THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: FIRST PERIOD, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF CANNÆ. B.C.
218-216.
The Second Punic War was not so much a contest between the powers of two
great nations--between Carthage and Rome--as between the individual
genius of Hannibal on one hand, and the combined energies of the Roman
people on the other. The position of Hannibal was indeed very peculiar.
His command in Spain, and the powerful army there, which was entirely at
his own disposal, rendered him in great measure independent of the
government at Carthage, and the latter seemed disposed to devolve all
responsibility upon him. Even now they did little themselves to prepare
for the impending contest. All was left to Hannibal, who, after the
conquest of Saguntum, had returned once more to New Carthage for the
winter, and was there actively engaged in preparations for transporting
the scene of war in the ensuing campaign from Spain into Italy. At the
same time he did not neglect to provide for the defense of Spain and
Africa during his absence. In the former country he placed his brother
Hasdrubal, with a considerable army, great part of which was composed of
Africans, while he sent over a large body of Spanish troops to
contribute to the defense of Africa, and even of Carthage itself.
All his preparations being now completed, Hannibal quitted his winter
quarters at New Carthage in the spring of B.C. 218, and crossed the
Iberus with an army of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse. The tribes between
that river and the Pyrenees offered at first a vigorous resistance, and,
though they were quickly subdued, Hannibal thought it necessary to leave
behind him a force of 11,000 men under Hanno to maintain this
newly-acquired province. His forces were farther thinned by desertion
during the passage of the Pyrenees, which obliged him to send home a
large body of his Spanish troops. With a greatly diminished army, but
one on which he could securely rely, he now continued his march from the
foot of the Pyrenees to the Rhone without meeting with any opposition;
for the Gaulish tribes through which he passed were favorably disposed
to him, or had been previously gained over by his enemies.
The Consul P. Cornelius Scipio had been ordered to proceed to Spain, but
various causes had detained him in Italy, and upon landing at Massilia
(Marseilles) he found that Hannibal was already advancing toward the
Rhone. Meantime the Carthaginian general effected his passage across the
river, notwithstanding the opposition of the Gauls; and when Scipio
marched up the left bank of the river he found that Hannibal had
advanced into the interior of Gaul, and was already three days in
advance of him. Despairing, therefore, of overtaking Hannibal, he
determined to sail back to Italy and await him in Cisalpine Gaul; but as
the Republic had already an army in that province, he sent the greater
part of his own forces into Spain under the command of his brother Cn.
Scipio. This prudent step probably saved Rome; for if the Carthaginians
had maintained the undisputed mastery of Spain, they might have
concentrated all their efforts to support Hannibal in Italy, and have
sent him such strong re-enforcements after the battle of Cannæ as would
have compelled Rome to submit.
Hannibal, after crossing the Rhone, continued his march up the left bank
of the river as far as its confluence with the Isère. Here he interposed
in a dispute between two rival chiefs of the Allobroges, and, by lending
his aid to establish one of them firmly on the throne, secured the
co-operation of an efficient ally, who greatly facilitated his farther
progress. But in his passage across the Alps he was attacked by the
barbarians, and as he struggled through the narrow and dangerous defiles
the enemy destroyed numbers of his men. It was some days before he
reached the summit of the pass. Thenceforth he suffered but little from
hostile attacks, but the descent was difficult and dangerous. The
natural difficulties of the road, enhanced by the lateness of the season
(the beginning of October, at which time the snows had already commenced
in the high Alps), caused him almost as much loss as the opposition of
the barbarians on the other side of the mountains. So heavy were his
losses from these combined causes, that, when he at length emerged from
the valley of Aosta into the plains of the Po and encamped in the
friendly country of the Insubres, he had with him no more than 20,000
foot and 6000 horse.[31] Such were the forces with which he descended
into Italy to attempt the overthrow of a power that a few years before
was able to muster a disposable force of above 700,000 fighting men.
Five months had been employed in the march from New Carthage to the
plains of Italy, of which the actual passage of the Alps had occupied
fifteen days. Hannibal's first care was now to recruit the strength of
his troops, exhausted by the hardships and fatigues they had undergone.
After a short interval of repose, he turned his arms against the
Taurinians (a tribe bordering on, and hostile to, the Insubrians), whom
he quickly reduced, and took their principal city (Turin). The news of
the approach of P. Scipio next obliged him to turn his attention toward
a more formidable enemy. In the first action, which took place in the
plains westward of the Ticinus, the cavalry and light-armed troops of
the two armies were alone engaged, and the superiority of Hannibal's
Numidian horse at once decided the combat in his favor. The Romans were
completely routed, and Scipio himself severely wounded; in consequence
of which he hastened to retreat beyond the Ticinus and the Po, under the
walls of Placentia. Hannibal crossed the Po higher up, and, advancing to
Placentia, offered battle to Scipio; but the latter declined the combat,
and withdrew to the hills on the left bank of the Trebia. Here he was
soon after joined by the other Consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus, who had
hastened from Ariminum to his support. Their combined armies were
greatly superior to that of the Carthaginians, and Sempronius was eager
to bring on a general battle, of which Hannibal, on his side, was not
less desirous, notwithstanding the great inferiority of his force. The
result was decisive; the Romans were completely defeated, with heavy
loss; and the remains of their shattered army, together with the two
Consuls, took refuge within the walls of Placentia. The battles of the
Ticinus and Trebia had been fought in December, and the winter had
already begun with unusual severity, so that Hannibal's troops suffered
severely from cold, and all his elephants perished except one. But his
victory had caused all the wavering tribes of the Gauls to declare in
his favor, and he was now able to take up his winter quarters in
security, and to levy fresh troops among the Gauls while he awaited the
approach of spring.
[Illustration: Coasts of the Mediterranean, illustrating the History of
the Punic.]
As soon as the season permitted the renewal of military operations (B.C.
217), Hannibal entered the country of the Ligurian tribes, who had
lately declared in his favor, and descended by the valley of the Macra
into the marshes on the banks of the Arno. He had apparently chosen this
route in order to avoid the Roman armies, which guarded the more obvious
passes of the Apennines; but the hardships and difficulties which he
encountered in struggling through the marshes were immense; great
numbers of his horses and beasts of burden perished, and he himself lost
the sight of one eye by a violent attack of ophthalmia. At length,
however, he reached Fæsulæ in safety, and was able to allow his troops a
short interval of repose.
The Consuls for this year were Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius. The
latter was the author of the celebrated Agrarian Law which occasioned
the Gallic War, and in his first consulship he had gained a great
victory over the Insubrian Gauls (see p. 79)(Sixth paragraph of Chapter
XI.--Transcriber). He had been raised to his second consulship by
popular favor, in spite of the opposition of the Senate; and he hurried
from Rome before the Ides of March,[32] lest the Senate might throw any
obstacle in the way of his entering upon his consulship. He was a man of
great energy, but headstrong and reckless. When Hannibal arrived at
Fæsulæ, Flaminius was with his army at Arretium. It was always the
object of Hannibal to bring the Roman commanders to a battle, and
therefore, in moving from Fæsulæ, he passed by the Roman general, and
advanced toward Perugia, laying waste the fertile country on his line of
march. Flaminius immediately broke up his camp, and, following the
traces of Hannibal, fell into the snare which was prepared for him. His
army was attacked under the most disadvantageous circumstances, where it
was hemmed in between rocky heights, previously occupied by the enemy,
and the Lake of Trasimenus. Its destruction was almost complete.
Thousands fell by the sword, among whom was the Consul himself;
thousands more perished in the lake, and no less than 15,000 prisoners
fell into the hands of Hannibal, who on his side is said to have lost
only 1500 men. Hannibal's treatment of the captives on this occasion, as
well as after the battle of the Trebia, was marked by the same policy
on which he afterward uniformly acted; the Roman citizens alone were
retained as prisoners, while their Italian allies were dismissed without
ransom to their respective homes. By this means he hoped to excite the
nations of Italy against their Roman masters, and to place himself in
the position of the leader of a national movement rather than that of a
foreign invader. It was probably in order to give time for this feeling
to display itself that he did not, after so decisive a victory, push on
toward Rome itself; but, after an unsuccessful attempt upon the Roman
colony of Spoletium, he turned aside through the Apennines into Picenum,
and thence into the northern part of Apulia. Here he spent a great part
of the summer, and was able effectually to refresh his troops, who had
suffered much from the hardships of their previous marches; but no
symptoms appeared of the insurrections he had looked for among the
Italians.
Meantime the Romans had collected a fresh army, which they placed under
the command of Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been elected Dictator by the
Comitia of the Centuries. Fabius formed a different plan for the
campaign. He determined to keep the heights, and not to risk a battle,
but at the same time to watch the Carthaginian army, cut off its
supplies, and harass and annoy it in every possible way. From pursuing
this policy he received the surname of _Cunctator_, or the _Lingerer_.
Hannibal now recrossed the Apennines, descended into the rich plains of
Campania, and laid waste, without opposition, that fertile territory.
But he was unable either to make himself master of any of the towns, or
to draw the wary Fabius to a battle. The Roman general contented himself
with occupying the mountain passes leading from Samnium into Campania,
by which Hannibal must of necessity retreat, and believed that he had
caught him, as it were, in a trap; but Hannibal eluded his vigilance by
an ingenious stratagem, passed the defiles of the Apennines without
loss, and established himself in the plains of Apulia, where he
collected supplies from all sides, in order to prepare for the winter.
Meantime the Romans, having become impatient at the inactivity of
Fabius, raised Minucius, the Master of the Horse, to an equality in
command with Fabius. His rashness very nearly gave Hannibal the
opportunity, for which he was ever on the watch, to crush the Roman army
by a decisive blow; but Fabius was able to save his colleague from
destruction; and Hannibal, after obtaining only a partial advantage,
took up his winter quarters at the small town of Geronium. Minucius
acknowledged his error, and resumed his post of Master of the Horse.
During the winter the Romans made preparations for bringing an
unusually large force into the field. The people thought that it needed
only a man of energy and decision at the head of an overwhelming force
to bring the war to a close. They therefore raised to the consulship C.
Terentius Varro, said to have been the son of a butcher, who had been
for some time regarded as the champion of the popular party. The Senate
regarded this election with dismay, as Varro possessed no military
experience; and they therefore persuaded the people to appoint as his
colleague L. Æmilius Paullus, who had distinguished himself by the way
in which he had conducted the Illyrian war during his consulship.
Hannibal remained at Geronium until late in the spring (B.C. 216), when,
compelled to move by the want of provisions, he surprised the Roman
magazines at Cannæ, a small town of Apulia, and established his
head-quarters there until the harvest could be got in. Meanwhile the two
Roman Consuls arrived at the head of an army of little less than 90,000
men. To this mighty host Hannibal gave battle in the plains on the right
bank of the Aufidus, just below the town of Cannæ. We have no statement
of the numbers of his army, but it is certain that it must have been
greatly inferior to that of the enemy; notwithstanding which, the
excellence of his cavalry, and the disciplined valor of his African and
Spanish infantry, gave him the most decisive victory. The immense army
of the Romans was not only defeated, but annihilated, and between forty
and fifty thousand men are said to have fallen in the field, among whom
was the Consul Æmilius Paullus, both the Consuls of the preceding year,
the late Master of the Horse, Minucius, above eighty senators, and a
multitude of the wealthy knights who composed the Roman cavalry. The
other Consul, Varro, escaped with a few horsemen to Venusia, and a small
band of resolute men forced their way from the Roman camp to Canusium;
all the rest were killed, dispersed, or taken prisoners. Hannibal has
been generally blamed for not following up his advantage at once, after
so decisive a victory, by an immediate advance upon Rome itself--a
measure which was strongly urged upon him by Maharbal. "Only send me on
with the cavalry," said this officer, "and within five days thou shalt
sup in the Capitol." Whatever may be the motives that deterred Hannibal
from marching upon Rome, we can not but be surprised at his apparent
inactivity after the battle. He probably expected that so brilliant a
success would immediately produce a general rising among the nations of
Italy, and remained for a time quietly in Apulia, until they should have
had time to declare themselves. Nor were his hopes disappointed; the
Hirpinians, all the Samnites (except the Pentrian tribe), and almost all
the Apulians, Lucanians, and Bruttians, declared in favor of Carthage.
But, though the whole of the south of Italy was thus apparently lost to
the Romans, yet the effect of this insurrection was not so decisive as
it would at first appear; for the Latin colonies, which still, without
exception, remained faithful, gave the Romans a powerful hold upon the
revolted provinces; and the Greek cities on the coast, though mostly
disposed to join the Carthaginians, were restrained by the presence of
Roman garrisons. Hence it became necessary to support the insurrection
in the different parts of Italy with a Carthaginian force. Hannibal
marched first into Samnium, and from thence into Campania, where he
obtained possession of the important city of Capua, the gates of which
were opened to him by the popular party. Here he established his army in
winter quarters. Thus ends the first period of the war, in which
Hannibal had met with uninterrupted success. Three great victories in
three years, followed by the revolt of a city scarcely inferior to Rome
itself in importance, seemed to promise a speedy termination of the war.
[Illustration: Route of Hannibal. (See p. 90.) (After footnote
32--Transcriber)]
[Footnote 31: The pass of the Alps which Hannibal crossed was probably
the Graian Alps, or _Little St. Bernard_. See note "On the Passage of
Hannibal across the Alps" at the end of this chapter.]
[Footnote 32: At this time the Consuls entered upon their office on the
Ides of March. It was not till B.C. 153 that the consulship commenced on
the Kalends of January.]
NOTE ON HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE ACROSS THE ALPS.
(See p. 84.)(Fourth paragraph of Chapter XII.--Transcriber)
The narrative in the text is taken from that of the Greek historian
Polybius, which is certainly by far the most trustworthy that has
descended to us; but that author has nowhere clearly stated by which of
the passes across the Alps Hannibal effected his march; and this
question has given rise to much controversy both in ancient and modern
times. Into this discussion our limits will not allow us to enter, but
the following may be briefly stated as the general results: 1. That
after a careful examination of the text of Polybius, and comparison of
the different localities, his narrative will be found, on the whole, to
agree best with the supposition that Hannibal crossed the Graian Alps,
or _Little St. Bernard_; though it can not be denied that there are some
difficulties attending this line, especially in regard to the descent
into Italy. 2. That Cælius Antipater certainly represented him as taking
this route (Liv., xxi., 38); and as he is known to have followed the
Greek history of Silenus, who is said to have accompanied Hannibal in
many of his campaigns, his authority is of the greatest weight. 3. That
Livy and Strabo, on the contrary, both suppose him to have crossed the
Cottian Alps, or _Mont Genèvre_. But the main argument that appears to
have weighed with Livy, as it has done with several modern writers on
the subject, is the assumption that Hannibal descended in the first
instance into the country of the Taurinians, which is opposed to the
direct testimony of Polybius, who says expressly that he descended among
the Insubrians, and _subsequently_ mentions his attack on the
Taurinians. 4. That, as according to Livy himself (xxi., 29), the
Gaulish emissaries who acted as Hannibal's guides were Boians, it was
natural that these should conduct him by the passage that led directly
into the territory of their allies and brothers-in-arms, the Insubrians,
rather than into that of the Taurinians, a Ligurian tribe, who were at
this very time in a state of hostility with the Insubrians. And this
remark will serve to explain why Hannibal chose apparently a longer
route, instead of the more direct one of Mont Genèvre. Lastly, it is
remarkable that Polybius, though he censures the exaggerations and
absurdities with which earlier writers had encumbered their narrative,
does not intimate that any doubt was entertained as to the line of
march; and Pompey, in a letter to the Senate, written in 73 B.C.,
alludes to the route of Hannibal across the Alps as something well
known. Hence it appears clear that the passage by which he crossed them
must have been one of those frequented in subsequent times by the
Romans. This argument seems decisive against the claims of _Mont Cenis_,
which have been advocated by some modern writers, that pass having
apparently never been used till the Middle Ages--See _Dict. of Greek and
Roman Biography_, vol. ii., p. 334, 335.
[Illustration: Plain of Cannæ.]