for peace until the _national_ territory shall have been
evacuated by the troops of the United States, he means by the
_national_ territory, from the Rio Grande to the Sabine, as well
as those portions of Mexico, which we now hold by invasion. Not
a single official declaration on the part of the Mexican
Government can be produced, in which any other boundary than the
Sabine is even supposed. In the last proclamation of Almonte,
this is the only boundary acknowledged by him. As long as this
is maintained by Mexico, peace is impossible. The Rio Grande was
the boundary of the Province of Texas, under the Spanish
Government, and as such, was claimed, both by France and the
United States, as part of Louisiana, under the treaty of
Ildefonso, when ceded by Spain. It is the boundary claimed by
Texas after her separation from Tamaulipas and Coawilla, with
which Texas had, for a time, been united, to form a State of the
Mexican confederacy; and on separating from that confederacy,
she returned to the ancient limits. It is this ancient Texas we
claim, and not the Texas arranged in connection with Tamaulipas
and Coawilla. But Santa Anna and Almonte now acknowledge no
boundary but the Sabine, notwithstanding their treaty with
Texas, expressly establishing the Rio Grande.
Persons not reflecting on our present position, as respects our
enemy, exclaim, “let us make peace—let us put an end to this
unfortunate war”. This supposes, that it is _in our power_ at
any moment, to make peace, when, from the very declarations of
Mexico, she is unwilling to treat with us, unless we first
acknowledge ourselves vanquished, and agree to retire, yielding
every thing we have been contending for! ONE may make war, but
it takes TWO or more, to make peace. We may, indeed, fall back
on the Rio Grande, and then to the Sabine, thus exposing
ourselves to the contempt and derision of the world; and there
are well meaning people, who propose this course. But, judging
from a knowledge of human nature, it is not difficult to
perceive, that the great majority of the people of the United
States will never consent to such a degrading submission, even
if it were prudent, as a mere matter of interest, which it is
plainly not, however it may be recommended by abstract
considerations of moral or religious duty, or rather of sickly
sentimentality.
Let us consider what are the steps to be taken to bring about
negotiations for peace. The olive branch ought to be continually
held out to the enemy; and our agents should not be prevented by
pride or offended dignity, from renewing at every moment, the
offer to treat. It would be magnanimous on our part, and also
continue us in the right. Suppose the proposition come from
Mexico, what will it be, and how made? It is not probable that
commissioners will be sent direct to Washington, or invited from
us, to Mexico. A communication may be addressed to our
Government declaring a willingness to treat, in all probability,
clogged with conditions of the withdrawal of our naval and
military forces, and proposing an armistice pending
negotiations. To the latter, we cannot accede, without giving
decided advantage to the enemy. The evacuation of the country we
now hold would not be listened to for a moment; it would at once
be yielding all the advantages we have gained at so much cost,
as the _means of coercing Mexico to treat of peace_. The attempt
at negotiation may thus fail at various stages, and it may fail
entirely; at all events, there will be unavoidable delay. There
is nothing before us, at present, but as a vigorous prosecution
of the war, _and at the same time, preparations on a much larger
scale than we have hitherto made_.
What is the state of the war at this moment? We have made
wonderful progress, if not towards conquest, at least, towards
bringing the enemy to terms. But we are obliged to keep up three
very extensive lines, without speaking of California and New
Mexico. The first, is along the Rio Grande, from Presidio to
Matamoras, of seven hundred miles; the next, that from Comargo
to Monterey; and the third, from Tampico to the same place, a
distance of nearly six hundred. It is absolutely necessary to
keep up the two first, in order to furnish supplies for our
troops in all their operations; although, since the occupation
of Tampico, a portion of these may be obtained from that
quarter. But, between the mountains and the river, there is an
enemy’s country, which, although thinly inhabited, is capable of
interrupting our communications by their rancheros, aided by
Mexican troops, and led by Mexican officers, even if they cannot
bring a sufficient force at any point, to meet ours in the
field. We hear of large bodies of irregular cavalry, which may
prove formidable in case the war be prolonged. This kind of
force, thus far, appears to have been much overrated, but it may
take lessons from us, and improve. Their horses, although small,
may be better trained, and their riders, equal to any in the
world, may be provided with better arms—the sabre, and pistol,
and carbine, instead of the lance and lasso.
It was supposed that there were but two passes through the
mountains to the table land; but a third, that of Tula, near
Victoria, is now spoken of. This river, appears to penetrate the
great barrier between Tampico and Monterey, and takes its rise
in the table land, between San Luis, and Zacatecas. It is
possible, that the army of Santa Anna may, by this route, keep
open a communication with the valley of the Rio Grande, and even
send large reinforcements of cavalry and infantry through this
pass, so as to threaten our lines on the Rio Grande and Tampico.
According to the last accounts, our troops were marching towards
Victoria. I should think it all important to take possession of
that pass, and close it completely.
There are still paragraphs in the papers, speaking of the
intended march from Monterey, or Tampico, to San Luis. I think
this highly improbable. It will be unsafe for us to move until
we are completely masters of the whole country between the river
and the mountains, and of all the passes to the table land. It
would not do to leave this country in our rear, with all our
military depots, but weakly guarded. Of one thing I will speak
with confidence; that we shall need all the troops we have on
the present scene of operations, and all we shall be able to
send for some time. The descent on Vera Cruz, which is said to
be in preparation, under the immediate direction of the
commander in chief, General Scott, will require, at least,
twenty thousand men, and if any considerable proportion be
withdrawn from General Taylor, it will leave him in a very
perilous situation. What is to prevent Santa Anna from making
his head quarters at Victoria? It is said, that cannon cannot be
transported by the Tula pass. This may, or may not be. Things
deemed impossible have been accomplished by men of bold and
enterprising spirit, as he is said to be. Napoleon crossed the
Alps in spite of impossibilities, and appeared suddenly in the
plains of Lombardy; and I should think the difficulties a
hundred times greater than would be encountered by the Mexican
Napoleon. I confess, I entertain serious apprehensions for our
troops, although of the best materials, and admirably commanded.
Santa Anna has, at this moment, a great advantage; he is posted
at San Luis with an army of twenty-five or thirty thousand men.
Thus concentrated at one point, he will be enabled to strike,
with his whole force, or the greater part of it, at Tampico,
Saltillo, or Victoria, while our forces, are necessarily divided
into comparatively small bodies. He can act with perfect
secrecy, in a friendly country, and with a perfect knowledge of
all our movements, while we are ignorant of his. If he should
attack us with his whole force at any one point, he may roll
back the tide of war, and drive us beyond the Rio Grande. Under
present circumstances, instead of weakening our lines, prudence
requires that we should strengthen them.
Looking to the hazzards of war, and the _dangers_ following on
conquests, the idea has suggested itself, of inviting the States
of the lower Rio Grande to establish a separate confederacy,
under our protection; and if Mexico persists in refusing to
treat, then, to enter into a treaty of peace, alliance, and
limits with this new confederacy, thus indemnifying ourselves
for Mexican spoliations, by taking California and New Mexico,
with the right of way to Mazatlan, and leaving Mexico to repent
of her folly at leisure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 9.
_Present advantageous position of our army—The necessity for
greater efforts—Our present force insufficient to march from
Vera Cruz to Mexico._
FEBRUARY 13TH, 1847.
SIR: The last intelligence from the seat of war has given much
relief to those who were beginning to feel uneasy about the
situation of our troops. Generals Taylor and Patterson have
taken Victoria or New Santander, and the line is therefore
established from Saltillo to Tampico. The line of the Sierra
Madre has already been described; it is certainly of a very
peculiar character; it now presents only three points of attack,
and that of Saltillo, the only one practicable for wheel
carriages, and consequently, for the advance of an army with its
parks of artillery. It is from this quarter, alone, that General
Taylor need fear the march of Santa Anna; but he will have to
cross at least three hundred miles of arid plains; and it is
said, that the water tanks have been destroyed by his order,
which looks as if he intended to prevent the march of General
Taylor on San Luis, rather than undertake the march to Saltillo.
It appears, that he has a large force at Tula, about
equi-distant from Saltillo and Victoria.
By guarding this line, the valley can be cut off from all
supplies from Mexico; with the exception of a small quantity of
indian corn, and the herds of the ranchos, very little can be
procured in it for the support of an army. Our own safety
requires, that we should take possession of all the principal
towns as soon as possible, and garrison them with a sufficient
force. It will, also, be necessary to establish civil authority,
for the country thus cut off from the central Government. Its
head must necessarily be military, as also the local superior
authorities, although using the machinery of Alcaldes &c., for
the purpose of carrying it on. The political Government, must be
suspended, as the consequence of being cut off from both the
State and federal authorities of Mexico.
It would now seem to be the general impression, that nothing
effectual can be done to bring Mexico to terms without taking
Vera Cruz, and marching to the capital; and this appears to be
the opinion of General Taylor at least, that if the march be
resolved upon, then Vera Cruz, is the proper point to start from
and not from Saltillo. A short time will determine.
We have, thus far, been operating at vast expense, with an army
of fifteen thousand men, about one half regulars, and the other
half, volunteers, on the remote, thinly inhabited, northern
frontier of Mexico; and we talk of marching through a densely
peopled country with numerous defiles! If there be any thing
like the resistance made by us during the revolutionary war,
thirty thousand men, at least, will be required for the march
from Vera Cruz to Mexico. A part of the force under General
Taylor may now be spared, but not so as to weaken and disable
him from repelling a part of the army of Santa Anna, if he
should think proper to detach it, for the purpose of attacking
Saltillo. It would be presumptuous in me to venture an opinion
on military movements; but considering the formidable army now
organized by Santa Anna, and the uncertainty as to the point
which he means to attack, I should think, that it would not be
safe to draw off any very considerable portion of General
Taylor’s force from the defence of the lines they at present
occupy.
It is in our power to seize all her ports, and cut off all the
trade of Mexico; and then, holding the lines we now occupy, it
will be strange, if she persists in refusing to make peace. The
fear of the loss of the interior and northern provinces, and the
interruption in her trade, thus shut up in her shell, may have
that effect, if any thing can. We have for the present, given
stability to her Government by outward pressure. Our only
security is to retain the hold we have; and perhaps, it may be
necessary to attempt something on a still larger scale; but for
this, we are not yet prepared. General Scott may take Vera Cruz,
and then block up the road to Mexico, but I have seen no force
yet, even on paper, sufficient to undertake the march to that
capital. If, by withdrawing a large portion of General Taylor’s
force, the line he now occupies be too much weakened, Santa
Anna, will at once, take advantage of it, and regain the country
on that side of the Rio Grande. In doing this, he will compel
the army which may be landed at Vera Cruz, to return in all
haste to Tampico, or Point Isabel. The crisis is now fast
approaching, when it will become a question of national
prowess—shall we cry, “hold, enough!” or make a mighty effort to
obtain the victory? I wish to see my country do right, and
justice to all nations; at the same time, I should be sorry to
see our flag humbled, under any circumstances, and in a war with
any nation on the Globe! I wish to see that flag wave proudly,
and respected, wherever it may be carried, not tarnished and
humbled, by defeat—insulted, scorned, treated with contempt,
instead of affording a shelter and protection to our citizens,
wherever they may be. But, firmly convinced, as I am, that our
country is in the right, and our enemy in the wrong, I should
feel the mortification ten fold, if we failed to obtain a just
and honorable peace by the only means left us, _after our enemy
has repeatedly spurned the olive branch_.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 10.
_Annexation of Texas—The suspension of diplomatic relations, the
immediate causes of the war._
FEBRUARY, 1847.
SIR: In these letters, I have endeavored to repress all party
feeling, thinking it a duty, in a contest with a foreign nation,
in time of actual war, to take the side of my country, unless so
grossly and palpably in the wrong, as to admit of no
justification or defence. I repeat, that it is my sincere
conviction, that justice is on our side, and this after as full,
and dispassionate an examination of the subject as I am able to
bestow. The contrary, is generally assumed, or taken for
granted, by the party to which I belong; and yet the speech of
Mr. Webster, at Philadelphia, which expresses the same opinion,
is highly applauded. He condemns the administration of Mr. Polk,
(not the cause of the country,) solely on the ground of bringing
on a state of actual hostilities, without the previous
approbation of Congress, while he admits, that Mexico is in the
wrong in the causes which led to it the annexation of Texas. But
the act of the President, is a domestic question between him and
American people. The causes previously existing, and which would
have justified Congress in making war, constitute a different
question from that of expediency, or of the distribution of
powers, under the Constitution. He concedes, that if the
constituted authorities of the Union had thought proper to
resort to this course, there was ample cause to justify it. To
this, I assent, and will endeavor to give the reasons on which
my opinion is founded, according to my view of the subject;
professing, at the same time, a sincere respect for the opinion
of those who may differ from me. I admit that the march from the
Nueces to the Rio Grande, had the effect of _hastening_
hostilities; but, in my opinion, it did do more than hasten, for
the appeal of arms was inevitable on the annexation of Texas,
unless Mexico receded entirely from the ground she had taken; of
which, I did not see the slightest probability, unless compelled
to do so, by the consequences of war, whether begun by her or by
us.
Mexico denounces the war as being aggressive on our part, but in
all the official State Papers of the high functionaries of that
Republic, (I do not refer to subordinate officers or generals,)
in all their manifestos, that aggression is distinctly declared
to _be the annexation of Texas_. It was on this ground, that she
put an end to all diplomatic intercourse, after having
previously announced that she would consider annexation as
equivalent to a declaration of war, on our part. It was on this
ground, that she refused to _resume_ a diplomatic intercourse,
and enter into negotiation for a peaceful adjustment of existing
differences, until satisfaction should first be made for the
alleged wrong. She has not limited her complaints of alleged
aggression to the march of our troops to the Rio Grande; her
complaint is, the being deprived of her province of Texas, which
she will never renounce; and she declares her determination
never to listen to overtures of peace, until that province shall
be evacuated by us. Has she, on any occasion, shown a
willingness to accept any other boundary than the Sabine? I have
seen no intimation of this kind, emanating from her President or
Congress. The contrary is unchangeably persisted in.[4] In fact,
it could not occur while she persists in her right to the whole
of Texas. The annexation is the _casus belli_ on the part of
Mexico—the paramount consideration—every thing else, is but
incidental, or subordinate. The very idea of fixing any other
boundary, would imply a relinquishment of her claim.
Footnote 4:
There is no distinct assertion of boundary in any of her
official papers down to the _war proclamation_ of the 23d of
April, 1846.
Now, that great statesman, Mr. Webster, has proved on various
occasions, and especially in his Philadelphia speech, that
annexation of Texas to the United States was no cause of war,
because Texas was as much an independent State as Mexico. The
act was no more a cause of war on the part of Mexico, than her
annexation to the United States would have been a cause of war
on the part of Texas. If Mr. Webster be correct, and I think
his argument unanswerable, was Mexico justifiable in the
course pursued by her towards us on account of that act? Was
she justifiable in withdrawing her minister, and ordering away
the minister of the United States? These were very high handed
and insulting measures, and attended, necessarily, with the
serious consequence of putting an end to all peaceful modes of
adjusting differences, and leaving the only alternatives of,
submission, or war, on our part. But, under the circumstances
in which Mexico was placed towards us, it was an act of gross
injustice, as well as insult. _She had a treaty obligation to
fulfil, in the payment of several millions, as the indemnity
for wrongs done to American citizens, and demands had been
made upon her for several millions more, which remained
unadjusted._ There was, also, a question of boundary to
settle—all these matters must be settled either peaceably, or
by war—if peaceably, the continuance, or re-establishment of
diplomatic intercourse, was indispensable. Her conduct was
like that of the debtor who cuts the acquaintance of his
creditor, and thinks by that means, to avoid fulfilling his
obligations. Let me ask, what would have been the course
pursued, (if placed in our situation,) by England or France,
or any other high minded Government? I ask any candid man to
say, whether they would have borne it as patiently as we have
done? I would ask whether there was as much forbearance shown
by us with Louis Philippe, on the subject of the French
indemnity, or with England in the Northern boundary, and
Oregon question? That nation assumes an awful responsibility,
which, like Mexico, puts an end to the peaceable ways of
diplomacy, leaving no alternative but horrid war, or base
submission. Mexico should have paid her debt before she put an
end to peaceful intercourse, and she could not do it without
injustice, while there were claims still depending. All
arguments drawn from considerations of forbearance, humanity,
generosity, expediency, are for ourselves—Mexico is entitled
to no part in them. In my estimation, the great _error_ of
Mexico, if so mild a term can be applied, consists in her
having terminated all peaceful modes of settling differences;
for, as there is no common arbiter between independent
nations, their differences in that case, must be settled by
war, or not at all.
I am again sustained, by the opinion of Mr. Webster, in respect
of the refusal of Mexico to the re-establishment of diplomatic
relations proposed by us; and again, in her refusal to meet the
more recent overtures for negotiation. The first improper
conduct of Mexico has been greatly aggravated by these acts. It
has been urged, that Mexico was willing to receive a
_commissioner_, to treat in relation to Texas. It is surprising
to me, that any one should not see the folly of this
proposition. It was only saying, “as you have wronged us, in the
annexation of Texas, we will permit you to offer us suitable
reparation, and this must precede all other matters between us.”
The ignorance and presumption of such an idea, is truly Mexican.
[5]If they were sincere in their desire to discuss the subject,
what objection could there be to receiving an ambassador,
clothed with full powers to settle all matters in dispute? What
right had Mexico to require us to _admit_, that annexation was
an aggression on her rights? There was no proposition to discuss
the question of _boundary_, as is frequently asserted, which
would be inconsistent with her pretensions. But even that could
be more fully settled by one having full authority, than by a
mere special commissioner, with limited powers. The whole was
but a diplomatic quibble—a deceitful evasion. In the opinion of
Mr. Webster, Mexico was wrong in putting an end to diplomatic
relations; she was wrong in rejecting our minister under a
frivolous pretext, and she continues in the wrong in rejecting
overtures of peace, after the commencement of hostilities. Here
was a direct advance on our part, superseding the necessity of
mediation, a measure only adopted to save the pride of either
party, in being the _first_ to propose a peace. In all this,
Mexico is in the wrong; and here is the whole question, as
between her and the United States. The degree of forbearance to
be shown, is a question for ourselves alone. The first blow was
struck by Mexico, unless the provocation of our march to the Rio
Grande, _be considered the first blow_. There is nothing left
for us, but to prosecute the war until Mexico shall be willing
to enter into peaceable negotiation. Some appear to think that
she would be most likely to re-establish diplomatic relations,
by our withdrawing our fleets and armies. But this would only be
an experiment, and might fail; and if it should fail, our work
would have to begin again. This was done when Mr. Slidell landed
at Vera Cruz, but without success. Can we place sufficient
confidence in Mexico, even after the most positive and distinct
assurances, and still less without any such assurances? For my
part, I have no confidence either in the good faith of her
present rulers, or in the stability of her Government. What,
then, is to be done? I see no way but to retain the advantages
we already possess, and to prosecute the war on her territory,
as other wars, under like circumstances, would be prosecuted by
other nations. What is there to prevent her from entering into
negotiations at once? Pride—folly—but we were not too proud to
negotiate with England, at the moment when the war was hottest.
At the very moment of signing the treaty of Ghent, the British
Commissioner supposed, and ours also, that the British troops
were in possession of Louisiana, and one of them observed to the
American Commissioner. “You have reason to be satisfied, for you
have now regained New Orleans.” The idea of falling back on the
Rio Grande, in the visionary hope of coaxing Mexico to make
peace, and then in case of her refusal, retaking Monterey and
Tampico, and the valley of the Rio Grande, would be like the
fisherman, who after having one good haul, throws back the best
fish into the sea, for the pleasure of retaking them!
Footnote 5:
Mr. Gallatin makes a strange mistake, when he says, that the
refusal, was to receiving a _resident minister_. The refusal
was on account of his not being a mere Commissioner on the
_single subject of Texas_! What reasonable objection could
there be to a resident minister, after a treaty of peace? And
if no such treaty were made, then the minister clothed with
those powers would take his _departure_, as a matter of
course. Mr. Gallatin speaks very _lightly_ of a _suspension_
of diplomatic intercourse! I regard this, under the
circumstance, as most serious. But there was more than
suspension; Mexico declared _all negotiations_ at an end, and
war was, therefore, the only alternative.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LETTER 11.