The third great period of the world-conflict--1915--is the year of
Russia's single-handed fight against Germany, Austria and Turkey. This
year was hardest for Russia not only because all attention and all
efforts of the three enemy powers were directed against Russia alone,
but also because in 1915 Russia was less than ever before prepared
for the struggle--being without arms, shells and munitions. No matter
how much Ludendorf may distort the truth in his memoirs, the whole
world knows that in that year the Russian positions were covered not
by barbed wire entanglements, but by the naked breasts of the Russian
soldiers, and German charges were repulsed not by artillery barrages
but by the bayonet, by cold steel--reminding us of the times when the
Mexicans, armed only with spears, fought against the rifles and cannon
of the Spaniards under Fernando Cortez.
Russia's loss of Poland in 1915 is altogether a result of this
situation, unprecedented in any of the wars fought by European nations.
It was hard to gain victory when the shortage of arms was so great that
some corps counted but 1,500 bayonets instead of 40,000, and at the
same time it was impossible to complement these corps with their quota
of men because these men had no rifles.
Russia had called millions to the colors, but had rifles only for
one-tenth of her men. It is only too obvious that nothing could be
accomplished with millions of men of whom only one in ten was armed.
But in 1916, when Russia acquired rifles and artillery, Brusilov
launched his memorable offensive which netted more than 200,000
prisoners. Another great offensive was in preparation for 1917, but the
Revolution interfered with its realization.
However that may be, the Germans had planned to have done with Russia
by confronting it with Austrian armies and with four or five additional
German corps. But already in 1914 the Germans were compelled to keep 19
corps in the East to the detriment and dislocation of their plans and
forces in France. (See diagrams No. 3,4.) Even during the days of the
Revolution the Germans were obliged to maintain 78½ divisions on the
Eastern front, in addition to 47 Austrian and 15 Turkish, altogether
140 infantry and 22 cavalry divisions, while on the Anglo-French
front the enemy had at that time only 142 divisions. If we take into
consideration all the Russian theatres of war, including those in Asia,
the enemy kept on the Russian fronts 164 infantry divisions and 28
cavalry divisions,--altogether 192 divisions (in May, 1917) while on
the Anglo-French front the enemy had in May, 1917, only 142 divisions.
[Illustration: THE NUMBER OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN DIVISIONS ON THE
RUSSIAN AND OTHER ALLIED FRONTS DURING SPRING OF 1917
INFANTRY CAVALRY TOTAL
ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT
IN EUROPE 125 22 147
IN ASIA 15 15
----
162
ON OTHER ALLIED FRONTS
FRENCH-BELGIAN 140 2 142
ITALIAN 36 36
SALONIKI 17 17
MESOPOTAMIAN 10 10
----
205
This diagram shows that in 1917--the beginning of the Russian
Revolution--there were 162 German, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian
divisions on the Russian front, 147 of whom were on the Russian front
in Europe. On the Anglo-French front there were at this time only 142
German divisions.
The enemy forces were thus divided as follows: on the Russian front,
44 per cent.; on the Anglo-French front, 39 per cent.; on the Italian
front, 10 per cent.; on the Salonika front, 4½ per cent., and on the
Mesopotamian front--about 2½ per cent. Thus, early in 1917 the Russian
Army had opposing it about one-half of all the forces of the Central
Powers.
It is clearer that if these Teutonic forces would be able to
concentrate on the French front, it would mean an immediate breakdown
of the Allies and the triumph of the Prussian militarism throughout the
civilized world.]
Notwithstanding the lack of arms and munitions the Russian Army
rendered the Allies, in the critical days of 1915, assistance that was
not less important and serious than that of the days of the Marne and
Ypres. Russia, by diverting upon herself, towards the close of 1914,
all the efforts of the Central Powers, thereby offered France and
England the opportunity for a whole year to prepare for the prosecution
of the War. Throughout 1915, when Germany, Austria and Turkey were
diverted by Russia, France was enabled quickly to accumulate new
reserves, munitions, shells, to recover from the serious wounds of
1914, and to prepare for that inevitable blow from Germany which
subsequently took the form of a determined offensive at Verdun in 1916.
At the same time England, owing to the fact that Russia had in 1915
taken upon herself the whole burden of the struggle, was enabled in
the course of one year to carry out Kitchener's stupendous plan of
expanding the small, 150 thousand-strong English Army of volunteers
into the four million-strong Army of the English nation in arms. On
the other hand Germany, having called to the colors new reserves, was
compelled by Russia to expend these reserves on the Russian front, and
not on the main front, in France, where the fate of the whole War was
to be decided for Germany.
All these opportunities, all this stupendous preparation in the
creation and development of new armed forces by the Allies, took place
undisturbed and in favorable circumstances, solely because 1915 was
the year of Russia's single-handed fight against three enemy powers,
the year of the greatest self-sacrifice of the Russian Army for the
common cause. Who knows what might have been the result of the German
offensive in France had those German reserves which perished in Russia
broken through somewhere in the north of France simultaneously with the
storming of Verdun, in February. Who knows how far the German military
catastrophe might have been averted had all the fresh reserves of
the Germans, which were being incessantly swallowed up by the Russian
front, found themselves in the West!
To these questions Ludendorf himself happens to give the answers in his
memoirs. Speaking of the offensive of the Germans at Verdun and of the
offensive of the Austrians in Italy, he says: "Both offensives suffered
from the fact that inadequate reserves prevented the first successes
from being followed up."
Where did these reserves, which were lacking for the capture of Verdun,
where did they go to after Germany had in 1915 created a great many new
formations? _In 1915 they were swallowed up by the Russian front during
the German offensive in Poland, and the Verdun operation was frustrated
because, as Ludendorf declares, there were no reserves with which to
develop the first success of the Germans._ For this reason the unbiased
investigator will admit that Russia in 1915 contributed to a tremendous
extent towards the calm and systematic preparation of the Allies for
the decisive German blow, struck at Verdun, but planned to go beyond
Paris. If the firm stand of the French at Verdun, if the talent of
Castelnau, who stopped the withdrawal of the French to the other bank
of the Meuse, directly repulsed the attack of the Germans, the true
ally, Russia, certainly aided by diverting upon herself all the German
reserves in 1915 and giving the Allies a whole year of respite in which
to create new armed forces.
_The Russian front incessantly drew to itself all new German formations
and reserves, and thereby automatically forced the German Army in the
West to carry on unproductive operations which never reached their
objective._ Not one single German operation in France could obtain
full development, and inevitably spent itself just because of lack of
reserves which were always opportunely swallowed by the Russian front.
Turning to the operations of 1915 we see that the Germans,
notwithstanding all their efforts and partial successes, never gained
any decisive results on the Russian front. The Russian Army, having
neither munitions nor arms, was naturally unable to win at this time,
and was compelled to retreat from Poland. But the Russian Army was not
crushed, which, however, had been the main objective of Ludendorf's
offensive.
In his memoirs Ludendorf plainly states: "The German General Staff now
resolved to try to obtain a decision against Russia." This, translated
from military parlance into plain English, simply means that it was the
object to settle, to "finish" with Russia, in other words, to crush
her Army, for otherwise there would have been no sense in starting
operations against Russia, and in wasting against her the reserves so
much needed on the main front, against France. Neither does Ludendorf
conceal this object further on in his memoirs, _but he admits that it
was not accomplished_. For this failure he blames General Falkenhayn,
the Chief of the General Staff, who, it was supposed, prevented
Ludendorf from crushing the Russian Army. We shall not enter into the
personal disputes between Ludendorf and Falkenhayn, whom Ludendorf
throughout criticises sharply. We shall only note that Ludendorf
attempted four times during the summer of 1915 to surround or break
through the several retreats of the Russian Army, but the latter in
every instance retreated in perfect order, carrying their arms with
them. In which one of these four instances, then, did Falkenhayn
interfere? How preposterous this shifting of the blame to Falkenhayn
is, may be seen even from Ludendorf's own statement: "Throughout the
whole War we never succeeded, either on the Eastern or Western front,
in exploiting a big break-through to the full!" In this way he himself
admits that the Germans did not even once succeed, at the proper time,
in utilizing a big success to the full, i. e., Falkenhayn's role was
immaterial. It is but natural that the resistance of the Russians in
1915 prevented the Germans from exploiting that success which they
regarded as a big one, but which, as a matter of fact, consisted
only in the systematic retreat of the Russian Army which was without
arms and munitions. However, the most inopportune statement made by
Ludendorf is contained in the following remark of his concerning the
operations against the Russians in 1915: "We had brought the final
overthrow of Russia a step nearer."
The offensive of Brusilov in the following year, which netted him
more than 200,000 prisoners and made Ludendorf, as he himself says,
frequently worry about the fate of the entire Austro-German front in
Russia, demonstrates how the offensive of Ludendorf in 1915 hastened
"the final overthrow of Russia." On the contrary, this offensive which
cost Ludendorf a great many of his reserves, and afforded a year of
quiet preparation to the Allies, did, as we saw, hasten "the final
overthrow of Germany."
_At this period of the campaign of 1915 there were on the Russian front
67 German divisions and up to 40 Austrian, altogether 107 divisions,
and on the French front about 110 divisions. The Germans could not
defeat the Allies in the beginning of the War, although they had
then in France almost all their forces. It is natural that in 1915,
when they had in France only 50 per cent. of their total forces, the
Germans, through the efforts of Russia, were finally deprived of any
chance of winning in France. It was only through Russia's military
operations that the Germans were driven to such an unfavorable,
hopeless grouping of their forces._