At the close of 1916 the Russian Army again had to offer most effective
assistance at the critical moment of Mackensen's and Falkenhayn's
invasion of Roumania. General Alexeiev pointed out to the Roumanian
High Command the excessive length of the Roumanian frontier line which
rendered operations in the border district difficult for the small
Roumanian Army. General Alexeiev, as well as the Allied military
experts, advised the Roumanians to shorten their front line, by means
of a retreat, to a shorter line in the East which could be held by the
comparatively small Roumanian Army. But the Roumanians, calculating
upon a weakening of the Austrians, preferred to choose a new plan and
invaded vast Transylvania.
[Illustration: This map shows the four places in which the Russian
Army, led by Gen. Brussiloff, broke through the Austro-German front in
the summer of 1916.]
This too daring move, which at first met but feeble resistance,
was, however, soon checked by the enemy. When thereupon the enemy
himself took the offensive and invaded Roumania and began to threaten
Bucharest, the Roumanian representative at Russian headquarters,
General Coanda, appealed to Russia for aid.
The Russian Army had not yet succeeded in recuperating from the effects
of its great summer offensive of 1916. Russia's reserves and supplies
had been to a considerable extent spent during the period of Brusilov's
offensive. Nevertheless Russia, again as always, did not hesitate
for one minute to come to the assistance of the Allies. The Russians
even proposed to take upon themselves the defense of the Roumanian
capital--Bucharest--but this offer was turned down by the Roumanians
with some show of embarrassment; they pointed out that the railroads
leading to Bucharest were blocked with evacuated freights from the
capital and could not therefore carry the Russian troops. Probably
certain political considerations played not a small part in this.
However that might be, Russia did not refuse her aid in the form
desired by the Roumanians. From the long Russian front which, in turn,
stood in need of reserves, troops were taken off and sent to Roumania.
Two armies, under Letchitzki and Sakharov, and the great mass of
cavalry under Mannerheim, were assigned by the Russians to assist the
retreating Roumanians. This effective help by Russia achieved its
purpose, stopping the offensive of the enemy, and towards 1917 the
Russian Armies also took upon themselves the none too easy task of
defending the greater part of the Roumanian front.
For the following year, 1917, Russia prepared for a decisive offensive
on the German front, in common with the Allies. That was the first
year that the Russian Army had at last obtained sufficient armaments
and supplies. The Germans realized that most serious danger threatened
them, and the Germano-Bolshevist provocation was now chosen as the
means of disarming Russia. And yet, even during those terrible days
of the collapse of the Russian Army and the Revolution, Russia was
indispensable to the Allies.
During those revolutionary days of 1917 Russia compelled the enemy to
maintain on the Russian front =162 divisions= of German, Austrian,
Turkish and Bulgarian troops, to the enemy's detriment on the French
main front. On this front the enemy was enabled to maintain only =140
divisions=.
Russia, although sapped by the Germano-Bolshevist conspiracy, was still
formidable, and the enemy did not risk the moving of any of his troops
from the Russian front. Russia was growing faint, but that honest
Russia which had saved her allies in East Prussia, Galicia, on the
fields of Poland, Lithuania, Roumania, in the Caucasus and Armenia, did
not lay down her arms to the very last moment, remaining true to her
obligations.