No. I.
------------------------------------------------------
MEXICAN LETTERS
WRITTEN
DURING THE PROGRESS OF THE LATE WAR
BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES
AND
MEXICO,
BY
B. H. M. BRACKENRIDGE:
NOW COLLECTED AND REPUBLISHED, WITH NOTES AND CORRECTIONS, TO BE
COMPLETED IN TWO NUMBERS.
────────
_Genus audax Japeti._
────────
WASHINGTON:
PRINTED BY ROBERT A. WATERS.
1850.
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PREFACE.
----------
One who thinks for himself, is very apt to think alone, or with a
minority, especially in our free republic, where there is such proneness
in opinion to run into party. The individual is restrained by party
trammels from asserting his independence, and he must adopt all the
articles of political, as well as religious creeds, or be expelled from
the church. Although agreeing with the whigs generally, I could not
agree with them in our late war with Mexico, that justice was on the
side of that republic; still less could I approve of the constant
condemnation of the war in which we were engaged. I applied the same
principle to that war that I did to the late war with Great Britain,
that is to say, that it becomes every citizen to sustain his country
against the common enemy, both by word and deed.
The letters now collected and submitted to the public, were written in
this spirit. The author has endeavored to treat with respect the
opinions of those who differed from him. He does not think he can be
justly censured by any one for attempting to prove by fair and honest
reasoning, that his country was in the right, and the enemy in the
wrong. He may be condemned by his party at the present day, but at a
future day the judgment may be reversed. These letters may serve as
materials for history. There will be no difficulty in finding the
records of the arguments of the administration party, which promoted and
defended the war; or of the opposition, which denounced it. But before
making up a verdict, the voice of the small number dissenting from the
latter ought also to be heard. It is with this view chiefly, that these
letters are collected and preserved. There is, besides, usually a
freshness in the commentaries on contemporary or passing events, which
cannot be attained by historical compilation, however elegant and
philosophic, while the former, may be but rude and unpolished.
The author, although desirous of the annexation of Texas, was fearful of
the consequences of any acquisition of territory on our southern
borders, for the single reason, that it might endanger the harmony of
the Union. He foresaw great evils and dangers arising from the _quasi_
independence of Texas, and from the certainty of the occupation of Upper
California by Great Britain, in case it did not fall into our hands.
Looking into the future, both of these points presented the probability
of fearful collisions with that power. We had a Scylla and Charybdis
before us; our bark could not strike upon both; but whether it will
escape both, the Almighty, who has thus far favored us in a peculiar
manner, can alone determine. As to Mexico, I have long been of opinion,
that we could never have a peace on a lasting foundation, without a war.
If that neighboring and jealous people had still remained united to the
Spanish monarchy, it would have been the same thing. This event was but
removed farther off, or postponed by the acquisition of Louisiana and
the Mississippi, but soon or late, a collision was inevitable; and
nothing else would determine the terms on which we should live in
future, as neighbors. To other persons, all this may appear visionary
and idle, the mere dreams of the closet. Be it so—let my opinions pass
for what they are worth; they are, at least, those of a thinker, an
observer, and an actor on the scene.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 1.
_Justice on the side of Texas in her war with Mexico._
JUNE, 1846.
_To the Editor of the Commercial Journal_:
We continually meet with the phrases in newspapers, English and
American, and especially in Mexican documents, “the robbery and
plunder of Mexico, of her province of Texas,” and of the
“ingratitude of the people of Texas.” These expressions, from
frequent use, have come to have some meaning attached to them
with those who are not acquainted with the true history of the
case. Now what is Mexico, and what particular right had she ever
to Texas? She was once a vice-royalty of Spain, composed of
various Intendencies, or local and subordinate Governments.
These Intendencies, taking advantage of the troubles of old
Spain, set up for themselves, and endeavored to throw off the
Spanish dominion, practising the same thing that Texas has done
as respects Mexico; and if Texas has been ungrateful to Mexico,
for the same reason Mexico has been ungrateful to Spain. But the
struggle for independence was carried on by them separately, and
independently of each other; not united like the British
Colonies in the Revolutionary War. It may be new to some to be
told that Texas not only achieved her own independence without
the aid of any Mexican Province or Intendency, but was actually
the means, through the Americans then inhabiting the country,
with the aid of citizens of the United States, of enabling the
other Mexican Provinces to gain _their_ independence. Before I
am done this will be demonstrated. Mexico owes a debt to the
American people of Texas and of the United States, for her
independence, _if it be worth anything_, and, consequently, the
ingratitude is on her side. But her efforts were finally
successful through the treachery of Iturbide. He was a traitor
to Spain, in whose employment he was, and by one of those
military revolts, since of daily recurrence in the mis-named
Republic of Mexico, overturned the Spanish authority, and
proclaimed himself Emperor! The empire was soon after overturned
by something approaching nearer to a popular revolution in the
Intendencies or Provinces. An attempt at something like a
Republic, followed the downfall of the Emperor. States were
formed out of the Intendencies, and a confederated Republic, in
imitation of the United States, was established in form, but in
form only. Texas, with parts of two other Intendencies, was
constituted one of these States. The confederated Republic was
not long lived. It fell to pieces or was overturned by the
military chiefs, and then each State, was again compelled to
look out for itself. Some submitted, some were subdued by this
military power, the only real power; and others still retain
their preference for the federative system, although compelled
to submit to the central authority. The only one which _did not
submit to the overthrow of the Constitution by a military
usurper, was ungrateful Texas_.
Santa Anna, after having expelled Iturbide, next overturned the
federative system, restored the central power of the city of
Mexico, and at the same time grasped the substance of absolute
power, prudently avoiding the name of Emperor. Troops were sent
to Texas, and these _ungrateful_ people were generously called
upon, _to give up their religion and surrender their rifles_!
The consequence was, that Coss and his fourteen hundred men were
driven over the Rio Grande. People talk of the Texans having no
cause of war, now I ask any one, who has a drop of American
blood in his veins, to say, what he would think of an order by a
military despot, to the people of Alleghany county for instance,
_to give up their religion and their arms_? But then did not
Mexico make grants of land to these ungrateful American
settlers, and did not that entitle her to call upon those
settlers to comply with her moderate requests?[1] It is true,
Mexico did make grants of land in Texas; yes, of land which did
not belong to her, for they were won from Spain by the Texan
Americans themselves, who constituted nine tenths of the people
of that part of the country. And what was the next movement on
the part of Mexico? These grants were made during the federative
system—Americans were invited on account of their valuable
assistance in contending against the Spanish monarchy, and
guarding the frontier against hostile Indians—but when they were
no longer needed, when the lands improved by them, tempted the
cupidity of the military despots, and when their sturdy habits
of independence and love of liberty stood in the way of the
despotic schemes of the military aspirants and plunderers of
Mexico, the next thing was to expel, or exterminate, the
ungrateful and hated North Americans. Santa Anna marched at the
head of ten thousand men for this holy purpose. We may judge of
the humane and civilized spirit of these barbarians, (for whom
so much sympathy is ignorantly felt by some of our fellow
citizens,) by the murder of Fanning and four hundred American
Texans in cold blood, after a surrender as prisoners of war!
This more than diabolical atrocity, is scarcely equalled by the
murder of the Huguenots by the fanatical ruffian, Pedro
Menendez.
Footnote 1:
Terms of reproach like these have been applied to the Texans,
even from the pulpit, by learned divines, who are better
theologians, than jurists or statesmen. As moral men, they
ought to beware how they cast reproach on their neighbors,
without being sure of their facts; and even then, tempered by
charity. If the allusion is to the grants of land made by
Mexico, those grants were made from the most interested
motives. Texas contained but two small towns, San Antonio and
Nacogdoches; all the rest was a wilderness, wandered over by
the Camanches and Lipans, and other hostile Indians, with the
exception of the few American settlements formed by hardy
American pioneers, and maintained by the rifle, at the
constant risk of life. The object of the Mexican Government
was to cover their frontier from Indian depredations by
placing an advanced guard of our countrymen between them and
their savage enemies. The lands of Texas were worse than
useless and worthless to Mexico, because they merely served as
the place of refuge for her savage enemies; she, in fact, gave
nothing that was of any value to her; on the contrary, the
grants were intended for her own advantage and security. But
for these settlements, her whole frontier would have been laid
waste; and many a bloody battle was fought, and many a Texan
life was lost in the border war of which the Mexican Provinces
reaped the benefit. But for the Texans, it is difficult to
say, what would have been the condition of the internal
provinces at this day. After expending millions in money and
labor—after opening farms, building towns, and rearing vast
herds of cattle, the Mexicans begin to discover its value, and
conceived the idea of placing their peon slaves on the
improved lands, which were to be parcelled out among military
chiefs. Besides, the sturdy republican predilections of the
Americans settled in Texas, and their intelligence, were
annoying to the leaders of the military despotism of Mexico.
It was conceived, that the purpose for which they were invited
to take possession of the dangerous post of frontier settlers,
was now accomplished, and that their further services could be
dispensed with; and, at the same time, gratify the cupidity of
their military chieftains. It was they who were frustrated in
the _attempt to steal the Texan lands_, while the Texans did
nothing more than defend their own—that which they had
created, _and which had never been the property of Mexico_.
I am disgusted when I hear persons talk of the injured Mexicans,
when such butcheries as these are passed _in almost approving
silence_. But Santa Anna met, not indeed _with the fate he
deserved_, but such an overthrow, as every true lover of liberty
and political justice ought to desire. His forces were driven
across the Rio Grande; Texas declared her independence; she
successfully maintained it, and proclaimed the Rio Grande as her
boundary, and has devolved that _claim_ upon us. Upon this mere
outline of facts, I appeal to every just and unprejudiced,
unbigoted man, to say, how has Texas been ungrateful to Mexico,
and how have we, or Texas, been guilty of robbing Mexico of an
independent State, which has fairly united her fate with ours?
Mr. Webster says, Mexico is “the most ill-governed country on
earth;” and I will add, that her Government is the most
faithless, unprincipled, and cruel. For the honor of humanity,
there are noble exceptions, doubtless, among the people and her
public officers, nevertheless, such, with too much truth, is the
general character of both.
In 1812, a young man of the name of Magee, who had been a
Lieutenant in the United States service, after resigning for the
purpose, assembled a force of American riflemen between the
Sabine and the Trinity Rivers, and raised the standard of revolt
against Spain, ostensibly under a native named Bernardo. At this
time, the different attempts at revolution throughout the
vice-royalty, had been completely put down, and the last rebel,
Hidalgo, publicly executed. Magee took Nacogdoches, then marched
to La Bahia, where, with four hundred Americans, he withstood a
siege of three months, the American riflemen making such havoc
among the Spanish soldiers in their occasional sorties, that
their commander was compelled to raise the siege and retreat to
St. Antonio; Magee, in the meantime died, not more than
twenty-two years of age. The Americans, in all, about three
hundred, and one hundred Indians, pursued the royal troops until
within twelve miles of St. Antonio. Here they were drawn up
twelve hundred strong, with six pieces of artillery. A charge
was made by the American riflemen, the artillery taken; and on
the same day they took possession of the town. About six months
after this, General Elisondo, with sixteen hundred men, who had
approached the place, was attacked by the Americans with about
nine hundred, (three or four hundred of them native Texans,) and
completely routed. Two Spanish armies were thus entirely
destroyed. A third, under Arredondo, would have shared the same
fate, but for the desertion of Manchaco who led the Texan
Spaniards.
It thus appears, that the revolutionary fire was kept alive in
Texas when every where else extinguished. It was the means of
exciting other revolutionary attempts in different parts of
Mexico. Even after Texas was reduced by the Spanish troops, new
attempts were continually made by Americans, and with partial
success, to regain it. It was, through the medium of Texas, that
supplies were continually obtained to aid the Mexicans in all
their struggles for independence. Hundreds of Americans
sacrificed their lives in every part of Mexico in support of the
cause. In the unfortunate expedition of General Mina, not less
than three hundred Americans embarked, few of whom ever
returned. I am well convinced that without the aid of the
ungrateful Texans, in the supply of men, arms, and means of war,
Mexico could not have gained her independence. And what was the
return made to the citizens of the United States for this, and
for being first to take her by the hand, and recognize her as an
independent Republic? It was natural for Americans to sympathize
with their countrymen in Texas when oppressed by Mexico, and a
determination avowed to exterminate them; and hence, the
principal cause of offence to Mexico, which instigated the
shocking treatment of American citizens engaged in their lawful
pursuits in that country, under the faith of treaties. Nothing
was more common than the imprisonment of Americans in the horrid
prisons of Mexico; for personal liberty, which to us, is the
dearest thing on earth; with them, is the cheapest. Our trade
with Mexico was almost annihilated. In every instance in which
American vessels were seized under some frivolous pretext as an
excuse for plunder, every one on board was thrown into prison
among the vilest malefactors, and compelled, for an indefinite
period, to undergo every kind of suffering, under which a large
proportion actually perished. A stupid and barbarous prejudice—a
fiendish hostility, seems to prevail among the great body of
that people where no opportunity has been afforded of becoming
personally acquainted with us. It reminds one of the ignorant
self-conceit and arrogance of the Chinese, and there seems to be
no way of securing their esteem and respect, but by adopting the
course pursued by the English with the “Celestials.” Our long
forbearance has doubtless tended to encourage this insolence.
They received a timely check from the French when the castle of
Ulloa was battered down with so little ceremony, and the
authorities required to pay on the deck of Admiral Baurin’s
vessel, a million of dollars, as the estimated value of their
plunder of French subjects. They now entertain a high opinion of
French civilization and politeness. England has always held them
under her thumb, by loans, investments, and cajolery, and they
now look to her for aid, support, and sympathy. England has a
deep stake in Mexico; it is to be expected therefore, that she
will sympathize with _her own interests_; that she will do all
she can to excite against us the prejudices of the Mexicans,
exhibiting our conduct through a jaundiced medium, both to
Mexicans and Europeans. No pains will be spared to place us
before the world as in the wrong in this contest. American
editors ought to be on their guard against such partial and
interested representations as that of J. D. Powell’s, “Chairman
of the South American and Mexican Association,” as well as
against the low and scurrilous slanders of the British presses
of Montreal.
H. M. BRACKENRIDGE.
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LETTER 2.
_The first blow of the War—Fortunate result—Reflections._
JULY, 1846.
Never was a country more suddenly raised up from a state of
depression, to the most enthusiastic rejoicing and gladness,
than we have been since the late glorious intelligence from the
Rio Grande! We may talk about the justice of the war, and there
may be fanatics who would rejoice in the defeat of our armies,
but the people, true to patriotic feeling, rejoice with one
heart over the glorious achievements of our countrymen. We are
the same people that we were at the capture of Cornwallis, and
at the defeat of the British at New Orleans.
There was a gloom settling over the public mind, and fears began
to be entertained of news like that from Detroit, at the opening
of that unfortunate campaign. To all appearance, General Taylor
and his gallant army were shut up in Fort Brown, and suddenly
cut off by an overwhelming force of Mexicans, from his military
depot at Point Isabel. If that depot, defended by less than a
thousand men, its fortifications incomplete, should be assailed
by the whole force of Arista and Ampudia, its safety appeared to
be hopeless. If taken, the army of General Taylor, shut up in
Fort Brown, with supplies only for a few weeks, would be either
compelled to surrender, or attempt to retreat to Corpus Christi.
The consequences, in either case, would be a triumph for the
Mexican arms, fatal to all hope of peace.
I passed some sleepless nights in revolving the subject in my
mind. The idea constantly recurred to me, as a sort of waking
dream, that General Taylor would leave a force in Fort Brown and
with the main body of his army cut his way to Point Isabel. I
was disposed to blame him for suffering himself to be separated
from his depot of supplies; but the war itself came on him
suddenly, and he was obliged to _wait the first blow_. In this
feverish state of mind, a friend came to my house early one
morning with two newspaper slips containing the accounts of the
two battles of Palo Alto, and Resaca. Never was the anxiety of a
people more suddenly and joyfully relieved! It was like the
anxiety felt by a family for the fate of those nearest and
dearest to it. We are peculiarly a national people; for every
man has a share in the Government; feels an interest in it, as a
part owner, and he feels his own safety and honor embarked in
the same bottom with the safety and honor of the nation.
Thank God, we are safe! They must be very short sighted men who
could wish success to the Mexicans. We should have had scenes of
bloodshed and devastation unparalleled. Our preparations for war
would have had to be renewed on a vast and expensive scale; the
most extravagant hopes in the presumptuous and barbarous enemy
would have been encouraged; while even the Sabine, for a
boundary, would not have contented them. Their demands would
have known no bounds, and the prospects of peace, would have
been remote indeed. Now, humbled and broken, their country
exposed to invasion and conquest, if we only will it; undeceived
in their fancied military pre-eminence, they must be insane if
they do not hasten to sue for peace. I confess, I did not look
for such decided success in the first blow, which, in wars and
battles, is often so important; and that, over a people who have
been continually practising the art of war, and who ought to
excel in it, if they can excel in any thing. If the history of
nations be a history of battles, (as it is said to be) Mexico
will claim a conspicuous page in that history. European nations,
who have been in the habit of judging others, chiefly by their
military prowess, will open their eyes when they receive the
news; for they have already prognosticated according to their
wishes, that we must be disgraced in the trial of arms with
Mexico.
I have no doubt, that President Polk will lay hold of this
occasion to offer terms of peace. I am not one of those whigs
who believe, that it was the predetermined plan of this
administration to involve the country in a war with Mexico. I
rather accuse them of a want of foresight, as to the inevitable
result of the annexation of Texas. If they had been convinced,
that war would have been the consequence of that measure, I
honestly think, there would have been no annexation. The
repeated declarations, that it would not be followed by war, I
believe, were made in sincerity. For my part, I thought
differently; the issue seemed to me to be this—shall we take
Texas, _and war_, or leave the numerous questions of policy
arising out of the independence of Texas, to take care of
themselves, and our relations with Mexico to remain in the same
embroiled state for an indefinite period? There is a providence
in the affairs of men, which shapes their fortunes, “rough hew
them as they will.”
I neither approve nor condemn the course of the administration
in relation to this war. I am convinced it would not,
intentionally, endanger its popularity on such rocks and shoals,
as the expense and casualty of war necessarily present. A
demonstration was thought to be sufficient to secure the
advantages of a treaty of peace and limits, settling all our
differences, and gratifying the nation, by a great acquisition
of territory. A small share of the glory and popularity which
may attend this war, will be reaped by the administration! These
will be bestowed on those who are immediately engaged on the
scene of action. Our friends are doing all they can to make it
Mr. Polk’s war; but the people will persist in looking upon it,
as General Scott’s and General Taylor’s war; so far, at least,
as the glory is concerned; if it should prove disastrous, then,
indeed, the administration will come in for a share.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 3.
_The annexation of Texas, the unavoidable cause of war—The
energetic prosecution of the war the only way to obtain
peace._
SEPTEMBER, 1846.
SIR: If the editor of the “Commercial Journal,” will look over
his files he will find, that two years ago I gave my opinion,
that the annexation of Texas would not merely _lead_ to war, but
would be war—that it would be a long war, and that if we carried
the war into Mexico, would require an addition to our regular
force of at least thirty thousand men, and an annual expenditure
of thirty millions of dollars. I ask you whether my prediction
has not been fulfilled? Yet, you must suppose, that I say this
from friendship to Mexico; I have no sympathy with either her
people or her military despotism. I feel interested in the honor
of my own country, and all my hopes and wishes are for the
success of her arms.
I do, moreover, honestly believe, that as respects Mexico, our
cause is just. Whether it was within the scope of possibility
for the Government, (I mean the whole Government, not the
Executive branch alone,) by prudent measures, and by
forbearance, to avoid hostilities, is a question which I do not
choose to discuss at present. But I contend, that Texas had a
right to annex herself to the United States, if she chose; that
we neither violated any right of Mexico nor any treaty
stipulation in accepting the offer, although, there is no doubt
that, looking at things as they actually exist, the joint
resolution of Congress annexing Texas would, inevitably be
followed by war.
Mexico has rejected, and continues to reject, all overtures of
peace, excepting on the condition of our retiring beyond the
Sabine, and making compensation for the wrong alleged to have
been done her, by the annexation and military occupation of her
province of Texas. Having thus got into war in consequence of
this step, the war has become the act of the nation, and there
is no hope of peace without concessions, which we cannot make.
It is useless for highly sublimated moralists, and highly
honorable statesman, to propose such concessions—every one
knows, as a matter of mere fact, that the nation will not
consent to them. We are in for the war, and must fight it out.
Judging of nations and men as they are, and not, perhaps, as
they ought to be, there is no other course.
Besides, there are points in which we are bound by positive
obligations, not by mere abstract morality. We are bound to
maintain the right of Texas to the boundary of the Rio Grande,
and we are bound to secure the amount of spoliations due by the
Mexican Government to our own citizens. As we are now at war,
(and it is not material as to this, whether by our act, or that
of Mexico,) the payment of that debt must be secured by
sequestration of California or other territory, and at the same
time, there must be indemnity for the expenses of the war. As to
the prospects ahead, that is, as to the results of the war, they
do not appear to me encouraging, and as to the prospects of
peace, they are still more gloomy.
I believe there is no nation on the Globe more powerful for
defence, than we are. But our power for warlike conquest, is an
idea which ought not to be encouraged, and no people had ever
less necessity for it. In order to be conquerors, we must have
regular standing armies; we must have tributary provinces as
Rome had, and, consequently, a system incompatible with our
simple democratic republican institutions. Unoccupied countries,
like California, may be conquered by our settlements, as Texas
and some of our States were conquered. In the course of time,
the whole of North America, and, perhaps South America, will
gradually and imperceptibly, yield to this kind of conquest. But
at present, the countries beyond the Rio Grande are inhabited by
a different race of people, too numerous to be at once absorbed
or displaced, and whose habits and character do not fit them to
become integral portions of our confederacy. Mere dependencies
and colonies do not suit the spirit of our free institutions.
The western side of the Rio Grande presents a very different
case from that of Texas, settled by our own people, and which
but a few years ago was little better than a wilderness, a
frontier to Mexico, as well as to us. The States of New Leon,
Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, contain half a million of people, have
been settled two hundred years, and contain ancient cities and
towns. They are spread over a surface as large as Virginia and
the Carolinas, and backed by other more extensive States towards
Mexico. If the struggle lay only between the Mexican military
and our armies, a few decisive battles might end the contest.
But we have to overcome the prejudices, ignorance, and
antipathies of the population, a conquest a thousand times more
difficult than that of arms. And are we certain that the people
of those States will remain perfectly passive, and that their
countrymen beyond the Sierra Madre, cannot be rendered
formidable as guerrillas? Our estimate of them may be too low.
In case of some severe reverse, their numbers, should they rise
_en masse_, may overwhelm detached bodies of our troops. The
proclamation of Ampudia, denouncing as traitors, all who will
hold intercourse with our people, has had its effect. The people
will become exasperated at the outrages which will, in all
probability, be committed by our irregular troops, and the
guerrilla warfare will bristle over the whole country. Few among
us are aware of its vast extent. It is for the greater part
composed of barren mountains and arid plains, interspersed with
fertile valleys, and entirely unlike our western States. We will
have to guard a frontier of two thousand miles, from Santa Fee
to Matamoras, without mentioning California. We will have to
garrison all the principal towns between the Rio Grande and the
Sierra Madre. If we attempt to advance beyond Monterey, we must
force our way through a population of several millions, after
crossing a desert of several hundred miles. Conquests are easy
enough, when people are willing to be conquered, but when they
determine to resist, it is a very different matter. When
Napoleon attempted the conquest of Spain, after the manner that
Edward I undertook that of Scotland, he had possession of Madrid
and all the principal cities, with five hundred thousand of the
best troops in the world, and yet, in less than three years, his
Generals were driven out with a remnant of thirty thousand men!
The capture of Burgoyne and of Cornwallis, show what a critical
thing it is for an invading army to penetrate an enemy’s
country, with the wave of an unconquered people closing behind
them. Our armies are about to operate in a country without
roads, without supplies or resources, through defiles, over
deserts without water, and under a burning sun. I have great
confidence in them, and I believe that whatever can be done,
they will do, but shall not expect impossibilities of them. They
may reach and take Monterey, after hard fighting and much
suffering, and then be compelled, by superior numbers, to fall
back on the Rio Grande, and fortifying themselves, carry on a
war of detachments with little prospect of any definitive
result. There is no hope of bringing the war to a speedy close
without putting in the field at least twenty thousand regulars
and thirty thousand volunteers, and their advancing from
Monterey and Vera Cruz, after taking those places. The advance
on the capital ought to be made at the same time, so as to
compel Santa Anna to divide his force.
A good deal has been said about the extension of slavery beyond
the Rio Grande. My design in these letters is simply to state
facts and give honest opinions. I am not an abolitionist, nor
interested in the question of slavery, nor will I suffer my
party feelings to bias my judgment in relation to Mr. Polk and
the democratic administration. The idea of negro slavery beyond
the Rio Grande, is, in my opinion, erroneous. The climate is
doubtless, adapted to the culture of sugar and cotton; but then
negro slaves cannot be retained on the Mexican frontier longer
than they shall think proper to remain in slavery. They would
escape into Mexican territory when they pleased; and there being
but few negroes in that country, and none having been held in
slavery, they would enjoy a consideration there, unknown even in
the free States of the Union. The wealthy Mexicans would not
want their services, as they have already a cheaper kind of
servitude in their peons, or half indian laborers. Negro slavery
was once attempted to be introduced into Mexico for the culture
and manufacture of the sugar cane, but failed, and the slaves
set free. The peons, with a nominal freedom, are actually
slaves. They receive trifling wages, scarcely sufficient to
provide them with the bare necessaries of life. It is even
doubtful, whether a slave population can be placed nearer than
the Nueces, on account of their facilities for escape. A large
proportion of Southern Texas presents the same objection to the
removal of the Southern planter. These Mexican acquisitions, or
proposed acquisitions, are greatly overrated in the slave
holding States, and the danger is equally magnified in the minds
of those who are opposed to the further extension of slavery.
Neither of these parties are disposed to view the subject in a
practical light; it is like the dispute in the fable about the
color of the Chameleon—one asserted that it was black, and the
other that it was white, but when exposed to view, it proved to
be green!
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 4.
_Victory of Monterey.—The prospects of peace._
SEPTEMBER, 1846.
SIR: Another glorious victory has been achieved by our gallant
army! I begin to think that there is scarcely any thing
impossible for such men, with such leaders as Taylor and Worth.
The incidents of the taking of Monterey would afford materials
not merely for a chapter, but a volume.
Surely Mexico will now embrace our offer of peace. The inability
of the Mexicans to cope with us is now placed beyond a doubt. We
have beaten them in the field two to one, they attacking us; and
we have taken one of their strongest cities in spite of
fortifications and barricades, and superior numbers. The
magnanimity and generosity of the conquerors surely must have
some effect on them, unless they are absolutely mad.
The distance of our army from Saltillo is about eighty miles,
the way lying through mountain gorges and narrow defiles capable
of complete defence in the hands of a brave and determined
people. It seems there is something wanting in these people,
which puzzles me. It must be, either want of skill and courage
in the officers, or a want of patriotism and bravery in the
soldiery and inhabitants.
Saltillo may be regarded as the pass of the Sierra Madre, rather
than Monterey; because, from Saltillo there is a road to
Presidio on the Rio Grande, and thence to San Antonio of Texas.
There should be another division, or rather army, to take this
road, and form a junction with General Taylor at Saltillo.
Perhaps, that under General Wool, instead of proceeding to
Chewawa, may take that course.[2] The range of mountains called
the Sierra Madre, forms an impenetrable barrier between the
States west of the Rio Grande and the other Mexican States.
There are said to be but three passes: the first, from Tampico,
by following the Panuco river from the head of its navigation,
but affording only a mule track; the second, that of Saltillo;
and the third, by the Rio Conchas to Chewawa. The distance from
Saltillo to Tampico, is not less than six hundred miles; and
after ascending the mountains to the table land, there is
nothing but a dreary desert for at least three hundred miles.
This, at once suggests the difficulty of the march to Mexico;
and, also, the difficulty on the part of Mexico of sending
armies to recover the country between the mountains and the Rio
Grande. If the war should continue, which I hope may not be the
case, these, and other passes (for I have no doubt there are
others) should be seized and fortified, instead of making the
Rio Grande the line of defence; establishing fifty assailable
points, instead of three, for an enemy’s concentrated force to
strike wherever that enemy may choose. If conquest be intended,
or result from the war, this line of defence along the Sierra
Madre would be absolutely necessary to the planting States, as
slavery could not be maintained with the Rio Grande as the
boundary. In my opinion, the only real advantage which will be
gained by this extension of our territory, will be the
navigation of the Rio Grande, which will open a trade with the
Internal Provinces capable of vast extension. Few southern
planters would run the risk of taking their slaves west of the
Rio Grande, even with the Sierra Madre as the boundary. They
would, of course, migrate in single families, and their negroes
could escape, if they thought proper, as fast as they came. I
have no doubt, many of them would remain of choice, with their
owners; but they would be insecure as property, and that would
discourage the importation. The navigation of the Rio Grande is
capable of great improvement, and it is ascertained that there
is an abundance of coal on its banks. These banks will, some
day, be crowded with towns and cities, and their fertile soil
will support as large a population as the Nile.
Footnote 2:
General Wool marched from Paras to Saltillo.
There are but two roads by which the city of Mexico can be
approached by our invading armies. The first is, from Saltillo,
through the populous States of Zacatecas, Guadalajara,
Guanahwato, San Louis, and Queretaro, containing near four
millions. Now, is it probable, that these States will offer no
resistance to the long march of General Taylor at the head of a
handful of men? I do not doubt, but that in the open field, at
the head of ten thousand men, he would beat three times that
number; but the heavy loss sustained at Monterey must satisfy us
that such victories will be dearly bought. It cannot be said
that the Mexican soldiers have not fought, and on some
occasions, have not fought well, and they may learn to fight
better. But let us consider again, what an immense commissariat
must accompany an army on such a march, to afford the necessary
supplies. Those who are urging the march of General Taylor on
Mexico, are, perhaps, not as well acquainted as he is with what
is necessary for such an undertaking. The second road is from
Vera Cruz, the distance of three hundred miles, through a
thickly settled country, but with numerous defiles, and where
there must be fighting at every step. Vera Cruz may be taken,
and will be taken, and then the Castle will fall. Here will be a
depot to supply the invading army as it shall advance, step by
step; and is it likely we can land an invading army of
sufficient strength to crush the forces of the Republic under
Santa Anna? If the Mexicans make but an indifferent use of the
means in their power, it would seem to me impossible for us to
reach their capital! The province of Mexico alone, not as large
as one of our counties, contains a million and a half of people.
If they are like our countrymen, I should say it would be
impossible for an invading army of thirty thousand men to
penetrate three hundred miles through a country so well
fortified by nature. We must expect to fight our way through
fifty thousand men at least, which Santa Anna could bring into
the field. The country is now united against us, under his sway,
by every consideration of hatred and religious feeling, if not
of patriotism. I consider it madness to undertake such a march
with twenty thousand men, regulars and volunteers, however
chivalrous they may be, if Santa Anna should throw himself
between Vera Cruz and Mexico, with the army he has been
collecting and training, with so much industry at San Louis
Potosi.
We may hold the other side of the Rio Grande; and as soon as our
people crowd into it, and bear some proportion to the population
already there, it may be regarded as conquered. As to
California, it is already ours, and we must soon be complete
masters of it, for it will be occupied by our people. The Texan
side of the Rio Grande will be ours in consequence of the towns,
garrisons, and settlements which will be rapidly established
there. We may take Tampico, and hold it; and we may also take
Vera Cruz, and retain it until Mexico comes to terms; and it
seems to me impossible that she will not do this in order to
regain her only seaport, while we, at the same time, cut off all
her foreign trade! Nothing but the most stupid, blind, and
ignorant obstinacy would prevent her from treating with us under
such circumstances. I approve the taking California, and New
Mexico, for the purpose of holding them under sequestration,
until Mexico shall be willing to make peace on just and
reasonable terms. Since the armistice, on the surrender of
Monterey, two months must elapse before any further steps can be
taken by General Taylor. He was in no condition to advance
further than Saltillo; at any rate; and, perhaps, without
completing his conquests of the country east of him, towards the
gulf, it would have been unwise to have moved beyond Monterey.
He had important preparations to make, of a very different
character from those of his forced march on that city. And,
besides, he entertained hopes, as we all did, that during the
breathing spell, some means might be found to put an end to the
war. In the capitulation of Monterey, he has shown himself as
humane as he is brave.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 5.
_Capitulation of Monterey—Ideas of conquests in Mexico._
OCTOBER 26, 1846
SIR: When I wrote my last letter I had not seen the capitulation
of Monterey, at least the official report. It appears, that the
terms were conditional, and allow no more time than is
absolutely requisite for Gen. Taylor to make his arrangements
for ulterior movements. The city was taken by a forced march,
with only a part of the troops. The attempt to cast censure, by
indirection, on this meritorious officer, betrays a jealousy of
his growing popularity. The capture of Monterey is of immense
importance, as well on account of its being one of the keys of
Mexico, as on account of the vast amount of public property, in
arms and munitions captured, which Mexico is in no condition to
replace. That city was a stronghold under the Spaniards before
the Mexican revolution, and contained a great quantity of
cannon, transported with immense difficulty and expense, from
the city of Mexico. It was in fact, the metropolis of the
provinces of the Rio Grande; and if a new confederacy should be
formed by those States, it would be the seat of the federal
Government. In a few weeks, the sickly season will be over; the
surviving sick will be again fit for duty, the commissariat will
be enabled to complete its supplies, and transportation for the
army, considerable reinforcements will reach the seat of war,
and then we may expect an onward movement.
General Taylor having now gained a safe footing, must go to work
to consolidate his occupation, or if you will, his conquest of
the country between the Rio Grande, the mountains, and the Gulf.
This extensive tract of country, as large as Italy, and
resembling it in scenery, climate, and soil, is now cut off by
our arms and by its natural boundary, from the rest of Mexico.
It ought to be completely occupied, by fortifying the principal
points on the Rio Grande, the mountain passes of the Sierra
Madre, and also by the occupation of the chief towns of New
Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas. Tampico, of course, must be
taken by a combined land and naval attack. It has a shallow sea
coast from Tampico to the mouth of the Rio Grande, of four
hundred miles, whilst it stretches east and west, between the
mountains and the river, nearly double that distance. Here is an
extent of surface equal to that from the Potomac to the Savannah
and east of the Appalachian chain. It is capable of containing
four millions of souls, and in the hands of Americans, would be
rapidly filled up by them and European emigrants. The climate is
said to be delightful, and much more temperate than might be
expected from its latitude. I have rated its population at five
hundred thousand; this estimate may be too high; but it is
possible, that the common estimate may be too low. The following
is that given by a recent pamphlet, including Chewawa:
New Leon, 100,000 Monterey, 15,000
Tamaulipas, 150,000 Tampico, 6,000
Coawilla, 125,000 Monclova, 3,000
Chewawa, 112,000 Chewawa, 30,000
──────
487,000
This population, it is true, is scattered over a very large
space, and more occupied in pastoral, than in agricultural
pursuits, with little trade or manufactures. Their flocks of
sheep and horned cattle, are immense, while they raise vast
numbers of horses and mules. Being shut out from all
communication with the Southern provinces, they can be conquered
by our arms, and made to stay conquered, by the American
emigrants who will immediately pour into every habitable
district. A small, well appointed regular army of five thousand
men, with an equal number of volunteers, replacing each other at
intervals, will be sufficient for the purpose.
The occupation of this important country, should be complete
before attempting any thing further. By grasping at too much, we
may fail to realize any thing. If our object be _conquest_, it
will be one of the greatest (even thus circumscribed) ever
effected by the same numerical force. After consolidating this
splendid acquisition, instead of marching on the city of Mexico,
I would take the course to Durango, and thence to Mazatlan, on
the Pacific, thus cutting off one half of the mine district, and
giving us a direct communication with that ocean, of such
immense importance to us in a commercial as well as political
point of view. If, however, the object be merely to _conquer a
peace_ with Mexico, the fear of losing at least one half of the
territory of the Republic, and the hope of regaining possession
of it, would be an inducement to treat, which nothing but the
most brutish stupidity can resist. I fear she will persist in
the same arrogant folly which induced her to declare, _that she_
_would be satisfied with no boundary short of the Sabine_. She
will not consent to receive back her territory by treaty, to the
Rio Grand—her wounded pride must be appeased by regaining it by
arms—and she will not consent under any circumstances, to yield
up California and Santa Fee! We shall be compelled, if she
persists in the determination, to hold to the line of the Sierra
Madre, and make our boundary from Tampico to Mazatlan. There is
no doubt that the administration would now gladly treat for the
boundary of the Rio Grand and a portion of Upper California. But
if Mexico persists in her obstinacy, we cannot retreat with
safety or honor; we may possibly be compelled to adopt the
tropic of Cancer, as the line from ocean to ocean, and thus add
to our confederacy a region as extensive as Europe.
But will England and France look with indifference on this vast
acquisition of territory? And suppose they shall be displeased,
what can they allege against us? The necessity of the conquest
will have been forced upon us by the refusal of Mexico to treat.
It is probable, that to the boundary of the Rio Grand, and to
the acquisition of a portion of California, with the barren
mountains and plains of New Mexico, they may be, comparatively,
indifferent. Not so with respect to the wholesale acquisition
just mentioned. But what can they say—what can they do? They
must address themselves to Mexico, and compel her to negotiate
with us, which she still persists in refusing, except on terms
which she knows it is impossible for us to concede. In the
meantime, let us not follow the example of our proud and
arrogant enemy, and refuse all friendly mediation which may lead
to an amicable adjustment on reasonable terms.
If, for the next three months, there should be no treaty of
peace with Mexico, I shall begin to fear we have entered upon an
experiment which may be attended with momentous consequences. It
will be a new and fearful career of conquest. I cannot agree
with those who propose a retreat; and I know that the American
people will never consent to it! Yet, I am well aware of the
danger to our confederacy, from such a conquest as that of all
Mexico. We must follow the war wherever it may lead; and if it
lead to victory it must end in conquest or a magnanimous peace,
when Mexico shall be at our feet.