They write from Stockholm, that the Court of London has thought proper

to make representations to that of Sweden, concerning the rencounter

which a convoy of merchant ships, under the escort of the Swedish

frigate, the Jaramas, had with the English squadron of Commodore

Stewart, who would have visited these merchant ships. The Court of

London pretends, that he was authorised to make such a visit, even in

virtue of the articles of the convention of the armed neutrality,

concluded between the three powers of the north; but that the Court of

Stockholm, far from blaming the refusal of the Captain of the

Jaramas, to permit the visit, had highly approved his conduct, and

answered, "that this officer had acted, conformably to his duty, for

that the regulation in one of the articles of the convention of the

armed neutrality in regard to the visits of merchant ships, respected

only the vessels, which navigated without convoy, but not at all those

which should be found under convoy, and consequently under the

protection of a sovereign flag (Pavillon,) the warranty of the nature

of their cargo, and of the property."

_Petersburg, December 14th, 1781._ "The Minister of Sweden having

communicated, by express order of the King his master, to our Court,

the complaints which that of London had made, concerning the

rencounter of the Swedish frigate, the Jaramas, with the squadron of

Commodore Keith Stewart, as well as the answer, which had been given

to those complaints, the Vice Chancellor, the Count d'Ostermann,

declared the day before yesterday to this Minister, 'that her Imperial

Majesty highly approved the answer of the Court of Stockholm, and

found it in all points conformable to the principle, which she herself

would follow in a parallel case. In consequence, if contrary to all

appearance, the Court of London should not be satisfied with it, and

should pretend to be able to visit neutral merchant ships, which

should be found under the protection of the King, or under that of the

sovereign flag of one of the allies, her Imperial Majesty would be

always ready to concur, and to co-operate with his Swedish Majesty and

the other allies, to oppose themselves to it, as well as to maintain

the independence and respect due to their respective flags.' At the

same time, orders have been sent to all the Ministers of the Empress,

at the belligerent powers, that 'in case there should arise just

complaints or difficulties, with relation to the detention, the

capture, the carrying off, or the ill treatment, which merchant ships,

navigating under the flag of this empire, or under that of one of the

allies of the convention of neutrality, shall have suffered, from

ships of war or armed vessels, of one or another of the belligerent

powers, they should make at first, in such case, every one in his

place, the necessary representations and requisitions, for reclaiming

the said vessels, the reparation of losses, &c. and concur and concert

to this effect with the other Ministers of the contracting Courts,

without asking or waiting for further orders. The allied Courts will

be requested, moreover, to give the orders to their respective

Ministers residing near the belligerent powers.' A courier, despatched

this day to the Hague and to London, carries these orders to the

Ministers of the Empress, as well as the acts of accession of the

Emperor to the principles of the convention of neutrality. The day

before yesterday, the usual day of the conferences with the Vice

Chancellor, he communicated the same acts to the foreign Ministers."

With great respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Amsterdam, February 14th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Yesterday the duplicate of your letter of the 23d of October was

brought to me, the original is not yet arrived. It is with great

pleasure I learn, that a Minister is appointed for foreign affairs,

who is so capable of introducing into that department an order, a

constancy, and an activity, which could never be expected from a

committee of Congress, so often changing, and so much engaged in other

great affairs, however excellent their qualifications or dispositions.

Indeed, Sir, it is of infinite importance to me to know the sentiments

of Congress; yet I have never known them in any detail or with any

regularity, since I have been in Europe. I fear Congress have heard as

little from me since I have been in Holland. My despatches by the way

of St Eustatia, and by several private vessels, and by the South

Carolina, have been vastly unfortunate.

My situation, Sir, has been very delicate; but as my whole life from

my infancy has been passed through an uninterrupted series of delicate

situations, when I find myself suddenly translated into a new one, the

view of it neither confounds nor dismays me. I am very sensible,

however, that such a habit of mind borders very nearly upon

presumption, and deserves very serious reflections. My health is still

precarious. My person has been thought by some to have been in danger;

but at present I apprehend nothing to myself or the public.

This nation will have peace with England, if they can obtain it upon

honorable terms; but upon no other. They cannot obtain it upon any

other, without giving offence to France, and England will not make

peace upon such conditions. I shall, therefore, probably remain here

in a very insipid and insignificant state a long time, without any

affront or answer. In the parties, which divide the nation, I have

never taken any share. I have treated all men of all parties whom I

saw alike, and have been used quite as well by the Court party as

their antagonists. Both parties have been in bodily fear of popular

commotions, and the politics of both appear to me to be too much

influenced by alternate fears, and I must add, hopes of popular

commotions. Both parties agree in their determinations to obtain peace

with England, if they can; but Great Britain will not cease to be the

tyrant of the ocean until she ceases to be the tyrant of America. She

will only give up her claims of empire over both together.

The Dutch have an undoubted right to judge for themselves, whether it

is for their interest to connect themselves with us or not. At present

I have no reason to be dissatisfied. I have, in pursuance of the

advice of the Count de Vergennes and the Duc de la Vauguyon, added to

that of several members of the States, demanded an answer. I was

received politely by all parties, though you will hear great

complaints from others that I am not received well. They have their

views in this; they know that this is a good string for them to touch.

I stand now in an honorable light, openly and candidly demanding an

answer in my public character. But it is the Republic that stands in a

less respectable situation, not one member of the Sovereignty having

yet ventured to give an answer in the negative. The dignity of the

United States is, therefore, perfectly safe, and if that of this

Republic is questionable, this is their own fault, not ours. Your

advice, to be well with the government, and to take no measures which

may bring upon me a public affront, is perfectly just. All appearance

of intrigue, and all the refinements of politics, have been as distant

from my conduct as you know them to be from my natural and habitual

character.

Your advice to spend much of my time at the Hague, I shall in future

pursue, though I have had reasons for a different conduct hitherto. As

to connexions with the Ministers of other powers, it is a matter of

great delicacy. There is no power but what is interested directly or

indirectly in our affairs at present. Every Minister has at his own

Court a competitor, who keeps correspondences and spies, to be

informed of every step; and open visits to or from any American

Minister are too dangerous for them to venture on. It must be managed

with so much art, and be contrived in third places, and with so much

unmeaning intrigue, that it should not be too much indulged, and after

all, nothing can come of it. There is not a Minister of them all, that

is intrusted with anything, but from time to time to execute positive

instructions from his Court.

A loan of money has given me vast anxiety. I have tried every

experiment and failed in all; and am fully of opinion, that we never

shall obtain a credit here until we have a treaty. When this will be,

I know not. If France has not other objects in view of more

importance, in my opinion she may accomplish it in a short time.

Whether she has or not, time must discover.

Mr Barclay is here doing his utmost to despatch the public effects

here; but these will turn out the dearest goods that Congress ever

purchased if they ever arrive safe. It has been insinuated, I

perceive, that I was privy to the purchase of a parcel of English

manufactures among these goods. This is a mistake. It was carefully

concealed from me, who certainly should not have countenanced it, if I

had known it. Mr Barclay will exchange them all for the manufactures

of Germany or Holland, or sell them here. The ordinance of Congress

against British manufactures, is universally approved as far as I

know, as a hostility against their enemies of more importance than the

exertions of an army of twenty thousand men.

With great esteem, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Amsterdam, February 19th, 1782.

Sir,

On the 14th instant, I had the honor to acknowledge the receipt of

your duplicate of the 23d of October. Today Major Porter brought me

your favor of the 20th of November, and the original of that of the

23d of October.

I congratulate you, Sir, on the glorious news contained in these

despatches; but I cannot be of your opinion, that, great as it is, it

will defeat every hope that Britain entertains of conquering a country

so defended. Vanity, Sir, is a passion capable of inspiring illusions,

which astonish all other men; and the Britons are, without exception,

the vainest people upon earth. By examining such a witness as Arnold,

the Ministry can draw from him evidence, which will fully satisfy the

people of England, that the conquest of America is still practicable.

Sensible men see the error; but they have seen it these twenty years,

and lamented it till their hearts are broken. The intention of

government seems to be to break the spirit of the nation, and to bring

affairs into so wretched a situation, that all men shall see that they

cannot be made better by new Ministers, or by the punishment of the

old ones.

It is suggested, that some plan of conciliation will be brought into

Parliament; but it will be only as deceitful as all the former ones.

They begin to talk big, and threaten to send Arnold with seventeen

thousand men to burn and destroy in the northern States; but this will

prove but an annual vapor. I rejoice the more in Colonel Willet's

glorious services, for a personal knowledge and esteem I have for that

officer. Zoutman's battle on Doggerbank shows what the nation could

do. But ... It is somewhat dangerous to write with perfect freedom

concerning the views and principles of each party, as you desire.

Indeed, the views of all parties are enveloped in clouds and darkness.

There are unerring indications, that all parties agree secretly in

this principle, that the Americans are right if they have power. There

is here and there an individual who says the Americans are wrong; but

these are very few. The English party are suspected to have it in view

to engage the Republic to join the English in the war against France,

Spain, and America.

The Prince is supposed to wish that this were practicable, but to

despair of it. Some of the great proprietors of English stocks,

several great mercantile houses in the service of the British

Ministry, are thought to wish it too; but if they are guilty of wishes

so injurious to their country and humanity, none of them dares openly

avow them. The Stadtholder is of opinion, that his house has been

supported by England; that his office was created, and is preserved by

her. But I do not see why his office would not be as safe in an

alliance with France as with England, unless he apprehends that the

republican party would in that case change sides, connect itself with

England, and by her means overthrow him. There are jealousies that the

Stadtholder aspires to be a sovereign; but these are the ordinary

jealousies of liberty, and I should think, in this case, groundless.

The opposite, which is called the republican party, is suspected of

desires and designs of introducing innovations. Some are supposed to

aim at the demolition of the Stadtholdership; others, of introducing

the people to the right of choosing the Regencies; but I think these

are very few in number, and very inconsiderable in power, though some

of them may have wit and genius.

There is another party, at the head of which is Amsterdam, who think

the Stadtholdership necessary, but wish to have some further

restraints or check upon it. Hence the proposition for a committee to

assist his Highness. But there is no appearance that the project will

succeed. All the divisions of the Republican party are thought to

think well of America, and to wish a connexion with her and France.

The opposite party do not openly declare themselves against this; but

peace is the only thing in which all sides agree. No party dares say

anything against peace; yet there are individuals very respectable,

who think that it is not for the public interest to make peace.

As to Congress' adapting measures to the views and interest of both

parties, they have already done it in the most admirable manner. They

could not have done better if they had been all present here, and I

know of nothing to be added. They have a Plenipotentiary here, with

instructions; they have given power to invite the Republic to accede

to the alliance between France and America, with a power to admit

Spain. All this is communicated to the Count de Vergennes and the Duc

de la Vauguyon, and I wait only their advice for the time of making

the proposition. I have endeavored to have the good graces of the

leaders, and I have no reason to suspect that I do not enjoy their

esteem, and I have received from the Prince repeatedly, and in strong

terms by his Secretary the Baron de Larray, assurances of his personal

esteem.

I wrote, Sir, on the 3d and 7th of May, as full an account of my

presenting my credentials, as it was proper to write, and am

astonished that neither duplicates nor triplicates have arrived. I

will venture a secret. I had the secret advice of our best friends in

the Republic to take the step I did, though the French Ambassador

thought the time a little too early. My situation would have been

ridiculous and deplorable indeed, if I had not done it, and the

success of the measure, as far as universal applause could be called

success, has justified it. Those who detested the measure, Sir, were

obliged to applaud it in words. I am surprised, to see you think it

places us in a humiliating light. I am sure it raised me out of a very

humiliating position, such as I never felt before, and shall never

feel again, I believe. I have lately by the express advice of all our

best friends, added to that of the Duc de la Vauguyon and the Count de

Vergennes, demanded a categorical answer. I knew very well I should

not have it; but it has placed the United States and their Minister in

a glorious light, demanding candidly an answer, and the Republic has

not yet equal dignity to give it.

In this manner we may remain with perfect safety to the dignity of the

United States, and the reputation of her Minister, until their High

Mightinesses shall think fit to answer, or until we shall think it

necessary to repeat the demand, or make a new one, which I shall not

do without the advice of the French Ambassador, with whom I shall

consult with perfect confidence.

My motives for printing the Memorial were, that I had no other way to

communicate my proposition to the Sovereign of the country. The

gentlemen at the Hague, who are called their High Mightinesses, are

not the Sovereign, they are only Deputies of the States-General, who

compose the Sovereignty. These joint Deputies form only a diplomatic

body, not a legislative nor an executive one. The States-General are

the Regencies of cities and bodies of nobles. The Regencies of cities

are the Burgomasters and Schepins, or Judges and Counsellors,

composing in the whole a number of four or five thousand men,

scattered all over the Republic. I had no way to come at them but by

the press, because the President refused to receive my memorial. If he

had received it, it would have been transmitted of course to all the

Regencies; but in that case it would have been printed; for there is

no memorial of a public Minister in this Republic, but what is

printed.

When the President said, "Sir, we have no authority to receive your

memorial until your title and character are acknowledged by our

constituents and sovereigns; we are not the sovereign;" I answered,

"In that case, Sir, it will be my duty to make the memorial public in

print, because I have no other possible way of addressing myself to

the sovereign, your constituents."

The President made no objection, and there has been no objection to

this day. Those who dreaded the consequence to the cause of Anglomany,

have never ventured to hint a word against it. The Anglomanes would

have had a triumph if it had not been printed, and I should before

this day have met with many disagreeable scenes, if not public

affronts. This openness has protected me. To conciliate the affections

of the people, to place our cause in an advantageous light, to remove

the prejudices that Great Britain and her votaries excite, to discover

the views of the different parties, to watch the motives that lead to

peace between England and Holland, have been my constant aim since I

have resided here. The secret aid of government in obtaining a loan, I

have endeavored to procure, but it can never be obtained until there

is a treaty. I have hitherto kept a friendly connexion with the

French Ambassador, and that without interruption. The new commission

for peace, and the revocation of that for a treaty of commerce with

Great Britain I have received.

My language and conduct are those of a private gentleman; but those

members of Congress who think this proper, know that I have held

public places in Europe, too public and conspicuous for me to be able

to remain incognito in this country, nor is it for the interest of the

public that I should attempt it.

I should be extremely obliged to you, Sir, if you would let me know

the dates of all the letters that have been received from me, since I

have been in Holland, that I may send further copies of such as have

miscarried. The States of Holland have accepted the mediation of

Russia, on condition of saving the rights of the armed neutrality.

There has been a balancing between a treaty with France, and the

acceptance of this mediation. Amsterdam said nothing. The mediation

was accepted; but several provinces have declared for a treaty with

France. People of the best intentions are jealous of a peace with

England upon dishonorable terms; but France will prevent this, though

she does not choose to prevent the acceptance of the mediation, as she

might have done by consenting to my making the proposition of a triple

or quadruple alliance. Her Ambassador says, the King must not oppose

the Empress of Russia, who will be of importance in the final

settlement of peace.

France has never discovered much inclination to a treaty with the

Republic. The demolition of the barrier towns may explain this, as

well as the Ambassador's opinion against presenting my memorial at the

time it was done. I believe that France too can explain the reason of

the delay of Spain, where we make a less respectable appearance than

in this Republic. The delay of Spain is fatal to our affairs. Yet I

know the American Minister there to be equal to any service, which

makes me regret the more the delay of that kingdom. The constant cry

is, why is Spain silent? We must wait for Spain. Nothing gives greater

advantage to the English party.

The nature of the government in an absolute monarchy, would render it

improper to make any application or memorial public. The nature of

this government rendered it indispensably necessary. The business must

begin in the public, that is in all the Regencies. De Witt and Temple

it is true, made a treaty in five days; but De Witt risked his head by

it, upon the pardon and confirmation of the Regencies. But it was a

time and a measure, which he knew to be universally wished for. The

case at present is different. M. Van Bleiswick, though he told me he

thought favorably of my first application, would not have dared to

take a single step without the previous orders of his masters, as he

told me.

It is the United States of America, which must save this Republic from

ruin. It is the only power that is externally respected by all

parties, although no party dares as yet declare openly for it. One

half the Republic nearly declares every day very indecently against

France, the other against England; but neither one nor the other

declares against America, which is more beloved and esteemed than any

other nation of the world.

We must wait, however, with patience. After oscillating a little

longer, and grasping at peace, finding it unattainable, I think they

will seek an alliance with America, if not with France. I had a week

ago a visit from one of the first personages in Friesland, who

promised me that in three weeks I should have an answer from that

Province.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Amsterdam, February 21st, 1782.

Sir,

I know very well the name of the family where I spent the evening with

my worthy friend Mr ---- before we set off, and have made my alphabet

accordingly; but I am, on this occasion, as on all others hitherto,

utterly unable to comprehend the sense of the passages in cypher. The

cypher is certainly not taken regularly under the two first letters of

that name. I have been able sometimes to decypher words enough to show

that I have the letters right; but, upon the whole, I can make nothing

of it, which I regret very much upon this occasion, as I suppose the

cyphers are a very material part of the letter.

The friendly and patriotic anxiety with which you inquire after my

motives and reasons for making the proposition of the 4th of May, and

for printing the memorial, has put me upon recollecting the

circumstances. If the series of my letters had arrived, I think the

reasons would have appeared, but not with that force in which they

existed at the time. I have never expressed in writing those reasons

so strongly as I felt them. The hopes have never been strong in

anybody of inducing the Republic to a sudden alliance with France and

America. The utmost expectation, that many of the well intentioned

have entertained has been to prevent the government from joining

England. I am sorry to be obliged to say it, and if it ever should be

made public, it might be ill taken. But there is no manner of doubt,

that the most earnest wish of the cabinet has been to induce the

nation to furnish the ships and troops to the English according to

their interpretation of the treaty. Amsterdam distinguished itself,

and its ancient and venerable Burgomaster, Temmink, and its eldest

Pensionary, Van Berckel, have distinguished themselves in Amsterdam.

When Mr Laurens's papers were discovered, they were sent forthwith to

the Hague. The Prince, in person, laid them before the States. Sir

Joseph Yorke thundered with his memorials against Amsterdam, her

Burgomasters, and Pensionary. The nation was seized with amazement,

and flew to the armed neutrality for shelter against the fierce wrath

of the King. Instantly Sir Joseph Yorke is recalled, and a declaration

of war appears, levelled against the city, against the Burgomasters,

and M. Van Berckel. Sir George Rodney, in his despatches pursues the

same partiality and personality against Amsterdam. What was the drift

of all this? Manifestly to excite seditions against Temmink and Van

Berckel. Here then, is a base and scandalous system of policy, in

which the King of Great Britain, and his Ministry and Admiral, all

condescended to engage, manifestly concerted by Sir Joseph Yorke, at

the Hague; and I am sorry to add, too much favored by the cabinet, and

even openly by the Prince, by his presenting Laurens's papers to the

States, to sacrifice Temmink and Van Berckel to the fury of an enraged

populace.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 06 · 第 18 / 36 段