Fitzherbert, are kept secret, not only from us, but from the Dutch
Ministers, and we hear nothing about Spain. In general, I learn, that
the French insist upon a great many fish. I dined yesterday with M.
Berkenrode, the Dutch Ambassador, and M. Brantzen, his colleague. They
were both very frank and familiar, and confessed to me, that nothing
had been said to them, and that they could learn nothing as yet of the
progress of the negotiation. Berkenrode told me, as an honest man,
that he had no faith in the sincerity of the English for peace as yet;
on the contrary, he thought that a part of Lord Howe's fleet had gone
to America, and that there was something meditated against the French
West India Islands. I doubt this, however; but we shall soon know
where my Lord Howe is. That something is meditating against the French
or Spaniards, and that they think of evacuating New York for that end,
I believe. Berkenrode seemed to fear the English, and said, like a
good man, that in case any severe stroke should be struck against
France, it would be necessary for Holland and America to discover a
firmness. This observation had my heart on its side; but without an
evacuation of New York, they can strike no blow at all, nor any very
great one with it.
Mr Oswald has made very striking overtures to us; to agree to the
evacuation of New York, to write a letter to General Washington, and
another to Congress, advising them to permit this evacuation, to
agree, that neither the people nor the army should oppose this
evacuation, or molest the British army in attempting it; nay, further,
that we should agree, that the Americans should afford them all sorts
of aid, and even supplies of provisions. These propositions he made to
us, in obedience to an instruction from the Minister, and he told us
their army were going against West Florida, to reconquer that from the
Spaniards. Our answer was, that we could agree to no such things; that
General Washington could enter into a convention with them, for the
terms upon which they should surrender the city of New York, and all
its dependencies, as Long Island, Staten Island, &c. to the arms of
the United States. All that we could agree to was, that the effects
and persons of those, who should stay behind, should have six months
to go off, nor could we agree to this, unless as an article to be
inserted in the general peace.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[13] This proved to be an error. Mr Jay wrote to Doctor Franklin, on
the 26th of January, 1783, as follows, "It having been suspected, that
I concurred in the appointment of your grandson to the place of
Secretary to the American Commission for Peace, _at your instance_, I
think it right thus unsolicited to put it in your power to correct the
mistake, &c." See the whole letter in _Franklin's Correspondence_,
Vol. IV. p. 73.
* * * * *
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.
Philadelphia, November 6th, 1782.
Sir,
The scene of action is so entirely transferred to your side of the
Atlantic, that scarce any occurrence among us at present is
sufficiently interesting to furnish matter for a public letter.
The resolutions, which have from time to time evinced the steady
determination of Congress, in no event to relinquish the great object
of the war, or think of peace but in connexion with their allies, have
been already transmitted to you. The military force on both sides is
perfectly inactive. By the enclosed extracts from General Carleton's,
and General Washington's letters, you will see that the first is so
bent on peace, that, notwithstanding the opinion of his superiors, he
does not see that the war has any longer an object. It is high time
that he disavows them, for their conduct is a direct disavowal of him.
The clauses of the commission to Mr Fitzherbert, which are designed to
include us, are strong indications of the extreme reluctance of the
British to give up their supposed dominion over this country. You have
great credit with me for the judgment you have formed, from time to
time, of the Court of Great Britain; though your opinions sometimes
run counter to those generally received.
Nothing can be more conformable to our wishes, than the instructions
you have transmitted; keep up that spirit in ---- and we have nothing
to fear from that quarter, but lengthy negotiations, even after they
shall commence in earnest.
We have yet no accounts of the evacuation of Charleston, and that
event begins daily to grow more uncertain. Such is the inconstancy of
the enemy, that one may as well predict what appearances a cloud will
put on two hours hence, by our knowledge of the wind, as reduce their
conduct to any settled shape, by knowing their professions. Our troops
have gone into winter quarters at West Point.
The French have marched to the eastward to be nearer their fleet,
which lies at Boston. Part of the British fleet, consisting of
fourteen sail of the line, and eight frigates, including a ship of
forty guns, sailed from New York the 26th ultimo. They have such a
decided superiority in the American seas, that if they had
correspondent land forces, or even knew how to apply those they keep
cooped up in America, they might render themselves very formidable in
the West Indies. This however is, I hope, an evil, which will be ere
long remedied.
Bills for the amount of your salary from January last have been
regularly transmitted to Dr Franklin. You will receive with this the
amount of the last quarter, ending the first of October. Mr Morris, my
Secretary, will enclose you a state of your accounts. I should be glad
if you would acknowledge the receipt of these moneys, as they come to
hand, since I stand charged with them in the Treasury books.
The enclosed resolution will show you, that Mr Boudinott has succeeded
Mr Hanson, as President of Congress.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, November 8th, 1782.
Sir,
In one of your letters you suppose, that I have an open avowed
contempt of all rank. Give me leave to say, you are much mistaken in
my sentiments. There are times, and I have often seen such, when a
man's duty to his country demands of him the sacrifice of his rank, as
well as his fortune and life, but this must be an epoch, and for an
object worthy of the sacrifice. In ordinary times, the same duty to
his country obliges him to contend for his rank, as the only means
indeed, sometimes, by which he can do service, and the sacrifice would
injure his country more than himself. When the world sees a man
reduced to the necessity of giving up his rank, merely to serve the
public, they will respect him, and his opinions will have the more
weight for it; but when the same world sees a man yield his rank for
the sake of holding a place, he becomes ridiculous. This, you may
depend upon it, will not be my case.
Ranks, titles, and etiquettes, and every species of punctilios, even
down to the visits of cards, are of infinitely more importance in
Europe, than in America, and therefore Congress cannot be too tender
of disgracing their Ministers abroad in any of these things, nor too
determined not to disgrace themselves. Congress will, sooner or later,
find it necessary to adjust the ranks of all their servants, with
relation to another, as well as to the magistrates and officers of the
separate governments.
For example, if, when Congress abolished my commission to the king of
Great Britain, and my commission for peace, and issued a new
commission for peace, in which they associated four other gentlemen
with me, they had placed any other at the head of the commission, they
would have thrown a disgrace and ridicule upon me in Europe, that I
could not have withstood. It would have injured me in the minds of
friends and enemies, the French and Dutch, as well as the English.
It is the same thing with the States. If Mr Jay and I had yielded the
punctilio of rank, and taken the advice of the Count de Vergennes and
Dr Franklin, by treating with the English or Spaniards, before we were
put upon the equal footing, that our rank demanded, we should have
sunk in the minds of the English, French, Spaniards, Dutch, and all
the neutral powers. The Count de Vergennes certainly knows this; if he
does not, he is not even an European statesman; if he does know it,
what inference can we draw, but that he means to keep us down if he
can; to keep his hand under our chin to prevent us from drowning, but
not to lift our heads out of water?
The injunctions upon us to communicate, and to follow the advice that
is given us, seem to be too strong, and too universal. Understood with
reasonable limitations and restrictions, they may do very well. For
example, I wrote a speculation, and caused it to be printed in the
_Courier du Bas Rhine_, showing the interest, policy, and humanity of
the neutral confederation's acknowledging American independence, and
admitting the United States to subscribe to the principles of their
Marine Treaty. This was reprinted in the Gazette of Leyden, the
_Politique Hollandais_, the _Courier de l'Europe_, and all the Dutch
gazettes. At the same time I caused to be transmitted to England some
pieces on the same subject, and further showing the probability, that
the neutral powers might adopt this measure, and the impolicy of Great
Britain, in permitting all the powers of Europe to get the start of
her, and having more merit with America than she, by acknowledging her
independence first. These pieces were printed in the English papers,
in the form of letters to the Earl of Shelburne, and can never be
controverted, because they are in writing, and in print, with their
dates. These fears thus excited, added to our refusal to treat on an
unequal footing, probably produced his Lordship's resolution, to
advise the King to issue the commission, under the great seal, to Mr
Oswald; by which Great Britain has got the start, and gone to the
windward of the other European powers. No man living, but myself,
knew, that all these speculations, in various parts of Europe, came
from me. Would it do for me to communicate all this to the French
Ministers? Is it possible for me to communicate all these things to
Congress? Believe me it is not, and give me leave to say it will not
do to communicate them to my friend, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, nor
my friend, M. Marbois. If they should be, long letters will lay all
open to the Count de Vergennes, who, I assure you, I do not believe
will assist me, or anybody else, in such measures of serving our
country. When the French Ministers in America, or Europe, communicate
everything to us, we may venture to be equally communicative with
them. But when everything is concealed from us, more cautiously than
it is from England, we shall do ourselves injustice, if we are not
upon our guard.
If we conduct ourselves with caution, prudence, moderation, and
firmness, we shall succeed in every great point; but if Congress, or
their Ministers abroad suffer themselves to be intimidated by threats,
slanders, or insinuations, we shall be duped out of the fishery, the
Mississippi, much of the western lands, compensation to the tories,
and Penobscot at least, if not Kennebec. This is my solemn opinion,
and I will never be answerable to my country, posterity, or my own
mind, for the consequences, that might happen from concealing it.
It is for the determinate purpose of carrying these points, that one
man, who is submission itself, is puffed up to the top of Jacob's
ladder in the clouds, and every other man depressed to the bottom of
it in the dust. This is my opinion, let me be punished for it, for
assuredly I am guilty.
With great respect, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, November 11th, 1782.
Sir,
On my first arrival at Paris, I found my colleagues engaged in
conferences with Mr Oswald. They had been before chiefly conducted by
Mr Jay, Dr Franklin having been mostly confined for three months, by a
long and painful illness. At this time, however, he was so much
better, although still weak and lame, as to join us in most of our
subsequent conferences, and we were so constantly engaged forenoon,
afternoon, and evening, that I had not been out to Versailles, nor
anywhere else.
On Saturday last, the Marquis de Lafayette called upon me, and told me
he had been to Versailles, and the Count de Vergennes had said to him,
that he had been informed by the returns of the Police, that I was in
Paris, but not officially, and he should take it well if I would come
to see him.
I went out to dine with Dr Franklin the same day, who had just
returned from delivering his memorial, and repeated to me the same
message. I said to both, I would go the next morning, and,
accordingly, on Sunday, the 9th, I went to make my court to his
Excellency. He received me politely, and asked me questions about our
progress. I answered him, that the English Minister appeared to me to
divide with us upon ostensible points; that I still doubted his
intentions to make a universal peace; that the cry of the nation was
for something to be done or said with the American Ministers; and to
satisfy this, the King of Great Britain had been advised to be the
third power in Europe to acknowledge our independence. As this was a
royal act, and under the great seal of his kingdom, it would never be
denied or revoked; but still it did not render the nation unanimous,
and to avoid, finally, disgusting any great party, the Minister would
still pursue his usual studied obscurity of policy. Points must be
conceded to the Americans, before a complete agreement could be made
with them, even on terms to be inserted in the universal peace, which
would open the full cry of a powerful party upon him, among which were
the refugees. It could not be supposed, that the refugees and
Penobscot were such points with the nation or Minister, that they
would continue the war for them only, if they were ready to strike
with France, Spain, and Holland.
The Count then asked me some questions respecting Sagadehock, which I
answered, by showing him the records, which I had in my pocket,
particularly that of Governor Pownal's solemn act of possession in
1759; the grants and settlements of Mount Desert, Machias, and all the
other townships east of Penobscot river; the original grant of James
the First, to Sir William Alexander of Nova Scotia, in which it is
bounded on St Croix river; (this grant I had in Latin, French, and
English) the dissertations of Governor Shirley, and Governor
Hutchinson, and the authority of Governor Bernard, all showing the
right of Massachusetts to this tract to be incontestable. I added,
that I did not think any British Minister would ever put his hand to a
written claim of that tract of land, their own national acts were so
numerous, and so clear against them. The Count said, Mr Fitzherbert
had told him, that it was for the masts, that a point was made of that
tract. But the Count said, Canada was an immense resource for masts. I
said, there were few masts there; that this could not be the motive;
that the refugees were still at the bottom of this; several of them
had pretensions to lands in Sagadehock, and the rest hoped for grants
there.
The Count said, it was not at all surprising, that the British
Ministry should insist upon compensation to the tories, for that all
the precedents were in their favor; in the case of the United
Provinces with Spain, all were restored to their possessions, and that
there never had been an example of such an affair terminated by
treaty, but all were restored. He said, it was a point well settled by
precedents. I begged his Excellency's pardon for this, and thought
there was no precedent in point. A restitution of an estate not
alienated, although confiscated to a Crown or State, could not be a
precedent in point, because, in our case, these estates had not only
been confiscated, but alienated by the State, so that it was no longer
in the power of the State to restore them. And when you come to the
question of compensation, there is every argument of national honor,
dignity of the State, public and private justice and humanity, for us
to insist upon a compensation for all the plate, negroes, rice, and
tobacco stolen, and houses and substance consumed, as there is for
them to demand compensation to the tories; and this was so much the
stronger in our favor, as our sufferers were innocent people, and
theirs guilty ones.
M. Rayneval, who was present, said something about the King and
nation being bound to support their adherents. I answered, that I
could not comprehend this doctrine. Here was a set of people, whose
bad faith and misrepresentations had deceived the King and deluded the
nation, to follow their all-devouring ambition, until they had totally
failed of their object; had brought an indelible reproach on the
British name, and almost irretrievable ruin on the nation, and yet
that nation is bound to support their deceivers and ruiners. If the
national honor was bound at all, it was bound still to follow their
ambition, to conquer America, and plant the refugees there in pomp and
power, and in such case, we all know whose estates would be
confiscated, and what compensation would be obtained. All this M.
Rayneval said was very true.
The Count asked me to dine, which I accepted, and was treated with
more attention and complaisance than ever, both by him and the
Countess. As it is our duty to penetrate, if we can, the motives and
views of our allies, as well as our enemies, it is worth while for
Congress to consider what may be the true motives of these intimations
in favor of the tories. History shows, that nations have generally had
as much difficulty to arrange their affairs with their allies as with
their enemies. France has had as much this war with Spain as with
England. Holland and England, whenever they have been allies, have
always found many difficulties, and from the nature of things, it must
ever be an intricate task, to reconcile the notions, prejudices,
principles, &c. of two nations in one concert of councils and
operations.
We may well think, that the French would be very glad to have the
Americans join with them in a future war. Suppose, for example, they
should think the tories men of monarchical principles, or men of more
ambition than principle, or men corrupted and of no principle, and
should, therefore, think them more easily seduced to their purposes
than virtuous Republicans, is it not easy to see the policy of a
French Minister in wishing them amnesty and compensation? Suppose that
a French Minister foresees, that the presence of the tories in America
will keep up perpetually two parties, a French and an English party,
and that this will compel the patriotic and independent men to join
the French side, is it not natural for him to wish them restored? Is
it not easy too to see, that a French Minister cannot wish to have the
English and Americans perfectly agreed upon all points, before they
themselves, the Spanish and the Dutch are agreed too? Can they be
sorry then to see us split upon such a point as the tories? What can
be their motives to become the advocates of the tories? It seems the
French Minister, at Philadelphia, has made some representations to
Congress, in favor of a compensation to the royalists, and that the
Count de Vergennes' conversation with me was much in favor of it. The
Count probably knows, that we are instructed against it, or rather,
have not a constitutional authority to make it; that we can only write
about it to Congress, and they to the States, who may, and probably
will, deliberate upon it a year or eighteen months before they all
decide, and then every one of them will determine against it. In this
way, there is an insuperable obstacle to any agreement between the
English and Americans, even upon terms to be inserted in the general
peace, before all are ready, and, indeed, after. It has been upon
former occasions the constant practice of the French, to have some of
their subjects in London, and the English some of theirs in Paris,
during conferences for peace, in order to propagate such sentiments as
they wished to prevail. I doubt not there are such there now. M.
Rayneval has certainly been there. It is reported, I know not how
truly, that M. Gerard has been there, and probably others are there,
who can easily prompt the tories to clamor, and to cry that the King's
dignity and nation's honor are compromised, to support their demands.
America has been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She has
been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it
is easy to foresee, that France and England both will endeavor to
involve us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid
them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and to
have nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce. My poor
thoughts and feeble efforts, have been from the beginning constantly
employed to arrange all our European connexions to this end, and will
continue to be so employed, whether they succeed or not. My hopes of
success are stronger now than they ever have been, because I find Mr
Jay precisely in the same sentiments, after all the observations and
reflections he has made in Europe, and Dr Franklin at last, at least
appears to coincide with us. We are all three perfectly united in the
affair of the tories, and of the Sagadehock, the only points in which
the British Minister pretends to differ from us.
The enclosed papers will show Congress the substance of the
negotiation. The treaty, as first projected between Mr Oswald on one
side, and Dr Franklin and Mr Jay on the other before my arrival; the
treaty as projected after my arrival, between Mr Oswald and the three
American Ministers, my Lord Shelburne having disagreed to the first;
Mr Oswald's letter and our answer; Mr Strachey's letter and our
answer.[14] Mr Strachey has gone to London with the whole, and we are
waiting his return, or the arrival of some other, with further
instructions.
If Congress should wish to know my conjecture, it is, that the
Ministry will still insist upon compensation to the tories, and thus
involve the nation every month of the war in an expense sufficient to
make a full compensation to all the tories in question. They would not
do this, however, if they were ready with France and Spain.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.
Philadelphia, November 18th, 1782.
Sir,
Since my letter of the 6th, Congress have been pleased to appoint Mr
Jefferson one of their Ministers Plenipotentiary for negotiating
peace. I have not yet received an answer to my letter informing him of
this event, though I have some reason to believe he will accept the
appointment.
I believe I mentioned to you, that Congress had refused to accept Mr
Laurens' resignation. Many members have since seen with great pain,
the petition published in the Parliamentary debates as his. I
sincerely wish, that it may prove to be a forgery, since the language
it speaks does not consist with the dignified character he holds. He
has since informed Congress, that he purposes to return to England,
and come out to this country by the way of New York. I hope the
determination of Congress will reach him before he leaves France, as
it will have an awkward appearance to send to England for an American
Minister.
All the contracts we have received from you, have been sent back with
the ratification endorsed. Some of them have, I hope, reached you
before this. So that the last hand may be put to the important
business of the loan.
So much has been said of Captain Asgill, upon whom, as you have been
informed, the lot fell, when it was determined to avenge the death of
Captain Huddy, that I should let you know the issue of this business,
which you may in part collect, from the enclosed resolve, though you
may be ignorant of the reasons which induced Congress to pass it, and
again render abortive their determination to punish the unexampled
cruelty of the enemy. Mrs Asgill, the mother of this unfortunate young
man, had sufficient influence at the Court of France to obtain its
interposition in his favor; a letter was written on the subject by
Count de Vergennes to General Washington, enclosing one from Mrs
Asgill to the Count, which was extremely pathetic. The Minister of
France had orders from his master to support this application. It was
thought advisable, that this should not be formally done, but that the
discharge of Asgill, should be grounded upon the reasons expressed in
the preamble of the resolution. Congress the more readily acquiesced
in this measure, as there is ground to hope, from the late conduct of
the enemy, that they have determined to adopt a more civilized mode of
carrying on the war in future. They have called off the savages, and a
large number of prisoners have returned on parole from Canada.