I beg leave to assure your Excellency, that I shall be at all times

ready to attend you, at the Hague, or elsewhere, to confer with you,

in the most entire confidence, respecting this negotiation, and shall

take no material step in it, without your approbation and advice.

There are three ways of proposing this business to their High

Mightinesses; 1st, your Excellency may alone propose it in the name of

His Most Christian Majesty; 2dly, it may be proposed jointly by the

Minister of his Majesty, and the Minister of the United States; or

3dly, it may be proposed by the Minister of the United States alone,

and as a consequence of his former proposal of a Treaty of Commerce. I

beg leave to submit these three measures, to your Excellency's

consideration, and shall very cheerfully comply with any, which you

may most approve.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO JOHN JAY, AMERICAN MINISTER AT MADRID.

Amsterdam, November 26th, 1781.

Sir,

By the last post, I received from L'Orient a set of fresh instructions

from Congress, dated the 16th of August, and with the more pleasure,

as I am enjoined to open a correspondence with your Excellency upon

the subject of them.

I presume you have a copy by the same vessel; but as it is possible it

may have been omitted, I shall venture to enclose a copy, and hope it

may pass unopened. I have communicated it to the French Ambassador

here, who says it is "_tres bien vu; tres bien combine_." I shall take

no step in it, without his knowledge and approbation. I shall hope for

your Excellency's communications as soon as convenient.

The Dutch have an inclination to ally themselves to France and

America, but they have many whimsical fears, and are much embarrassed

with party quarrels. In time, I hope, they will agree better with one

another, and see their true interests more clearly. This measure of

Congress is very well timed.

I congratulate you on the glorious news of the surrender of

Cornwallis. Some are of opinion it will produce a Congress at Vienna;

but I cannot be of that sentiment. The English must have many more

humiliations before they will agree to meet us upon equal terms, or

upon any terms, that we can approve.

What is the true principle of the policy of Spain, in delaying so long

to declare themselves explicitly? Her delay has a bad effect here.

Mr Dana has been gone northward these four months, but I have no

letters from him. Whether the post is unfaithful, or whether he

chooses to be talked about as little as possible at present, which I

rather suspect, I do not know.

My respects to Mr Carmichael, and to your family, if you please.

With great esteem, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO B. FRANKLIN.

Amsterdam, November 26th, 1781.

Sir,

I presume you have a copy from Congress of their instructions to me of

the 16th of August; but, as it is possible it may be otherwise, I have

enclosed one. I have communicated them to the Duc de la Vauguyon. I

shall do nothing in the business without communicating it beforehand

to him, with the most entire confidence, and receiving his approbation

and advice. He informs me, that he has not yet received any

instructions from his Court respecting it.

These instructions have arrived at a very proper time to counteract

another insidious trick of the British Ministry, in agreeing to the

mediation of Russia for a separate peace with Holland.

With unfeigned joy I congratulate your Excellency on the glorious news

of the surrender of Cornwallis to the arms of the allies. How easy a

thing would it be to bring this war to a happy conclusion, if Spain

and Holland would adopt the system of France, and co-operate in it

with the same honor and sincerity. There is nothing wanting but a

constant naval superiority in the West Indies, and on the coast of the

United States, to obtain triumphs upon triumphs over the English, in

all quarters of the globe. The allies now carry on the war in America

with an infinite advantage over the English, whose infatuation,

nevertheless, will continue to make them exhaust themselves there, to

the neglect of all their possessions in other parts of the world.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO JOHN JAY.

Amsterdam, November 28th, 1781.

Sir,

I had the honor to write to you on the 26th instant by the post, a

conveyance which I am determined to try until I am certainly informed

of its infidelity; in which case I will ask the favor of the French or

Spanish Ambassador, to enclose my despatches.

I received, by the last post, a duplicate of despatches from Congress,

the originals of which I received some time ago. I presume you have

received the same from Congress, or from Passy; but, if otherwise, I

will enclose in a future letter a commission and instructions for

assisting at the conferences for peace, at Vienna or elsewhere,

whenever they may take place. In this commission, Congress have added

Mr Franklin, President Laurens, your Excellency, and Mr Jefferson; a

measure which has taken off my mind a vast load, which, if I had ever

at any time expected I should be called to sustain alone, would have

been too heavy for my forces.

The capture of Cornwallis and his army is the most masterly measure,

both in the conception and execution, which has been taken this war.

When France and Spain shall consider the certain triumphant success,

which will ever attend them while they maintain a naval superiority in

the West Indies and on the coast of North America, it is to be hoped,

they will never depart from that policy. Many here are of opinion,

that this event will bring peace; but I am not of that mind, although

it is very true that there are distractions in the British Cabinet, a

formidable faction against Lord G. Germain, and, it is said, the

Bedford party are determined to move for peace.

Our late triumphs have had an effect here. I have received several

visits of congratulation, in consequence of them, from persons of

consequence, from whom I did not expect them. But they are invisible

fairies, who disconcert in the night all the operations of the

patriots in the day.

There will, probably, be a proposal soon of a triple alliance between

France, America, and Holland. If Spain would join, and make it

quadruple, it would be so much the better.

General Green's last action in South Carolina, in consequence of

which, that State and Georgia have both re-established their

governments, is quite as glorious for the American arms as the capture

of Cornwallis. The action was supported even by the militia, with a

noble constancy. The victory on our side was complete, and the English

lost twelve hundred men.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, December 4th, 1781.

Sir,

I have received those instructions, with which I was honored by

Congress on the 16th of August, and communicated them forthwith to the

French Ambassador, to their High Mightinesses, and to the American

Ministers at Versailles and Madrid.[5] The Duc de la Vauguyon was of

opinion, that they were very well considered and very well timed, to

counteract another trait of British policy, in agreeing to the

mediation of Russia for a separate peace with Holland. The British

Ministry mean only to aid the stocks, and lull the Dutch.

There is no longer any talk of a Congress at Vienna. The late news of

General Washington's triumphs in Virginia, and of the friendly and

effectual aid of the Counts de Rochambeau and de Grasse, have made a

great impression here, and all over Europe. I shall punctually observe

my instructions, and consult in perfect confidence with the Duc de la

Vauguyon, in the execution of my late commission. A quadruple

alliance, for the duration of the war, would, probably, soon bring it

to a conclusion; but the Dutch are so indolent, so divided, so

animated with party spirit, and above all so entirely in the power of

their Chief, that it is very certain that they will take the

proposition _ad referendum_ immediately, and then deliberate upon it a

long time.

This nation is not blind; it is bound and cannot get loose. There is

great reason to fear, that they will be held inactive, until they are

wholly ruined. Cornwallis' fate, however, has somewhat emboldened

them, and I have received unexpected visits of congratulation from

several persons of note; and there are appearances of a growing

interest in favor of an alliance with France and America. If I were

now to make the proposition, I think it would have a great effect. I

must, however, wait for the approbation of the Duke, and he, perhaps,

for instructions from Versailles, and, indeed, a little delay will

perhaps do no harm, but give opportunity to prepare the way. The

general cry at this time in pamphlets and public papers, is for an

immediate connexion with France and America.

The consent of Zealand is expected immediately to the loan of five

millions for his Most Christian Majesty. My loan rests as it was, at a

few thousand guilders, which, by the advice of Dr Franklin, I reserve

for the relief of our countrymen, who escape from prison in England in

distress. I have ordered a hundred pounds for President Laurens in the

Tower, at the earnest solicitation of his daughter, who is in France,

and of some of his friends in England; but for further supplies have

referred them to Dr Franklin. I some time since had an intimation that

the British Ministry were endeavoring to form secret contracts with

traitorous Americans to supply the masts for the royal navy. According

to my information, the British navigation in all parts of the world is

at present distressed for masts, especially those of the largest size.

Congress will take such measures as to their wisdom shall appear

proper to prevent Americans from this wicked and infamous commerce, I

wrote to Dr Franklin upon the subject, who communicated my letter, as

I requested, at Court, and his Excellency supposes that the Count de

Vergennes will write to Congress, or to the Chevalier de la Luzerne

upon the subject.

The Continental goods left here by Commodore Gillon, are detained for

freight and damages, and very unjustly as I conceive. I am doing all

in my power to obtain possession of them, and send them to America, or

dispose of them here, at as little loss as possible, according to the

desire and advice of Dr Franklin. It is not necessary to trouble

Congress to read a volume of letters upon the subject of these goods.

All that can be done by me, has been and shall be done to save the

public interest. This piece of business has been managed as ill as any

that has ever been done for Congress in Europe, whether it is owing to

misfortune, want of skill, or anything more disagreeable.

The Court of Russia does not at present appear to be acting that noble

part, which their former conduct gave cause to expect. Mr Dana is at

Petersburg, but he prudently avoids writing. If he sees no prospect of

advantage in staying there, he will be very silent, I believe, and not

stay very long.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[5] For these instructions, and Mr Adams' new commission to form a

treaty of alliance with the United Provinces, see the _Secret Journals

of Congress_, Vol. II pp. 470, 472.

* * * * *

THE DUC DE LA VAUGUYON TO JOHN ADAMS.

Translation.

The Hague, December 7th, 1781.

Sir,

I have received the letter you did me the honor to write me, and the

copy of the resolutions of Congress, of the 16th of August last. I

flatter myself, that you will not doubt of my zeal to concert with you

the ulterior measures, which they may require, as soon as the King has

authorised me. But until his Majesty has transmitted to me his orders

on this point, I can only repeat to you the assurances of my zeal for

everything interesting to the common cause of France and North

America, and the peculiar satisfaction I shall derive from my

connexions with you in all circumstances.

I have the honor to be, &c.

DE LA VAUGUYON.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, December 13th, 1781.

Sir,

The answer of my Lord Stormont to M. Simolin is as follows.

"The alliance, which has subsisted so many years between Great Britain

and the States-General, has always been considered by his Majesty as a

connexion founded on the most natural relations, and which was not

only conformable to the interests of the two nations, but as essential

to their mutual well-being. The King has done everything on his part

to maintain these connexions and to strengthen them; and if the

conduct of their High Mightinesses had been answerable to that of his

Majesty, they would have subsisted at this hour in all their force.

But from the commencement of the present troubles, the single return

with which the Republic has requited the constant friendship of the

King, has been the renunciation of the principles of an alliance, the

primary object of which was the mutual defence of the two nations; an

obstinate refusal to fulfil the most sacred obligations; a daily

violation of the most solemn treaties; an assistance given to those

very enemies against whom the King had a right to demand succor; an

asylum granted to American pirates in the ports of Holland, in public

violation of the clearest stipulations; and to fill up the measure, a

denial of justice and of satisfaction for the affront offered to the

dignity of the King by a secret league with his rebel subjects.

"All these accumulated grievances have not permitted the King to act

any other part, than that which he has taken with the most sensible

reluctance. When we laid before the public the motives which had

rendered this rupture inevitable, the King attributed the conduct of

the Republic to its true cause, viz. the unfortunate influence of a

faction, which sacrificed the interest of the nation to private views;

but the King at the same time manifested the sincerest desire to be

able to draw back the Republic to a system of strict union,

efficacious alliance and reciprocal protection, which has so greatly

contributed to the well-being and to the glory of the two nations.

"When the Empress of Russia offered her good offices to effectuate a

reconciliation by a particular peace, the King testified his gratitude

for this fresh proof of a friendship, which is to him so precious, and

avoided to expose the mediation of her Majesty to the danger of a

fruitless negotiation; he explained the reasons which convinced him,

that in the then prevailing disposition of the Republic, governed by a

faction, any reconciliation during the war with France, would be but a

reconciliation in appearance, and would give to the party which rule

in the Republic, an opportunity to re-assume the part of a secret

auxiliary of all the King's enemies, under the mask of a feigned

alliance with Great Britain. But if there are certain indications of

an alteration in this disposition; if the powerful intervention of her

Imperial Majesty can accomplish this change, and reclaim the Republic

to principles, which the wisest part of the nation has never

abandoned; his Majesty will be ready to treat of a separate peace with

their High Mightinesses; and he hopes that the Empress of all the

Russias may be the sole mediatrix of this peace. She was the first to

offer her good offices; and an intervention so efficacious and so

powerful as her's, cannot gain in weight and influence by the

accession of the most respectable allies. The friendship of the

Empress towards the two nations, the interest which her empire has in

their reciprocal welfare, her known impartiality, and her elevated

views, are so many securities for the manner in which she will conduct

this salutary work, and in a negotiation, which has for its end the

termination of a war, caused by the violation of treaties, and an

affront offered to the Crown of a King, his Majesty refers himself

with equal satisfaction and confidence to the mediation of a

Sovereign, who holds sacred the faith of treaties, who knows so well

the value of the dignity of Sovereigns, and who has maintained her

own, during her glorious reign, with so much firmness and grandeur."

Thus the mediation of Russia is accepted, and that of Sweden and

Denmark refused. The instructions of Congress and their new commission

of last August are arrived in most happy time, to counteract this

insidious manoeuvre, and I hope the Duc de la Vauguyon will receive

his instructions on the same subject before it be too late.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, December 14th, 1781.

Sir,

The first public body, which has proposed a connexion with the United

States, is the Quarter of Oostergo, in the Province of Friesland. The

proposition is in these words;

"Every impartial patriot has a long time perceived, that in the

direction of affairs relative to this war with England, there has been

manifested an inconceivable lukewarmness and sloth; but they discover

themselves still more at this moment, by the little inclination which

in general the Regencies of the Belgic Provinces testify to commence a

treaty of commerce and friendship with the new Republic of the

Thirteen United States of North America; and to contract engagements,

at least during the continuance of this common war with the Crowns of

France and Spain. Nevertheless, the necessity of these measures

appears clearly, since according to our judgments, nothing was more

natural, nor more conformable to sound policy, founded upon the laws

of nature the most precise, than that this Republic immediately after

the formal declaration of war by the English, (not being yet able to

do anything by military exploits, not being in a state of defence

sufficiently respectable to dare at sea to oppose one fleet or

squadron to our perfidious enemy,) should have commenced by

acknowledging, by a public declaration, the independence of North

America.

"This would have been from that time the greatest step to the

humiliation of England, and our own re-establishment, and by this

measure, the Republic would have proved her firm resolution to act

with vigor. Every one of our inhabitants, all Europe, who have their

eyes fixed upon us, the whole world expected, with just reason, this

measure from the Republic. It is true, that before the formal

declaration of war by England, one might perhaps have alleged some

plausible reasons to justify in some degree the backwardness in this

great and interesting affair. But, as at present Great Britain is no

longer our secret, but our declared enemy, which dissolves all the

connexions between the two nations; and as it is the duty not only of

all the Regencies, but also of all the citizens of this Republic to

reduce by all imaginable annoyances this enemy, so unjust to reason,

and to force him if possible, to conclude an honorable peace; why

should we hesitate any longer to strike, by this measure so

reasonable, the most sensible blow to the common enemy? Will not this

delay occasion a suspicion, that we prefer the interest of our enemy,

to that of our country? North America, so sensibly offended by the

refusal of her offer; France and Spain, in the midst of a war

supported with activity, must they not regard us as the secret friends

and favorers of their and our common enemy? Have they not reason to

conclude from it, that our inaction ought to be less attributed to our

weakness, than to our affection for England? Will not this opinion

destroy all confidence in our nation heretofore so renowned in this

respect? And our allies, at this time natural, must they not imagine,

that it is better to have in us declared enemies, than pretended

friends; and shall we not be involved in a ruinous war, which we might

have rendered advantageous, if it had been well directed?

"While, on the other hand, it is evident that by a new connexion with

the States of North America, by engagements at least during this war

with France and Spain, we shall obtain not only the confidence of

these formidable powers instead of their distrust, but by this means

we shall, moreover, place our Colonies in safety against every insult;

we shall have a well-grounded hope of recovering with the aid of the

allied powers, our lost possessions, if the English should make

themselves masters of them, and our commerce, at present neglected and

so shamefully pillaged, would reassume a new vigor, considering that

in such case as it is manifestly proved by solid reasons, this

Republic would derive from this commerce the most signal advantages.

But since our interest excites us forcibly to act in concert with the

enemies of our enemy; since the Thirteen United States of North

America invited us to it long ago; since France appears inclined to

concert her military operations with ours, although this power has

infinitely less interest to ally itself with us, whose weakness

manifests itself in so palpable a manner than we are to form an

alliance the most respectable in the universe; it is indubitably the

duty of every regency to promote it with all its forces, and with all

the celerity imaginable.

"To this effect we have thought it our duty to lay before your Noble

Mightinesses, in the firm persuasion that the zeal of your Noble

Mightinesses will be as earnest as ours, to concur to the

accomplishment of this point, which is for us of the greatest

importance; that consequently, your Noble Mightinesses will not delay

to co-operate with us, that upon this important object there may be

made to their High Mightinesses a proposition so vigorous, that it may

have the desired success; and that this affair, of an importance

beyond all expression for our common country, may be resolved and

decided by unanimous suffrages, and in preference to every particular

interest."

M. Van der Capellan de Marsch was the first individual who ventured to

propose in public a treaty with the United States, and the Quarter of

Oostergo the first public body. This, indeed, is but a part of one

branch of the sovereignty. But these motions will be honored by

posterity. The whole Republic must follow. It is necessitated to it by

a mechanism, as certain as clockwork; but its operations are and will

be studiously and zealously slow. It will be a long time before the

measure can be completed.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, December 18th, 1781.

Sir,

Having received an invitation to the Hague, in order to have some

conversation with some gentlemen in the government, concerning the

further steps proper for me to take in the present conjuncture, I had

determined to have undertaken the journey today; but the arrival in

town of the Duc de la Vauguyon, determined me to postpone it until

tomorrow.

At noon, today, his Excellency did me the honor of a visit, and a long

conversation upon the state of affairs at my house. He informed me,

that upon the communication I had made to him, when he was here last,

in person, and afterwards by letter, of my new commission and

instructions, he had written to the Count de Vergennes; that he had

explained to that Minister his own sentiments, and expected an answer.

His own idea is, that I should go to the Hague in some week, when

there is a President whose sentiments and disposition are favorable,

and demand an answer to my former proposition, and afterwards, that I

should go round to the cities of Holland, and apply to the several

Regencies.

He thinks that I may now assume a higher tone, which the late

_Cornwallization_ will well warrant. I shall, however, take care not

to advance too fast, so as to be unable to retreat. His advice is, to

go to the Hague tomorrow, and meet the gentlemen who wish to see me

there; this I shall do.

I have been very happy hitherto, in preserving an entire good

understanding with this Minister, and nothing shall ever be wanting on

my part, to deserve his confidence and esteem.

I have transmitted by two opportunities, one by Captain Trowbridge,

from hence, another by Dr Dexter by the way of France, despatches from

Mr Dana, at Petersburg, by which Congress will perceive that material

advantages will arise from that gentleman's residence in that place,

whether he soon communicates his mission to that Court or not.

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