In the following year, 1916, Russia once more came forward with
her assistance at a critical moment, when the Austrians had broken
the resistance of the Italian Armies on the Asiago-Arsiero front,
threatening a further development of their offensive in the rear of the
Italian Army, in the direction of Venice. At the same time Ludendorf in
his memoirs points out how great were the objects which the Austrians
were aiming at on the Italian front, and he says plainly: "In Italy it
was a question of an operation on a grand scale."
However, the Russian Army in 1916 had no intention of launching an
offensive on the Austrian front, and prepared for an offensive in
an altogether different place, on the German front. Our General
Staff had prepared for the main offensive in the direction of Vilna,
and accordingly it was here that troops and munitions were being
concentrated. (See Gurko's "War and Revolution.")
Everything was ready when the Italians, crushed by the Austrians,
appealed to Russia for aid. An offensive on the Austrian front held
no particular interest for Russia, which naturally had in view the
crushing of the main enemy--the Germans. Still, Russia, just as on
previous occasions, did not hesitate a minute to help her Allies.
Notwithstanding that nothing had been prepared for such an offensive,
General Brusilov launched it along a front two hundred miles long,
with the troops he just happened to have on the spot. Everybody
remembers this celebrated offensive of Brusilov, which netted hundreds
of thousands of prisoners, a great number of other trophies, and
which compelled the Austrians to immediately abandon their offensive
in Italy and to begin the transfer of troops to the Russian front.
"Austria gradually broke off the Italian offensive and sent troops to
the Eastern front," writes Ludendorf. "The Italian Army now started a
counter-offensive in the Tyrol," he remarks further on.
Describing the period of Brusilov's offensive, Ludendorf does not
conceal the fact that they passed through some very bad and critical
moments. "Our G. H. Q. made heavy demands on both groups (group south
of Riga and Prince Leopold group) _and also withdrew divisions from
the West_," writes Ludendorf. "Even all the fresh divisions that
were thrown in were hardly sufficient to hold the front," says he in
describing the situation of the Austro-Germans after the Russian break
through at the Dniester. "This was one of the greatest crises on the
Eastern front," says he further on, in speaking of the new break by
Brusilov at Lutzk.
The effects of Brusilov's offensive proved to be so far-reaching as to
affect not only the situation on the Italian front but also that on the
French main front. The Allies, in view of the difficult situation of
the Germans on the Russian front, launched an offensive at the Somme,
and towards fall they had finally cleared the forts of Verdun of the
Germans.
So did Russia once more fulfill her obligation towards her allies,
as soon as her Army had received some quantity of munitions. This
quantity was not yet sufficient in 1916, and it was only in 1917 that
the Russian troops were at last more or less provided. The lack of
munitions during the period of Brusilov's offensive was pointed out
by the Russian Staff, and Ludendorf himself emphasizes it. He writes
that the situation was relieved thanks to the fact that "the Russians
were also contending against extraordinary difficulty of supply." From
this it may be seen that the Russian Army, having obtained only the
first consignments of inconsiderable and insufficient munitions, did
not hesitate, in 1916, to offer her allies generous assistance on the
largest scale.
* * * * *
Still earlier, during the Verdun period, the Russian Army, not yet
recuperated from the hard blows of 1915, did by no means stand by as an
idle onlooker of the heroic efforts of the French at Verdun. When at
the end of February, 1916, French Headquarters appealed to the Russian
Army for assistance, preparations were begun for an offensive. "The
Russian Army had not lost its spirit after the heavy fighting of 1915,"
says Ludendorf. On the 16th of March operations were begun by the
Russian troops in the territory to the northwest of Dvinsk, continuing
until the 26th of March. This partial offensive, solely in aid of the
French, was attended by success of a local nature. Ludendorf criticises
this operation and says that "it was choked in swamps and blood." Of
course, the terrible weather conditions, the rains and the impassable
roads, interfered with a broad development of this offensive, but still
it had a sufficiently serious effect. "From the 11th to the 21st of
March," acknowledges Ludendorf, "the situation of the 10th (German)
army was critical."