THE WORLD WAR
Paris throbs with the _Marseillaise_--A British railway conductor
refuses a five-pound note--Americans panic-stricken in London--A
special committee to aid Americans in Europe--The embassy
committee--Mr. and Mrs. Herbert C. Hoover--Impressions of Earl Grey
and Waldorf Astor--England's "White Paper" is issued--Sir Edward
Grey--Russian autocracy's effect on Allied cause--I am urged to
state British views to American newspapers--We return home--James
Speyer gives a dinner--I broach the subject of mediation to
Bernstorff--A flying trip to Washington; mediation interviews with
Bryan, Spring-Rice, and Jusserand--A letter from Earl
Grey--Germany's insincerity is exposed--New Year messages to
warring nations--Roosevelt's warnings--An effort to persuade
President Wilson to confer with ex-Presidents--Prominent Jews of
German origin condemn Germany's attitude--America enters war--Final
visits with Theodore Roosevelt--His death--Pilgrims to Sagamore
Hill.
Touring through Normandy late in July, 1914, we met some friends who had
just come from Paris who told us that war was imminent and from best
reports would break out within a very few days. Accordingly we hurried
to Paris and in the course of twenty-four hours the whole aspect of the
city had changed. From the windows of our hotel on the Place Vendome and
on the principal boulevards of the city we saw youths of military age
marching to headquarters. The air throbbed with the _Marseillaise_.
Everywhere there were crowds, but they were neither boisterous nor
hilarious. Everywhere there was an air of tension and determination,
vastly unlike the usual mood of jovial, happy Paris.
Starting at once for London, we found the trains so overcrowded that it
was impossible to get accommodations, so we motored to Dieppe and
reached there in time to take the boat that left at three o'clock in the
morning for Newhaven. The ordinary capacity of the boat was five hundred
passengers, but it was packed from stem to stern with some two thousand
persons on this voyage, mainly Americans. The Calais-Dover crossing of
the Channel had already been suspended.
On board the train from Newhaven to London, a curious incident occurred
that indicated the derangement of things. I had four fares to pay,
amounting to about three pounds. I handed the conductor a five-pound
Bank of England note. He took it, but shortly returned with it, saying
he could accept nothing but gold. I expostulated with him, told him I
had no gold, and since a bank note was valid tender I insisted upon its
acceptance. But the upshot was that he preferred to take my card with my
London address!
It would appear that my credit at that moment was better than that of
the Bank of England.
We arrived in London on Sunday, August 2d. At the Hyde Park Hotel, to
which we went, a typewritten notice was posted announcing a meeting on
the following day at the Waldorf Hotel on the Strand. The persons who
signed the notice were unknown to me, and at first I was inclined to pay
no attention to it. However, I did go, and found gathered inside and in
front of the hotel several thousand stranded Americans. The main hall
and all approaches to it were packed. Several persons in the crowd
recognized me and made a passageway so that I could get into the room
where the meeting was being held. Upon my entrance I was lifted upon a
table that served as a platform, and was asked to speak. I made a short
address to the panic-stricken assembly, assured them they had nothing to
fear and were as safe in London as if they were in New York, and that
our committee would remain with them and help them get suitable
transportation as early as practicable. There was loud cheering and my
words seemed to have a comforting effect.
Immediately thereafter a group of us came together and organized a
special committee for the aid of Americans in Europe. There were
Frederick I. Kent, one of the vice-presidents of the Bankers' Trust
Company; W. N. Duane, another vice-president of the Bankers' Trust
Company; Theodore Hetzler, a vice-president of the Fifth Avenue Bank;
Joseph P. Day, a prominent real estate auctioneer of New York City;
William C. Breed, an officer of the Merchants' Association; Chandler P.
Anderson and James Byrne, prominent American lawyers, several others,
and myself. We arranged for headquarters at the Hotel Savoy, where
several of the largest salons were placed at our disposal so that we had
room for the various departments that needed to be formed to attend to
the wants of the many terrified Americans who were pouring into London
from all over the Continent. Mr. Hetzler was chairman of the general
committee, Mr. Duane secretary, and Robert W. DeForest, vice-president
of the American Red Cross, was member _ex-officio_. I was made chairman
of the embassy committee of which Ambassador Page was honorary chairman,
and the American ambassadors to France, Germany, Austria, and the
ministers to Holland and Belgium were made advisory members. We found
many willing helpers, including a number of professors from American
universities and other public-spirited men and women.
The necessary sub-committees were speedily formed: Mr. Day was made
chairman of the transportation committee and got in touch with the
managers of all the transatlantic steamship companies. Mr. Kent was
chairman of the finance committee, and through his banking connections
was able to get a limited amount of gold to advance to those who could
not convert their foreign money, notwithstanding the moratorium that had
been declared which made it impossible for several days to get ready
money; foreign bills were not being accepted by the banks. With the
declaration of the moratorium we at once called a meeting of the
managers of the hotels where most of the Americans were stopping, and
without exception these men were very accommodating. They agreed not to
require payment from their American guests for the time being, and as
far as possible to advance them a little money to meet their immediate
requirements.
Our embassy was crowded from morning to night with hundreds of citizens,
most of whom wanted to make application for passports, for the steamship
companies required the exhibition of passports before arranging for
transportation. The rooms at the embassy were not large enough to
accommodate the crowds that filled them, so we transferred the passport
division to the Hotel Savoy, and Ambassador Page assigned to me several
clerks to facilitate the handling of our business. I am sorry to say
there was a tendency on the part of many American travelers to find
fault with our ambassador and the embassy. This was not at all
justified, and I took every occasion to assure them that the ambassador
was doing all in his power with his limited staff, and that our
committee had his fullest cooperation and was getting his aid in every
possible way. I consulted with Ambassador Page almost every day, and
together we planned for arranging for money and the many other
requirements of our citizens.
In those first hectic days, some of us worked all day and far into the
night, or rather into the next morning. Many British friends who visited
our rooms marveled at the promptness and efficiency with which we
dispatched business under the circumstances, and were solicitous for
the health of "the unofficial ambassador," as I was being called, and
his staff.
After the committee had been going a few days, it secured the
cooperation of Mr. and Mrs. Herbert C. Hoover. He was chairman of an
American benevolent society, of the woman's committee of which Mrs.
Hoover was at the head. As the members of our relief committee returned
home, the work was by degrees turned over to Mr. and Mrs. Hoover and
their associates, until by August 27th we put all of the remaining work
and funds into the hands of their society.
One day Earl Grey paid me a visit at our headquarters, and with him was
Mrs. Waldorf Astor, now Viscountess Astor, who reminded me that "all
work and no play makes Jack a dull boy," and insisted that Mrs. Straus
and I spend the week-end at Cliveden, their residence, a short distance
by rail out of London. Other guests were Earl Grey, Geoffrey Robinson,
editor of the London "Times," and several others connected with the
editorship of "The Round Table," a political quarterly.
Mr. Waldorf Astor was an earnest, modest young man, then about
thirty-four years old, unspoiled by his enormous wealth. On the
contrary, he was and still is devoting much of his wealth as well as his
parliamentary activities to philanthropic work, including the treatment
and prevention of tuberculosis, and in this connection had been in touch
with my brother Nathan in regard to milk pasteurization.
There were several subsequent week-ends at Cliveden. On one of these
visits, a dozen or more young men were there, members of England's
foremost families. They enjoyed themselves at tennis and other games and
on Monday were to join the colors. It is sad to record that most of
these fine fellows, with the exception of two or three, were killed or
seriously wounded within the next few months.
When England entered the war, the diplomatic correspondence was
published in what was called the British "White Paper." Sir Edward Grey,
now Viscount Grey, had made a speech in Parliament, of which I read the
published version in this "White Paper." It happened that on that very
day Earl Grey, cousin to Sir Edward, was lunching with me at my hotel,
and I took the occasion to point out to him the necessity of making
clear, especially for the American public, that the reason England had
joined the Allies was not only on Belgium's account, but to uphold the
sanctity of international obligations. This concerned not alone the
belligerent nations, but all the nations. Without the sanctity of
international obligations the war, no matter how it ended, would cause a
reversion to a state of international barbarity. Earl Grey suggested
that I discuss the subject with his cousin, and arranged for a meeting.
A few days later we three sat down to a simple and informal luncheon at
Earl Grey's home on South Street, in Park Lane.
Sir Edward Grey spoke earnestly and frankly. He felt the great
responsibility of the decision that brought England into the war, and
said he had often asked himself whether he could have done otherwise.
There was nothing chauvinistic in either his attitude or his arguments.
It was plain that he had weighed the entire issue carefully. His
open-mindedness, his simplicity and straightforwardness of manner, his
great ability and humanitarian zeal, impressed me very much.
I called his attention to the importance of having Russia grant civil
and religious rights to her subject nationalities; the failure of such
action would weaken the moral cause of the Allies, and also from an
American point of view it was important that Russia give some evidence
of a liberal spirit, otherwise it might be feared that victory for the
Allies would redound mainly to the advantage of autocracy in Russia. I
contended that it was not a question of humanity, but plain state
policy, and that it was important that the Governments of Great Britain
and France bring Russia, as their ally, into line. I had received
several cables from prominent men in New York and Boston who had thus
expressed the American point of view.
The conversation ran on for an hour and a half in a very informal way.
Earl Grey then made the suggestion, in accordance with my remarks of a
few days before about the necessity of making clear England's position
in entering the war, that I give out an interview to the American press
covering the substance of our conversation. I demurred. Naturally I
hesitated to state publicly the delicate and critical questions that the
British Minister of Foreign Affairs had so frankly discussed with me.
However, Sir Edward himself said he would appreciate my doing so, for he
had perfect confidence in my doing it without embarrassment to his
country. I therefore agreed to it, with the proviso that he approve the
interview before it was released for publication.
I got in touch with the representatives of the American papers in London
and that evening gave out the interview. The next morning I sent a copy
to Sir Edward, who returned it to me without a single change, saying he
approved both its form and content. The matter was then cabled to
America, published in our leading papers on August 15th, and cabled back
for republication in the British papers.
Thereafter the London papers came to me for further interviews, and in a
subsequent statement I dwelt more specifically on the importance of
Russia's fair treatment of her subject nationalities, particularly the
Jews, who had suffered most. The press representatives asked whether
they might show my interview to Lord Weardale and if possible get his
comment, to which I gladly consented.
Lord Weardale had been head of the Parliamentary deputation that visited
Russia the year before and had an intimate knowledge of Russian
conditions. He told me later that he had already written the Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonoff, along the identical lines of my
interview. He supplemented what I had stated, with an interview, saying,
among other things:
It would be an immense step in the path of progress of Russia
herself and would create a profound sentiment of satisfaction in
the civilized world if the Tsar at such a juncture were to give
emphatic endorsement to his already declared intention to give full
religious liberty to all his peoples. It is not enough to be
powerful in the battlefield; it is even more important to conquer
the approval of the human conscience.
The Government and people of Great Britain were very solicitous at that
time regarding public opinion in America and the probable attitude of
our Government. In many quarters there was a feeling of uncertainty and
even of misgiving toward the statement by President Wilson respecting an
offer of mediation at the opportune moment, in accordance with the
provisions of the Hague Treaty. Because of this and other
considerations, Sir Edward Grey and others recognized the importance of
having Russia give evidence of a more enlightened spirit.
* * * * *
We left London at the end of August, and upon arrival home went up to
Hartsdale, a short distance out of New York, to visit with our son. A
few days afterward Mr. James Speyer, whose summer home was but a few
miles distant, at Scarboro, telephoned, inviting Mrs. Straus and myself
to dine with him. Mrs. Speyer had not returned from abroad; the guests
were Mr. and Mrs. Frank A. Vanderlip and Count von Bernstorff. As Mrs.
Straus was rather worn out by her London experience, I went alone. There
were several other neighbors, Mr. Frank H. Platt and Mr. Frank Trumbull
and perhaps one other, about eight of us, of whom Mrs. Vanderlip was the
only lady.
Bernstorff I had known for a number of years. I had first met him in
1888 when I was on my first mission to Turkey and he was attache of the
German embassy. Later he came to Washington as ambassador when I was in
the Cabinet, and we met frequently there.
The conversation at dinner was general, although it was inevitable that
we discuss the war. Bernstorff voiced the usual claim of the Germans,
that they did not want war, and that the Kaiser and the German
Government stood for peace. When he had dilated upon that theme I asked
him:
"Is that the present sentiment and attitude of your country?"
He replied that it certainly was when he left Berlin only two weeks
before, on returning to America from his leave of absence.
Knowing how anxious President Wilson was to use any proper opportunity
that might present itself for ending the war, I asked Bernstorff whether
his Government would entertain a proposition for mediation.
He answered me promptly: "Speaking for myself, I certainly would
entertain such a proposition." But he added that he could not speak
officially, since cable communication with his Government had been cut
off for a week or more.
I asked him whether in his opinion his Government would give favorable
consideration to such a proposal. He said that before leaving Berlin he
had discussed with the Chancellor the possibility of mediation,
following the report of President Wilson's statement that he was ready
to offer his services as mediator to both parties, and the Chancellor
had said that the war had but begun and it was too early to instruct
regarding mediation until the offer was presented. On my questioning him
further, the ambassador said his personal opinion was that his
Government would accept an offer of mediation. I remarked that I could
not but regard his statement as significant, and asked him if I might
use it in such a manner as I saw fit. He replied that he had no
objection.
As we rose from the table, I made sure of my understanding of his
statements, and then the thought occurred to me that the best thing to
do was to report the conversation to Secretary of State Bryan, so that
he might, if he saw fit, bring it before the President. I so informed
Bernstorff, and again he told me he had no objection.
I looked at my watch. It was ten-fifteen. I announced that I would go to
Washington on the midnight train. My host suggested that I "sleep on it
and don't hurry"; but I concluded that if there was anything I could do
to shorten the war by even a few hours I would have to charge myself
with neglect of duty if on account of personal convenience I had
refrained from doing so. The next day was Sunday; the day after was
Labor Day; and all the while thousands were falling on the battlefield.
Several of the guests agreed with my decision, so I bade them
good-night, called my motor, and caught the midnight train for
Washington.
Sunday morning I telephoned to Mr. Bryan at once and made an appointment
to meet him at his home. I repeated my conversation with Bernstorff
precisely as it had occurred, and Bryan believed, as I did, that it
might pave the way to mediation. I suggested that he have the German
ambassador come to Washington and speak with him. He communicated with
the German embassy, and Bernstorff arrived the following morning.
Bryan presented the subject to the President, who expressed himself as
pleased with the possibility of a favorable outcome. The Secretary
advised me to have a conference with the British ambassador, Sir Cecil
Spring-Rice, and with the French ambassador, M. Jusserand. He had
already informed them what had taken place and of my presence in
Washington. Sir Cecil asked whether I would kindly come to the embassy,
and I replied I would do so, and suggested that he arrange to have the
French ambassador also present. This he did.
When I reached the embassy, M. Jusserand had not yet arrived, and Sir
Cecil and I indulged in reminiscences. He too had been in Constantinople
during my first mission, as secretary of the British embassy. Soon we
were joined by M. Jusserand, whom also I had known well for many years,
for he had been in Washington since 1902, and I had seen much of him
during my Cabinet days.
When we took up the proposal regarding which we had come together, both
of these gentlemen agreed that it was deserving of serious attention,
but Sir Cecil had little confidence in Bernstorff, who had been his
colleague at Cairo, where they had represented their respective
Governments. He asked whether I thought an ambassador would make such a
statement as Bernstorff's without authority from his Government. I
replied that both he and M. Jusserand were better qualified to answer
that question, upon which M. Jusserand said that he knew that no
ambassador under the German system would dare make such remarks without
previous authority from his Government.
"That is so much the better," I commented.
Sir Cecil declared that German diplomacy was peculiar and that the
Foreign Office had no conscience in disavowing statements by its
ambassadors if it suited Germany's purpose.
After we had gone over the whole subject, both ambassadors stated that
if it held one chance in a hundred of shortening the war, it was their
duty to entertain it. I replied that I hoped they would entertain it
cordially.
Jusserand in his usual happy manner said, "'Cordially,' that is a little
too strong."
"Well, sympathetically, then," I said.
"Yes, sympathetically, yes." And with that we parted, both ambassadors
expressing their thanks and appreciation of my services.
I had been scrupulously careful to be absolutely accurate in all my
statements, and it was therefore gratifying, after the Bryan-Bernstorff
conference, to have the Secretary tell me that the ambassador's report
of the Scarboro incident was in every detail in accord with mine, and to
have the ambassador also confirm the correctness of Mr. Bryan's
understanding from my report. Naturally I was anxious to avoid
misunderstandings or misconceptions of any kind. The issue was too
important.
Both Secretary Bryan and Ambassador Bernstorff cabled to Berlin, and for
the time the subject rested there. My remaining in Washington was
unnecessary, and I returned to New York. But before leaving, I called by
appointment at both the French and British embassies, which also had
communicated events in detail to their Governments. Both ambassadors
expressed their high appreciation for my services and hoped I would keep
in close touch with them regarding the matter, both for their sake and
for the sake of our respective Governments. I told them I would regard
myself as "messenger boy" for mediation. Sir Cecil replied, "Ambassador
extraordinary." He promised to keep me informed, and two days later
wrote me:
I have not yet received any intimation from my Government, nor do I
expect one unless something definite is before them. But I need not
tell you how heartily my sympathy is with your humanitarian
efforts, and you know Grey well enough to be sure that, while
scrupulously faithful to all his engagements, he will do everything
possible in the cause of peace.
Throughout these negotiations we took great care to keep the matter
secret. Despite that fact it leaked out in some way, and the
correspondent of the London "Times" reported it in such a way as to give
the impression that I had been duped by the wily German ambassador; and
there were one or two other papers which took that view. Sir Cecil
Spring-Rice was incensed at this interpretation and wrote me on October
3d:
I am sure no one who knows you and knows the facts would ever think
that you were either duped or the secret agent of Germany. I am
quite positive that Sir Edward Grey would never have such an idea.
What you did--and what I hope you will continue to do--is a work of
pure philanthropy.
On October 15th he wrote me again on this subject, saying that when the
London "Times" representative returned to Washington from New York, he
would set him right as to the facts with a view to having the report
corrected, and adding:
We used to say at school, "Blessed are the peace makers, for they
get more kicks than half-pence!" It represents a melancholy truth,
but, however, I am sure every well-thinking person must appreciate
your beneficent efforts.
But in general the press of Great Britain expressed its appreciation of
the services I had rendered in lifting the latch of the door to
mediation.
A letter from Sir Edward Grey concerning the negotiations sheds
important light upon the British attitude:
FOREIGN OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.
_Saturday, 26 September, 1914_
DEAR MR. STRAUS:
Thank you for your letter of the 9th. I am so busy that I have not
time to write at any length; but do not let that make you suppose
that I am out of sympathy with what you say.
First of all, however, we must save ourselves and the West of
Europe, before we can exercise any influence elsewhere. The
Prussian military caste has dominated Germany, and the whole of the
West of Europe is in danger of being dominated by it. The German
Government, in the hands of this military caste, prepared this war,
planned it, and chose the time for it. We know now that the war has
revealed how thoroughly the German preparations had been made
beforehand: with an organization and forethought which is
wonderful, and would have been admirable had it been devoted to a
praiseworthy purpose. Not one of the other nations now fighting
against Germany is prepared in the same way.
Now, we wish to have three things: Firstly, to secure our own
liberty as independent States, who will live and let live on equal
terms; secondly, the establishment somehow of a Germany not
dominated by a military caste; a nation who will look at liberty
and politics from the same point of view as we do, and who will
deal with us on equal terms and in good faith; thirdly, reparation
for the cruel wrongs done to Belgium; to get that is a matter of
honour and justice and right.
The statements made by Wolff's Bureau in Europe deny that Germany
is yet ready for peace. If she is ready for peace, then I think
that her ambassador in Washington ought not to beat about the
bush. He ought to make it clear to President Wilson that he is
authorized to speak on behalf of his Government; and state to the
President that Germany does wish to make peace. In that case,
President Wilson could approach all the others who are engaged in
this war and bring them into consultation with one another and with
him. But at present we have no indication that Germany wishes to
have peace, and no indication that she would agree to any terms
that would give reparation to Belgium and security to the rest of
Europe that the peace would be durable.
Yours very truly
E. GREY
The history of those negotiations is presented somewhat at length
because my friend of many years, the late Ambassador Page, in his
recently published letters also expressed the feeling that I had been
used as a dupe to throw the blame for continuing the war upon Great
Britain, though he expressed great confidence in me and friendship for
me. I may say I was not unmindful of this contingency; but I felt that
if the negotiations did not result as we hoped, they would serve to
expose the insincerity of the German Government with regard to its peace
professions. And this is precisely what happened, as the answer of the
German Chancellor, received by the State Department on September 22d,
confirms:
The Imperial Chancellor is much obliged for America's offer.
Germany did not want war, it was forced upon her. Even after we
shall have defeated France we shall still have to face England and
Russia. England, France, and Russia have signed a convention to
make peace solely in mutual agreement with each other. England,
that is, Mr. Asquith, the London Times, and English diplomatic
officers, have on various occasions ... [sic] that England is
determined to conduct the war to the utmost and that she expects
success from it lasting a long time. It is therefore up to the
United States to get our enemies to make peace proposals. Germany
can only accept the peace which promises to be a real and lasting
peace and will protect her against any new attacks from her
enemies. If we accepted America's offer of mediation now our
enemies would interpret it as a sign of weakness and the German
people would not understand it. For the nation which has been
willing to make such sacrifices has a right to demand that there
shall be guarantees of rest and security.
Secretary Bryan, in his instruction to Ambassador Page on September 8th,
had anticipated Germany's refusal to accept mediation. The instruction
concluded:
We do not know, of course, what reply the German Emperor will make,
but this war is so horrible from every aspect that no one can
afford to take the responsibility for continuing it implacably. The
British and French ambassadors fear that Germany will not accept
any reasonable terms, but even a failure to agree will not rob an
attempt at mediation of all its advantages because the different
nations would be able to explain to the world their attitude, the
reasons for continuing the war, the end to be hoped for and the
terms upon which peace is possible. This would locate the
responsibility for the continuance of the war and help to mould
public opinion. Will notify you as soon as answer is received from
Bernstorff.
On September 29th all the British papers served by the Central News War
Service carried a cable from New York detailing the negotiations, which
ended:
It is believed by those concerned that an important step has been
taken to pave the way for mediation, when the opportune moment
arrives. In other words, the bolt on the door of mediation has been
thrown back so that it will be possible for the door to be opened
without either side being forced to take the initiative. Time will
doubtless show that the initiative so fortuitously taken by Mr.
Straus will prove of real service in the interests of ultimate
peace negotiations, and any endeavors to deprecate those services
as having been made in Germany's interests are not only contrary to
all the facts, but are most unfortunate.
_Note_: The censor does not object to the publication of the
foregoing details, but insists that publication should be
accompanied by a footnote pointing out that since these
occurrences took place the German Government have disavowed their
ambassador.
Had Germany's oft-reiterated peace professions been sincere, she would
have accepted this offer for mediation. By her refusal the falsity of
her professions was exposed not only in Great Britain and in our own
country, but in all the neutral countries; and the _expose_ served as
added proof to all peace-loving and neutrally-minded persons that the
responsibility for the war and its continuance rested upon the German
Government.
In America many of us continued to hope that some way might be found to
bring the representatives of the warring nations into a conference,
thereby removing misunderstanding and misconception and paving the way
for an early peace. On December 31st the New York representative of the
Central News of London asked several Americans to write New Year's
messages to the warring nations of Europe, to be cabled to all the chief
newspapers of the continent. Messages were given by Dr. Nicholas Murray
Butler, Andrew Carnegie, Bishop David Greer, and myself, and they were
all substantially of the same tenor, as a passage from each will show:
_Bishop Greer_: It is the earnest hope and prayer of all Christian
people in America that the awful and deplorable war now raging may
soon reach an end which will insure lasting peace and one
satisfactory in character to all the nations involved.
_Andrew Carnegie_: I am convinced that the next effort of lovers of
peace should be to concentrate the world over in demanding that
this unparalleled slaughter of man by man shall be the last war
waged by civilized nations for the settlement of international
disputes. War dethroned--Peace enthroned.
_President Butler_: May it be in America's fortunate lot to bind up
the wounds of the war and to set the feet of her sister nations
once more in the paths of peace, international good-will and
constructive statesmanship.
I said: For the past five months each of the nations has been
seeking victory in the trenches of death; but it has not been found
there. Only through wise counsels can the victory of permanent
peace be obtained. President Wilson and His Holiness the Pope have
offered their offices to open the door of mediation. Will not the
Kaiser and King George give the mandate so that the door may be
opened and this delusion be dispelled, thereby earning the
blessings of a bleeding and suffering world?
These statements are cited as evidence of how slowly we in America came
to realize the ruthless designs for conquest which the German
militarists had prepared and fostered for forty years, not only
strategically, but even in shaping the psychology of the child in school
and the man in the street to conform to their design.
For a year or more events marched on, tragically, like a malignant
disease. On February 2, 1917, I lunched with Roosevelt at the Hotel
Langdon, on Fifth Avenue and Fifty-Sixth Street, where Roosevelt was in
the habit of stopping when in New York. The German Government two days
before had announced her submarine blockade of the British, French, and
Dutch coasts, and our own entrance into the war seemed likely.
We were discussing the crisis, and Roosevelt said he did not think we
should be involved; the President would probably find some way out and
arrange to have Germany's pledge, not to destroy merchant ships of
neutrals or belligerents without warning, whittled down so as to apply
only to ships flying the American flag. He told us that he had engaged
passage on one of the United Fruit Company steamers to Jamaica for Mrs.
Roosevelt and himself. Mrs. Roosevelt needed a change, and they would
start in a few days. Regarding the war, he could do nothing more. He
had done all he could. He had made an offer to the Secretary of War to
raise a division, and had a whole card catalogue of names of men who had
volunteered to serve in it.
His relations with the President were far from friendly. He had
violently criticized him in articles contributed to the "Metropolitan
Magazine" and in several public addresses had urged preparedness and
compulsory military training. I asked him, in view of the German
blockade, what he would do if he were President. He said he would
promptly assemble our fleet, put marines on the interned German ships,
and show Germany that we were in dead earnest; that unless she recalled
her decision to sink merchant ships without observing the rules of
modern warfare we should take immediate steps to protect our rights.
"If we continue to back down we will become Chinafied, without any
rights that other nations will respect," said Roosevelt emphatically.
In such critical times, personal differences might be laid aside, I
suggested, and I wanted him to write the President and let him have the
benefit of his views. I went further: I suggested that I could write the
President about it. But in Roosevelt's opinion, Wilson would conclude
that Roosevelt had himself urged me to do this because of my close
association with Roosevelt.
My own relations with the President were always agreeable, I might even
say most friendly. He had written me sometime before, that he would
consider it a favor if I would keep him informed of developments that
came under my observation regarding important matters. It occurred to me
that on the eve of war it would be a fine thing if he consulted with his
two surviving predecessors, as Monroe had done in consulting with
Jefferson and Madison before issuing the doctrine which bears his name.
In the crisis we were facing such a step would allay partisan
differences and serve to solidify the Nation. With these ideas in mind I
sent the President the following telegram:
Every patriotic American should support you in this great crisis in
the history of our country. May I suggest the course followed by
Monroe under a crisis involving many of the same principles, to
confer with the two surviving ex-Presidents, whose advice, I feel
sure, will be most helpful and serve to patriotically solidify the
country behind you?
I informed Roosevelt of my action. He felt sure the President wanted
neither advice nor cooperation, though he himself was ready to give him
the fullest cooperation should Wilson desire it. He thought the same was
true on the part of Mr. Taft. The telegram, to my surprise, was given
out at Washington to the press a day or two later, but nothing ever came
of it.
On February 7th the country was more or less agreeably surprised by the
fact that Count von Bernstorff had been given his passports and
Ambassador Gerard at Berlin had been instructed to demand his. I say the
country was surprised because the President had so long delayed and
avoided such a step--even after the sinking of the Lusitania and the
Sussex following his "strict accountability" and other strong
statements--that it was generally believed he did not mean to take it.
Roosevelt, of course, thought that we should have taken such action long
before. His contention was always that had we taken prompt and decisive
steps after the Lusitania tragedy, we should have been spared the
submarine invasions. In fact, he thought we should have acted when
Germany announced her submarine blockade and possibly saved ourselves
from the Lusitania horror. Now that diplomatic relations were broken
off, he canceled his trip to Jamaica, not wishing to be out of the
country when war was likely to be declared at any moment.
At about this time the impression was current that the Jews of America
were anti-Ally, a fact that had a prejudicial effect in France and
England. It probably grew out of the fact that three of the largest
Jewish banking houses of the country were of German origin, and further
that the Yiddish press was anti-Russian in its sympathies as a result of
the treatment of Jews in Russia.
After a careful investigation of these reports, a group of us met at the
home of Eugene Meyer, Jr., later chairman of the War Finance
Corporation. Among those I recall at this meeting were: Fabian Franklin,
of the "New York Evening Post"; George L. Beer, the historian; Rabbi
Stephen S. Wise; Professor Richard Gottheil, of Columbia University. M.
Stephane Lauzanne, editor of "Le Matin" of Paris, and Professor Henri
Bergson, both of whom were then in New York, had also been consulted. It
was decided that the most practical way of correcting this erroneous
impression was for me to write to the French and British ambassadors at
Washington.
Accordingly I wrote to Ambassadors Spring-Rice and Jusserand that the
impression was unfounded, that our investigations and observations
showed a large preponderance of pro-Ally sympathy among the Jews, and I
cited a number of leading citizens in business and the various
professions, who were representative of their class, whom I knew
personally to be pro-Ally. I stated further that in one of the largest
Jewish clubs, whose membership consisted almost entirely of Jews of
German origin, the pro-Ally sentiment was so strong as to be practically
unanimous.
The ambassadors were grateful for this information, which they
communicated to their Governments; and through the agency of M. Lauzanne
and with the consent of the ambassadors, the letters were given in full
to the French and British press.
On the very day that Congress declared war against Germany, April 6,
1917, we were giving a dinner at our home to Professor Henri Bergson.
Among our guests were James M. Beck, author of "The Evidence in the
Case" and "The War and Humanity"; ex-Senator Burton of Ohio; former
Governor and Mrs. John M. Slaton, of Georgia; Adolph S. Ochs, of the
"New York Times," and Mrs. Ochs. Bergson was regarded as the unofficial
representative of France in our country at the time. Of course, our
thoughts and conversation were dominated by the great event of the day.
Professor Bergson and Mr. Beck drank and responded to toasts with
eloquent fervor. It was felt by all that the entrance into the war of
the United States would prove a decided factor in winning it for
democracy and constitutional liberty.
* * * * *
Just before Christmas, 1918--to be specific, on December 22d--I called
on Roosevelt at the Roosevelt Hospital, where he was convalescing from
his seven weeks' illness, believed to have been inflammatory rheumatism.
He was dressed in his _robe de chambre_ and was seated in an armchair
with a pile of books before him. He looked neither enfeebled nor
emaciated, though he showed signs of illness. When I asked him how he
had been since my last visit, for I had called on him frequently during
his illness, he told me that he had had an attack of embolism--I think
that was the ailment--which showed in his wrists, and that his fever had
gone up to 104. But that was all gone and he was again feeling fine. He
was planning to return to Sagamore Hill to spend Christmas, which he
subsequently did.
He inquired particularly about my son Roger, of whom he was very fond,
and who was then in Siberia, where he had served for some months as
captain and assistant intelligence officer on the staff of General
William S. Graves, in command of the American Expeditionary Forces. I
told him we had had a cable from Roger from Blagoveschensk that he was
well. In his last letter he had expressed a desire to come home, since
the war was over. Roosevelt agreed that that was right. He would not
want his own sons to endanger their lives in the civil war raging in
Russia, and he would not have Roger do so. "Let the Russians settle
their own internal affairs; that is not our business," he added.
By way of amusing and interesting Roosevelt, I told him of a curious
incident narrated in one of Roger's letters. He had been sent as the
official representative of the army into the Amur Province, of which the
governor was Alexandre Alexiefsky, who had been a member of the
Constitutional Assembly of the Kerensky Government. When Roger called,
the governor repeated his name familiarly and then asked: "Are you
related to His Excellency by that name in the Cabinet of President
Roosevelt?" When Roger told him he was my son, the governor immediately
expressed a readiness to help him in every possible way, because as the
latter said he owed his life to me. As Roger expressed it, "He was
courteous before, but after that he was ready to give me his
undershirt."
[Illustration: ROGER W. STRAUS
First Lieutenant, afterwards Captain, on the Staff of General W. S.
Graves, American Expeditionary Force in Siberia. Now Major in the
Reserve Corps, U. S. A.]
Alexiefsky had told Roger the story of his case. In the autumn of 1908,
several Russians whom the Czar had exiled to Siberia as political
prisoners made their escape and came to the United States. The Russian
Government discovered this and engaged one of the leading New York law
firms to secure the extradition of the refugees, which was demanded on
the specious charge of murder. Secretary Root, in the midst of his many
important duties, favored the extradition, and the papers were referred
by the State Department to Attorney-General Bonaparte. Application for
deportation was also made to me under the immigration laws.
Meanwhile several prominent men and women interested in the case--Miss
Lillian Wald, of the Henry Street Settlement House, New York, and James
Bronson Reynolds, chairman of the American Society for Russian Freedom,
foremost among these--supplied the intelligence and the proof that these
men were not criminals in any sense, but political refugees. When
Roosevelt spoke to me about them, I told him that I had declined to
deport them because it was clear to me that they were political
refugees. At that moment Bonaparte joined us. Roosevelt requested him to
return the papers in the case, and shortly directed that the men were
not to be deported.
Roosevelt said he vividly recalled all this. His face beamed as he said:
"Is n't that fine! Very fine! I'm delighted to hear it!"
"You did that," I said to him; "without your sustaining me these men
would have been either extradited or deported, which would have meant
death."
"Both of us did it; it's fine! I'm delighted to hear it," he commented,
his face glowing with its usual vivacity.
The next day Roosevelt left the hospital to return to his home in Oyster
Bay. He apparently gave every indication that soon he would be entirely
well again and be with us for many years. Certainly that is what we all
expected. He was only sixty.
Exactly two weeks later, on January 6, 1919, I received a telephone call
at seven o'clock in the morning from Miss Striker, secretary to Mr.
Roosevelt, announcing that he had died early that morning. For thirteen
years or more he had had a large and affectionate share in our lives and
thoughts, and Mrs. Straus and I felt as though we had been stricken with
the loss of a member of our immediate family. I can truly say that I
never had a more loyal or a dearer friend. He always treated me and mine
as if we were among his nearest relatives.
On January 8th my wife, my son's wife, and I motored to Oyster Bay to
attend the funeral in the little Episcopal Church. It had been
Roosevelt's wish that he be buried from the little church that was the
place of worship of his family. The building held only about three
hundred and fifty persons, so that none but his family and close friends
could be present. There was a committee from the United States Senate
headed by Vice-President Marshall; a committee from the House; several
former members of the Cabinet--Elihu Root, Truman H. Newberry, Henry L.
Stimson, James R. Garfield, Mrs. Garfield, ex-President Taft, Governor
Hughes. William Loeb, Jr., and Captain Archie Roosevelt were ushers. The
other sons, Theodore and Kermit, were still in France. The church was
filled with a company of sincere friends and bereaved mourners. The
regular Episcopal service was begun at twelve-forty-five, and lasted
about twenty-five minutes, when we all accompanied the body to the
little cemetery on the side of the hill half a mile away.
Hardly a day passes without its scores of pilgrims to that grave. They
come from near and far. Many lay flowers on the grave. On holidays and
Sundays they come by the hundreds. Two years ago the intimate friends of
Roosevelt, who had been officially or personally associated with him,
formed the Roosevelt Pilgrimage, an association whose purpose is to keep
alive the ideals and personality of Theodore Roosevelt by an annual
visit to his grave and a simple ceremony. The idea and organization
originated with Mr. E. A. Van Valkenburg of the Philadelphia "North
American." On January 6, 1922, some sixty persons made the pilgrimage,
headed by Dr. Lyman Abbott, permanent chairman of the association. James
R. Garfield read Roosevelt's Nobel Peace Prize address, delivered in
Christiania in 1910, at the conclusion of which some wreaths were laid
on the grave. Mrs. Roosevelt invited us all to luncheon, and the
old-time hospitality and friendliness of the Roosevelt home brought many
memories of our departed leader.
After luncheon the annual meeting of the Pilgrimage took place in the
great North Room, where Roosevelt had so often received his friends and
guests. Dr. Abbott made a brief and feeling address, and Mrs. Richard
Derby (Ethel Roosevelt) read from original manuscript Roosevelt's
proclamation of 1912 which called into being the Progressive Party.
Hermann Hagedorn read a poem entitled "The Deacon's Prayer," by Samuel
Valentine Cole, which had especially appealed to Roosevelt. The last
stanza of this poem is as follows:
"We want a man whom we can trust
To lead us where thy purpose leads;
Who dares not lie, but dares be just--
Give us the dangerous man of deeds!"
So prayed the deacon, letting fall
Each sentence from his heart; and when
He took his seat the brethren all,
As by one impulse, cried, "Amen!"