But surely (remarks Adeimantus), according to this picture, your

Guardians or Soldiers, though masters of all the city, will be

worse off than any of the other citizens. They will be deprived of

those means of happiness which the others are allowed to enjoy.

Perhaps they will (replies Sokrates): yet I should not be

surprised if they were to be the happiest of all. Be that as it

may, however, my purpose is, not to make _them_ especially

happy, but to make the whole city happy. The Guardians can enjoy

only such happiness as consists with the due performance of their

functions as Guardians. Every man in our city must perform his

appropriate function, and must be content with such happiness as

his disposition will admit, subject to this condition.[88] In

regard to all the citizens without exception, it must be the duty

of the Guardians to keep out both riches and poverty, both of

which spoil the character of every one. No one must be rich, and

no one must be poor.[89] In case of war, the constant discipline

of our soldiers will be of more avail than money, in making them

efficient combatants against other cities.[90] Moreover, other

cities are divided against themselves: each is many cities, and

not one: poor and rich are at variance with each other, and

various fractions of each of these classes against other

fractions. Our city alone, constituted as I propose, will be

really and truly One. It will thus be the greatest of all cities,

even though it have only one thousand fighting men. It may be

permitted to increase, so long as it will preserve its complete

unity, but no farther.[91] Farthermore, each of our citizens is

one and not many: confined to that special function for which he

is qualified by his nature.

[Footnote 88: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.]

[Footnote 89: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 E.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 422 B.]

[Footnote 91: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423 A.]

[Side-note: The maintenance of the city depends upon

that of the habits, character, and education of the Guardians.]

It will devolve upon our Guardians to keep up this form of

communion unimpaired; and they will have no difficulty in doing

so, as long as they maintain their own education and training

unimpaired. No change must be allowed either in the musical or

gymnastic training: especially not in the former, where changes

are apt to creep in, with pernicious effect.[92] Upon this

education depends the character and competence of the Guardians.

They will provide legislation in detail, which will be good, if

their general character is good--bad, on the contrary supposition.

If their character and the constitution of the city be defective

at the bottom, it is useless for us to prescribe regulations of

detail, as we would do for sick men. The laws in detail cannot be

good, while the general constitution of the city is bad. Those

teachers are mistaken who exhort us to correct the former, but to

leave the latter untouched.[93]

[Footnote 92: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 424 A.]

[Footnote 93: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 425-426.]

[Side-note: Religious legislation--Consult the Delphian

Apollo.]

In regard to religious legislation--the raising of temples,

arrangement of sacrifices, &c.--we must consult Apollo at

Delphi, and obey what he directs. We know nothing ourselves about

these matters, nor is there any other authority equally

trustworthy.[94]

[Footnote 94: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 427 B. [Greek: ta\ ga\r dê\

toiau=ta ou)/t' e)pista/metha ê(mei=s], &c.]

[Side-note: The city is now constituted as a good city--that

is, wise, courageous, temperate, just. Where is its Justice?]

Our city is now constituted and peopled (continues Sokrates). We

mast examine it, and see where we can find Justice and

Injustice--reverting to our original problem, which was, to know what

each of them was, and which of the two conferred happiness. Now assuming

our city to be rightly constituted, it will be perfectly good:

that is, it will be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. These

four constituents cover the whole: accordingly, if we can discover

and set out Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance--that which remains

afterwards will be Justice.[95]

[Footnote 95: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 427-428.]

[Side-note: First, where is the wisdom of the city? It

resides in the few elder Rulers.]

First, we can easily see where Wisdom resides. The city includes

in itself a great variety of cognitions, corresponding to all the

different functions in which its citizens are employed. But it is

not called _wise_, from its knowledge of husbandry, or of

brazier's and carpenter's craft: since these are specialties which

cover only a small fraction of its total proceedings. It is called

_wise_, or well-advised, from that variety of intelligence or

cognition which directs it as a whole, in its entire affairs: that

is, the intelligence possessed by the chief Guardians or Rulers.

Now the number of persons possessing this variety of intelligence

is smaller than the number of those who possess any other variety.

The wisdom of the entire city resides in this very small presiding

fraction, and in them alone.[96]

[Footnote 96: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 428-429.]

[Side-note: Where is the Courage? In the body of Guardians

or Soldiers.]

Next, we can also discern without difficulty in what fraction of

the city Courage resides. The city is called courageous from the

valour of those Guardians or Soldiers upon whom its defence rests.

These men will have learnt, in the course of their training, what

are really legitimate objects of fear, and what are not legitimate

objects of fear. To such convictions they will resolutely adhere,

through the force of mind implanted by their training, in defiance

of all disturbing impulses. It is these right convictions,

respecting the legitimate objects of fear, which I (says Sokrates)

call true political courage, when they are designedly inculcated

and worked in by regular educational authority: when they spring

up without any rational foundation, as in animals or slaves, I do

not call them Courage. The Courage of the entire city thus resides

in its Guardians or Soldiers.[97]

[Footnote 97: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 429-430.]

[Side-note: Where is the Temperance? It resides in all and

each, Rulers, Guardians, and People. Superiors rule and Inferiors

obey.]

Thirdly, wherein resides the Temperance of the city? Temperance

implies a due relation, proportion, or accord, between different

elements. The temperate man is called superior to himself: but

this expression, on first hearing, seems unmeaning, since the man

must also be inferior to himself. But the expression acquires a

definite meaning, when we recognise it as implying that there are

in the same man's mind better and worse elements: and that when

the better rules over the worse, he is called superior to himself,

or temperate--when the worse rules over the better, he is called

inferior to himself, or intemperate. Our city will be temperate,

because the better part of it, though smaller in number, rules

over the worse and inferior part, numerically greater. The

pleasures, pains, and desires of our few Rulers, which are

moderate and reasonable, are preponderant: controuling those of

the Many, which are miscellaneous, irregular, and violent. And

this command is exercised with the perfect consent and good-will

of the subordinates. The Many are not less willing to obey than

the Few to command. There is perfect unanimity between them as to

the point--Who ought to command, and who ought to obey? It is this

unanimity which constitutes the temperance of the city: which thus

resides, not in any one section of the city, like Courage and

Wisdom, but in all sections alike: each recognising and

discharging its legitimate function.[98]

[Footnote 98: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 431-432.]

[Side-note: Where is the Justice? In all and each of them

also. It consists in each performing his own special function, and

not meddling with the function of the others.]

There remains only Justice for us to discover. Wherein does the

Justice of the city reside? Not far off. Its justice consists in

that which we pointed out at first as the fundamental

characteristic of the city, when we required each citizen to

discharge one function, and one alone--that for which he was best

fitted by nature. That each citizen shall do his own work, and not

meddle with others in their work--that each shall enjoy his own

property, as well as do his own work--this is true Justice.[99] It

is the fundamental condition without which neither temperance, nor

courage, nor wisdom could exist; and it fills up the good

remaining after we have allowed for the effects of the preceding

three.[100] All the four are alike indispensable to make up the

entire Good of the city: Justice, or each person (man, woman,

freeman, slave, craftsman, guardian) doing his or her own

work--Temperance, or unanimity as to command and obedience between

Chiefs, Guardians, and the remaining citizens--Courage, or the

adherence of the Guardians to right reason, respecting what is

terrible and not terrible--Wisdom, or the tutelary superintendence

of the Chiefs, who protect each person in the enjoyment of his

own property.[101]

[Footnote 99: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 432-433. 433 A: [Greek:

Kai\ mê\n o(/ti ge to\ ta\ au(tou= pra/ttein kai\ mê\

polupragmonei=n dikaiosu/nê e)sti/, kai\ tou=to a)/llôn te pollô=n

a)kêko/amen, kai\ au)toi\ polla/kis ei)rê/kamen.]

433 E. [Greek: ê( tou= oi)kei/ou te kai\ e(autou= e(/xis te kai\

pra=xis dikaiosu/nê a)\n o(mologoi=to.]]

[Footnote 100: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 B. [Greek: dokei= moi

to\ u(po/loipon e)n tê=| po/lei ô(=n e)ske/mmetha, sôphrosu/nês

kai\ a)ndrei/as kai\ phronê/seôs, tou=to ei)=nai o(\ pa=sin

e)kei/nois tê\n du/namin pa/reschen ô(/ste e)ggene/sthai, kai\

e)ggenome/nois ge sôtêri/an pare/chein, e(/ôs per a)\n e)nê=|.]]

[Footnote 101: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 D.]

[Side-note: Injustice arises when any one part of the city

interferes with the functions of the other part, or undertakes

double functions.]

As justice consists in each person doing his own work, and not

meddling with that of another--so injustice occurs, when a person

undertakes the work of another instead of his own, or in addition

to his own. The mischief is not great, when such interference

takes place only in the subordinate functions: when, for example,

the carpenter pretends to do the work of the shoemaker, or _vice

versâ_; or when either of them undertake both. But the mischief

becomes grave and deplorable, when a man from the subordinate

functions meddles with the higher--when a craftsman, availing

himself of some collateral support, wealth or party or strength,

thrusts himself into the functions of a soldier or auxiliary--or

when the Guardian, by similar artifice, usurps the functions of a

Chief--or when any one person combines these several functions all

at once in himself. Herein consists the true injustice, ruinous to

the city: when the line of demarcation is confounded between these

three classes--men of business, Guardians, Chiefs. That each of

these classes should do its own work, is Justice: that either of

them should meddle with the work of the rest, and especially that

the subordinate should meddle with the business of the superior,

is Injustice, with ruin following in its train.[102] It is from

these opposite characteristics that the titles Just or Unjust will

be rightfully bestowed upon our city.

[Footnote 102: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 434 B-C. [Greek: ê( triô=n

a)/ra o)/ntôn genô=n polupragmosu/nê kai\ metabolê\ ei)s a)/llêla,

megi/stê te bla/bê tê=| po/lei kai\ o)rtho/tat' a)\n

prosagoreu/oito ma/lista kakourgi/a . . . Kakourgi/an de\ tê\n

megi/stên tê=s e(autou= po/leôs ou)k a)diki/an phê/seis ei)=nai? . . .

chrêmatistikou=, e)pikourikou=, phulakikou=, ge/nous

oi)keiopragi/a, . . . dikaiosu/nê t' a)\n ei)/ê, kai\ tê\n po/lin

dikai/an pa/rechoi.]]

[Side-note: Analogy of the city to the individual--Each man

is tripartite, having in his mind Reason, Energy, Appetite. These

three elements are distinct, and often conflicting.]

We must now apply, as we undertook to do, the analogy of the city

to the individual. The just man, so far forth as justice is

concerned, cannot differ from the just city. He must therefore

have in his own individual mind three distinct parts, elements, or

classes, corresponding to the three classes above distinguished in

the city. But is it the fact that there are in each man three such

mental constituents--three different classes, sorts, or varieties,

of mind?

To settle this point as it ought to be settled, would require

a stricter investigation than our present dialogue will permit:

but we may contribute something towards it.[103] It is manifest

that there exist different individuals in whom reason, energy

(courage or passion), and appetite, are separately and unequally

developed: thus in the Thracians there is a predominance of energy

or courage--in the Phoenicians of appetite--in the Athenians, of

intellect or reason. The question is, whether we employ one and

the same mind for all the three--reason, energy, and appetite; or

whether we do not employ a different mind or portion of mind, when

we exercise reason--another, when we are under the influence of

energy--and a third, when we follow appetite.[104]

[Footnote 103: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 435 C.

Schleiermacher (in the Introduction to his translation of the

Republic, p. 71) considers that this passage of the Republic is

intended to note as a desideratum the exposition in the Timæus;

wherein the constituent elements of mind or soul are more fully

laid down, and its connection with the fundamental elements of the

Kosmos.]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 436 A.]

To determine this question, we must consider that the same thing

cannot at the same time do or suffer opposites, in the same

respect and with reference to the same thing. The same thing or

person cannot at the same time, and in the same respect, both

stand still and move. This may be laid down as an universal truth:

but since some may not admit it to be so, we will at any rate

assume it as an hypothesis.[105] Now in reference to the mind, we

experience at the same time various movements or affections

contrary to each other: assent and dissent--desire and aversion--the

attracting any thing to ourselves, and the repelling it from

ourselves: each of these is different from and contrary to the

other. As a specimen of desires, we will take thirst. When a man

is in this condition, his mind desires nothing else but to drink;

and strains entirely towards that object. If there be any thing

which drags back his mind when in this condition, it must be

something different from that which pulls him forward and attracts

him to drink. That which attracts him, and that which repels him,

cannot be the same: just as when the archer at the same time pulls

his bow towards him and pushes it away from him, it is one of his

hands that pulls and another that pushes.[106] Now it often

happens that a man athirst refuses to drink: there is something

within him that prompts him to drink, and something still more

powerful that forbids him. These two cannot be the same: one of

them is different from the other: that which prompts is appetite,

that which forbids is reason. The rational element of the mind is

in like manner something different or distinguishable from all the

appetites, which tend towards repletion and pleasure.

[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 437 A.]

[Footnote 106: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 A-B.]

[Side-note: Reason, Energy, Appetite, in the individual--analogous

to Rulers, Guardians, Craftsmen in the city. Reason is

to rule Appetite. Energy assists Reason in ruling it.]

Here then we have two distinct species, forms, or kinds, existing

in the mind.[107] Besides these two, however, there is a third,

distinct from both: Energy, Passion, Courage, which neither

belongs to Appetite nor to individual Reason. Each of these three

acts apart from, and sometimes in contrariety to, each of the

others.[108] There are thus three distinct elements or varieties

of mind in the individual--Reason, Energy, Appetite: corresponding

to the three constituent portions of the city--The Chiefs or

Rulers--The Guardians or Soldiers--The Craftsmen, or the remaining

Community.[109] The Wisdom of the city resides in its Elders: that

of the individual in his Reason. The Courage of the city resides

in its Guardians or Soldiers: that of the individual in his

Energy. But in the city as well as in the individual, it is the

right and privilege of the rational element to exercise command,

because it alone looks to the welfare and advantage of the whole

compound:[110] it is the duty of the two other elements--the

energetic and the appetitive--to obey. It is moreover the special

function of the Guardians in the city to second the Chiefs in

enforcing obedience upon the Craftsmen: so also in the individual,

it is the special function of Energy or Courage to second Reason

in controuling Appetite.

[Footnote 107: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 E. [Greek: Tau=ta me\n

toi/nun du/o ê(mi=n ô(ri/sthô ei)/dê e)n psuchê=| e)no/nta],

&c.]

[Footnote 108: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 440-441.]

[Footnote 109: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 C. [Greek: ta\ au)ta\

me\n e)n po/lei, ta\ au)ta\ d' e)n e(no\s e(ka/stou tê=| psuchê=|

ge/nê e)nei=nai, kai\ i)/sa to\n a)rithmo/n.] 443 D: [Greek: ta\

e)n tê=| psuchê=| ge/nê], &c.]

[Footnote 110: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 E, 442 C. [Greek:

tô=| me\n logistikô=| a)/rchein prosê/kei, sophô=| o)/nti kai\

e)/chonti tê\n u(pe\r a(pa/sês tê=s psuchê=s promê/theian . . . .

Sopho\n de/ ge (e(/na e(/kaston kalou=men) e)kei/nô| tô=| smikrô=|

me/rei, tô=| o(\ ê)=rche/ t' e)n au)tô=| kai\ tau=ta parê/ggellen,

e)/chon au)= ka)kei=no e)pistê/mên e)n au(tô=| tê\n tou=

xumphe/rontos e(ka/stô| te kai\ o(/lô| tô=| koinô=| sphô=n au)tô=n

triô=n o)/ntôn.]]

[Side-note: A man is just when these different parts of his

mind exercise their appropriate functions without hindrance.]

These special functions of the separate parts being laid down,

Justice as well as Temperance will appear analogous in the

individual and in the city. Both Justice and Temperance reside in

all the parts equally: not in one of them exclusively, as Wisdom

and Courage reside. Justice and Temperance belong to the

subordinate as well as to the dominant parts. Justice exists when

each of the parts performs its own function, without encroaching

on the function of the others: Temperance exists when all the

parts are of one opinion as to the title of the higher or rational

element to exercise command.[111]

[Footnote 111: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442 C, 443 B.]

A man as well as a city is just, when each of his three sorts or

varieties of mind confines itself to its own legitimate function:

when Reason reigns over and controuls the other two, and when

Energy seconds Reason in controuling Appetite. Such a man will not

commit fraud, theft, treachery, perjury, or any like

proceedings.[112] On the contrary, injustice exists when the parts

are in conflict with each other: when either of them encroaches on

the function of the other: or when those parts which ought to be

subordinate rise in insurrection against that which ought to be

superior.

[Footnote 112: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442-443.]

[Side-note: Justice and Injustice in the mind--what health

and disease are in the body.]

Justice is in the mind what health is in the body, when the parts

are so arranged as to controul and be controuled pursuant to the

dictates of nature. Injustice is in the mind what disease is in

the body, when the parts are so arranged as to controul and be

controuled contrary to the dictates of nature. Virtue is thus the

health, beauty, good condition of the mind: Vice is the disease,

ugliness, weakness, of the mind.[113]

[Footnote 113: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 444 B-C.]

[Side-note: Original question now resumed--Does Justice make

a man happy, and Injustice make him miserable, apart from all

consequences? Answer--Yes.]

Having thus ascertained the nature of justice and injustice, we

are now in a condition (continues Sokrates) to reply to the

question proposed for investigation--Is it profitable to a man to

be just and to do justice _per se_, even though he be not

known as just either by Gods or men, and may thus be debarred from

the consequences which would ensue if he were known? Or is it

profitable to him to be unjust, if he can contrive to escape

detection and punishment? We are enabled to answer the first

question in the affirmative, and the second question in the

negative. As health is the greatest good, and sickness the

greatest evil, of body: so Justice is the greatest good, and

injustice the greatest evil, of mind. No measure of luxury,

wealth, or power, could render life tolerable, if we lost our

bodily health: no amount of prosperity could make life tolerable,

without mental health or justice. As bodily health is good _per

se_, and sickness evil _per se_, even apart from its

consequences: so justice also is good in itself, and injustice

evil in itself, apart from its consequences.[114]

[Footnote 114: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 445 A.]

[Side-note: Glaukon requires farther explanation about the

condition of the Guardians, in regard to sexual and family ties.]

Sokrates now assumes the special question of the dialogue to be

answered, and the picture of the just or perfect city, as well as

of the just or perfect individual, to be completed. He is next

proceeding to set forth the contrasts to this picture--that is,

the varieties of injustice, or the various modes of depravation

and corruption--when he is arrested by Polemarchus and Adeimantus:

who call upon him to explain more at large the position of the

body of Guardians or Soldiers in the city, in regard to women,

children, and the family.[115]

[Footnote 115: Plato, Republic, v. p. 449 C.]

[Side-note: Men and women will live together and perform the

duties of Guardians alike--They will receive the same gymnastic

and musical training.]

In reply, Sokrates announces his intention to make such provision

as will exclude separate family ties, as well as separate

property, among these Guardians. The Guardians will consist both

of men and women. The women will receive the same training, both

musical and gymnastical, as the men.[116] They will take part both

in the bodily exercises of the palæstra, in the military drill,

and in the combats of war. Those who deride these naked exercises

as preposterous for the female sex, should be reminded (Sokrates

says) that not long ago it was considered unseemly among the

Greeks (as it still is among many of the _barbari_) for men

to expose their naked bodies in the palæstra: but such repugnance

has been overpowered by the marked usefulness of the practice: the

Kretans first setting the example, next the Lacedæmonians;

lastly all other Greeks doing the same.[117] We maintain the

principle which we laid down in the beginning, that one person

should perform only one duty--that for which he is best qualified.

But there is no one function, or class of functions, for which

women as such are peculiarly qualified, or peculiarly

disqualified. Between women generally, and men generally, in

reference to the discharge of duties, there is no other

difference, except that men are superior to women in every

thing:[118] the best women will be on a level only with the

second-best men, but they will be superior to all men lower than

the second best. But among women, as among men, there are great

individual differences: one woman is fit for one duty, another for

another: and in our city, each must be employed for the duty

suitable to her individual disposition. Those who are best

qualified by nature for the office of Guardians, must be allotted

to that office: they must discharge it along with the men, and

must be trained for it by the same education as the men, musical

and gymnastical.

[Footnote 116: Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 A.]

[Footnote 117: Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 D.]

[Footnote 118: Plato, Republic, v. p. 455 C-D.]

[Side-note: Nature does not prescribe any distribution of

functions between men and women. Women are inferior to men in

every thing. The best women are equal to second-best men.]

If an objector accuses us of proposing arrangements contrary to

nature, we not only deny the force of the objection, but we retort

the charge. We affirm that the arrangements now existing in

society, which restrict all women to a limited number of domestic

and family functions, are contrary to nature--and that ours are

founded upon the genuine and real dictates of nature.[119] The

only difference admissible between men and women, in the joint

discharge of the functions of Guardians, is, that the easier

portion of such functions must in general be assigned to women,

and the more difficult to men, in consequence of the inferiority

of the feminine nature.[120]

[Footnote 119: Plato, Republic, v. p. 456 C. [Greek: kata\ phu/sin

e)ti/themen to\n no/mon; a)lla\ ta\ nu=n para\ tau=ta gigno/mena

para\ phu/sin ma=llon, ô(s e)/oike, gi/gnetai.]]

[Footnote 120: Plato, Republic, v. p. 457 B.]

[Side-note: Community of life and relations between the male

and female Guardians. Temporary marriages arranged by contrivance

of the Elders. No separate families.]

These intermingled male and female Guardians, in the discharge of

their joint functions, will live together in common barracks and

at common mess-tables. There must be no separate houses or

separate family-relations between them. All are wives or

husbands of all: no youth must know his own father, no mature man

must know his own son: all the mature men and women are fathers or

mothers of all the younger: all of the same age are brothers and

sisters.[121] We do not intend, however, that the copulation

between them shall take place in a promiscuous and arbitrary

manner: we shall establish laws to regulate the intermarriages and

breeding.[122] We must copy the example of those who regulate the

copulation of horses, dogs, and other animals: we must bring

together those who will give existence to the best offspring.[123]

We must couple, as often as we can, the men who are best, with the

women who are best, both in mind and body; and the men who are

least good, with the women who are least good. We must bring up

the offspring of the former couples--we must refuse to bring up

the offspring of the latter.[124] And such results must be

accomplished by underhand arrangements of the Elder Chiefs; so as

to be unknown to every one else, in order to prevent discontent

and quarrel among the body of the Guardians. These Elders will

celebrate periodical festivals, in which they will bring together

the fitting brides and bridegrooms, under solemn hymns and

sacrifices. They must regulate the number of marriages in such

manner as to keep the total list of Guardians as much as possible

without increase as well as without diminution.[125] The Elders

must make an artful use of the lot, so that these couplings shall

appear to every one else the effect of chance. Distinguished

warriors must be rewarded with a larger licence of copulation with

different women, which will produce the farther advantage of

having as many children as possible born from their

procreation.[126] All the children as soon as born must be

consigned to the Chiefs or Elders, male and female, who will

conceal in some convenient manner those who are born either from

the worst couples or with any bodily imperfection: while they

place the offspring of the best couples in special outbuildings

under the charge of nurses. Those mothers who are full of milk

will be brought here to give suck, but every precaution will be

taken that none of them shall know her own child: wet-nurses will

also be provided in addition, to ensure a full supply: but all the

care of the children will devolve on the public nurses, not on the

mothers.[127]

[Footnote 121: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 457-458.]

[Footnote 122: Plato, Republic, v. p. 458 E.]

[Footnote 123: Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 A.]

[Footnote 124: Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 D-E. [Greek: dei= me\n

e)k tô=n ô(mologême/nôn tou\s a)ri/stous tai=s a)ri/stais

suggi/gnesthai ô(s pleista/kis, tou\s de\ phaulota/tous tai=s

phaulota/tais tou)nanti/on, kai\ tô=n me\n ta\ e)/kgona tre/phein,

tô=n de\ mê/, ei) me/llei to\ poi/mnion o(/, ti a)kro/taton

ei)=nai; kai\ tau=ta pa/nta gigno/mena lantha/nein plê\n au)tou\s

tou\s a)/rchontas, ei) au)= ê( a)ge/lê tô=n phula/kôn o(/, ti

ma/lista a)stasi/astos e)/stai.]]

[Footnote 125: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 A.]

[Footnote 126: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 B.]

[Footnote 127: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 C-D.]

[Side-note: Regulations about age, for procreation--Children

brought up under public authority.]

The age for such intermarriages, destined to be procreative for

the benefit of the city, must be from thirty to fifty-five, for

men--from twenty to forty, for women. No man or woman, above or

below these limits of age, will be allowed to meddle with the

function of intermarriage and procreation for the public; which

function must always be conducted under superintendence of the

authorities, with proper sacrifice and prayers to the Gods. Nor

will any man, even within the licensed age, be allowed to approach

any woman except by assignment from the authorities. If any

infringement of this law should occur, the offspring arising from

it will be pronounced spurious and outcast.[128] But when the

above limits of age are passed, both men and women may have

intercourse with whomsoever they please, except fathers with

daughters or sons with mothers: under condition, however, that no

offspring shall be born from such intercourse, or that if any

offspring be born, it shall be exposed.[129]

[Footnote 128: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 A-B.]

[Footnote 129: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 C.]

How is the father to know his own daughter (it is asked), or the

son his own mother? They cannot know (replies Sokrates): but each

couple will consider every child born in the seventh month or

tenth month after their marriage, as their child, and will address

him or her by the appellation of son or daughter. The fathers and

mothers will be fathers and mothers of all the children born at

that time: the sons and daughters will be in filial relation to

all the couples brought together at the given antecedent

period.[130]

[Footnote 130: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 D.]

[Side-note: Perfect communion of sentiment and interest

among the Guardians--Causes of pleasure and pain the same to all,

like parts of the same organism.]

The main purpose of such regulations, in respect to family as in

respect to property, is to establish the fullest communion between

all the Guardians, male and female--and to eliminate as much

as possible the feeling of separate interest in any fraction of

them. The greatest evil to any city is, that which pulls it to

pieces and makes it many instead of one: the greatest good to it

is that which binds it together and makes it one. Now what is most

efficacious in binding it together, is, community of the causes of

pleasure and pain: when each individual feels pleasure from the

same causes and on the same occasions as all the rest, and pain in

like manner. On the other hand, when the causes of pleasure and

pain are distinct, this tends to dissolution; and becomes fatal if

the opposition is marked, so that some individuals are much

delighted, and others much distressed, under the same

circumstances. That city is the best arranged, wherein all the

citizens pronounce the words _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, with

reference to the same things: when they coalesce into an unity

like the organism of a single individual. To him a blow in the

finger is a blow to the whole man: so also in the city, pleasure

or pain to any one citizen ought to communicate itself by sympathy

as pleasure and pain to all.[131]

[Footnote 131: Plato, Republic, v. p. 462 D.]

[Side-note: Harmony--absence of conflicting interest--assured

scale of equal comfort--consequent happiness--among the

Guardians.]

Now the Guardians under our regulations will present as much as

possible this community of _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, as

well as of pleasures and pains--and this exclusion of the separate

individual _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, as well as of separate

pleasures and pains. No individual among them will have either

separate property or separate family relationship: each will have

both one and the other in common with the rest.[132] No one will

have property of his own to be increased, nor a family of his own

to be benefited, apart from the rest: all will be as much as

possible common recipients of pleasure and pain.[133] All the

ordinary causes of dispute and litigation will thus be excluded.

If two Guardians of the same age happen to quarrel, they must

fight it out: this will discharge their wrath and prevent worse

consequences--while at the same time it will encourage attention

to gymnastic excellence.[134] But no younger Guardian will

raise his hand against an older Guardian, whom he is taught to

reverence as his father, and whom every one else would protect if

attacked. If the Guardians maintain harmony among themselves, they

will easily ensure it among the remaining inhabitants. Assured of

sufficient but modest comforts, the Guardians will be relieved

from all struggles for the maintenance of a family, from the arts

of trade, and from subservience to the rich.[135] They will escape

all these troubles, and will live a life happier than the envied

Olympic victor: for they will gain the victory in an enterprise

more illustrious than he undertakes, and they will receive from

their fellow-citizens fuller maintenance and higher privilege than

what is awarded to him, as well as honours after death.[136] Their

lives are not to be put in comparison with those of the farmer or

the shoemaker. They must not indeed aspire to any happiness

incompatible with their condition and duty as Guardians. But that

condition will itself involve the highest happiness. And if any

silly ambition prompts them to depart from it, they will assuredly

change for the worse.[137]

[Footnote 132: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 B.]

[Footnote 133: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 D. [Greek: pa/ntas ei)s

to\ dunato\n o(mopathei=s lu/pês te kai\ ê(donê=s ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 134: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 E.]

[Footnote 135: Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 C. [Greek: tô=n kakô=n . . .

ô(=n a)pêllagme/noi a)\n ei)=en, kolakei/as te plousi/ôn

pe/nêtes a)pori/as te kai\ a)lgêdo/nas], &c.]

[Footnote 136: Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 D. [Greek: Pa/ntôn te

dê\ tou/tôn a)palla/xontai, zê/sousi/ te tou= makaristou= bi/ou,

o(\n oi( O)lumpioni=kai zô=si, makariô/teron.]]

[Footnote 137: Plato, Republic, v. p. 466 A-C.]

[Side-note: In case of war both sexes will go together to

battle--Rewards to distinguished warriors.]

Such is the communion of sexes which must be kept up for the

duties of Guardians, and for the exigencies of military defence.

As in other races of animals, males and females must go out to

fight, and each will inspire the other with bravery. The children

must be taken out on horseback to see the encounters from a

distance, so that they may be kept clear of danger, yet may

nevertheless be gradually accustomed to the sight of it.[138] If

any one runs away from the field, he must be degraded from the

rank of Guardian to that of husbandman or craftsman. If any man

suffers himself to be taken prisoner, he is no loss: the enemy may

do what they choose with him. When any one distinguishes himself

in battle, he shall be received on his return by garlands and by

an affectionate welcome from the youth.[139] Should he be slain

in battle, he shall be recognised as having become a Dæmon or

Demigod (according to the Hesiodic doctrine), and his sepulchre

shall be honoured by appropriate solemnities.[140]

[Footnote 138: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 466-467.]

[Footnote 139: Plato, Republic, v. p. 468 B.]

[Footnote 140: Plato, Republic, v. p. 469 B.]

[Side-note: War against Hellenic enemies to be carried on

mildly--Hellens are all by nature kinsmen.]

In carrying on war, our Guardians will observe a marked difference

in their manner of treating Hellenic enemies and barbaric enemies.

They will never enslave any Hellenic city, nor hold any Hellenic

person in slavery. They will never even strip the body of an

Hellenic enemy, except so far as to take his arms. They will never

pile up in their temples the arms, nor burn the houses and lands,

of Hellenic enemies. They will always keep in mind the members of

the Hellenic race as naturally kindred with each other, and bound

to aid each other in mutual defence, against Barbaric aliens who

are the natural enemies of all of them.[141] They will not think

themselves authorised to carry on war as Hellens now do against

each other, except when their enemies are Barbaric.

[Footnote 141: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 470-471.]

Enough of this, Sokrates, replies Glaukon. I admit that your city

will have all the excellencies and advantages of which you boast.

But you have yet to show me that it is practicable, and how.[142]

[Footnote 142: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 471-472.]

[Side-note: Question--How is the scheme practicable? It is

difficult, yet practicable on one condition--That philosophy and

political power should come into the same hands.]

The task which you impose (says Sokrates) is one of great

difficulty: even if you grant me, what must be granted, that every

reality must fall short of its ideal type.[143] One condition, and

one only, is essential to render it practicable: a condition which

you may ridicule as preposterous, but which, though not probable,

is certainly supposable. Either philosophers must acquire the

ruling power, or else the present rulers of mankind must

themselves become genuine philosophers. In one or other of these

two ways philosophy and political power must come into the into

the same hands. Unless such condition be fulfilled, our city can

never be made a reality, nor can there ever be any respite of

suffering to the human race.[144]

[Footnote 143: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 472-473.]

[Footnote 144: Plato, Republic, v. p. 473 D.]

The supremacy which you claim for philosophers (replies

Glaukon), will be listened to with repugnance and scorn. But

at least you must show who the philosophers are, on whose behalf

you invoke such supremacy. You must show that it belongs to them

by nature both to pursue philosophy, and to rule in the various

cities: and that by nature also, other men ought to obey them as

well as to abstain from philosophy.[145]

[Footnote 145: Plato, Republic, v. p. 474 A-B.]

[Side-note: Characteristic marks of the philosopher--He

contemplates and knows Entia or unchangeable Forms, as

distinguished from fluctuating particulars or Fientia.]

The first requisite for a philosopher (replies Sokrates) is, that

he shall love and pursue eagerly every sort of knowledge or

wisdom, without shrinking from labour for such purpose. But it is

not sufficient that he should be eager about hearing tragedies or

learning the minor arts. Other men, accomplished and curious, are

fond of hearing beautiful sounds and discourses, or of seeing

beautiful forms and colours. But the philosopher alone can see or

distinguish truth.[146] It is only he who can distinguish the

genuine Form or Idea, in which truth consists, from the particular

embodiments in which it occurs. These Forms or Ideas exist,

eternal and unchangeable. Since Pulchrum is the opposite of Turpe,

they must be two, and each of them must be One: the same about

Just and Unjust, Good and Evil; each of these is a distinct Form

or Idea, existing as One and Unchangeable by itself, but

exhibiting itself in appearance as manifold, diverse, and

frequently changing, through communion with different objects and

events, and through communion of each Form with others.[147] Now

the accomplished, but unphilosophical, man cannot see or recognise

this Form in itself. He can see only the different particular

cases and complications in which it appears embodied.[148] None

but the philosopher can contemplate each Form by itself, and

discriminate it from the various particulars in conjunction with

which it appears. Such philosophers are few in number, but they

are the only persons who can be said truly to live. Ordinary and

even accomplished men--who recognise beautiful things, but

cannot recognise Beauty in itself, nor even follow an instructor

who points it out to them--pass their lives in a sort of dream or

reverie: for the dreamer, whether asleep or awake, is one who

believes what is similar to another thing to be not merely

similar, but to be the actual thing itself.[149] The philosopher

alone, who embraces in his mind the one and unchangeable Form or

Idea, along with, yet distinguished from, its particular

embodiments, possesses knowledge or science. The unphilosophical

man, whose mind embraces nothing higher than variable particulars,

does not know--but only opines, or has opinions.[150]

[Footnote 146: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 474-475. [Greek: tou\s tê=s

a)lêthei/as philothea/monas] (p. 475 E).]

[Footnote 147: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 A. [Greek: E)peidê/

e)stin e)nanti/on kalo\n ai)schrô=|, du/o au)tô\ ei)=nai . . .

Ou)kou=n e)peidê\ du/o, kai\ e(\n e)ka/teron? . . . Kai\ peri\

dikai/ou kai\ a)di/kou kai\ a)gathou= kai\ kakou= kai\ pa/ntôn

tô=n ei)dô=n pe/ri, o( au)to\s lo/gos, au)to\ me\n e(\n e(/kaston

ei)=nai, tê=| de\ tô=n pra/xeôn kai\ sôma/tôn kai\ a)llê/lôn

koinôni/a| pantachou= phantazo/mena polla\ phai/nesthai

e(/kaston?]]

[Footnote 148: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]

[Footnote 149: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]

[Footnote 150: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n

tou/tou me\n tê\n dia/noian ô(s gignô/skontos _gnô/mên_ a)\n

o)rthô=s phai=men ei)=nai, tou= de\ _do/xan_, ô(s

doxa/zontos.]]

[Side-note: Ens alone can be known--Non-Ens is unknowable.

That which is midway between Ens and Non-Ens (particulars) is

matter only of opinion. Ordinary men attain nothing beyond

opinion.]

This latter, the unphilosophical man, will not admit what we say.

Accordingly, we must prove it to him. You cannot know without

knowing Something: that is, Some Ens: for Non-Ens cannot be known.

That which is completely and absolutely Ens, is completely and

absolutely cognizable: that which is Non-Ens and nowhere, is in

every way uncognizable. If then there be anything which is at once

Ens and Non-Ens, it will lie midway between these two: it will be

something neither absolutely and completely cognizable, nor

absolutely and completely uncognizable: it belongs to something

between ignorance and science. Now science or knowledge is one

thing, its object is, complete Ens. Opinion is another thing, its

object also is different. Knowing and Opining belong, like Sight

and Hearing, to the class of Entia called Powers or Faculties,

which we and others possess, and by means of which--that is, by

means of one or other of them--we accomplish everything that we do

accomplish. Now no one of these powers or faculties has either

colour or figure, whereby it may be recognised or distinguished

from others. Each is known and distinguished, not by what it is in

itself, but by what it accomplishes, and by the object to which it

has special relation. That which has the same object and

accomplishes the same result, I call the same power or faculty:

that which has a different object, and accomplishes a different

result, I call a different power or faculty. Now Knowing,

Cognition, Science, is one of our faculties or powers, and the

strongest of all: Opining is another, and a different one. A

marked distinction between the two is, that Knowing or Cognition

is infallible--Opining is fallible. Since Cognition is one power

or faculty, and Opining another--the object of one must be

different from the object of the other. But the object of

Cognition is, the Complete Ens: the object of Opining must

therefore be, not the Complete Ens, but something different from

it. What then is the object of Opining? It is not Complete Ens,

but it is still Something. It is not Non-Ens, or Nothing; for

Non-Ens or Nothing is not thinkable or opinable: you cannot think

or opine, and yet think or opine nothing. Whoever opines or thinks,

must opine or think something. Ens is the object of Cognition,

Non-Ens is the object of non-Cognition or Ignorance: Opination or

Opinion is midway between Cognition and Ignorance, darker than the

former, but clearer than the latter. The object of opination is

therefore something midway between Ens and Non-Ens.

[Side-note: Particulars fluctuate: they are sometimes just

or beautiful, sometimes unjust or ugly. Forms or Entia alone

remain constant.]

But what is this Something, midway between Ens and Particulars

Non-Ens, and partaking of both--which is the object of Opination?

To make out this, we must revert to the case of the

unphilosophical man. We have described him, as not believing in

the existence of the Form or Idea of Beauty, or Justice _per

se_; not enduring to hear it spoken of as a real Ens and Unum;

not knowing anything except of the many diverse particulars,

beautiful and just. We must remind him that every one of these

particular beautiful things will appear repulsive also: every one

of these just and holy particulars, will appear unjust and unholy

also. He cannot refuse to admit that each of them will appear

under certain circumstances beautiful and ugly, just and unjust,

holy and unholy. In like manner, every particular double will

appear also a half: every light thing will appear heavy: every

little thing great. Of each among these many particulars, if you

can truly predicate any one quality about it, you may with equal

truth predicate the opposite quality also. Each of them both is,

and is not, the substratum of all these different and opposite

qualities. You cannot pronounce them to be either one or the

other, with fixity and permanence: they are at once both and

neither.

[Side-note: The many cannot discern or admit the reality of

Forms--Their minds are always fluctuating among particulars.]

Here then we find the appropriate object of Opination: that which

is neither Ens nor Non-Ens, but something between both.

Particulars are the object of Opination, as distinguished from

universal Entities, Forms, or Ideas, which are the object of

Cognition. The many, who disbelieve or ignore the existence of

these Forms, and whose minds dwell exclusively among

particulars--cannot know, but only opine. Their usages and creeds,

as to beautiful, just, honourable, float between positive Ens and

Non-Ens. It is these intermediate fluctuations which are caught up by

their opining faculty, intermediate as it is between Cognition and

Ignorance. It is these also, the objects of Opination, which they

love and delight in: they neither recognise nor love the objects

of Cognition or Knowledge. They are lovers of opinion and its

objects, not lovers of Knowledge. The philosopher alone recognises

and loves Knowledge and the objects of Knowledge. His mind dwells,

not amidst the fluctuating, diverse, and numerous particulars, but

in contemplation of the One, Universal, permanent, unchangeable,

Form or Idea.

[Side-note: The philosopher will be ardent for all varieties

of knowledge--His excellent moral attributes--He will be trained

to capacity for active life.]

Here is the characteristic difference (continues Sokrates) which

you required me to point out, between the philosopher and the

unphilosophical man, however accomplished. The philosopher sees,

knows, and contemplates, the One, Real, unchangeable, Form or

Idea: the unphilosophical man knows nothing of this Form _per

se_, and sees only its multifarious manifestations, each

perpetually variable and different from all the rest. The

philosopher, having present to his mind this type--and

approximating to it, as far as may be, the real institutions and

practices--will be the person most competent to rule our city:

especially as his education will give him farthermore--besides

such familiarity with the Form or Type--as large a measure of

experience, and as much virtue, as can fall to the lot of the

unphilosophical man.[151] The nature and disposition of the

true philosopher, if improved by education, will include all the

virtue and competence of the practical man. The philosopher is

bent on learning everything which can make him familiar with

Universal Forms and Essences in their pure state, not floating

amidst the confusion of generated and destroyed realities: and

with Forms and Essences little as well as great, mean as well as

sublime.[152] Devoted to knowledge and truth--hating falsehood--he

has little room in his mind for the ordinary desires: he is

temperate, indifferent to money, free from all meanness or

shabbiness. A man like him, whose contemplations stretch over all

time and all essence, thinks human life a small affair, and has no

fear of death. He will be just, mild in his demeanour, quick in

apprehension, retentive in memory, elegant in his tastes and

movements. All these excellences will be united in the

philosophers to whom we confide the rule of our city.[153]

[Footnote 151: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 484.]

[Footnote 152: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 485 A.]

[Footnote 153: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 485-486.]

[Side-note: Adeimantus does not dispute the conclusion, but

remarks that it is at variance with actual facts--Existing

philosophers are either worthless pretenders, or when they are

good, useless.]

It is impossible, Sokrates (remarks Adeimantus), to answer in the

negative to your questions. Nevertheless we who hear and answer,

are not convinced of the truth of your conclusion. Unskilled as we

are in the interrogatory process, we feel ourselves led astray

little by little at each successive question; until at length,

through the accumulated effect of such small deviations, we are

driven up into a corner without the power of moving, like a bad

player at draughts defeated by one superior to himself.[154] Here

in this particular case your conclusion has been reached by steps

to which we cannot refuse assent. Yet if we look at the facts, we

see something quite the reverse as to the actual position of

philosophers. Those who study philosophy, not simply as a branch

of juvenile education but as a continued occupation throughout

life, are in most cases strange creatures, not to say thoroughly

unprincipled: while the few of them who are most reasonable,

derive nothing from this pursuit which you so much extol, except

that they become useless in their respective cities.[155]

[Footnote 154: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 B. [Greek: Pro\s me\n

tau=ta soi ou)dei\s a)\n oi(=o/s t' ei)/ê a)nteipei=n; a)lla\ ga\r

toio/nde ti pa/schousin oi( a)kou/ontes e(ka/stote a)\ nu=n

le/geis; ê(gou=ntai di' a)peiri/an tou= e)rôta=|n te kai\

a)pokri/nesthai u(po\ tou= lo/gou par' e(/kaston to\ e)rô/têma

smikro\n parago/menoi, a)throisthe/ntôn tô=n smikrô=n e)pi\

teleutê=s tô=n lo/gôn, me/ga to\ spha/lma kai\ e)nanti/on toi=s

prô/tois a)naphai/nesthai], &c.

This is an interesting remark on the effect produced upon many

hearers by the Sokratic and Platonic dialogues,--puzzling,

silencing, and ultimately stimulating the mind, but not satisfying

or convincing, rather raising suspicions as to the trustworthiness

of the process, which suspicions have to be turned over and

scrutinised by subsequent meditation.]

[Footnote 155: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 D.]

[Side-note: Sokrates admits the fact to be so--His simile of

the able steersman on shipboard, among a disobedient crew.]

Yes (replies Sokrates), your picture is a correct one. The

position of true and reasonable philosophers, in their respective

cities, is difficult and uncomfortable. Conceive a ship on her

voyage, under the management of a steersman distinguished for

force of body as well as for skill in his craft, but not clever in

dealing with, or acting upon other men. Conceive the seamen all

quarrelling with each other to get possession of the rudder; each

man thinking himself qualified to steer, though he has never

learnt it--nor had any master in it--nor even believes it to be

teachable, but is ready to massacre all who affirm that it is

teachable.[156] Imagine, besides, these seamen importuning the

qualified steersman to commit the rudder to them, each being ready

to expel or kill any others whom he may prefer to them: and at

last proceeding to stupify with wine or drugs the qualified

steersman, and then to navigate the vessel themselves according to

their own views; feasting plentifully on the stores. These men

know nothing of what constitutes true and able steersmanship. They

extol, as a perfect steersman, that leader who is most

efficacious, either by persuasion or force, in seizing the rudder

for them to manage: they despise as useless any one who does not

possess this talent. They never reflect that the genuine steersman

has enough to do in surmounting the dangers of his own especial

art, and in watching the stars and the winds: and that if he is to

acquire technical skill and practice adequate to such a purpose,

he cannot at the same time possess skill and practice in keeping

his hold of the rudder whether the crew are pleased with him or

not. Such being the condition of the ship and the crew, you see

plainly that they will despise and set aside the true steersman as

an useless proser and star-gazer.[157]

[Footnote 156: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488.]

[Footnote 157: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488 D-E.]

[Side-note: The uselessness of the true philosopher is

the fault of the citizen, who will not invoke his guidance.]

Now the crew of this ship represent the citizens and leaders of

our actual cities: the steersman represents the true philosopher.

He is, and must be, useless in the ship: but his uselessness is

the fault of the crew and not his own. It is not for the true

steersman to entreat permission from the seamen, that they will

allow him to command; nor for the wise man to solicit employment

at the doors of the rich. It is for the sick man, whether he be

poor or rich, to ask for the aid of the physician; and for every

one who needs to be commanded, to invoke the authority of the

person qualified to command. No man really qualified will submit

to ask command as a favour.[158]

[Footnote 158: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 B. [Greek: tê=s me/ntoi

a)chrêsti/as tou\s mê\ chrôme/nous ke/leue ai)tia=sthai, a)lla\

mê\ tou\s e)pieikei=s. Ou) ga\r e)/chei phu/sin kubernê/tên

nautô=n dei=sthai a)/rchesthai u(ph' au(tou=], &c.]

Thus, Adeimantus (continues Sokrates), I have dealt with the first

part of your remark, that the true philosopher is an useless man

in cities as now constituted: I have shown you this is not his

fault--that it could not be otherwise,--and that a man even of the

highest aptitude, cannot enjoy reputation among those whose turn

of mind is altogether at variance with his own.[159]

[Footnote 159: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 D. [Greek: e)/k te

toi/nun tou/tôn kai\ e)n tou/tois ou) r(a/|dion eu)dokimei=n to\

be/ltiston e)pitê/deuma u(po\ tô=n ta)nanti/a e)pitêdeuo/ntôn.]]

I shall now deal with your second observation--That while even the

best philosophers are useless, the majority of those who cultivate

philosophy are worthless men, who bring upon her merited

discredit. I admit that this also is correct; but I shall prove

that philosophy is not to be blamed for it.[160]

[Footnote 160: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 E. [Greek: o(/ti ou)de\

tou/tou philosophi/a ai)ti/a, peirathô=men dei=xai.]]

[Side-note: The great qualities required to form a

philosopher, become sources of perversion, under a misguiding

public opinion.]

You will remember the great combination of excellent dispositions,

intellectual as well as moral, which I laid down as indispensable

to form the fundamental character of the true philosopher. Such a

combination is always rare. Even under the best circumstances

philosophers must be very few. But these few stand exposed, in our

existing cities, to such powerful causes of corruption, that they

are prevented from reaching maturity, except by some happy

accident. First, each one of those very qualities, which, when

combined, constitute the true philosopher,--serves as a cause

of corruption, if it exists by itself and apart from the rest.

Next, what are called good things, or external advantages, act in

the same manner--such as beauty, strength, wealth, powerful

connections, &c. Again, the stronger a man's natural aptitudes

and the greater his external advantages,--the better will he

become under favourable circumstances, the worse will he become,

if circumstances are unfavourable. Heinous iniquity always springs

from a powerful nature perverted by bad training: not from a

feeble nature, which will produce no great effects either for good

or evil. Thus the eminent predispositions,--which, if properly

improved, would raise a man to the highest rank in virtue,--will,

if planted in an unfavourable soil, produce a master-mind in deeds

of iniquity, unless counteracted by some providential

interposition.

[Side-note: Mistake of supposing that such perversion arises

from the Sophists. Irresistible effect of the public opinion

generally, in tempting or forcing a dissenter into orthodoxy.]

The multitude treat these latter as men corrupted by the Sophists.

But this is a mistake. Neither Sophists nor other private

individuals produce mischief worth mentioning. It is the multitude

themselves, utterers of these complaints, who are the most active

Sophists and teachers: it is they who educate and mould every

individual, man and woman, young and old, into such a character as

they please.[161] When they are assembled in the public assembly

or the dikastery, in the theatre or the camp--when they praise

some things and blame others, with vociferation and vehemence

echoed from the rocks around--how irresistible will be the

impression produced upon the mind of a youth who hears them! No

private training which he may have previously received can hold

out against it. All will be washed away by this impetuous current

of multitudinous praise or blame, which carries him along with it.

He will declare honourable or base the same things as they declare

to be so: he will adopt the character, and follow the pursuits,

which they enjoin. Moreover, if he resists such persuasive

influence, these multitudinous teachers and Sophists have

stronger pressure in store for him.[162] They punish the

disobedient with disgrace, fine, and even death. What other

Sophist, or what private exhortation, can contend successfully

against teachers such as these? Surely none. The attempt to do so

is insane. There neither is, nor has been, nor will be, any

individual human disposition educated to virtue in opposition to

the training of the multitude:[163] I say _human_, as

distinguished from _divine_, of which I make exception: for

in the existing state of society, any individual who is preserved

from these ascendant influences to acquire philosophical

excellence, owes his preservation to the divine favour.

[Footnote 161: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 A. [Greek: ê)\ kai\ su\

ê(gei=, ô(/sper oi( polloi/, diaphtheirome/nous tina\s ei)=nai

u(po\ sophistô=n ne/ous, diaphthei/rontas de/ tinas sophista\s

i)diôtikou/s, o(/, ti kai\ a)/xion lo/gon, a)ll' ou)k au)tou\s

tou\s tau=ta le/gontas megi/stous me\n ei)=nai sophista/s?

paideu/ein de\ teleô/tata kai\ a)perga/zesthai oi(/ous bou/lontai

ei)=nai kai\ ne/ous kai\ presbute/rous kai\ a)/ndras kai\

gunai=kas?]]

[Footnote 162: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 C-D. [Greek: Kai\

phê/sein te ta\ au)ta\ tou/tois kala\ kai\ ai)schra\ ei)=nai, kai\

e)pitêdeu/sein a(/per a)\n ou(=toi, kai\ e)/sesthai toiou=ton . . .

Kai\ mê\n ou(/pô tê\n megi/stên a)na/gkên ei)rê/kamen. Poi/an?

E(\n e)/rgô| prostithe/asi, lo/gô| mê\ pei/thontes, ou(=toi oi(

paideutai/ te kai\ sophistai/. Ê)\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti to\n mê\

peitho/menon a)timi/ais te kai\ chrê/masi kai\ thana/tois

kola/zousin? Kai\ ma/la, e)/phê, spho/dra.]]

[Footnote 163: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 D.]

[Side-note: The Sophists and other private teachers accept

the prevalent orthodoxy, and conform their teaching to it.]

Moreover, though the multitude complain of these professional

teachers as rivals, and decry them as Sophists--yet we must

recollect that such teachers inculcate only the opinions received

among the multitude themselves, and extol these same opinions as

wisdom.[164] The teachers know nothing of what is really

honourable and base,--good and evil,--just and unjust. They

distribute all these names only with reference to the opinions of

the multitude:--pronouncing those things which please the

multitude to be good, and those which displease to be

evil,--without furnishing any other rational account. They call

things necessary by the name of just and honourable; not knowing

the material difference between what is good and what is necessary,

nor being able to point out that difference to others. Thus

preposterous are the teachers, who count it wisdom to suit the

taste and feelings of the multitude, whether in painting or in

music or in social affairs. For whoever lives among them, publicly

exhibiting either poetry or other performances private or

official, thus making the multitude his masters beyond the strict

limits of necessity--the consequence is infallible, that he must

adapt his works to that which they praise. But whether the works

which he executes are really good and honourable, he will be

unable to render any tolerable account.[165]

[Footnote 164: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 A. [Greek: e(/kaston

tô=n mistharnou/ntôn i)diôtô=n, ou(\s dê\ ou(=toi sophista\s

kalou=si kai\ a)ntite/chnous ê(gou=ntai, mê\ a)/lla paideu/ein ê)\

tau=ta ta\ tô=n pollô=n do/gmata, a(\ doxa/zousin o(/tan

a)throisthô=si, kai\ sophi/an tau/tên kalei=n.]]

[Footnote 165: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 C-D.]

[Side-note: The people generally hate philosophy--A youth

who aspires to it will be hated by the people, and persecuted even

by his own relatives.]

It is therefore the multitude, or the general voice of society--not

the Sophists or private teachers, mere echoes of that general

voice--which works upon and moulds individuals. Now the multitude

cannot tolerate or believe in the existence of those Universals or

Forms which the philosopher contemplates. They know only the many

particulars, not the One Universal. Incapable of becoming

philosophers themselves, they look upon the philosopher with

hatred: and this sentiment is adopted by all those so-called

philosophers who seek to please them.[166] Under these

circumstances, what chance is there that those eminent

predispositions, which we pointed out as the foundation of the

future philosopher, can ever be matured to their proper result? A

youth of such promise, especially if his body be on a par with his

mind, will be at once foremost among all his fellows. His

relatives and fellow-citizens, eager to make use of him for their

own purposes, and anxious to appropriate to themselves his growing

force, will besiege him betimes with solicitations and

flatteries.[167] Under these influences, if we assume him to be

rich, well born, and in a powerful city, he will naturally become

intoxicated with unlimited hopes and ambition; fancying himself

competent to manage the affairs of all governments, and giving

himself the empty airs of a lofty potentate.[168] If there be any

one to give him a quiet hint that he has not yet acquired

intelligence, nor can acquire it without labour--he will turn a

deaf ear. But suppose that such advice should by chance prevail,

in one out of many cases, so that the youth alters his tendencies

and devotes himself to philosophy--what will be the conduct of

those who see, that they will thereby be deprived of his

usefulness and party-service, towards their own views? They will

leave no means untried to prevent him from following the

advice, and even to ruin the adviser, by private conspiracy and

judicial prosecution.[169] It is impossible that the young man can

really turn to philosophy, against obstructions thus powerful. You

see that those very excellences and advantages, which form the

initial point of the growing philosopher, become means and

temptations for corrupting him. The best natures, rare as they

always are, become thus not only ruined, but turned into

instruments of evil. For the same men (as I have already said)

who, under favourable training, would have done the greatest good,

become perpetrators of the greatest evil, if they are badly

placed. Small men will do nothing important, either in the one way

or the other.[170]

[Footnote 166: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 A. [Greek: philo/sophon

me\n a)/ra plê=thos a)du/naton ei)=nai . . . Kai\ tou\s

philsophou=ntas a)/ra a)na/gkê pse/gesthai u(p' au)tô=n . . . kai\

u(po\ tou/tôn dê\ tô=n i)diôtô=n, o(/soi prosomilou=ntes o)/chlô|

a)re/skein au)tô=| e)pithumou=sin.]]

[Footnote 167: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 B.]

[Footnote 168: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 C. [Greek:

plêrôthê/sesthai a)mêcha/nou e)lpi/dos, ê(gou/menon kai\ ta\ tô=n

E(llê/nôn kai\ ta\ tô=n barba/rôn i(kano\n ei)=nai pra/ttein.]]

[Footnote 169: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 D-E. [Greek: e)a\n d'

ou)=n, dia\ to\ eu)= pephuke/nai kai\ to\ xuggene\s tô=n lo/gôn,

ei)=s ai)stha/nêtai/ te/ pê| kai\ ka/mptêtai kai\ e(/lkêtai pro\s

philosophi/an, ti/ oi)o/metha dra/sein e)kei/nous tou\s

ê(goume/nous a)pollu/nai au)tou= tê\n chrei/an te kai\

e(tairei/an? ou) pa=n me\n e)/rgon, pa=n d' e)/pos, le/gonta/s te

kai\ pra/ttontas kai\ peri\ au)to/n, o(/pôs a)\n mê\ peisthê=|,

kai\ peri\ to\n pei/thonta, o(/pôs a)\n mê\ oi(=o/s t' ê)=|, kai\

i)di/a| e)pibouleu/ontas kai\ dêmosi/a| ei)s a)gô=nas

kathi/stantas?]]

[Footnote 170: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 A-B.]

[Side-note: The really great minds are thus driven away from

the path of philosophy--which is left to empty pretenders.]

It is thus that the path of philosophy is deserted by those who

ought to have trodden it, and who pervert their exalted powers to

unworthy objects. That path--being left vacant, yet still full of

imposing titles and pretensions, and carrying a show of superior

dignity as compared with the vulgar professions--becomes invaded

by interlopers of inferior worth and ability, who quit their own

small craft, and set up as philosophers.[171] Such men, poorly

endowed by nature, and debased by habits of trade, exhibit

themselves, in their self-assumed exaltation as philosophers, like

a slave recently manumitted, who has put on new clothes and

married his master's daughter.[172] Having intruded themselves

into a career for which they are unfit, they cannot produce any

grand or genuine philosophical thoughts, or any thing better than

mere neat sophisms, pleasing to the ear.[173] Through them arises

the discredit which is now attached to philosophers.

[Footnote 171: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 C-D. [Greek:

kathorô=ntes ga\r a)/lloi a)nthrôpi/skoi kenê\n tê\n chô/ran

tau/tên gignome/nên, kalô=n de\ o)noma/tôn kai\ proschêma/tôn

mestê/n, ô(/sper oi( e)k tô=n ei)rgmô=n ei)s ta\ i(era\

a)podidra/skontes, a)/smenoi kai\ ou(=toi e)k tô=n technô=n

e)kpêdô=sin ei)s tê\n philosophi/an.]]

[Footnote 172: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 E.]

[Footnote 173: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 A.]

[Side-note: Rare cases in which a highly qualified

philosopher remains--Being at variance with public opinion, he can

achieve nothing, and is lucky if he can obtain safety by silence.]

Amidst such general degradation of philosophy, some few and

rare cases are left, in which the pre-eminent natures qualified

for philosophy remain by some favourable accident uncorrupted. One

of these is Theagês, who would have been long ago drawn away from

philosophy to active politics, had he not been disqualified by bad

health. The restraining Dæmon, peculiar to myself (says Sokrates),

is another case.[174] Such an exceptional man, having once tasted

the sweetness and happiness of philosophy, embraces it as an

exclusive profession. He sees that the mass of society are

wrongheaded--that scarce any one takes wholesome views on social

matters--that he can find no partisans to aid him in upholding

justice[175]--that while he will not take part in injustice, he is

too weak to contend single-handed against the violence of all, and

would only become a victim to it without doing any good either to

the city or to his friends--like a man who has fallen among wild

beasts. On these grounds he stands aloof in his own separate

pursuit, like one sheltering himself under a wall against a

hurricane of wind and dust. Witnessing the injustice committed by

all around, he is content if he can keep himself clear and pure

from it during his life here, so as to die with satisfaction and

good hopes.

[Footnote 174: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 D.]

[Footnote 175: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 C-D. [Greek: kai\

tou/tôn dê\ tô=n o)li/gôn oi( geuo/menoi kai\ geusa/menoi ô(s

ê(du\ kai\ maka/rion to\ ktê=ma, kai\ tô=n pollô=n au)= i(kanô=s

i)do/ntes tê\n mani/an, kai\ o(/ti ou)dei\s ou)de\n u(gie\s, ô(s

e)/pos ei)pei=n, peri\ ta\ tô=n po/leôn pra/ttei, ou)d' e)/sti

xu/mmachos meth' o(/tou tis i)ô\n e)pi\ tê\n tô=n dikai/ôn

boê/theian sô/zoit' a)/n, a)ll' ô(/sper ei)s thêri/a a)/nthrôpos

e)mpesô/n, ou)/te xunadikei=n e)the/lôn ou)/te i(kano\s ô)\n ei(=s

pa=sin a)gri/ois a)nte/chein, pri/n ti tê\n po/lin ê)\ phi/lous

o)nêsai proapolo/menos a)nôphelê\s au(tô=| te kai\ toi=s a)/llois

a)\n ge/noito--tau=ta pa/nta logismô=| labô=n, ê(suchi/an e)/chôn

kai\ ta\ au)tou= pra/ttôn . . . o(rô=n tou\s a)/llous

katapimplame/nous a)nomi/as, a)gapa=| ei)/ pê au)to\s katharo\s

a)diki/as], &c.]

He will perform no small achievement (remarks Adeimantus) if he

keeps clear to the end.[176]

[Footnote 176: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497 A.]

[Side-note: The philosopher must have a community suitable

to him, and worthy of him.]

True (replies Sokrates)--yet nevertheless he can perform no great

achievement, unless he meets with a community suited to him.

Amidst such a community he will himself rise to greatness, and

will preserve the public happiness as well as his own. But there

exists no such community anywhere, at the present moment. Not one

of those now existing is worthy of a philosophical

disposition:[177] which accordingly becomes perverted, and

degenerates into a different type adapted to its actual abode,

like exotic seed transported to a foreign soil. But if this

philosophical disposition were planted in a worthy community, so

as to be able to assert its own superior excellence, it would then

prove itself truly divine, leaving other dispositions and pursuits

behind as merely human.

[Footnote 177: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497 B-C.]

[Side-note: It must be such a community as Sokrates has been

describing--But means must be taken to keep up a perpetual

succession of philosophers as Rulers.]

You mean by a worthy community (observes Adeimantus), such an one

as that of which you have been drawing the outline?--I do (replies

Sokrates): with this addition, already hinted but not explained,

that there must always be maintained in it a perpetual supervising

authority representing the scheme and purpose of the primitive

lawgiver. This authority must consist of philosophers: and the

question now arises--difficult but indispensable--how such

philosophers are to be trained up and made efficient for the good

of the city.

[Side-note: Proper manner of teaching philosophy--Not to

begin at a very early age.]

The plan now pursued for imparting philosophy is bad. Some do not

learn it at all: and even to those who learn it best, the most

difficult part (that which relates to debate and discourse) is

taught when they are youths just emerging from boyhood, in the

intervals of practical business and money-getting.[178] After that

period, in their mature age, they abandon it altogether; they will

scarcely so much as go to hear an occasional lecture on the

subject, without any effort of their own: accordingly it has all

died out within them, when they become mature in years. This

manner of teaching philosophy ought to be reversed. In childhood

and youth, instruction of an easy character and suitable to that

age ought to be imparted; while the greatest care is taken to

improve and strengthen the body during its period of growth, as a

minister and instrument to philosophy. As age proceeds, and the

mind advances to perfection, the mental exercises ought to become

more difficult and absorbing. Lastly, when the age of bodily

effort passes away, philosophy ought to become the main and

principal pursuit.[179]

[Footnote 178: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 A. [Greek: Nu=n me\n

oi( kai\ a(pto/menoi meira/kia o)/nta a)/rti e)k paidô=n to\

metaxu\ oi)konomi/as kai\ chrêmatismou= plêsia/santes au)tou= tô=|

chalepôta/tô| a)palla/ttontai, oi( philosophô/tatoi poiou/menoi;

le/gô de\ chalepô/taton to\ peri\ tou\s lo/gous; e)n de\ tô=|

e)/peita, e)a\n kai\ a)/llôn tou=to pratto/ntôn parakalou/menoi

e)the/lôsin a)kroatai\ gi/gnesthai, mega/la ê(gou=ntai, pa/rergon

oi)o/menoi au)to\ dei=n pra/ttein.]]

[Footnote 179: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 C.]

[Side-note: If the multitude could once see a real, perfect,

philosopher, they could not fail to love him: but this never

happens.]

Most people will hear all this (continues Sokrates) with mingled

incredulity and repugnance. We cannot wonder that they do so: for

they have had no experience of one or a few virtuously trained men

ruling in a city suitably prepared.[180] Such combination of

philosophical rulers within a community adapted to them, we must

assume to be realised.[181] Though difficult, it is noway

impracticable: and even the multitude will become reconciled to

it, if you explain to them mildly what sort of persons we mean by

philosophers. We do not mean such persons as the multitude now

call by that name; interlopers in the pursuit, violent in dispute

and quarrel with each other, and perpetually talking personal

scandal.[182] The multitude cannot hate a philosophical temper

such as we depict, when they once come to know it--a man who,

indifferent to all party disputes, dwells in contemplation of the

Universal Forms, and tries to mould himself and others into

harmony with them.[183] Such a philosopher will not pretend to

make regulations, either for a city or for an individual, until he

has purified it thoroughly. He will then make regulations framed

upon the type of the Eternal Forms--Justice, Temperance,

Beauty--adapting them as well as he can to human exigencies.[184]

The multitude, when they know what is really meant, will become

perfectly reconciled to it. One single prince, if he rises so as

to become a philosopher, and has a consenting community, will

suffice to introduce the system which we have been describing. So

fortunate an accident can undoubtedly occur but seldom; yet it is

not impossible, and one day or other it will really occur.[185]

[Footnote 180: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 E.]

[Footnote 181: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 499 B-C.]

[Footnote 182: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 499-500.]

[Footnote 183: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 500 C-D.]

[Footnote 184: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 501 A.]

[Footnote 185: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 502.]

[Side-note: Course of training in the Platonic city, for

imparting philosophy to the Rulers. They must be taught to ascend

to the Idea of Good. But what is Good?]

I must now (continues Sokrates) explain more in detail the studies

and training through which these preservers Rulers of our city,

the complete philosophers, must be created. The most perfect among

the Guardians, after having been tested by years of exercises

and temptations of various kinds, will occupy that distinguished

place. Very few will be found uniting those distinct and almost

incompatible excellences which qualify them for the post. They

must give proof of self-command against pleasures as well as

pains, and of competence to deal with the highest studies.[186]

But what are the highest studies? What is the supreme object of

knowledge? It is the Idea of Good--the Form of Good: to the

acquisition of which our philosophers must be trained to ascend,

however laborious and difficult the process may be.[187] Neither

justice nor any thing else can be useful or profitable, unless we

superadd to them a knowledge of the Idea of Good: without this, it

would profit us nothing to possess all other knowledge.[188]

[Footnote 186: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 503.]

[Footnote 187: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 504.]

[Footnote 188: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 A. [Greek: o(/ti ge ê(

tou= a)gathou= i)de/a me/giston ma/thêma polla/kis a)kê/koas, ê)=|

di/kaia kai\ ta)/lla proschrêsa/mena chrê/sima kai\ ô)phe/lima

gi/gnetai], &c.]

[Side-note: Ancient disputes upon this point, though every

one yearns after Good. Some say Intelligence; some say Pleasure.

Neither is satisfactory.]

Now as to the question, What Good is? there are great and

long-standing disputes. Every mind pursues Good, and does every thing

for the sake of it--yet without either knowledge or firm assurance

what Good is, and consequently with perpetual failure in deriving

benefit from other acquisitions.[189] Most people say that

Pleasure is the Good: an ingenious few identify Intelligence with

the Good. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. For

when a man says that Intelligence is the Good, our next question

to him must be, What sort of Intelligence do you

mean?--Intelligence of what? To this he must reply, Intelligence

of the Good: which is absurd, since it presumes us to know already

what the Good is--the very point which he is pretending to elucidate.

Again, he who contends that Pleasure is the Good, is forced in

discussion to admit that there are such things as bad pleasures:

in other words, that pleasure is sometimes good, sometimes

bad.[190] From these doubts and disputes about the real nature

of good, we shall require our philosophical Guardians to have

emancipated themselves, and to have attained a clear vision. They

will be unfit for their post it they do not well know what the

Good is, and in what manner just or honourable things come to be

good.[191] Our city will have received its final consummation,

when it is placed under the superintendence of one who knows what

the Good is.

[Footnote 189: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 E. [Greek: O(\ dê\

diô/kei me\n a(/pasa psuchê\ kai\ tou/tou e(/neka pa/nta pra/ttei,

a)pomanteuome/nê ti\ ei)=nai, a)porou=sa de\ kai\ ou)k e)/chousa

labei=n i(kanô=s ti/ pot' e)sti/n, ou)de\ pi/stei chrê/sasthai

moni/mô|, oi(/a| kai\ peri\ ta)/lla, dia\ tou=to de\

a)potugcha/nei kai\ tô=n a)/llôn ei)/ ti o)/phelos ê)=n],

&c.]

[Footnote 190: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 C.]

[Footnote 191: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 A. [Greek: di/kaia/ te

kai\ kala\ a)gnoou/mena o(/pê| pote\ a)gatha/ e)stin, ou) pollou=

tino\s a)/xion phu/laka kektê=sthai a)\n e(autô=n to\n tou=to

a)gnoou=nta.]]

[Side-note: Adeimantus asks what Sokrates says. Sokrates

says that he can not answer: but he compares it by a metaphor to

the Sun.]

But tell me, Sokrates (asks Adeimantus), what do _you_

conceive the Good to be--Intelligence or Pleasure, or any other

thing different from these? I do not profess to know (replies

Sokrates), and cannot tell you. We must decline the problem, What

Good itself is? as more arduous than our present impetus will

enable us to reach.[192] Nevertheless I will partially supply the

deficiency by describing to you the offspring of Good, very like

its parent. You will recollect that we have distinguished the Many

from the One: the many just particulars, beautiful particulars,

from the One Universal Idea or Form, Just _per se_, Beautiful

_per se_. The many particulars are seen but not conceived:

the one Idea is conceived, but not seen.[193] We see the many

particulars through the auxiliary agency of light, which emanates

from the Sun, the God of the visible world. Our organ and sense of

vision are not the Sun itself, but they are akin to the Sun in a

greater degree than any of our other senses. They imbibe their

peculiar faculty from the influence of the Sun.[194] The Sun

furnishes to objects the power of being seen, and to our eyes the

power of seeing: we can see no colour unless we turn to objects

enlightened by its rays. Moreover it is the Sun which also brings

about the generation, the growth, and the nourishment, of these

objects, though it is itself out of the limits of generation: it

generates and keeps them in existence, besides rendering them

visible.[195] Now the Sun is the offspring and representative

of the Idea of Good: what the Sun is in the sensible and visible

world, the Idea of Good is in the intelligible or conceivable

world.[196] As the Sun not only brings into being the objects of

sense, but imparts to them the power of being seen so the Idea of

Good brings into being the objects of conception or cognition,

imparts to them the power of being known, and to the mind the

power of knowing them.[197] It is from the Idea of Good that all

knowledge, all truth, and all real essence spring. Yet the Idea of

Good is itself extra-essential; out of or beyond the limits of

essence, and superior in beauty and dignity both to knowledge and

to truth; which are not Good itself, but akin to Good, as vision

is akin to the Sun.[198]

[Footnote 192: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 B-E. [Greek: Au)to\

me\n ti/ pot' e)sti\ ta)gatho\n e)a/sômen ta\ nu=n ei)=nai; ple/on

ga/r moi phai/netai ê)\ kata\ tê\n parou=san o(rmê\n e)phike/sthai

tou= ge dokou=ntos e)moi\ ta\ nu=n; o(/s de\ e)/kgono/s te tou=

a)gathou= phai/netai kai\ o(moio/tatos e)kei/nô|, le/gein

e)the/lô] (p. 506 E).]

[Footnote 193: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 507 B-C. [Greek: Kai\ ta\

me\n (polla\) dê\ o(ra=sthai/ phamen, noei=sthai de\ ou)/; ta\s d'

au)= i)de/as noei=sthai me/n, o(ra=sthai de\ ou)/.]]

[Footnote 194: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 A. [Greek: ê(

o)/psis--ê(lioeide/staton tô=n peri\ ta\s ai)sthê/seis o)rga/nôn.]]

[Footnote 195: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. [Greek: To\n ê(/lion

toi=s o(rôme/nois ou) mo/non tê\n tou= o(ra=sthai du/namin

pare/chein phê/seis, a)lla\ kai\ tê\n ge/nesin kai\ au)/xên kai\

trophê/n, ou) ge/nesin au)to\n o)/nta.]]

[Footnote 196: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 B-C. [Greek: Tou=ton

(to\n ê(/lion) to\n tou= a)gathou= e)/kgonon, o(\n ta)gatho\n

e)ge/nnêsen a)na/logon e(autô=|, o(/, ti per au)to\ e)n tô=|

noêtô=| to/pô| pro/s te nou=n kai\ ta\ noou/mena, tou=to tou=ton

e)n tô=| o(ratô=| pro/s te o)/psin kai\ ta\ o(rô/mena.]]

[Footnote 197: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E. [Greek: Tou=to

toi/nun to\ tê\n a)lê/theian pare/chon toi=s gignôskome/nois kai\

tô=| gignô/skonti tê\n du/namin a)podido\n tê\n tou= a)gathou=

i)de/an pha/thi ei)=nai, ai)ti/an d' e)pistê/mês ou)=san kai\

a)lêthei/as ô(s gignôskome/nês], &c.]

[Footnote 198: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. [Greek: Kai\ toi=s

gignôskome/nois toi/nun mê\ mo/non to\ gignô/skesthai pha/nai

u(po\ tou= a)gathou= parei=nai, a)lla\ kai\ to\ ei)=nai te kai\

tê\n ou)si/an u(p' e)kei/nou au)tois prosei=nai, ou)k ou)si/as

o)/ntos tou= a)gathou=, a)ll' e)/ti e)pe/keina tê=s ou)si/as

presbei/a| kai\ duna/mei u(pere/chontos. Kai\ o( Glau/kôn ma/la

geloi/ôs, A)/pollon, e)/phê, daimoni/as u(perbolê=s! Su\ ga/r,

ê)=n d' e)gô/, ai)/tios, a)nagka/zôn ta\ e)moi\ dokou=nta peri\

au)tou= le/gein.]--Also p. 509 A.]

[Side-note: The Idea of Good rules the ideal or intelligible

world, as the Sun rules the sensible or visible world.]