Congress, in favor of a compensation to the royalists, and the Count
de Vergennes no longer than yesterday said much to me in their favor.
The Count probably knows, that we are instructed against it, that
Congress are instructed against it, or rather have not constitutional
authority to do it; that we can only write about it to Congress, and
they to the States, who may, and probably will, deliberate upon it
eighteen months before they all decide, and then every one of them
will determine against it. In this way there is an insuperable
obstacle to any agreement between the English and Americans, even upon
terms to be inserted in the general peace, before all are ready. It
was the constant practice of the French to have some of their subjects
in London during the conferences for peace in order to propagate such
sentiments there as they wished to prevail. I doubted not such were
there now; M. Rayneval had been there. M. Gerard, I had heard, is
there now, and probably others. They can easily persuade the tories to
set up their demands, and tell them and the Ministers, that the King's
dignity and nation's honor are compromised in it.
For my own part, I thought America had been long enough involved in
the wars of Europe. She had been a football between contending nations
from the beginning, and it was easy to foresee, that France and
England both would endeavor to involve us in their future wars. I
thought it our interest and duty, to avoid them as much as possible,
and to be completely independent, and have nothing to do but in
commerce with either of them; that my thoughts had been from the
beginning to arrange all our European connexions to this end, and that
they would continue to be so employed. And I thought it so important
to us, that if my poor labors, my little estate, or (smiling) sizy
blood, could effect it, it should be done. But I had many fears.
I said, the King of France might think it consistent with his station
to favor people, who had contended for a Crown, though it was the
Crown of his enemy. Whiteford said, they seem to be through the whole
of their course, fighting for reputation. I said, they had acquired
it, and more, they had raised themselves high from a low estate by it,
and they were our good friends and allies, and had conducted
generously, and nobly, and we should be just and grateful, but they
might have political wishes, which we were not bound by treaty, nor in
justice or gratitude to favor, and these we ought to be cautious of.
He agreed that they had raised themselves very suddenly and
surprisingly by it.
_Tuesday, November 12th._--The compliment of "_Monsieur, vous etes le
Washington de la negotiation_," was repeated to me, by more than one
person. I answered, "_Monsieur, vous me faites le plus grand honneur,
et le compliment le plus sublime possible_." "_Eh! Monsieur, en
verite, vous l'avez bien merite._"
_Friday, November 15th._--Mr Oswald came to visit me, and entered with
some freedom, into conversation. I said many things to him to convince
him, that it was the policy of my Lord Shelburne, and the interest of
the nation, to agree with us upon the advantageous terms, which Mr
Strachey carried away on the 5th; showed him the advantages of the
boundary, the vast extent of land, and the equitable provision for the
payment of debts, and even the great benefits stipulated for the
tories.
He said he had been reading Mr Paine's answer to the Abbe Raynal, and
had found there an excellent argument in favor of the tories. Mr Paine
says, that before the battle of Lexington, we were so blindly
prejudiced in favor of the English, and so closely attached to them,
that we went to war at any time, and for any object, when they bid us.
Now this being habitual to the Americans, it was excusable in the
tories to behave on this occasion, as all of us had ever done upon all
others. He said, if he were a member of Congress, he would show a
magnanimity upon this occasion, and would say to the refugees, take
your property, we scorn to make any use of it in building up our
system.
I replied, that we had no power, and Congress had no power, and,
therefore, we must consider how it would be reasoned upon in the
several Legislatures of the separate States, if, after being sent by
us to Congress, and by them to the several States, in the course of
twelve or fifteen months, it should be there debated. You must carry
on the war six or nine months certainly, for this compensation; and
consequently spend, in the prosecution of it, six or nine times the
sum necessary to make the compensation; for I presume this war costs
every month to Great Britain, a larger sum than would be necessary to
pay for the forfeited estates.
"How," said I, "will an independent man in one of our Assemblies
consider this? We will take a man, who is no partisan of England or
France, one who wishes to do justice to both, and to all nations, but
is the partisan only of his own." "Have you seen," said he, "a certain
letter written to the Count de Vergennes, wherein Mr Samuel Adams is
treated pretty freely?" "Yes," said I, "and several other papers, in
which Mr John Adams has been treated so too. I do not know what you
may have heard in England of Mr Samuel Adams. You may have been taught
to believe, for what I know, that he eats little children. But I
assure you, he is a man of humanity and candor, as well as integrity;
and further, that he is devoted to the interest of his country, and, I
believe, wishes never to be, after a peace, the partisan to France or
England, but to do justice and all the good he can to both. I thank
you for mentioning him, for I will make him my orator. What will he
say, when the question of amnesty and compensation to the tories comes
before the Senate of Massachusetts, and when he is informed, that
England makes a point of it, and that France favors her? He will say,
here are two old sagacious Courts, both endeavoring to sow the seeds
of discord among us, each endeavoring to keep us in hot water; to keep
up continual broils between an English party and a French party, in
hopes of obliging the independent and patriotic party to lean to its
side. England wishes them here, and compensated, not merely to get rid
of them, and to save herself the money, but to plant among us
instruments of her own, to make divisions among us, and between us and
France, to be continually crying down the religion, the government,
the manners of France, and crying up the language, the fashions, the
blood, &c. of England. England also means, by insisting on our
compensating these worst of enemies, to obtain from us a tacit
acknowledgment of the right of the war, an implicit acknowledgment,
that the tories have been justifiable, or at least excusable, and that
we, only by a fortunate coincidence of events, have carried a wicked
rebellion into a complete revolution. At the very time, when Britain
professes to desire peace, reconciliation, perpetual oblivion of all
past unkindnesses, can she wish to send in among us a number of
persons, whose very countenances will bring fresh to our remembrance
the whole history of the rise and progress of the war, and of all its
atrocities? Can she think it conciliatory, to oblige us to lay taxes
upon those, whose habitations have been consumed, to reward those who
have burned them? Upon those, whose relations have been cruelly
destroyed, to compensate the murderers? What can be the design of
France, on the other hand, by espousing the cause of those men?
Indeed, her motives may be guessed at. She may wish to keep up in our
minds a terror of England, and a fresh remembrance of all we have
suffered. Or she may wish to prevent our Ministers in Europe from
agreeing with the British Ministers, until she shall say, that she and
Spain are satisfied in all points."
I entered largely with Mr Oswald into the consideration of the
influence this question would have upon the councils of the British
cabinet, and the debates in Parliament. The King and the old Ministry
might think their personal reputations concerned, in supporting men
who had gone such lengths, and suffered so much in their attachment to
them. The King may say, "I have other dominions abroad, Canada, Nova
Scotia, Florida, the West India Islands, the East Indies, Ireland. It
will be a bad example to abandon these men. Others will lose their
encouragement to adhere to my government." But the shortest answer to
this is the best, let the King by a message recommend it to Parliament
to compensate them.
But how will my Lord Shelburne sustain the shock of opposition, when
Mr Fox and Mr Burke shall demand a reason, why the essential interests
of the nation are sacrificed to the unreasonable demands of those very
men, who have done this great mischief to the empire? Should these
orators indulge themselves in Philippics against the refugees, show
their false representations, their outrageous cruelties, their
innumerable demerits against the nation, and then attack the First
Lord of the Treasury for continuing to spend the blood and treasure of
the nation for their sakes?
_Sunday, November 17th._--Mr Vaughan came to me yesterday, and said,
that Mr Oswald had that morning called upon Mr Jay, and told him, if
he had known as much the day before, as he had since learned, he would
have written to go home. Mr Vaughan said, Mr Fitzherbert had received
a letter from Mr Townshend, that the compensation would be insisted
on. Mr Oswald wanted Mr Jay to go to England; thought he could
convince the Ministry. Mr Jay said, he must go with or without the
knowledge and advice of the Court, and, in either case, it would give
rise to jealousies. He could not go. Mr Vaughan said, he had
determined to go, on account of the critical state of his family, his
wife being probably abed. He should be glad to converse freely with
me, and obtain from me all the lights and arguments against the
tories, even the history of their worst actions. That, in case it
should be necessary to run them down, it might be done, or at least
expose them, for their true history was little known in England. I
told him, I must be excused, it was a subject that I had never been
desirous of obtaining information upon; that I pitied those people too
much, to be willing to aggravate the sorrows and sufferings, even of
those who had deserved the worst. It might not be amiss to reprint the
letters of Bernard, Hutchinson, and Oliver, to show their rise. It
might not be amiss to read the history of Wyoming, in the annual
register for 1778 or 9, to recollect the prison ships, and the
churches at New York, where the garrison of Fort Washington were
starved, in order to make them enlist in refugee corps, it might not
be amiss to recollect the burning of cities, and the thefts of plate,
negroes, and tobacco.
I entered into the same arguments with him that I had used with Mr
Oswald, to show that we could do nothing; Congress nothing; the time
it would take to consult the States, and the reason to believe, that
all of them would at last decide against it. I showed him, that it
would be a religious question with some; a moral one with others; and
a political one with more; an economical one with very few. I shewed
him the ill effect which would be produced upon the American mind by
this measure; how much it would contribute to perpetuate alienation
against England, and how French emissaries might, by means of these
men, blow up the flames of animosity and war. I showed him how the
whig interest, and the opposition, might avail themselves of this
subject in Parliament, and how they might embarrass the Minister.
He went out to Passy for a passport, and in the evening called upon me
again; he said he found Dr Franklin's sentiments to be the same with
Mr Jay's and mine, and hoped he should be able to convince Lord
Shelburne. He was pretty confident it would work right. The Ministry
and nation were not informed upon the subject. Lord Shelburne had told
him, that no part of his office gave him so much pain, as the levee he
held for these people, and hearing their stories of their families and
estates, their losses, sufferings, and distresses. Mr Vaughan said, he
had picked up here a good deal of information about these people from
Mr Allen, and other Americans.
In the evening, M. de Lafayette came in and told me he had been to see
M. de Fleury on the subject of a loan. He told him, he must afford
America this year a subsidy of twenty millions. M. de Fleury said,
France had already spent two hundred and fifty millions in the
American war, and that they could not allow any more money to her;
that there was a great deal of money in America; that the King's
troops had been paid and subsisted there; that the British army had
been subsisted and paid there, &c. The Marquis said, that little of
the subsistence or pay of the British had gone into any hands, but
those of the tories within the lines. I said, that more money went in
for their goods, than came out for provisions, or anything. The
Marquis added to M. de Fleury, that Mr Adams had a plan for going to
the States-General for a loan, or a subsidy. M. de Fleury said, he did
not want the assistance of Mr Adams, to get money in Holland, he could
have what he would. The Marquis said, Mr Adams would be glad of it, he
did not want to go, but was willing to take the trouble, if necessary.
The Marquis said, that he should dine with the Queen tomorrow, and
would give her a hint to favor us, that he should take leave in a few
days, and should go in the fleet that was to sail from Brest; that he
wanted the advice of Dr Franklin, Mr Jay, and me, before he went, &c.
said that there was a report, that M. Gerard had been in England, and
that M. de Rayneval was gone. I told him, I saw M. Gerard at Mr Jay's
a few evenings ago. He said, he did not believe M. Gerard had been;
that he had mentioned it to Count de Vergennes, and he did not appear
confused at all, but said M. Gerard was here about the limits of
Alsace. The Marquis said, that he believed the reason why Count de
Vergennes said so little about the progress of Mr Fitzherbert with him
was, because the difficulty about peace was made by the Spaniards, and
he was afraid of making the Americans still more angry with Spain. He
knew the Americans were very angry with the Spaniards.
_Monday, November 18th._--Returned Mr Oswald's visit. He says, Mr.
Strachey, who sat out the 5th, did not reach London until the 10th.
Couriers are three, four, or five days in going, according as the
winds are.
We went over the old ground concerning the tories. He began to use
arguments with me to relax. I told him, he must not think of that; but
must bend all his thoughts to convince and persuade his Court to give
it up; that if the terms now before his Court were not accepted, the
whole negotiation would be broken off, and this Court would probably
be so angry with Mr Jay and me, that they would set their engines to
work upon Congress, get us recalled, and some others sent, who would
do exactly as this Court would have them. He said, he thought that
very probable. In another part of his conversation he said, we should
all have gold snuff boxes, set with diamonds; you will certainly have
the picture. I told him no, I had dealt too freely with this Court, I
had not concealed from them any useful and necessary truth, although
it was disagreeable. Indeed, I neither expected, or desired any favors
from them, nor would I accept any; I should not refuse any customary
compliment of that sort, but it never had been, or would be offered to
me. My fixed principle, never to be the tool of any man, nor the
partisan of any nation, would forever exclude me from the smiles and
favors of Courts.
In another part of the conversation I said, that when I was young and
addicted to reading, I had heard about dancing upon the points of
metaphysical needles; but, by mixing in the world, I had found the
points of political needles finer and sharper than the metaphysical
ones. I told him the story of Josiah Quincy's conversation with Lord
Shelburne, in 1774, in which he pointed out to him the plan of
carrying on the war, which has been pursued this year, by remaining
inactive on land, and cruising upon the coast to distress our trade.
He said he had been contriving an artificial truce, since he found we
were bound by treaty not to agree to a separate truce. He had proposed
to the Ministry, to give orders to their men-of-war, and privateers,
not to take any unarmed American vessels.
I said to him, supposing the armed neutrality should acknowledge
American independence, by admitting Mr Dana, who is now at Petersburg
with a commission in his pocket for that purpose, to subscribe to the
principles of their marine treaty; the King of Great Britain could
find no fault with it; he could never hereafter say it was an affront
or hostility; he had done it himself. Would not all neutral vessels
have a right to go to America? And could not all American trade be
carried on in neutral bottoms? I said to him, that England would
always be a country, which would deserve much of the attention of
America, independently of all consideration of blood, origin,
language, morals, &c.; merely as a commercial people, she would
forever claim the respect of America, because a great part of her
commerce would be with her, provided she came to her senses, and made
peace with us, without any points in the treaty, that should ferment
in the minds of the people. If the people should think themselves
unjustly treated, they would never be easy, and they are so situated
as to be able to hurt any power. The fisheries, the Mississippi, the
tories, were points that would rankle, and that nation that should
offend our people in any of them, would sooner or later feel the
consequences.
Mr Jay, M. Couteulx, and Mr Grand, came in. Mr Grand says there is a
great fermentation in England, and that they talk of uniting Lord
North and Mr Fox in administration; the Duke of Portland to come in,
and Keppel to go out. But this is wild.
You are afraid, said Mr Oswald today, of being made the tools of the
powers of Europe. Indeed I am, said I. What powers, said he? All of
them, said I. It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be
continually manoeuvring with us, to work us into their real or
imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make of us a
makeweight candle, when they are making out their pounds. Indeed it is
not surprising; for we shall very often, if not always be able to turn
the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle, and that
of all the powers of Europe, not to desire us, or perhaps even to
permit us to interfere, if they can help it. I beg of you, said he, to
get out of your head the idea, that we shall disturb you. What, said
I, do you yourself believe, that your Ministers, Governors, and even
nation, will not wish to get us of your side in any future war? As for
the Governors, said he, we will take off their heads if they do an
improper thing towards you. Thank you for your good will, said I,
which I feel to be sincere. But nations do not feel as you and I do.
And your nation, when it gets a little refreshed from the fatigues of
the war; when men and money are become plenty, and allies at hand,
will not feel as it does now. We never can be such sots, said he, as
to think of differing again with you. Why, said I, in truth I have
never been able to comprehend the reason, why you ever thought of
differing with us.
_Monday, November 25th._ Doctor Franklin, Mr Jay, and myself, at 11
o'clock, met at Mr Oswald's lodgings. Mr Strachey told us, he had been
to London, and waited personally on every one of the King's cabinet
council, and had communicated the last propositions to them. They
every one of them unanimously condemned that respecting the tories, so
that that unhappy affair stuck, as he foresaw and foretold it would.
The affair of the fishery too was somewhat altered. They could not
admit us to dry on the shores of Nova Scotia, nor to fish within three
leagues of the coast of Cape Breton. The boundary they did not
approve. They thought it too extended, too vast a country; but they
would not make a difficulty. That if these terms were not admitted,
the whole affair must be thrown into Parliament, where every man would
be for insisting on restitution to the refugees. He talked about
excepting a few, by name, of the most obnoxious of the refugees.
I could not help observing, that the ideas respecting the fishery
appeared to me to come piping hot from Versailles. I quoted to them
the words of our treaty with France, in which the indefinite and
exclusive right to the fishery on the western side of Newfoundland was
secured against us, according to the true construction of the treaties
of Utrecht and Paris. I showed them the 12th and 13th articles of the
treaty of Utrecht, by which the French were admitted to fish from Cape
Bonavista to Point Riche. I related to them the manner in which the
cod and haddock came into the rivers, harbors, creeks, and up to the
very wharves, on all the northern coasts of America, in the spring, in
the month of April, so that you have nothing to do, but step into a
boat, and bring in a parcel of fish in a few hours. But that in May
they began to withdraw. We have a saying in Boston that, "when the
blossoms fall, the haddock begin to crawl," i.e. to move into deep
water; so that in summer you must go out some distance to fish; at
Newfoundland it was the same. The fish in March and April were in
shore, in all the creeks, bays, and harbors, i.e. within three leagues
of the coasts or shores of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia; that neither
French nor English, could go from Europe and arrive early enough for
the first fare; that our vessels could, being so much nearer, an
advantage which God and nature had put into our hands; but this
advantage of ours had been an advantage to England; because our fish
had been sold in Spain and Portugal for gold and silver, and that gold
and silver sent to London for manufactures; that this would be the
course again; that France foresaw it, and wished to deprive England of
it, by persuading her to deprive us of it; that it would be a master
stroke of policy if she could succeed; but England must be completely
the dupe before she could succeed.
There were three lights in which it might be viewed. 1st. As a nursery
for seamen. 2d. As a source of profit. 3d. As a source of contention.
As a nursery of seamen, did England consider us as worse enemies than
France? Had she rather France should have the seamen than America? The
French marine was nearer and more menacing than ours. As a source of
profit, had England rather France should supply the markets of Lisbon
and Cadiz with fish, and take the gold and silver, than we? France
would never spend any of that money in London. We should spend it all
there, very nearly. As a source of contention, how could we restrain
our fishermen (the boldest men alive) from fishing in prohibited
places? How could our men see the French admitted to fish, and
themselves excluded by the English? It would then be a cause of
disputes, and such seeds France might wish to sow. That I wished for
two hours' conversation on the subject with one of the King's council.
If I did not convince him he was undesignedly betraying the interest
of his Sovereign; I was mistaken. Strachey said, perhaps I would put
down some observations in writing upon it; I said, with all my heart,
provided I had the approbation of my colleagues; but I could do
nothing of the kind without submitting it to their judgments; and,
that whatever I had said or should say, upon the subject, however
strongly I might express myself was always to be understood, with
submission to my colleagues. I showed them Captain Coffin's letter,
and gave them his character. His words are;
"Our fishermen from Boston, Salem, Newbury, Marblehead, Cape Ann, Cape
Cod, and Nantucket, have frequently gone out on the fisheries to the
Straits of Belleisle, north part of Newfoundland, and the banks
adjacent thereto, there to continue the whole season, and have made
use of the north part of Newfoundland, the Labrador coast, in the
Straits of Belleisle, to cure their fish, which they have taken in and
about those coasts. I have known several instances of vessels going
there to load in the fall of the year, with the fish taken and cured
at these places, for Spain, Portugal, &c. I was once concerned in a
voyage of that kind myself, and speak from my own knowledge.