THE BLOCKADE AND PORT HUDSON.
1862-1863.
Operations in the Mississippi having now temporarily ceased, Farragut
was at liberty to give his undivided attention for a time to the coast
blockade. The important harbor of Pensacola had been evacuated by the
Confederates in May, less than a month after the capture of New Orleans.
Its abandonment was due to want of troops to garrison it properly; the
pressure of the United States armies in Kentucky and Tennessee, after
the fall of Fort Donelson in the previous February, having necessitated
the withdrawal of all men that could be spared from other points. Before
the war Pensacola had been the seat of a well-equipped navy yard with a
good dry-dock, the only naval station of the United States in the Gulf
of Mexico. At the time of the evacuation the buildings in the yard had
been destroyed and the dry-dock injured; but the fine harbor, the depth
of water--twenty-two feet--that could be carried over the bar, and the
nearness of the port to Mobile, the most important center of blockade
running, all combined to make it the headquarters of the fleet for
repairs and supplies. Farragut arrived there on the 20th of August. Just
before leaving New Orleans he received his commission as rear admiral,
dated July 16, 1862. Three other officers were promoted at the same time
to the active list of this grade, which had never before existed in the
United States; but as Farragut was the senior in rank of the four, he
may be said to have been the first officer of the navy to hoist an
admiral's flag.
The admiral remained in Pensacola for three months, superintending from
there the affairs of his squadron. During this period the harbors of
Galveston and of various other smaller ports on the coast of Texas and
Louisiana were occupied by detachments of vessels, as the surest way of
enforcing the blockade. The admiral had early announced that he should
carry on the blockade as far as possible inside; and these successes
enabled him to say in December, 1862, that he now held the whole coast
except Mobile. During his stay in Pensacola he received a visit from his
son, who found him in the best of spirits, all having gone well on the
coast; the only mishap having been the success of a Confederate cruiser,
the Oreto, in running into Mobile. She had availed herself of her close
resemblance to some of the British cruisers in the Gulf to hoist the
British flag; and as visits of these vessels to the blockaded ports were
authorized and not infrequent, the ruse induced the United States ship
that overhauled her to withhold its fire for a few critical moments.
During these the Oreto gained so far on the other that, although struck
three times by heavy projectiles, she received no vital injury and
succeeded in gaining the shelter of the forts.
The period of the admiral's stay in Pensacola was one of the deepest
depression to the Union cause, and his letters bear evidence of the
anxiety which he shared with all his fellow-countrymen in that time of
distress. The reverses of McClellan in the peninsula, followed by the
withdrawal of his army from thence and its transference to northern
Virginia, the defeats suffered by Pope, and the first invasion of
Maryland, occurred either immediately before or during the time that
Farragut was in Pensacola. His own bootless expedition up the
Mississippi and subsequent enforced retirement conspired also to swell
the general gloom; for, although thinking military men could realize
from the first that the position into which the fleet was forced was so
essentially false that it could not be maintained, the unreflecting
multitude saw only the conversion into repulse and disaster of a
substantial success, of a conquest as apparently real as it was actually
phantasmal. In the West, Grant was so stripped of troops that he feared
the possibility of the Union forces being obliged to withdraw behind the
Ohio, as they had in the East recrossed the Potomac. "The most anxious
period of the war to me," he afterward wrote, "was during the time the
army of the Tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by the fall of
Corinth and Memphis, and before I was sufficiently re-enforced to take
the offensive"--from July 15 to October 15, 1862.
The Confederate forces which confronted Grant in northern Mississippi
during these anxious months interposed between him and Vicksburg, and
belonged to the department charged with the defenses of the Mississippi
river. As they touched Grant, therefore, on the one side, on the other
they were in contact with Farragut's command. The summer passed in
various movements by them, threatening Grant's position at Corinth,
which culminated on the 3d of October in an attack in force. This was
repulsed after hard fighting, and re-enforcements to Grant beginning to
come in, the Confederates themselves were thrown on the defensive. The
approach of winter, bringing with it higher water and healthier weather
on the line of the Mississippi, warned them also that the time was at
hand when they might have to fight for the control of the water
communications, upon which they no longer had, nor could hope to have, a
naval force. Reports therefore began to reach the admiral in Pensacola,
from the senior naval officer in the river, that the Confederates were
with renewed energy building batteries above Baton Rouge and strongly
fortifying Port Hudson.
As there seemed no speedy prospect of obtaining the land force, without
whose co-operation an attack upon Mobile would be a fruitless
enterprise, Farragut felt his proper position was now in the Mississippi
itself. Important as was the blockade service, it was of a character
safely to be trusted to a subordinate; whereas the strictly military
operations of the approaching campaign, whatever shape they might
finally take, would be for the control of the river. It therefore
behooved the commander-in-chief of the naval forces to be at hand, ready
to support in any way that might offer the effort to obtain control of a
region of which the water communications were so characteristic a
feature. To push far up a narrow and intricate river a force of ships,
whose numbers are insufficient even to protect their own communications
and insure their coal supplies, is one thing; it is quite another to
repair to the same scene of action prepared to support the army by
controlling the water, and by establishing in combined action a secure
secondary base of operations from which further advances can be made
with reasonable certainty of holding the ground gained. There was no
inconsistency between Farragut's reluctance of the spring and his
forwardness in the autumn. The man who, to secure New Orleans and
compass the fall of the forts, had dared to cut adrift from his base and
throw his communications to the winds, because he had an object adequate
to the risk, was the same who, six weeks later, had testified his
anxiety about communications stretched too far and to no purpose; and
now, half a year after that reluctant ascent of the river against his
better judgment, we find him eagerly planning to go up again,
establishing under the protection of the army an advanced base, from
which, with the supplies accumulated at it, further movements may be
contemplated with a good chance of final success.
On the 14th of November Farragut reported to the Navy Department his
return to New Orleans. The Government, however, had taken warning by the
fiasco of the previous season; and, far from urging the admiral on, now
sought to impress him with the need for caution. As the great object of
opening the Mississippi and obtaining control of it remained, and
necessarily must remain, the first of the Government's aims in the
Southwest, the result of these instructions was to give Farragut the
discretion which had before been denied him. He retained fully his
convictions of the summer. "I am ready for anything," he writes to the
Department, "but desire troops to hold what we get. General Butler urges
me to attack Port Hudson first, as he wishes to break up that
rendezvous before we go outside. It will take at least five thousand men
to take Port Hudson." In the same spirit he writes home, "I am still
doing nothing but waiting for the tide of events, and doing all I can to
hold what I have"; and again, a week later, "As Micawber says, I am
waiting for something to turn up, and in the mean time having patience
for the water to rise." Readiness to act, but no precipitation; waiting
for circumstances, over which he had no control, to justify acting, may
be described as his attitude at this moment.
On the 16th of December the arrival from the north of General Banks to
relieve General Butler--an event which took Farragut much by
surprise--gave him the opportunity to show at once his own ideas of the
proper military steps to be taken. Banks had brought re-enforcements
with him; and three days after his coming the admiral writes to the
Department: "I have recommended to General Banks the occupation of Baton
Rouge.... It is only twelve or fifteen miles from Port Hudson, and is
therefore a fine base of operations. He has approved of the move, and
ordered his transports to proceed directly to that point. I ordered
Commander James Alden, in the Richmond, with two gunboats, to accompany
them and cover the landing." Baton Rouge is on the southernmost of the
bluffs which in rapid succession skirt the Mississippi below Vicksburg.
With an adequate garrison it became a base of operations from which the
army could move against Port Hudson when the time came; and under its
protection the colliers and supplies necessary for the naval vessels in
the advance could safely remain.
While waiting for the new commander of the army to get fairly settled to
work and ready for the combined movement which Farragut was eager to
make, the latter was called upon to endure some sharp disappointments.
On the 1st of January, 1863, the military forces in Galveston were
attacked by Confederate troops, and the naval vessels by a number of
river steamboats barricaded with cotton to resist shells fired against
them, and loaded with riflemen. The garrison was captured, one of the
gunboats blown up by her own officers, and another surrendered after her
captain and first lieutenant had been killed on her decks. The other
vessels abandoned the harbor. The affair was not only a disaster; it was
attended with discreditable circumstances, which excited in the admiral
indignation as well as regret. Shortly afterward, two sailing vessels of
the squadron, charged with the blockade of Sabine Pass, were also taken
by cotton-clad steamers; which to attack availed themselves of a calm
day, when the ships were unable to manoeuvre. An unsuccessful attempt
was made after this to take Sabine Pass; but both that place and
Galveston remained in the power of the enemy, and were not regained
until the final collapse of the Confederacy. Farragut dispatched one of
his most trusted and capable officers, Commodore Henry H. Bell, formerly
his chief-of-staff, to re-establish the blockade of Galveston. Arriving
off the port toward night, Bell sent one of his detachment, the
Hatteras, a light side-wheel iron steamer bought from the merchant
service, to overhaul a sail in the offing. Unfortunately, the stranger
proved to be the Confederate steamer Alabama, far superior in force to
the Hatteras, and after a short engagement the latter was sunk.
All this bad news came in rapid succession, and was closely followed by
tidings of the escape from Mobile of the Oreto, which a few months
before had eluded the blockading squadron through the daring ruse
practiced by her commander. Known now as the Florida, and fitted as a
Confederate cruiser, she ran out successfully during the night of
January 15th. Here again, though the discredit was less than at
Galveston, the annoyance of the admiral was increased by the knowledge
that carelessness, or, at the best, bad judgment, had contributed to the
enemy's success. From a letter written home at this time by his son, who
had not yet returned from the visit begun at Pensacola, it appears that
in the intimacy of family life he admitted, and showed by his manner,
how keenly he felt the discredit to his command from these events.
Though conscious that they were not due to failure on his part to do his
utmost with the force given to him, and seeing in the escape of the
Oreto a further justification of his own opinion that the lower harbor
of Mobile should have been early seized, he nevertheless was "very much
worried." This inside view of the effect, visible to those from whom he
had no concealments, is supplemented by the description of the admiral's
bearing under these reverses given by Captain (now Rear-Admiral)
Jenkins, who at this time became his chief-of-staff. "These disasters,"
he writes, "were sore trials to the admiral, and a less well-poised man
would have given way; but they seemed only to give him greater strength
of will and purpose.... I myself had the misfortune, after months of
watching, to see the Oreto run out the first night after I had been
relieved of the command of the Oneida and ordered to report to the
admiral as his fleet-captain. I had to bear him these bad tidings.
Though no stoic, he bore the news as one accustomed to misfortune." It
may seem, indeed, that these events, considered individually, were but
instances of the hard knocks to be looked for in war, of which every
general officer in every campaign must expect to have his share; and
this view is undoubtedly true. Nevertheless, occurring in such rapid
succession, and all in that part of his extensive command, the blockade,
to which at that moment it seemed impossible to give his principal
attention, the effect was naturally staggering. His first impulse was to
leave the river and repair in person to the scene of disaster in Texas;
but reflection soon convinced him that, however unfortunate the
occurrences that had taken place there and elsewhere on the coast, they
had not the same vital bearing on the issues of the war as the control
of the Mississippi, and therefore not an equal claim upon the
commander-in-chief.
At the same time, the effect was to intensify the desire to act--to
redeem by success the blot which failures had brought upon his command;
and the state of affairs elsewhere on the river was becoming such as to
justify enterprise by the reasonable hope of substantial results. A
series of circumstances which have been often narrated, and nowhere in a
more interesting manner than by General Grant in his personal memoirs,
had led to the abandonment of the movement by land upon Vicksburg by the
Army of the Tennessee, following the Mississippi Central Railroad.
Instead of this original plan of campaign, the Mississippi River was now
adopted as the line of advance and of communications. The first move
along this new line had been made by General Sherman, who brought with
him 32,000 troops, and on the 26th of December, 1862, had landed on the
low ground between the mouth of the Yazoo and Vicksburg. On the 29th the
army assaulted the works on the hills before them, but were repulsed.
Sherman, satisfied that the position there was too strong to be carried,
had determined to change his point of attack to the extreme right of the
enemy's line, higher up the Yazoo; but the heavy rains which
characterized the winter of 1862-'63 in the Mississippi Valley made
untenable the ground on which the troops were, and it became necessary
to re-embark them. The transports were then moved out into the
Mississippi, where they were joined by General McClernand, the senior
general officer in the department under Grant himself.
McClernand now decided to attack Arkansas Post, on the Arkansas River,
which enters the Mississippi from the west about two hundred miles above
Vicksburg. The Post was primarily intended to close the Arkansas and the
approach to the capital of the State of the same name; but although
fifty miles from the mouth of the river, it was, by the course of the
stream, but fifteen by land from the Mississippi. The garrison, being
five thousand strong, was thus dangerously placed to threaten the
communications by the latter river, upon which the army was to depend
during the approaching campaign; and it had already given evidence of
the fact by the capture of a valuable transport. This post was reduced
on the 11th of January, and McClernand next day started troops up the
White River, a tributary of the Arkansas. From this ex-centric movement,
which seemed wholly to ignore that Vicksburg and the Mississippi were
the objective of the campaign, McClernand was speedily and peremptorily
recalled by Grant. The latter, having absolutely no confidence in the
capacity of his senior subordinate, could dispossess him of the chief
command only by assuming it himself. This he accordingly did, and on the
30th of January joined the army, which was then encamped on the levees
along the west bank of the river above Vicksburg.
Serious action on the part of the army, directed by a man of whose
vigorous character there could be no doubt, though his conspicuous
ability was not yet fully recognized, was evidently at hand; and this
circumstance, by itself alone, imparted a very different aspect to any
naval enterprises, giving them reasonable prospect of support and of
conducing substantially to the great common end. Never in the history of
combined movements has there been more hearty co-operation between the
army and navy than in the Vicksburg campaign of 1863, under the
leadership of Grant and Porter. From the nature of the enemy's positions
their forcible reduction was necessarily in the main the task of the
land forces; but that the latter were able to exert their full strength,
unweakened, and without anxiety as to their long line of communications
from Memphis to Vicksburg, was due to the incessant vigilance and
activity of the Mississippi flotilla, which grudged neither pains nor
hard knocks to support every movement. But, besides the care of our own
communications, there was the no less important service of harassing or
breaking up those of the enemy. Of these, the most important was with
the States west of the Mississippi. Not to speak of cereals and sugar,
Texas alone, in the Southwest, produced an abundance of vigorous beef
cattle fit for food; and from no other part of the seceded States could
the armies on the east banks of the Mississippi be adequately supplied.
Bordering, moreover, upon Mexico, and separated from it only by a shoal
river into which the United States ships could not penetrate, there
poured across that line quantities of munitions of war, which found
through the Mexican port of Matamoras a safe entry, everywhere else
closed to them by the sea-board blockade. For the transit of these the
numerous streams west of the Mississippi, and especially the mighty Red
River, offered peculiar facilities. The principal burden of breaking up
these lines of supply was thrown upon the navy by the character of the
scene of operations--by its numerous water-courses subsidiary to the
great river itself, and by the overflow of the land, which, in its
deluged condition during the winter, effectually prevented the movement
of troops. Herein Farragut saw his opportunity, as well as that of the
upper river flotilla. To wrest the control of the Mississippi out of the
enemy's hands, by reducing his positions, was the great aim of the
campaign; until that could be effected, the patrol of the section
between Vicksburg and Port Hudson would materially conduce to the same
end.
Over this Farragut pondered long and anxiously. He clearly recognized
the advantage of this service, but he also knew the difficulties
involved in maintaining his necessary communications, and, above all,
his coal. At no time did the enemy cease their annoyance from the river
banks. Constant brushes took place between their flying batteries and
the different gunboats on patrol duty; a kind of guerrilla warfare,
which did not cease even with the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, but
naturally attained its greatest animation during the months when their
fate was hanging in the balance. The gunboats could repel such attacks,
though they were often roughly handled, and several valuable officers
lost their lives; but not being able to pursue, the mere frustration of
a particular attack did not help to break up a system of very great
annoyance. Only a force able to follow--in other words, troops--could
suppress the evil. "You will no doubt hear more," the admiral writes on
the 1st of February, 1863, "of 'Why don't Farragut's fleet move up the
river?' Tell them, Because the army is not ready. Farragut waits upon
Banks as to when or where he will go."
Still, even while thus dancing attendance upon a somewhat dilatory
general, his plans were maturing; so that when occasion arose he was, as
always, ready for immediate action--had no unforeseen decision to make.
"The evening of the day (about January 20th) that I reported to him at
New Orleans," writes Admiral Jenkins, "he sent everybody out of the
cabin, and said: 'I wish to have some confidential talk with you upon a
subject which I have had in mind for a long time.... I have never hinted
it to any one, nor does the department know anything of my thoughts. The
first object to be accomplished, which led me to think seriously about
it, is to cripple the Southern armies by cutting off their supplies
from Texas. Texas at this time is, and must continue to the end of the
war to be, their main dependence for beef cattle, sheep, and Indian
corn. If we can get a few vessels above Port Hudson the thing will not
be an entire failure, and I am pretty confident it can be done.'"
Jenkins naturally suggested that the co-operation of the army by an
active advance at the same time would materially assist the attempt. To
this, of course, the admiral assented, it being in entire conformity
with his own opinion; and several interviews were held, without,
however, their leading to any definite promise on the part of General
Banks.
Meantime Admiral Porter, who after leaving the mortar flotilla had been
appointed to the command of the Mississippi squadron, with the rank of
acting rear-admiral, realized as forcibly as Farragut the importance of
placing vessels in the waters between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. In the
middle of December he was before Vicksburg, and had since then been
actively supporting the various undertakings of the land forces. Three
days after Grant joined the army, on the 2d of February, the ram Queen
of the West ran the Vicksburg batteries from above, and successfully
reached the river below. Ten days later, Porter sent on one of his
newest ironclads, the Indianola, which made the same passage under cover
of night without being even hit, although twenty minutes under fire. The
latter vessel took with her two coal barges; and as the experiment had
already been successfully tried of casting coal barges loose above the
batteries, and trusting to the current to carry them down to the Queen
of the West, the question of supplies was looked upon as settled. The
Indianola was very heavily armed, and both the admiral and her commander
thought her capable of meeting any force the enemy could send against
her.
Unfortunately, on the 14th of February, two days only after the
Indianola got down, the Queen of the West was run ashore under a battery
and allowed to fall alive into the hands of the enemy. The latter at
once repaired the prize, and, when ready, started in pursuit of the
Indianola with it and two other steamers; one of which was a ram, the
other a cotton-protected boat filled with riflemen. There was also with
them a tender, which does not appear to have taken part in the fight. On
the night of February 24th the pursuers overtook the Indianola, and a
sharp action ensued; but the strength of the current and her own
unwieldiness placed the United States vessel at a disadvantage, which
her superior armament did not, in the dim light, counterbalance. She was
rammed six or seven times, and, being then in a sinking condition, her
commander ran her on the bank and surrendered. This put an end to
Porter's attempts to secure that part of the river by a detachment. The
prospect, that had been fair enough when the Queen of the West was sent
down, was much marred by the loss of that vessel; and the subsequent
capture of the Indianola transferred so much power into the hands of the
Confederates, that control could only be contested by a force which he
could not then afford to risk.
The up-river squadron having failed to secure the coveted command of the
river, and, besides, transferred to the enemy two vessels which might
become very formidable, Farragut felt that the time had come when he not
only might but ought to move. He was growing more and more restless,
more and more discontented with his own inactivity, when such an
important work was waiting to be done. The news of the Queen of the
West's capture made him still more uneasy; but when that was followed by
the loss of the Indianola, his decision was taken at once. "The time has
come," he said to Captain Jenkins; "there can be no more delay. I must
go--army or no army." Another appeal, however, was made to Banks,
representing the assistance which the squadron would derive in its
attempt to pass the batteries from a demonstration made by the army. The
permanent works at Port Hudson then mounted nineteen heavy cannon, many
of them rifled; but there were reported to be in addition as many as
thirty-five field-pieces, which, at the distance the fleet would have to
pass, would be very effective. If the army made a serious diversion in
the rear, many of these would be withdrawn, especially if Farragut's
purpose to run by did not transpire. The advantage to be gained by this
naval enterprise was so manifest that the general could scarcely refuse,
and he promised to make the required demonstration with eight or ten
thousand troops.
On the 12th of March, within a fortnight after hearing of the Indianola
affair, Farragut was off Baton Rouge. On the 14th he anchored just above
Profit's Island, seven miles below Port Hudson, where were already
assembled a number of the mortar schooners, under the protection of the
ironclad Essex, formerly of the upper squadron. The admiral brought with
him seven vessels, for the most part essentially fighting ships,
unfitted for blockade duty by their indifferent speed, but carrying
heavy batteries. If the greater part got by, they would present a force
calculated to clear the river of every hostile steamer and absolutely
prevent any considerable amount of supplies being transferred from one
shore to the other.
For the purpose of this passage Farragut adopted a somewhat novel
tactical arrangement, which he again used at Mobile, and which presents
particular advantages when there are enemies only on one side to be
engaged. Three of his vessels were screw steamers of heavy tonnage and
battery; three others comparatively light. He directed, therefore, that
each of the former should take one of the latter on the side opposite to
the enemy, securing her well aft, in order to have as many guns as
possible, on the unengaged side, free for use in case of necessity. In
this way the smaller vessels were protected without sacrificing the
offensive power of the larger. Not only so; in case of injury to the
boilers or engines of one, it was hoped that those of her consort might
pull her through. To equalize conditions, to the slowest of the big
ships was given the most powerful of the smaller ones. A further
advantage was obtained in this fight, as at Mobile, from this
arrangement of the vessels in pairs, which will be mentioned at the time
of its occurrence. The seventh ship at Port Hudson, the Mississippi, was
a very large side-wheel steamer. On account of the inconvenience
presented by the guards of her wheel-houses, she was chosen as the odd
one to whom no consort was assigned.
[Illustration: ORDER OF ATTACK ON BATTERIES AT PORT HUDSON,
MARCH 14, 1863.
A. Hartford (flag-ship), Captain James S. Palmer. _a._
Albatross, Lieut.-Com. John E. Hart. B. Richmond, Commander
James Alden. _b._ Genesee, Commander W. H. Macomb. C.
Monongahela, Captain J. P. McKinstry. _c._ Kineo, Lieut.-Com.
John Waters. D. Mississippi, Captain Melancton Smith. E. Essex,
Commander C. H. B. Caldwell. F. Sachem, Act. Vol. Lieut. Amos
Johnson. G. G. Mortar schooners. H. Spot where Mississippi
grounded.]
Going up the river toward Port Hudson the course is nearly north; then a
bend is reached of over ninety degrees, so that after making the turn
the course for some distance is west-southwest. The town is on the east
side, just below the bend. From it the batteries extended a mile and a
half down the river, upon bluffs from eighty to a hundred feet high.
Between the two reaches, and opposite to the town, is a low, narrow
point, from which a very dangerous shoal makes out. The channel runs
close to the east bank.
The squadron remained at its anchorage above Profit's Island but a few
hours, waiting for the cover of night. Shortly before 10 P. M. it got
under way, ranged as follows: Hartford, Richmond, Monongahela, each with
her consort lashed alongside, the Mississippi bringing up the rear. Just
as they were fairly starting a steamer was seen approaching from down
the river, flaring lights and making the loud puffing of the
high-pressure engines. The flag-ship slowed down, and the new arrival
came alongside with a message from the general that the army was then
encamped about five miles in rear of the Port Hudson batteries.
Irritated by a delay, which served only to attract the enemy's attention
and to assure himself that no diversion was to be expected from the
army, the admiral was heard to mutter: "He had as well be in New Orleans
or at Baton Rouge for all the good he is doing us." At the same moment
the east bank of the river was lit up, and on the opposite point huge
bonfires kindled to illumine the scene--a wise precaution, the neglect
of which by the enemy had much favored the fleet in the passage of the
lower forts.
The ships now moved on steadily, but very slowly, owing to the force of
the current. At 11 P. M. the Hartford had already passed the lower
batteries, when the enemy threw up rockets and opened fire. This was
returned not only by the advancing ships, but also by the ironclad Essex
and the mortar schooners, which had been stationed to cover the passage.
The night was calm and damp, and the cannonade soon raised a dense smoke
which settled heavily upon the water, covering the ships from sight, but
embarrassing their movements far more than it disconcerted the aim of
their opponents. The flag-ship, being in the advance, drew somewhat
ahead of the smoke, although even she had from time to time to stop
firing to enable the pilot to see. Her movements were also facilitated
by placing the pilot in the mizzen-top, with a speaking tube to
communicate with the deck, a precaution to which the admiral largely
attributed her safety; but the vessels in the rear found it impossible
to see, and groped blindly, feeling their way after their leader. Had
the course to be traversed been a straight line, the difficulty would
have been much less; but to make so sharp a turn as awaited them at the
bend was no easy feat under the prevailing obscurity. As the Hartford
attempted it the downward current caught her on the port bow, swung her
head round toward the batteries, and nearly threw her on shore, her stem
touching for a moment. The combined powers of her own engine and that of
the Albatross, her consort, were then brought into play as an oarsman
uses the oars to turn his boat, pulling one and backing the other; that
of the Albatross was backed, while that of the Hartford went ahead
strong. In this way their heads were pointed up stream and they went
through clear; but they were the only ones who effected the passage.
The Richmond, which followed next, had reached the bend and was about to
turn when a plunging shot upset both safety valves, allowing so much
steam to escape that the engines could not be efficiently worked.
Thinking that the Genesee, her companion, could not alone pull the two
vessels by, the captain of the Richmond turned and carried them both
down stream. The Monongahela, third in the line, ran on the shoal
opposite to the town with so much violence that the gunboat Kineo,
alongside of her, tore loose from the fastenings. The Monongahela
remained aground for twenty-five minutes, when the Kineo succeeded in
getting her off. She then attempted again to run the batteries, but when
near the turn a crank-pin became heated and the engines stopped. Being
now unmanageable, she drifted down stream and out of action, having lost
six killed and twenty-one wounded. The Mississippi also struck on the
shoal, close to the bend, when she was going very fast, and defied every
effort to get her off. After working for thirty-five minutes, finding
that the other ships had passed off the scene leaving her unsupported,
while three batteries had her range and were hulling her constantly, the
commanding officer ordered her to be set on fire. The three boats that
alone were left capable of floating were used to land the crew on the
west bank; the sick and wounded being first taken, the captain and first
lieutenant leaving the ship last. She remained aground and in flames
until three in the morning, when she floated and drifted down stream,
fortunately going clear of the vessels below. At half-past five she blew
up. Out of a ship's company of two hundred and ninety-seven, sixty-four
were found missing, of whom twenty-five were believed to be killed.
In his dispatch to the Navy Department, written the second day after
this affair, the admiral lamented that he had again to report disaster
to a part of his command. A disaster indeed it was, but not of the kind
which he had lately had to communicate, and to which the word "again"
seems to refer; for there was no discredit attending it. The stern
resolution with which the Hartford herself was handled, and the
steadiness with which she and her companion were wrenched out of the
very jaws of destruction, offer a consummate example of professional
conduct; while the fate of the Mississippi, deplorable as the loss of so
fine a vessel was, gave rise to a display of that coolness and
efficiency in the face of imminent danger which illustrate the annals of
a navy as nobly as do the most successful deeds of heroism.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the failure to pass the
batteries, by nearly three fourths of the force which the admiral had
thought necessary to take with him, constituted a very serious check to
the operations he had projected. From Port Hudson to Vicksburg is over
two hundred miles; and while the two ships he still had were sufficient
to blockade the mouth of the Red River--the chief line by which supplies
reached the enemy--they could not maintain over the entire district the
watchfulness necessary wholly to intercept communication between the two
shores. Neither could they for the briefest period abandon their station
at the river's mouth, without affording an opportunity to the enemy; who
was rendered vigilant by urgent necessities which forced him to seize
every opening for the passage of stores. From the repulse of five out of
the seven ships detailed for the control of the river, it resulted that
the enemy's communications, on a line absolutely vital to him, and
consequently of supreme strategic importance, were impeded only, not
broken off. It becomes, therefore, of interest to inquire whether this
failure can be attributed to any oversight or mistake in the
arrangements made for forcing the passage--in the tactical dispositions,
to use the technical phrase. In this, as in every case, those
dispositions should be conformed to the object to be attained and to the
obstacles which must be overcome.
The purpose which the admiral had in view was clearly stated in the
general order issued to his captains: "The captains will bear in mind
that the object is _to run the batteries at the least possible damage to
our ships_, and thereby secure an efficient force above, for the purpose
of rendering such assistance as may be required of us to the army at
Vicksburg, or, if not required there, to our army at Baton Rouge." Such
was the object, and the obstacles to its accomplishment were twofold,
viz., those arising from the difficulties of the navigation, and those
due to the preparations of the enemy. To overcome them, it was necessary
to provide a sufficient force, and to dispose that force in the manner
best calculated to insure the passage, as well as to entail the least
exposure. Exposure is measured by three principal elements--the size and
character of the target offered, the length of time under fire, and the
power of the enemy's guns; and the last, again, depends not merely upon
the number and size of the guns, but also upon the fire with which they
are met. In this same general order Farragut enunciated, in terse and
vigorous terms, a leading principle in warfare, which there is now a
tendency to undervalue, in the struggle to multiply gun-shields and
other defensive contrivances. It is with no wish to disparage defensive
preparations, nor to ignore that ships must be able to bear as well as
to give hard knocks, that this phrase of Farragut's, embodying the
experience of war in all ages and the practice of all great captains, is
here recalled, "The best protection against the enemy's fire is a
well-directed fire from our own guns."
The disposition adopted for the squadron was chiefly a development of
this simple principle, combined with an attempt to form the ships in
such an order as should offer the least favorable target to the enemy. A
double column of ships, if it presents to the enemy a battery formidable
enough to subdue his fire, in whole or in part, shows a smaller target
than the same number disposed in a single column; because the latter
order will be twice as long in passing, with no greater display of
gun-power at a particular point. The closer the two columns are
together, the less chance there is that a shot flying over the nearer
ship will strike one abreast her; therefore, when the two are lashed
side by side this risk is least, and at the same time the near ship
protects the off one from the projectile that strikes herself. These
remarks would apply, in degree, if all the ships of the squadron had had
powerful batteries; the limitation being only that enough guns must be
in the near or fighting column to support each other, and to prevent
several of the enemy's batteries being concentrated on a single ship--a
contingency dependent upon the length of the line of hostile guns to be
passed. But when, as at Port Hudson, several of the vessels are of
feeble gun-power, so that their presence in the fighting column would
not re-enforce its fire to an extent at all proportionate to the risk to
themselves, the arrangement there adopted is doubly efficacious.
The dispositions to meet and overcome the difficulties imposed by the
enemy's guns amounted, therefore, to concentrating upon them the
batteries of the heavy ships, supporting each other, and at the same
time covering the passage of a second column of gunboats, which was
placed in the most favorable position for escaping injury. In principle
the plan was the same as at New Orleans--the heavy ships fought while
the light were to slip by; but in application, the circumstances at the
lower forts would not allow one battery to be masked as at Port Hudson,
because there were enemy's works on both sides. For meeting the
difficulties of the navigation on this occasion, Farragut seems not to
have been pleased with the arrangement adopted. "With the exception of
the assistance they might have rendered the ships, if disabled, they
were a great disadvantage," he wrote. The exception, however, is
weighty; and, taken in connection with his subsequent use of the same
order at Mobile, it may be presumed the sentence quoted was written
under the momentary recollection of some inconvenience attending this
passage. Certainly, with single-screw vessels, as were all his fleet, it
was an inestimable advantage, in intricate navigation or in close
quarters, to have the help of a second screw working in opposition to
the first, to throw the ship round at a critical instant. In the supreme
moment of his military life, at Mobile, he had reason to appreciate this
advantage, which he there, as here, most intelligently used.
Thus analyzed, there is found no ground for adverse criticism in the
tactical dispositions made by Farragut on this memorable occasion. The
strong points of his force were utilized and properly combined for
mutual support, and for the covering of the weaker elements, which
received all the protection possible to give them. Minor matters of
detail were well thought out, such as the assignment to the more
powerful ship of the weaker gunboat, and the position in which the small
vessels were to be secured alongside. The motto that "the best
protection against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire by our own
guns" was in itself an epitome of the art of war; and in pursuance of it
the fires of the mortar schooners and of the Essex were carefully
combined by the admiral with that of the squadron. Commander Caldwell,
of the Essex, an exceedingly cool and intelligent officer, reported that
"the effect of the mortar fire (two hundred bombs being thrown in one
hundred and fifty minutes, from eleven to half-past one) seemed to be to
paralyze the efforts of the enemy at the lower batteries; and we
observed that their fire was quite feeble compared to that of the upper
batteries." Nor had the admiral fallen into the mistake of many general
officers, in trusting too lightly to the comprehension of his orders by
his subordinates. Appreciating at once the high importance of the object
he sought to compass, and the very serious difficulties arising from the
enemy's position at Port Hudson and the character of the navigation, he
had personally inspected the ships of his command the day before the
action, and satisfied himself that the proper arrangements had been made
for battle. His general order had already been given to each commanding
officer, and he adds: "We conversed freely as to the arrangements, and I
found that all my instructions were well understood and, I believe,
concurred in by all. After a free interchange of opinions on the
subject, every commander arranged his ship in accordance with his own
ideas."
In this point the admiral appears to have made a mistake, in not making
obligatory one detail which he employed on board the flag-ship. "I had
directed a trumpet fixed from the mizzen-top to the wheel on board this
ship, as I intended the pilot to take his station in the top, so that he
might see over the fog, or smoke, as the case might be. To this idea,
and to the coolness and courage of my pilot, Mr. Carrell, I am indebted
for the safe passage of this ship past the forts." It may be that the
admiral counted upon the vessels being so closed up that the flag-ship
would practically serve as the pilot for all. If so, he reckoned without
his host, and in this small oversight or error in judgment is possibly
to be found a weak point in his preparations; but it is the only one.
The failure of the Richmond, his immediate follower, was not in any way
due to pilotage, but to the loss of steam by an accidental shot; and it
is still a matter of doubt whether the Genesee, her consort, might not
have pulled her by. The third in the order, the Monongahela, also failed
finally from the heating of a bearing; but as this occurred after being
aground for half an hour, with the vigorous working of the engines that
naturally ensues under such circumstances, it seems as if her failure
must ultimately be traced to the smoke. "The firing had so filled the
atmosphere with smoke," wrote her captain, "as to prevent distinguishing
objects near by." The loss of the Mississippi was due entirely to an
error of the pilot, whatever may have been the cause.
The effect of the appearance above Port Hudson of the Hartford and
Albatross is abundantly testified in the correspondence of the day, both
Union and Confederate, and justifies beyond dispute this fine conception
of Farragut's and the great risk which he took entirely upon his own
responsibility. He found, indeed, a ground for his action in an order of
the Department dated October 2, 1862,[U] directing him "to guard the
lower part of the Mississippi, especially where it is joined by the Red
River," until he heard from Admiral Porter that the latter, in
conjunction with the army, had opened the river; but he distrusted the
consent of the Secretary to his running the great risk involved in the
passage of Port Hudson. As Grant was ordered to take Vicksburg, so was
Farragut ordered to blockade the Red River; and as Grant did not notify
the commander-in-chief of his final great resolve to cut loose from his
base, until it was too late to stop him, so did Farragut keep within his
own breast a resolve upon which he feared an interdict. For even after
two years of war the department was embarrassed for ships, and the
policy of economy, of avoiding risks, the ever fatal policy of a halting
warfare, was forced upon it--an impressive illustration of the effect
exerted by inadequate preparation upon the operations of war. For lack
of ships, Mobile was in 1863 still in the hands of the enemy. "I would
have had it long since or been thrashed out of it," wrote Farragut six
weeks before Port Hudson. "I feel no fears on the subject; _but they do
not wish their ships risked, for fear we might not be able to hold the
Mississippi_." A similar reluctance might be anticipated to expose such
valuable vessels as attacked Port Hudson, when their loss was so hard to
repair; for only men of the temper of Farragut or Grant--men with a
natural genius for war or enlightened by their knowledge of the
past--can fully commit themselves to the hazard of a great
adventure--can fully realize that a course of timid precaution may
entail the greatest of risks.
[Footnote U: The full text of this order was as follows. It committed
the department to nothing.
"NAVY DEPARTMENT, _October 2. 1862_.
"SIR: While the Mississippi River continues to be blockaded at
Vicksburg, and until you learn from Commander D. D. Porter, who
will be in command of the Mississippi squadron, that he has, in
conjunction with the army, opened the river, it will be necessary
for you to guard the lower part of that river, especially where
it is joined by the Red River, the source of many of the supplies
of the enemy. I am respectfully, etc.,
"GIDEON WELLES.
"_Secretary of the Navy._"
That five months elapsed between the date of this order and
Farragut's action, without anything more definite, shows clearly
that the department took no responsibility. On the other hand, it
is right to say that it showed a generous appreciation of the
effort, and did not complain about the losses.]
"Your services at Red River," wrote Admiral Porter to Farragut upon
hearing of his arrival above Port Hudson, "will be a godsend; it is
worth to us the loss of the "Mississippi," and is at this moment the
severest blow that could be struck at the South. They obtain all their
supplies and ammunition in that way.... The great object is to cut off
supplies. For that reason I sent down the Queen of the West and the
Indianola. I regret that the loss of the Indianola should have been the
cause of your present position." These utterances, which bespeak the
relief afforded him at the moment by Farragut's bold achievement, are
confirmed by the words written many years later in his History of the
Navy. "Farragut in the Hartford, with the Albatross, reached the mouth
of the Red River, and Port Hudson was as completely cut off from
supplies as if fifty gunboats were there.... It was soon seen that the
object aimed at had been gained--the works at Port Hudson were cut off
from supplies and the fate of the garrison sealed." "I look upon it as
of vast importance," wrote General Grant, "that we should hold the river
securely between Vicksburg and Port Hudson"; and he undertook to
contribute anything that the army could furnish to enable vessels from
above to run by Vicksburg, and so supply to Farragut the numbers he
needed through the repulse of his own ships.
"The Mississippi is again cut off," wrote to Richmond the Confederate
General Pemberton, who commanded the district in which are Vicksburg and
Port Hudson, "neither subsistence nor ordnance can come or go"; and the
following day, March 20th, the sixth after Farragut's passage, he sends
word to General Richard Taylor, on the west shore, "Port Hudson depends
almost entirely for supplies upon the other side of the river." "Great
God! how unfortunate!" writes, on March 17th, a Confederate commissary
in Taylor's department. "Four steamers arrived to-day from Shreveport.
One had 300,000 pounds of bacon; three others are reported coming down
with loads. Five others are below with full cargoes designed for Port
Hudson, but it is reported that the Federal gunboats are blockading the
river." As to passing by other points, "it is doubtful whether many
cattle ever get through the swamps and bayous through which they are
required to pass on this side. As the water declines, I think likely
cattle in large quantities can be crossed by swimming, but _at present
your prospect of getting supplies from this side is gloomy enough_."
"Early in February," writes Pemberton again, "the enemy succeeded in
passing two of his gunboats by our batteries at Vicksburg" (the
Indianola and Queen of the West). "This at once rendered the navigation
of the Mississippi and Red River dangerous, and from that time it was
only by watching opportunities, and at great risk of capture, that
supplies could be thrown into Port Hudson and Vicksburg. Nevertheless,
large amounts were successfully introduced into both places."
This success, partial as it was, was due, first, to the capture of
Porter's detachment, which opened the river again until Farragut came;
and, secondly, to the repulse of so large a portion of the latter's
squadron. The Hartford and Albatross, though they could close the Red
River, could not multiply themselves to cover the great stretch which
the admiral had purposed to occupy with seven vessels. Neither was the
Albatross of sufficient force to be left by herself at the mouth of the
Red River. Farragut therefore moved slowly up the Mississippi,
destroying a quantity of stores accumulated upon the levees awaiting
transportation, as well as a number of flat-boats; and on the afternoon
of the 19th of March he anchored twelve miles below Vicksburg. The
following day he moved further up and communicated with General Grant,
informing him of the events that had just befallen him and offering any
assistance in the power of the two ships. If not needed, he purposed
returning to Red River, and asked for coal from either army or navy.
Porter was then absent on the Deer Creek expedition, an attempt to get
the Mississippi gunboats through the bayou of that name into the Yazoo;
whereby, if successful, the Confederate position at Vicksburg would be
turned. Grant accordingly undertook to send down coal, which was done by
turning adrift in the current of the Mississippi a barge carrying some
four hundred tons. This floated by night clear of the enemy's positions,
and was picked up by boats from the Hartford.
Farragut had written to Porter of his wish to receive some vessels from
above, specifying two rams and an ironclad, with which and his own two
vessels he could better carry out his purpose of closing the whole
stretch in which he was. He intimated this wish to Grant, who highly
approved of it. "I see by Southern papers received yesterday," he wrote
to Farragut, "that Vicksburg must depend upon Louisiana, or west of the
Mississippi, for supplies. Holding Red River from them is a great step
in the direction of preventing this, but it will not entirely accomplish
the object. New Carthage (twenty miles below Vicksburg, on the west
bank) should be held, and it seems to me that in addition we should have
sufficient vessels below to patrol the whole river from Warrenton (ten
miles below Vicksburg) to the Red River. I will have a consultation with
Admiral Porter on this subject. I am happy to say the admiral and myself
have never yet disagreed upon any policy." In the absence of Porter,
General Ellet determined to send down two of the Ellet rams, which made
their dash on the morning of March 25, displaying all the daring, but
unfortunately also much of the recklessness, which characterized that
remarkable family. Starting near dawn, on a singularly clear night, they
were surprised by daylight still under fire. One, being very rotten, was
shattered to pieces by a shell exploding her boilers. The other was
disabled, also by a shell in the boilers, but, being stronger, drifted
down with the current and reached Farragut safely. She was soon
repaired, and was an addition to his force.
While lying below Vicksburg the admiral transferred to Porter's care,
for passage north by the Mississippi River, his son and only child, who
had been with him since the summer stay in Pensacola. They had passed
the batteries at Port Hudson together, the bearing of the boy in that
hot contest approving itself to the father, who, despite his anxiety,
could not bring himself to accept the surgeon's suggestion to send him
below, out of harm's way. "I am trying to make up my mind to part with
Loyall," he wrote to his wife, "and to let him go home by way of Cairo.
I am too devoted a father to have my son with me in troubles of this
kind. The anxieties of a father should not be added to those of the
commander."
On the 27th of March the Hartford started again down river, accompanied
by the Albatross and the Ellet ram Switzerland. On the 2d of April the
little squadron anchored off the mouth of the Red River, having on its
passage down again destroyed a number of skiffs and flat-boats used for
transporting stores. Warned by the fate of the Indianola, the admiral
left nothing undone to ensure the absolute safety of the flag-ship; for,
though her powerful armament and numerous crew gave her a great
superiority over any number of river vessels, granting her room to
manoeuvre, the difficulties of the river and the greatness of the
stake to both parties made it imperative to take no needless risks. As a
protection against rams, large cypress logs were hung around the ship
about a foot above the water line, where they would both resist
penetration and also give time for the elasticity of the frame of a
wooden vessel to take up the blow. Against boarding, elaborate
preparations were made, which would prevent a steamer attempting it from
getting nearer than twenty feet to the side, where she would remain an
easy victim to the shell and grape of the Hartford's guns.
From the 2d to the 30th of April Farragut remained in the neighborhood
of the Red River, between its mouth and Port Hudson. Cut off by the
batteries of the place, and by the prevalence of guerrillas on the west
bank, from all usual means of communication with General Banks and his
own squadron, he contrived to get a letter down by the daring of his
secretary, Mr. Edward C. Gabaudan; who was set adrift one night in a
skiff ingeniously covered with drift brush, and, thus concealed, floated
undiscovered past the enemy's guards. The small number of his vessels
prevented his extending his blockade as far as he wished; but in closing
the Red River he deprived the enemy of by far the best line they
possessed, and he destroyed a quantity of stores and boats.
In the mean time diverse and important events were concurring to release
him from his position of isolation. Toward the end of March General
Grant, who had for some time abandoned all expectation of turning
Vicksburg by its right flank, began the celebrated movement down the
west side of the Mississippi; whence he crossed to the east bank at
Bruinsburg, and fought the campaign which ended by shutting up Pemberton
and his army within the lines of the place. In furtherance of this plan,
Porter himself, with a large body of his ships, ran the batteries at
Vicksburg on the night of April 16. The fleet then kept pace with the
necessarily slow progress of the army, encumbered with trains, through
the roads heavy with the mire of the recent overflow. On the 29th of
April the Mississippi squadron fought a sharp engagement with the
Confederate batteries at Grand Gulf, which they could not reduce; and
the following day Grant's army crossed the river.
While these events were bringing the Mississippi squadron into that part
of the river which Farragut had aimed to control, other movements were
leading to his assistance some of the lighter vessels of his own
command. After the naval action at Port Hudson, Banks had temporarily
abandoned his designs upon that post in favor of operations west of the
Mississippi by the Bayous Teche and Atchafalaya, the latter of which
communicates with the Red River a few miles above its mouth. This
movement was accompanied by a force of four gunboats, under the command
of Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke, of the Estrella, which captured a
post on the Atchafalaya called Butte à la Rose, on the 20th of April,
the same day that Opelousas, sixty miles from Alexandria, was entered by
the army. The latter pressed on toward Alexandria, while the gunboats
pushed their way up the Atchafalaya. On the first of May two of them,
the Estrella and Arizona, passed into the Red River, and soon afterward
joined the Hartford.
Three days later Admiral Porter arrived with several of his fleet and
communicated with Farragut. The next day, May 5th, Porter went up the
Red River and pushed rapidly toward Alexandria, which was evacuated, its
stores being removed to Shreveport, three hundred and fifty miles
farther up.
Farragut now felt that his personal presence above Port Hudson was no
longer necessary. The Mississippi was ultimately to become the command
of Porter, whose vessels were especially fitted for its waters; and that
admiral was now at liberty to give his full attention below Vicksburg.
On the other hand, his own squadron in the lower river and on the
blockade demanded a closer attention than he could give from his
isolated station. Accordingly, on the 6th of May he transferred the
command to Commodore Palmer, of the Hartford, with whom he left the
Albatross, Estrella, and Arizona to intercept communications between the
two banks of the Mississippi below Red River; while he himself returned
by one of the bayous to New Orleans, reaching there on the 11th.
Thus ended Farragut's brilliant strategic movement against the
communications of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and through them against
the intercourse of the Confederacy with its great Western storehouse,
over which the two fortresses stood guard. It was a movement which,
though crippled from the beginning by a serious disaster on the
battle-field, was conceived in accordance with the soundest principles
of the art of war. Its significance has been obscured and lost in the
great enterprise initiated a month later by General Grant, and solidly
supported by the navy under Porter; whose co-operation, Grant avows, was
absolutely essential to the success--nay, even to the contemplation of
such an undertaking.[V] In this combined movement, identical in
principle with that of Farragut, Porter, in executing his part, had the
current with instead of against him. Had circumstances delayed or
prevented Grant's advance by the west bank of the Mississippi--had he,
for instance, been enabled by one of the abortive bayou expeditions to
penetrate north of Vicksburg--Farragut's action would have been no more
sound nor bold, but its merits would have been far more perceptible to
the common eye. Re-enforcements must have been sent him; and around his
flag-ship would have centered a force that would have choked the life
out of Vicksburg and Port Hudson.
[Footnote V: _Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant_, vol. i, p. 461.]
Because rightly aimed, this daring campaign was not frustrated even by
the disasters of the night action. It is distinguished from the unhappy
fiasco of the year before by all the difference between a fitting and an
unfitting time--by all that separates a clear appreciation of facts from
a confused impression of possibilities. In 1862 Farragut was driven up
the river against his own judgment, seeing no prospect of tangible or
permanent results. In 1863 he went on his own responsibility, because he
saw that in the then condition of affairs, with the armies gathering at
both ends of the line, the movement he made would not only be successful
in itself, but would materially conduce to the attainment of the common
end. It is significant of his true military insight that neither
depreciation nor disaster shook his clear convictions of the importance
of his work. "Whether my getting by Port Hudson was of consequence or
not," he wrote chaffingly in reference to some slighting comments in a
Southern newspaper, "if Pollard's stomach were as tightly pinched for
food as theirs at Port Hudson and Vicksburg have been since I shut up
Red River, he would know how to value a good dinner and a little peace."
In soberer style he wrote to his home: "We have done our part of the
work assigned to us, and all has worked well. _My last dash past Port
Hudson was the best thing I ever did_, except taking New Orleans. It
assisted materially in the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson."
Farragut remained but a short time in New Orleans, and was soon again at
the front; joining the vessels of his squadron lying near, but below,
Port Hudson. After entering Alexandria on the 7th of May, General Banks
moved down with his army to the Mississippi, which he crossed five or
six miles above Port Hudson. General Augur, of his command, at the same
time moved up from Baton Rouge, the two divisions meeting on the 23d of
May, and immediately investing Port Hudson. An assault was made on the
27th; but proving unsuccessful, regular siege operations were begun. The
mortar schooners and the Essex supported them by constant bombardment,
and the navy furnished and manned a battery of four nine-inch Dahlgren
guns.
While contributing thus conspicuously to the immediate furtherance of
the siege, the most essential work of the navy, here as in the upper
Mississippi, was in the maintenance of the communications, which were
wholly by the river, as well as in assuring the safety of New Orleans,
then stripped of all the troops that could be spared. The danger of two
points like Vicksburg and Port Hudson, both of such vital importance,
and both being besieged at the same time, aroused every latent energy of
the Confederacy, and set in motion every armed man of whom it could
dispose. To divert and distract the attention of the Union generals, to
induce them to abandon their efforts or diminish the forces at the
front, no means were so ready nor so sure as an attack upon their
communications, or a threat directed against their base. To make these
insecure, is like mining the foundations of a building. Here the navy
removed every substantial cause of anxiety by its firm support, and by
the rapidity with which its heavy guns were brought to sustain every
point attacked. Under such diligent guardianship the barrier of the
Mississippi remained impassable; and although a transport might now and
again be arrested and forced to surrender, such an occasional annoyance
could not by the most uneasy general be magnified into a serious menace
to his communications. The active Confederate general, Richard Taylor,
in command of the district west of the river, stripped all his posts to
concentrate an effort along the right bank, which, by disturbing Banks,
might make a favorable diversion for Port Hudson; and loud talk was made
of an attack upon New Orleans itself, favored by a rising among the
citizens, still heartily attached to the Southern cause. The powerful
vessels kept before the city by Farragut effectually disposed of any
chance of such an attempt, although much anxiety was felt by General
Emory, in command of the station, and confident expectation was plainly
discernible on the faces of the towns-people. The Confederates, however,
did for a season control the west side of the river, appearing before
Donaldsonville and Plaquemine, where were posts of United States troops.
These were saved by the prompt appearance of gunboats, which followed
the movements of the enemy; but the report of them brought Farragut down
in person, and elicited from him a remonstrance to Banks for leaving
upon the west bank, inadequately sustained, heavy guns which, if they
fell into the hands of the Confederates, might convert a menace into a
serious embarrassment. A few days later, at midnight of June 27th, the
enemy attacked Donaldsonville in force. The storming party succeeded in
entering the works, but the three gunboats which Farragut had stationed
there opened so heavy a fire upon the supports that these broke and
fled; and those in advance, being unsustained, were made prisoners.
A few days later Farragut summoned his chief-of-staff, Captain Thornton
A. Jenkins, to relieve him at Port Hudson, as he felt his own presence
necessary at New Orleans. Jenkins started up in the Monongahela, a heavy
corvette commanded by Captain Abner Read, having in company two small
transports with needed supplies. The enemy, despite the repulse at
Donaldsonville, remained in the neighborhood, and had established a
battery of field-guns a few miles below at a bend in the river. By these
the Monongahela was attacked and pretty severely handled for a few
moments. Her captain, an officer of distinguished courage and
enterprise, was mortally wounded, and Captain Jenkins slightly so. These
two affairs sufficiently indicate the character of the enemy's
operations on the west bank of the Mississippi at this time. They did
not in the least succeed in shaking the grip of the Union army before
Port Hudson, nor did they entirely cease with the surrender of the
place. That they did so little harm, with the enemy in nearly undisputed
command in the regions west of the river, was due to the navy, whose
mobility exceeded that of their troops.
Vicksburg surrendered on the 4th of July, 1863, and its fall was
followed by that of Port Hudson on the 9th of the same month. Farragut
then wrote to Porter, and turned over to him the command in all the
Mississippi Valley above New Orleans. On the 1st of August Porter
himself arrived off the city in his flag-ship, and the two admirals had
an interview on the scene of their former exploits. The same afternoon
Farragut sailed in the Hartford for the North, to enjoy a brief respite
from his labors during the enervating autumn months of the Gulf climate.
Though now sixty-two years old, he retained an extraordinary amount of
vitality, and of energy both physical and moral; but nevertheless at his
age the anxieties and exposure he had to undergo tell, and had drawn
from him, soon after his return from above Port Hudson, the expressive
words, "I am growing old fast, and need rest." On the 10th of August the
flag-ship anchored in New York, after a passage of nine days.
The admiral remained in the North until the first of the following year.
His own ship, and her powerful sisters, the Richmond and Brooklyn, were
in need of extensive repairs before they could be considered again fit
for winter service in the Gulf. The Hartford was in better condition
than the other two, being uninjured below the water line, but the severe
actions through which she had passed were proved by the scars, two
hundred and forty in number, where she had been struck by shot or
shell.