FREDERICK PALMER[1]

[Footnote 1: Reprinted by permission from an article in _Everybody's

Magazine_.]

Against any one of his little Christian neighbors the Turk had superior

numbers, and had only to concentrate on a single section of his

many-sided frontier line. It had never entered his mind that the little

neighbors would form an alliance. He had trusted to their jealousies to

keep them apart. United, they could strike him on the front and both

sides simultaneously. He was due for an attack coming down the main

street and from alleys to the right and left.

In this situation he must temporarily accept the defensive. Meanwhile,

he foresaw the battalions of "chocolate soldiers" beating themselves to

pieces against the breastworks of his garrisons, and Greek turning on

Serb and Serb on Bulgar after a taste of real war. Against divided

counsels would be one mind, which, with reenforcements of the faithful

from Asia Minor, would send the remnants of the _opéra bouffe_ invasion

flying back over their passes.

But the allies fully realized the danger of quarreling among

themselves, which would have been much harder to avert if their armies

had been acting together as a unit under a single command. Happily,

each army was to make a separate campaign under its own generals; each

had its own separate task; each was to strike at the force in front of

its own borders. Prompt, staggering blows before the Turkish reserves

could arrive were essential.

The Montenegrins in the northwest, who had the side-show (while

Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece had the three rings under the main tent),

did their part when they invested the garrison of Scutari.

Advancing northward, the Greeks, with strong odds in their favor,

easily took care of the Turkish force at Elassona and continued their

advance toward Salonika.

Advancing southward, the Serbs, one hundred thousand strong (that is,

the army of their first line), moved on Kumanova among the hills, where

the forty thousand Turks defending the city of Uskub would make their

stand as inevitably as a board of army engineers would select Sandy

Hook as a site for some of the defenses of New York harbor.

Confidently, the Turkish commander staked all on the issue.

The Serbs did not depend alone on mass or envelopment by flank. They

murderously and swiftly pressed the attack in the front as well as on

the sides; and the cost of victory was seven or eight thousand

casualties. Two or three fragments of the Turkish army escaped along

the road; otherwise, there was complete disintegration.

Uskub was now undefended. It was the ancient capital of Servia; and the

feelings of the Serbs, as they marched in, approximated what ours would

be if our battalions were swinging down Pennsylvania Avenue after a

Mexican proconsul had occupied the White House for five hundred years.

Meanwhile, at Monastir were forty thousand more Turks. So far as

helping their comrades at Kumanova was concerned, they might as well

have been in jail in Kamchatka. You can imagine them sitting

cross-legged, Turkish fashion, waiting their turn. They broke the

precedent of Plevna, which the garrisons of Adrianople and Scutari

gloriously kept, by yielding rather easily. There must have been a

smile on the golden dome of the tomb of Napoleon, who thrashed the

armies of Europe in detail.

A Servian division, immediately after Kumanova, started southwest over

the mountain passes in the snow and through the valleys in the mud to

clinch the great Servian object of the war with the nine points of

possession. To young Servia, Durazzo, the port of old Servia, is as

water to the gasping fish. It stands for unhampered trade relations

with the world; for economic freedom. When that division, ragged and

footsore, came at last in sight of the blue Adriatic--well, it may

safely be called a historic moment for one little nation.

Now we turn from the side lines, where the Serbs and the Greeks were

occupied, to the neck of the funnel through which the Turkish

reenforcements from Asia Minor were coming. There the Bulgars had

undertaken the great, vital task of the war against the main Turkish

army.

The Bulgarian army was little given to gaiety and laughter, but sang

the "Shuma Maritza" on the march. This is the song of big men in

boots--big white men with set faces--making the thunder of a torrent as

they charge. "Roaring Maritza" is the nearest that you can come to

putting it into English. The Maritza is the national river, and the

song pictures it swollen and rushing in the winter rains or when the

snows on the Balkans melt, on its way past the Bulgarian border into

Turkey; and the gray army was now to follow it to the Aegean, in the

spirit of its flood, and make the harbor at its mouth Bulgarian.

Yes, a gray army, bent on a grim business in a hurry, in gray winter

weather and chill mountain mists, with the sun showing through overcast

skies--something of the kind of weather that bred the Scotch. Cromwell

or Stonewall Jackson would have felt at home, saying his prayers at the

double-quick, in such company. As mementos from home, the soldiers wore

in their caps and buttonholes withered flowers and sprigs of green

which their womenfolk had given in farewell. The women were just as

Spartan as the Spartans; perhaps more so. If any soldier lacked innate

courage, the spur of public opinion drove him forward in step with his

comrades.

Naturally, Bulgarian generalship had to adapt its plan of campaign to

the obstacles between it and its adversary. For armies are cumbrous

affairs. In all times they have been tied down to roads and bridges.

The main highway and the main railway line from Sofia, the capital of

Bulgaria, to Constantinople both ran through Adrianople. Nature meant

this city, set in a basin among hills, for defense, and for the center

of any army defending Thrace. On the near-by hills is a circle of

permanent forts that commands all approaches for guns or infantry. In

front of it is the turbulent Maritza, and to the northeast lies the

town of Kirk-Kilesseh, partly fortified and naturally strong, which

formed the Turkish right. The left rested at Demotika, to the south of

Adrianople, in a rough country inaccessible to prompt action by a large

force.

The Bulgars must turn one wing or the other. Foreign military experts

thought that Kirk-Kilesseh could be taken only after a long operation,

and then only by a force much larger than the Bulgars could spare for

concentration at any one point of the line. Let two weeks pass without

a definite victory, and the Turks would have numbers equal to the

Bulgars; a month, superior numbers. As it was, the Turks had

altogether, including the Adrianople garrison, a hundred and

seventy-five thousand men in strong position against the Bulgars' first

line of two hundred and eighty thousand.

A branch of the Sofia-Constantinople railway line runs northeast to

Yamboli, on the Bulgarian frontier. Between Yamboli and Kirk-Kilesseh

is a highway--the Turkish kind of highway--and no unfordable streams or

other natural obstacles to an army's progress. At Yamboli the Bulgars

concentrated their third army corps, under General Demetrief, and a

portion of their second. The rest of the second faced Adrianople, while

the first corps operated to the south and east.

Swinging around on Kirk-Kilesseh, the third army would not take "No!"

for an answer. The Bulgarian infantry stormed the redoubts in the

moonlight. They knew how to use the bayonet and the Turks did not.

Skilfully driven steel slaughtered Mohammedan fanaticism that fought

with clubbed guns, hands, and teeth, asking no quarter this side of

Paradise. Kirk-Kilesseh fell. The Turkish army, flanked, had to go;

Adrianople was isolated. The Bulgarian dead on the field could not

complain; the wounded were in the rear; the living had burning eyes on

the next goal.

"_Na noj!"_ ("Fix bayonets!") had won. "_Na noj!_ Give them the steel!"

was the cry of a nation. Soldiers sang it out to one another on the

march. Children prattled it at home as if it were a new kind of game:

"Give them the steel and they will go! Nothing can stop Bulgaria!"

Not more than two Bulgarian soldiers out of twenty ever reached the

Turk with a bayonet. The Turk did not wait for them. So the bayonet

counted no less in the morale of the eighteen than of the two.

Frequently they fixed it at a distance of five or six hundred yards.

Their desire to use it made them press close at all points with the

grim initiative that will not be gainsaid. When they charged, the

spirit of cold steel was in their rush.

There was a splendid audacity in General Demetrief's next move after

Kirk-Kilesseh. He did not pause to surround Adrianople. To the east was

a wide gap in the investing lines. Through this the garrison might have

made a sortie with telling effect. But Demetrief knew his enemy. He

took it for granted that the garrison was settling itself for a siege.

With twelve thousand Turkish reenforcements a day arriving from Asia,

even hours counted.

As yet, the Turks were not decisively beaten; only the right that

fought at Kirk-Kilesseh had been really demoralized. On the line of

Bunar Hissar to Lüle Burgas they formed to receive the second shock.

They were given scant time to prepare for it. "_Na noj!_" For three

days this battle, the Waterloo of the war, raged. The advancing

Bulgarian infantry went down like ninepins; but it did not give up, for

it knew that "they would go when they saw the steel." Again the turning

movement in flank crushed in the end. This time the Turkish main army

was shattered. It hardly had the cohesiveness of a large mob. It was

many little mobs, hungry, staggering on to the rear, where the ravages

of cholera awaited.

In two weeks the Bulgars had made their dispositions and fought two

battles, each lasting three days. They had advanced seventy-five miles

over a rough country where the roads were sloughs. The loss in killed

and wounded was sixty thousand; one man out of five was down.

When officers and men had snatched any sleep it was on the rain-soaked

earth. The bread in their haversacks was wet and moldy. When they lay

in the fire zones they were lucky if they had this to eat. By day they

had dug their way, trench by trench, up to the enemy's position,

crouching in the mud to keep clear of bullets. By night they had

charged. They were an army in a state of auto-intoxication, bent on the

one object of driving the Turkish army back to the narrow line of the

peninsula. This accomplished, all the isolated forces in European

Turkey, whether at distant Scutari or near-by Adrianople, were without

hope of relief. The neck of the funnel was closed; the war practically

won.

All the world knows now, and the Bulgarian staff must have known at the

time, that for a week after Lüle Burgas the utter demoralization of the

Turkish retreat left the way open to Constantinople. Why did not

General Demetrief go on? Why did that army which had proceeded thus far

with such impetuous and irresistible momentum suddenly turn snail?

For the reason that the Marathon winner when he drops across the tape

is not good for another mile. The Bulgar was on his stomach in the mud,

though he was facing toward the heels of the Turk. Food and ammunition

were not up. A fresh force of fifty thousand men following up the

victory might easily have made its own terms at the door of Yildiz

Palace within three or four days; but there was not even a fresh

regiment.

It was three weeks after Lüle Burgas before Demetrief was ready to

attack; three weeks, in which the cholera scare had abated, the panic

in Constantinople had come and gone, reenforcements had arrived and

been organized into a kind of order, while they built fortifications.

The Turkish cruisers supported both of Nazim Pasha's flanks with the

fire of heavier guns than the Bulgars possessed. There was an

approachable Turkish front of only about sixteen miles. Without

silencing the Turkish batteries, Demetrief sent his infantry against

the redoubts. He lost five or six thousand men without gaining a single

fort. Against a stubborn and even semi-intelligent foe there is no

storming a narrow frontal line of fortifications when you may not turn

the ends.

Adrianople lay across the straight line of transportation by railroad

and highway to the peninsula. All munitions for Demetrief's army had to

go around it in the miserable, antiquated ox-carts. It was the rock

splitting the flood of the Bulgarian advance. While the world was

hearing rumors of the city's fall, the truth was that it was not really

invested until a month after Lüle Burgas was fought.

For a month the garrison reported to be starving was drawing in

supplies from a big section of farming country. When the armistice was

signed it still had pasturage within the lines of defense for flocks of

sheep and herds of cattle. The problem for the Bulgars first and last

was to keep this fact masked and to check the savage sorties and spare

all the guns and men they could for the main army. Volunteers from

Macedonia still in native dress, clerks still in white collars, old men

who had perjured themselves about their age in order to get a rifle,

and the young conscripts of twenty years came to take the place of the

regular forces on the investing lines, who moved on to re-enforce

Demetrief. Fifty thousand Servians, two divisions, were spared after

Kumanova, and speeded across Bulgaria on the single-line railway with

an amazing rapidity to assist, according to plan, the Bulgars in the

investment operations.

To the Turk, Adrianople is a holy city. Here is the most splendid

mosque in all the empire, that built by the conqueror Sultan Selim.

With the shadow of the minarets over his shoulder, the Turkish private

in a trench was ready to die for Allah. But death must come for him. He

is not going to hustle intelligently after paradise. In short, he is a

sit-and-take-it fighter. While any delay of the Bulgarian advance was

invaluable in gaining time, he made no use of his opportunities in a

country of hills and transverse valleys and ravines, which nature meant

for rear-guard action. A company of infantry posted on a hill could

force a regiment to deploy and attack, and a few miles farther on could

repeat the process. Cavalry could harass the flanks of the attacking

force. Field-guns could get a commanding position above a road, with

safe cover for retreat.

At Mustapha Pasha, twenty miles in front of Adrianople, was a solid old

stone bridge over the Maritza, whose floods in the winter rains would

be a nightmare to engineers who had to maintain a crossing with

pontoons. If ever a corps needed a bridge the second Bulgarian corps

needed this one. They found that a small and badly placed charge of

dynamite had merely knocked out a few stones between two of the

buttresses, leaving the bridge intact enough for all the armies of

Europe to pass over it; and the Turks did not even put a mitrailleuse

behind sandbags in the streets or use field-guns from the adjacent

hills to delay the Bulgars in their crossing.

The soldier who is good only for the defensive can never win. What beat

the Turk was the Turk himself. His army was in the chaos between

old-fashioned organization and an attempt at a modern organization. His

generals were divided in their counsels; his junior officers aped the

modern officer in form, but lacked application. They had ceased to

believe in their religion. Therefore, they did not lead their privates

who did believe. In the midst of the war, captains and lieutenants,

trustworthy observers tell me, would leave their untrained companies of

reservists to march by the road while they themselves rode by train.

They took their soldiers' pay. They neglected all the detail which is

the very essence of that preparation at the bottom without which no

generalship at the top can prevail.

The Bulgarian officers, two-thirds of whom were reservists, enjoyed a

comradeship with their men at the same time that discipline was rigid.

They believed in their God; at least, in the god of efficiency. They

worked hard. They belong in the world of to-day and the Turk does not.

Therefore the Turk has to go.

"We will not make peace without Adrianople!" was the cry of every

Bulgar. Its possession became a national fetish, no less than naval

superiority to the British. Adrianople stood for the real territorial

object of the war. It must be the center of any future line of defense

against the Turk. Practically its siege was set, once there was

stalemate at Tchatalja. With no hope of beating the main Bulgarian army

back, there was no hope of relieving the garrison, whose fate was only

a matter of time.

At the London Peace Conference the allies stood firm for the possession

of Adrianople. The Turkish commissioners, after repeating for six weeks

that they would never cede it, had finally agreed to yield on orders

from Constantinople, when the young Turks killed Nazim Pasha, the

Turkish commander-in-chief, and overthrew the old cabinet. "You can

have Adrianople when you take it!" was the defiance of the new cabinet

to the allies.

The Great Events by Famous Historians, Volume 21 The Recent Days (1910-1914) · 第 114 / 142 题