believe, there is no portion of the
earth, of the same extent, “so blessed of God,” as these United
States.
In one thing we have been undeceived; we supposed that the
Mexicans are a rich people; that is, possessed abundant stores
of the necessaries and luxuries of life. So far from it, that we
have been compelled to draw nearly all of our supplies for our
armies from the States. There are, doubtless, rich individuals
among them, but the mass of the people are miserably poor. They
lay up no stores, and have little beyond what is required by
their immediate wants. The very abundance of the productions of
nature may be one of the causes of this general poverty. As a
people, they are sunk in sloth, in vice and ignorance. I speak
in general, for there are, no doubt, numerous exceptions. Their
opinions of the “Yankees,” as they call us, in contempt and
derision, is likely to undergo an entire change. They will
entertain a different opinion of us; they will look upon us with
fear and respect, and will be as anxious to cultivate a good
understanding as they were to insult us and ill treat our
citizens. Hereafter, their Government will take a second thought
before it countenances the plunder and murder of Americans.
Treaties of peace will be respected, and we may venture into the
country without danger to person or property, provided we
conduct ourselves with propriety.
There are many of the geographical features of so vast a
country, especially as to its mountains, table lands, and
rivers, differing entirely from our portion of the continent.
For instance, the character of the table lands beyond Monterey
would not be understood without the explanation, that the
Mexican mountains are not in regular ranges or ridges like the
Alleghanies, with intervening valleys, but present, on the
eastern side, the appearance of giant ramparts of naked rock,
through which fissures have been made by torrents; while on
their summit, a vast plain, six or seven thousand feet above the
sea, like a table raised above the floor, stretches out for
hundreds of miles, with occasional depressions and peaks piled
up to the height of five or six thousand feet more, and covered
with perpetual snow. We have no such mountains. The sides of our
mountains are nearly all fertile, at least, east of the
Mississippi. The precipitous sides of the _Sierra Madre_ are
broken through by several rivers, which, in the course of a
hundred miles, descend six or seven thousand feet, and in
consequence of this, excepting a short distance from their
mouths in the Gulf of Mexico, are not fit for navigation. It is
along the courses of these rivers, that the passes are found:
such as that of the Panuco from Tampico; that of the Tula, near
Victoria; that of the San Juan, from Monterey to Saltillo, and
the Conchas, towards Chewawa. The want of good roads from the
interior, and good harbors on the Gulf, essentially render the
eastern portion of Mexico, an inland country. The Alvarado,
Guasacualco, and Tobasco, are almost the only exceptions. The
States north and east of the Sierra Madre, comprising those
which we now hold, although not yet completely subdued, have no
water transportation to the coast, excepting by means of the Rio
Grande. The want of a carriage road is exemplified by the fact,
that the British company engaged in working the mines of
Catorce, which are not more than three hundred miles in a direct
line from Tampico, having landed their engines at that place,
could not transport them direct to San Luis, but were obliged to
go north towards Matamoras, and then take the direction of
Monterey and Saltillo. From the latter place, after ascending to
the table land, they proceed to San Louis, making a circuit of
more than twelve hundred miles, and which consumed four months.
The delightful country which I have described, as the States of
New Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, is equal in extent to the
eastern parts of Virginia and North and South Carolina, and
large enough for a kingdom. It is, in general a plain, but not
flat; on the contrary, picturesque, with a fine soil, admirably
adapted to all the productions of the temperate climates, but
free from frosts. This country we shall be compelled to hold,
even if our conquests should extend no further. We cannot
abandon it _without a treaty of peace and boundaries_, and to
which, from present appearances, Mexico will not agree. We shall
not give it up unless for a complete cession of California and
New Mexico, with the boundary of the Rio Grande. The population
of those States is, now, perhaps, equal to that of our Southern
States during our revolutionary war, and would easily contain
four or five millions. For defence, it ought now to bring
fifteen or twenty thousand fighting men into the field, in
guerrilla parties, and poorly armed. If supported by some
regular troops, the rancheros might give us trouble. But cut off
from all supplies, with no rallying points or fortified places,
we could by pushing the war vigorously, effectually subdue them.
If we fall back on the Rio Grande, we leave the whole country
west of it, open to the operations of Santa Anna; and we shall
be compelled to establish a chain of fortifications along the
great river, for at least two thousand miles. On the other hand,
the table land of the Sierra Madre, and on the west, towards the
Pacific, being only accessible by a few passes, the inhabitants
once completely subdued, must remain so. That mountain boundary
is, infinitely, more easy to defend, than the line of the river;
a river, which would be bordered in its whole length by an
enemy, who might send detachments at any moment to make
destructive inroads. It would be necessary to have both sides of
the river, without which, it would be a bad boundary. If we
confine ourselves to the east side of it, the inhabitants on the
other bank, in case of hostilities, can at any time call in the
aid of the Mexican Government. Collisions will be unavoidable,
and Texas will be continually threatened, unless we keep up, at
great expense, a permanent force along the line. But taking the
mountains as the boundary, we could keep Mexico in her shell,
until the valley shall be filled by American and European
population. There is, no doubt, unappropriated land; but, even
supposing the whole to be claimed under grants to the church,
and to individuals, these might justly be subjected to
forfeitures and confiscations, partial or total, in case of
refusal to own allegiance. The tenures of all these lands are,
in their nature, feudal; that is, the fee is in the sovereign,
whoever that may be, and subject to be resumed and regranted at
the pleasure of the sovereign. The tenure or holding, is not
allodial as with us; it is rather political or military, if I
may so express myself, than legal.[3] This subject is not
generally understood among us, and it would occupy too much
space to explain it more fully. If Mexico compels us to conquer
the country described, we must annex it, but cannot do this
without republicanizing it first; and this, again, cannot be
done without abolishing the feudal system, and changing the
tenure of the lands. Still, I am no advocate of conquest; I
would rather take the boundary of the Rio Grande by fair treaty,
than hold the States bordering on that river, by the rights of
war, which are regarded by all barbarous nations, and by Mexico
herself, is the highest, and most glorious of all titles.
Footnote 3:
I speak of the large grants, the smaller are allodial, as
also, the grants on condition of settlement.
The policy of Santa Anna, at present, is to act on the
defensive, preparatory to taking the offensive. He is now at
work at San Luis, in collecting and organizing a powerful army,
the most formidable ever yet seen in the republic. He will
address himself to the Mexicans, with such appeals as may rouse
them to a sense of their danger, and will, perhaps, attempt to
lay hold of the immense riches of the church, to sustain the
national cause. In the latter, he will probably fail; it is the
greater power in Mexico, for power does not centre exclusively
in the army, and but a small portion of it in the people, if
there can be said to be a people at all. His object is, no
doubt, to make himself a _dictator_, or an absolute despot; and
this he cannot accomplish, without, in the first instance,
having the support of the church. When sufficiently strong by
means of the army, he can then use the church as a part of his
machinery. Every thing depends on his success in this war. If he
succeeds in repelling the invasion, he will, in all probability,
be able to establish his power on a permanent footing of
hereditary despotism. To conquer the country, our shortest
course is, to deal at once with the church and the great land
holders, and make them responsible for their peons; for the
proprietors not only own the land, with but few exceptions, but
also own the population, just as the Russian noble owns the
serfs of his estate.
Since the Mexican revolution, the States and territories north
and west of the line from Tampico to Mazatlan, and even the
States which I have mentioned, directly west of the great river,
have been rapidly returning to their original state of
barbarism. Contrary to the usual course of things on this
continent, the indian tribes have here been, for years,
encroaching on the whites, instead of being encroached upon and
driven back. In the States of Durango, Chewawa, Sonora, Sinaloa,
and in Lower California, the Apaches and Camanches, are
continually laying waste, robbing, plundering, and murdering,
and each succeeding year, their ravages are becoming more and
more extensive. Under the royal government, posts were
established every where, troops were kept up, and the
inhabitants protected, by pursuing the marauding parties, the
only way in which a country can be protected from savages. But
they did not arm the inhabitants, and require them to assist in
defending themselves. There was no militia, and consequently,
when left to themselves, they are perfectly helpless. There
could be no greater blessing to them, than to be placed under
the protection of the United States. I repeat, that my object is
not to encourage a spirit of conquest. In indulging in these
speculations, I endeavor to be guided by the spirit of truth.
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LETTER 8.
_Slight hopes of peace—State of the war—The situation of General
Taylor._
JANUARY, 1847.