Here then we have two distinct regions or genera; one, the

conceivable or intelligible, ruled by the Idea of Good--the other

the visible, ruled by the Sun, which is the offspring of Good. Now

let us subdivide each of these regions or genera, into two

portions. The two portions of the visible will be--first, real

objects, visible such as animals, plants, works of art,

&c.--second, the images or representations of these, such as shadows,

reflexions in water or in mirrors, &c. The first of these two

subdivisions will be greatly superior in clearness to the second:

it will be distinguished from the second as truth is distinguished

from not-truth.[199] Matter of knowledge is in the same relation

to matter of opinion, as an original to its copy. Next, the

conceivable or intelligible region must be subdivided into two

portions, similarly related one to the other: the first of these

portions will be analogous to the real objects of vision, the

second to the images or representations of these objects: the

first will thus be the Forms, Ideas, or Realities of Conception or

Intellect--the second will be particular images or embodiments

thereof.[200]

[Footnote 199: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 509-510. 510 A: [Greek:

diê|rê=sthai a)lêthei/a| te kai\ mê/, ô(s to\ doxasto\n pro\s to\

gnôsto/n, ou)/tô to\ o(moiôthe\n pro\s to\ ô(=| ô(moiô/thê.]]

[Footnote 200: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B.]

[Side-note: To the intelligible world there are applicable

two distinct modes of procedure--the Geometrical--the Dialectic.

Geometrical procedure assumes diagrams.]

Now in regard to these two portions of the conceivable or

intelligible region, two different procedures of the mind are

employed: the pure Dialectic, and the Geometrical, procedure. The

Geometer or the Arithmetician begins with certain visible images,

lines, figures, or numbered objects, of sense: he takes his

departure from certain hypotheses or assumptions, such as given

numbers, odd and even--given figures and angles, of three

different sorts.[201] He assumes these as data without rendering

account of them, or allowing them to be called in question, as if

they were self-evident to every one. From these premisses he

deduces his conclusions, carrying them down by uncontradicted

steps to the solution of the problem which he is examining.[202]

But though he has before his eyes the visible parallelogram

inscribed on the sand, with its visible diagonal, and though all

his propositions are affirmed respecting these--yet what he has

really in his mind is something quite different--the Parallelogram

_per se_, or the Form of a Parallelogram--the Form of a

Diagonal, &c. The visible figure before him is used only as an

image or representative of this self-existent form; which last he

can contemplate only in conception, though all his propositions

are intended to apply to it.[203] He is unable to take his

departure directly from this Form, as from a first principle: he

is forced to assume the visible figure as his point of departure,

and cannot ascend above it: he treats it as something privileged

and self-evident.[204]

[Footnote 201: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B. [Greek: ê(=| to me\n

au)tou= (tmê=ma) toi=s to/te tmêthei=sin ô(s ei)ko/si chrôme/nê]

(this is farther illustrated by p. 511 A--[Greek: ei)ko/si

chrôme/nên au)toi=s toi=s u(po\ tô=n ka/tô a)peikasthei=si)

psuchê\ zêtei=n a)nagka/zetai e)x u(pothe/seôn, ou)k e)p' a)rchê\n

poreuome/nê a)ll' e)pi\ teleutê/n], &c.]

[Footnote 202: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 C-D. [Greek: oi( peri\

ta\s geômetri/as te kai\ logismou\s kai\ ta\ toiau=ta

pragmateuo/menoi, u(pothe/menoi to/ te peritto\n kai\ to\ a)/rtion

kai\ ta\ schê/mata kai\ gôniô=n tritta\ ei)/dê kai\ a)/lla tou/tôn

a)delpha\ kath' e(ka/stên me/thodon, tau=ta me\n ô(s ei)do/tes,

poiêsa/menoi u(pothe/seis au)ta/, ou)de/na lo/gon ou)/te au(toi=s

ou)/te toi=s a)/llois e)/ti a)xiou=si peri\ au)tô=n dido/nai, ô(s

panti\ phanerô=n; e)k tou/tôn d' a)rcho/menoi ta\ loipa\ ê)/dê

diexio/ntes teleutô=sin o(mologoume/nôs e)pi\ tou=to, ou)= a)\n

e)pi\ ske/psin o(rmê/sôsin.]]

[Footnote 203: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 D-E. [Greek: toi=s

o(rôme/nois ei)/desi proschrô=ntai, kai\ tou\s lo/gous peri\

au)tô=n poiou=ntai, ou) peri\ tou/tôn dianoou/menoi, a)ll'

e)kei/nôn pe/ri oi(=s tau=ta e)/oike, tou= tetragô/nou au)tou=

e(/neka tou\s lo/gous poiou/menoi kai\ diame/tron au)tê=s, a)ll'

ou) tau/tês ê(\n gra/phousi, kai\ ta)/lla ou(/tôs; au)ta\ me\n

tau=ta a(\ pla/ttousi/ te kai\ gra/phousin, ô(=n] kai\ skiai\ kai\

e)n u(/dasin ei)ko/nes ei)si/, tou/tois me\n ô(s ei)ko/sin au)=

chrô/menoi, zêtou=nte/s te au)ta\ e)kei=na i)dei=n, a(\ ou)k a)\n

a)/llôs i)/doi tis ê)\ tê=| dianoi/a|.]

[Footnote 204: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 A. [Greek: ou)k e)p'

a)rchê\n i)ou=san, ô(s ou) duname/nên tô=n u(pothe/seôn a)nôte/rô

e)kbai/nein, ei)ko/si de\ chrôme/nên au)toi=s toi=s u(po\ tô=n

ka/tô a)peikasthei=sin, kai\ e)kei/nois pro\s e)kei=na ô(s

e)narge/si dedoxasme/nois te kai\ tetimême/nois.]]

[Side-note: Dialectic procedure assumes nothing. It departs

from the highest Form, and steps gradually down to the lowest,

without meddling with any thing except Forms.]

From the geometrical procedure thus described, we must now

distinguish the other section--the pure Dialectic. Here the

Intellect ascends to the absolute Form, and grasps it directly.

Particular assumptions or hypotheses are indeed employed, but only

as intervening stepping-stones, by which the Intellect is to

ascend to the Form: they are afterwards to be discarded: they are

not used here for first principles of reasoning, as they are by

the Geometer.[205] The Dialectician uses for his first principle

the highest absolute Form; he descends from this to the next

highest, and so lower and lower through the orderly gradation of

Forms, until he comes to the end or lowest: never employing

throughout the whole descent any hypothesis or assumption, nor any

illustrative aid from sense. He contemplates and reasons upon the

pure intelligible essence, directly and immediately: whereas the

Geometer can only contemplate it indirectly and mediately, through

the intervening aid of particular assumptions.[206]

[Footnote 205: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 B. [Greek: to\ e(/teron

tmê=ma tou= noêtou= . . . ou)= au)to\s o( lo/gos a(/ptetai tê=|

tou= diale/gesthai duna/mei, ta\s u(pothe/seis poiou/menos ou)k

a)rcha\s a)lla\ tô=| o)/nti u(pothe/seis, oi(=on e)piba/seis te

kai\ o(rma/s, i(/na me/chri tou= a)nupothe/tou, e)pi\ tê\n tou=

panto\s a)rchê\n i)ô/n, a(psa/menos au)tê=s, pa/lin au)=

e)cho/menos tô=n e)kei/nês e)chome/nôn, ou(/tôs e)pi\ teleutê\n

katabai/nê|, ai)sthêtô=| panta/pasin ou)deni\ proschrô/menos,

a)ll' ei)/desin au)toi=s di' au)tô=n ei)s au)ta/, kai\ teleuta=|

ei)s ei)/dê.]]

[Footnote 206: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 C. [Greek: saphe/steron

ei)=nai to\ u(po\ tê=s tou= diale/gesthai e)pistê/mês tou= o)/ntos

te kai\ noêtou= theôrou/menon ê)\ to\ u(po\ tô=n technô=n

kaloume/nôn, ai(=s ai( u(pothe/seis a)rchai/], &c.]

[Side-note: Two distinct grades of Cognition--Direct or

Superior--Noûs--Indirect or Inferior--Dianoia.]

The distinction here indicated between the two different sections

of the Intelligible Region, and the two different sections of the

Region of Sense--we shall mark (continues Sokrates) by appropriate

terms. The Dialectician alone has Noûs or Intellect, direct or the

highest cognition: he alone grasps and comprehends directly the

pure intelligible essence or absolute Form. The Geometer does

not ascend to this direct contemplation or intuition of the Form:

he knows it only through the medium of particular assumptions, by

indirect Cognition or Dianoia; which is a lower faculty than Noûs

or Intellect, yet nevertheless higher than Opinion.

[Side-note: Two distinct grades of Opinion also in the

Sensible World--Faith or Belief--Conjecture.]

As we assign two distinct grades of Cognition to the Intelligible

Region, so we also assign two distinct grades of Opinion to the

Region of Sense, and its two sections. To the first of these two

sections, or to real objects of sense, we assign the highest grade

of Opinion, _viz._: Faith or Belief. To the second of the

two, or to the images of real objects of sense, we assign the

lower grade, _viz._: Conjecture.

Here then are the four grades. Two grades of Cognition--1. Noûs,

or Direct Cognition. 2. Dianoia, or Indirect Cognition: both of

them belonging to the Intelligible Region, and both of them higher

than Opinion. Next follow the two grades of Opinion. 3. The higher

grade, Faith or Belief. 4. The lower grade, Conjecture. Both the

two last belong to the sensible world; the first to real objects,

the last to images of those objects.[207]

[Footnote 207: Plato, Republic, p. 511 D-E.]

[Side-note: Distinction between the philosopher and the

unphilosophical public, illustrated by the simile of the Cave, and

the captives imprisoned therein.]

Sokrates now proceeds to illustrate the contrast between the

philosopher and the unphilosophical or ordinary man, by the

memorable simile of the cave and its shadows. Mankind live in a

cave, with its aperture directed towards the light of the sun; but

they are so chained, that their backs are constantly turned

towards this aperture, so that they cannot see the sun and

sunlight. What they do see is by means of a fire which is always

burning behind them. Between them and this fire there is a wall;

along the wall are posted men who carry backwards and forwards

representations or images of all sorts of objects; so that the

shadows of these objects by the firelight are projected from

behind these chained men upon the ground in front of them, and

pass to and fro before their vision. All the experience which such

chained men acquire, consists in what they observe of the

appearance and disappearance, the transition, sequences, and

co-existences, of these shadows, which they mistake for truth and

realities, having no no acquaintance with any other

phenomena.[208] If now we suppose any one of them to be liberated

from his chains, turned round, and brought up to the light of the

sun and to real objects--his eyesight would be at first altogether

dazzled, confounded, and distressed. Distinguishing as yet nothing

clearly, he would believe that the shadows which he had seen in

his former state were true and distinct objects, and that the new

mode of vision to which he had been suddenly introduced was

illusory and unprofitable. He would require a long time to

accustom him to daylight: at first his eyes would bear nothing but

shadows--next images in the water--then the stars at

night--lastly, the full brightness of the Sun. He would learn that

it was the Sun which not only gave light, but was the cause of varying

seasons, growth, and all the productions of the visible world. And

when his mind had been thus opened, he would consider himself much

to be envied for the change, looking back with pity on his

companions still in the cave.[209] He would think them all

miserably ignorant, as being conversant not with realities, but

only with the shadows which passed before their eyes. He would

have no esteem even for the chosen few in the cave, who were

honoured by their fellows as having best observed the

co-existences and sequences among these shadows, so as to predict

most exactly how the shadows would appear in future.[210] Moreover

if, after having become fully accustomed to daylight and the

contemplation of realities, he were to descend again into the

cave, his eyesight would be dim and confused in that comparative

darkness; so that he would not well recognise the shadows, and

would get into disputes about them with his companions. They on

their side would deride him as having spoilt his sight as well as

his judgment, and would point him out as an example to deter

others from emerging out of the cave into daylight.[211] Far from

wishing to emerge themselves, they would kill, if they could,

any one who tried to unchain them and assist them in

escaping.[212]

[Footnote 208: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 514-515.]

[Footnote 209: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 515-516.]

[Footnote 210: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 516 C. [Greek: Timai\ de\

kai\ e)/painoi ei)/ tines au)toi=s ê)=san to/te par' a)llê/lôn

kai\ ge/ra tô=| o)xu/tata kathorô=nti ta\ pario/nta, kai\

mnêmoneu/onti ma/lista o(/sa te pro/tera au)tô=n kai\ u(/stera

ei)ô/thei kai\ a(/ma poreu/esthai, kai\ e)k tou/tôn dê\

dunatô/tata a)pomanteuome/nô| to\ me/llon ê(/xein, dokei=s a)\n

au)to\n e)pithumêtikô=s au)tô=n e)/chein kai\ zêlou=n tou\s par'

e)kei/nois timôme/nous te kai\ e)ndunasteu/ontas?]]

[Footnote 211: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A. [Greek: a)=r' ou)

ge/lôt' a)\n para/schoi kai\ le/goito a)\n peri\ au)tou= ô(s

a)naba\s a)/nô diephtharme/nos ê(/kei ta\ o)/mmata, kai\ o(/ti

ou)k a)/xion ou)de\ peira=sthai a)/nô i)e/nai?]]

[Footnote 212: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A. [Greek: kai\ to\n

e)picheirou=nta lu/ein te kai\ a)na/gein, ei)/ pôs e)n tai=s

chersi\ du/naito labei=n kai\ a)poktei=nai, a)poktinnu/nai

a)\n?]]

[Side-note: Daylight of philosophy contrasted with the

firelight and shadows of the Cave.]

By this simile (continues Sokrates) I intend to illustrate, as far

as I can, yet without speaking confidently,[213] the relations of

the sensible world to the intelligible world: the world of

transitory shadows, dimly seen and admitting only opinion,

contrasted with that of unchangeable realities steadily

contemplated and known, illuminated by the Idea of Good, which is

itself visible in the background, being the cause both of truth in

speculation and of rectitude in action.[214] No wonder that the

few who can ascend into the intelligible region, amidst the clear

contemplations of Truth and Justice _per se_, are averse to

meddle again with the miseries of human affairs and to contend

with the opinions formed by ordinary men respecting the shadows of

Justice, the reality of which these ordinary men have never seen.

There are two causes of temporary confused vision: one, when a man

moves out of darkness into light--the other when he moves from

light into darkness. It is from the latter cause that the

philosopher suffers when he redescends into the obscure cave.[215]

[Footnote 213: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517. [Greek: tê=s g'

e)mê=s e)lpi/dos, e)peidê\ tau/tês e)pithumei=s a)kou/ein;

_theo\s de/ pou oi)=den ei) a)lêthê\s ou)=sa tugcha/nei_.]

This tone of uncertainty in Plato deserves notice. It forms a

striking contrast with the dogmatism of many among his

commentators.]

[Footnote 214: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 C.]

[Footnote 215: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 517-518.]

[Side-note: Purpose of a philosophical training, to turn a

man round from facing the bad light of the Cave to face the

daylight of philosophy, and to see the eternal Forms.]

The great purpose of education is to turn a man round from his

natural position at the bottom of this dark cave, where he sees

nothing but shadows: to fix his eyes in the other direction, and

to induce him to ascend into clear daylight. Education does not,

as some suppose, either pour knowledge into an empty mind, or

impart visual power to blind persons. Men have good eyes, but

these eyes are turned in the wrong direction. The clever among

them see sharply enough what is before them: but they have nothing

before them except shadows, and the sharper their vision the more

mischief they do.[216] What is required is to turn them round

and draw them up so as to face the real objects of daylight. Their

natural eyesight would then suffice to enable them to see these

objects well.[217] The task of our education must be, to turn

round the men of superior natural aptitude, and to draw them up

into the daylight of realities. Next, when they shall have become

sufficiently initiated in truth and philosophy, we must not allow

them to bury themselves permanently in such studies--as they will

themselves be but too eager to do. We must compel them to come

down again into the cave and exercise ascendancy among their

companions, for whose benefit their superior mental condition will

thus become available.[218]

[Footnote 216: Plato, Republic, p. 519 A-B.]

[Footnote 217: Plato, Republic, p. 519 B. [Greek: ô(=n ei)

a)pallage\n periestre/pheto ei)s ta)lêthê=, kai\ e)kei=na a)\n to\

au)to\ tou=to tô=n au)tô=n a)nthrô/pôn o)xu/tata e(ô/ra, ô(/sper

kai\ e)ph' a)\ nu=n te/traptai.]]

[Footnote 218: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 519-520.]

[Side-note: Those who have emerged from the Cave into full

daylight amidst eternal Forms, must be forced to come down again

and undertake active duties--Their reluctance to do this.]

Coming as they do from the better light, they will, after a little

temporary perplexity, be able to see the dim shadows better than

those who have never looked at anything else. Having contemplated

the true and real Forms of the Just, Beautiful, Good--they will

better appreciate the images of these Forms which come and go,

pass by and repass in the cave.[219] They will indeed be very

reluctant to undertake the duties or exercise the powers of

government: their genuine delight is in philosophy; and if left to

themselves, they would cultivate nothing else. But such reluctance

is in itself one proof that they are the fittest persons to

govern. If government be placed in the hands of men eager to

possess it, there will be others eager to dispossess them, so that

competition and factions will arise. Those who come forward to

govern, having no good of their own, and seeking to extract their

own good from the exercise of power, are both unworthy of trust

and sure to be resisted by opponents of the like disposition. The

philosopher alone has his own good in himself. He enjoys a life

better than that of a ruler; which life he is compelled to forego

when he accepts power and becomes a ruler.[220]

[Footnote 219: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 520 C.]

[Footnote 220: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 520-521.]

[Side-note: Studies serving as introduction to

philosophy--Arithmetic, its awakening power--shock to the mind

by felt contradiction.]

The main purpose of education, I have said (continues Sokrates)

is, to turn round the faces of the superior men, and to invite

them upwards from darkness to light--from the region of

perishable shadows to that of imperishable realities.[221] Now

what cognitions, calculated to aid such a purpose, can we find to

teach?[222] Gymnastic, music, the vulgar arts, are all useful to

be taught: but they do not tend to that which we are here seeking.

Arithmetic does so to a certain extent, if properly taught which

at present it is not.[223] It furnishes a stimulus to awaken the

dormant intellectual and reflective capacity. Among the variety of

sensible phenomena, there are some in which the senses yield a

clear and satisfactory judgment, leaving no demand in the mind for

anything beyond: there are others in which the senses land us in

apparent equivocation, puzzle, and contradiction--so that the mind

is stung by this apparent perplexity, and instigated to find a

solution by some intellectual effort.[224] Thus, if we see or feel

the fingers of our hand, they always appear to the sense, fingers:

in whatever order or manner they may be looked at, there is no

contradiction or discrepancy in the judgment of sense. But if we

see or feel them as great or small, thick or thin, hard or soft,

&c., they then appear differently according as they are seen

or felt in different order or under different circumstances. The

same object which now appears great, will at another time appear

small: it will seem to the sense hard or soft, light or heavy,

according as it is seen under different comparisons and

relations.[225] Here then, sense is involved in an apparent

contradiction, declaring the same object to be both hard and soft,

great and small, light and heavy, &c. The mind, painfully

confounded by such a contradiction, is obliged to invoke

intellectual reflection to clear it up. Great and small are

presented by the sense as inhering in the same object. Are they

one thing, or two separate things? Intellectual reflection informs

us that they are two: enabling us to conceive separately two

things, which to our sense appeared confounded together.

Intellectual (or abstract) conception is thus developed in our

mind, as distinguished from sense, and as a refuge from the

confusion and difficulties of sense, which furnish the stimulus

whereby it is awakened.[226]

[Footnote 221: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C. [Greek: psuchê=s

periagôgê/, e)k nukterinê=s tino\s ê(me/ras ei)s a)lêthinê\n tou=

o)/ntos i)ou/sês e)pa/nodon, ê(\n dê\ philosophi/an a)lêthê=

phê/somen ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 222: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C. [Greek: Ti/ a)\n

ou)=n ei)/ê ma/thêma psuchê=s o(lko\n a)po\ tou= gignome/nou e)pi\

to\ o)/n?]]

[Footnote 223: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 522-523 A.]

[Footnote 224: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 523 C.]

[Footnote 225: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 523-524.]

[Footnote 226: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 524 B-C.]

[Side-note: Perplexity arising from the One and Many,

stimulates the mind to an intellectual effort for clearing it up.]

Now arithmetic, besides its practical usefulness for arrangements

of war, includes difficulties and furnishes a stimulus of this

nature. We see the same thing both as One and as infinite in

multitude: as definite and indefinite in number.[227] We can

emerge from these difficulties only by intellectual and abstract

reflection. It is for this purpose, and not for purposes of

traffic, that our intended philosophers must learn Arithmetic.

Their minds must be raised from the confusion of the sensible

world to the clear daylight of the intelligible.[228] In teaching

Arithmetic, the master sets before his pupils numbers in the

concrete, that is, embodied in visible and tangible objects--so

many balls or pebbles.[229] Each of these balls he enumerates as

One, though they be unequal in magnitude, and whatever be the

magnitude of each. If you remark that the balls are unequal--and

that each of them is Many as well as One, being divisible into as

many parts as you please--he will laugh at the objection as

irrelevant. He will tell you that the units to which his

numeration refers are each _Unum per se_, indivisible and

without parts; and all equal among themselves without the least

shade of difference. He will add that such units cannot be

exhibited to the senses, but can only be conceived by the

intellect: that the balls before you are not such units in

reality, but serve to suggest and facilitate the effort of

abstract conception.[230] In this manner arithmetical teaching

conducts us to numbers in the abstract--to the real, intelligible,

indivisible unit--the _Unum per se_.

[Footnote 227: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 A. [Greek: a(/ma ga\r

tau)to\n ô(s e(/n te o(rô=men kai\ ô(s a)/peira to\ plê=thos.]]

[Footnote 228: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 B. [Greek: dia\ to\

tê=s ou)si/as a(pte/on ei)=nai gene/seôs e)xanadu/nti], &c.]

[Footnote 229: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 D. [Greek: o(rata\ ê)\

a(pta\ sô/mata e)/chontas a)rithmou\s], &c.]

[Footnote 230: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 526 A. [Greek: ei)/ tis

e)/roito au)tou/s, Ô)= thauma/sioi, peri\ poi/ôn a)rithmô=n

diale/gesthe, e)n oi(=s to\ e(\n oi(=on u(mei=s a)xiou=te/ e)stin,

i)/son te e(/kaston pa=n panti\ kai\ ou)de\ smikro\n diaphe/ron,

mo/rio/n te e)/chon e)n e(autô=| ou)de/n? ti/ a)\n oi)/ei au)tou\s

a)pokri/nasthai? Tou=to e)/gôge, o(/ti peri\ tou/tôn le/gousin

ô(=n dianoêthê=nai mo/non e)gchôrei=, a)/llôs d' ou)damô=s

metacheiri/zesthai dunato/n.]]

[Side-note: Geometry conducts the mind to wards Universal

Ens.]

Geometrical teaching conducts the mind to the same order of

contemplations; leading it away from variable particulars to

unchangeable universal Essence. Some persons extol Geometry

chiefly on the ground of its usefulness in applications to

practice. But this is a mistake: its real value is in conducing to

knowledge, and to elevated contemplations of the mind. It does,

however, like Arithmetic, yield useful results in practice: and

both of them are farther valuable as auxiliaries to other

studies.[231]

[Footnote 231: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 526-527.]

[Side-note: Astronomy--how useful--not useful as now

taught--must be studied by ideal figures, not by observation.]

After Geometry--the measurement of lines and superficial

areas--the proper immediate sequel is Stereometry, the measurement

of solids. But this latter is nowhere properly honoured and

cultivated: though from its intrinsic excellence, it forces its

way partially even against public neglect and discouragement.[232]

Most persons omit it, and treat Astronomy as if it were the

immediate sequel to Geometry: which is a mistake, for Astronomy

relates to solid bodies in a state of rotatory movement, and ought

to be preceded by the treatment of solid bodies generally.[233]

Assuming Stereometry, therefore, as if it existed, we proceed to

Astronomy.

[Footnote 232: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 A-C.]

[Footnote 233: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 A-B. [Greek: e)n

periphora=| o)\n ê)/dê stereo\n labo/ntes, pri\n au)to\ kath'

au(to\ labei=n.] Also 528 E.]

Certainly (remarks Glaukon) Astronomy, besides its usefulness in

regard to the calendar, and the seasons, must be admitted by every

one to carry the mind upwards, to the contemplation of things not

below but on high. I do not admit this at all (replies Sokrates),

as Astronomy is now cultivated: at least in my sense of the words,

_looking upwards and looking downwards_. If a man lies on his

back, contemplating the ornaments of the ceiling, he may carry his

eyes upward, but not his mind.[234] To look upwards, as I

understand it, is to carry the mind away from the contemplation of

sensible things, whereof no science is attainable--to the

contemplation of intelligible things, entities invisible and

unchangeable, which alone are the objects of science. Observation

of the stars, such as astronomers now teach, does not fulfil any

such condition. The heavenly bodies are the most beautiful of all

visible bodies and the most regular of all visible movements,

approximating most nearly, though still with a long interval of

inferiority, to the ideal figures and movements of genuine and

self-existent Forms--quickness, slowness, number, figure, &c.,

as they are in themselves, not visible to the eye, but

conceivable only by reason and intellect.[235] The movements of

the heavenly bodies are exemplifications, approaching nearest to

the perfection of these ideal movements, but still falling greatly

short of them. They are like visible circles or triangles drawn by

some very exact artist; which, however beautiful as works of art,

are far from answering to the conditions of the idea and its

definition, and from exhibiting exact equality and

proportion.[236] So about the movements of the sun and stars: they

are comparatively regular, but they are yet bodily and visible,

never attaining the perfect sameness and unchangeableness of the

intelligible world and its forms. We cannot learn truth by

observation of phenomena constantly fluctuating and varying. We

must study astronomy, as we do geometry, not by observation, but

by mathematical theorems and hypotheses: which is a far more

arduous task than astronomy as taught at present. Only in this way

can it be made available to improve and strengthen the

intellectual organ of the mind.[237]

[Footnote 234: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 B.]

[Footnote 235: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 D.]

[Footnote 236: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 529-530.]

[Footnote 237: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 530 B. [Greek:

Problê/masin a)/ra chrô/menoi ô(/sper geômetri/an, ou(/tô kai\

a)stronomi/an me/timen; ta\ d' e)n tô=| ou)ra/nô| e)a/somen],

&c.]

[Side-note: Acoustics, in like manner--The student will be

thus conducted to the highest of all studies--Dialectic: and to

the region of pure intelligible Forms.]

In like manner (continues Sokrates), Acoustics or Harmonics must

be studied, not by the ear, listening to and comparing various

sounds, but by the contemplative intellect, applying arithmetical

relations and theories.[238]

[Footnote 238: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531.]

After going through all these different studies, the student will

have his mind elevated so as to perceive the affinity of

method[239] and principle which pervades them all. In this state

he will be prepared for entering on Dialectic, which is the final

consummation of his intellectual career. He will then have

ascended from the cave into daylight. He will have learnt to see

real objects, and ultimately the Sun itself, instead of the dim

and transitory shadows below. He will become qualified to grasp

the pure Intelligible Form with his pure Intellect alone, without

either aid or disturbance from sense. He will acquire that

dialectical discursive power which deals exclusively with these

Intelligible Forms, carrying on ratiocination by means of them

only, with no reference to sensible objects. He will attain at

length the last goal of the Dialectician--the contemplation of

Bonum _per se_ (the highest perfection and elevation of the

Intelligible)[240] with Intellect _per se_ in its full

purity: the best part of his mind will have been raised to the

contemplation and knowledge of the best and purest entity.[241]

[Footnote 239: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531 D.]

[Footnote 240: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 A. [Greek: ou(/tô kai\

o(/tan tis tô=| diale/gesthai e)picheirê=|, a)/neu pasô=n tô=n

ai)sthê/seôn dia\ tou= lo/gou e)p' au)to\ o(\ e)/stin e(/kaston

o(rma=|, kai\ mê\ a)postê=| pri\n a)\n au)to\ o(\ e)/stin

a)gatho\n au)tê=| tê=| noê/sei la/bê|, e)p' au)tô=| gi/gnetai tô=|

tou= noêtou= te/lei], &c.]

[Footnote 241: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 D.]

[Side-note: Question by Glaukon--What is the Dialectic

Power? Sokrates declares that he cannot answer with certainty, and

that Glaukon could not follow him if he did.]

I know not whether I ought to admit your doctrine, Sokrates

(observes Glaukon). There are difficulties both in admitting and

denying it. However, let us assume it for the present. Your next

step must be to tell us what is the characteristic function of

this Dialectic power--what are its different varieties and ways

of proceeding? I would willingly do so (replies Sokrates), but you

would not be able to follow me.[242] I would lay before you not

merely an image of the truth but the very truth itself; as it

appears to me at least, whether I am correct or not--for I ought

not to be sure of my own correctness.

[Footnote 242: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 A.]

[Side-note: He answers partially--It is the consummation of

all the sciences, raising the student to the contemplation of pure

Forms, and especially to that of the highest Form--_Good_.]

But I am sure that the dialectic power is something of the nature

which I have described. It is the only force which can make plain

the full truth to students who have gone through the preliminary

studies that we have described. It is the only study which

investigates rationally real forms and essences[243]--what each

thing is, truly in itself. Other branches of study are directed

either towards the opinions and preferences of men--or towards

generation and combination of particular results--or towards

upholding of combinations already produced or naturally springing

up: while even as to geometry and the other kindred studies, we

have seen that as to real essence, they have nothing better than

dreams[244]--and that they cannot see it as it is, so long as

they take for their principle or point of departure certain

assumptions or hypotheses of which they can render no account. The

principle being thus unknown, and the conclusion as well as the

intermediate items being spun together out of that unknown, how

can such a convention deserve the name of Science?[245] Pursuant

to custom, indeed, we call these by the name of Sciences. But they

deserve no higher title than that of Intellectual Cognitions,

lower than Science, yet higher than mere Opinion. It is the

Dialectician alone who discards all assumptions, ascending at once

to real essence as his principle and point of departure:[246]

defining, and discriminating by appropriate words, each variety of

real essence--rendering account of it to others--and carrying it

safely through the cross-examining process of question and

answer.[247] Whoever cannot discriminate in this way the Idea or

Form of Good from every thing else, will have no proper cognition

of Good itself, but only, at best, opinions respecting the various

shadows of Good. Dialectic--the capacity of discriminating real

Forms and maintaining them in cross-examining dialogue is thus the

coping-stone, completion, or consummation, of all the other

sciences.[248]

[Footnote 243: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 B. [Greek: ô(s au)tou=

ge e(ka/stou pe/ri, o(\ e)/stin e(/kaston, ou)k a)/llê tis

e)picheirei= me/thodos o(dô=| peri\ panto\s lamba/nein], &c.]

[Footnote 244: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 C. [Greek: ô(s

o)neirô/ttousi me\n peri\ to\ o)/n, u(/par de\ a)du/naton au)tai=s

i)dei=n, e(/ôs a)\n u(pothe/sesi chrô/menai tau/tas a)kinê/tous

e)ô=sin], &c.]

[Footnote 245: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 D.]

[Footnote 246: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 E.]

[Footnote 247: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 B. [Greek: ê)= kai\

dialektiko\n kalei=s to\n lo/gon e(/kastou lamba/nonta tê=s

ou)si/as?]]

[Footnote 248: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 C-E. [Greek: ô(/sper

thrigko\s toi=s mathê/masin ê( dialektikê\ ê(mi=n e)pa/nô

kei=sthai], &c.]

[Side-note: The Synoptic view peculiar to the

Dialectician.]

[Side-note: Scale and duration of various studies for the

Guardians, from youth upwards.]

The preliminary sciences must be imparted to our Guardians during

the earlier years of life, together with such bodily and mental

training as may test their energy and perseverance of

character.[249] After the age of twenty, those who have

distinguished themselves in the juvenile studies and gymnastics,

must be placed in a select class of honour above the rest, and

must be initiated in a synoptic view of the affinity pervading all

the separate cognitions which have been imparted to them. They

must also be introduced to the view of Real Essence and its

nature. This is the test of aptitude for Dialectics: it is the

synoptic view only, which constitutes the Dialectician.[250]

[Footnote 249: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 535-536 D.]

[Footnote 250: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 536-537 C. [Greek: kai\

megi/stê pei=ra dialektikê=s phu/seôs kai\ mê/; o( me\n ga\r

sunoptiko\s dialektiko/s, o( de\ mê/, ou)/.]]

In these new studies they will continue until thirty years of

age: after which a farther selection must be made, of those

who have most distinguished themselves. The men selected will be

enrolled in a class of yet higher honour, and will be tested by

dialectic cross-examination: so that we may discover who among

them are competent to apprehend true, pure, and real Essence,

renouncing all visual and sensible perceptions.[251] It is

important that such Dialectic exercises should be deferred until

this advanced age--and not imparted, as they are among us at

present, to immature youths: who abuse the license of

interrogation, find all their homegrown opinions uncertain, and

end by losing all positive convictions.[252] Our students will

remain under such dialectic tuition for five years, until they are

thirty-five years of age: after which they must be brought again

down into the cave, and constrained to acquire practical

experience by undertaking military and administrative functions.

In such employments they will spend fifteen years: during which

they will undergo still farther scrutiny, to ascertain whether

they can act up to their previous training, in spite of all

provocations and temptations.[253] Those who well sustain all

these trials will become, at fifty years of age, the finished

Elders or Chiefs of the Republic. They will pass their remaining

years partly in philosophical contemplations, partly in

application of philosophy to the regulation of the city. It is

these Elders whose mental eye will have been so trained as to

contemplate the Real Essence of Good, and to copy it as an

archetype in all their ordinances and administration. They will be

the Moderators of the city: but they will perform this function as

a matter of duty and necessity--not being at all ambitious of it

as a matter of honour.[254]

[Footnote 251: Plato, Republic, p. 537 D.]

[Footnote 252: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 538-539.]

[Footnote 253: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 539 D-E.]

[Footnote 254: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 539-540.]

[Side-note: All these studies, and this education, are

common to females as well as males.]

What has here been said about the male guardians and philosophers

must be understood to apply equally to the female. We recognise no

difference in this respect between the two sexes. Those females

who have gone through the same education and have shown themselves

capable of enduring the same trials as males, will participate,

after fifty years of age, in the like philosophical

contemplations, and in superintendence of the city.[255]

[Footnote 255: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 C.]

[Side-note: First formation of the Platonic city--how

brought about: difficult, but not impossible.]

I have thus shown (Sokrates pursues) how the fundamental postulate

for our city may be brought about.--That philosophers, a single

man or a few, shall become possessed of supreme rule: being

sufficiently exalted in character to despise the vulgar

gratifications of ambition, and to carry out systematically the

dictates of rectitude and justice. The postulate is indeed hard to

be realised--yet not impossible.[256] Such philosophical rulers,

as a means for first introducing their system into a new city,

will send all the inhabitants above ten years old away into the

country, reserving only the children, whom they will train up in

their own peculiar manners and principles. In this way the city,

according to our scheme, will be first formed: when formed, it

will itself be happy, and will confer inestimable benefit on the

nation to which it belongs.[257]

[Footnote 256: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 E.]

[Footnote 257: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 541 A.]

Plato thus assumes his city, and the individual man forming a

parallel to his city, to be perfectly well constituted. Reason,

the higher element, exercises steady controul: the lower elements,

Energy and Appetite, both acquiesce contentedly in her right to

controul, and obey her orders--the former constantly and

forwardly--the latter sometimes requiring constraint by the

strength of the former.]

[Side-note: The city thus formed will last long, but not

for ever. After a certain time, it will begin to degenerate.

Stages of its degeneracy.]

But even under the best possible administration, the city, though

it will last long, will not last for ever. Eternal continuance

belongs only to Ens; every thing generated must one day or other

be destroyed.[258] The fatal period will at length arrive, when

the breed of Guardians will degenerate. A series of changes for

the worse will then commence, whereby the Platonic city will pass

successively into timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, despotism. The

first change will be, that the love of individual wealth and

landed property will get possession of the Guardians: who, having

in themselves the force of the city, will divide the territory

among themselves, and reduce the other citizens to dependence and

slavery.[259] They will at the same time retain a part of their

former mental training. They will continue their warlike

habits and drill: they will be ashamed of their wealth, and will

enjoy it only in secret: they will repudiate money-getting

occupations as disgraceful. They will devote themselves to the

contests of war and political ambition--the rational soul becoming

subordinate to the energetic and courageous.[260] The system which

thus obtains footing will be analogous to the Spartan and Kretan,

which have many admirers.[261] The change in individual character

will correspond to this change in the city. Reason partially

losing its ascendancy, while energy and appetite both gain

ground--an intermediate character is formed in which energy or

courage predominates. We have the haughty, domineering, contentious,

man.[262]

[Footnote 258: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 546 A. [Greek: genome/nô|

panti\ phthora/ e)stin], &c.]

[Footnote 259: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 547.]

[Footnote 260: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 547-548 D. [Greek:

diaphane/staton d' e)n au)tê=| e)sti\n e(/n ti mo/non u(po\ tou=

thumoeidou=s kratou=ntos--philonei/kiai kai\ philoti/miai.]]

[Footnote 261: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 544 C.]

[Footnote 262: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 549-550.]

[Side-note: 1. Timocracy and the timocratical individual. 2

Oligarchy, and the oligarchical individual.]

Out of this timocracy, or timarchy, the city will next pass into

an oligarchy, or government of wealth. The rich will here govern,

to the exclusion of the poor. Reason, in the timocracy, was under

the dominion of energy or courage: in the oligarchy, it will be

under the dominion of appetite. The love of wealth will become

predominant, instead of the love of force and aggrandisement. Now

the love of wealth is distinctly opposed to the love of virtue:

virtue and wealth are like weights in opposite scales.[263] The

oligarchical city will lose all its unity, and will consist of a

few rich with a multitude of discontented poor ready to rise

against them.[264] The character of the individual citizen will

undergo a modification similar to that of the collective city. He

will be under the rule of appetite: his reason will be only

invoked as the servant of appetite, to teach him how he may best

enrich himself.[265] He will be frugal,--will abstain from all

unnecessary expenditure, even for generous and liberal

purposes--and will keep up a fair show of honesty, from the fear

of losing what he has already got.[266]

[Footnote 263: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 550 D-E-551 A. 550 E:

[Greek: proi+o/ntes ei)s to\ pro/sthen tou= chrêmati/zesthai,

o(/sô| a)\n tou=to timiô/teron ê(gô=ntai, tosou/tô| a)retê\n

a)timote/ran. ê)\ ou)ch ou(/tô plou/tou a)retê\ die/stêken,

ô(/sper e)n pla/stiggi zugou= keime/nou e(kate/rou a)ei\

tou)nanti/on r(e/ponte?] Also p. 555 D.]

[Footnote 264: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 552 D-E.]

[Footnote 265: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 553 C.]

[Footnote 266: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 554 D.]

[Side-note: 3. Democracy, and the democratical

individual.]

The oligarchical city will presently be transformed into a

democracy, mainly through the abuse and exaggeration of its own

ruling impulse--the love of wealth. The rulers, anxious to enrich

themselves, rather encourage than check the extravagance of young

spendthrifts, to whom they lend money at high interest, or whose

property they buy on advantageous terms. In this manner there

arises a class of energetic men, with ruined fortunes and habits

of indulgence. Such are the adventurers who put themselves at the

head of the discontented poor, and overthrow the oligarchy.[267]

The ruling few being expelled or put down, a democracy is

established with equal franchise, and generally with officers

chosen by lot.[268]

[Footnote 267: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 555-556.]

[Footnote 268: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 557 A.]

The characteristic of the democracy is equal freedom and open

speech to all, with liberty to each man to shape his own life as

he chooses. Hence there arises a great diversity of individual

taste and character. Uniformity of pursuit or conduct is scarcely

enforced: there is little restraint upon any one. A man offers

himself for office whenever he chooses and not unless he chooses.

He is at war or at peace, not by obedience to any public

authority, but according to his own individual preference. If he

be even condemned by a court of justice, he remains in the city

careless of the sentence, which is never enforced against him.

This democracy is an equal, agreeable, diversified, society, with

little or no government: equal in regard to all--to the good, bad,

and indifferent.[269]

[Footnote 269: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 557-558.]

So too the democratical individual. The son of one among these

frugal and money-getting oligarchs, departing from the habits and

disregarding the advice of his father, contracts a taste for

expensive and varied indulgences. He loses sight of the

distinction between what is necessary, and what is not necessary,

in respect to desires and pleasures. If he be of a quiet

temperament, not quite out of the reach of advice, he keeps clear

of ruinous excess in any one direction; but he gives himself up to

a great diversity of successive occupations and amusements,

passing from one to the other without discrimination of good

from bad, necessary from unnecessary.[270] His life and

character thus becomes an agreeable, unconstrained, changeful,

comprehensive, miscellany, like the society to which he

belongs.[271]

[Footnote 270: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 560-561 B. [Greek: ei)s

i)/son dê/ ti katastê/sas ta\s ê(dona\s dia/gei, tê=|

parapiptou/sê| a)ei\ ô(/sper lachou/sê| tê\n e(autou= a)rchê\n

paradidou/s, e(/ôs a)\n plêrôthê=|, kai\ au)=this a)/llê|,

ou)demi/an a)tima/zôn, a)ll' e)x i)/sou tre/phôn.]]

[Footnote 271: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 561 D-E. [Greek:

pantodapo/n te kai\ plei/stôn ê(thô=n mesto/n, kai\ to\n kalo/n te

kai\ poiki/lon, ô(/sper e)kei/nên tê\n po/lin, tou=ton to\n

a)/ndra ei)=nai.]]

[Side-note: 4. Passage from democracy to despotism.

Character of the despotic city.]

Democracy, like oligarchy, becomes ultimately subverted by an

abuse of its own characteristic principle. Freedom is gradually

pushed into extravagance and excess, while all other

considerations are neglected. No obedience is practised: no

authority is recognised. The son feels himself equal to his

father, the disciple to his teacher, the metic to the citizen, the

wife to her husband, the slave to his master. Nay, even horses,

asses, and dogs, go free about, so that they run against you in

the road, if you do not make way for them.[272] The laws are not

obeyed: every man is his own master.

[Footnote 272: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 562-563 C.]

The subversion of such a democracy arises from the men who rise to

be popular leaders in it: violent, ambitious, extravagant, men,

who gain the favour of the people by distributing among them

confiscations from the property of the rich. The rich, resisting

these injustices, become enemies to the constitution: the people,

in order to put them down, range themselves under the banners of

the most energetic popular leader, who takes advantage of such a

position to render himself a despot.[273] He begins his rule by

some acceptable measures, such as abolition of debts, and

assignment of lands to the poorer citizens, until he has expelled

or destroyed the parties opposed to him. He seeks pretences for

foreign war, in order that the people may stand in need of a

leader, and may be kept poor by the contributions necessary to

sustain war. But presently he finds, or suspects, dissatisfaction

among the more liberal spirits. He kills or banishes them as

enemies: and to ensure the continuance of his rule, he is under

the necessity of dispatching in like manner every citizen

prominent either for magnanimity, intelligence, or wealth.[274]

Becoming thus odious to all the better citizens, he is obliged

to seek support by enlisting a guard of mercenary foreigners and

manumitted slaves. He cannot pay his guards, without plundering

the temples, extorting perpetual contributions from the people,

and grinding them down by severe oppression and suffering.[275]

Such is the government of the despot, which Euripides and other

poets employ their genius in extolling.[276]

[Footnote 273: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 565-566.]

[Footnote 274: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 567 B.]

[Footnote 275: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 568-569.]

[Footnote 276: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 568 B.]

[Side-note: Despotic individual corresponding to that

city.]

We have now to describe the despotic individual, the parallel of

the despotised city. As the democratic individual arises from the

son of an oligarchical citizen departing from the frugality of his

father and contracting habits of costly indulgence: so the son of

this democrat will contract desires still more immoderate and

extravagant than his father, and will thus be put into training

for the despotic character. He becomes intoxicated by insane

appetites, which serve as seconds and auxiliaries to one despotic

passion or mania, swaying his whole soul.[277] To gratify such

desires, he spends all his possessions, and then begins to borrow

money wherever he can. That resource being exhausted, he procures

additional funds by fraud or extortion; he cheats and ruins his

father and mother; he resorts to plunder and violence. If such men

are only a small minority, amidst citizens of better character,

they live by committing crimes on the smaller scale. But if they

are more numerous, they set up as a despot the most unprincipled

and energetic of their number, and become his agents for the

enslavement of their fellow-citizens.[278] The despotic man passes

his life always in the company of masters, or instruments, or

flatterers: he knows neither freedom nor true friendship--nothing

but the relation of master and slave. The despot is the worst and

most unjust of mankind: the longer he continues despot, the worse

he becomes.[279]

[Footnote 277: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 572-573 D. [Greek: E)/rôs

tu/rannos e)/ndon oi)kô=n diakuberna=| ta\ tê=s psuchê=s

a(/panta.] 574 E-575 A: [Greek: turanneuthei\s u(po\

E)/rôtos--E)/rôs mo/narchos], &c.]

[Footnote 278: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 574-575.]

[Footnote 279: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 575-576.]

[Side-note: The city has thus passed by four stages, from

best to worse. Question--How are Happiness and Misery apportioned

among them?]

We have thus gone through the four successive depravations which

our perfect city will undergo--timocracy, oligarchy, democracy,

despotism. Step by step we have passed from the best to the

worst--from one extreme to the other. As is the city, so is the

individual citizen--good or bad: the despotic city is like the

despotic individual,--and so about the rest. Now it remains to

decide whether in each case happiness and misery is proportioned

to good and evil: whether the best is the happiest, the worst the

most miserable,--and so proportionally about the

intermediate.[280] On this point there is much difference of

opinion.[281]

[Footnote 280: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 D.]

[Footnote 281: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 C. [Greek: toi=s de\

polloi=s polla\ kai\ dokei=.]]

[Side-note: Misery of the despotised city.]

If we look at the condition of the despotised city, it plainly

exhibits the extreme of misery; while our model city presents the

extreme of happiness. Every one in the despotised city is

miserable, according to universal admission, except the despot

himself with his immediate favourites and guards. To be sure, in

the eyes of superficial observers, the despots with these few

favourites will appear perfectly happy and enviable. But if we

penetrate beyond this false exterior show, and follow him into his

interior, we shall find him too not less miserable than those over

whom he tyrannises.[282]

[Footnote 282: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577 A.]

[Side-note: Supreme Misery of the despotising individual.]

What is true of the despotised city, is true also of the

despotising individual.[283] The best parts of his mind are under

subjection to the worst: the rational mind is trampled down by the

appetitive mind, with its insane and unsatisfied cravings. He is

full of perpetual perturbation, anxiety, and fear; grief when he

fails, repentance even after he has succeeded. Speaking of his

mind as a whole, he never does what he really wishes for the

rational element, which alone can ensure satisfaction to the whole

mind, and guide to the attainment of his real wishes, is enslaved

by furious momentary impulses.[284] The man of despotical mind is

thus miserable; and most of all miserable, the more completely he

succeeds in subjugating his fellow-citizens and becoming a despot

in reality. Knowing himself to be hated by everyone, he lives

in constant fear of enemies within as well as enemies without,

against whom he can obtain support only by courting the vilest of

men as partisans.[285] Though greedy of all sorts of enjoyment, he

cannot venture to leave his city, or visit any of the frequented

public festivals. He lives indoors like a woman, envying those who

can go abroad and enjoy these spectacles.[286] He is in reality

the poorest and most destitute of men, having the most vehement

desires, which he can never satisfy.[287] Such is the despot who,

not being master even of himself, becomes master of others: in

reality, the most wretched of men, though he may appear happy to

superficial judges who look only at external show.[288]

[Footnote 283: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577 C-D. [Greek: tê\n

o(moio/têta a)namimnêsko/menos tê=s te po/leôs kai\ tou= a)ndro/s

. . . ei) ou)=n o(/moios a)nê\r tê=| po/lei, ou) kai\ e)n

e)kei/nô| a)na/gkê tê\n au)tê\n ta/xin e)nei=nai?] &c. Also

579 E.]

[Footnote 284: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577-578. [Greek: Kai\ ê(

turannoume/nê a)/ra psuchê\ ê(/kista poiê/sei a(\ a)\n boulê/thê|,

ô(s peri\ o(/lês ei)pei=n psuchê=s; u(po\ de\ oi)/strou a)ei\

e(lkome/nê bi/a| tarachê=s kai\ metamelei/as mestê\ e)/stai] (557

E).]

[Footnote 285: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 578-579.]

[Footnote 286: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 579 C.]

[Footnote 287: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 579 E.]

[Footnote 288: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 579-580.]

[Side-note: Conclusion--The Model city and the individual

corresponding to it, are the happiest of all--That which is

farthest removed from it, is the most miserable of all.]

Thus then (concludes Sokrates) we may affirm with confidence,

having reference to the five distinct cities above described--(1.

The Model-City, regal or aristocratical. 2. Timocracy. 3.

Oligarchy. 4. Democracy. 5. Despotism)--that the first of these is

happy, and the last miserable: the three intermediate cities being

more or less happy in the order which they occupy from the first

to the last.

[Side-note: The Just Man is happy in and through his

Justice, however he may be treated by others. The Unjust Man,

miserable.]

Each of these cities has its parallel in an individual citizen.

The individual citizen corresponding to the first is happy--he who

corresponds to the last is miserable: and so proportionally for

the individual corresponding to the three intermediate cities. He

is happy or miserable, in and through himself, or essentially;

whether he be known to Gods and men or not--whatever may be the

sentiment entertained of him by others.[289]

[Footnote 289: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 580 D. [Greek: e)a/n te

lantha/nôsi toiou=toi o)/ntes e)a/n te mê\ pa/ntas a)nthrô/pous te

kai\ theou/s.]]

There are two other lines of argument (continues Sokrates)

establishing the same conclusion.

[Side-note: Other arguments proving the same

conclusion--Pleasures of Intelligence are the best of all pleasures.]

1. We have seen that both the collective city and the individual

mind are distributed into three portions: Reason, Energy,

Appetite. Each of these portions has its own peculiar pleasures

and pains, desires and aversions, beginnings or principles of

action: Love of Knowledge: Love of Honour: Love of Gain. If you

question men in whom these three varieties of temper respectively

preponderate, each of them will extol the pleasures of his own

department above those belonging to the other two. The lover of

wealth will declare the pleasures of acquisition and appetite to

be far greater than those of honour or of knowledge: each of the

other two will say the same for himself, and for the pleasures of

his own department. Here then the question is opened, Which of the

three is in the right? Which of the three varieties of pleasure

and modes of life is the more honourable or base, the better or

worse, the more pleasurable or painful?[290] By what criterion, or

by whose judgment, is this question to be decided? It must be

decided by experience, intelligence and rational discourse.[291]

Now it is certain that the lover of knowledge, or the philosopher,

has greater experience of all the three varieties of pleasure than

is possessed by either of the other two men. He must in his

younger days have tasted and tried the pleasures of both; but the

other two have never tasted his.[292] Moreover, each of the three

acquires more or less of honour, if he succeeds in his own

pursuits: accordingly the pleasures belonging to the love of

honour are shared, and may be appreciated, by the philosopher;

while the lover of honour as such, has no sense for the pleasures

of philosophy. In the range of personal experience, therefore, the

philosopher surpasses the other two: he surpasses them no less in

exercised intelligence, and in rational discourse, which is his

own principal instrument.[293] If wealth and profit furnished the

proper means of judgment, the money-lover would have been the best

judge of the three: if honour and victory furnished the proper

means, we should consult the lover of honour: but experience,

intelligence, and rational discourse, have been shown to be the

means--and therefore it is plain that the philosopher is a better

authority than either of the other two. His verdict must be

considered as final. He will assuredly tell us, that the pleasures

belonging to the love of knowledge are the greatest: those

belonging to the love of honour and power, the next: those

belonging to the love of money and to appetite, the least.[294]

[Footnote 290: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 581.]

[Footnote 291: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 A. [Greek: e)mpeiri/a|

te kai\ phronê/sei kai\ lo/gô|.]]

[Footnote 292: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 B.]

[Footnote 293: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C-D. [Greek: lo/goi de\

tou/tou ma/lista o)/rganon.]]

[Footnote 294: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 582-583.]

[Side-note: They are the only pleasures completely true and

pure. Comparison of pleasure and pain with neutrality. Prevalent

illusions.]

2. The second argument, establishing the same conclusion, is as

follows:--No pleasures, except those belonging to philosophy or

the love of wisdom, are completely true and pure. All the other

pleasures are mere shadowy outlines, looking like pleasure at a

distance, but not really pleasures when you contemplate them

closely.[295] Pleasure and pain are two conditions opposite to

each other. Between them both is another state, neither one nor

the other, called neutrality or indifference. Now a man who has

been sick and is convalescent, will tell you that nothing is more

pleasurable than being in health, but that he did not know what

the pleasure of it was, until he became sick. So too men in pain

affirm that nothing is more pleasurable than relief from pain.

When a man is grieving, it is exemption or indifference, not

enjoyment, which he extols as the greatest pleasure. Again, when a

man has been in a state of enjoyment, and the enjoyment ceases,

this cessation is painful. We thus see that the intermediate

state--cessation, neutrality, indifference--will be some times

pain, sometimes pleasure, according to circumstances. Now that

which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot possibly be both.[296]

Pleasure is a positive movement or mutation of the mind: so also

is pain. Neutrality or indifference is a negative condition,

intermediate between the two: no movement, but absence of

movement: non-pain, non-pleasure. But non-pain is not really

pleasure: non-pleasure is not really pain. When therefore

neutrality or non-pain, succeeding immediately after pain,

appears to be a pleasure--this is a mere appearance or illusion,

not a reality. When neutrality or non-pleasure, succeeding

immediately after pleasure, appears to be pain--this also is a

mere appearance or illusion, not a reality. There is nothing sound

or trustworthy in such appearances. Pleasure is not cessation of

pain, but something essentially different: pain is not cessation

of pleasure, but something essentially different.

[Footnote 295: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 583 B. [Greek: ou)de\

panalêthê/s e)stin e( tô=n a)/llôn ê(donê\ plê\n tê=s tou=

phroni/mou, ou)de\ kathara/, a)ll' e)skiagraphême/nê tis, ô(s

e)gô\ dokô= moi tô=n sophô=n tino\s a)kêkoe/nai.]]

[Footnote 296: Plato, Republ. ix. pp. 583 E-584 A. [Greek: O(\

metaxu\ a)/ra nu=n dê\ a)mphote/rôn e)/phamen ei)=nai, tê\n

ê(suchi/an, tou=to/ pote a)mpho/tera e)/stai, lu/pê te kai\

ê(donê/ . . . Ê)= kai\ dunato\n to\ mêde/tera o)\n a)mpho/tera

gi/gnesthai? Ou)/ moi dokei=. Kai\ mê\n to/ ge ê(du\ e)n psuchê=|

gigno/menon kai\ to\ lupêro\n ki/nêsi/s tis a)mphote/rô e)/ston?

ê)\ ou)/? Nai/. To\ de\ mê/te ê(du\ mê/te lupêro\n ou)chi\

ê(suchi/a me/ntoi kai\ e)n me/sô| tou/tôn e)pha/nê a)/rti?

E)pha/nê ga/r. Pô=s ou)=n o)rthô=s e)/sti to\ mê\ a)lgei=n ê(du\

ê(gei=sthai, ê)\ to\ mê\ chai/rein a)niaro/n? Ou)damô=s. Ou)k

e)/stin a)/ra tou=to, a)lla\ phai/netai, para\ to\ a)lgeino\n

ê(du\ kai\ para\ to\ ê(du\ a)lgeino\n to/te ê( ê(suchi/a, kai\

ou)de\n u(gie\s tou/tôn tô=n phantasma/tôn pro\s ê(donê=s

a)lê/theian, a)lla\ goêtei/a tis.]]

[Side-note: Most men know nothing of true and pure

pleasure. Simile of the Kosmos--Absolute height and depth.]

Take, for example, the pleasures of smell, which are true and

genuine pleasures, of great intensity: they spring up

instantaneously without presupposing any anterior pain--they

depart without leaving any subsequent pain.[297] These are true

and pure pleasures, radically different from cessation of pain: so

also true and pure pains are different from cessation of pleasure.

Most of the so-called pleasures, especially the more intense,

which reach the mind through the body, are in reality not

pleasures at all, but only cessations or reliefs from pain. The

same may be said about the pleasures and pains of anticipation

belonging to these so-called bodily pleasures.[298] They may be

represented by the following simile:--There is in nature a real

Absolute Up and uppermost point--a real Absolute Down and lowest

point--and a centre between them.[299] A man borne from the lowest

point to the centre will think himself moving upwards, and will be

moving upwards relatively. If his course be stopped in the centre,

he will think himself at the absolute summit--on looking to the

point from which he came, and ignorant as he is of any thing

higher. If he be forced to return from the centre to the point

from whence he came, he will think himself moving downwards, and

will be really moving downwards, absolutely as well as relatively.

Such misapprehension arises from his not knowing the portion of

the Kosmos above the centre--the true and absolute Up or summit.

Now the case of pleasure and pain is analogous to this. Pain is

the absolute lowest--Pleasure the absolute highest--non-pleasure,

non-pain, the centre intermediate between them. But most men know

nothing of the region above the centre, or the absolute

highest--the region of true and pure pleasure: they know only the

centre and what is below it, or the region of pain. When they fall

from the centre to the point of pain, they conceive the situation

truly, and they really are pained: but when they rise from the

lowest point to the centre, they misconceive the change, and

imagine themselves to be in a process of replenishment and

acquisition of pleasure. They mistake the painless condition for

pleasure, not knowing what true pleasure is: just as a man who has

seen only black and not white, will fancy, if dun be shown to him,

that he is looking on white.[300]

[Footnote 297: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 B.]

[Footnote 298: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C.]

[Footnote 299: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C. [Greek: Nomi/zeis ti

e)n tê=| phu/sei ei)=nai to\ me\n a)/nô, to\ de\ ka/tô, to\ de\

me/son? E)/gôge.]]

[Footnote 300: Plato, Republic, pp. 584 E-585 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n

tau=ta pa/schoi a)\n pa/nta dia\ to\ mê\ e)/mpeiros ei)=nai tou=

a)lêthinô=s a)/nô te o)/ntos kai\ e)n me/sô|? . . . o(/tan me\n

e)pi\ to\ lupêro\n phe/rôntai, a)lêthê= te oi)/ontai kai\ tô=|

o)/nti lupou=ntai, o(/tan de\ a)po\ lu/pês e)pi\ to\ metaxu/,

spho/dra me\n oi)/ontai pro\s plêrô/sei te kai\ ê(donê=|

gi/gnesthai, ô(/sper de\ pro\s me/lan phaio\n a)poskopou=ntes

a)peiri/a| leukou=, kai\ pro\s to\ a)/lupon ou(/tô lu/pên

a)phorô=ntes a)peiri/a| ê(donê=s a)patô=ntai?]]

[Side-note: Nourishment of the mind partakes more of real

essence than nourishment of the body--Replenishment of the mind

imparts fuller pleasure than replenishment of the body.]

Hunger and thirst are states of emptiness in the body: ignorance

and folly are states of emptiness in the mind. A hungry man in

eating or drinking obtains replenishment: an ignorant man becoming

instructed obtains replenishment also. Now replenishment derived

from that which exists more fully and perfectly is truer and more

real than replenishment from that which exists less fully and

perfectly.[301] Let us then compare the food which serves for

replenishment of the body, with that which serves for

replenishment of the mind. Which of the two is most existent?

Which of the two partakes most of pure essence? Meat and drink--or

true opinions, knowledge, intelligence, and virtue? Which of the

two exists most perfectly? That which embraces the true, eternal,

and unchangeable--and which is itself of similar nature? Or that

which embraces the mortal, the transient, and the ever

variable--being itself of kindred nature? Assuredly the former. It

is clear that what is necessary for the sustenance of the body

partakes less of truth and real essence, than what is necessary

for the sustenance of the mind. The mind is replenished with

nourishment more real and essential: the body with nourishment

less so: the mind itself is also more real and essential than the

body. The mind therefore is more, and more thoroughly, replenished

than the body. Accordingly, if pleasure consists in being

replenished with what suits its peculiar nature, the mind will

enjoy more pleasure and truer pleasure than the body.[302] Those

who are destitute of intelligence and virtue, passing their lives

in sensual pursuits, have never tasted any pure or lasting

pleasure, nor ever carried their looks upwards to the higher

region in which alone it resides. Their pleasures, though seeming

intense, and raising vehement desires in their uninstructed minds,

are yet only phantoms deriving a semblance of pleasure from

contrast with pains:[303] they are like the phantom of Helen, for

which (as Stesichorus says) the Greeks and Trojans fought so many

battles, knowing nothing about the true Helen, who was never in

Troy.

[Footnote 301: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 B. [Greek: Plê/rôsis

de\ a)lêtheste/ra tou= ê(=tton ê)\ tou= ma=llon o)/ntos? Dê=lon

o(/ti tou= ma=llon. Po/tera ou)=n ê(gei= ta\ ge/nê ma=llon

kathara=s ou)si/as mete/chein, ta\ oi(=on si/tou kai\ potou= kai\

o)/psou kai\ xumpa/sês trophê=s, ê)\ to\ do/xês te a)lêthou=s

ei)=dos kai\ e)pistê/mês kai\ nou= kai\ xullê/bdên xumpa/sês

a)retê=s?]]

[Footnote 302: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 E.]

[Footnote 303: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 586.]

[Side-note: Comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of

Appetite and Ambition, when measured against those of

Intelligence.]

The pleasures belonging to the Love of Honour (Energy or Passion)

are no better than those belonging to the Love of Money

(Appetite). In so far as the desires belonging to both these

departments of mind are under the controul of the third or best

department (Love of Wisdom, or Reason), the nearest approach to

true pleasure, which it is in the nature of either of them to

bestow, will be realised. But in so far as either of them throws

off the controul of Reason, it will neither obtain its own truest

pleasures, nor allow the other departments of mind to obtain

theirs.[304] The desires connected with love, and with despotic

power, stand out more than the others, as recusant to Reason. Law,

and Regulation. The kingly and moderate desires are most obedient

to this authority. The lover and the despot, therefore, will enjoy

the least pleasure: the kindly-minded man will enjoy the most. Of

the three sorts of pleasure, one true and legitimate, two bastard,

the despot goes most away from the legitimate, and to the farthest

limit of the bastard. His condition is the most miserable, that of

the kingly-minded man is the happiest: between the two come the

oligarchical and the democratical man. The difference between

the two extremes** is as 1: 729.[305]

[Footnote 304: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 586-587.]

[Footnote 305: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 587 E.]

[Side-note: The Just Man will be happy from his justice--He

will look only to the good order of his own mind--He will stand

aloof from public affairs, in cities as now constituted.]

I have thus refuted (continues Sokrates) the case of those who

contend--That the unjust man is a gainer by his injustice,

provided he could carry it on successfully, and with the

reputation of being just. I have shown that injustice is the

greatest possible mischief, intrinsically and in itself, apart

from consequences and apart from public reputation: inasmuch as it

enslaves the better part of the mind to the worse. Justice, on the

other hand, is the greatest possible good, intrinsically and in

itself, apart from consequences and reputation, because it keeps

the worse parts of the mind under due controul and subordination

to the better.[306] Vice and infirmity of every kind is

pernicious, because it puts the best parts of the mind under

subjection to the worst.[307] No success in the acquisition of

wealth, aggrandisement, or any other undue object, can compensate

a man for the internal disorder which he introduces into his own

mind by becoming unjust. A well-ordered mind, just and temperate,

with the better part governing the worse, is the first of all

objects: greater even than a healthy, strong, and beautiful

body.[308] To put his mind into this condition, and to acquire all

the knowledge thereunto conducing, will be the purpose of a wise

man's life. Even in the management of his body, he will look not

so much to the health and strength of his body, as to the harmony

and fit regulation of his mind. In the acquisition of money, he

will keep the same end in view: he will not be tempted by the

admiration and envy of people around him to seek great wealth,

which will disturb the mental polity within him:[309] he will, on

the other hand, avoid depressing poverty, which might produce the

same effect. He will take as little part as possible in public

life, and will aspire to no political honours, in cities as at

present constituted--nor in any other than the model-city

which we have described.[310]

[Footnote 306: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 588-589.]

[Footnote 307: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 590 B-C.]

[Footnote 308: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B.]

[Footnote 309: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 D-E. [Greek: kai\ to\n

o)/gkon tou= plê/thous ou)k, e)kplêtto/menos u(po\ tou= tô=n

pollô=n makarismou=, a)/peiron au)xê/sei, a)pe/ranta kaka\ e)/chôn

. . . A)ll' a)poble/pôn ge, pro\s tê\n e)n au(tô=| politei/an,

kai\ phula/ttôn mê/ ti parakinê=| au)tou= tô=n e)kei= dia\

plê=thos ou)si/as ê)\ di' o)ligo/têta, ou(/tô kubernô=n

prosthê/sei kai\ a)nalô/sei tê=s ou)si/as, kath' o(/son a)\n

oi(=o/s t' ê)=|.]]

[Footnote 310: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 592.]

[Side-note: Tenth Book--Censure of the poets is

renewed--Mischiefs of imitation generally, as deceptive--Imitation

from imitation.]

The tenth and last book of the Republic commences with an argument

of considerable length, repeating and confirming by farther

reasons the sentence of expulsion which Plato had already

pronounced against the poets in his second and third books.[311]

The Platonic Sokrates here not only animadverts upon poetry, but

extends his disapprobation to other imitative arts, such as

painting. He attacks the process of imitation generally, as false

and deceptive; pleasing to ignorant people, but perverting their

minds by phantasms which they mistake for realities. The work of

the imitator is not merely not reality, but is removed from it by

two degrees. What is real is the Form or Idea: the one conceived

object denoted by each appellative name common to many

particulars. There is one Form or Idea, and only one, known by the

name of Bed; another by the name of Table.[312] When the carpenter

constructs a bed or a table, he fixes his contemplation on this

Form or Idea, and tries to copy it. What he constructs, however,

is not the true, real, existent, table, which alone exists in

nature, and may be presumed to be made by the Gods[313]--but a

something like the real existent table: not true Ens, but only

quasi-Ens:[314] dim and indistinct, as compared with the truth,

and standing far off from the truth. Next to the carpenter comes

the painter, who copies not the real existent table, but the copy

of that table made by the carpenter. The painter fixes his

contemplation upon it, not as it really exists, but simply as it

appears: he copies an appearance or phantasm, not a reality. Thus

the table will have a different appearance, according as you look

at it from near or far--from one side or the other: yet in reality

it never differs from itself. It is one of these appearances

that the painter copies, not the reality itself. He can in like

manner paint any thing and every thing, since he hardly touches

any thing at all--and nothing whatever except in appearance. He

can paint all sorts of craftsmen and their works--carpenters,

shoemakers, &c. without knowledge of any one of their

arts.[315]

[Footnote 311: Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B. The language here

used by Plato seems to imply that his opinions adverse to poetry

had been attacked and required defence.]

[Footnote 312: Plato, Republic, x. p. 596 A-B. [Greek: Bou/lei

ou)=n e)/nthende a)rxô/metha e)piskopou/ntes, e)k tê=s ei)ôthui/as

metho/dou? ei)=dos ga/r pou/ ti e(\n e(/kaston ei)ô/thamen

ti/thesthai peri\ e(/kasta ta\ polla/, oi(=s tau)to\n o)/noma

e)piphe/romen . . . thô=men dê\ kai\ nu=n o(/ti bou/lei tô=n

pollô=n; oi(=on, ei) the/leis pollai/ pou/ ei)si kli=nai kai\

tra/pezai . . . A)ll' i)de/ai ge/ pou peri\ tau=ta ta\ skeu/ê

du/o, mi/a me\n kli/nês, mi/a de\ trape/zês.]

[Footnote 313: Plato, Republic, x. p. 597 B-D. 597 B: [Greek: mi/a

me\n ê( e)n tê=| phu/sei ou)=sa, ê(\n phai=men a)/n, ô(s

e)gô=|mai, theo\n e)rga/sasthai.]]

[Footnote 314: Plato, Republic, x. p. 597 A. [Greek: ou)k a)\n to\

o)\n poioi=, a)lla/ ti toiou=ton oi(=on to\ o)/n, o)\n de\

ou)/.]]

[Footnote 315: Plato, Republic, x. p. 598 B-C.]

[Side-note: Censure of Homer--He is falsely extolled as

educator of the Hellenic world. He and other poets only deceive

their hearers.]

The like is true also of the poets. Homer and the tragedians give

us talk and affirmations about everything: government,

legislation, war, medicine, husbandry, the character and

proceedings of the Gods, the habits and training of men, &c.

Some persons even extol Homer as the great educator of the

Hellenic world, whose poems we ought to learn by heart as guides

for education and administration.[316] But Homer, Hesiod, and the

other poets, had no real knowledge of the multifarious matters

which they profess to describe. These poets know nothing except

about appearances, and will describe only appearances, to the

satisfaction of the ignorant multitude.[317] The representations

of the painter, reproducing only the appearances to sense, will be

constantly fallacious and deceptive, requiring to be corrected by

measuring, weighing, counting--which are processes belonging to

Reason.[318] The lower and the higher parts of the mind are here

at variance; and the painter addresses himself to the lower,

supplying falsehood as if it were truth. The painter does this

through the eye, the poet through the ear.[319]

[Footnote 316: Plato, Republic, p. 606 E.]

[Footnote 317: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 600-601 C. 601 B: [Greek:

tou= me\n o)/ntos ou)de\n e)pai+/ei, tou= de\ phainome/nou.] 602

B: [Greek: oi(=on phai/netai kalo\n ei)=nai toi=s polloi=s te kai\

mêde\n ei)do/si, tou=to mimê/setai.]]

[Footnote 318: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 602-603.]

[Footnote 319: Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 B.]

[Side-note: The poet chiefly appeals to emotions--Mischiefs

of such eloquent appeals, as disturbing the rational government of

the mind.]

In the various acts and situations of life a man is full of

contradictions. He is swayed by manifold impulses, often directly

contradicting each other. Hence we have affirmed that there are in

his mind two distinct principles, one contradicting the other: the

emotional and the rational.[320] When a man suffers misfortune,

emotion prompts him to indulge in extreme grief, and to

abandon himself like a child to the momentary tide. Reason, on the

contrary, exhorts him to resist, and to exert himself immediately

in counsel to rectify or alleviate what has happened, adapting his

conduct as well as he can to the actual throw of the dice which

has befallen him.[321] Now it is these vehement bursts of emotion

which lend themselves most effectively to the genius of the poet,

and which he must work up to please the multitude in the theatre:

the state of rational self-command can hardly be described so as

to touch their feelings. We see thus that the poet, like the

painter, addresses himself to the lower department of the mind,

exalting the emotional into preponderance over the rational--the

foolish over the wise--the false over the true.[322] He introduces

bad government into the mind, giving to pleasure and pain the

sceptre over reason. Hence we cannot tolerate the poet, in spite

of all his sweets and captivations. We can only permit him to

compose hymns for the Gods and encomiums for good men.[323]

[Footnote 320: Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 D. [Greek: muri/ôn

toiou/tôn e)nantiôma/tôn a(/ma gignome/nôn ê( psuchê\ ge/mei

ê(mô=n . . .] 604 B: [Greek: e)nanti/as de\ a)gôgê=s gignome/nês

e)n tô=| a)nthrô/pô| peri\ to\ au)to\ a(/ma du/o tine/ phamen e)n

au)tô=| a)nagkai=on ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 321: Plato, Republic, x. p. 604 C. [Greek: Tô=|

bouleu/esthai peri\ to\ gegono\s kai\ ô(/sper e)n ptô/sei ku/bôn

pro\s ta\ peptôko/ta ti/thesthai ta\ au)tou= pra/gmata, o(/pê| o(

lo/gos ai(rei= be/ltist' a)\n e)/chein, a)lla\ mê\

prosptai/santas, katha/per pai=das, e)chome/nous tou= plêge/ntos

e)n tô=| boa=n diatri/bein], &c.]

[Footnote 322: Plato, Republic, x. p. 605.]

[Footnote 323: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 605-606-607. 605 B: [Greek:

to\n mimêtiko\n poiêtê\n phê/somen kakê\n politei/an i)di/a|

e(ka/stou tê=| psuchê=| e)mpoiei=n, tô=| a)noê/tô| au)tê/s

charizo/menon . . .] 607 A: [Greek: ei) de\ tê\n ê(dusme/nên

mou=san parade/xei e)n me/lesin ê)\ e)/pesin, ê(donê/ soi kai\

lu/pê basileu/seton a)nti\ no/mou te kai\ tou= koinê=| a)ei\

do/xantos ei)=nai belti/stou lo/gou.]]

[Side-note: Ancient quarrel between philosophy and

poetry--Plato fights for philosophy, though his feelings are

strongly enlisted for poetry.]

This quarrel between philosophy and poetry (continues the Platonic

Sokrates) is of ancient date.[324] I myself am very sensible to

the charms of poetry, especially that of Homer. I should be

delighted if a case could be made out to justify me in admitting

it into our city. But I cannot betray the cause of what seems to

me truth. We must resist our sympathies and preferences, when they

are incompatible with the right government of the mind.[325]

[Footnote 324: Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B. [Greek: palaia/ tis

diaphora\ philosophi/a| te kai\ poiêtikê=|].]

[Footnote 325: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 607-608.]

[Side-note: Immortality of the soul affirmed and sustained

by argument--Total number of souls always the same.]

To maintain the right government and good condition of the soul or

mind, is the first of all considerations: and will be seen yet

farther to be such, when we consider that it is immortal and

imperishable. Of this Plato proceeds to give a proof,[326]

concluding with a mythical sketch of the destiny of the soul

after death. The soul being immortal (he says), the total

number of souls is and always has been the same--neither

increasing nor diminishing.[327]

[Footnote 326: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 609-610.]

[Footnote 327: Plato, Republic, x. p. 611 A.]

[Side-note: Recapitulation--The Just Man will be happy,

both from his justice and from its consequences, both here and

hereafter.]

I have proved (the Platonic Sokrates concludes) in the preceding

discourse, that Justice is better, in itself and intrinsically,

than Injustice, quite apart from consequences in the way of reward

and honour; that a man for the sake of his own happiness, ought to

be just, whatever may be thought of him by Gods or men--even

though he possessed the magic ring of Gyges. Having proved this,

and having made out the intrinsic superiority of justice to

injustice, we may now take in the natural consequences and

collateral bearings of both. We have hitherto reasoned upon the

hypothesis that the just man was mistaken for unjust, and treated

accordingly--that the unjust man found means to pass himself off

for just, and to attract to himself the esteem and the rewards of

justice. But this hypothesis concedes too much, and we must now

take back the concession. The just man will be happier than the

unjust, not simply from the intrinsic working of justice on his

own mind, but also from the exterior consequences of justice.[328]

He will be favoured and rewarded both by Gods and men. Though he

may be in poverty, sickness, or any other apparent state of evil,

he may be assured that the Gods will compensate him for it by

happiness either in life or after death.[329] And men too, though

they may for a time be mistaken about the just and the unjust

character, will at last come to a right estimation of both. The

just man will finally receive honour, reward, and power, from his

fellow-citizens: the unjust man will be finally degraded and

punished by them.[330] And after death, the reward of the just

man, as well as the punishment of the unjust, will be far greater

than even during life.

[Footnote 328: Plato, Republic, x. p. 612 B-C.]

[Footnote 329: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 612-613.]

[Footnote 330: Plato, Republic, x. p. 613 C-D.]

This latter position is illustrated at some length by the mythe

with which the Republic concludes, describing the realm of Hades,

with the posthumous condition and treatment of the departed souls.