SECOND PUNIC WAR: SECOND PERIOD, FROM THE REVOLT OF CAPUA TO THE BATTLE
OF THE METAURUS. B.C. 215-207.
Capua was celebrated for its wealth and luxury, and the enervating
effect which these produced upon the army of Hannibal became a favorite
theme of rhetorical exaggeration in later ages. The futility of such
declamations is sufficiently shown by the simple fact that the
superiority of that army in the field remained as decided as ever. Still
it may be truly said that the winter spent at Capua (B.C. 216-215) was
in great measure the turning-point of Hannibal's fortune, and from this
time the war assumed an altered character. The experiment of what he
could effect with his single army had now been fully tried, and,
notwithstanding all his victories, it had decidedly failed; for Rome was
still unsubdued, and still provided with the means of maintaining a
protracted contest. But Hannibal had not relied on his own forces alone,
and he now found himself, apparently at least, in a condition to
commence the execution of his long-cherished plan--that of arming Italy
itself against the Romans, and crushing the ruling power by means of her
own subjects. It was to this object that his attention was henceforth
mainly directed. From this time, also, the Romans changed their plan of
operations, and, instead of opposing to Hannibal one great army in the
field, they hemmed in his movements on all sides, guarded all the most
important towns with strong garrisons, and kept up an army in every
province of Italy to thwart the operations of his lieutenants and check
the rising disposition to revolt. It is impossible here to follow in
detail the complicated operations of the subsequent campaigns, during
which Hannibal himself frequently traversed Italy in all directions,
appearing suddenly wherever his presence was called for, and astonishing
and often baffling the enemy by the rapidity of his marches. All that we
can do is to notice very briefly the leading events which distinguished
each successive campaign.
The campaign of B.C. 215 was not marked by any decisive events. The
Consuls were Q. Fabius Maximus (whose plan of conducting the war had
been fully vindicated by the terrible defeat of Cannæ) and Tiberius
Sempronius Gracchus. With the advance of spring Hannibal took up his
camp on Mount Tifata, where, while awaiting the arrival of
re-enforcements from Carthage, he was at hand to support his partisans
in Campania and oppose the Roman generals in that province. But his
attempts on Cumæ and Neapolis were foiled, and even after he had been
joined by a force from Carthage (very inferior, however, to what he had
expected), he sustained a repulse before Nola, which was magnified by
the Romans into a defeat. As the winter approached he withdrew into
Apulia, and took up his quarters in the plains around Arpi. But other
prospects were already opening before him. In his camp on Tifata he had
received embassies from Philip, king of Macedon, and Hieronymus of
Syracuse, both of which he had eagerly welcomed, and thus sowed the
seeds of two fresh wars, and raised up two formidable enemies against
the Roman power.
These two collateral wars in some degree drew off the attention of both
parties from that in Italy itself; yet the Romans still opposed to the
Carthaginian general a chain of armies which fettered all his
operations; and though Hannibal was ever on the watch for the
opportunity of striking a blow, the campaign of B.C. 214 was still less
decisive than that of the preceding year. Fabius was again elected
Consul, and Marcellus was appointed his colleague. Early in the summer
Hannibal advanced from Apulia to his former station on Mount Tifata to
watch over the safety of Capua; from thence he had descended to the Lake
Avernus, in hopes of making himself master of Puteoli, when a prospect
was held out to him of surprising the important city of Tarentum.
Thither he hastened by forced marches, but arrived too late; Tarentum
had been secured by a Roman force. After this his operations were of
little importance, until he again took up his winter quarters in Apulia.
During the following summer (B.C. 213), while all eyes were turned
toward the war in Sicily, Hannibal remained almost wholly inactive in
the neighborhood of Tarentum, the hopes he still entertained of making
himself master of that important city rendering him unwilling to quit
that quarter of Italy. Before the close of the ensuing winter he was
rewarded with the long-looked-for prize, and Tarentum was betrayed into
his hands by two of its citizens. The advantage, however, was
incomplete, for a Roman garrison still held possession of the citadel,
from which he was unable to dislodge them. The next year (B.C. 212) was
marked by important events in Sicily and Spain, to which we must now
direct our attention.
Hiero, so long the faithful ally of Rome, died shortly after the battle
of Cannæ (B.C. 216), and was succeeded by his grandson Hieronymus, a
vain youth, who abandoned the alliance of Rome for that of Carthage. But
he was assassinated after a reign of fifteen months, and a republican
form of government was established in Syracuse. A contest ensued between
the Roman and Carthaginian parties in Syracuse, but the former
ultimately prevailed, and Epicydes and Hippocrates, two brothers whom
Hannibal had sent to Syracuse to espouse his interests, had to quit the
city, and took refuge at Leontini. Such was the state of affairs when
the Consul Marcellus arrived in Sicily (B.C. 214). He forthwith marched
against Leontini, which Epicydes and Hippocrates defended with a
considerable force. He took the city by storm, and, though he spared the
inhabitants, executed in cold blood 2000 Roman deserters whom he found
among the troops that had formed the garrison. This sanguinary act at
once alienated the minds of the Sicilians, and alarmed the mercenary
troops in the service of Syracuse. The latter immediately joined
Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had made their escape to Herbessus; the
gates of Syracuse were opened to them by their partisans within the
walls, and the party hostile to Rome was thus established in the
undisputed command of that city. Marcellus now appeared before Syracuse
at the head of his army, and, after a fruitless summons to the
inhabitants, proceeded to lay siege to the city both by sea and land.
His attacks were vigorous and unremitting, and were directed especially
against the quarter of Achradina[33] from the side of the sea; but,
though he brought many powerful military engines against the walls,
these were rendered wholly unavailing by the superior skill and science
of Archimedes, which were employed on the side of the besieged. All the
efforts of the assailants were baffled; and the Roman soldiers were
inspired with so great a dread of Archimedes and his engines,[34] that
Marcellus was compelled to give up all hopes of carrying the city by
open force, and to turn the siege into a blockade. The siege was
prolonged far on into the summer of B.C. 212, nor did there appear any
prospect of its termination, as the communications of the besieged by
sea were almost entirely open. In this state of things Marcellus
fortunately discovered a part of the walls more accessible than the
rest; and, having prepared scaling ladders, effected an entrance at this
point during the night which followed a great festival, and thus made
himself master of Epipolæ. The two quarters called Tyché and Neapolis
were now at his mercy, and were given up to plunder; but Epicydes still
held the island-citadel and the important quarter of Achradina, which
formed two separate and strong fortresses. Marcellus, however, made
himself master of the fort of Euryalus, and had closely invested
Achradina, when the Carthaginian army under Himilco and Hippocrates
advanced to the relief of the city. Their efforts were, however, in
vain; all their attacks on the camp of Marcellus were repulsed, and they
were unable to effect a junction with Epicydes and the Syracusan
garrison. The unhealthiness of the country soon gave rise to a
pestilence which carried off both the Carthaginian generals and led to
the entire break-up of the army. Shortly afterward the treachery of a
leader of Spanish mercenaries in the Syracusan service opened to
Marcellus the gates of Achradina, and in the general attack that ensued
he made himself master of the island of Ortygia also. The city was given
up to plunder, and Archimedes was slain by a Roman soldier, being so
intent upon a mathematical problem at the time that he did not answer a
question that was asked him. He was deeply regretted by Marcellus, who
gave orders for his burial, and befriended his surviving relatives.[35]
The booty found in the captured city was immense: besides the money in
the royal treasury, which was set apart for the coffers of the state,
Marcellus carried off many of the works of art with which the city had
been adorned, to grace his own triumph and the temples at Rome. This was
the first instance of a practice which afterward became so general; and
it gave great offense not only to the Greeks of Sicily, but to a large
party at Rome itself.
The fall of Syracuse was followed, though not immediately, by the
subjugation of the whole island by the Romans; but these successes were
counterbalanced by the defeat and death of the two Scipios in Spain. We
have already seen that P. Scipio, when he landed at Massilia and found
himself unable to overtake Hannibal in Gaul, sent his brother Cneius
with the army into Spain, while he himself returned to Italy. In the
following year (B.C. 217) Publius himself crossed over into Spain, where
he found that his brother had already obtained a firm footing. They
continued in Spain for several years, during which they gained many
victories, and prevented Hasdrubal from marching into Italy to support
his victorious brother. When Hasdrubal was recalled to Africa to oppose
Syphax, one of the Numidian kings, who was carrying on war against
Carthage, the Scipios availed themselves of his absence to strengthen
their power still farther. They gained over new tribes to the Roman
cause, took 20,000 Celtiberians into their pay, and felt themselves so
strong in B.C. 212 that they resolved to cross the Iberus and to make a
vigorous effort to drive the Carthaginians out of Spain. They
accordingly divided their forces; but the result was fatal. Publius was
destroyed, with the greater part of his troops; and Cneius was also
defeated, and fell in battle, twenty-nine days after the death of his
brother. These victories seemed to establish the superiority of Carthage
in Spain, and open the way for Hasdrubal to join his brother in Italy.
In Italy (B.C. 212) the two Consuls Appius Claudius and Q. Fulvius began
to draw together their forces for the purpose of besieging Capua.
Hannibal advanced to relieve it, and compelled the Consuls to withdraw;
but he was unable to force either of them to fight. Shortly afterward he
returned again to the south to urge on the siege of the citadel of
Tarentum, which still held out; and he spent the winter and the whole of
the ensuing spring (B.C. 211) in its immediate neighborhood. But during
his absence the Consuls had renewed the siege of Capua, and prosecuted
it with such activity, that they had succeeded in surrounding the city
with a double line of intrenchments. The pressing danger once more
summoned Hannibal to its relief. He accordingly presented himself before
the Roman camp, and attacked their lines from without, while the
garrison co-operated with him by a vigorous sally from the walls. Both
attacks were however repulsed, and Hannibal, foiled in his attempt to
raise the siege by direct means, determined on the bold manoeuvre of
marching directly upon Rome itself, in hopes of thus compelling the
Consuls to abandon their designs upon Capua, in order to provide for the
defense of the city. But this daring scheme was again frustrated; the
appearance of Hannibal before the gates of Rome for a moment struck
terror through the city; but a considerable body of troops was at the
time within the walls; and the Consul Fulvius, as soon as he heard of
Hannibal's march, hastened, with a portion of the besieging army, from
Capua, while he still left with the other Consul a force amply
sufficient to carry on the siege. Hannibal was thus disappointed in the
main object of his advance, and he had no means of effecting any thing
against Rome itself, where Fulvius and Fabius confined themselves
strictly to the defensive, allowing him to ravage the whole country
without opposition, up to the very walls of Rome. Nothing therefore
remained for him but to retreat, and he accordingly recrossed the Anio,
and marched slowly and sullenly through the land of the Sabines and
Samnites, ravaging the country which he traversed. From thence he
retired to the Bruttii, leaving Capua to its fate. The city soon after
surrendered to the Romans. Its punishment was terrible. All the leaders
of the insurrection were beheaded; the chief men were imprisoned; and
the rest of the people were sold. The city and its territory were
confiscated, and became part of the Roman domain.
The commencement of the next season (B.C. 210) was marked by the fall of
Salapia, which was betrayed by the inhabitants to Marcellus; but this
loss was soon avenged by the total defeat and destruction of the army of
the Proconsul Cn. Fulvius at Herdonea. The Consul Marcellus, on his
part, carefully avoided an action for the rest of the campaign, while he
harassed his opponent by every possible means. Thus the rest of that
summer too wore away without any important results. But this state of
comparative inactivity was necessarily injurious to the cause of
Hannibal; the nations of Italy that had espoused that cause when
triumphant now began to waver in their attachment; and in the course of
the following summer (B.C. 209) the Samnites and Lucanians submitted to
Rome, and were admitted to favorable terms. A still more disastrous blow
to the Carthaginian cause was the loss of Tarentum, which was betrayed
into the hands of Fabius, as it had been into those of Hannibal. In vain
did the latter seek to draw the Roman general into a snare; the wary
Fabius eluded his toils. The recovery of Tarentum was the last exploit
in the military life of the aged Fabius, and was a noble completion to
his long list of achievements. From the time of the battle of Cannæ he
had directed almost exclusively the councils of his country, and his
policy had been pre-eminently successful; but the times now demanded
bolder measures, and something else was necessary than the caution of
the Lingerer to bring the war to a close.
After the fall of Tarentum Hannibal still traversed the open country
unopposed, and laid waste the territories of his enemies. Yet we can not
suppose that he any longer looked for ultimate success from any efforts
of his own; his object was doubtless now only to maintain his ground in
the south until his brother Hasdrubal should appear in the north of
Italy, an event to which he had long anxiously looked forward. Yet the
following summer (B.C. 208) was marked by some brilliant achievements.
The two Consuls, Crispinus and Marcellus, who were opposed to Hannibal
in Lucania, allowed themselves to be led into an ambush, in which
Marcellus was killed, and Crispinus mortally wounded. Marcellus was one
of the ablest of the Roman generals. Hannibal displayed a generous
sympathy for his fate, and caused due honors to be paid to his remains.
The following year (B.C. 207) decided the issue of the war in Italy. The
war in Spain during the last few years had been carried on with
brilliant success by the young P. Scipio, of whose exploits we shall
speak presently. But in B.C. 208, Hasdrubal, leaving the two other
Carthaginian generals to make head against Scipio, resolved to set out
for Italy to the assistance of his brother. As Scipio was in undisputed
possession of the province north of the Iberus, and had secured the
passes of the Pyrenees on that side, Hasdrubal crossed these mountains
near their western extremity, and plunged into the heart of Gaul. After
spending a winter in that country, he prepared to cross the Alps in the
spring of B.C. 207, and to descend into Italy. The two Consuls for this
year were C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius. Nero marched into Southern
Italy to keep a watch upon Hannibal; Livius took up his quarters at
Ariminum to oppose Hasdrubal. The latter experienced little loss or
difficulty in crossing the Alps. The season of the year was favorable,
and the Gauls were friendly to his cause. But instead of pushing on at
once into the heart of Italy, he allowed himself to be engaged in the
siege of Placentia, and lost much precious time in fruitless efforts to
reduce that colony. When at length he abandoned the enterprise, he sent
messengers to Hannibal to apprize him of his movements, and concert
measures for their meeting in Umbria. But his dispatches fell into the
hands of the Consul Nero, who formed the bold resolution of instantly
marching with a picked body of 7000 men to join his colleague, and fall
upon Hasdrubal with their united forces before Hannibal could receive
any information of his brother's movements. Nero executed his design
with equal secrecy and rapidity. Hannibal knew nothing of his departure,
and in a week's time Nero marched 250 miles to Sena, where his colleague
was encamped in presence of Hasdrubal. He entered the camp of Livius in
the night, that his arrival might not be known to the Carthaginians.
After a day's rest the two Consuls proceeded to offer battle; but
Hasdrubal, perceiving the augmented numbers of the Romans, and hearing
the trumpet sound twice, felt convinced that the Consuls had united
their forces, and that his brother had been defeated. He therefore
declined the combat, and in the following night commenced his retreat
toward Ariminum. The Romans pursued him, and he found himself compelled
to give them battle on the right bank of the Metaurus. On this occasion
Hasdrubal displayed all the qualities of a consummate general; but his
forces were greatly inferior to those of the enemy, and his Gaulish
auxiliaries were of little service. The gallant resistance of the
Spanish and Ligurian troops is attested by the heavy loss of the Romans;
but all was of no avail, and seeing the battle irretrievably lost, he
rushed into the midst of the enemy, and fell, sword in hand, in a manner
worthy of the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hannibal. The Consul
Nero hastened back to Apulia almost as speedily as he had come, and
announced to Hannibal the defeat and death of his brother by throwing
into his camp the severed head of Hasdrubal. "I recognize," said
Hannibal, sadly, "the doom of Carthage."
The victory of the Metaurus was, as we have already said, decisive of
the fate of the war in Italy, and the conduct of Hannibal shows that he
felt it to be such. From this time he abandoned all thoughts of
offensive operations, and, withdrawing his garrisons from Metapontum and
other towns that he still held in Lucania, collected together his forces
within the peninsula of the Bruttii. In the fastnesses of that wild and
mountainous region he maintained his ground for nearly four years, while
the towns that he still possessed on the coast gave him the command of
the sea.
[Footnote 33: See the map in the "Smaller History of Greece," p. 117.]
[Footnote 34: The story that Archimedes set the Roman ships on fire by
the reflected rays of the sun is probably a fiction, though later
writers give an account of this burning mirror.]
[Footnote 35: Upon his tomb was placed the figure of a sphere inscribed
in a cylinder. When Cicero was Quæstor in Sicily (B.C. 75), he found his
tomb near one of the gates of the city, almost hid among briers, and
forgotten by the Syracusans.]
[Illustration: Hannibal.]