The Peace Conference came to naught and hostilities were resumed on
February 14, 1913, because of the impossibility of agreement between
the allies and Turks on three important points: the status of
Adrianople, the disposal of the Aegean islands, and the payment of an
indemnity by Turkey. Bulgaria and Turkey both maintained that
Adrianople was essential to their national safety. Moreover, its
possession by Bulgaria was absolutely necessary were she to secure the
hegemony in the Balkans at which she aimed. On the other hand, to the
Turks, Adrianople is a sacred city around which cluster the most
glorious memories of their race. Thus they would yield it only as a
last necessity. The ambassadorial conference, anxious to bring to an
end a war which was threatening to embroil Austria-Hungary and Russia
and desirous also to make the settlement permanent, had already on
January 17th in its collective note to the Porte unavailingly
recommended to the Porte the cession of Adrianople to the Balkan
States.
The question of the Aegean islands presented similar difficulties. They
are inhabited almost exclusively by Greeks who demand to be united to
the mother country; but Turkey insisted that the possession of some of
them (_e.g._, Imbros, Tenedos, and Lemnos) was necessary to her for the
protection of the Dardanelles, since they command the entrance to the
straits, while others (_e.g._, Chios and Mitylene) are part of Asiatic
Turkey. The Greeks asserted that to leave any of them to Turkey would
cause constant unrest in Greece, and subsequent uprising against
Turkey, thus merely repeating the history of Crete. Moreover, the
Greeks maintained that they must have the disputed islands because they
are the only large and profitable ones; but they expressed a
willingness to neutralize them so that the integrity of the Dardanelles
would not be endangered. The difficulty was complicated by the
retention of a number of the islands by Italy until Turkey should
fulfil all the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne arising from the
Tripolitan war. The Greeks asserted that their fleet would have taken
all the islands except for the Italian occupation. Moreover, they are
suspicious of Italian intentions, especially with regard to Rhodes. The
ambassadorial conference in its collective note to the Porte had
advised the Porte "to leave to the Powers the task of deciding upon the
fate of the islands of the Aegean Sea and the Powers would arrange a
settlement of the question which will exclude all menace to the
security of Turkey."
The third question in dispute concerned a money indemnity. The war had
been a fearful drain upon the resources of the allies. They were
determined not to share any of the Ottoman debt and to compel Turkey,
if possible, to bear the financial burden of the war. But to yield to
this demand would absolutely destroy Turkish credit. This would result
in the financial ruin of many of the subjects of the great Powers.
Hence this demand of the allies met with scant favor in the
ambassadorial conference.
The war dragged on during the entire month of February without changing
the relative positions of the belligerents. In the mean time, the
relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia were daily becoming more
strained. This was due to the determination of Austria-Hungary to
prevent Servia from securing a seaboard upon the Adriatic. In the
slogan of the allies, "the Balkan peninsula for the Balkan peoples,"
Austria-Hungary found a principle which could be utilized against their
demands. She took the stand that the Albanians are a Balkan people
entirely distinct from Slavs and Greeks and particularly unfriendly to
the Slavs. It would be as suicidal to place any of the Albanians under
the Slavs as to put back any of the Slavs under the Turks. Albania must
be an autonomous State; that it may live in peace, it must possess its
seaboard intact. In this position Austria-Hungary was seconded by
Italy, which has interests in Albania as important as those of
Austria-Hungary. Neither State can afford to allow the other to possess
the eastern shore of the Adriatic; and both are determined that it
shall not fall into the possession of another possibly stronger power.
As early as December 20, 1912, the ambassadors had recommended to their
governments, and the latter had accepted, the principle of Albanian
autonomy, together with a provision guaranteeing to Servia commercial
access to the Adriatic. This had aroused the intense indignation of the
Serbs, whose armies, contrary to the express prohibitions of
Austria-Hungary, had already occupied Durazzo on the Adriatic and
overrun northern Albania. The Serbs denied the right of any State to
forbid them to occupy the territory of the enemy whom they had
conquered, and Servia sent a detachment of her best troops and some of
her largest siege guns to help the Montenegrins take Scutari. Moreover,
numerous reports of outrages committed upon Albanians by the
"Liberators" in their attempts to convert both Moslem and Catholic
Albanians to the orthodox faith reached central Europe and caused great
danger in Vienna. Count Berchtold's statement to the Delegations that
Austria-Hungary would insist upon territory enough to enable
independent Albania to be a stable State with Scutari as the capital,
aroused in turn much excitement in Russia. Scutari was the chief goal
of Montenegrin ambition. To possess it had been the hope of King
Nicholas and his people during his long reign of half a century. To
forbid him to possess it would be to deprive him of the fruits of the
really heroic sacrifices his people had made during this war. Hence the
excitement in all Slavdom. On February 7th Francis Joseph sent Prince
Hohenlohe to St. Petersburg with an autograph letter to the Czar which
had the good effect of reducing the tension between the two countries.
The ambassadorial conference at London then directed its attention
exclusively to settling the status of Albania. After more than a month
of acrimonious discussion a settlement was reached on March 26th in
which the principle of nationality which had been invoked to justify
the creation of an independent Albania was quietly ignored. The
conference agreed upon the northern and northeastern boundaries of
Albania. In order to carry her point that Scutari must be Albanian,
Austria-Hungary agreed that the almost exclusively Albanian towns of
Ipek, Djakova, Prizrend, and Dibra should go to the Serbs. On April 1st
King Nicholas was notified that the powers had unanimously agreed to
blockade his coast if he did not raise the siege of Scutari. His answer
was that the proposed action of the powers was a breach of neutrality
and that Montenegro would not alter her attitude until she had signed a
treaty of peace. At once the warships of all the powers save Russia
(which had none in the Mediterranean) engaged in the blockade. On April
15th, owing to the pressure of the powers and to the strained relations
that had arisen between Servia and Bulgaria, the Servian troops were
recalled from Scutari. Nevertheless the Montenegrins persisted alone
and Scutari fell April 22, 1913. Two days later the Austro-Hungarian
government demanded that vigorous action be undertaken by the powers to
put independent Albania in possession of Scutari according to the
agreement of March 26th. At once the greatest excitement prevailed
throughout Russia. Street demonstrations against the Austro-Hungarian
policy were held in many of the large cities. In Austria-Hungary
military preparations became active on a large scale, and on May 1st
the Dual Monarchy gave notice that it would undertake individual action
should Montenegro not agree to the ultimatum. Italy, which is
determined never to permit the Dual Monarchy individual action in
Albania, announced that she would support her ally. As the result of
all the pressure brought to bear upon him, on May 5th, King Nicholas
yielded and placed Scutari in the hands of the powers, just in time, as
Sir Edward Grey informed the English House of Commons, to prevent an
outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
While the chancelleries of the great powers were thus straining every
nerve to agree upon the status of Albania and thereby to prevent a
conflict between the two powers most vitally interested, the war
between the allies and Turkey was prosecuted during March with greater
vigor and with more definite results. On March 5th, Janina surrendered
to the Greeks and on March 26th Adrianople fell. The powers had already
offered to mediate between the belligerents, and their good offices had
been accepted by both sides. The allies at first insisted upon the
Rodosto-Malatra line as the western boundary of Turkey, but were
informed that the powers would not consent to giving Bulgaria a
foothold on the Dardanelles.
After much outcry and violent denunciation by the allies, an armistice
was signed at Bulair on April 19th by representatives of all the
belligerents except Montenegro, which was thereby only incited to more
heroic efforts to capture Scutari. Nevertheless the allies had profited
so much by delay in their relations with the powers since the very
outbreak of the war that they now hoped to secure advantages by a
similar policy, and it was not until May 21st that their
representatives reassembled at London. Even then there appeared to be
no sincere desire to come to terms, and on May 27th Sir Edward Grey
informed the delegates that they would soon lose the confidence of
Europe, and that for all that was being accomplished they might as well
not be in London. The delegates were very indignant at this strong
language, but it had the desired effect, for on May 30, 1913, the
Treaty of London was signed by the representatives of all the
belligerents. Its principal provisions were those already suggested by
the powers, _viz_.:
(1) The boundary between Turkey and the allies to be a line drawn from
Midia to Enos, to be delimited by an international commission:
(2) The boundaries of Albania to be determined by the powers.
(3) Turkey to cede Crete to Greece.
(4) The powers to decide the status of the Aegean islands.
(5) The settlement of all the financial questions arising out of the
war to be left to an international commission to meet at Paris.
It was time for a settlement, since the problem was no longer to secure
peace between Turkey and the allies, but rather to maintain peace among
the allies. The solution of the great problem of the war, the division
of the spoils, could no longer be deferred. From the moment that
Adrianople had fallen, the troops of Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece
maneuvered for position, each state determined to secure possession of
as much territory as possible, in the hope that at the final settlement
it might retain what it had seized.