THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION. 1862.
The necessity of controlling the Mississippi valley had been early
realized by the United States Government. In its hands the great stream
would become an impassable barrier between two large sections of the
Southern Confederacy; whereas in the possession of the latter it
remained a link binding together all the regions through which it
flowed, or which were penetrated by any of its numerous tributaries. The
extensive territory west of the river also produced a large part of the
provisions upon which depended the Southern armies, whose main field of
action was, nevertheless, on the eastern side. In a country habitually
so unprepared for war as is the United States, and where, of course,
such a contingency as an intestine struggle between the sections could
not have been provided for, there seemed room to hope that the national
forces might by rapid action seize the whole course of the river, before
the seceding States were able to take adequate measures for its defense.
The Government had the support of that part of the country which had
received the largest manufacturing development, and could, therefore,
most quickly prepare the material for war, in which both sides were
lamentably deficient; and, what was yet more important, it possessed in
the new navy built since 1855 an efficient weapon to which the South had
nothing to oppose. The hope was extravagant and doomed to
disappointment; for to overrun and hold so extensive a territory as the
immediate basin of the Mississippi required a development of force on
the one side and a degree of exhaustion on the other which could not be
reached so early in the war. The relative strengths, though unequal,
were not yet sufficiently disproportioned to enable the gigantic work to
be accomplished; and the principal result of an effort undertaken
without due consideration was to paralyze a large fraction of a navy too
small in numbers to afford the detachment which was paraded gallantly,
but uselessly, above New Orleans. Nor was this the worst; the time thus
consumed in marching up the hill in order at once to march down again
threw away the opportunity for reducing Mobile before its defenses were
strengthened. Had the navy been large enough, both tasks might have been
attempted; but it will appear in the sequel that its scanty numbers were
the reason which postponed the attack on Mobile from month to month,
until it became the most formidable danger Farragut ever had to
encounter.
Despite the extensive sea-coast of the United States and the large
maritime commerce possessed by it at the opening of the war, the navy
had never, except for short and passing intervals, been regarded with
the interest its importance deserved. To this had doubtless contributed
the fixed policy of the Government to concentrate its attention upon
the internal development of the country, and to concern itself little
with external interests, except so far as they promoted the views of
that section which desired to give extension to slaveholding territory.
The avoidance of entangling alliances had become perverted to
indifference to the means by which alone, in the last resort, the nation
can assert and secure control in regions outside its borders, but
vitally affecting its prosperity and safety. The power of navies was
therefore, then as now, but little understood. Consequently, when the
importance of the Mississippi Valley was realized, as it immediately
was, there was but one idea as to the means of controlling it, and that
was by a land invasion from the great Western and Northwestern States.
To this a navy was indeed to be adjoined, but in a manner so distinctly
subsidiary that it was, contrary to all custom, placed under the orders
of the commander-in-chief of the Western army, and became simply a
division of the land forces. From this subordinate position it was soon
raised by its own intrinsic value and the logic of facts; but the
transient experience is noteworthy, because illustrating the general
ignorance of the country as to the powers of the priceless weapon which
lay ready, though unnoticed, to its hand.
Happily, in the Navy Department itself juster views prevailed; and the
general indifference permitted it at least one compensation--to follow
its own ways. The Secretary himself was not a professional man, though
he had had official connection with the service in the past; but most
fortunately there was called to his assistance one who had been for
eighteen years in the navy, had passed while in it to the command of
mail steamers, and only five years before the war had resigned and
entered civil life. This gentleman, Mr. Gustavus V. Fox, thus combined
with business experience and an extensive acquaintance with naval
officers the capacities of a seaman. He knew what ships could do and
what they could not; but to this common knowledge of sea officers,
gained by the daily habit of sea life, he had added the results of study
and reflection upon events passing elsewhere than under his own
observation. The experiences of the allied navies in the Crimean War had
convinced him that, if the wooden sides of ships could not be pitted in
prolonged stand-up fight against the stone walls of fortresses, they
were capable of enduring such battering as they might receive in running
by them through an unobstructed channel. This conviction received
support by the results of the attacks upon Hatteras Inlet and Port
Royal. He might, indeed, have gone much further back and confirmed his
own judgment as a seaman by the express opinion of an eminent soldier.
Nearly a hundred years before, Washington, at the siege of Yorktown, had
urged the French Admiral De Grasse to send vessels past Cornwallis's
works to control the upper York River, saying: "I am so well satisfied
by experience of the little effect of land batteries on vessels passing
them with a leading breeze that, unless the two channels near Yorktown
should be found impracticable by obstructions, I should have the
greatest confidence in the success of this important service."[C]
[Footnote C: _Washington's Letters_, October 1, 1781.]
In this conviction of Mr. Fox's lay the inception of the expedition
against New Orleans. It was, in his view, to be a purely naval attack.
Once over the bar at the mouth of the river, the channel as far as the
city had no natural obstruction, was clearly defined, and easily
followed, by day or night, without a pilot. The heavy current of the
early spring months, while it would retard the passage of the ships and
so keep them longer under fire, would make it difficult for the enemy to
maintain in position any artificial barrier placed by him. The works to
be passed--the seaward defenses of New Orleans, Forts Jackson and St.
Philip--were powerful fortifications; but they were ultimately dependent
upon the city, ninety miles above them, for a support which could come
only by the river. A fleet anchored above the forts lay across their
only line of communication, and when thus isolated, their fall became
only a question of time. The work proposed to the United States Navy
was, therefore, to turn the forts by passing their fire, seize their
line of communications--the upper river--and their base, New Orleans,
and then to give over the latter to the army, which engaged to furnish a
force sufficient to hold the conquest.
Having first taken the necessary, but strictly preliminary, step of
seizing as a depot Ship Island, in Mississippi Sound, about a hundred
miles from the mouth of the river, Mr. Fox's proposition, which had been
adopted by the Secretary of the Navy, was submitted to the President.
Mr. Lincoln, himself a Western man, unfamiliar with maritime matters and
engrossed with the idea of invasion from the north, was disposed to be
incredulous of success; but with his usual open-mindedness consented to
a full discussion before him by experts from both services. A meeting
was therefore held with General McClellan at his headquarters. There
were present, besides the President, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Fox,
and Commander David D. Porter, who had recently returned from service
off the mouth of the Mississippi. The antecedents of General McClellan
were those of an officer of the engineers, who are generally disposed to
exaggerate the powers of forts as compared with ships, and to
contemplate their reduction only by regular approaches; just as an
officer of the line of the army, looking to the capture of a place like
New Orleans, will usually and most properly seek first a base of
operations, from which he will project a campaign whose issue shall be
the fall of the city. To this cause was probably due the preference
observed by the Navy Department to exist in army circles, for an attack
upon Mobile first. Being close to the sea, which was completely under
the control of the navy, the necessary land operations would begin under
far more favorable conditions, and could be more easily maintained than
in the alluvial soil of the Mississippi delta. McClellan, who was an
accomplished master of his profession in all its branches, received at
first the impression that regular military operations against New
Orleans by way of the river were being proposed to him, and demurred;
but, on learning that the only demand was for a force to hold the city
and surroundings in case of success, he readily consented to detail ten
or fifteen thousand troops for the purpose. Though more hazardous, the
proposition of the Navy Department was in principle strategically sound.
The key of the position was to be struck for at once, and the outlying
defenses were expected then to fall by the severance of their
communications. The general might have his own opinion as to the power
of the navy to carry out the proposed passage of the forts, and as to
whether its coal, when once above, would outlast the endurance of the
hostile garrisons; but those were points upon which the Navy Department,
which undertook the risk, might be presumed to have more accurate
judgment than himself.
The conference, which was held about the middle of November, 1861,
resulted in the adoption of Mr. Fox's plan in its main outlines; but
with an important addition, which threatened at one time to become a
very serious modification. Commander Porter suggested that the naval
vessels should be accompanied by a mortar flotilla, to subdue the fire
of the forts by bombardment, and so to allow the fleet to pass without
risk, or with risk much diminished. This proposition approved itself to
the engineer instincts of McClellan, and was adopted. The general then
designated Major Barnard, of the Engineer Corps, to represent him in
adjusting the details of the expedition. Barnard also took strong ground
in favor of the mortars, and to this added the opinion--in which Porter
concurred--that the forts should be not merely bombarded, but reduced
before the passage. He summed up his conclusions in the following
perfectly clear words: "To pass those works (merely) with a fleet and
appear before New Orleans is merely a raid--no capture. New Orleans and
the river can not be held until communications are perfectly
established." The assertion of the last sentence can not be denied; it
admits of no difference of opinion. The point in dispute between the two
arguments was not this, but whether the fall of the city, which had no
local defenses, would entail that of the forts, and so open the
communications. Mr. Fox strongly held that it would; but although he
stuck to his opinion, he had a deservedly high estimate of Porter's
professional ability--so much so that, had the latter's rank justified,
he would have urged him for the command of the expedition. In this
doubtful state of the argument, it will be seen of how great importance
was the choice of the officer to be put in charge of the whole
undertaking. Had he also taken the view of Barnard and Porter in favor
of the more cautious, but--as it proved--more dangerous course, it could
scarcely have failed that Fox would have been overruled.
The nomination of this officer could not be longer deferred. Secrecy and
rapidity of action were large elements in the hoped-for achievement, and
secrecy depends much upon the length of time the secret must be kept.
Among the officers whose length of service and professional reputation
indicated them as suitable for the position, there was little to guide
the department to the man who would on emergency show the audacity and
self-reliance demanded by the intended operations. The action proposed,
though it falls within the limits of the methods which history has
justified, and has, therefore, a legitimate place in the so-called
science of war, was, nevertheless, as the opinions of Barnard and Porter
show, contrary to the more usual and accepted practice. It disregarded
the safeguards commonly insisted upon, overleaped the successive steps
by which military achievement ordinarily advances to its end, and,
looking only to the exceptional conditions, resorted fearlessly to
exceptional methods. For such a duty the department needed a man of more
than average determination and vigor.
Farragut's name was necessarily among those considered; but the final
choice appears to have been determined by the impression made upon Mr.
Fox, and through him upon the department, by his course in leaving
Norfolk at the time and in the way he did. This, Fox argued, showed
"great superiority of character, clear perception of duty, and firm
resolution in the performance of it." His conspicuous ability was not
then recognized, could not be until revealed by war; but it was evident
that he stood well above the common run of simply accomplished officers.
Still, further tests were required; in a matter of so much importance
the department had need to move warily. That Farragut was faithful could
not be doubted; but was his heart so far in the contest that he could be
depended upon to exert his abilities to the full? Commander Porter was
ordered to go to New York on duty connected with the mortar flotilla,
and while there to make an opportunity to visit Farragut. There had
been, as is known, a close relation between the two families, and to him
Farragut was likely to show how hearty he was in the cause. Porter's
account was most favorable, and it then remained only to judge whether
he was in sympathy with the military plan of the proposed expedition.
For this object Farragut was ordered to report at the department, and
Fox undertook to meet him at the train and talk over the matter
informally. He arrived in Washington on the 21st of December, was met as
arranged, and taken to the house of the Postmaster-General, Montgomery
Blair. The latter was brother-in-law to Fox, and the three breakfasted
together. "After breakfast, Fox laid before Farragut the plan of attack,
the force to be employed, and the object to be attained, and asked his
opinion. Farragut answered unhesitatingly that it would succeed. Fox
then handed him the list of vessels being fitted out, and asked if they
were enough. Farragut replied he would engage to run by the forts and
capture New Orleans with two thirds the number. Fox told him more
vessels would be added, and that he would command the expedition.
Farragut's delight and enthusiasm were so great that when he left us Fox
asked if I did not think he was too enthusiastic. I replied I was most
favorably impressed with him, and sure he would succeed."[D] There could
be no question, at any rate, that his whole heart was in the war and in
the expedition; whether he would rise equal to his task still remained
to be seen. He said, however, frankly, that had he been previously
consulted, he would have advised against the employment of the mortar
flotilla. He had no faith in the efficacy of that mode of attack since
his observations of the results at San Juan de Ulloa, twenty-three years
before. He was convinced that the fleet could run by the forts, and
anticipated nothing but delay from the bombardment. Nevertheless, since
the arrangements had been made, he was willing to give the bombs a
trial. "He was never profuse in promises," writes Mr. Welles, the
Secretary of the Navy, "but he felt complimented that he was selected,
and I saw that in modest self-reliance he considered himself equal to
the emergency and to the expectation of the Government."[E] To his home
he wrote: "Keep your lips closed and burn my letters, for perfect
silence is to be observed--the first injunction of the Secretary. I am
to have a flag in the Gulf, and the rest depends upon myself. Keep calm
and silent. I shall sail in three weeks."
[Footnote D: Montgomery Blair, in _The United Service_,
January, 1881.]
[Footnote E: Gideon Welles, in the _Galaxy_, November, 1871.]
On the 23d of December, 1861, Farragut received preparatory orders, and
on the 9th of the following January was formally appointed to command
the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron; the limits of which, on the coast
of the Confederacy, were defined as from St. Andrew's Bay to the mouth
of the Rio Grande. The coasts of Mexico and Yucatan were also embraced
in them. The steam sloop-of-war Hartford was selected for his flag-ship.
On the 20th of January final orders were issued to him. These were
somewhat discreetly worded, and, literally understood, must be conceded
to take from the department the credit of boldly adhering to, and
assuming the responsibility of, the original plan--a credit Mr. Welles
seems desirous to claim. "When you are completely ready," they read,
"you will collect such vessels as can be spared from the blockade, and
proceed up the Mississippi River _and reduce the defenses_ which guard
the approaches to New Orleans, _when_ you will appear off that city and
take possession of it under the guns of your squadron." Understood
according to the plain meaning of the words, these orders prescribed the
reduction of the works as a condition precedent to appearing off the
city, and so recur to the fears expressed by both Barnard and Porter as
to the consequences of leaving the forts unreduced. There is not in
them even "the latitude and discretion in the employment of the means
placed under his command" which Mr. Welles claimed.[F] Had Farragut,
after leaving the forts unreduced, as he did, met with serious disaster,
it can scarcely be doubted that the phrase quoted would have been used
to acquit the Government.
[Footnote F: Gideon Welles, in the _Galaxy_, December, 1871.]
The steam-sloop Hartford, upon which Farragut now hoisted his flag, and
in which he continued throughout the war, was a nearly new vessel,
having sailed on her first cruise to China in the summer of 1859. She
belonged to the early period of the transition from sails to steam for
the motive power of vessels; the steam being regarded as auxiliary only,
and giving her a speed of but eight knots per hour, while the spars and
sail area were those of a full-rigged ship. The deficiency of
horse-power was a serious drawback in such an operation as passing
forts, especially when, as in the Mississippi, the current was strong
and always adverse to vessels ascending the river. The Hartford had, on
the other hand, a powerful battery of the best existent type. She
carried twenty-two Dahlgren nine-inch shell guns, eleven on each side;
and, owing to the lowness of the river banks, these guns would be on a
level with or even above those in the lower tier of the batteries
opposed to her. The Pensacola, Brooklyn, and Richmond were vessels of
the same type as the Hartford, and built at the same time.
[Illustration: PASSAGE OF FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP,
APRIL 24, 1862.
ORDER OF ATTACK.
FIRST DIVISION--_Leading under command of
Captain Theodorus Bailey_.
1. Cayuga, Flag-Gunboat. Lieut.-Com. Harrison.
2. Pensacola, Captain H. W. Morris.
3. Mississippi, Captain M. Smith.
4. Oneida, Commander S. P. Lee.
5. Varuna, Commander C. S. Boggs.
6. Katahdin, Lieut.-Com. G. H. Preble.
7. Kineo, Lieut.-Com. Ransom.
8. Wissahickon, Lieut.-Com. A. N. Smith.
CENTER DIVISION--_Admiral Farragut_.
9. Hartford, Commander Wainwright.
10. Brooklyn, Captain T. T. Craven.
11. Richmond, Commander J. Alden.
THIRD DIVISION--_Captain H. H. Bell_.
12. Sciota, Lieut.-Com. Edward Donaldson.
13. Iroquois, Com. John De Camp.
14. Kennebec, Lieut.-Com. John H. Russell.
15. Pinola, Lieut.-Com. P. Crosby.
16. Itasca, Lieut.-Com. C. H. B. Caldwell.
17. Winona, Lieut.-Com. E. T. Nichols.
18. COMMANDER PORTER'S GUNBOATS.
19. Sloop Portsmouth, Commander S. Swartwout.]
On the 2d of February, 1862, the Hartford sailed from Hampton Roads, and
on the 20th reached Ship Island. The following day Farragut took over
the command of his district and squadron from Flag Officer McKean, who
up to that time had had charge of both the East and West Gulf. None of
the other vessels of the expedition were yet there; but they came in one
by one and were rapidly assembled at the Southwest Pass, then the
principal entrance to the river. Much difficulty was encountered in
getting the heavier ships over the bar, two weeks' work being needed to
drag the Pensacola inside; but on the 7th of April she floated in the
river, and Farragut found his force complete. It then consisted,
independently of the steamers attached to the mortar flotilla, of four
steam sloops-of-war of about two thousand tons each, three of half that
size, one large side-wheel ship-of-war, the Mississippi, of seventeen
hundred tons, and nine gun-boats of five hundred. The latter had been
hurriedly built to meet the special exigencies of this war, and were
then commonly known as the "ninety-day" gunboats. Each carried one
eleven-inch shell-gun and one thirty-pounder rifle. The aggregate
batteries of the seventeen vessels composing the squadron, excluding
some light brass pieces, amounted to one hundred and fifty-four cannon,
of which one hundred and thirty-five were thirty-two pounders or above.
The two forts which constituted the principal defenses of New Orleans
against a naval attack from the sea were at Plaquemine Bend, about
twenty miles above the Head of the Passes; by which name is known the
point where the main stream of the Mississippi divides into several
channels, called passes, through which its waters find their way to the
Gulf. The river, whose general course below New Orleans is southeast,
turns at Plaquemine Bend northeast for a mile and three-quarters, and
then resumes its previous direction. The heavier of the two works, Fort
Jackson, is on the right bank, at the lower angle of the Bend. It was a
casemated brick structure, pentagonal in form, carrying in barbette over
the casemates twenty-seven cannon of and above the size of thirty-two
pounders, besides eleven twenty-four pounders. In the casemates were
fourteen of the latter caliber. Attached to this fort, but below it, was
a water battery carrying half a dozen heavy cannon. Fort St. Philip was
nearly opposite Fort Jackson, but somewhat below it, so as to command
not only the stream in its front, but also the stretch down the river,
being thus enabled to rake vessels approaching from below before they
came abreast. It comprised the fort proper and two water batteries,
which together mounted forty-two guns. The sites of these fortifications
had been skillfully chosen; but their armaments, though formidable and
greatly superior to those of the fleet--regard being had to the commonly
accepted maxim that a gun ashore is equivalent to four afloat--were not
equal to the demands of the situation or to the importance of New
Orleans. Out of a total of one hundred and nine pieces,[G] of which
probably over ninety could be used against a passing fleet, fifty-six,
or more than half, were of the very old and obsolete caliber of
twenty-four pounders.
[Footnote G: There were some guns bearing inland and some flanking
howitzers, besides those already enumerated.]
This inadequate preparation, a year after the attack upon Fort Sumter
and the outbreak of hostilities, is doubtless to be attributed to
surprise. The Southern authorities, like those of the National
Government, were firmly possessed with the idea that the Mississippi, if
subdued at all, must be so by an attack from the north. Despite the
frequency of spies and treason along the border line of the two
sections, the steps of the Navy Department were taken so quietly, and
followed so closely upon the resolve to act, that the alarm was not
quickly taken; and when intimations of attack from the sea did filter
through, they had to encounter and dislodge strong contrary
preoccupations in the minds of the Southern leaders. Only the
Confederate general commanding the military division and his principal
subordinates seem to have been alive to the danger of New Orleans, and
their remonstrances had no effect. Not only were additional guns denied
them and sent North, but drafts were made on their narrow resources to
supply points considered to be in greater danger. A striking indication
of the prepossessions which controlled the authorities at Richmond was
elicited by Commodore Hollins, of the Confederate Navy. That gallant
veteran was ordered to take to Memphis several of the rams extemporized
at New Orleans. He entreated the Navy Department to allow him to remain,
but the reply was that the main attack upon New Orleans would be from
above, not from below. After the fleet entered the river he telegraphed
from Memphis for permission to return, but received the answer that the
proposition was wholly inadmissible. Before the Court of Inquiry upon
the loss of New Orleans, he testified that the withdrawal of his ships
was the chief cause of the disaster.[H]
[Footnote H: _Official Records of the War of the Rebellion_,
Series I, vol. vi, p. 610.]
While the heavy ships were being dragged over the bar at the Southwest
Pass, the mortar flotilla had entered the river under the command of
Commander Porter. No time was avoidably lost, though there were
inevitable delays due to the magnitude of the preparations that in every
quarter taxed the energies of the Government. On the 16th of April, less
than ten days after the Pensacola got safely inside, the fleet was
anchored just out of range of the forts. On the 18th the mortar vessels
were in position, and at 10 A. M. the bombardment by them began,
continuing throughout the succeeding days till the passage of the fleet,
and being chiefly directed upon Fort Jackson. From daylight to dark a
shell a minute was fired, and as the practice was remarkably good a
great proportion of these fell within the fort. As Farragut had
predicted, they did not in the course of six days' bombardment do harm
enough to compel a surrender or disable the work; but they undoubtedly
harassed the garrison to an extent that exercised an appreciable effect
upon the fire of Jackson during the passage.
While the bombardment was progressing, the lighter vessels of the
squadron were continuously engaged by detachments in protecting the
mortar flotilla, steaming up above it and drawing upon themselves the
fire of the forts. A more important duty was the removal of the
obstructions that the enemy had thrown across the river, below the
works, but under their fire. Opinions differed, both in the United
States squadron and in the counsels of the enemy, as to the power of the
ships to pass the forts; but it was realized on both sides that any
barrier to their passage which should force them to stop under fire, or
should throw confusion into their order, would materially increase the
chances against them. Whatever the blindness or neglect of the
Confederate Government, the Confederate officers of the department had
not been remiss in this matter. The construction of a floating barrier
had early engaged their attention, and, despite the difficulties
presented by so rapid a current, a formidable raft had been placed early
in the winter. It consisted of cypress logs forty feet long and four or
five feet in diameter, lying lengthwise in the river, with an interval
of three feet between them to allow drift to pass. The logs were
connected by two and a half inch iron cables, stretching underneath from
one side of the stream to the other; and the whole fabric was held up
against the current by some thirty heavy anchors and cables. So long as
it stood, this constituted a very grave difficulty for an attacking
fleet; but the water was deep and the holding ground poor, so that even
under average conditions there was reason to fear its giving way. The
fleet arrived in the early spring, the season when the current, swollen
by the melting snows about the head waters of the Mississippi and its
tributaries, is at its strongest; and in 1862 the spring rise was
greater than for many years. In February the raft began to show signs of
yielding under the pressure of the drift wood accumulating on it from
above, and on the 10th of March the cables had parted, the sections on
either side being swept against the banks and leaving about a third of
the river open. The gap was filled by anchoring in it eight heavy
schooners of about two hundred tons burden. They were joined together as
the cypress logs had been, but with lighter chains, probably because no
heavy ones were at hand; and, as a further embarrassment to the
assailants, their masts were unstepped and allowed to drag astern with
the rigging attached, in the hopes that by fouling the screws the
ascending vessels might be crippled.
This central barrier of schooners was not intrinsically strong, but it
was not to be despised, considering the very moderate speed possessed by
the ships and the strength of the current which they had to stem. It was
doubtful whether they could break through with so little loss of way as
to produce no detention; and the mere presence of so many hulls on a
dark night and under the added gloom of the battle's smoke was liable to
increase a confusion which could redound only to the advantage of the
defense. It became necessary, therefore, to remove the schooners in
whole or in part. This was effected in a very daring manner by two
gunboats, the Itasca and Pinola, Captains Caldwell and Crosby; the fleet
captain, Henry H. Bell, an officer in whom Farragut had the most
unbounded confidence, being placed in command of both. The work had to
be done, of course, within range of the hostile batteries, which,
through some culpable negligence, failed to molest it. The Pinola
carried an electrician with a petard, by which it was hoped to shatter
the chains. This attempt, however, failed, owing to the wires of the
electrical battery parting before the charge could be exploded. The
Itasca, on the other hand, ran alongside one of the schooners and
slipped the chains; but, unfortunately, as the hulk was set adrift
without Captain Caldwell being notified, and the engines of the gunboat
were going ahead with the helm a-port, the two vessels turned inshore
and ran aground under fire of the forts. In this critical position the
Itasca remained for some time, until the Pinola could be recalled to her
assistance; and then several attempts had to be made before she finally
floated. Caldwell then did an exceedingly gallant thing, the importance
of which alone justified, but amply justified, its temerity. Instead of
returning at once to the squadron, satisfied with the measure of success
already attained, he deliberately headed up the river; and then, having
gained sufficient ground in that direction to insure a full development
of his vessel's speed, he turned and charged full upon the line of
hulks. As she met the chains, the little vessel rose bodily three or
four feet from the water, sliding up on them and dragging the hulks down
with her. The chains stood the strain for an instant, then snapped, and
the Itasca, having wrought a practicable breach, sped down to the fleet.
While these various accessory operations were going on, Admiral
Farragut's mind was occupied with the important question of carrying out
the object of his mission. The expedient of reducing or silencing the
fire of the enemy's forts, in which he himself had never felt
confidence, was in process of being tried; and the time thus employed
was being utilized by clearing the river highway and preparing the ships
to cut their way through without delay, in case that course should be
adopted. Much had been done while at the Head of the Passes, waiting for
the Pensacola to cross the bar; but the work was carried on
unremittingly to the last moment. The loftier and lighter spars of all
the vessels had already been sent ashore, together with all unnecessary
encumbrances, several of the gunboats having even unstepped their lower
masts; and the various ordinary precautions, known to seamen under the
name of "clearing ship for action," had been taken with reference to
fighting on anchoring ground. These were particularized in a general
order issued by the admiral, and to them he added special instructions,
rendered necessary by the force of the current and its constancy in the
same direction. "Mount one or two guns on the poop and top-gallant
forecastle," he said; "in other words, be prepared to use as many guns
as possible ahead and astern to protect yourself against the enemy's
gunboats and batteries, bearing in mind that you will always have to
ride head to the current, and can only avail yourself of the sheer of
the helm to point a broadside gun more than three points (thirty-four
degrees) forward of the beam.... Trim your vessel also a few inches by
the head, so that if she touches the bottom she will not swing head down
the river," which, if the stern caught the bottom, would infallibly
happen, entailing the difficult manoeuvre and the perilous delay of
turning round under the enemy's fire in a narrow river and in the dark.
The vessels generally had secured their spare iron cables up and down
their sides in the line of the boilers and engines; and these vital
parts were further protected by piling around them hammocks, bags of
sand or ashes, and other obstructions to shot. The outsides of the hulls
were daubed over with Mississippi mud, to be less easily discerned in
the dark; while the decks were whitewashed, so as to throw in stronger
relief articles lying upon them which needed to be quickly seen.
Having given his general instructions, the flag officer could intrust
the details of preparation to his subordinates; but no one could relieve
him of the momentous decision upon which the issues of the campaign must
turn. The responsibility of rejecting one course of action and adopting
another was his alone; and as has already been remarked, the wording of
the department's order, literally understood, imposed upon him the task
of reducing the forts before approaching the city. The questions
involved were essentially the same as those presented to every general
officer when the course of a campaign has brought him face to face with
a strong position of the enemy. Shall it be carried by direct attack,
and, until so subdued, arrest the progress of the army? or can it be
rendered impotent or untenable by severing its communications and by
operations directed against the district in its rear, which it protects,
and upon which it also depends? The direct attack may be by assault, by
investment, or by regular siege approaches; but whatever the method, the
result is the same--the assailant is detained for a longer or shorter
time before the position. During such detention the post fulfills its
mission of securing the region it covers, and permits there the
uninterrupted prosecution of the military efforts of every character
which are designed to impede the progress of the invader.
To such cases no general rule applies; each turns upon particular
conditions, and, although close similarities may exist between various
instances, probably no two are entirely identical. It is evident,
however, that very much will depend upon the offensive power shut up in
the position under consideration. If it be great walled town, such as
are found on the Continent of Europe, behind whose defenses are
sheltered numerous troops, the assailant who advances beyond it thereby
exposes his communications to attack; and, to guard against this danger,
must protect them by a force adequate to hold the garrison in check. If,
again, there be but a single line by which the communications can be
maintained, by which supplies and re-enforcements can go forward, and
that line passes close under the work and is commanded by it, the
garrison may be small, incapable of external action, and yet may vitally
affect the future operations of the venturesome enemy who dares to leave
it unsubdued behind him. Such, to some extent, was the Fort of Bard, in
the narrow pass of the Dora Baltea, to Napoleon's crossing of the St.
Bernard in 1800; and such, to some extent, would be Forts Jackson and
St. Philip to Farragut's fleet after it had fought its way above. The
Mississippi was the great line of communication for the fleet; no other
was comparable to it--except as a by-path in a mountain is comparable to
a royal highway--and the forts commanded the Mississippi. Their own
offensive power was limited to the range of their guns; their garrisons
were not fitted, either by their number or their aptitudes, for
offensive action upon the water; but so long as their food and
ammunition lasted, though an occasional vessel might run by them, no
steady stream of supplies, such as every armed organization needs, could
pass up the Mississippi. Finally, though the garrison could not move,
there lay behind or under the forts a number of armed vessels, whose
precise powers were unknown, but concerning which most exaggerated
rumors were current.
The question, therefore, looming before Farragut was precisely that
which had been debated before the President in Washington; precisely
that on which Fox had differed from Porter and Barnard. It was, again,
closely analogous to that which divided Sherman and Grant when the
latter, a year after Farragut ran by the forts, made his famous decision
to cut adrift from his communications by the upper Mississippi, to march
past Vicksburg by the west bank of the river, to cross below the works,
and so cut off the great stronghold of the Mississippi from the country
upon which it depended for food and re-enforcements.[I] But as Grant's
decision rested upon a balance of arguments applicable to the problem
before him, so did Farragut's upon a calculation of the risks and
advantages attendant, respectively, upon the policy of waiting for the
forts to fall, or of speeding by them to destroy the resources upon
which they depended.
[Footnote I: The following is Grant's account of a matter which,
but for Sherman's own zeal in proclaiming the merits of his
commander-in-chief, would probably have always remained unknown.
It would be difficult to find a closer parallel to the difference
of judgment existing between Farragut and Porter at New Orleans:
"When General Sherman first learned of the move I proposed to
make, he called to see me about it. I was seated on the piazza,
engaged in conversation with my staff, when he came up. After a
few moments' conversation, he said he would like to see me alone.
We passed into the house together and shut the door after us.
Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move I had ordered, saying
that I was putting myself voluntarily in a position which an enemy
would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. I
was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me,
and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below.
He said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of
troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of
supplies which they would guard as the apple of the eye, etc. He
pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the
campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true
campaign to make. This was, in substance, to go back until high
ground could be reached on the east bank of the river, fortify
there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there,
being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I
said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that
was the very place he should go to, and would move by railroad
from Memphis to Granada. To this I replied, the country is already
disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our
armies,... and if we went back so far as Memphis, it would
discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of
no use; neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would
be furnished. The problem was to move forward to a decisive
victory, or our cause was lost.... Sherman wrote to my
adjutant-general embodying his views of the campaign that should
be made, and asking him to advise me at least to get the views of
my generals upon the subject. Rawlins showed me the letter, but I
did not see any reasons for changing my plans."--_Personal Memoirs
of U. S. Grant_, vol. i, p. 542 (note).]
The reasons in favor of waiting for the fall of the works were ably
presented by Commander Porter in a paper which he asked to have read in
a council of commanding officers of the fleet, assembled on board the
flag-ship on the third day of the bombardment, April 20. Farragut was
already familiar with the arguments on both sides, and Porter's paper
can be regarded only as an expression of views already uttered, but now
invested with a formality becoming the seriousness of the occasion. In
its finality it has somewhat the character of a protest, though indirect
and couched in perfectly becoming language, against a decision which
Farragut had now reached and which Porter had always combated. The
latter does not appear to have doubted the ability of the fleet to pass
the works, but he questioned the utility and expediency of so doing. His
words were as follows:[J]
"The objections to running by the forts are these: It is not
likely that any intelligent enemy would fail to place chains
across above the forts, and raise such batteries as would protect
them against our ships. Did we run the forts we should leave an
enemy in our rear, and the mortar vessels would have to be left
behind. We could not return to bring them up without going
through a heavy and destructive fire. If the forts are run, part
of the mortars should be towed along, which would render the
progress of the vessels slow against the strong current at that
point. If the forts are first captured, the moral effect would be
to close the batteries on the river and open the way to New
Orleans; whereas, if we don't succeed in taking them, we shall
have to fight our way up the river. Once having possession of the
forts, New Orleans would be hermetically sealed, and we could
repair damages and go up on our own terms and in our own time....
Nothing has been said about a combined attack of army and navy.
Such a thing is not only practicable, but, if time permitted,
should be adopted. Fort St. Philip can be taken with two thousand
men covered by the ships, the ditch can be filled with fascines,
and the wall is easily to be scaled with ladders. It can be
attacked in front and rear."
[Footnote J: The paper being long, only those parts are quoted
which convey the objections to running by.]
In summoning his captains to meet him on this occasion, Farragut had no
idea of calling a council-of-war in the sense which has brought that
name into disrepute. He sent for them, not because he wanted to make up
his mind, but because it was made up, and he wished at once to impart to
them his purposes and receive the benefit of any suggestion they might
make. Bell, the chief-of-staff, who was present, has left a memorandum
of what passed, which is interesting as showing that the members were
not called to express an opinion as to the propriety of the attack, but
to receive instructions as to the method, on which they could suggest
improvements.
"April 20, 10 A. M. Signal was made for all captains commanding to
repair on board the flag-ship. All being present except the three on
guard to-day, viz., Commander De Camp and Lieutenants-Commanding Nichols
and Russell, the flag-officer unfolded his plan of operations, assigning
the places for every vessel in the fleet in the attack, and exhibited
his charts of the river and of the forts. Some discussion was had
thereupon, and Commander Alden read a written communication to the
flag-officer from Commander Porter at his request, expressing his views
as to the operation against the forts. Having read them, Commander Alden
folded up the paper and returned it to his pocket, whereupon I suggested
the propriety of the document being left with the flag-officer, and the
paper was accordingly left in his hands. It was therein stated that the
boom being a protection to the mortars against attacks of all kinds from
above, the boom should not be destroyed until the forts were reduced.
Upon this the flag-officer remarked that the commander had this morning
assented to the propriety of the boom being broken to-night--which I
heard--and, again, that the fleet should not go above the forts, as the
mortar fleet would be left unprotected. The flag-officer thought the
mortars would be as well protected above as below the forts, and that
co-operation with the army, which entered into the plans of both
parties, could not be effectual unless some of the troops were
introduced above the forts at the same time that they are below. Once
above, he intended to cover their landing at Quarantine, five miles
above, they coming to the river through the bayou there. Once above, the
forts were cut off and his propellers intact for ascending the river to
the city. And in passing the forts, if he found his ships able to cope
with them, he should fight it out. Some of the captains and commanders
considered it a hazardous thing to go above, as being out of the reach
of supplies. To this it may be said that the steamers can pass down at
the rate of twelve miles an hour. The flag-officer remarked that our
ammunition is being rapidly consumed without a supply at hand, and that
something must be done immediately. He believed in celerity. It was
proposed by myself and assented to by the flag-officer, that three
steamers should go up the river shortly after dark, under my own
guidance, to break the boom."
It appears from this account, supported by the general order issued
immediately after it and given a few pages further on, that Farragut had
definitely determined not to await the reduction of the forts, because
the bombardment so far did not indicate any probability of effectual
results. It was his deliberate opinion that the loss of time and the
waste of effort were entailing greater risks than would be caused by
cutting adrift from his base and severing his own communications in
order to strike at those of the enemy. It is commonly true that in the
effort to cut the communications of an opponent one runs the risk of
exposing his own; but in this case the attacking force was one
pre-eminently qualified to control the one great medium of communication
throughout that region--that is, the water. Also, although in
surrendering the river Farragut gave up the great line of travel, he
kept in view that the bayou system offered an alternative, doubtless
greatly inferior, but which, nevertheless, would serve to plant above
the forts, under the protection of the navy, such troops as should be
deemed necessary; and that the combined efforts of army and navy could
then maintain a sufficient flow of supplies until the forts fell from
isolation. Finally, a fleet is not so much an army as a collection of
floating fortresses, garrisoned, provisioned, and mobile. It carries its
communications in its hulls, and is not in such daily dependence upon
external sources as is the sister service.
In deciding, therefore, against awaiting the reduction of the forts by
direct attack, and in favor of attempting the same result by striking at
the interests they defended and the base on which they rested, Farragut
was guided by a calculation of the comparative _material_ risks and
advantages of the two courses, and not mainly by consideration of the
moral effect produced upon the defenders by a successful stroke, as has
been surmised by Lord Wolseley. This eminent English authority
attributes the success of the expedition against New Orleans to three
causes. "First, the inadequate previous preparation of the naval part
of the New Orleans defenses; second, the want of harmonious working
between the Confederate naval and military forces; and, lastly,
Farragut's clear appreciation of the moral effect he would produce by
forcing his way past the defenses of Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip,
and by his appearance before New Orleans. For, after all, the forts were
never captured by actual attack.... This brilliant result is a striking
instance of the due appreciation by a commander of the effect which
daring achievements exert on men's minds, although, _as in this case_,
those daring acts _do not actually, directly, or materially_ make
certain the end or surrender they may have secured." And, again, in
another place: "Admiral Farragut's success was mainly due to the moral
effect produced by his gallant passage of the forts.... He never reduced
the forts, and seems to have done them but little harm."[K]
[Footnote K: Lord Wolseley in _North American Review_, vol. cxlix,
pp. 32-34, 597. The italics are the author's.]
The moral effect produced in war upon men's minds, and through the mind
upon their actions, is undeniable, and may rightly count for much in the
calculations of a commander; but when it becomes the sole, or even the
chief reliance, as in Bonaparte's advance into Carinthia in 1797, the
spirit displayed approaches closely to that of the gambler who counts
upon a successful bluff to disconcert his opponent. The serious
objection to relying upon moral effect alone to overcome resistance is
that moral forces do not admit of as close knowledge and measurement as
do material conditions. The insight and moral strength of the enemy may
be greater than you have means of knowing, and to assume that they are
less is to fall into the dangerous error of despising your enemy. To
attribute to so dubious a hope, alone, the daring act of Admiral
Farragut in passing the forts and encountering the imperfectly known
dangers above, is really to detract from his fame as a capable as well
as gallant leader. That there were risks and accidents to be met he knew
full well; that he might incur disaster he realized; that the dangers
above and the power of the enemy's vessels might exceed his expectations
was possible; war can not be stripped of hazard, and the anxiety of the
doubtful issue is the penalty the chieftain pays for his position. But
Farragut was convinced by experience and reflection that his fleet could
force its passage; and he saw that once above the material probabilities
were that army and navy could be combined in such a position of vantage
as would isolate the forts from all relief, and so "actually, directly,
and materially make certain their surrender," and secure his end of
controlling the lower Mississippi. There was only one road practicable
to ships to pass above, and that led openly and directly under the fire
of the forts; but having passed this, they were planted across the
communications as squarely as if they had made a circuit of hundreds of
miles, with all the secrecy of Bonaparte in 1800 and in 1805. Are
strongholds never "captured" unless by "actual attack"? Did Ulm and
Mantua yield to blows or to isolation?
Such, certainly, was the opinion of the able officers who conducted the
Confederate defense, and whose conduct, except in matters of detail, was
approved by the searching court of inquiry that passed upon it. "In my
judgment," testified General M. L. Smith, who commanded the interior
line of works and was in no way responsible for the fall of Forts St.
Philip and Jackson, "the forts were impregnable _so long as they were in
free and open communication with the city_. This communication was not
endangered while the obstruction existed. The conclusion, then, is
briefly this: While the obstruction existed the city was safe; when it
was swept away, as the defenses then existed, it was in the enemy's
power."[L] General Lovell, the commander-in-chief of the military
department, stated that he had made preparations to evacuate New Orleans
in case the fleet passed the fort by sending out of the city several
hundred thousand rations and securing transport steamers. He continued:
"In determining upon the evacuation of the city I necessarily, as soon
as the enemy's fleet had passed the forts, regarded the position _the
same as if both their army and navy were present before the city_,
making due allowance simply for the time it would take them to transport
their army up. Inasmuch as their ships had passed Forts Jackson and St.
Philip, _they could at once place themselves in open and uninterrupted
communication with their army at points from six to twenty miles above
the forts through various small water communications from the Gulf_,
made more available by the extraordinary height of the river, and which,
while they (we?) were in possession of the latter, I had easily and
without risk defended with launches and part of the river-defense fleet.
I had also stationed Szymanski's regiment at the Quarantine for the same
object. These were, however, all destroyed or captured by the enemy's
fleet after they got possession of the river between the forts and the
city."[M] Colonel Szymanski testified: "After the forts had been passed,
it was practicable for the enemy to transport his army through the
bayous and canals to New Orleans, without encountering the forts. A
portion of the enemy did come that way. I have for many years owned a
plantation fifteen miles below the city, and am very familiar with the
whole country. I have never known the river as high as it was in 1862.
Also, above English Turn (five miles below the city) there is water
communication through Lake Borgne with the Gulf of Mexico by other
bayous and canals of the same character."[N]
[Footnote L: _Official Records of the War of the Rebellion._
Series I, vol. vi, p. 583.]
[Footnote M: _Official Records of the War of the Rebellion._
Series I, vol. vi, p. 566.]
[Footnote N: Ibid., p. 578.]
It is evident, therefore, that competent military men on the spot, and
in full possession of all the facts, considered, as did Farragut, that
with the passage of the forts by the fleet the material probabilities of
success became in favor of the United States forces. The only moral
effect produced was the mutiny of the half-disciplined alien troops that
garrisoned the forts; and surely it will not be contended that any such
wild anticipation as of that prompted Farragut's movement. The officers
of the forts were trained and educated soldiers, who knew their duty and
would not be crushed into submission by adverse circumstances. They
would doubtless have replied, as did the commander of Fort Morgan two
years later, that they looked upon the United States fleet above them as
their prisoners, and they would have held out to the bitter end; but the
end was certain as soon as the fleet passed above them. They had
provisions for two months; then, if not reduced by blows, they must
yield to hunger.
Immediately after the conference with his captains, Farragut issued the
following general order, from which it appears that, while his opinion
remained unchanged as to the expediency of running by the forts, he
contemplated the possibility, though not the probability, of their being
subdued by the fire of the fleet, and reserved to himself freedom to act
accordingly by prescribing a simple signal, which would be readily
understood, and would convert the attempt to pass into a sustained and
deadly effort to conquer:
"UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP HARTFORD,
MISSISSIPPI RIVER, _April 20, 1862_.
"The flag-officer, having heard all the opinions expressed by the
different commanders, is of the opinion that whatever is to be
done will have to be done quickly, or we shall be again reduced
to a blockading squadron, without the means of carrying on the
bombardment, as we have nearly expended all the shells and fuses
and material for making cartridges. He has always entertained the
same opinions which are expressed by Commander Porter--that is,
there are three modes of attack,[O] and the question is, which is
the one to be adopted? His own opinion is that a combination of
two should be made, viz., _the forts should be run, and when a
force is once above the forts to protect the troops they should
be landed at Quarantine from the Gulf side by bringing them
through the bayou_, and then our forces should move up the
river, mutually aiding each other as it can be done to advantage.
"When in the opinion of the flag-officer the propitious time has
arrived, the signal will be made to weigh and advance to the
conflict. If, in his opinion, at the time of arriving at the
respective positions of the different divisions of the fleet we
have the advantage, he will make the signal for close action, No.
8, and abide the result--conquer or be conquered--drop anchor or
keep under way, as in his opinion is best.
"_Unless the signal above mentioned is made_, it will be
understood that the first order of sailing will be formed after
leaving Fort St. Philip, and we will proceed up the river _in
accordance with the original opinion expressed_.
"The programme of the order of sailing accompanies this general
order, and the commanders will hold themselves in readiness for
the service as indicated.
D. G. FARRAGUT,
_Flag-officer Western Gulf Blockading Squadron_".
[Footnote O: Those three were: First, a direct naval attack upon
the works; second, running by the works; third, a combined attack
by army and navy.]
Nothing can be clearer than that the opinion expressed and maintained by
the flag-officer from the beginning was the one carried out, resulting
in a complete success.
The bombardment by the mortar flotilla was continued three days longer,
at the end of which time the provision of bombs immediately obtainable
was becoming exhausted. Enough, however, remained to sustain a very
vigorous fire during the period of the passage, and as the cover of
darkness was desired the delay was not without its advantages, for the
waning moon grew daily less and rose an hour later each succeeding
night. On the 23d notice was given to the ships that the attempt to pass
would be made that night, and that, as half-past three was the hour of
moon-rise, the signal, two red lights, would be hoisted at 2 A. M.
During that afternoon Farragut personally visited each ship, in order to
know positively that each commander understood his orders for the
attack, and to see that all was in readiness.
The original intention of the flag-officer was to attack in two parallel
columns, a more compact formation than one long one, less liable to
straggling, and in which the heavy batteries of the larger ships would
more effectually cover the lighter vessels by keeping down the fire of
the enemy. In this arrangement, which remained unaltered until the 23d,
the second in command, Captain Theodorus Bailey, whose divisional flag
was flying in the gunboat Cayuga, would have had the right column, and
the flag-officer himself the left in the Hartford. The latter was to be
followed by the Brooklyn and Richmond, and upon these three heavy ships
would fall the brunt of the engagement with Fort Jackson, the more
powerful of the enemy's works. The right column also had its heaviest
ships in the lead; the exceptional station of the Cayuga being due to
some natural unwillingness on the part of other commanding officers to
receive on board, as divisional commander and their own superior, an
officer whose position in the fleet was simply that of captain of a
single ship.[P] The Cayuga led, not in virtue of her armament, but
because she bore on board the commander of one column.
[Footnote P: Captain Bailey commanded the Colorado frigate, which
drew too much water to cross the bar. Anxious to share in the
fight, he obtained from the flag-officer the divisional
appointment.]
On the 23d Farragut, considering the narrowness of the opening in the
obstructions through which the fleet must pass, decided that the risk of
collision with the hulks on either side, or between the columns
themselves, would be too great if he adhered to his written programme;
and he accordingly gave a verbal order that the right column should
weigh first, and be followed closely by the other under his own
guidance. To facilitate the departure and avoid confusion, the ships of
the right shifted their berth after dark to the east side of the river,
anchoring in the order prescribed to them.
As some doubts had been expressed as to the actual rupture of the chains
between the hulks on either side the breach, although they had evidently
been dragged from their position by the efforts made on the night of the
20th, Lieutenant Caldwell was again chosen, at his own request, to make
an examination of the actual conditions. This he did in the early part
of the night, before the ships got under way; and it is a singular
confirmation of the slackness and inefficiency that has been charged
against the water service of the Confederates that he effected this duty
thoroughly and without molestation. Twice he pulled above the hulks and
thence allowed his boat to drift down between them, a heavy lead with
sixty feet of line hanging from her bows. As this line caught on nothing
it was clear that within the narrow limits of the breach no impediment
to the passage of a vessel existed. By 11 P. M. Caldwell was on his
return with this decisive and encouraging report.
At 2 A. M. the appointed signal was made, and at once was heard in every
direction the clank-clank of the chains as the seamen hove the anchors
to the bows. The strength of the current and the tenacity of the bottom
in some spots made this operation longer than had been expected, and not
till half-past three did the leading vessel reach the line of hulks,
followed closely by the rest of her division. There is something
singularly impressive in the thought of these moments of silent tension,
following the active efforts of getting under way and preceding the
furious strife, for whose first outburst every heart on board was
waiting; and the impression is increased by the petty size of the little
vessel in the lead, which thus advanced with steady beating of the
engines to bear the first blast of the storm. Favored partly by her
size, and yet more by the negligence of those among the enemy whose duty
it was to have kept the scene alight with the numerous fire-rafts
provided for that very purpose, the Cayuga passed the hulks and was well
on her way up river before she was seen. "Although it was a starlight
night," wrote Lieutenant Perkins, who by her commander's direction was
piloting the ship, "we were not discovered until well under the forts;
then they opened upon us a tremendous fire." It was the prelude to a
drama of singular energy and grandeur, for the Confederates in the forts
were fully on their guard, and had anticipated with unshaken courage,
but with gloomy forebodings, an attack during that very night. "There
will be no to-morrow for New Orleans," had said the undaunted commander
of Fort Jackson the day before, "if the navy does not at once move the
Louisiana to the position assigned to her," close to the obstructions.
The Louisiana was a powerful ironclad battery, not quite complete when
Farragut entered the river. She had been hurried down to the forts four
days before the passage of the fleet, but her engines could not drive
her, and the naval commander refused to take up the position, asked of
him by the military authorities, below St. Philip, where he would have a
cross fire with the forts, a close command of the line of obstructions,
and would greatly prolong the gantlet of fire through which the fleet
must run. To support the movement of the latter by drawing the fire and
harassing the gunners of the enemy, Commander Porter moved up with the
steamers of the mortar flotilla to easy range of the water battery under
Fort Jackson, which he engaged; while the mortar schooners, as soon as
the flash of the enemy's guns showed that the head of the column had
been discovered, opened a furious bombardment, keeping two shells
constantly in the air. Except for the annoyance of the bombs, the
gunners of the forts had it much their own way until the broadsides of
the Pensacola, which showed eleven heavy guns on either side, drew up
abreast of them. "The Cayuga received the first fire," writes Perkins,
"and the air was filled with shells and explosives which almost blinded
me as I stood on the forecastle trying to see my way, for I had never
been up the river before. I soon saw that the guns of the forts were all
aimed for midstream, so I steered close under the walls of Fort St.
Philip; and although our masts and rigging got badly shot through our
hull was but little damaged." Small as she was--five hundred tons--and
with the scanty top hamper of a schooner, the Cayuga was struck
forty-two times, below and aloft.
"After passing the last battery," continues Perkins, "and thinking we
were clear, I looked back for some of our vessels, and my heart jumped
up into my mouth when I found I could not see a single one. I thought
they all must have been sunk by the forts." This seeming desertion was
due to the fact that the heavy ships--the Pensacola, Mississippi, and
Oneida--had been detained by the resolute manner in which the first
stopped to engage Fort St. Philip. Stopping to fire, then moving slowly,
then stopping again, the reiterated broadsides of this big ship,
delivered at such close range that the combatants on either side
exchanged oaths and jeers of defiance, beat down the fire of the exposed
barbette batteries, and gave an admirable opportunity for slipping by to
the light vessels, which brought up the rear of the column and were
wholly unfit to contend with the forts. The Mississippi and Oneida
keeping close behind the Pensacola and refusing to pass her, the Cayuga
was thus separated from all her followers.
The isolation of the Cayuga was therefore caused by her anomalous
position at the head of the column, a post proper only to a heavy ship.
It was impossible for her petty battery of two guns to pause before the
numerous pieces of the enemy; it was equally impossible for the powerful
vessels following her to hasten on, leaving to the mercy of the
Confederates the gunboats of the same type that succeeded them in the
order. That the Cayuga was thus exposed arose from the amiable desire of
the admiral to gratify Bailey's laudable wish to share in the battle,
without compelling an officer of the same grade, and junior only in
number, to accept a superior on his own quarter-deck in the day of
battle, when the harvest of distinction is expected to repay the patient
sowing of preparation. The commander of the Cayuga, who was only a
lieutenant, had reconciled these conflicting claims by volunteering to
carry Bailey's divisional flag. As there is no reason to suppose that
Farragut deliberately intended to offer the gunboat up as a forlorn hope
by drawing the first fire of the enemy, always the most deadly, and thus
saving the more important vessels, the disposition of her constitutes
the only serious fault in his tactical arrangements on this occasion--a
fault attributable not to his judgment, but to one of those concessions
to human feelings which circumstances at times extort from all men. His
first intention, an advance in two columns, the heavy ships leading and
closely engaging the forts with grape and canister, while the two-gun
vessels slipped through between the columns, met the tactical demands of
the proposed operation. The decision to abandon this order in favor of
one long, thin line, because of the narrowness of the opening, can not
be challenged. This formation was distinctly weaker and more liable to
straggling, but nothing could be so bad as backing, collision, or
stoppage at the obstructions. In such an attack, however, as in all of
Farragut's battles, it seems eminently fitting that the commander of the
column should lead. The occasion is one for pilotage and example; and
inasmuch as the divisional commander can not control, except by example,
any ship besides the one on board which he himself is, that ship should
be the most powerful in his command. These conclusions may hereafter be
modified by conditions of submarine warfare, though even under them it
seems likely that in forcing passage into a harbor the van ship should
carry the flag of the officer commanding the leading division; but under
the circumstances of Farragut's day they may be accepted as representing
his own convictions, first formed by the careful deliberation of a man
with a genius for war, and afterward continually confirmed by his
ever-ripening experience.
Left thus unsupported by the logical results of her false position, the
Cayuga found herself exposed to an even greater danger than she had
already run from the guns of the stationary works. "Looking ahead," says
Perkins's letter, already quoted, "I saw eleven of the enemy's gunboats
coming down upon us, and it seemed as if we were 'gone' sure." The
vessels thus dimly seen in the darkness of the night were a
heterogeneous, disorganized body, concerning which, however, very
imperfect and very exaggerated particulars had reached the United States
fleet. They were freely spoken of as ironclad gunboats and ironclad
rams, and the Confederates had done all in their power to increase the
moral effect which was attendant upon these names, then new to maritime
warfare. None of them had been built with any view to war. Three only
were sea-going, with the light scantling appropriate to their calling as
vessels for freight and passenger traffic. Another had been a large
twin-screw tugboat that began her career in Boston, and thence, shortly
before the war, had been sent to the Mississippi. After the outbreak of
hostilities she had been covered with an arched roof and
three-quarter-inch iron; a nine-inch gun, capable only of firing
directly ahead, had been mounted in her bows, and, thus equipped, she
passed into notoriety as the ram Manassas. With the miserable speed of
six knots, to which, however, the current of the river gave a very
important addition, and with a protection scarcely stronger than the
buckram armor of the stage, the Manassas, by her uncanny appearance and
by the persistent trumpeting of the enemy, had obtained a very
formidable reputation with the United States officers, who could get no
reliable information about her.
The remainder of the force were river steamboats, whose machinery was
protected with cotton, and their stems shod with one-inch iron, clamped
in place by straps of the same material extending a few feet aft. Thus
strengthened, it was hoped that with the sharpness of their bows and the
swiftness of the current they could, notwithstanding the exceeding
lightness of their structure, penetrate the hulls of the United States
ships. Resolutely and vigorously handled, there can be little doubt that
they might have sunk one or two of their assailants; but there is no
probability that they could under all the circumstances have done more.
The obscurity of the night, the swiftness of the stream, and the number
of actors in the confusing drama being played between the two banks of
the Mississippi, would have introduced into the always delicate fencing
of the ram extraordinary difficulties, with which the inexperience of
their commanders was in no degree qualified to deal. The generally
steady approach, bows on, of the United States ships, presented the
smallest target to their thrust and gave to the threatened vessel the
utmost facilities for avoiding the collision or converting it into a
glancing blow; while, as for rounding-to, to ram squarely on the beam of
a ship stemming the current, the assailant, even if he displayed the
remarkable nicety of judgment required, was not likely to find the
necessary room.
These difficulties received illustration by the career of the Manassas
that night. Her commander, Lieutenant Warley, was a former officer of
the United States Navy, and he handled her with judgment and the utmost
daring. Rushing nearly bows on upon the Pensacola, the thrust was wholly
avoided by the quick moving of the latter's helm, which Warley
characterized as beautiful; while the attempt made immediately afterward
upon the Mississippi resulted in a merely glancing blow, which took a
deep and long shaving out of the enemy's quarter, but did no serious
damage. Not till a much later period of the action did the Manassas find
an opportunity to charge squarely upon the beam of the Brooklyn. She did
so across the current, striking therefore only with her own speed of six
knots. But little shock was felt on board the rammed ship, and no
apprehension of damage was experienced; but it was afterward found that
the enemy's stem had entered between two frames, and crushed both the
outer and inner planking. A few moments earlier the Brooklyn had been
thrown across the current by the chances of the night. Had the ram then
struck her in the same place, carrying the four knots additional
velocity of the current, it is entirely possible that the mortification
of the Confederate defeat would have derived some consolation from the
sinking of one of Farragut's best ships. Such were the results obtained
by a man of singular and resolute character, who drove his tiny vessel
through the powerful broadsides of the hostile fleet, and dared
afterward to follow its triumphant course up the river, in hopes of
snatching another chance from the jaws of defeat.
Another example, equally daring and more successful, of the power of the
ram, was given that same night by Kennon, also an ex-officer of the
United States Navy; but the other ram commanders did not draw from their
antecedent training and habits of thought the constancy and pride, which
could carry their frail vessels into the midst of ships that had thus
victoriously broken their way through the bulwarks of the Mississippi.
The River-Defense Fleet, as it was called, was a separate organization,
which owned no allegiance and would receive no orders from the navy; and
its absurd privileges were jealously guarded by a government whose
essential principle was the independence of local rights from all
central authority. Captains of Mississippi River steamboats, their
commanders held to the full the common American opinion that the
profession of arms differs from all others in the fact that it requires
no previous training, involves no special habits of thought, is
characterized by no moral tone which only early education or years of
custom can impart. Rejecting all suggestion and neglecting all
preparation, they cherished the most inordinate confidence in the raw
native valor which they were persuaded would inspire them at the
critical moment; and, incredible as it would seem, some of the men who
in the battle could find no other use for their boats but to run them
ashore and burn them, ventured to tell Warley the night before that
their mission was to show naval officers how to fight. They did not
lack courage, but that military habit upon whose influence Farragut had
so acutely remarked when a youth, returning in 1820 from the European
station.[Q] "Had regular naval officers," said Kennon bitterly, "instead
of being kept in the mud forts on the creeks in Virginia, and in the
woods of Carolina cutting timbers to build ironclads, been sent to
command these vessels, even at the eleventh hour, they would have proved
very formidable."
[Footnote Q: See page 62.]
Steaming into the midst of such as these, the peril of the Cayuga, real
enough, was less than it seemed; but she had to do at once with Warley's
Manassas and with the Governor Moore, the vessel that Kennon commanded,
and which afterward sunk the Varuna. "Three made a dash to board us,"
records Lieutenant Perkins, agreeing therein with the official reports
of Captain Bailey and of his own commander, Lieutenant Harrison; "but a
heavy charge from our eleven-inch gun settled the Governor Moore, which
was one of them. A ram, the Manassas, in attempting to butt us just
missed our stern, and we soon settled the third fellow's 'hash.' Just
then some of our gunboats which had passed the forts came up, and then
all sorts of things happened." This last expression is probably as terse
and graphic a summary of a _mêlée_, which to so many is the ideal of a
naval conflict, as ever was penned. "There was the wildest excitement
all round. The Varuna fired a broadside into us instead of into the
enemy. Another of our gunboats attacked one of the Cayuga's prizes; I
shouted out, 'Don't fire into that ship, she has surrendered.' Three of
the enemy's ships had surrendered to us before any of our vessels
appeared; but when they did come up we all pitched in, and settled the
eleven rebel vessels in about twenty minutes." Besides the eleven armed
boats known to have been above, there were several unarmed tugs and
other steamers, some of which probably shared in this wild confusion.
One at least came into conflict with the Hartford.
The second column, led by the flag-ship, was promptly away and after the
first; following, indeed, so closely that the head of the one lapped the
rear of the other. The Brooklyn and Richmond, close behind the Hartford,
formed with her a powerful "body of battle," to use the strong French
expression for the center of a fleet. Though called sloops-of-war, the
tonnage and batteries of these ships were superior to those of the
medium ships-of-the-line of the beginning of this century, with which
Nelson fought his celebrated battles. As the flag-ship reached the hulks
the night, which, though very dark, was fairly clear, had become
obscured by the dense clouds of smoke that an almost breathless
atmosphere suffered to settle down upon the water. Only twenty minutes
had elapsed since the forts opened upon the Cayuga, when Farragut's flag
entered the battle. Soon after passing the obstructions, and when about
to sheer in toward Fort Jackson, upon which was to be concentrated her
own battery and that of her two formidable followers, a fire-raft was
observed coming down the river in such a way as to make contact probable
if the course were not changed. Heading across the river, and edged
gradually over by the raft continuing to work toward her, the ship took
the ground a little above Fort St. Philip, but still under its
batteries. While in this dangerous position, the raft, whose movements
proved to be controlled not by the current but by a small tugboat, was
pushed against her port quarter. The flames caught the side of the ship,
spread swiftly along it, leaped into the rigging and blazed up toward
the tops. The danger was imminent, and appeared even more so than it
was; for the body of heat, though great, was scarcely sufficient to
account for such a rapid spread of the flames, which was probably due
mainly to the paint. The thoroughly organized fire department soon
succeeded in quenching the conflagration, its source being removed by
training some of the after-guns upon the daring pygmy, which with such
reckless courage had well-nigh destroyed the commander-in-chief of her
enemy's fleet. The tug received a shot in her boilers and sunk. The
Hartford backed clear, but in so doing fell off broadside to the stream,
thereby affording another chance to the hostile rams, had there been one
prepared to dare the hazard. Watson, the flag-lieutenant, remarks that
the flag-officer stood during this critical period giving his orders and
watching the ship slowly turn, referring occasionally to a little
compass which was attached to his watch-chain. During most of the
engagement, however, he was forward observing the conflict.
The Brooklyn and Richmond, with the Sciota and the Iroquois, which
followed immediately after them, fought their way through with more or
less of adventure, but successfully reached the river above the forts.
It is to be observed, however, that these, as well as the Hartford,
suffered from the embarrassment of the smoke, which had inconvenienced
the ships of the first column to a much less degree. This was to be
expected, and doubtless contributed to the greater loss which they
suffered, by delaying their progress and giving uncertainty to their
aim; the result of the latter being naturally to intensify the action of
the hostile gunners. Four gunboats brought up the rear of the column, of
which but one got through, and she with a loss greater than any vessel
of her class. The three last failed to pass. Blinded by smoke and
further delayed by the tendency to open out, which is observable in all
long columns, they came under the fire of the forts at a time when, the
larger vessels having passed, they were no longer covered or supported
by their fire, and when day was about to break. The Itasca, commanded by
the gallant Caldwell, who had so nobly broken through the obstructions,
opposing only her puny battery to the concentrated wrath of the forts,
was knocked about by them at will, received a shot through her boiler
and drifted down the river out of action. The Winona likewise
encountered almost alone, or perhaps in company with the Itasca, the
fire of the enemy. After nearly running ashore in the smoke, daylight
surprised her while still under fire below the works; and her commander
very properly decided not to risk the total destruction and possible
capture of his vessel for the sake of adding her insignificant force to
that above. Admirably as the gunboats were officered, perhaps their most
useful service on this night was to demonstrate again the advantage of
big ships, as of big battalions.
Thirteen out of his seventeen vessels having rallied around his flag
above the forts, and the three below being of the least efficient type,
the flag-officer could congratulate himself upon a complete victory,
won with but little loss. One vessel only was sacrificed, and she to
that inconsiderate ardor which in so many cases of pursuit leads men,
without any necessity, out of reach of support. The Varuna, the fifth in
the order, and the only merchant-built vessel in the fleet, after
clearing the forts had steamed rapidly through the Confederate flotilla,
firing right and left, but not stopping. She soon passed above it, and
getting sight of a small steamer heading for New Orleans, sped away
after her. Kennon, in the Governor Moore, happened to have noticed this
movement; and, finding by the rapid accessions to the number of his
enemies that he was likely to be soon overwhelmed, he determined to
follow this one which, whatever her strength, he might tackle alone.
Stealing out of the _mêlée_ he started up the river, hoisting lights
similar to those he had observed the enemy's ships to carry. Deceived by
this ruse, the Varuna at the first paid no attention to her pursuer,
some distance behind whom followed one of the River-Defense boats, the
Stonewall Jackson. When Kennon at last opened fire, the Varuna, having
by then run down her steam in her headlong speed, was being rapidly
overtaken. The second shot from the Moore raked the Varuna's deck,
killing and wounding twelve men. The Union vessel's helm was then put
hard-a-port, swinging her broadside to bear upon her approaching foe,
who was naturally expected to imitate the movement, opposing side to
side to avoid being raked. Instead of so doing Kennon kept straight on,
and, while receiving a deadly raking fire from his antagonist's battery,
which struck down many of his men, he succeeded in driving the sharp
stem of the Moore through the side of the Varuna. A few moments after
the Stonewall Jackson coming up also rammed the disabled enemy, whose
commander then drove her ashore on the east side of the river, where she
sank. By this time the corvette Oneida had made out the state of the
case. Steaming rapidly ahead, she overhauled the Confederate vessels;
which, finding they could not escape, ran ashore, the Jackson on the
west bank, the Moore on the east, and in those positions they were
surrendered.
Farragut had undertaken this daring exploit with the expectation that,
after passing the forts, he could obtain the co-operation of the army,
and that the action of the two services, combined in mutual support,
would suffice to force the way to New Orleans. The occupation of the
land by the army, and of the water by the navy, interposing by the
nature of their operations between the city and the forts, would
effectually isolate the latter. In accordance with this plan he at once
sent Captain Boggs, of the Varuna, through the Quarantine Bayou with
messages to Commander Porter and General Butler. The latter was notified
that the way was now clear to land his troops through the bayou, in
accordance with the previous arrangements, and that gunboats would be
left there to protect them against those of the enemy, of which three or
four were seen to be still at the forts. Boggs passed successfully
through the country and streams which a day before had been in quiet
possession of the enemy, though it took him twenty-six hours to do so;
but General Butler, who from a transport below had witnessed the success
of the fleet, had waited for no further tidings. Hurrying back to his
troops, he collected them at Sable Island, twelve miles in rear of Fort
St. Philip, whence they were transported and landed at a point on the
river five miles above the work, where the Kineo and Wissahickon awaited
them.
During the remainder of the 24th the fleet stayed at anchor off the
Quarantine station, to repose the crews after the excessive labor and
excitement of the previous night. Early the next morning all got under
way except the two gunboats left to support Butler's troops, and moved
up stream; but slowly, owing to the indifferent speed of some and to
want of knowledge of the river. At half-past ten they reached English
Turn, five miles below the city; the point where the British forces had
in 1815 been so disastrously repelled in their assault upon the
earth-works held by Jackson's riflemen. The Confederates had fortified
and armed the same lines on both sides of the Mississippi, as part of
the interior system of defenses to New Orleans; the exterior line being
constituted by Forts Jackson and St. Philip, together with several
smaller works at different points, commanding the numerous subsidiary
approaches through the Mississippi delta. The interior lines at English
Turn, known as the Chalmette and McGehee batteries, were, however,
intended only to check an approach of troops from down the river. Their
general direction was perpendicular to the stream; and along its banks
there ran only a short work on either side to protect the main
entrenchments from an enfilading fire by light vessels, which might, in
company with an invading army, have managed to turn the lower forts by
passing through the bayous. These river batteries, mounting respectively
nine and five guns, were powerless to resist the ships that had
successfully passed the main defenses of the city. After a few shots,
fired rather for the honor of the flag than in any hope of successful
result, the guns were forsaken; and both lines of entrenchments, being
turned and taken in the rear, were abandoned.
Meanwhile, in New Orleans a scene of fearful confusion was growing
hourly more frenzied. Whatever the fears of the military commanders as
to the result of the attack upon the forts, they had very properly
concealed them from the inhabitants; and these, swayed by the boastful
temper common to mobs, had been readily led to despise the efforts of
the enemy and to trust implicitly in the power of their defenses.
General Lovell, commanding the department, had gone down to the forts
the evening before the attack, and was still there when the United
States fleet was breaking its way through; he was, in fact, on board the
little steamer, the pursuit of which lured the Varuna into the isolation
where she met her fate. The news of the successful forcing of the
exterior and principal defenses thus reached the city soon after it was
effected; and at the same time Lovell, satisfied from the first that if
the forts were passed the town was lost, prepared at once to evacuate
it, removing all the Government property. This in itself was a service
of great difficulty. New Orleans is almost surrounded by water or marsh;
the only exit was to the northward by a narrow strip of dry land, not
over three quarters of a mile wide, along the river bank, by which
passed the railroad to Jackson, in the State of Mississippi. As has
already been said, Lovell had by this road been quietly removing army
rations for some time, but had abstained from trying to carry off any
noticeable articles by which his apprehensions would be betrayed to the
populace. The latter, roused from its slumber of security with such
appalling suddenness, gave way to an outburst of panic and fury; which
was the less controllable because so very large a proportion of the
better and stronger element among the men had gone forth to swell the
ranks of the Confederate army. As in a revolution in a South American
city, the street doors were closed by the tradesmen upon the property in
their stores; but without began a scene of mad destruction, which has
since been forcibly portrayed by one, then but a lad of fourteen years,
who witnessed the sight.
Far down the stream, and throughout their ascent, the ships were passing
through the wreckage thus made. Cotton bales, cotton-laden ships and
steamers on fire, and working implements of every kind such as are used
in ship-yards, were continually encountered. On the piers of the levees,
where were huge piles of hogsheads of sugar and molasses, a mob,
composed of the scum of the city, men and women, broke and smashed
without restraint. Toward noon of the 25th, as the fleet drew round the
bend where the Crescent City first appears in sight, the confusion and
destruction were at their height. "The levee of New Orleans," says
Farragut in his report, "was one scene of desolation. Ships, steamers,
cotton, coal, etc., were all in one common blaze, and our ingenuity was
much taxed to avoid the floating conflagration. The destruction of
property was awful." Upon this pandemonium, in which the fierce glare of
burning property lit up the wild passions and gestures of an infuriated
people, the windows of heaven were opened and a drenching rain poured
down in torrents. The impression produced by the ships as they came in
sight around the bend has been graphically described by the boy before
mentioned, who has since become so well-known as an author--Mr. George
W. Cable. "I see the ships now, as they come slowly round Slaughter
House Point into full view, silent, grim, and terrible; black with men,
heavy with deadly portent, the long-banished Stars and Stripes flying
against the frowning sky. Oh! for the Mississippi! for the Mississippi!"
(an iron-clad vessel nearly completed, upon which great hopes had been
based by the Confederates). "Just then she came down. But how? Drifting
helplessly, a mass of flames.
"The crowds on the levee howled and screamed with rage. The swarming
decks answered never a word; but one old tar on the Hartford, standing
lanyard in hand beside a great pivot gun, so plain to view that you
could see him smile, silently patted its big black breech and blandly
grinned. And now the rain came down in torrents."
That same morning, as though with the purpose of embarrassing the victor
whom he could not oppose, the Mayor of New Orleans had ordered the State
flag of Louisiana to be hoisted upon the City Hall. His secretary, who
was charged with this office, waited to fulfill it until the cannonade
at English Turn had ceased, and it was evident the fleet had passed the
last flimsy barrier and would within an hour appear before the city. The
flag was then run up; and the Mayor had the satisfaction of creating a
position of very unnecessary embarrassment for all parties by his
useless bravado.
To Captain Bailey, the second in command, who had so gallantly led both
in the first assault and in the attack at Chalmette, was assigned the
honor of being the first to land in the conquered city and to demand its
surrender. It was no barren honor, but a service of very sensible
personal danger to which he was thus called. General Lovell having to
devote his attention solely to his military duties, the city which had
so long been under martial law was escaping out of the hands of the
civil authorities and fast lapsing into anarchy. Between one and two in
the afternoon Bailey landed, accompanied by Perkins, the first
lieutenant of the Cayuga; who, having shared his former perils, was
permitted to accompany him in this one also. "We took just a boat and a
boat's crew," writes Perkins, "with a flag of truce, and started off.
When we reached the wharf there were no officials to be seen; no one
received us, although the whole city was watching our movements, and the
levee was crowded in spite of a heavy rainstorm. Among the crowd were
many women and children, and the women were shaking rebel flags and
being rude and noisy. They were all shouting and hooting as we stepped
on shore.... As we advanced the mob followed us in a very excited state.
They gave three cheers for Jeff Davis and Beauregard and three groans
for Lincoln. Then they began to throw things at us, and shout 'Hang
them!' 'Hang them!' We both thought we were in a bad fix, but there was
nothing for us to do but just to go on." Mr. Cable has given his
description of the same scene: "About one or two in the afternoon, I
being in the store with but one door ajar, came a roar of shoutings and
imprecations and crowding feet down Common Street. 'Hurrah for Jeff
Davis!' 'Shoot them!' 'Kill them!' 'Hang them!' I locked the door of
the store on the outside and ran to the front of the mob, bawling with
the rest, 'Hurrah for Jeff Davis!' About every third man had a weapon
out. Two officers of the United States navy were walking abreast,
unguarded and alone, not looking to the right or left, never frowning,
never flinching, while the mob screamed in their ears, shook cocked
pistols in their faces, cursed, crowded, and gnashed upon them. So
through those gates of death those two men walked to the City Hall to
demand the town's surrender. It was one of the bravest deeds I ever saw
done."
Farragut's demand, made through Bailey, was that the flag of Louisiana
should be hauled down from the City Hall, and that of the United States
hoisted over the buildings which were its property, namely, the Custom
House, Post Office, and Mint. This the Mayor refused to do; and, as
Farragut had no force with which to occupy the city, it became a
somewhat difficult question to carry on an argument with the authorities
of a town protected by the presence of so many women and children. The
situation was for three days exceedingly critical, from the temper and
character of the mob and from the obstinacy and powerlessness of the
officials. It was doubtless as much as the life of any citizen of the
place was worth to comply with the admiral's demands. On the other hand,
while there could be no difficulty in hoisting the United States flag,
there would be much in protecting it from insult with the means at the
flag-officer's disposal; for to open fire upon a place where there were
so many helpless creatures, innocent of any greater offense than
behaving like a set of spoiled children, was a course that could not be
contemplated unless in the last necessity, and it was undesirable to
provoke acts which might lead to any such step. The United States
officers who were necessarily sent to communicate with the authorities
did so, in the opinion of the authorities themselves, at the peril of
their lives from a mob which no one on shore could control. On the 28th
of April, however, Forts Jackson and St. Philip surrendered to Commander
Porter in consequence of a mutiny in their garrisons, which refused to
fight any longer, saying further resistance was useless; and the
following day Farragut sent ashore a body of two hundred and fifty
marines with two howitzers manned by seamen from the Hartford, the whole
under the command of the fleet-captain, Captain Henry H. Bell. The force
was formally drawn up before the City Hall, the howitzers pointing up
and down the street, which was thronged with people. Fearing still that
some rash person in the crowd might dare to fire upon the men who were
hauling down the flag, the Mayor took his stand before one of the
howitzers; a sufficient intimation to the mob that were murder done he
would be the first victim to fall in expiation. The United States flag
was then hoisted over the Custom House, and left flying under the
protection of a guard of marines.
Thus was timely and satisfactorily completed an act, by which Farragut
signalized and sealed the fact that the conquest of New Orleans and of
its defenses, from the original conception of the enterprise to its
complete fulfillment by the customary tokens of submission and taking
possession, was wholly the work of the United States Navy; of which he,
by his magnificent successes, became the representative figure. It was a
triumph won over formidable difficulties by a mobile force, skillfully
directed and gallantly fought. By superior promptitude and a correct
appreciation of the true strategic objective had been reduced to
powerlessness obstacles not to be overcome by direct assault, except by
a loss of time which would have allowed the enemy to complete
preparations possibly fatal to the whole undertaking. Forts Jackson and
St. Philip, which the fleet could not have reduced by direct attack,
fell by the severance of their communications.
It is not to be questioned that the moral effect of the passage of the
forts, succeeded, as it was, by the immediate fall of the great city of
the Mississippi, was very great; but it was not upon the forts
themselves, nor in the unexpected mutiny of the garrison, that that
effect was chiefly manifested. Great as was the crime of the men, they
showed by their act a correct appreciation of those results to the
forts, from the passage of the fleet, which some have sought to
ignore--results physical, undeniable, fatal. It was not moral effect,
but indisputable reasoning which sapped the further resistance of
men--brave till then--to whom were wanting the habit of discipline and
the appreciation of the far-reaching effects upon the fortunes of a
campaign produced by a prolonged, though hopeless, resistance. They saw
that the fate of the forts was sealed, and beyond that they recognized
no duties and no advantages. On the scene of his exploit Farragut reaped
the material fruits of the celerity in which he believed; and which he
had reluctantly for a space postponed, at the bidding of superior
authority, in order to try the effect of slower methods. These being
exhausted, he owed to the promptness of his decision and action that the
Louisiana, on whose repairs men were working night and day, did not take
the advantageous position indicated to her by the officers of the forts;
and that the Mississippi, the ironclad upon which not only the
designers, but naval officers, founded extravagant hopes, was neither
completed nor towed away, but burned where she lay. The flaming mass, as
it drifted hopelessly by the Hartford, was a striking symbol of
resistance crushed--of ascendency established over the mighty river
whose name it bore; but it was a symbol not of moral, but of physical
victory.
It was elsewhere, far and wide, that were felt the moral effects which
echoed the sudden, unexpected crash with which the lower Mississippi
fell--through the length and breadth of the South and in the cabinets of
foreign statesmen, who had believed too readily, as did their officers
on the spot, that the barrier was not to be passed--that the Queen City
of the Confederacy was impregnable to attack from the sea. Whatever may
have been the actual purposes of that mysterious and undecided
personage, Napoleon III, the effect of military events, whether on sea
or shore, upon the question of interference by foreign powers is
sufficiently evident from the private correspondence which, a few months
after New Orleans, passed between Lords Palmerston and Russell, then the
leading members of the British Cabinet.[R] Fortunately for the cause of
the United States, France and Great Britain were not of a mind to
combine their action at the propitious moment; and the moral effect of
the victory at New Orleans was like a cold plunge bath to the French
emperor, at the time when he was hesitating whether to act alone. It
produced upon him even more impression than upon the British Government;
because his ambitions for French control and for the extension of the
Latin races on the American continent were especially directed toward
Louisiana, the former colony of France, and toward its neighbors, Texas
and Mexico.
[Footnote R: See Walpole's _Life of Lord John Russell_,
vol. ii, pp. 349-351.]
The sympathies, however, of the classes from whom were chiefly drawn the
cabinets of the two great naval States were overwhelmingly with the
South; and the expressions alike of the emperor and of his principal
confidants at this time were designedly allowed to transpire, both to
the Southern commissioners and to the British Government. On the very
day that Porter's mortar schooners opened on Fort Jackson, Louis
Napoleon unbosomed himself to a member of the British Parliament, who
visited him as an avowed partisan of the Confederate cause. He said that
while he desired to preserve a strict neutrality, he could not consent
that his people should continue to suffer from the acts of the Federal
Government. He thought the best course would be to make a friendly
appeal to it, either alone or concurrently with England, to open the
ports; but to accompany the appeal with a proper demonstration of force
upon our coasts, and, should the appeal seem likely to be ineffectual,
to back it by a declaration of his purpose not to respect the blockade.
The taking of New Orleans, which he did not then anticipate, might
render it inexpedient to act; that he would not decide at once, but
would wait some days for further intelligence.[S] Similar semi-official
assurances came from different persons about the emperor; and the
members of the Cabinet, with a single exception, showed little reserve
in their favorable expressions toward the Confederacy.
[Footnote S: _North American Review_, vol. cxxix, p. 347.]
A few weeks later Mr. Slidell had a conversation with M. Billault, the
minister _sans portefeuille_, one of the most conservative and cautious
men in the Cabinet, who represented the Government in the Chambers upon
all subjects connected with foreign affairs. Slidell read a note which
he had received from Sir Charles Wood, a leading Southern sympathizer in
England, denying that the British Government was unwilling to act in
American affairs--a denial to which some color is given by the
correspondence of Palmerston and Russell before mentioned. In answer, M.
Billault declared that the French Cabinet, with the possible exception
of M. Thouvénel, had been unanimously in favor of the South, and added
that if New Orleans had not fallen its recognition would not have been
much longer delayed; but, even after that disaster, if decided successes
were obtained in Virginia and Tennessee, or the enemy were held at bay
for a month or two, the same result would follow. After an interview
with M. Thouvénel, about the same time, Slidell reported that, though
that minister did not directly say so, his manner gave fair reason to
infer that if New Orleans had not been taken, and no very serious
reverses were suffered in Virginia and Tennessee, recognition would very
soon have been declared.[T]
[Footnote T: Ibid., vol. cxxix, p. 348.]
In its moral effect, therefore, the fall of the river forts and of New
Orleans, though not absolutely and finally decisive of the question of
foreign intervention, corresponded to one of those telling blows, by
which a general threatened by two foes meets and strikes down one before
the other comes up. Such a blow may be said to decide a campaign; not
because no chance is left the enemy to redeem his misfortune, but
because without the first success the weaker party would have been
overwhelmed by the junction of his two opponents. The heart-rending
disasters to our armies during the following summer does but emphasize
the immense value to the Union cause of the moral effect produced by
Farragut's victory. Those disasters, as it was, prompted the leaders of
the British ministry to exchange confidences in which they agreed on the
expediency of mediation. They did not carry all their colleagues with
them; but who can estimate the effect, when the scales were thus
balancing, if the navy had been driven out of the Mississippi as the
army was from Virginia?