we know that the first division of the troops, and a considerable
number of the inhabitants sailed on the 19th ultimo, as is said, for
Augustine; it is probably evacuated by this time.
It would give me pleasure to receive from you an accurate account of
the differences, which have arisen between the Court of Denmark and
the United Provinces, and the effects they may probably produce. We
are imperfectly acquainted with facts here, and still less with the
politics of the Northern Courts; you will sometimes extend your
observations to them.
I confide too much in the wisdom of the States-General to believe,
that they will omit any honorable means to prevent an accession of
strength to Great Britain, at this critical moment.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
FOOTNOTE:
[14] These papers will be found in the Correspondence of the Ministers
for negotiating a peace.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, November 18th, 1782.
Sir,
The instructions from Congress, which direct us to pay so strict an
attention to the French Ministry, and to follow their advice, are
conceived in terms so universal and unlimited, as to give a great deal
of anxiety to my mind.
There is no man more impressed with the obligation of obedience to
instructions; but, in ordinary cases, the principal is so near the
Deputy, as to be able to attend to the whole progress of the business,
and to be informed of every new fact, and every sudden thought.
Ambassadors in Europe can send expresses to their Courts, and give and
receive intelligence in a few days, with the utmost certainty. In
such cases there is no room for mistake, misunderstanding, or
surprise. But, in our case, it is very different. We are at an immense
distance. Despatches are liable to foul play, and vessels are subject
to accidents. New scenes open, the time presses, various nations are
in suspense, and necessity forces us to act.
What can we do? If a French Minister advises us to cede to the
Spaniards the whole river of the Mississippi, and five hundred miles
of territory to the eastward of it, are we bound by our instructions
to put our signature to the cession, when the English themselves are
willing we should extend to the river, and enjoy our natural right to
its navigation? If we should be counselled to relinquish our right to
the fishery on the Grand Bank of Newfoundland, when the British
Ministry are ready, by treaty, to acknowledge our right to it, are we
obliged to relinquish it? If we are advised to restore and compensate
the tories, are we to comply? If we know, or have reasons to believe,
that things, which will have weight upon the minds of the British
Ministry against us upon some points, will be communicated to them in
some way or other, secret or open, if we communicate it to this Court,
are we bound to do it?
I cannot think, that a construction, so literal and severe, was ever
intended to be put upon it; and, therefore, I see no way of doing my
duty to Congress, but to interpret the instruction, as we do all
general precepts and maxims, by such restrictions and limitations, as
reason, necessity, and the nature of things demand.
It may sometimes be known to a deputy, that an instruction from his
principal was given upon information of mistaken facts, what is he to
do? When he knows, that if the truth had been known, his principal
would have given a directly contrary order, is he to follow that,
which issued upon mistake? When he knows, or has only good reason to
believe, that, if his principal were on the spot, and fully informed
of the present state of facts, he would give contrary directions, is
he bound by such as were given before? It cannot be denied, that
instructions are binding, that it is a duty to obey them, and that a
departure from them cannot be justified; but I think it cannot be
denied on the other hand, that in our peculiar situation, cases may
happen, in which it might become our duty to depend upon being
excused, (or, if you will, pardoned) for presuming, that if Congress
were upon the spot, they would judge as we do.
I presume not to dictate, nor to advise, but I may venture to give my
opinion, as I do freely, and with much real concern for the public,
that it would be better, if every instruction in being were totally
repealed, which enjoins upon any American Minister to follow, or ask
the advice, or even to communicate with any French, or other Minister,
or Ambassador in the world. It is an inextricable embarrassment
everywhere. Advice would not be more seldom asked, nor communication
less frequent. It would be more freely given. A communication of
information, or a request of council would then be received as a
compliment, and a mark of respect; it is now considered as a duty and
a right. Your Ministers would have more weight, and be the more
respected through the world. Congress cannot do too much to give
weight to their own Ministers, for, they may depend upon it, great and
unjustifiable pains are taken to prevent them from acquiring
reputation, and even to prevent an idea taking root in any part of
Europe, that anything has been, or can be done by them. And there is
nothing, that humbles and depresses, nothing that shackles and
confines, in short, nothing that renders totally useless all your
Ministers in Europe, so much as these positive instructions, to
consult and communicate with French Ministers, upon all occasions, and
follow their advice. And I really think it would be better to
constitute the Count de Vergennes, our sole Minister, and give him
full powers to make peace and treat with all Europe, than to continue
any of us in the service, under the instructions in being, if they are
to be understood in that unlimited sense, which some persons contend
for.
I hope, that nothing indecent has escaped me upon this occasion. If
any expressions appear too strong, the great importance of the
subject, and the deep impression it has made on my mind and heart,
must be my apology.
I am, Sir, your humble servant,
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, November 24th, 1782.
Sir,
We live in critical moments. Parliament is to meet, and the King's
speech will be delivered on the 26th. If the speech announces Mr
Oswald's commission, and the two Houses in their answers thank him for
issuing it, and there should be no change in the Ministry, the
prospect of peace will be flattering. Or if there should be a change
in the Ministry, and the Duke of Portland, with Mr Fox and Mr Burke,
should come in, it will be still more so. But if Richmond, Cambden,
Keppel, and Townshend should retire, and my Lord North and company
come in, with or without the Earl of Shelburne, the appearances of
peace will be very unpromising. My Lord North, indeed, cannot revoke
the acknowledgment of our independence, and would not probably
renounce the negotiations for peace, but ill will to us is so habitual
to him and his master, that he would fall in earnestly with the
wing-clipping system; join in attempts to deprive us of the fisheries
and the Mississippi, and to fasten upon us the tories, and in every
other measure to cramp, stint, impoverish and enfeeble us. Shelburne
is not so orthodox as he should be, but North is a much greater
heretic in American politics.
It deserves much consideration what course we should take, in case the
old Ministry should come in wholly, or in part. It is certain, at
present, that to be obnoxious to the Americans, and their Ministers,
is a very formidable popular cry against any Minister or candidate for
the Ministry in England, for the nation is more generally for
recovering the good will of the Americans than they ever have been.
Nothing would strike such a blow to any Ministry, as to break off the
negotiations for peace; if the old Ministry come in, they will demand
terms of us, at first, probably, that we can never agree to.
It is now eleven or twelve days, since the last result of our
conferences were laid before the Ministry in London. Mr Vaughan went
off on Sunday noon, the 17th. So that he is, no doubt, before this
time with my Lord Shelburne. He is possessed of an ample budget of
arguments to convince his Lordship, that he ought to give up all the
remaining points between us. Mr Oswald's letters will suggest the same
arguments in a different light, and Mr Strachey, if he is disposed to
do it, is able to enlarge upon them all in conversation.
The fundamental point of the sovereignty of the United States being
settled in England, the only question now is, whether they shall
pursue a contracted, or a liberal, a good natured, or an ill natured
plan towards us. If they are generous, and allow us all we ask, it
will be the better for them; if stingy, the worse. That France does
not wish them to be very noble to us, may be true. But we should be
dupes indeed, if we did not make use of every argument with them, to
show them that it is their interest to be so. And they will be the
greatest bubbles of all, if they should suffer themselves to be
deceived by their passions, or by any arts, to adopt an opposite tenor
of conduct.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, December 4th, 1782.
Sir,
It is with much pleasure, that I transmit you the preliminary treaty
between the King of Great Britain and the United States of America.
The Mississippi, the western lands, Sagadehock, and the fisheries, are
secured as well as we could, and I hope what is done for the refugees
will be pardoned.
As the objects, for which I ever consented to leave my family and
country, are thus far accomplished, I now beg leave to resign all my
employments in Europe. They are soon enumerated; the first, is my
commission to borrow money in Holland, and the second, is my credence
to their High Mightinesses. These two should be filled up immediately,
and as Mr Laurens was originally designed to that country, and my
mission there was merely owing to his misfortune, I hope that
Congress will send him a full power for that Court.
The commission for peace I hope will be fully executed before this
reaches you. But, if it should not, as the terms are fixed, I should
not choose to stay in Europe, merely for the honor of affixing my
signature to the definitive treaty, and I see no necessity of filling
up my place; but if Congress should think otherwise, I hope they will
think Mr Dana the best entitled to it.
With great esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
EXTRACTS FROM A JOURNAL.
_Saturday, November 2d, 1782._--Almost every moment of this week has
been employed in negotiation with the English gentlemen, concerning
peace. We have two propositions, one, the line of fortyfive degrees,
the other, a line through the middle of the Lakes. And for the
boundary between Massachusetts and Nova Scotia, a line from the mouth
of St Croix to its source, and from its source to the Highlands.
_Sunday, November 3d._--In my first conversation with Dr Franklin, on
Tuesday last, he told me of Mr Oswald's demand of the payment of
debts, and compensation to the tories; he said their answer had been,
that we had not power, nor had Congress. I told him, I had no notion
of cheating anybody. The question of paying debts, and compensating
tories, were two. I had made the same observation that forenoon to Mr
Oswald and Mr Strachey, in company with Mr Jay, at his house. I saw
it struck Mr Strachey with peculiar pleasure; I saw it instantly
smiling in every line of his face. Mr Oswald was apparently pleased
with it too. In a subsequent conversation with my colleagues, I
proposed to them, that we should agree that Congress should recommend
it to the States, to open their courts of justice for the recovery of
all just debts. They gradually fell into this opinion, and we all
expressed these sentiments to the English gentlemen, who were much
pleased with it, and with reason; because it silences the clamors of
all the British creditors against the peace, and prevents them from
making common cause with the refugees. Mr Jay came in and spent two
hours in conversation upon our affairs, and we attempted an answer to
Mr Oswald's letter. He is perfectly of my opinion, or I am of his,
respecting Mr Dana's true line of conduct, as well as his with Spain,
and ours with France, Spain, and England.
Vergennes has endeavored to persuade him to treat with d'Aranda,
without exchanging powers. He refuses. Vergennes also pronounced
Oswald's first commission sufficient, and was for making the
acknowledgment of American independence, the first article of the
treaty. Jay would not treat; the consequence was, a complete
acknowledgment of our independence by Oswald's new commission, under
the great seal of Great Britain, to treat with the Commissioners of
the United States of America. Thus a temperate firmness has succeeded
everywhere, but the base system nowhere.
D'Estaing has set off for Madrid and Cadiz; _reste a savoir_ what his
object is, whether to take the command of a squadron, and in that
case, where to go, whether to Rhode Island, to join Vaudreuil, and go
against New York, or to the West Indies. Will they take New York, or
only prevent the English from evacuating it? Oswald proposed solemnly
to all three of us yesterday, at his house, to agree not to molest the
British troops in the evacuation; but we did not. This, however, shows
they have it in contemplation. Suppose they are going against West
Florida. How far are we bound to favor the Spaniards? Our treaty with
France must, and shall be sacredly fulfilled, and we must admit Spain
to accede when she will; but until she does, our treaty does not bind
us to France to assist Spain.
The present conduct of England and America, resembles that of the
eagle and cat. An eagle, scaling over a farmer's yard, espied a
creature that he thought a hare. He pounced upon and took him up in
the air, the cat seized him by the neck with her teeth, and round the
body with her fore and hind claws. The eagle, finding himself
scratched and pressed, bids the cat let go, and fall down. No, says
the cat, I will not let go and fall, you shall stoop and set me down.
_Monday, November 4th._--All the forenoon, from eleven till three, at
Mr Oswald's, Mr Jay and I. In the evening there again, until near
eleven. Strachey is as artful and insinuating a man as they could
send; he pushes and presses every point as far as it can possibly go;
he has a most eager, earnest, pointed spirit.
_Tuesday, November 5th._ Mr Jay told me our allies did not play fair.
They were endeavoring to deprive us of the fishery, the western lands,
and the navigation of the Mississippi. They would even bargain with
the English, to deprive us of them. They want to lay the western
lands, Mississippi, and the whole Gulf of Mexico into the hands of
Spain.
Oswald talks of Pultney, and a plot to divide America between France
and England. France to have New England. They tell a story about
Vergennes, and his agreeing that the English might propose such a
division, but reserving a right to deny it all. These whispers ought
not to be credited by us.
_Saturday, November 9th._--M. de Lafayette came in, and told me he had
been at Versailles, and in consultation about the affair of money, as
he and I agreed he should. He said he found, that the Count de
Vergennes and their Ministry were of the same opinion with me, that
the English were determined to evacuate New York. After some time, he
told me, in a great air of confidence, that he was afraid the Count
took it amiss, that I had not been to Versailles to see him. The Count
told him, that he had not been officially informed of my arrival, he
had only learned it from the returns of the police. I went out to
Passy to dine with Dr Franklin, who had been to Versailles, and
presented his Memorial, and the papers accompanying it. The Count said
he would have the papers translated to lay them before the King, but
the affair would meet with many difficulties. Franklin brought the
same message to me from the Count, and said he believed it would be
taken kindly if I went. I told both the Marquis and the Doctor, that I
would go tomorrow morning.
_Sunday, November 10th._--Accordingly, at eight this morning, I went
and waited on the Count. He asked me how we went on with the English.
I told him we divided upon two points, the tories and Penobscot, two
ostensible points; for it was impossible to believe, that my Lord
Shelburne, or the nation, cared much about such points. I took out of
my pocket, and showed him, the record of Governor Pownal's solemn act
of burying a leaden plate, with this inscription; 'May 23d, 1759.
Province of Massachusetts Bay. Penobscot dominions of Great Britain.
Possession confirmed by Thomas Pownal, Governor.' This was planted on
the east side of the river of Penobscot, three miles above marine
navigation. I showed him also all the other records, the laying out of
Mount Desert, Machias, and all the other towns to the east of
Penobscot river, and told him, that the grant of Nova Scotia, by James
the First, to Sir William Alexander, bounded it on the river St Croix,
and that I was possessed of the authorities of four of the greatest
Governors the King of England ever had, Shirley, Pownal, Bernard, and
Hutchinson, in favor of our claim, and of learned writings of Shirley
and Hutchinson in support of it. The Count said, that Mr Fitzherbert
told him they wanted it for the masts. But the Count said, that Canada
had an immense quantity. I told him I thought there were few masts
there, but, that I fancied it was _not masts, but tories_, that again
made the difficulty. Some of them claimed lands in that territory, and
others hoped for grants there.
The Count said, it was not astonishing, that the British Ministry
should insist upon compensation to them, for that all the precedents
were in favor of it; that there had been no example of an affair like
this terminated by a treaty, without re-establishing those who had
adhered to the old government, in all their possessions. I begged his
pardon in this, and said, that in Ireland at least there had been a
multitude of confiscations without restitution. Here we ran into some
conversation concerning Ireland, &c. M. Rayneval, who was present,
talked about the national honor, and the obligation they were under to
support their adherents. Here I thought I might indulge a little more
latitude of expression, than I had done with Oswald and Strachey, and
I answered, if the nation thought itself bound in honor to compensate
these people, it might easily do it, for it cost the nation more money
to carry on this war one month, than it would cost it to compensate
them all. But I could not comprehend this doctrine of national honor.
Those people, by their misrepresentations had deceived the nation, who
had followed the impulsion of their devouring ambition, until it had
brought an indelible stain on the British name, and almost
irretrievable ruin on the nation, and now that very nation was thought
to be bound in honor to compensate its dishonorers and destroyers.
Rayneval said it was very true.
The Count invited me to dine; I accepted. When I came, I found M. de
Lafayette in conference with him. When they came out, the Marquis took
me aside, and told me he had been talking with the Count upon the
affair of money. He had represented to him Mr Morris's arguments, and
the things I had said to him, as from himself, &c. That he feared the
arts of the English, that our army would disband, and our governments
relax, &c. That the Count feared many difficulties; that France had
expended two hundred and fifty millions in this war, &c. That he
talked of allowing six millions, and my going to Holland with the
scheme I had projected, and having the King's warranty, &c. to get the
rest; that he had already spoken to some of M. de Fleury's friends,
and intended to speak to him, &c.
We went up to dinner. I went up with the Count alone. He showed me
into the room where were the ladies and the company. I singled out the
Countess, and went up to her to make her my compliment. The Countess,
and all the ladies rose up. I made my respects to them all, and turned
and bowed to the rest of the company. The Count, who came in after me,
made his bows to the ladies, and to the Countess last. When he came to
her, he turned round and called out, _Mons. Adams, venez ici, voila la
Comtesse de Vergennes_. A nobleman in company said, Mr Adams has
already made his court to Madame la Comtesse. I went up again,
however, and spoke again to the Countess, and she to me. When dinner
was served, the Count led Madame de Montmorin, and left me to conduct
the Countess, who gave me her hand with extraordinary condescension,
and I conducted her to table. She made me sit next to her, on her
right hand, and was remarkably attentive to me the whole time. The
Count, who sat opposite, was constantly calling out to me, to know
what I would eat, and to offer me _petits gateaux_, claret, and
Madeira, &c. &c. In short, I was never treated with half the respect
at Versailles in my life. In the antichamber, before dinner, some
French gentlemen came to me, and said they had seen me two years ago,
and that I had shown in Holland, that the Americans understood
negotiation, as well as war.
_Monday, November 11th._ Mr Whiteford the Secretary of Mr Oswald, came
a second time, not having found me at home yesterday, when he left a
card, with a copy of Mr Oswald's commission, attested by himself (Mr
Oswald). He delivered the copy, and said Mr Oswald was ready to
compare it with the original with me. I said Mr Oswald's attestation
was sufficient, as he had already shown me the original. He sat down,
and we fell into conversation about the weather, and the vapors and
exhalations from Tartary, which had been brought here last spring by
the winds, and given us all the influenza. Thence to French fashions
and the punctuality, with which they insist upon people's wearing thin
clothes in spring and fall, though the weather is ever so cold, &c. I
said it was often carried to ridiculous lengths, but that it was at
bottom an admirable policy, as it rendered all Europe tributary to the
city of Paris, for its manufactures.
We fell soon into politics. I told him, that there was something in
the minds of the English and French, which impelled them irresistibly
to war every ten or fifteen years. He said the ensuing peace would, he
believed, be a long one. I said it would, provided it was well made,
and nothing left in it to give future discontents. But if anything was
done, which the Americans should think hard or unjust, both the
English and French would be continually blowing it up, and inflaming
the American minds with it, in order to make them join one side or the
other in a future war. Suppose for example, they should think the
tories men of monarchical principles, or men of more ambition than
principle, or men corrupted and of no principle, and should therefore
think them more easily seduced to their purposes, than virtuous
republicans, is it not easy to see the policy of a French Minister in
wishing them amnesty and compensation? Suppose a French Minister
foresees, that the presence of the tories in America will keep up
perpetually two parties, a French party, and an English party, and
that this will compel the patriotic and independent party to join the
French party, is it not natural for him to wish them restored? Is it
not easy to see, that a French Minister cannot wish to have the
English and Americans perfectly agreed upon all points before they
themselves, the Spaniards and the Dutch are agreed too? Can they be
sorry then to see us split upon such a point as the tories? What can
be their motives to become the advocates of the tories?