DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen also spoke of Giraud and described the

case much in the same way as that of Weygand. In neither case was he in

a position to say from his own first-hand knowledge that you had given

such an order, but he reported what Canaris had told him and illustrated

his testimony by means of later inquiries. I ask you to tell us what you

know about the case of Giraud, which created a sensation at the time and

also here, and to say what part you took in discussions regarding

Giraud.

KEITEL: Giraud’s successful escape from the Fortress of Königstein near

Dresden on 19 April 1942 created a sensation; and I was severely

reprimanded about the guard of this general’s camp, a military fortress.

The escape was successful despite all attempts to recapture the general,

by police or military action, on his way back to France. Canaris had

instructions from me to keep a particularly sharp watch on all the

places at which he might cross the frontier into France or

Alsace-Lorraine, so that we could recapture him. The police were also

put on to this job; 8 or 10 days after his escape it was made known that

the general had arrived safely back in France. If I issued any orders

during this search I probably used the words I gave in the preliminary

interrogations, namely, “We must get the general back, dead or alive.” I

possibly did say something like that. He had escaped and was in France.

Second phase: Efforts, made through the Embassy by Abetz and Foreign

Minister Ribbentrop to induce the general to return to captivity of his

own accord, appeared not to be unsuccessful or impossible, as the

general had declared himself willing to go to the occupied zone to

discuss the matter. I was of the opinion that the general might possibly

do it on account of the concessions hitherto made to Marshal Pétain

regarding personal wishes in connection with the release of French

generals from captivity. The meeting with General Giraud took place in

occupied territory, at the staff quarters of a German Army Corps, where

the question of his return was discussed. The Military Commander

informed me by telephone of the general’s presence in occupied

territory, in the hotel where the German officers were billeted.

The commanding general suggested that if the general would not return

voluntarily it would be a very simple matter to apprehend him if he were

authorized to do so. I at once refused this categorically for I

considered it a breach of faith. The general had come trusting to

receive proper treatment and be returned unmolested.

Third phase: The attempt or desire to get the general back somehow into

military custody arose from the fact that Canaris told me that the

general’s family was residing in territory occupied by German troops;

and it was almost certain that the general would try to see his family,

even if only after a certain period of time and when the incident had

been allowed to drop. He suggested to me to make preparations for the

recapture of the general if he made a visit of this kind in occupied

territory. Canaris said that he himself would initiate these

preparations through his Counterintelligence office in Paris and through

his other offices. Nothing happened for some time; and it was surely

quite natural for me to ask on several occasions, no matter who was with

Canaris or if Lahousen was with him, “What has become of the Giraud

affair?” or, in the same way, “How is the Giraud case getting on?” The

words used by Mr. Lahousen were, “It is very difficult; but we shall do

everything we can.” That was his answer. Canaris made no reply. That

strikes me as significant only now; but at the time it did not occur to

me.

Third phase: At a later stage—Shall I continue?

DR. NELTE: Fourth phase.

KEITEL: Fourth phase. This began with Hitler saying to me: “This is all

nonsense. We are not getting results. Counterintelligence is not capable

of this and cannot handle this matter. I will turn it over to Himmler

and Counterintelligence had better keep out of this, for they will never

get hold of the general again.” Admiral Canaris said at the time that he

was counting on having the necessary security measures taken by the

French secret state police in case General Giraud went to the occupied

zone; and a fight might result, as the general was notoriously a

spirited soldier, a man of 60 who lowers himself 45 meters over a cliff

by means of a rope—that is how he escaped from Königstein.

Fifth phase: According to Lahousen’s explanation in Berlin, Canaris’

desire to transfer the matter to the Secret State Police, which Lahousen

said was done as a result of representations from the departmental

heads, was because I asked again how matters stood with Giraud and he

wanted to get rid of this awkward mission. Canaris came to me and asked

if he could pass it on to the Reich Security Main Office or to the

police. I said yes, because the Führer had already told me repeatedly

that he wanted to hand it over to Himmler.

Next phase: I wanted to warn Canaris some time later, when Himmler came

to see me and confirmed that he had received orders from Hitler to have

Giraud and his family watched unobtrusively and that I was to stop

Canaris from taking any action in the case. He had been told that

Canaris was working along parallel lines. I immediately agreed.

Now we come to the phase which Lahousen has described at length. I had

asked about “Gustav” and similar questions. I wanted to direct Canaris

immediately to stop all his activities in the matter, as Hitler had

confirmed the order. What happened in Paris according to Lahousen’s

detailed reports, that excuses were sought, _et cetera_, that the matter

was thought to be very mysterious, that is, Gustav as an abbreviation

for the G in Giraud, all this is fancy rather than fact. I had Canaris

summoned to me at once, for he was in Paris and not in Berlin. He had

done nothing at all, right from the start. He was thus in a highly

uncomfortable position with regard to me for he had lied to me. When he

came I said only, “You will have nothing more to do in this matter; keep

clear of it.”

Then came the next phase: The general’s escape without difficulty to

North Africa by plane, which was suddenly reported—if I remember

correctly—before the invasion of North Africa by the Anglo-American

troops. That ended the business. No action was ever taken by the

Counterintelligence whom I had charged to watch him, or by the police;

and I never even used the words to do away with the general. Never!

The final phase of this entire affair may sound like a fairy tale, but

it is true nevertheless. The general sent a plane from North Africa to

Southern France near Lyons in February or March 1944, with a liaison

officer who reported to the Counterintelligence and asked if the general

could return to France and what would happen to him on landing in

France. The question was turned over to me. Generaloberst Jodl is my

witness that these things actually happened. The chief of the

Counterintelligence Office involved in this matter was with me. The

answer was: “Exactly the same treatment as General Weygand who is

already in Germany. There is no doubt that the Führer will agree.”

Nothing actually did happen, and I heard no more about it. But these

things actually happened.

DR. NELTE: To complete our information, I must ask you a few questions

for the French Prosecution have mentioned that later, in a later phase,

the family of General Giraud suffered inconveniences or losses of a

rather serious nature. When you were searching for Giraud did you cause

any trouble to his family, who were living in occupied France? Did you

give any directives which would confine or inconvenience the family in

any way?

KEITEL: No. I had only an unobtrusive watch kept on the family’s

residence in order to receive information of any visit which he might

have planned. But no steps of any kind were ever taken against the

family. It would have been foolish in this case.

DR. NELTE: Foolish of you?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: To make matters quite clear: You had no knowledge of anything

having happened later on?

KEITEL: No, none at all.

DR. NELTE: Well, General Giraud is still alive and I will only ask you,

in conclusion, under your oath: Can you confirm that you did not, at any

time, give an order or a directive which might be interpreted to mean

that General Giraud was to be killed?

KEITEL: No. I never gave such an order, unless the phrase “We must have

him back, dead or alive” may be considered of weight in this respect. I

never gave orders that the general was to be killed or done away with,

or anything of the kind. Never.

DR. NELTE: I have concluded my direct examination of the Defendant

Keitel. May I ask you to permit me to submit in evidence the affidavit,

that last one, Number 6 in Document Book Number 2. I would like to

submit that affidavit in evidence. It is on Page 51 and following and is

Document K...

THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you put that in as K-12 yesterday?

DR. NELTE: Today I submit Keitel-13...

THE PRESIDENT: This affidavit that you want to submit now, where is it

and what is the date of it?

DR. NELTE: It is Page 51 and following, and it is dated 9 March 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.

DR. NELTE: This affidavit has also been attested to by Generaloberst

Jodl. I ask permission to question him about the affidavit or to show it

to him for confirmation when he is called to the witness stand.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: If the Court please, we have looked into the matter of the

so-called interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst referred to yesterday

by Dr. Nelte. Insofar as we can determine, this paper was never offered

in evidence by any members of the Prosecution. It was referred to by M.

Dubost—I mean, it was not referred to by him, but it was included in

his brief. I did not refer to it, and I did not offer it in evidence.

That is how it came into the hands of Dr. Nelte, but not in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte want to offer it in evidence now?

DR. NELTE: I ask to submit it as Document Number Keitel-14.

THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number or another number?

DR. NELTE: No, Mr. President, it has no other number.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Now, do any of the other Defense Counsel want to ask questions?

DR. STAHMER: Mr. Defendant, as you have corrected your former statement

by answering the question put by your counsel with a statement that

Reich Marshal Göring was not present at the conference in which Hitler

gave orders for the airmen who had escaped from the Sagan Camp should be

held by the police and since you further said that a conference with

Reich Marshal Göring in Berlin did not take place, I have only the

following questions on this subject: Some weeks after that escape, did

you receive a letter from the Quartermaster General of the General Staff

of the Luftwaffe informing you that the Luftwaffe wanted to hand over

their prison camps to the OKW?

KEITEL: Yes, I received this letter and following an interview with

Hitler I declined the offer.

DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.

DR. SEIDL: At the beginning of the war, the Defendant Dr. Frank was a

lieutenant of the 9th Infantry Regiment; is that correct?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Do you remember receiving a letter from Dr. Frank, who was

then Governor General, in 1942, saying that he wanted to rejoin the

Wehrmacht?

The purpose of that letter was, of course, that he be relieved of his

office as Governor General in this way. Is that correct?

KEITEL: Yes, I received such a letter and handed it to the Führer who

merely made a movement with his hands and said “Out of the question.” I

informed Frank of that decision through the liaison officer who was

temporarily with him at the time.

DR. SEIDL: That is all.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is 3 minutes to one and it will not take me

very long, but it might take me beyond 1 o’clock, so it might be better

to adjourn now. I would then put my question to the witness after the

recess.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn until 2:00 o’clock.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: May it please the Tribunal, this witness is competent and an

expert who can give the Tribunal definite figures about the armament

expenditures of the Reich. However, the witness is certainly not in a

position to remember these figures just at the moment. Professor Kraus,

my colleague, therefore, during my absence, was kind enough to mark

these figures down and to check them in co-operation with the witness.

The written deposition was signed by the witness at that time, in order

to avoid any misunderstanding. In order to help him recollect these

figures, I now ask your permission to have submitted to the witness this

deposition which he has signed. I have had translations made of this

deposition into the three languages in question and I now submit to the

Tribunal eight copies. I also have four copies for the four delegations

of the Prosecution, and German copies for the counsels of the Defendants

Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Dönitz, and the OKW.

May I ask for just one moment so that the witness can read it?

[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, would you please look at the

first column only, which bears the heading “Total Expenditures.” The

second and the third columns show which of those sums were raised

through the Reichsbank, on the one hand, and which were raised from

other sources, on the other hand. These figures I should like to have

certified during the interrogation of Schacht himself, because they were

the results of Schacht’s calculations and the witness here can therefore

give no information about them. May I ask you concerning these armament

expenditures of the Reich, beginning with the fiscal year of 1935, the

fiscal year running from 1 April to 31 March: The figures stated herein

are: 5,000 millions for 1935, 7,000 millions for 1936, 9,000 millions

for 1937, 11,000 millions for 1938, and 20,500 millions for 1939. Are

these figures correct?

KEITEL: According to my conviction these figures are correct. May I add

that at the beginning of my captivity I also had an opportunity to speak

to the Reich Finance Minister about these figures and to co-ordinate our

opinions.

DR. DIX: Now, a question about the armament strength of the Reich on 1

April 1938. Is it correct to say that at that time there existed: 24

infantry divisions, 1 armored division, no motorized division, 1

mountain division, 1 cavalry division, and that in addition 10 infantry

divisions and 1 armored division were being formed? I wish to add, that

of the 3 reserve divisions none had been completed on 1 April 1938; and

only 7 to 8 were in the process of being formed and expected to be

complete by 1 October 1938.

KEITEL: I consider these figures correct and I have therefore confirmed

them in this affidavit.

DR. DIX: That is as far as the deposition goes. I would like to put two

more questions to the witness which have not been discussed with him so

that I do not know whether he remembers the figures in question.

I consider it possible that the Tribunal would be interested in the

proportion of strength between the Reich, on the one hand, and

Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, at the time of Hitler’s march into

Czechoslovakia; that is the relation of strength (a) concerning the

armed might and (b) concerning the civilian population.

KEITEL: I do not remember the accurate figures about that. In the

preliminary interrogation I have been questioned about it and I believe

the figures will be correct if I say that in the fall of 1938, going by

military units, that is, divisions...

DR. DIX: I mean now the time when Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia, in

the spring of 1939.

KEITEL: That was in the same year of mobilization, that is to say at

that time, as far as figures are concerned, there were fewer divisions

than Czechoslovakia had at her disposal. In the fall of 1938 the number

of formations, that is, divisions, was probably equal. In the spring of

1939, when we marched in, the strength which was used then was less than

that which stood ready in the fall of 1938. Accurate figures, if they

are important to this Tribunal, you could get rather from General Jodl.

DR. DIX: As to the number of divisions which Czechoslovakia had at her

disposal in March 1939, could you not tell us anything about that?

KEITEL: No, I do not know that exactly.

DR. DIX: Then I shall possibly ask General Jodl about that later.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you will actually offer this document in evidence

when the Defendant Schacht gives evidence. Is that what you intend to

do?

DR. DIX: I am going to submit it in evidence and it will be included in

my document book. It is not necessary to keep it now, because I have to

take it up again when Schacht will be examined and you will find it then

in the document book. However, I would like to suggest that the copy

which I have given to the witness should become a part of the record,

because my questions have referred to this document. For this reason it

might be useful to make this copy a part of the record.

THE PRESIDENT: If you want to make it a part of the record it had better

be given a number now. It had better be S-1 had it not?

DR. DIX: Yes. Your Lordship, may I suggest Schacht-1?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. STAHMER (Representing Dr. Robert Servatius, Counsel for Defendant

Sauckel, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Witness, on 4

January 1944, a conference allegedly took place between the Führer and

Sauckel about the procuring of manpower. Were you present at this

conference?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: Did Sauckel on this occasion state that he could not fill,

to the extent demanded, the manpower demands of those who asked for it?

KEITEL: Yes, he discussed it thoroughly and also gave his reasons for

it.

DR. STAHMER: What reasons did he give?

KEITEL: He pointed out the great difficulties encountered in the areas

from which he was supposed to draft or recruit manpower; the strong

activity of guerillas and partisans in these areas, the great obstacles

in obtaining sufficient police forces for protecting the action, and

similar reasons. I do not remember any details.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Field Marshal, were you the leader of the

German delegation which signed the capitulation with which the war in

Europe was terminated?

KEITEL: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When and where did that take place?

KEITEL: In Berlin on 8 May, that is to say during the night from 8 to 9

May 1945.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you asked for full powers which would

authorize you to negotiate about the capitulation?

KEITEL: Yes. I took the full powers with me to Berlin. They had been

signed by Grossadmiral Dönitz in his capacity as Chief of State and

Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and stated in a few words that he

had authorized and ordered me to conduct the negotiations and to sign

the capitulation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these full powers examined and

acknowledged by the Allies?

KEITEL: In the course of the afternoon of 8 May I was asked to present

the full powers. Obviously they were examined and several hours later

they were returned to me by a high ranking officer of the Red Army who

said that I had to show them again when signing.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you show them again?

KEITEL: I did have my credentials at hand during the act of capitulation

and handed them over to become part of the record.

PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness,

during your testimony you have explained the organization of the Supreme

Command of the Wehrmacht. This organization was based on a decree of the

Führer and Reich Chancellor of 4 February 1938. In that decree the OKW

was designated as the military staff of the Supreme Commander of the

Armed Forces. So, in that aspect you were the Chief of Staff. Now, the

Prosecution have repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is that

correct?

KEITEL: No, General Jodl never was my Chief of Staff, he was the Chief

of the Armed Forces’ Operations Staff and one of the departmental chiefs

of the Armed Forces High Command as I have already stated, although the

first among equals.

DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say, the Chief of several collateral

co-ordinated offices?

KEITEL: Yes; I never had a Chief of Staff.

DR. JAHRREISS: Mention was made here about the discussion between Hitler

and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938. Do you remember

that? A diary entry by Jodl referring to this conversation has been

submitted to the Tribunal. Was Jodl present at this conference?

KEITEL: No, he was not present and his knowledge is derived from the

conference which I described before and which I held with him and

Canaris about the news to be disseminated as to certain military

preparations during the days following the Schuschnigg conference; it is

therefore an impression gained by General Jodl as a result of the

description made to him.

DR. JAHRREISS: In the course of the preparations to make the

German-Czechoslovakian question acute, that is, the Sudeten question,

the plan to stage an incident played a great role. Did you ever give an

order to the department Abwehr II (Counterintelligence) under Canaris,

to stage such an incident in Czechoslovakia or on the border?

KEITEL: No, such orders were never given to the Abwehr, anyway, not by

myself.

DR. JAHRREISS: After Munich, that is in October 1938, Field Marshal, the

then Chief of National Defense, Defendant Jodl, left this position and

was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor?

KEITEL: Jodl was transferred to active service. He became chief of an

artillery division in Vienna and his successor was Warlimont, at that

time Colonel Warlimont.

DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say his successor...

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: If I understood you correctly, that is to say Jodl was

not only sent on leave but he definitely left his office?

KEITEL: Jodl had definitely left the High Command of the Armed Forces

and was personnel officer of a division; Warlimont was not his

representative but successor in Jodl’s position.

DR. JAHRREISS: Now, the Prosecution has said that, at the occasion of

that famous conference of 23 May 1938—no, 1939—Warlimont was present

as deputy designate for Jodl. What had Jodl to do with that conference?

KEITEL: Nothing at all, he was at that time a front-line officer and

commander in Vienna.

DR JAHRREISS: Why did you choose Jodl to be chief of the Armed Forces

Operations Staff?

KEITEL: That was in consequence of our co-operation from 1935 to 1938.

My opinion was that I could not find a better man for that position.

DR. JAHRREISS: How did Jodl picture his military career, once his

command as artillery commander in Vienna or Brünn had ended?

KEITEL: I knew about his passion and his desire to become commander of a

mountain division. He has frequently told me about it.

DR. JAHRREISS: Well, would there have been any chance to get such a

command?

KEITEL: Yes, I tried to use my influence with the Commander-in-Chief of

the Army and I remember that during the summer of 1939, I wrote him that

his wish to become the commander of a mountain division in

Reichenhall—I do not remember the number—would come true. I was glad

to be able to give him that information.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was it up to you to make the decision or was it up to the

OKH?

KEITEL: I had made a request to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and

he had made the decision.

DR. JAHRREISS: And if I understand correctly, you yourself notified

Jodl?

KEITEL: I wrote him a letter because I knew that I would make him very

happy.

DR. JAHRREISS: May I ask, Field Marshal, did you correspond regularly

with Jodl?

KEITEL: No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to him

during that year.

DR. JAHRREISS: I ask that for a definite reason: Jodl leaves the OKW. He

knows that if the necessity arises he will become chief of the future

so-called Armed Forces Operations Staff, that is to say, a rather

important position. He goes on active service, as you say. One should

think that then he would not only receive a private letter once from you

but would be kept informed by you regularly.

KEITEL: That was certainly not done by me and, according to my personal

opinion, every general staff officer who goes on active service is very

happy if he is not bothered with such things any longer.

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but fate does not grant us everything which would

make us happy. It could be that somebody received the official order for

instance, to keep this gentleman informed.

KEITEL: I certainly did not do it. I do not believe that it happened,

but I do not know for sure whether or not somebody tried to do it.

DR. JAHRREISS: During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and Brünn, that

is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly in Berlin in order to get

information?

KEITEL: I did not see him and he did not come to see me. I believe it is

very unlikely because if such were the case he would have visited me.

DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have to understand from what you say, that when he

came to Berlin shortly before the beginning of the war, in response to a

telegram, he first had to be informed as to what was going on?

KEITEL: Yes, and that was the first thing done between him and myself.

DR. JAHRREISS: You informed him?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Another thing, Field Marshal. You remember, perhaps, the

somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellery after the Simovic

Putsch; that was 27 March 1941, was it not?

KEITEL: Yes, Yugoslavia.

DR. JAHRREISS: If one reflects on the politics and the history of the

wars of the last 200 years in Europe, one asks: Was there nobody at that

conference in the Reich Chancellery who might have suggested that

instead of attacking immediately, it would be better to march to the

borders of a state whose attitude was completely uncertain and then

clarify the situation by an ultimatum?

KEITEL: Yes, during all these pros and cons under turbulent conditions

in that morning session, Jodl, himself, to my knowledge, brought that

point up in the debate. Proposal: To march and to send an ultimatum;

that is about the way it was.

DR. JAHRREISS: If I am correctly informed, you were in the East in

October 1941 for the purpose of an inspection or a visit to Army Group

North; is that correct?

KEITEL: Yes, in the autumn of 1941 I frequently went by plane to Army

Group North in order to get information for the Führer.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was Field Marshal Von Leeb the commander of Army Group

North?

KEITEL: Yes, he was.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did Von Leeb tell you about particular worries which he

had at that time?

KEITEL: I think it was my last or the next to the last visit to Von Leeb

where the questions of capitulation, that is to say, the question of the

population of Leningrad, played an important role, which worried him

very much at that time because there were certain indications that the

population was streaming out of the city and infiltrating into his area.

I remember that at that time he asked me to make the suggestion to the

Führer that, as he could not take over and feed 1 million civilians

within the area of his army group, a sluice, so to speak, should be made

towards the east, that is, the Russian zone, so that the population

could flow out in that direction. I reported that to the Führer at that

time.

DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did the population turn in any other direction?

KEITEL: Yes, especially to the south into the Southern forests.

According to Von Leeb a certain pressure exerted by the population to

get through the German lines made itself felt at the time.

DR. JAHRREISS: And that would have impeded your operations?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Field Marshal, you are aware, I suppose, since it has

been mentioned this morning, of the order issued by the Führer and

Supreme Commander about the Commandos, dated 18 October 1942, that is

Document Number 498-PS which has been submitted here. It had been

announced publicly beforehand that an order of that kind would be

issued. Do you know that?

KEITEL: Yes; the item in question was included in one of the daily

communiqués of the Wehrmacht.

DR. JAHRREISS: We are dealing with the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October

1942, which, below the usual report, states with reference to what has

happened, “The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore considers

itself obliged to issue the following orders.” The first item is of no

interest here, and then, at the second item appears the following

sentence:

“In the future all terror and sabotage Commandos of the British

and their accomplices who do not behave like soldiers, but

rather like bandits, will be treated as such by the German

troops and will be killed in combat without mercy wherever they

appear.”

Field Marshal, who drafted this wording?

KEITEL: The Führer personally. I was present when he dictated and

corrected it.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to continue at the point which was

last mentioned by Professor Jahrreiss. The order about Commandos,

Document Number 498-PS, was discussed. In this order on Commandos, under

Number VI, Hitler threatened that all commanders would be

court-martialed if they did not carry out this order. Do you know what

considerations prompted Hitler to include this particular passage in the

order?

KEITEL: Yes, they are actually quite clear; I should think that the

purpose, was to put emphasis on the demand that this order should

actually be carried out, since it was definitely considered by the

generals and those who were to carry it out, as a very grave order; and

for that reason compliance was to be enforced by the threat of

punishment.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I should like to ask you several questions

concerning the nature of the so-called Groups of the General Staff and

the OKW. What do you understand to be the German General Staff?

KEITEL: By the General Staff I understand those officers who are

especially trained to be assistants to the higher leadership.

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already spent a very long time in

explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff of the various

commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically and quite

clearly what the group is, which they are asking the Court to declare as

criminal; and therefore, I do not see what relevance any further

evidence on the subject can have. What are you trying to show by asking

him now about what he understands by the General Staff?

DR. LATERNSER: This question was purely preparatory. I intended to

connect this question with another one; and, by the answer to the second

question, I wanted to prove that under the alleged group, a group has

been accused under a wrong name.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong name if the

group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has already told us what

he understands by the General Staff. Will you put your second question.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if the higher military leaders are considered

collectively to form one group which is designated as General Staff and

OKW, do you consider this designation to be correct or misleading?

KEITEL: According to our German military concepts this designation is

misleading, because to us the General Staff always means a body of

assistants, whereas the commanders of armies and army groups and the

commanding generals represent the leadership corps.

DR. LATERNSER: The military hierarchy has been discussed sufficiently in

this Trial. I want to know only the following from you: Was the relation

of these echelons to each other that of military superiors and

subordinates or did there exist an additional organization involving

these ranks which went beyond purely professional military duties?

KEITEL: No, the General Staff, that is to say, the General Staff

officers as assistants to the leaders, could be recognized by their

uniforms as such. The leaders or so-called commanders themselves had no

relation to each other through any interoffice channels or through any

other organizations of any kind.

DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday the affidavit made by Generaloberst Halder was

put to you. I would like to discuss now the last sentence of that

affidavit; I shall read it to you, “That was the actual General Staff

and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces.” Is the statement in

that sentence correct or incorrect?

KEITEL: I understand it this way, that Halder wanted to say that those

few officers who had General Staff positions were the ones who did the

real work in the General Staff of the Army, while the rest of the far

more than 100 General Staff officers in the OKH had nothing to do with

these matters. That is what I think he wanted to say, a small group

which was concerned with these problems.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know of a single incident where Hitler ever

consulted a military leader on a political matter?

KEITEL: No, that did not happen.

DR. LATERNSER: I assume that you were present at most of the conferences

with Hitler when the situation was discussed. Could you tell me anything

about protests made, with or without success, by any commanders who had

come from the front and who happened to be present?

KEITEL: As a rule front Commanders who were present were silent

listeners at the general discussion of the situation; and afterwards,

according to circumstances, such commanders used to make a special

report to Hitler about their respective areas. Then there was also an

opportunity, as I believe was already mentioned by Kesselring, to

discuss these things personally and to advance opinions. But otherwise

nobody had anything to say in these matters.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you ever present when particularly emphatic

objections were raised, by any commander, to Hitler?

KEITEL: During the discussion of the situation?

DR. LATERNSER: No, I mean, whatever the occasion may have been.

KEITEL: I was not, of course, present at every conference which Hitler

had with high ranking commanders in his quarters, but I do not know of

any such incidents. I have related in detail those cases which played a

role in this war, namely the opposition of the generals in the West,

before the beginning of the war, and I understood your question to mean

whether I knew of any cases beyond that.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes.

KEITEL: I have related all that and must emphasize once more that the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the limit of

anything which could be justified from the military viewpoint.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of Hitler toward the General Staff

of the Army?

KEITEL: It was not a good one. One may say that he held a prejudice

against the General Staff and thought the General Staff was arrogant. I

believe that is sufficient.

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this once, if not more than once.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not believe that this witness has

been asked about that. As far as I remember, this particular witness has

not been asked about these points.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he has been asked about it.

DR. LATERNSER: I would have paid special attention to this point and

would have crossed off this question already if one of my colleagues had

put it before.

[_To the defendant._] Would Hitler, in case an application for

resignation was tendered by one or more front commanders have been

willing to take back an order which he had once given...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, nearly every officer who has come and

given evidence to this Court has spoken about that subject, certainly

many of them.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, does your objection refer to the question

I have put now?

THE PRESIDENT: Nearly all the officers who have been examined in this

Court have told us it was impossible to resign. That is what you are

asking about, isn’t it?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I will be glad to forego that question, if I can

assume that the Tribunal accepts those facts which I wanted to prove, as

true.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether they accept

its truth or not, is a different question.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to say something also to

this question. I do not believe that it can be considered cumulative,

since as has already been pointed out by my colleague, Dr. Dix, the same

question when put to two different witnesses is in each case a different

question, because the subjective answer of the individual witness to

this particular point is desired. But I will forego that question.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have a few more questions.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, to what extent was the

headquarters of the Führer protected against attacks during the war?

KEITEL: There was a special guard detachment of the Army and also I

believe one company of the Waffen-SS. Very thorough security measures

had been taken with every kind of safety device such as fences,

obstacles, and similar things. It was very well secured against any

surprise attack.

DR. LATERNSER: Were there several zones?

KEITEL: Yes, there was an inner zone and an outer zone and several areas

which were fenced in separately.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. You have already stated that the commanders of the

army groups and armies in the East did not have any authority outside

their area of operation. Was there a tendency to keep that operational

area as small as possible, or as large as possible?

KEITEL: Originally the tendency definitely was to have large areas of

operation in order to assure the greatest possible freedom of movement

in the rear of the armies and army groups. The Führer was the first who,

by drastic means, caused the limitation of these zones to make them as

small as possible.

DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons?

KEITEL: As he said, in order to free military officers from

administrative measures and get them out of the extended space they had

sought for their equipment and to concentrate them into narrowly limited

areas.

DR. LATERNSER: You mentioned during your interrogation, units of the

Waffen-SS which were assigned to the Army for operational, that is, for

combat purposes. I am particularly interested in getting that point

clear because, as far as I see, there still prevails some confusion. Did

the forces of the SD have anything to do with the units of the Waffen-SS

which were subordinated to army units for the purpose of operational

assignments?

KEITEL: No, the formations of the Waffen-SS within divisions were

incorporated as such into the armies and had nothing to do with anything

else. They were in that case purely Army Forces.

DR. LATERNSER: Was it possible for a commander to punish an SS man for

any offense?

KEITEL: If the man was caught in the act I believe no commander would

have hesitated; but apart from that, the last resort for disciplinary

measures and jurisdiction was the Reichsführer Himmler, and not the

commander of the army.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the executives of the Einsatzgruppen of the SD have

to report to the commanders of the armies upon what they did on

Himmler’s orders?

KEITEL: This question has been dealt with here in great detail by the

witness Ohlendorf, and I am not informed about the connections which

existed between the commanders and the Einsatzgruppen and commands. I

was not involved and took no part in it.

DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to know from you whether the Einsatzgruppen of

the SD, according to your knowledge of the regulations, were obliged to

report to the military commanders in whose rear areas they operated.

KEITEL: I do not believe so; I do not know the orders which were in

force in this respect; I have not seen them.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military commanders at any

time were informed of the intention of Hitler or Himmler to kill the

Jews?

KEITEL: According to my opinion, that was not the case, since I

personally was not informed either.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have only one more question, on the subject of the

prisoners of war. It had already become known during the war that the

conditions relating to the food supply of Soviet Russian prisoners of

war during the first period of the eastern campaign were miserable. What

was the reason for these conditions which prevailed during that first

period?

KEITEL: I can base my statement only on what the Commander-in-Chief of

the Army said during the situation report conferences. As I recall, he

repeatedly reported that it was clearly a problem of large masses which

required extraordinary efforts of organization to provide food supply,

housing, and security.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, these conditions were without doubt actually chaotic

during a certain period of time. I am thinking of a particular reason

which existed, and in order to refresh your memory, Witness, I would

like to mention the following:

The Army had already prepared camps in the homeland for the future

prisoners of war, because it was planned in the beginning that these

prisoners should be transferred to the homeland. In spite of these

preparations, however, as has been stated here, this was stopped by a

sudden order from Hitler which prohibited the transfer of these Russian

prisoners into the homeland.

KEITEL: I explained that this morning; and I said that during a certain

period until September, the transfer of Soviet Russian prisoners of war

into the Reich was prohibited and only after that the transfer into the

home camps was made possible in order to utilize the manpower.

DR. LATERNSER: And the deficiencies which appeared during this first

period could not be remedied by the means at the disposal of the troops?

KEITEL: That I do not know. I am not informed about that. Only the OKH,

which had the exclusive responsibility, would know that.

DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions about the position of

the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. When was that

position set up?

KEITEL: I believe in 1942.

DR. LATERNSER: 1942. What was the rank connected with that position?

KEITEL: It could be a colonel or a general.

DR. LATERNSER: What I mean is whether it was about the same as the

position of a commander of a division?

KEITEL: Well, I would say it was equal to the position of the commander

of a brigade or a division, a section chief.

DR. LATERNSER: How many section chiefs were there in the OKW?

KEITEL: I could not say that at present from memory. By way of estimate

I had eight department chiefs, each of which had one, two, three or four

sections. Therefore there would have been about 30 or 35 section chiefs.

DR. LATERNSER: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was

one of the eight or of the 30 section chiefs?

KEITEL: No, I would not like to say that definitely. We had among the

department chiefs so-called department group chiefs, who combined

several small sections. That was about his position.

DR. LATERNSER: What were the official duties connected with that

position?

KEITEL: Naturally the supervision and direction of all the work of that

part of the Armed Forces Operations Staff which was attached to the

Führer’s headquarters. It was his task to direct that work in accordance

with the directives given by Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces

Operations Staff.

DR. LATERNSER: Was the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff

responsible for the strategic planning to a particularly high degree, as

is maintained by the Prosecution?

KEITEL: He was, of course, not responsible for that in this capacity,

but as a matter of fact he belonged to the small group of high ranking

and outstanding general staff officers who were concerned with these

things, as Halder has pointed out.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question. Was, therefore, the

position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, not

equal in importance to the other positions which are included in this

group or alleged group of the General Staff and the OKW?

KEITEL: I said chief of a group of departments in the Armed Forces

Operations Staff and co-worker in the small group of those who had to

deal with operational and strategical questions, but subordinate to

General Jodl and director of the work supervisor in the Arbeitsstab.

DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, I believe that the question which I have

put to you was not completely answered. I have asked you whether the

importance of that position was equal to or even approached equality

with that of the other offices which are included in the group of the

general staff and the OKW.

KEITEL: No, certainly not, because in the group of the General Staff and

the OKW there were the commanders-in-chief, the supreme commanders, and

the chiefs of the general staff. He certainly did not belong to those.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.

HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, you have said in your

Affidavit Keitel-12 that the SS, at the beginning of the war, became the

champions and standard bearers of a policy of conquest and force. In

order to exclude any misunderstandings, I should like to clarify the

following: What did you mean by SS in this case?

KEITEL: I can say to that, that what has been read here by my counsel

was a short summary of a much longer affidavit. If you read the latter

you would find for yourself the answer to your question. To state it in

a more precise way: It concerned the Reich SS Leadership under Himmler

and under those functionaries within his sphere of command, police and

SS, who appeared and were active in the occupied territories. The

concept of the so-called general SS in the homeland had nothing to do

with that. I hope that makes it clear.

HERR BABEL: Yes, thank you.

DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): Witness, the

Prosecution in their trial brief have charged the Defendant Bormann also

with his activity in the so-called Volkssturm. In that connection, I

would like to put a few questions to you.

Was an offensive or defensive activity planned for the Volkssturm as it

was formed by decree of the Führer of 18 October 1944?

KEITEL: To that I can only say that Reichsleiter Bormann refused to give

the military authorities any advice, any co-operation, and any

information on the Volkssturm.

DR. BERGOLD: You mean to say that you were not at all informed of the

purpose of the Volkssturm?

KEITEL: Only that I saw it as the last levy of men to defend their own

homesteads.

DR. BERGOLD: That means that, within the framework of the Wehrmacht, the

Volkssturm was not designed for any offensive purpose?

KEITEL: No, but all services of the Wehrmacht which encountered the

Volkssturm units in their areas, either incorporated them or sent them

home.

DR. BERGOLD: Did I understand you correctly that you wanted to say that

that institution, the Volkssturm, was a product of Bormann’s brain or

did it originate with Hitler?

KEITEL: I do not know that, perhaps from both.

DR. BERGOLD: Hitler did not tell you about it, either?

KEITEL: No, he spoke only about the Volkssturm and similar things, but

military authorities had nothing to do with it.

DR. BERGOLD: Did Bormann report any other military matters to the Führer

besides the odd things about the Volkssturm?

KEITEL: He has often accused the Wehrmacht of all sorts of things; I can

conclude that only from what I was told, and assume that it originated

with Bormann. I do not know it.

DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, after his

return from Moscow in August 1939, on account of the changed foreign

political situation—the guarantee pact between England and Poland had

been ratified—advised Hitler to stop the military measures which had

been set in motion?

KEITEL: I had the impression at that time that the orders given to me by

Hitler were based upon a conversation between him and his foreign

minister. I was not present at that conversation.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, just like the other

ministers with portfolio, was as a rule not informed about the strategic

plans?

KEITEL: I can say only for myself and for the Chief of the Armed Forces

Operations Staff, that we were not authorized to do it and that we never

did it. If the Reich Foreign Minister was informed about such questions,

that information could have come only from Hitler himself. I doubt that

he made an exception here.

DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a letter of 3 April 1940,

concerning the impending occupation of Denmark and Norway which you sent

to the then Reich Foreign Minister. In that letter you informed the

Reich Foreign Minister of the impending occupation and requested him to

take the necessary political steps. Had you already instructed Von

Ribbentrop before that date about the intended occupation of Norway and

Denmark?

KEITEL: No, I would not have been allowed to do that, according to the

way in which the Führer worked with us. That letter was an unusual

method of giving information about this, by the Führer’s order, to the

Reich Foreign Minister, who knew nothing about these things. I was

ordered to write it to him.

DR. HORN: In connection with the testimony by General Lahousen, I want

to ask you one question. At the time of the Polish campaign, was there a

directive or an order by Hitler to exterminate the Jews in the Polish

Ukraine?

KEITEL: I cannot recall any such things. I know only that during the

occupation of Poland—that is after the occupation—the problem of the

Polish Jews played a part. In that connection I also put a question once

to Hitler to which, I believe, he answered that that area was well

suited for settling the Jews there. I do not know or remember anything

else.

DR. HORN: At the time of the Polish campaign, was there any plan to

instigate a revolt in the Polish Ukraine in the rear of the Poles?

KEITEL: I cannot answer that question, although I have heard such things

said here by Lahousen. I do not know or remember anything about it.

DR. HORN: Thank you.

HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): Field Marshal, you were Chief of

the OKW and thereby also the Chief of the KGF, that is, Prisoners of War

Organization. Did you ever issue orders or have orders issued on the

basis of which members of the SA or units of the SA were detailed to

guard prisoners of war or prisoner-of-war camps, or were to be used for

that purpose?

KEITEL: I cannot remember that any such directive had been issued by the

OKW. I believe that certainly was not the case.

HERR BÖHM: In that respect, was a report ever made to you that any such

guard duty was performed?

KEITEL: I cannot remember but I do not mean to deny that some units of

the army in some particular place may have used SA men temporarily to

assist in guard duty, which I would not know.

HERR BÖHM: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in open session tomorrow morning at

10 o’clock. At 1230 it will take the supplementary applications for

witnesses and documents, and after that at a quarter to 1 it will

adjourn into a closed session.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I would like you to tell me exactly when

you received your first commission as an officer?

KEITEL: On 18 August 1902.

GEN. RUDENKO: What military training did you receive?

KEITEL: I came into the army as an officer candidate. Starting as a

simple private I advanced through the various ranks of private first

class, corporal and ensign to lieutenant.

GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you about your military training.

KEITEL: I was an army officer until 1909, and then for almost 6 years

regimental adjutant; then during the World War I, battery commander, and

then after the spring of 1915 I served on the general staff.

GEN. RUDENKO: You were evidently not given a correct translation. Did

you pass the Staff College or any other college, that is to say, did you

receive preliminary training?

KEITEL: I never attended the War Academy. Twice I participated in

so-called Great General Staff trips as regimental adjutant and in the

summer of 1914 I was detailed to the Great General Staff and returned to

my regiment later when the war broke out in 1914.

GEN. RUDENKO: What military training and military rank did Hitler

possess?

KEITEL: Only a few years ago I found out from Hitler himself that after

the end of World War I, he had been a lieutenant in a Bavarian infantry

regiment. During the war he was a private, then private first class and

maybe corporal during the last period.

GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not, therefore, conclude that you, with your

thorough military training and great experience, could have had an

opportunity of influencing Hitler, very considerably, in solving

questions of a strategic and military nature, as well as other matters

pertaining to the Armed Forces?

KEITEL: No. I have to declare in that respect that, to a degree which is

almost incomprehensible to the layman and the professional officer,

Hitler had studied general staff publications, military literature,

essays on tactics, operations, and strategy and that he had a knowledge

in the military fields which can only be called amazing. May I give an

example of that which can be confirmed by the other officers of the

Wehrmacht. Hitler was so well informed concerning organization,

armament, leadership, and equipment of all armies, and what is more

remarkable, of all navies of the globe, that it was impossible to prove

any error on his part; and I have to add that also during the war, while

I was at his headquarters and in his close proximity, Hitler studied at

night all the big general staff books by Moltke, Schlieffen, and

Clausewitz and from them acquired his vast knowledge by himself.

Therefore we had the impression: Only a genius can do that.

GEN. RUDENKO: You will not deny that by reason of your military training

and experience you were Hitler’s adviser in a number of highly important

matters?

KEITEL: I belonged to his closest military entourage and I heard a lot

from him; but I pointed out yesterday to the question of my counsel that

even in the simple, every-day questions concerning organization and

equipment of the Wehrmacht, I must admit openly that I was the pupil and

not the master.

GEN. RUDENKO: From what date do you consider that your co-operation with

Hitler began?

KEITEL: Exactly from the day when I was called into that position, 4

February 1938.

GEN. RUDENKO: That means that you were working with Hitler during the

entire period of preparation for and realization of aggressive warfare?

KEITEL: Yes. I have already given all the necessary explanations as to

how, after I entered my new position in the beginning of February,

events followed in quick succession, often in a very surprising manner.

GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military leaders of the OKW

and the OKH had the rank of Reich Minister?

KEITEL: The rank of Reich Minister was given to the three

commanders-in-chief of the sections of the Armed Forces, and among these

the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reich Marshal Göring, was also

Reich Minister of Aviation; likewise I received, as I said yesterday,

the rank but not the authority and title of a minister.

GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military collaborators of the

OKH and the OKW, signed decrees together with Hitler and the other Reich

Ministers?

KEITEL: In the ministerial sector of the Reich Government, there was the

method of the signatures of the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the

Ministers immediately involved, and, finally of the Chief of the Reich

Chancellery. This did not hold good for the military sector, for

according to the traditions of the German Army and the Wehrmacht the

signatures were given by the principal experts who had worked on the

matter, by the Chief of Staff, or by whoever had given or at least

drafted the order, and an initial was added on the margin.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you said that you signed such decrees together

with other Ministers of the Reich.

KEITEL: Yes, yesterday I mentioned individual decrees and also gave the

reasons why I signed them, and that in so doing I was not Reich Minister

and did not receive the function of a minister in office.

GEN. RUDENKO: What organization exercised the function of the War

Ministry from February 1938 on?

KEITEL: Until the last days of January, or the first days of February,

it was the former Reich Minister for War, Von Blomberg. Beginning with 4

February there was neither a Minister for War nor a War Ministry.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely why I asked you what government

organization had replaced the War Ministry and exercised its function,

since I knew that this Ministry did not exist.

KEITEL: I, myself, with the Wehrmachtsamt, the former Staff of the War

Ministry, whose chief I was, carried on the work and distributed it, as

I described in detail yesterday, that is, I transferred all command

functions to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht.

But this was not an order of mine but an order of Hitler’s.

GEN. RUDENKO: From the diagram you have submitted to the Tribunal it

would appear that the OKW was the central, coordinating, and supreme

military authority of the Reich and that it was directly under Hitler’s

control. Would this conclusion be correct?

KEITEL: Yes, that was the military staff of Hitler.

GEN. RUDENKO: Who, in the OKW, directly supervised the drafting of

military and strategic plans? I am referring specifically to the plans

for the attack on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland,

France, Norway, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

KEITEL: I believe that yesterday I stated that very precisely, saying

that the operational and strategic planning, after an order had been

given by Hitler, was prepared and then submitted to Hitler by the

commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht; that is to say,

for the Army, by the High Command of the Army and the General Staff of

the Army, and then further decisions were made with respect to it.

GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to Yugoslavia I should like to ask you the

following question: Do you admit that a directive issued under your

signature, for the preliminary partition of Yugoslavia, is _per se_ a

document of great political and international importance, providing for

the actual abolition of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state?

KEITEL: I did nothing more or less than to write down a decree by the

Führer and forward it to those offices which were interested and

concerned. I did not have any personal or political influence whatsoever

in these questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: Under your own signature?

KEITEL: As to the signatures which I have given, I made a complete

explanation yesterday, as to how they came about and what their

significance is.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, we did talk about it, we did hear about it, and I

shall ask some more questions on the subject later on. I should now like

to determine with greater precision your own position in the question of

Yugoslavia. Do you agree that you, with the direct participation of the

OKW, organized acts of provocation in order to find a reason for

aggression against Yugoslavia and a justification for this aggression in

the eyes of the world?

KEITEL: This morning, in response to questions of the counsel of other

defendants, I answered clearly that I did not participate in any

preparation of an incident and that Hitler did not wish either that any

military offices should ever participate in the discussion, preparation,

deliberation, or the execution of incidents. I use “incident” here in

the sense of provocation.

GEN. RUDENKO: Undoubtedly. What part did the OKW take to insure the

arming of the Free Corps in the Sudetenland?

KEITEL: Which Free Corps, General? I do not know to which Free Corps you

refer.

GEN. RUDENKO: The Free Corps of the Sudetenland.

KEITEL: I am not informed as to whether any military office did any

gun-running, if I may say so, or secretly sent arms there. I have no

knowledge concerning that. An order to that effect was not given, or at

any rate did not pass through my hands. I cannot remember that.

GEN. RUDENKO: By whom and for what reason was the order issued to occupy

Ostrau in Moravia and Witkovitz by German troops, on 14 March 1939, in

the afternoon, while President Hacha was still on the way to Berlin for

negotiations with Hitler?

KEITEL: The order was eventually released and decided by the Führer.

There had been preparations to occupy by a _coup de main_ that area

where the well-known big and modern steel works were located near

Mährisch Ostrau—I cannot remember the name now—before the date of the

march into Czechoslovakia as originally set. As a justification for that

decision, Hitler had told me that it was done in order to prevent the

Poles from making a surprise attack from the north, and thereby perhaps

taking possession of the most modern rolling mill in the world. This he

gave as a reason, and the operation, that is, the occupation, actually

took place in the late hours of 14 March.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but during the same time, President Hacha was on the

way to Berlin to negotiate with Hitler?

KEITEL: Yes, that is correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: This is treachery!

KEITEL: I do not believe that I need to add my judgement to the facts.

It is true that the occupation was carried out on that evening. I have

given the reasons, and President Hacha learned about it only after he

arrived in Berlin.

Now I remember the name. The rolling mill was Witkovitz.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask you in connection with

the aggression against the Soviet Union. You testified to the Tribunal

yesterday on the subject. You explained your position, with regard to

the attack on the Soviet Union. But you informed the Tribunal that the

orders for preparing Plan Barbarossa were given at the beginning of

December 1940. Is that right?

KEITEL: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you definitely remember and confirm this?

KEITEL: I do not know of, or do not remember, any specific order by the

High Command of the Wehrmacht which called for the drawing up of this

plan called Barbarossa any earlier than that. I explained yesterday,

however, that some order had been issued, probably in September,

concerning transport and railway facilities and similar matters. I

cannot recall whether I signed that order, but yesterday I mentioned

such a preparatory order to improve transport conditions from the West

to the East.

GEN. RUDENKO: In September?

KEITEL: It may have been in September or October, but I cannot commit

myself as to the exact time.

GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to know the exact time.

KEITEL: More accurate information may probably be obtained at a later

stage from General Jodl, who ought to know it better.

GEN. RUDENKO: Of course we shall ask him about it during the course of

his interrogation. I should like you to recollect the following briefly:

Did you first learn of Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union in

the summer of 1940?

KEITEL: No. In the summer of 1940 this conversation which is mentioned

in Jodl’s diary—I believe that is what you are referring to, you mean

the conversation from Jodl’s diary—I was not present at this obviously

very casual and brief conversation and did not hear it. My recollections

concerning that period also justify my belief that I was not present,

because I was on the move almost every day by airplane and was not

present at the discussions of the situation at that time.

GEN. RUDENKO: And when did your conversation with Ribbentrop take place?

KEITEL: That may have been during the last days of August; I believe, it

was in the beginning of September, but I cannot give the exact date any

more. I reconstruct the date by the fact that I did not return to

Berchtesgaden until 10 August, and that I wrote the memorandum which I

mentioned yesterday at a later date.

GEN. RUDENKO: And so you assure the Tribunal that you first heard about

Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union from the conversation with

Ribbentrop?

KEITEL: No, no. After having been absent from Berchtesgaden for about

two weeks, partly on leave and partly on duty in Berlin, I returned to

headquarters at Berchtesgaden; and then on one of the subsequent days,

probably during the middle of August, I heard for the first time ideas

of that kind from Hitler. That was the basis for my deliberation and my

memorandum.

GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, have I put my question correctly in asking

whether you learned of Hitler’s schemes in the summer of 1940?

KEITEL: Yes. The middle of August, after all, is still summer.

GEN. RUDENKO: August is still summer, we will not quibble about that.

Further, I should like to remind you of the evidence of the witness

Paulus, which he gave here before the Tribunal, on 11 February of this

year. Paulus, as you will remember, informed the Tribunal that when he

entered the OKH on 3 September 1940, he found among other plans an

unfinished preliminary operational draft of a plan for attacking the

Soviet Union, known under the name of Barbarossa. Do you remember that

part of Paulus’ testimony?

KEITEL: I remember it only insofar as he stated that it was a study or a

draft for a maneuver, and that he found a document on the occasion of

his transfer to the OKH, to the General Staff of the Army. This is not

known to me, and it could not be known to me because the documents,

files, and other reports of the General Staff of the Army were never at

my disposal; and I never had an opportunity to look at them.

GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to establish one fact. Do you deny that the OKH, in

September 1940, was elaborating plans in connection with Plan

Barbarossa?

KEITEL: If we go by the testimony of Field Marshal Paulus, then I could

not say that it is not true, since I cannot know whether it actually was

true. I can neither deny nor affirm it.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You informed the Tribunal that you were opposed

to the war with the Soviet Union.

KEITEL: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You also stated that you went to Hitler with the

suggestion that he should change his plans with regard to the Soviet

Union. Is that correct?

KEITEL: Yes, not only to change them, but to drop this plan and not to

wage war against the Soviet Union. That was the content of my

memorandum.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely what I asked you. I would like to ask

you now about a conference, evidently known to you, which was held 3

weeks after Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, the conference of 16

July 1941. Do you remember that conference, which dealt with the tasks

for the conduct of the war against the Soviet Union?

KEITEL: No, at the moment I do not know what you mean. I do not know.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to submit that document to you at this

particular minute. You may remember that I submitted it to the Defendant

Göring, when the question of the dismemberment and of the annexation of

the Soviet Union arose. Do you remember?

KEITEL: That is a document which I know. I believe it is marked on top

“BO-FU,” and during my interrogation here I have identified it as a

memorandum from Reichsleiter Bormann.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct.

KEITEL: I made that statement. At that time I also testified that I was

called in only during the second part of the conference and that I had

not been present during the first part of it. I also testified that it

was not the minutes but a free summary made by Reichsleiter Bormann,

dictated by him.

GEN. RUDENKO; But you do remember that even then, on 16 July, the

question was already being advanced about the annexation by Germany of

the Crimea, the Baltic States, the regions of the Volga, the Ukraine,

Bielorussia and other territories?

KEITEL: No, I believe that was discussed at the first part of the

conference. I can remember the conference, from that stage on where

questions of personnel were discussed, that is, certain personalities

who were to be appointed. That I remembered. I have seen the document

here for the first time and did not know of it before; and did not

attend the first half of the conference.

GEN. RUDENKO: In that case may I put the question differently: What were

the final aims pursued by Hitler and his entourage at that time, against

the Soviet Union?

KEITEL: According to the explanations which Hitler had given me, I saw

the more profound reasons for this war in the fact that he was convinced

that a war would break out some way or other within the next years

between the Greater Slav Empire of Communism and the German Reich of

National Socialism. The reasons which were given to me were something

like this: If I believe or rather if I am convinced that such a conflict

between these two nations will take place, then it would be better now

than later. That is how I can put it. But I do not remember, at least

not at the moment, the questions which are in this document about the

dismemberment of several areas. Perhaps they were constructions of

fantasy.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you tell the Tribunal under oath that you did not know

of the Hitlerite plans to seize and colonize the territories of the

Soviet Union?

KEITEL: That has not been expressed in that form. It is true that I

believed that the Baltic provinces should be made dependents of the

Reich, and that the Ukraine should come into a closer connection from

the point of view of food supply or economy, but concrete plans for

conquest are not known to me and if they were ever touched upon I never

considered them to be serious problems. That is the way I looked at it

at that time. I must not explain how I see it today, but only how I saw

it at that time.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know that at this conference of 16 July Hitler

announced the necessity of razing the city of Leningrad to the ground?

KEITEL: I do not believe that during that conference—I have read that

document here again. That it is contained in the document I cannot

remember now. But I have had this document here in my hands; I have read

it in the presence of the American Prosecutor; and if it is stated

therein, then the question of whether or not I have heard it depends

entirely on the moment at which I was called to that conference.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to hand you the document now, because it

has already been submitted several times. But in the minutes previously

quoted to the Defendant Göring, who read them himself, it is said, “The

Leningrad region is claimed by the Finns. The Führer wants to raze

Leningrad to the ground and then cede it to the Finns.”

KEITEL: I can only say that it is necessary to establish from what

moment on I attended that conference. Whatever was said before that

moment I did not hear, and I can indicate that only if I am given the

document or if one reads the record of my preliminary interrogation.

That is what I told the interrogating officer at that time.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We shall give you the minutes of the conference

of 16 July immediately. While the passages required are being found, I

shall ask you a few more questions, and by that time the passages will

have been found.

With regard to the destruction of Leningrad, did you not know about it

from other documents?

KEITEL: I have been asked about that by the Russian Delegation and the

general who is present here in this courtroom. He has called my

attention to a document.

GEN. RUDENKO: That was during the preliminary investigation, that is

quite right.

KEITEL: I know the document which came from the Navy, from an admiral,

as well as a second document which contained a short directive, I

believe on the order of Jodl, concerning Leningrad. I have been

interrogated regarding both documents. As to that I can state only that

neither through artillery operations during the siege, nor by operations

of the Air Force, could the extent of destruction be compared with that

of other places we know about. It did not materialize, we did not carry

it out. It never came to a systematic shelling of Leningrad, as far as I

know. Consequently, only that can be stated which I said at that time

under oath to the gentlemen of the Soviet Delegation.

GEN. RUDENKO: According to your knowledge was Leningrad never shelled?

KEITEL: Certainly artillery was also used in the Leningrad area, but it

never went so far as to constitute shelling for the purposes of

destruction. That would have occurred, General, if it had come to an

attack on Leningrad.

GEN. RUDENKO: Look at this document, and I shall then ask you a few

supplementary questions. [_The document was submitted to the

defendant._]

KEITEL: It is very simple. My entry is exactly after the moment after

this remark had been made. I told the American interrogator at the time

that I just heard the discussion about the appointment of Gauleiter

Lohse when I entered the room. The preceding remarks I did not hear.

GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with those minutes of the

report on the conference of 16 July that deal with Leningrad?

KEITEL: Yes, that is where I entered.

GEN. RUDENKO: You saw that there was such an entry in the minutes of the

meeting. You arrived at the conference just as they had finished talking

about Leningrad?

KEITEL: Yes. I entered the room when they were talking about the

qualifications of Gauleiter Lohse, whether or not he was suitable for an

administrative office. These were the first words which I heard. A

debate was going on about that subject just when I entered.

GEN. RUDENKO: It states there quite clearly: “Raze the city of Leningrad

to the ground.”

KEITEL: Yes, I have read that here.

GEN. RUDENKO: The same is stated in the decree, is it not?

KEITEL: Yes; but there is no direct connection with me. Do you mean the

order of the Navy, the order which was found with the Navy?

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that there were two decrees, one issued by the

naval command and the other by the OKW, signed by Jodl? You do know

that, do you not?

KEITEL: Yes, I have seen both these decrees here. They were submitted by

the Russian Delegation.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you know that the decree signed by the Defendant Jodl

also refers to the destruction of the city of Moscow.

KEITEL: That I do not remember exactly, any more since only Leningrad

was referred to at that time, when I glanced at it. But if it is stated

there, I will not doubt it at all.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you: Did the OKW issue decrees for the purpose

of having them obeyed?

KEITEL: The order or communication of the Navy is first of all no OKW

order and how it originated is not known to me. The short order of the

OKW, signed “By order of Jodl,” was not drafted in my presence, as I

already stated yesterday. I would have signed it but I was absent and

therefore do not know either to which reasons or discussions this order

was due.

GEN. RUDENKO: You have not replied to my question. I am asking you: The

directives issued by the OKW were given out to be obeyed? Can you reply

to me briefly?

KEITEL: This is a directive but not an order, because an order can be

given only by the office of the local command of the army. It was

therefore a directive, an aim, an intention.

GEN. RUDENKO: And are directives from the OKW not meant to be carried

out?

KEITEL: Certainly they are meant to be carried out.

GEN. RUDENKO: As to your statement that no one shelled Leningrad, it

does not even call for further denial, since it is a well-known fact.

KEITEL: May I at least say that I did not issue that order. That is why

I do not know anything about it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that before the beginning of the war against

the Soviet Union the Defendant Göring issued a so-called Green Folder

containing directives on the economic matters in the territories of the

U.S.S.R. intended for occupation?

KEITEL: Yes, that is known to me.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you affirm that in your directive of 16 June 1941 you

instructed all the German troops to obey these directives implicitly?

KEITEL: Yes, there is a directive which makes known to all units of the

Army the organizations which are assigned for important tasks and what

their responsibilities are, and that all the military commands of the

Army must act in compliance therewith. That I passed on; it was not my

order, I passed it on.

GEN. RUDENKO: Was it your own order or were you merely obeying the

Führer’s instructions?

KEITEL: I merely passed on the orders received from the Führer, and I

could not give any orders at all to Reich Marshal Göring in that

respect.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not issue an order to Field Marshal Göring, but

addressed your order to the troops?

KEITEL: I could not give him any orders either; I could only communicate

the will of the Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he had

to pass it on to his army groups.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not disagree with this will of the Führer’s?

KEITEL: I did not raise any objection, since this did not concern a duty

of the OKW. I followed the order and passed it on.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that this order gave you instructions for the

immediate and complete economic exploitation of the occupied regions of

the Soviet Union in the interest of German war economy?

KEITEL: I did not give such an order containing the aims and tasks which

were to be carried out by the organization Economic Staff Oldenburg,

since I had nothing to do with that. I only passed on the contents of

the Green Folder—it is known what this name stands for—to the High

Command of the Army for appropriate action.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that the directives contained in Göring’s

Green Folder were aimed at the plunder of the material wealth of the

Soviet Union and all her citizens?

KEITEL: No. In my opinion nothing was said about destruction in the

Green Folder. Instead of destruction one ought to say, to make good use

of surplus, especially in the field of the food supply and the

utilization of raw materials for the entire war economy of Germany, but

not the destruction of them.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please repeat what you have said.

KEITEL: I said that in the Green Folder there were principles for the

utilization of present and future reserves which were considered

surplus, but never for their destruction. To let the Soviet population

starve at the same time, on account of this, that was not the case. I

have seen these things on the spot and therefore I am qualified to speak

about them.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not consider that plunder?

KEITEL: The quibble about words, whether booty, or exploitation of

reserves found during the war, or looting, or the like, is a matter of

concepts which I believe need not be defined here. Everyone uses his own

expressions in this respect.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, do not let us argue about it. I have one last

question to ask you with regard to the attack on the Soviet Union: Do

you agree that the methods of warfare adopted by the German Army in the

East stood in striking contrast with the simplest concept of military

honor of an army and the exigencies of war?

KEITEL: No, I cannot admit that in this form. I would rather say, the

fact that the brutalizing—I have used this term before—that the

brutalizing of the war against the Soviet Union and what occurred in the

East, is not to be attributed to instigation by the German Army but to

circumstances which I have stated in an affidavit submitted by my

counsel to the Tribunal. I would furthermore like to ask the Russian

Prosecutor to read it so that he can see my opinion about it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. To conclude the question of aggression and to

pass to the question of atrocities, I have to ask you the following

question, and I trust you will impart to the Tribunal the information

you possess in your capacity as Hitler’s closest adviser on the conduct

of the war.

My question is the following: What tasks did the High Command of the

Armed Forces entrust to the German Army in case Germany fought to the

finish a victorious war against the Soviet Union?

KEITEL: I do not know what you mean by that. Which demands were put to

the military leadership in case the war would be a success? May I ask

you to put this question differently. I did not understand it.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have in mind tasks for the further conduct of the war

after a successful conclusion of the Eastern campaign.

KEITEL: There could have occurred what actually did occur later, that

is, the landing of the British and American forces in France, in

Denmark, or in Germany, _et cetera_. There were various possibilities of

warfare which might occur and which could not be anticipated at all.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am not asking this question in general. You are

evidently acquainted with a document entitled, _Manual of Naval

Warfare_, which had already been drafted on 8 August 1941 and contained

plans for the subsequent conduct of the war after the conclusion of the

Eastern campaign. I refer here to the drafting of plans for an attack on

Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Do you know this document?

KEITEL: It has not been submitted to me so far. It is a surprise at the

moment, and I cannot recall it.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know this document.

This document, Your Honors, is Number S-57; it was submitted to the

Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-336. I shall show it to you in a minute.

Please hand this document to the defendant. [_The document was submitted

to the defendant._]

KEITEL: I see this document for the first time, at any rate here during

the proceedings. It begins with the sentence, “A draft of directives

concerning further plans after the end of the Eastern campaign was

submitted to the Naval Operations Staff.” This order or directive of the

Navy I have never seen nor could I have seen it. It is a draft of

directives which could come only from the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

In the Armed Forces Operations Staff there were officers from the Army,

the Navy, and the Air Force, and it is quite possible that ideas which

took the shape of drafts of directives were made known at the time to

the officers of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. I cannot remember any

such draft of directives of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, but perhaps

Generaloberst Jodl may possibly be in a position to give information

about that. I cannot remember it.