THE FIRST ADVANCE ON VICKSBURG.
1862.
The purpose of the Navy Department, as expressed in the original orders
to Farragut, had been to send his squadron up the river immediately
after the capture of New Orleans. The words were: "If the Mississippi
expedition from Cairo shall not have descended the river, you will take
advantage of the panic to push a strong force up the river to take all
their defenses in the rear." When New Orleans fell, the Cairo
expedition, more commonly known as the Mississippi flotilla, so far from
having descended the river to the neighborhood of New Orleans, was still
detained before Fort Pillow, one of the outlying defenses of Memphis,
forty miles above the latter city and over eight hundred from New
Orleans. It was not until the end of May that the evacuation of Corinth
by the Confederates made Memphis untenable, leading to the abandonment
of the forts on the 4th of June and the surrender of the city on the
following day. It became therefore incumbent upon Farragut, after
turning over the command of New Orleans to Butler on the 1st of May, to
go up the river as soon as he possibly could.
Although the flag-officer seems to have acquiesced in this programme in
the beginning, it was probably with the expectation that the advance, up
river and against the current, required of his heavy-draught and
slow-moving ships would not be very far; that the Cairo expedition,
which at the date of the orders quoted, January 20th, had not begun to
move, would, from the character of the vessels composing it, many being
ironclad, and from the advantage of the current, have progressed very
far by the time he had taken New Orleans. Moreover, at that date the
upper river flotilla was still a branch of the army, and its prospective
movements were to be in combination with, and a part of, a great
military enterprise, securing control both of the stream and of the
land; whereas Farragut's was a purely naval operation, to which the army
contributed only a force sufficient to hold the points which were first
reduced by the fleet.
Under the actual conditions, the proposed ascent of the river bore a
very different aspect to the commanding naval officer on the spot from
that which presented itself to the fond imaginations of the officials in
Washington. The question now was not one of fighting batteries, for
there was no reason as yet to expect anything heavier than the fleet had
already overcome with ease; it was the far more difficult matter of
communications, in the broadest scope of the word, to be maintained over
a long, narrow, tortuous, and very difficult road, passing in many
places close under the guns of the enemy. "As I stated in my last
dispatch," wrote Farragut to the department after his first visit to
Vicksburg, "the dangers and difficulties of the river have proved to us,
since we first entered it, much greater impediments to our progress,
and more destructive to our vessels, than the enemy's shot. Between
getting aground, derangement of the machinery, and want of coal, the
delays in getting up the river are great." To take the defenses in the
rear, and in their then state to drive the enemy out of them, was one
thing; but to hold the abandoned positions against the return of the
defenders, after the fleet had passed on, required an adequate force
which Butler's army, calculated by McClellan for a much narrower sphere,
could not afford. Coal and supply ships, therefore, must either run the
gantlet for the four hundred miles which separated Vicksburg from New
Orleans, or be accompanied always by armed vessels. The former
alternative was incompatible with the necessary security, and for the
latter the numbers of the fleet were utterly inadequate. In fact, to
maintain the proposed operations, there would be needed so many ships to
guard the communications that there would be none left for the
operations to which they led.
It must also be observed that not only was this line of communications
four times as long as that which led from the sea to New Orleans, and of
far more difficult pilotage, but that the natural character of the
enemy's positions upon it was essentially different. They were as yet
undeveloped by art; but by nature they were high and commanding bluffs,
having secure land communications with an extensive enemy's country in
their rear over which our troops exercised no control whatever--where
they had not even been seen. To speak of "taking them in the rear" was
to beg the question--to assume that their front was then, as in June,
1863, toward an enemy investing them on the land side. New Orleans and
the region below, including its defenses and the communications
therewith, were low-lying and intersected with numerous water-courses;
over such a navy naturally exercises a preponderating control. Above New
Orleans the low delta of the Mississippi extends, indeed, on the west
bank as far as the Red River, if it may not be said to reach to
Vicksburg and beyond; but on the east bank it ceases one hundred and
fifty miles from the city. From thence to Vicksburg, a distance of two
hundred and fifty miles, the stream is bordered by a series of bluffs
backing on a firm country of moderate elevation. Such positions are not
to be reduced from the water alone. On the contrary, if the water be a
narrow strip swept by their guns, they command it; while, from the
extent of country in their rear, they are not susceptible of isolation
by fleets above and below, as were Forts Jackson and St. Philip.
This series of bluffs became, therefore, the line upon which the
Confederates based their control of the Mississippi and maintained their
vital communications with Texas and the Red River region. It could be
reduced only by a military force; and to think of subduing it by a fleet
taking advantage of the panic following the fall of New Orleans, was
truly to rely upon moral effect without adequate physical force to
support it. It is due to the Navy Department to say that they expected
the army from the North to advance more rapidly than it did; but,
without seeking to assign the blame, the utterly useless penetration of
the United States fleet four hundred miles into the heart of the enemy's
country and its subsequent mortifying withdrawal, when contrasted with
the brilliant success resulting from Farragut's dash by the forts,
afford a very useful lesson in the adaptation of means to ends and the
selection of a definite objective, upon compassing which something
happens. The object of the United States Government being to control the
lower Mississippi, that was effected by means of isolating its defenses,
which then fell. When the further object was sought of controlling the
course of the stream above, the mere perambulation of a body of ships
effected nothing, because it aimed at nothing in particular, and could
have no effect upon the decisive points.
Of all these considerations Farragut was fully sensible; and, while he
obeyed his orders, he showed in his dispatches to the Department, and in
private letters of the same period, how much against his judgment were
operations conceived on such erroneous military principles and
undertaken with such inadequate force. The Department was forward to
press him on, and as early as the 17th of May sent a dispatch intimating
that he had forgotten his orders on the subject; and he was urged and
required to open up the Mississippi to Flag-officer Davis's command (the
Mississippi flotilla), then still above Memphis. This and other letters
of the same date must have been peculiarly exasperating; for they were
received early in June, when he had been up the river as far as
Vicksburg and satisfied himself that without an adequate force of troops
nothing could be accomplished. "The Department," he replies, "seems to
have considered my fleet as having escaped all injury, and that when
they arrived off New Orleans they were in condition to be pushed up the
river. This was not the case; but, the moment the vessels could be
gotten ready, the gunboats were all sent up under the command of
Commander S. P. Lee, with directions to proceed to Vicksburg, take that
place, and cut the railroad.... From all I could hear it was not
considered proper, even with pilots, to risk the ships beyond
Natchez.... By the time Commander Lee arrived at Vicksburg (May 18th) he
was satisfied that the force of the enemy was too great for him to
venture to take the town, or even to pass it. The land in the rear of
Vicksburg is about two hundred feet high, on which are placed some eight
and ten inch columbiads, which are perfectly secure from our fire.... I
determined to get the heavy ships up there if possible, which I did a
day or two after. General Williams arrived in the mean time with fifteen
hundred men, when I proposed to him, if he could carry the battery on
the hill, I would attack the town. He made a careful reconnaissance, and
returned to me in the afternoon, when I had all the (naval) commanders
assembled. He reported that it would be impossible for him to land, and
that he saw no chance of doing anything with the place so long as the
enemy were in such force, having at their command thirty thousand men
within one hour by railroad. A large majority of the commanders
concurred with him in the opinion."
Writing to his home about this council, in which, contrary to his
independent decision when below Fort Jackson, he yielded to the advice
of his captains, he said: "I did not pass Vicksburg; not because it was
too strongly fortified; not because we could not have passed it easily
enough, _but we would have been cut off from our supplies of coal and
provisions_. We would have been placed between two enemies (Vicksburg
and Memphis), and so the captains advised me not to do it. I was very
sick at the time, and yielded to their advice, _which I think was good_;
but I doubt if I would have taken it had I been well." Here is seen,
transpiring vividly enough, the uncertainty and indecision arising from
the conflict between the orders of the Department and his own sounder
judgment. He would fain obey; yet no orders could override, though they
might cruelly embarrass, the responsibility of the officer in command on
the spot. "Fighting is nothing," he adds, "to the evils of the
river--getting on shore, running foul of one another, losing anchors,
etc." "The army," he resumes in his dispatch to the Department, "had
been sent up early with a few days' rations, and I was compelled to
supply them from the squadron, thereby reducing our own supplies, which
were barely sufficient to bring the ships back to New Orleans, making
allowance for probable delays. The river was now beginning to fall, and
I apprehended great difficulty in getting down should I delay much
longer. In the mean time coal vessels had been towed up the river just
above Natchez (a hundred miles below Vicksburg), which vessels I was
obliged to bring down and keep in company with the vessels of war, for
fear of their being captured by the guerrilla bands which appear to
infest almost the entire banks of the river wherever there are rapids
and bluffs."
Such were some of the difficulties being experienced when the
Assistant-Secretary of the Navy was writing: "The _only_ anxiety _we_
feel is to know if you have followed up your instructions and pushed a
strong force up the river to meet the Western flotilla." "I had no
conception," replied Farragut, "that the Department ever contemplated
that the ships of this squadron were to attempt to go to Memphis, above
which the Western flotilla then was; nor did I believe it was
practicable for them to do so, unless under the most favorable
circumstances, in time of peace, when their supplies could be obtained
along the river. The gunboats are nearly all so damaged that they are
certainly not in condition to contend with ironclad rams coming down
upon them with the current.... We consider the advantage entirely in
favor of the vessel that has the current added to her velocity." In
conclusion he adds: "I arrived in New Orleans with five or six days'
provisions and one anchor, and am now trying to procure others. As soon
as provisions and anchors are obtained we will take our departure for up
the river, and endeavor to carry out, as far as practicable, the orders
conveyed in your different dispatches." Writing home, he expressed
himself more freely and unmistakably: "They will keep us in this river
until the vessels break down and all the little reputation we have made
has evaporated. The Government appears to think that we can do anything.
They expect me to navigate the Mississippi nine hundred miles in the
face of batteries, ironclad rams, etc., and yet with all the ironclad
vessels they have North they could not get to Norfolk or Richmond....
Well, I will do my duty to the best of my ability, and let the rest take
care of itself.... They can not deprive me and my officers of the
historical fact that we took New Orleans. Now they expect
impossibilities."
Enough has been quoted to show that Farragut was in no way responsible
for, nor approved of, the ill-timed tenacity with which the Government
held to its original plan, when the conditions had turned out entirely
different from those at first expected. The Secretary of the Navy at a
later date endeavored to throw the blame of failure entirely upon the
War Department, which was either unwilling or unable to support the
naval movement with adequate troops. It is not necessary, in a life of
the admiral, to attempt to decide upon the degree of remissness, if any,
shown by the military service, nor upon whose shoulders it falls. It is
sufficient to point out that the Navy Department required of Farragut to
go up to meet the Western flotilla when it was near nine hundred miles
from the mouth of the Mississippi, for no better reason, apparently,
than that it had determined upon the junction at a time when it supposed
it would be effected much lower down. In so doing it left nothing to the
judgment of the officer commanding on the spot. "I think," said Farragut
quietly, "that more should have been left to my discretion; but I hope
for the best, and pray God to protect our poor sailors from harm." His
own opinion was that Mobile should be the next point attacked. The
difficulties there were not so great as those encountered at the
Mississippi forts; and his success at the latter might not improbably
have considerable moral effect upon the other works, whose position had
some strong features of resemblance to those already subdued, and which
were not yet in the strong state of defense which they afterward
reached. The blockade of the coast was part of his charge; and in no way
did he think it could be so thoroughly maintained as by occupying the
harbors themselves, or their entrances.
In obedience to his peremptory orders Farragut again started up the
river, with the apprehension that if he once got above Vicksburg he
would not be able to return before the next spring rise; for the season
of lowest water in the Mississippi was now at hand. The Hartford did run
ashore on the way up, and remained hard and fast for the better part of
twenty-four hours. "It is a sad thing to think of having your ship on a
mud bank, five hundred miles from the natural element of a sailor,"
wrote the flag-officer; "but I knew that I had done all I could to
prevent her being up the river so high, and was commanded to go." She
had to take out her coal and shot, and had even removed two guns before
she floated.
On the 18th of June the squadron was assembled just below Vicksburg,
having in company also seventeen schooners of the mortar flotilla, still
under Porter's command. These were placed as rapidly as possible in
suitable positions on the two sides of the river, opened fire on the
26th, and continued it through the 27th. Upon the evening of the latter
day Porter notified the flag-officer that he was ready to cover, by a
steady bombardment, the intended passage of the fleet before the
batteries.
[Illustration: PASSAGE OF VICKSBURG BATTERIES, JUNE 28, 1862.
ORDER OF ATTACK.]
Vicksburg is situated on the first high land met on the east bank of the
Mississippi after leaving Memphis, from which it is four hundred miles
distant. The position was one of peculiar strength and importance for
commanding the navigation of the river. Not only was it exceptionally
lofty, and on one flank of that series of bluffs which has before
been mentioned as constituting the line upon which the Confederate grip
of the stream was based, but the tortuous character of the channel gave
particular facilities for an enfilading fire on vessels both before and
after they came abreast the works. They were thus exposed to a longer
and more dangerous cannonade than is the case where the stream flows
straight past the front of a battery. The channel has now changed; but
in 1862 the river, which from Memphis had pursued its winding course
through an alluvial country, made when abreast of Vicksburg a sharp turn
to the northeast, as though determined to reach the bluffs but four
miles distant. As it neared them it swung round with a sharp turn to the
southwest, parallel to its recent direction, flowing for the most part
close to the foot of the hills. Between the two reaches, and formed by
them, immediately opposite the town, there was a low tongue of land, or
promontory, four miles long and less than one wide. The squadron, being
below, had to steam up through the lower reach against the current, make
the sharp turn at the bend, and then pass through the upper reach. In
the bend it was followed by a fire from the highest part of the bluffs,
to which it could make no reply.
At 2 A. M. of June 28th the signal was given, and at three the squadron
was under way--eleven vessels, of which three were the heavy ships
Hartford, Richmond, and Brooklyn; two, the corvettes Iroquois and
Oneida; and six gunboats. At four, the ships in their slow progress,
stemming the current, had passed the mortar schooners; and the latter
then opened fire, as did the steamers connected with them, which were
not to attempt the passage. Owing to a misunderstanding, the three
vessels which formed the rear of the column, the Brooklyn and two
gunboats, did not get by. The others, at 6 A. M., anchored above
Vicksburg. Though exposed much of the time to a raking fire, to which
they were not able to reply, the vessels suffered less than would have
been expected, owing to the enemy falling into the common mistake of
giving too much elevation to his guns. Having thus accomplished his
instructions, Farragut reported coldly to the Department that, in
obedience to the orders "and the command of the President, I proceeded
up to Vicksburg with the Brooklyn, Richmond, and Hartford, with the
determination to carry out my instructions to the best of my ability....
The Department will perceive from this report that the forts can be
_passed_, and _we have done it_, and can _do it again as often as may be
required_ of us. It will not, however, be an easy matter for us to do
more than silence the batteries for a time, as long as the enemy has a
large force behind the hills to prevent our landing and holding the
place." "I am satisfied," he says again, "it is not possible to take
Vicksburg without an army of twelve or fifteen thousand men. General Van
Dorn's division (Confederate) is here, and lies safely behind the hills.
The water is too low for me to go over twelve or fifteen miles above
Vicksburg." The last sentence reveals clearly enough the madness of
attempting to take three of the best ships of the navy to the upper
river in falling water. Fortunately the insufficient depth now was
above--not below--them, and they were not utterly cut off from the sea.
Commander Porter, however, who started down river a week later, in
compliance with orders summoning him to Washington, and than whom the
navy had no more active nor enterprising officer, wrote back to the
flag-officer that if the big ships did not soon return he feared they
would have to remain till next year.
Three days after Farragut passed the batteries of Vicksburg, on the 1st
of July, the Mississippi flotilla, under the command of Flag-officer
Charles H. Davis, joined him from above; having left Memphis only two
days before, but favored in their voyage by the current, by competent
pilots, and by a draught suited to the difficulties of river navigation.
The united squadrons continued together until the 15th of July, lying at
anchor near the neck of the promontory opposite Vicksburg; with the
exception of the Brooklyn and the two gunboats which had not passed up
on the 28th of June. These remained below the works, and on the opposite
side of the promontory.
The position of the two flag-officers was about four miles below the
mouth of the Yazoo River, a tributary of the Mississippi, which enters
the main stream on the east side not far above Vicksburg. It was known
to them that there was somewhere in the Yazoo an ironclad ram called the
Arkansas; which, more fortunate than the Mississippi at New Orleans, had
been hurried away from Memphis just before that city fell into the hands
of the United States forces. She was a vessel of between eight hundred
and a thousand tons burden, carrying ten guns, which were protected by
three inches of railroad iron, backed by bales of compressed cotton
firmly braced. Her most dangerous weapon, however, was her ram; but,
owing to the lightness and bad construction of the engines, this was not
as formidable as it otherwise might have been to the enemy's ships.
So little injury had thus far been done to the United States vessels by
the rams of the Confederates that the two flag-officers were probably
lulled into a state of over-security, and they allowed their squadrons
to lie with too low fires. To this doubtless contributed the more
powerful motive of the difficulty to the coal supply incurred by the
excessively long line of exposed communications, imposed upon both
squadrons by the stubborn persistence of the Navy Department in hurrying
the fleets far in advance of any support by the army. Beyond the reach
of their guns they could not control the river banks; and, unless they
could be present everywhere along the eight hundred miles which
separated Memphis from New Orleans, even the narrow strip on either side
swept by their cannon was safe at any point only while they were abreast
it. The moral effect of their promenade up and down and of their meeting
at Vicksburg was accurately weighed by the enemy; and, however it may
have imposed upon the Northern people, did nothing to insure the safety
of the unarmed vessels upon which supplies depended. This essentially
vicious military situation resulted necessarily in a degree of
insecurity which could have but one issue--a retreat by both squadrons
toward their respective bases, which soon after followed.
Convinced of the inutility of his own presence at Vicksburg, and
preoccupied with the risks threatening his squadron from the unguarded
state of the river and its dangerous navigation, it is not wonderful
that Farragut, who was the senior of the two flag-officers, thought
little of the single ironclad vessel in his neighborhood. He was not
prone to exaggerate danger, and his experience had not led him to
entertain any high opinion of the enemy's rams. To these circumstances
he owed one of the most mortifying incidents of his career.
On the 15th of July a reconnoitering expedition was sent into the Yazoo,
composed of two vessels of Davis's squadron, accompanied by one of the
rams which at that time formed an independent organization upon the
upper Mississippi under the command of Colonel Ellet. It was a fortunate
move, for to this circumstance was due that the squadrons had any notice
of the approach of the Arkansas. The detached vessels met her about six
miles within the Yazoo, when a running fight ensued between her and the
Carondelet, to the disadvantage of the United States vessel; but the
sustained cannonade attracted betimes the attention of the fleet, and
the Tyler, a small unarmored boat, after supporting the Carondelet to
the best of her ability through the action, preceded the combatants down
stream, bringing tidings of the ram's approach. There was not time to
raise steam--only to cast loose the guns for action. When the Arkansas
reached the fleet her smoke-stack had been so often perforated by the
Carondelet's shot that her boilers could scarcely supply any steam. Her
speed was thereby reduced to one knot, powerless to ram and scarcely
sufficient to steer. At that rate, with the favor also of the current,
she passed through the United States vessels, suffering from their
successive fires much injury, though not of a vital kind, and took
refuge under the guns of Vicksburg. It was a most gallant exploit,
fairly comparable in daring to the passage of the Mississippi forts, but
resulting in no decisive effect upon the issues of the war.
It became immediately advisable for Farragut to rejoin the three ships
which lay below the town, and were consequently in a condition favoring
an attack by the ram, whose apparent immunity under the fire of the two
squadrons showed her an enemy not to be despised. He determined to
follow her down at once, again passing the batteries, and endeavoring to
destroy her with the guns of his squadron as it went by. The execution
of the plan was set for the late afternoon, and the Mississippi flotilla
took up a position to support the movement by engaging the upper
batteries. Unfortunately, time was lost in forming the order of battle,
and the passage was effected in the dark. The uncertainty of aim thus
caused was increased by the precaution of the enemy, who shifted his
position after nightfall. Two shots only found her, injuring several of
her people and setting fire to the cotton bulwarks. Beyond this she
received no injury at this time, but she had been severely shaken by the
hammering of the morning. A week later, on the 22d of July, Davis sent
down the Essex, one of his heavy ironclads, accompanied by one of
Ellet's rams, to attack the Arkansas at her moorings. The effort was
unsuccessful, although the enemy's vessel received some further injury.
The ram rejoined the upper squadron; but the Essex, from her indifferent
speed, was unable to return against the current, exposed unsupported to
the fire of all the batteries. She therefore became thenceforth a member
of the lower squadron, together with a ram called the Sumter, which had
run down with Farragut on the 15th.
On the 20th of the month Farragut had received orders from the Navy
Department, dated July 14th, directing him to get the part of his fleet
above Vicksburg below that place with as little injury and loss of life
as possible. The circumstances that have been narrated caused him to
receive this dispatch below the town; and on the 24th, two days after
the descent of the Essex, he departed for New Orleans. Davis assured him
that the Essex and Sumter should look out for the river between
Vicksburg and Baton Rouge. To them were joined three of Farragut's
gunboats; and the five vessels took an active part in supporting the
garrison of Baton Rouge when an attack was made upon the place by the
Confederates on the 5th of August. In this the Arkansas was to have
co-operated with the enemy's troops, and she left Vicksburg on the 3d
for that purpose; but her machinery broke down, and while lying helpless
against the river bank the Essex came in sight. Resistance in her then
plight was hopeless. She was set on fire by her commander, the crew
escaping to the shore. Farragut himself reached Baton Rouge shortly
after this happened. He had with much difficulty succeeded in getting
the heavier ships to New Orleans on the 28th of July; and there he had
lingered, unwilling to leave the river, though desirous of doing so,
until affairs seemed on a reasonably secure basis. The chief element of
anxiety was the Arkansas, concerning whose power to harm quite
exaggerated notions prevailed. While thus lying before New Orleans word
was brought him of the attack on Baton Rouge, and he at once retraced
his steps with the Hartford, Brooklyn, and some smaller ships. On the
7th he reached the scene of action, and learned the destruction of the
Confederate vessel. The same day he wrote to the Department: "It is one
of the happiest moments of my life that I am enabled to inform the
Department of the destruction of the ram Arkansas; not because I held
the iron-clad in such terror, but because the community did." It must
have been an additional element of satisfaction to him that the
disappearance from the waters of the Mississippi of the last hostile
vessel capable of offensive action released him from the necessity of
remaining himself, or of keeping a large force there, during the
unhealthy season.
Before leaving Vicksburg the crews of the fleet had suffered severely
from the sickness common in that climate. The Brooklyn had sixty-eight
sick out of a total of three hundred; and as this proportion was less
than in the upper river flotilla, where the sick numbered forty per cent
of the total force, it is probable that it fairly represents the general
condition of Farragut's ships. Among the troops accompanying the
expedition there were but eight hundred fit for duty out of over three
thousand. It was not considered well to maintain for a longer time in
Baton Rouge the small garrison hitherto stationed there. It had
honorably repulsed the enemy's attack; but, in the general cessation of
offensive movements by the United States army, the Confederates were
continually strengthening their forces on the line of bluffs south of
Vicksburg, to the importance of which their attention, never entirely
diverted, had been forcibly drawn by the advance of the fleet in the
previous months. Fruitless as that ill-judged advance had been, it
reminded the enemy of the serious inconvenience they would suffer if the
United States ships could freely patrol that part of the Mississippi,
and impressed upon them the necessity of securing a section of it, by
which they could have undisturbed communication between the two shores.
This could be done by fortifying two points in such strength that to
pass them from either direction would involve a risk too great to be
lightly undertaken. The points chosen were Vicksburg and Port Hudson,
two hundred miles apart, and embracing between them the mouth of the Red
River. The latter is the great artery of the region west of the
Mississippi, and also, by means of the Atchafalaya Bayou, offers direct
communication for light-draught vessels with the Gulf of Mexico. Port
Hudson being less than twenty miles from Baton Rouge, the presence in
the latter of a small garrison, which could undertake no offensive
movement and which there were no troops to re-enforce, became
purposeless. On the 16th of August, 1862, the post was abandoned, and
the troops occupying it withdrew to New Orleans.