closely but you see that the document plans the seizure of Gibraltar
with the active participation of Spain. In addition it provides for an
attack on Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and so forth. And you say that you
know nothing of this document?
KEITEL: I shall be glad to give information about that. An attack to
seize Gibraltar, the entrance to the Mediterranean straits, had already
been planned for the preceding winter but had not been carried out, that
is, during the winter of 1939-40. It was nothing new and the other
topics which have been mentioned were those which developed ideas based
on the situation existing north of the Caucasus as a result of the
operations. I do not at all mean to say that these ideas were not given
any thought, but I do not remember it and I did not read every document
or paper of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff when it was in the drafting
stage.
GEN. RUDENKO: If you consider as mere scraps of paper documents
concerning the seizure of foreign countries, then what documents do you
consider as important?
KEITEL: I can state only the following, which is true and sincere. In
wartime one makes many plans and considers various possibilities which
are not and cannot be carried out in the face of the hard facts of
reality; and therefore it is not permissible to regard such papers
afterwards from an historical point of view, as representing throughout
the will and intention of the operational and strategic war leadership.
GEN. RUDENKO: I agree with you that from an historical point of view
this document is at present of no importance whatsoever. But taken in
conjunction with the plan of the German General Staff at a time when
this Staff thought it was going to defeat the Soviet Union, the document
does acquire a very different meaning. However, I shall not examine you
any further about this document, for the time being.
I now pass on to the subject of atrocities and of your attitude towards
these crimes. Your counsel, Dr. Nelte, has already handed you the
principal documents of the Prosecution on the subject of atrocities. I
do not therefore intend either to submit them again or to enter into any
detailed argument on the subject. I shall merely examine you on the
basic principles of these documents which were submitted by your counsel
when he interrogated you.
I shall first of all refer to a document entitled, “Directive on the
Introduction of Military Jurisdiction in Region Barbarossa and on the
Adoption of Special Military Measures.” Do you remember that document?
It was drawn up on 13 May 1941 more than a month before the outbreak of
war against the Soviet Union. Do you remember that in that document,
drawn up before the war, instructions were given that suspect elements
should immediately be brought before an officer and that he would decide
whether they were to be shot? Do you remember that directive? Did you
sign the document?
KEITEL: Yes, I have never denied that. But I have given the necessary
explanations as to how the document came into being and who was its
originator.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?
GEN. RUDENKO: Document C-50, dated 13 May 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
GEN. RUDENKO: [_To the defendant_]: Although you declare that you have
already elucidated the matter to your counsel, I am nevertheless obliged
to put this question to you in a slightly different form: Did you
consider that an officer had a right to shoot people without trial or
investigation?
KEITEL: In the German Army there have always been courts-martial for our
own soldiers as well as for our enemies, which could always be set up,
consisting of one officer and one or two soldiers all three of whom
would act as judges. That is what we call a court-martial
(Standgericht); the only requisite is always that an officer must
preside at this court. But as a matter of principle I have to repeat the
statement which I have made yesterday...
GEN. RUDENKO: One moment! Please reply to this question. Did not this
document do away with judicial proceedings in the case of so-called
suspects, at the same time leaving to an officer of the German Army the
right to shoot them? Is that correct?
KEITEL: In the case of German soldiers it was correct and was permitted.
There is a military tribunal with judicial officers and there is a
court-martial which consists of soldiers. These have the right to pass
and to execute an appropriate sentence against any soldier of the German
Army in court-martial proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. The question is, what
right does this document give, not what the orders in the German Army
are.
GEN. RUDENKO: Can you reply to the following question? Did this document
do away with judicial proceedings and did it give the German officer the
right to shoot suspects, as stated herein?
KEITEL: That was an order which was given to me by Hitler. He had given
me that order and I put my name under it. What that means, I explained
in detail yesterday.
GEN. RUDENKO: You, a Field Marshal, signed that decree. You considered
that the decree was irregular; you understood what the consequences of
that decree were likely to be. Then why did you sign it?
KEITEL: I cannot say any more than that I put my name to it and I
thereby, personally, assumed in my position a degree of responsibility.
GEN. RUDENKO: And one more question. This decree was dated 13 May 1941,
almost a month before the outbreak of war. So you had planned the murder
of human beings beforehand?
KEITEL: That I do not understand. It is correct that this order was
issued about 4 weeks before the beginning of the campaign Barbarossa,
and another 4 weeks earlier it had been communicated to the generals in
a statement by Hitler. They knew that weeks before.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know how this decree was actually applied?
KEITEL: I have also told my opinion to the interrogating General of the
Soviet Army in the preliminary interrogations; whether generals
discussed this order with me has not been mentioned, but I wish to point
out that it says specifically here that the higher commanders have the
right to suspend this order concerning court jurisdiction as soon as
their area is pacified. I have given the same answer to every general
who has asked me about the reasons for this order and its effect. I said
that it provides that they were allowed to suspend this order as soon as
they considered their area to be pacified. That is an individual
subjective question for the discretion of the commanders and it is
provided therein.
GEN. RUDENKO: And now for the final question in connection with this
order or directive. This order actually assured German soldiers and
officers impunity for arbitrary actions and actions of lawlessness?
KEITEL: Within certain limits, within certain limits! The limit was
strictly defined in the oral order to the generals, namely, application
of severest disciplinary measures among their own troops.
GEN. RUDENKO: I think, Defendant Keitel, that you have seen these
“certain limits” in the documents submitted to the Tribunal and in the
documentary films.
I shall now ask you the following question: On 12 May 1941 the question
of the treatment of captured Russian political commissars and military
prisoners was under consideration. Do you remember that document?
KEITEL: At the moment I cannot recall which one you mean. It is not
clear to me what you are referring to at the moment.
GEN. RUDENKO: I refer to the document dated 12 May 1941, which
established that the political leaders of the Red Army should not be
recognized as prisoners of war but should be destroyed.
KEITEL: I have seen only notes on it. I do not recall the document at
present but I know the facts. I cannot recall the document at the
moment. May I see it please?
GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. [_The document was handed to the
defendant._]
THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?
GEN. RUDENKO: Number 884-PS. It is a document dated 12 May 1941 and
entitled: “Treatment of Political and Military Russian Functionaries.”
KEITEL: It is not an order but a memorandum on a report by the
Department of National Defense, with the remark that decisions by the
Führer are still required. The memorandum probably refers to a suggested
order, I remember this now; I saw it at the time and the result of the
report is not mentioned but merely a suggestion which was put down for
the ruling. As far as I know, the ruling was taken on those lines then
communicated to the High Command of the Army as having been approved by
the Führer or having been attended to, or discussed, or agreed upon,
directly between the Führer and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
GEN. RUDENKO: What do you mean when you speak of “regulation”? We have
learned so many expressions from German Army terminology, such as
“regulation,” “special treatment,” “execution,” but they all, translated
into vulgar parlance, mean one thing, and one thing only—murder. What
are you thinking of when you say “regulation”?
KEITEL: I did not say “regulation.” I do not know which word was
understood to mean regulation. I said that, in the sense of that
memorandum, according to my recollection, directives had been issued by
Hitler to the Army at that time, that is, an approval to the suggestion
which has been made in the memorandum.
GEN. RUDENKO: In that case you do not deny that as far back as May, more
than a month before the outbreak of war, the document had already been
drafted which provided for the annihilation of Russian political
commissars and military personnel? You do not deny this?
KEITEL: No, that I do not deny. That was the result of the directives
which had been communicated and which had been worked out here in
writing by the generals.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST DAY
Saturday, 6 April 1946
_Morning Session_
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I am asking you about the directive
concerning the so-called communist insurrectionary movement in the
occupied territories. Yesterday your counsel showed you this directive.
It is an order of 16 September 1941, Number R-98. I shall remind you of
one passage from this order. It states:
“In order to nip in the bud any conspiracy, the strongest
measures should be taken at the first sign of trouble in order
to maintain the authority of the occupying power and to prevent
the conspiracy from spreading...”;
and furthermore:
“...one must bear in mind that in the countries affected human
life has absolutely no value and that a deterrent effect can be
achieved only through the application of extraordinarily harsh
measures.”
You remember this basic idea of the order, that human life absolutely
does not amount to anything. Do you remember this statement, the basic
statement of the order, that “human life has absolutely no value”? Do
you remember this sentence?
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You signed the order containing this statement?
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider that necessity demanded this extremely
evil order?
KEITEL: I explained some of the reasons for this order yesterday and I
pointed out that these instructions were addressed in the first place to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht offices in the Southeast; that
is, the Balkan regions, where extensive partisan warfare and a war
between the leaders had assumed enormous proportions, and secondly,
because the same phenomena had been observed and established on the same
or similar scale in certain defined areas of the occupied Soviet
territory.
GEN. RUDENKO: Does this mean that you consider this order to have been
entirely correct?
KEITEL: I have already explained in detail, in replying to questions, my
fundamental standpoint with regard to all orders concerning the
treatment of the population. I signed the order and by doing so I
assumed responsibility within the scope of my official jurisdiction.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that you are not answering the
question. The question was perfectly capable of an answer “yes” or “no”
and an explanation afterwards. It is not an answer to the question to
say that you have already explained to your counsel.
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more, do you consider this order, this
particular order—and I emphasize, in which it is stated that “human
life has absolutely no value”—do you consider this order correct?
KEITEL: It does not contain these words; but I knew from years of
experience that in the Southeastern territories and in certain parts of
the Soviet territory, human life was not respected to the same degree.
GEN. RUDENKO: You say that these words do not exist in the order?
KEITEL: To my knowledge those exact words do not appear; but it says
that human life has very little value in these territories. I remember
something like that.
GEN. RUDENKO: According to your recollection now, you remember that you
were interrogated by General Alexandrov on 9 November 1945. To a
question in regard to the meaning of this sentence you replied: “I must
admit that this sentence is authentic, although the Führer himself
inserted this sentence in the order.”
Do you remember your explanation?
KEITEL: That is correct. That is true.
GEN. RUDENKO: I can produce this order for you. I did not produce it
because you were familiarizing yourself with it yesterday.
KEITEL: I did not read through all the points yesterday. I merely
admitted its actual existence.
THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal if you got a translation of
the document. When you are cross-examining upon a document and as to the
actual words of it, it is very inconvenient for us not to have the
document before us.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I shall at once present this order to the
defendant.
[_Handing the document to the defendant._]
THE PRESIDENT: Is it Document 389-PS?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, this is Document 389-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: When you are citing a document it would be a good thing
if you would cite the number rather slowly because very often the
translation does not come through accurately to us.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, I shall observe this in the future, Mr.
President. I numbered this document R-98, but it has a double number,
R-98 and 389-PS. I cited Subparagraph 3 b) of this order.
Defendant Keitel, have you familiarized yourself with the document?
KEITEL: Yes. The text in the German language says that “in the countries
affected human life frequently has no value...”
GEN. RUDENKO: And further?
KEITEL: Yes, “...and a deterrent effect can be obtained only by extreme
harshness. To atone for the life of a German soldier...”
GEN. RUDENKO: Quite clear. And in this same order, in this same
Subparagraph “b,” it is stated that:
“To atone for the life of one German soldier, 50 to 100
Communists must, as a rule, be sentenced to death. The method of
execution should strengthen the measure of determent.”
Is that correct?
KEITEL: The German text is slightly different. It says: “In such cases
in general, the death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists may be considered
adequate.”
That is the German wording.
GEN. RUDENKO: For one German soldier?
KEITEL: Yes. I know that and I see it here.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is what I was asking you about. So now I ask you once
more...
KEITEL: Do you want an explanation of that or am I not to say any more?
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall now interrogate you on this matter. I ask you
whether, when signing this order you thereby expressed your personal
opinion on these cruel measures? In other words, were you in agreement
with Hitler?
KEITEL: I signed the order but the figures contained in it are
alterations made personally by Hitler himself.
GEN. RUDENKO: And what figures did you present to Hitler?
KEITEL: The figures in the original were 5 to 10.
GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, the divergence between you and Hitler
consisted merely in the figures and not in the spirit of the document?
KEITEL: The idea was that the only way of deterring them was to demand
several sacrifices for the life of one soldier, as is stated here.
GEN. RUDENKO: You...
THE PRESIDENT: That was not an answer to the question. The question was
whether the only difference between you and Hitler on this document was
a question of figures. That admits of the answer, “yes” or “no.” Was the
only difference between you and Hitler a question of figures?
KEITEL: Then I must say that with reference to the underlying principle
there was a difference of opinion, the final results of which I no
longer feel myself in a position to justify, since I added my signature
on behalf of my department. There was a fundamental difference of
opinion on the entire question.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. Let us continue.
I would like to remind you of one more order. It is the order dated 16
December 1942, referring to the so-called “Fight against the Partisans.”
This document was submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-16; I
shall not examine you in detail with regard to this order. It was
presented to you yesterday by your defense counsel.
KEITEL: I do not remember that at the moment.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember?
KEITEL: Not the one that was presented yesterday.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. If you do not remember I can hand you this
document in order to refresh your memory.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the PS number of this document?
GEN. RUDENKO: This is the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution
as Exhibit Number USSR-16 (Document Number USSR-16).
THE PRESIDENT: I just took down that it was USA-516, but I suppose I was
wrong in hearing. It is USSR-16, is it?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, USSR-16.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
GEN. RUDENKO: [_Handing the document to the defendant._] I shall
interrogate you, Defendant Keitel, only on one question in connection
with this order. In Subparagraph 1 of this order, Paragraph 3, it is
stated, and I would draw your attention to the following sentence:
“The troops are therefore authorized and ordered in this
struggle to take any measures without restriction even against
women and children, if that is necessary to achieve success.”
Have you found this passage?
KEITEL: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Have you found the order calling for the application of
any kind of measures you like without restriction, also against women
and children?
KEITEL: “To employ without restriction any means, even against women and
children, if it is necessary.” I have found that.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is exactly what I am asking you about. I ask you,
Defendant Keitel, Field Marshal of the former German Army, do you
consider that this order is a just one, that measures may be employed at
will against women and children?
KEITEL: Measures, insofar as it means that women and children were also
to be removed from territories where there was partisan warfare, never
atrocities or the murder of women or children. Never!
GEN. RUDENKO: To remove—a German term—means to kill?
KEITEL: No. I do not think it would ever have been necessary to tell
German soldiers that they could not and must not kill women and
children.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not answer my question.
Do you consider this order a just one in regard to measures against
women and children or do you consider it unjust? Answer “yes” or “no.”
Is it just or unjust? Explain the matter later.
KEITEL: I considered these measures to be right and as such I admit
them; but not measures to kill. That was a crime.
GEN. RUDENKO: “Any kind of measures” includes murder.
KEITEL: Yes, but not of women and children.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but it says here “Any kind of measures against women
and children.”
KEITEL: No, it does not say “any measures.” It says “...and not to
shrink from taking measures against women and children.” That is what it
says.
No German soldier or German officer ever thought of killing women and
children.
GEN. RUDENKO: And in reality...?
KEITEL: I cannot say in every individual case, since I do not know and I
could not be everywhere and since I received no reports about it.
GEN. RUDENKO: But there were millions of such cases?
KEITEL: I have no knowledge of that and I do not believe that it
happened in millions of cases.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not believe it?
KEITEL: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall proceed to another question. I shall now refer to
one question, the question of the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
I do not intend to examine you in regard to the branding of Soviet
prisoners of war and other facts; they are sufficiently well known to
the Tribunal. I want to examine you in regard to one document, the
report of Admiral Canaris, which was presented to you yesterday. You
remember yesterday your counsel submitted to you the Canaris report; it
is dated 15 September 1941 and registered under Document Number EC-338.
As you will remember, even a German officer drew attention to the
exceptional arbitrariness and lawlessness admitted in connection with
the Soviet prisoners of war. Canaris in this report pointed to the mass
murders of Soviet prisoners of war and spoke of the necessity of
definitely eliminating this arbitrariness. Did you agree with the
statements advanced by Canaris in his report, with reference to
yourself?
KEITEL: I did not understand the last statement. With reference to
myself?
GEN. RUDENKO: The last question amounts to this: Were you, Keitel,
personally in agreement with the proposals made by Canaris in his
report, that the arbitrary treatment permitted should be done away with
where Soviet prisoners of war were concerned?
KEITEL: I answered my counsel yesterday...
GEN. RUDENKO: You can answer my question briefly; were you in agreement
with it?
KEITEL: Yes, I will be brief—on receiving that letter, I immediately
submitted it to the Führer, Adolf Hitler, especially on account of the
enclosed publication by the Peoples’ Commissars, which was dated the
beginning of July, and I asked for a new decision. On the whole I shared
the objections raised by Canaris, but I must supplement that...
GEN. RUDENKO: You shared them? Very well. I shall now present you with
the original copy of Canaris’ report, containing your decision.
Mr. President, I shall now present to the defendant the document
containing his decision. This decision was not read into the record in
court and I shall also present the text of his final decision to the
Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the original?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I gave it to the defendant.
And now, Witness Keitel, will you please follow?
KEITEL: I know the document with the marginal notes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Listen to me and follow the text of the decision. This is
Canaris’ document, which you consider a just one. The following are the
contents of your decision:
“These objections arise from the military conception of
chivalrous warfare. We are dealing here with the destruction of
an ideology and, therefore, I approve such measures and I
sanction them.” Signed: “Keitel.”
Is this your resolution?
KEITEL: Yes, I wrote that after it had been submitted to the Führer for
decision. I wrote it then.
GEN. RUDENKO: It is not written there that the Führer said so; it is
said “I sanction them”—meaning Keitel.
KEITEL: And I state this on oath; and I said it even before I read it.
GEN. RUDENKO: This means that you acknowledge the decision. I will now
draw your attention to another passage of this document. I draw your
attention to Page 2. Please observe that the text of Canaris’ report
mentions the following:
“The separation of civilians and prisoners of war who are
politically undesirable, and decisions to be made in regard to
their fate, is to be effected by task forces (Einsatzkommando)
belonging to the Security Police and the SD in accordance with
directives not known to the Wehrmacht establishments and whose
execution cannot be checked by the latter.”
Canaris writes this; your decision, Defendant Keitel, is written in the
margin. It says, “Highly expedient.” Is that correct?
KEITEL: Please repeat the last question. The last words I heard were
“Canaris writes.”
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, and I am now mentioning the fact that your decision
“Highly expedient” appears in the margin, opposite that paragraph, and
written by your own hand. Have you found this?
KEITEL: Yes. The word “expedient” refers to the fact that the army
offices had nothing to do with these Einsatzkommandos and knew nothing
about them. It states that they are not known to the Wehrmacht.
GEN. RUDENKO: And furthermore it refers to the fact that the Security
Police and the SD should wreak vengeance on civilians and prisoners of
war? You consider that expedient?
KEITEL: No, I thought it expedient that the activities of these
Kommandos be unknown to the Armed Forces. That is what I meant. That
appears here and I underlined “unknown.”
GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you, Defendant Keitel, known as Field Marshal
and one who, before this Tribunal, has repeatedly referred to yourself
as a soldier, whether you, in your own blood-thirsty decision of
September 1941, confirmed and sanctioned the murder of the unarmed
soldiers whom you had captured? Is that right?
KEITEL: I signed both decrees and I, therefore, bear the responsibility
within the sphere of my office; I assume the responsibility.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is quite clear. In this connection I would like to
ask you, since you have repeatedly mentioned it before the Tribunal,
about the duty of a soldier. I want to ask you: Is it in accordance with
the concept of a “soldier’s duty” and the “honor of an officer” to
promulgate such orders for reprisals on prisoners of war and on peaceful
citizens?
KEITEL: Yes, as far as the reprisals of August and September are
concerned, in view of what happened to German prisoners of war whom we
found in the field of battle, and in Lvov where we found them murdered
by the hundreds.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, do you again wish to follow the path to
which you resorted once before, and revive the question of the alleged
butchery of German prisoners of war? You and I agreed yesterday that as
far back as May 1941, prior to the beginning of the war, you had signed
a directive on the shooting of political and military workers in the Red
Army. I have some...
KEITEL: Yes, I also signed the orders before the war but they did not
contain the word “murder.”
GEN. RUDENKO: I am not going to argue with you since this means arguing
against documents; and documents speak for themselves.
I have a few last questions to ask you: You informed the Tribunal that
the generals of the German Army were only blindly carrying out Hitler’s
orders?
KEITEL: I have stated that I do not know if any generals raised
objections or who they were, and I said that it did not happen in my
presence when Hitler proclaimed the principles of the ideological war
and ordered them to be put into practice.
GEN. RUDENKO: And do you know that the generals, on their own
initiative, promulgated orders on atrocities and on the violation of the
laws and customs of war, and that these orders were approved by Hitler?
KEITEL: I know that high authorities in the Army issued orders altering,
modifying, and even cancelling in part; for instance, as regards
jurisdiction, the March decree and other measures, because they also
discussed it with me.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not understand me. I did not ask about
modifications, but whether the generals, on their own initiative, ever
promulgated orders inciting to the violation of the laws and customs of
war.
KEITEL: I do not know of that. I do not know what order you are
referring to, General. At the moment I cannot say that I know that.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall refer to one order only. What I have in mind is
General Field Marshal Reichenau’s order governing the conduct of troops
in the East.
This document, Mr. President, was presented by the Soviet Prosecution as
Exhibit Number USSR-12 (Document Number USSR-12). The passages to which
I refer are underlined in this document, and I shall read into the
record one quotation from this order governing the conduct of troops in
the East:
“Feeding the inhabitants and prisoners of war...is...a mistaken
humanity...”
KEITEL: I know the order. It was shown to me during a preliminary
interrogation.
GEN. RUDENKO: This order, issued on Reichenau’s initiative and approved
by Hitler, was distributed as a model order among all the army
commanders.
KEITEL: I did not know that; I heard about it here for the first time.
To my knowledge I never saw the order either.
GEN. RUDENKO: Of course you would, quite obviously, consider such orders
as entirely insignificant. After all, could the fate of Soviet prisoners
of war and of the civilian population be of any possible interest to the
Chief of the OKW, since their lives were of no value whatsoever?
KEITEL: I had no contact with the commanders at the front and had no
official connection with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was
the only one who had.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing your cross-examination. When testifying
before the Tribunal you very often referred, as did your accomplices,
the Defendants Göring and Ribbentrop, to the Treaty of Versailles, and I
am asking you, were Vienna, Prague, Belgrade and the Crimea part of
Germany before the Treaty of Versailles?
KEITEL: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: You stated here that in 1944, after the law had been
amended, you received an offer to join the Nazi Party. You accepted this
offer, presented your personal credentials to the leadership of the
Party, and paid your membership fees. Tell us, did not your acceptance
to join the membership of the Nazi Party signify that you were in
agreement with the program, objectives, and methods of the Party?
KEITEL: As I had already been in possession of the Golden Party Badge
for three or four years, I thought that this request for my personal
particulars was only a formal registration; and I paid the required
Party membership subscription. I did both these things and have admitted
doing them.
GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, before this formal offer was ever made,
you already, _de facto_, considered yourself a member of the Nazi Party?
KEITEL: I have always thought of myself as a soldier; not as a political
soldier or politician.
GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not conclude, after all that has been said here,
that you were a Hitler-General, not because duty called you but on
account of your own convictions?
KEITEL: I have stated here that I was a loyal and obedient soldier of my
Führer. And I do not think that there are generals in Russia who do not
give Marshal Stalin implicit obedience.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have exhausted all my questions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember on the 2d of October
1945 writing a letter to Colonel Amen, explaining your position? It was
after your interrogations, and in your own time you wrote a letter
explaining your point of view. Do you remember that?
KEITEL: Yes, I think I did write a letter; but I no longer remember the
contents. It referred to the interrogations, however.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
KEITEL: And I think it contained a request that I be given a further
opportunity of thinking things over, as the questions put to me took me
by surprise and I was often unable to remember the answers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to remind you of one passage and ask you
whether it correctly expresses your view:
“In carrying out these thankless and difficult tasks, I had to
fulfill my duty under the hardest exigencies of war, often
acting against the inner voice of my conscience and against my
own convictions. The fulfillment of urgent tasks assigned by
Hitler, to whom I was directly responsible, demanded complete
self-abnegation.”
Do you remember that?
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want you to tell the Tribunal,
what were the worst matters in your view in which you often acted
against the inner voice of your conscience? Just tell us some of the
worst matters in which you acted against the inner voice of your
conscience.
KEITEL: I found myself in such a situation quite frequently, but the
decisive questions which conflicted most violently with my conscience
and my convictions were those which were contrary to the training which
I had undergone during my 37 years as an officer in the German Army.
That was a blow at my most intimate personal principles.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted it to come from you, Defendant. Can you
tell the Tribunal the three worst things you had to do which were
against the inner voice of your conscience? What do you pick out as the
three worst things you had to do?
KEITEL: Perhaps, to start with the last, the orders given for the
conduct of the war in the East, insofar as they were contrary to the
acknowledged usage of war; then something which particularly concerns
the British Delegation, the question of the 50 R.A.F. officers, the
question which weighed particularly heavy on my mind, that of the
terror-fliers and, worst of all, the Nacht und Nebel Decree and the
actual consequences it entailed at a later stage and about which I did
not know. Those were the worst struggles which I had with myself.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take the Nacht und Nebel.
My Lord, this document and a good many to which I shall refer are in the
British Document Book Number 7, Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, and it
occurs on Page 279. It is L-90, Exhibit USA-503.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, I will give you the German
document book. It is 279 of the British document book, and 289...
KEITEL: Number 731?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 289. I do not know which volume it
is; Part 2, I think it is.
You see, the purpose of the decree is set out a few lines from the
start, where they say that in all cases where the death penalty is not
pronounced and not carried out within a week,
“...the accused are in the future to be deported to Germany
secretly, and further proceedings in connection with the
offenses will take place here. The deterrent effect of these
measures lies in: (a) the complete disappearance of the accused;
(b) the fact that no information may be given as to their
whereabouts or their fate.”
Both these purposes, you will agree, were extremely cruel and brutal,
were they not?
KEITEL: I said both at the time and yesterday, that I personally thought
that to deport individuals secretly was very much more cruel than to
impose a sentence of death. I have...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn to Page 281—291 of yours—281 of
the English Book?
KEITEL: Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that this is your covering letter:
“The Führer is of the opinion:”—Line 4—“In the case of
offenses such as these, punishment by imprisonment, or even
penal servitude for life, will be considered a sign of weakness.
Effective and lasting intimidation can only be achieved either
by capital punishment or by measures which keep the culprit’s
relatives and the population generally uncertain as to his
fate.”
You will agree that there again these sentences of the Führer which you
are here transmitting were cruel and brutal, were they not?
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I...
KEITEL: May I add something?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, as shortly as you can.
KEITEL: I made a statement yesterday on this subject and I drew your
attention particularly to the words: “It is the Führer’s long considered
will,” which were intended to convey to the generals who were receiving
these orders what was written between the lines.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, you know, Defendant, that that was by no
means the end of this series of orders, was it? This order was
unsuccessful despite its cruelty and brutality in achieving its purpose,
was it not? This order, the Nacht und Nebel Order, in that form was
unsuccessful in achieving its purpose; it did not stop what it was
designed to stop? Is that right?
KEITEL: No, it did not cease.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that in 1944 you had to make a still more
severe order. Would you look at Document D-762? My Lord, that will
become Exhibit GB-298.
[_Turning to the defendant._] It says:
“The constant increase in acts of terror and sabotage in the
occupied territories, committed more and more by bands under
unified leadership, compels us to take the sternest
countermeasures in a degree corresponding to the ferocity of the
war which is forced upon us. Those who attack us from the rear
at the crisis of our fight for existence deserve no
consideration.
“I therefore order:
“All acts of violence committed by non-German civilians in the
occupied territories against the German Wehrmacht, the SS, or
the Police, or against installations used by them, are to be
combated in the following manner as acts of terrorism and
sabotage:”—(1)—“The troops,”—the SS and so on—“are to fight
down on the spot...all terrorists and saboteurs.”—(2)—“Those
who are apprehended later are to be handed over to the nearest
local Security Police and the SD office.”—(3)—“Accomplices,
especially women, who take no active part in the fighting, are
to be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.”
Now, would you look at Paragraph II:
“The Chief of the OKW will issue the necessary executive
instructions. He is entitled to make alterations and additions
as far as required by the exigencies of war operations.”
Did you think that was a cruel and severe order or not?
KEITEL: Yes, I do think so, but may I make one small correction? It must
have been incorrectly translated. The actual wording is: “Women are to
be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.” So it says in the
original version which I have before me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “spared.” “Spared” meant that they were
not to be treated thus. I was careful to mention that.
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had authority to make alterations and
additions. Did you, by your alterations and additions, attempt to
mitigate the severity of that order in any way?
KEITEL: I have no recollection of having issued any additional orders to
mitigate its severity. I may also say that I never would have issued
anything without first presenting it to the Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see what you did issue. Would you
look at Document D-764, which will be Exhibit GB-299?
Now, that is your executive order, countersigned I think by the Senior
Military Judge, putting forward your order based on that decree; and
would you look at Paragraphs 4 and 5:
“All legal proceedings now going on in connection with acts of
terrorism, sabotage, or other crimes committed by non-German
civilians in the occupied territories which imperil the security
or readiness for action of the occupying power are to be
suspended. Indictments are to be dropped. Sentences already
pronounced are not to be carried out. The culprits are to be
handed over with a report on the proceedings to the nearest
local Security Police and SD office. In the case of death
sentences which have already become final, the regulations now
in force will continue to apply.
“Crimes affecting German interests but which do not imperil the
security or readiness for action of the occupying power do not
justify the retention of jurisdiction over non-German civilians
in the occupied territories. I authorize the commanders of the
occupied territories to draw up new regulations in agreement
with the Higher SS and the Police Leader.”
And then you ask them to consider among the first, one handing them over
to the SD for forced labor.
That was certainly not mitigation of the order, was it? You were not
making it any easier.
KEITEL: There are a few sentences to be added here. This arose out of
the daily discussion of these matters which I dealt with later on the
same lines as the first decree. I made suitable annotations, and signed
them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what you called terrorism and
sabotage. Let us look at what happened to people who were guilty of
something less than terrorism or sabotage. Look at Document D-763. That
will be GB-300. “Non-German civilians...”
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Non-German civilians in the occupied
territories who endanger the security or tactical preparedness
of the occupying power otherwise than through acts of terrorism
and sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD. Section I, Number
3...”—that is the part that says women will be employed on
labor and children will be spared—“of the Führer’s order also
applies to them.”
Well, you knew perfectly well what would happen to anyone who was handed
over to the SD, that he would probably be killed, certainly be put into
a concentration camp, did you not?
KEITEL: I did not interpret it that way; the words “to be allocated on
labor” were always used; but it has become clear to me from what I have
learned that they frequently ended in the concentration camp. However,
it was always described to us, to me, as a labor camp. That was the
description, “labor camps of the Secret State Police.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But this is August 1944. You will agree that
that is a most severe course to take with people who have been guilty of
something less than terrorism or sabotage, do you not?
KEITEL: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us...
KEITEL: I assume that you do not wish me to discuss this origin and
development here. Otherwise I could explain them; but I will merely
answer the question. The answer is, yes, it was a very severe measure.
The explanation, if I may state it very briefly, is that, as is known,
during the interminable daily situation reports on the incidents in all
the occupied territories, I received from the Führer instructions and
orders which were afterwards crystallized in a form similar to this
document; and I think I have already described in detail the way in
which I discussed these things with him and how I worked, that on
principle I never issued or signed anything which did not agree in
principle with his wishes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was severe enough for you for only 3 weeks,
was it not, because on 4 September, which is barely 3 weeks later, you
issued another order, Document D-766, Exhibit GB-301. Now, this was
issued, as it shows, as an agreement with Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, the
Reich Minister of Justice and Dr. Lammers. Now look at I:
“Non-German civilians in occupied territories who have been
sentenced by German courts for a criminal act against the
security or tactical preparedness of the occupying power, the
sentence having become final, and who are in custody in the
occupied territories or in the home front area, are to be handed
over, together with a report on the facts, to the nearest local
Security Police and SD office. An exception is made only in the
case of those sentenced to death for whom the execution of the
penalty has been ordered.
“II. Persons convicted of criminal acts against the Reich or the
occupying power and prohibited, in accordance with the
directives...issued by the Führer for the prosecution of such
acts, from intercourse with the outside world, are to be given a
distinguishing mark.”
Now, had you any idea how many people would be affected by that order?
KEITEL: No, I cannot say anything about that. I know only that it was
made necessary by the increasing tension in the occupied territories,
due to lack of troops to keep order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me remind you. You called a conference
to consider this matter. That is shown in Document D-765, and I also
show you D-767, the report of the conference. You need not worry about
765, which just says that there is to be a conference, but in Document
D-767, which will be Exhibit GB-303, there is a report of the
conference. The second paragraph says:
“The Reichsführer SS”—Himmler—“demands in his letter the
immediate surrender to the SD of approximately 24,000 non-German
civilians who are under arrest or held for interrogation.”—Now
listen to this: “No answer was given to the question raised
during the discussion as to why they must be surrendered to the
SD at the present moment, in spite of the considerable amount of
administrative work involved.”
Can you give any answer now as to why 24,000 people who had been
sentenced should be transferred to the tender mercies of the SD?
KEITEL: May I read this note? I do not know it; may I read it now,
please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. You will see that I did not trouble
you with it all, but it says what I had already put to you earlier, that
the Nacht und Nebel Decree had become superfluous as a result of the
terror and sabotage decree, and that the Wehrmacht Legal Department had
presented these things for discussion.
Now, can you give us any answer as to why these 24,000 unfortunate
persons who had been sentenced should be handed over to the tender
mercies of the SD?
KEITEL: I must say that I am surprised by the whole incident. I did not
attend the conference, and apparently I did not read the note since, as
a matter of principle, I always marked every document which had been
presented to me with my initials. I am not acquainted with the figures
quoted; this is the first time I have seen them; I am not acquainted
with them and I do not remember them, unless another order was...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will give you something which you have read.
KEITEL: As regards the facts about which you ask, I must answer in the
affirmative. I do not know the figures, only the facts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you cannot answer my question. You cannot
give us any reason as to why the Wehrmacht and these other offices were
sending the 24,000 people, who had been sentenced by ordinary courts,
over to the SD? You cannot give us any reason for that?
KEITEL: No; I may say that up to a point I can. I think “SD” is a
misinterpretation. I think police custody was meant. That does not mean
the same thing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly not.
KEITEL: I do not know if it might have been the same thing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely you have been at this Trial too long to
think that handing people over to the SD means police custody. It means
a concentration camp and a gas chamber usually, does it not? That is
what it meant in fact, whether you knew it or not.
KEITEL: I did not know it, but it obviously led to the concentration
camp in the end. I consider it possible; in any case, I cannot say that
it was not.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the last paragraph but one refers to the OKW.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I am just coming to that.
[_Turning to the defendant._] If you will notice that, Defendant, two
paragraphs below the one I put to you it states:
“As the OKW is not particularly interested in trying the minor
matters still remaining for the military tribunals, they are to
be settled by decrees to be agreed upon by local authorities.”
It is quite clear that your office was deeply concerned in this
business, was it not, Defendant?
KEITEL: I do not know exactly what it means, but it was obviously
mentioned at that conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I put the next document, I want you
to realize how we have been going. We started with the Nacht und Nebel
Decree, which disappeared, and we went on to the Terror and Sabotage
Decree. We then proceeded to acts which were less than terror and
sabotage, but were criminal acts under the rules of the occupying power.
I now want you to consider what was done to people who simply refused to
work. Would you look at Document D-769? That is Exhibit GB-304. That is
a telegram from Luftwaffe General Christiansen, who was in the
Netherlands, Commander of the Air Forces in the Netherlands, through his
Chief of Staff.
Now listen to this:
“Owing to railway strike, all communications in Holland at
standstill. Railway personnel does not respond to appeals to
resume work. Demands for motor vehicles and other means of
transport for moving troops and maintaining supplies are no
longer obeyed by the civil population. According to the Führer’s
decree of 18 August 1944”—that is the Terror and Sabotage
Decree, which you have already had—“and the supplementary
executive instructions of the Chief of the OKW”—which we have
already seen—“troops may use weapons only against persons who
commit acts of violence as terrorists or saboteurs, whereas
persons who endanger the security or tactical preparedness of
the occupying power in any other way than by terrorism or acts
of sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD.”
Then General Christiansen comes in with this:
“This regulation has proved too complicated, and therefore
ineffective. Above all, we do not possess the necessary police
forces. The troops must again receive authority to shoot also,
with or without summary court-martial, persons who are not
terrorists or saboteurs in the sense of the Führer’s decree, but
who endanger the fighting forces by passive resistance. It is
requested that the Führer’s decree be altered accordingly, as
the troops cannot otherwise assert themselves effectively
against the population, which in its turn, appears to endanger
the conduct of operations.”
Now, Defendant, will you agree that shooting, with or even without
trial, railway men who will not work, is about as brutal and cruel a
measure as could well be imagined by the mind of man? Do you agree?
KEITEL: That is a cruel measure, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your answer to that cruel measure?
KEITEL: I cannot say. I do not recollect the incident at all, but
perhaps the answer is there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at the Document D-770, which is, I
think, your answer; it is Exhibit GB-305. You will notice on the
distribution list that that goes to the Commander of the Armed Forces in
the Netherlands, and further to the signal which we have just been
looking at. Now, you say:
“According to the Führer’s order of 30 July 1944, non-German
civilians in the occupied territories who attack us in the rear
in the crisis of our battle for existence deserve no
consideration. This must be our guiding principle in the
interpretation and application of the Führer’s decree itself and
the Chief of the OKW’s executive decree of 18 August 1944.
“If the military situation and the state of communications make
it impossible to hand them over to the SD, other effective
measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently. There is,
naturally”—and I ask you to note the word “naturally”—“no
objection to passing and executing death sentences by summary
court-martial under such circumstances.”
I can not remember, Defendant, whether you have ever had an independent
command yourself or not. Have you? Have you had an independent command,
apart from your division? I think that was the last independent command
you had. You have not had an independent command yourself, have you?
Don’t I make myself clear?
KEITEL: I did not understand. What do you mean by “independent”?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I mean that you have not been a commander or
chief of an army or army group yourself, if I remember rightly, or of an
area, have you?
KEITEL: No, I have not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I ask you to put yourself in General
Christiansen’s position. That answer of yours was a direct
encouragement, practically amounting to an order, to shoot these railway
men out of hand, was it not? “To take other effective measures
ruthlessly and independently.”
KEITEL: That is explained by the form of summary court-martial. It is
not left to the discretion of the individual; jurisdiction of summary
court-martial was provided.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the way it is put, Defendant. I
suggest to you that it is quite clear. One sentence states: “If handing
over to the SD is impossible, owing to the military situation and the
state of communications, other effective measures are to be taken
ruthlessly and independently.”
Then, the next sentence: “There are, naturally”—look at the word
“naturally.” I suppose that it was “natürlich” in German. Is that
correct?
KEITEL: I have not the word “natürlich” here. Two words, so far as I can
make out, have been inserted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it says: “There are, naturally, no
objections to passing and executing death sentences by summary
court-martial procedure.” What you are saying is that, of course, there
is no objection to a summary court, but you are telling him, in addition
to that, that he is to take effective measures ruthlessly and
independently. If General Christiansen had shot these railway men out of
hand, after getting that letter from you, neither you nor any other
superior could have blamed him for it, could you?
KEITEL: According to the last sentence, he was obliged to carry out
summary court-martial procedure. It says: “There are no objections to
the executing of this sentence by summary court-martial under such
circumstances.” That is how I meant it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what did you mean by “effective measures to
be taken ruthlessly and independently”? What did you mean by that, if it
was only an ordinary summary court procedure?
KEITEL: Not apart from summary court procedure, but by means of the
same. That is what the last sentence means. It is already unusual to
appoint a summary court-martial in such cases.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, even on your basis, to use a military
summary court to shoot railway men who will not work is going rather far
even for you, is it not? It is going rather far, isn’t it?
KEITEL: That was a very severe measure, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that when you make all
these additions, taking you through the chain of additions that you make
to the order replacing the Nacht und Nebel Order, of which you
disapproved, do you say that you went to Hitler for every one of these
executive orders and answers that you made?
KEITEL: Yes. I went to him on the occasion of every one of these orders.
I must emphasize the fact that I did not issue any of these orders
without previously submitting it to the Führer. I must expressly point
out that that was so.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think a misunderstanding has crept into the
translation. The translation interprets “Standgericht” as summary court.
I do not believe that the words “summary court” reflect accurately what
we understand in the German language by “Standgericht.” I do not know
just what you understand in the English or American language by “summary
court,” but I can imagine that this means some summary procedure.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was taking it in favor of the Defendant that
it meant the court he referred to yesterday, one officer and two
soldiers. I was taking that. If I am wrong, the Defendant will correct
me. Is that right, Defendant?
KEITEL: I described this Standgericht (summary court-martial procedure)
briefly yesterday, and the criterion of a summary court-martial was that
it was not always necessary for a fully trained legal expert to be
present, although it was desirable.
THE PRESIDENT: While you are on the subject of translation, the
Defendant seemed to suggest that there was no word in the German which
is translated by the English word “naturally.” Is that true?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had it checked and I am told that the
translation is right.
THE PRESIDENT: There is a German word which is translated by
“naturally”? I should like to know that from Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: I am told that a false conception or false judgment might be
produced in this connection since in British and American law a summary
court has no right to pass sentences of death. I am told that a summary
court...
THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me, Dr. Nelte, I did not ask that question. The
question I asked you was whether there was any German word which is
translated into English by the word “naturally.” Is that not a clear
question?
DR. NELTE: In the German text it says “under such circumstances, of
course.” I think the English translation is incorrect in using the word
“naturally” and in putting it after “in these circumstances” instead of
at the beginning, so that one is led to conclude that it means, “there
are naturally no objections (es gibt natürlich keine Einwendungen),”
whereas the German text says, “Against the passing and executing of
death sentences by summary court procedure there are—under such
circumstances, of course—no objections (Gegen die Verhängung und
Vollstreckung von Todesurteilen im standgerichtlichen Verfahren bestehen
unter solchen Verhältnissen selbstverständlich keine Bedenken).”
THE PRESIDENT: Then the answer to my question is “yes.” There is a word
in the German which is translated “naturally.”
DR. NELTE: Yes, but the words “naturally” and “under such circumstances”
are separated in the English version, while in the German version they
belong together. “Naturally” refers to “under such circumstances.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to come to another point. You told us
yesterday that with regard to forced labor you were concerned in it
because there was a shortage of manpower and you had to take men out of
industry for the Wehrmacht. Your office was concerned with using
military forces in order to try and round-up people for forced labor,
was it not?
KEITEL: I do not think that is quite the correct conception. The
Replacement Office in the High Command of the Wehrmacht...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are going to deny it, I put the document
to you. I put General Warlimont’s views to you and see if you agree. I
think it saves time in the end. If you look at Document 3819-PS, which
will be Exhibit GB-306, Page 9 of the English version. It is the report
of a meeting at Berlin on 12 July 1944. You have to look on through the
document after the letters from the Defendant Sauckel and the Defendant
Speer, the account of a meeting in Berlin. I think it is Page 10 of the
German version. It starts with a speech by Dr. Lammers and goes on with
a speech from the Defendant Sauckel, then a speech from the witness Von
Steengracht, then a speech from General Warlimont: “The Deputy of the
head of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer
order.” Have you found the portion? I will read it if you have.
KEITEL: Yes, I have found the paragraph “The Representative of the Chief
of the OKW...”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The Representative of the Chief of the
OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer
order, according to which all German forces had to participate
in the task of raising manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was
stationed, if it was not employed exclusively in pressing
military duties (as, for example, in the construction of coastal
defenses), it would be available, but it could not be assigned
expressly for the purpose of the GBA. General Warlimont made the
following practical suggestions:
“a) The troops employed in fighting the partisans are to take
over, in addition, the task of raising manpower in the partisan
areas. Everyone who cannot give a satisfactory reason for his
presence in these areas is to be recruited by force.
“b) When large cities are wholly or partly evacuated on account
of the difficulty of providing food, those members of the
population suitable for labor are to be utilized for labor with
the assistance of the Wehrmacht.
“c) The refugees from the areas near the front should be rounded
up with special vigor with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.”
After reading this report of General Warlimont’s words, do you still say
that the Wehrmacht...
KEITEL: I am not aware that the Armed Forces have ever received an order
mentioning the rounding-up of workers. I would like to say that I know
of no such demand and I have not found any confirmation of it. The
conference as such is unknown to me and so are the proposals you
mentioned. It is new as far as I am concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear that General Warlimont is
suggesting that the Wehrmacht should help in the rounding-up of forced
labor, isn’t it?
KEITEL: But as far as I know it has never happened. I do not know that
such an order was given. According to the record, this is a proposal
made by General Warlimont, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps in those circumstances you should read
the three lines after the passage you have read.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I should. The next line:
“Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks and
expressed the expectation that a certain amount of success could
be achieved by this means.”
KEITEL: May I say something about that? May I ask that Gauleiter Sauckel
be asked at a given time whether and to what extent troops of the Armed
Forces did actually participate in such matters. It is not known to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No doubt the Defendant Sauckel will be asked a
number of questions in due time. At the moment I am asking you. You say
that you do not know anything about it?
KEITEL: No, I do not recollect that any order was given in this
connection. I gather from the statement by Warlimont that discussions
took place.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to ask you a few questions about the
murder of various prisoners of war. I want to get it quite clear. Did
you mean yesterday to justify the order for the shooting of Commandos,
dated 18 October 1942? Did you wish to say that it was right and
justified, or not?
KEITEL: I stated yesterday that neither General Jodl nor I thought that
we were in a position, or considered it possible, to draft or submit
such a written order. We did not do it because we could not justify it
or give reasons for it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next question that I put to you is this: Did
you approve and think right the order that was made that Commandos
should be shot?
KEITEL: I no longer opposed it, firstly on account of the punishment
threatened, and secondly because I could no longer alter the order
without personal orders from Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that that order was right?
KEITEL: According to my inner convictions I did not consider it right,
but after it had been given I did not oppose it or take a stand against
it in any way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that your orders had contained
provisions for the use of parachutists being dropped for sabotage
purposes, don’t you? Your own orders have contained that provision of
parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes. Don’t you remember in
the Fall Grün against Czechoslovakia? I would put it to you if you like,
but I would so much prefer that you try to remember it yourself. Don’t
you remember that your own orders contained a provision for parachutists
being dropped for sabotage purposes in Czechoslovakia?
KEITEL: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You don’t?
KEITEL: No, I do not remember the order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I refer you to it. My Lord, it is Page 21 and 22
of the document book.
KEITEL: Which document book, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. It ought to be your first document book,
and quite early on. It is part of the Fall Grün, which is Document
388-PS, and it is Item 11. I think it is somewhere about Page 15 or 16
or 20. You remember the Schmundt minutes and then it is divided into
items.
The Tribunal will find it at the foot of Page 21:
[_Turning to the defendant._]
“For the success of this operation, co-operation with the
Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the
Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops, and
with units of the sabotage service will be of importance.”
KEITEL: May I read the paragraph that I think you mean?
SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; it is headed “Missions for the Branches of
the Armed Forces...”
KEITEL: “Missions for the Branches of the Armed Forces.” It states:
“For success, co-operation with the Sudeten German frontier
population and the deserters from the Czechoslovakian Army, with
parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage
service can be of importance.”
These parachutists and airborne troops were in fact to be set to work on
frontier fortifications, as I explained yesterday, since army
authorities believed that the artillery resources at our command were
insufficient to permit our combating them with artillery.
This does not mean parachutists or saboteurs, but actual members of the
German Air Force, and the sabotage service is mentioned at the end.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sabotage service must be people who are
going to do sabotage if they are going to be of any use, must they not?
They do sabotage, don’t they?
KEITEL: Undoubtedly; but not by means of airborne troops and
parachutists, but through saboteurs in the frontier areas who offer
their services for this kind of work. Yes, that is what they are
thinking of. We had many such people in the Sudeten region.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you, but I want to
have it clear. I now want to come to the way in which this order of the
Führer was announced. You will find the order—the Tribunal will find it
on Page 64—but what I want him to look at if he would be so kind, is
Page 66 of the book, Page 25, Defendant, of your book. The second
sentence of the Defendant Jodl’s “To the Commanders” about this order.
That is on Page 25, and Defendant Jodl says: “This order is for the
commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy
hands.” Was that because you and the Defendant Jodl were ashamed of the
order, that you had this secrecy provision put on it?
KEITEL: I have not found it yet, and I would like to know the
connection. Page 25 is a teletype letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the Oberkommando Wehrmacht, dated 19
October. Now have you got it, the second sentence?
KEITEL: Dated 18 October 1942?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 19 October, issuing order of the 18th. “This
order is for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall
into enemy hands.” Was that because you were ashamed of the order, that
it was put like that?
KEITEL: I have not seen the letter and I think General Jodl should be
asked about it. I do not know the contents, but I have already stated
the opinion of both of us. I cannot give you the reason.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t give me the reason for this secrecy?
KEITEL: I do not know the motives behind it and I would ask you to put
this question to General Jodl. I have not seen it. But I have already
stated my own views and those of General Jodl.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want you to look at the way that
even Hitler expresses it with regard to this. If you look—I guess it is
Page 31 in our book. It is a report from Hitler wherein he says:
“The report which should appear on this subject in the Armed
Forces communiqué will state briefly and laconically that a
sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and
exterminated to the last man.” (Document Number 503-PS)
You were doing your best—and when I say “you,” I mean you collectively,
Hitler, yourself, and Jodl and everyone else concerned. You were doing
your best to keep quiet about this, about anything being known about
this order, weren’t you?
KEITEL: That was not my impression; on the contrary, in every case we
subsequently published the facts in the Wehrmacht orders, the Wehrmacht
report. It is my recollection, namely, that in the Wehrmacht report we
stated that such and such an incident had occurred, followed by such and
such consequences. That is my recollection.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am now only going to ask you to look at one
document further on, because in that regard, you remember, after the
Soviet Union tried certain people at Kharkov, when you were trying to
get up some counterpropaganda—now, look at this document, about these
executions, it is Page 308, Document UK-57. You have got a copy of it. I
am going to ask you about only two incidents. You see it is a memorandum
and the passage that I want you to look at is Number 2, the fourth
memorandum, Paragraph 2, which is headed “Attempted Attacks on the
Battleship _Tirpitz_.” Do you see that?
KEITEL: Just one moment, I have not found it yet. Battleship _Tirpitz_,
oh, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got it? Just listen, now:
“At the end of October 1942 a British Commando that had come to
Norway in a cutter, had orders to carry out an attack on the
Battleship _Tirpitz_ in Drontheim Fjord, by means of a two-man
torpedo. The action failed since both torpedoes, which were
attached to the cutter, were lost in the stormy sea. From among
the crew, consisting of six Englishmen and four Norwegians, a
party of three Englishmen and two Norwegians were challenged on
the Swedish border; however, only the British seaman in civilian
clothes, Robert Paul Evans, born 14 January 1922, in London,
could be arrested and the others escaped into Sweden.
“Evans had a pistol pouch in his possession, such as are used to
carry weapons under the armpit, and also a knuckle duster.”
And now the next page:
“Violence representing a breach of international law could not
be proved.”
Did incidents such as that, under this order, come to your attention?
KEITEL: I do not remember the actual incident, but I can see that it has
been reported by the department.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now you have told us that you have been a
soldier for 41 years; that emphasizes your military position. What, in
the name of all military tradition, has that boy done wrong by coming
from a two-man torpedo to make an attack on a battleship; what had he
done wrong?
KEITEL: No, this is an attack against a weapon of war, if carried out by
soldiers in their capacity of members of the armed forces, it is an
attack made with the object of eliminating a battleship by means of
sabotage.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But why, why should you not if you were prepared
to go on a two-man torpedo for an attack against a battleship, what is
wrong with a sailor doing that? I want to understand what is in your
mind. What do you, as a man who has been a soldier for 40 years, what do
you see wrong for a man doing that, towing out a torpedo against a
battleship? Tell us. I cannot understand what is wrong.
KEITEL: This is no more wrong than an attack with an aerial bomb if it
is successful. I recognize that it is right, that it is a perfectly
permissible attack.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you did not see that incident I
will not go through putting the others in, as they are all just the
same, men in uniform coming up to the Gironde to attack German ships.
What I want to understand is this. You were a Field Marshal, standing in
the boots of Blücher, Gneisenau, and Moltke. How did you tolerate all
these young men being murdered, one after the other without making any
protests?
KEITEL: I have stated here in detail my reasons for not making any
further resistance or objection; and I cannot alter any statement now. I
know that these incidents occurred and I know the consequences.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Field Marshal, I want you to understand
this. As far as I know, in the German military code, as in every
military code, there is no obligation on the part of a soldier to obey
an order which he knows is wrong, which he knows is contrary to the laws
of war and law. It is the same in your army, and our army, and I think
in every army, isn’t that so?
KEITEL: I did not personally carry out the orders of 18 October 1942. I
was not present either at the mouth of the Gironde or at the attack on
the battleship _Tirpitz_. I knew only that the order was issued,
together with all the threats of punishment which made it so difficult
for the commanders to alter or deviate from the order on their own
initiative. You, Sir David, asked me yourself whether I considered this
order to be right or to serve any useful purpose and I have given you a
definite answer: that I could not have prevented the action taken at the
mouth of the Gironde or in the case of _Tirpitz_ if I had wanted to.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my difficulty. I have given you only two
cases; there are plenty more. There are others which occurred in Italy
which we have heard. The point I am putting to you is this: You were the
representative; that you have told us a hundred times, of the military
tradition. You had behind you an officers corps with all its...
KEITEL: No, Sir David, I must deny that. I was not responsible either
for the Navy or for the Army or for the Air Force. I was not a
commander; I was a Chief of Staff and I had no authority to intervene in
the execution of orders in the various branches of the Armed Forces,
each of which had its own Commander-in-Chief.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have heard about your staff rank, but I want
to make this point perfectly clear. You were a Field Marshal, Kesselring
was a Field Marshal, Milch was a Field Marshal, all, I gather, with
military training behind them and all having their influence if not
their command, among the Armed Forces of Germany. How was it that there
was not one man of your rank, of your military tradition, with the
courage to stand up and oppose cold-blooded murder? That is what I want
to know.
KEITEL: I did not do it; I made no further objection to these things. I
can say no more and I cannot speak for others.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us pass if you can say no more than
that. I want to see what you did with regard to our French allies
because I have been asked to deal with some matters for the French
Delegation.
You remember that on the Eastern Front you captured some Frenchmen who
were fighting with the Russians. Do you remember making an order about
that? You captured some De Gaullists, as you called them, that is Free
French people who were fighting for the Russians. Do you remember your
action with regard to that?
KEITEL: I recollect the transmission of a Führer order in regard to the
surrender of these Frenchmen to their lawful government, which was
recognized by us.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not, of course, the part of the order I
want to put to you.
“Detailed investigations are to be made in appropriate cases
with regard to relatives of Frenchmen fighting for the Russians.
If the investigation reveals that relatives have given
assistance to facilitate escape from France, then severe
measures are to be taken.
“OKW/Wi. Rü is to make the necessary preparations with the
respective military commander or the Higher SS and Police Leader
in France.—Signed—Keitel.”
Can you imagine anything more dreadful than taking severe measures
against the mother of a young man who has helped him to go and fight
with the allies of his country? Can you imagine anything more
despicable?
KEITEL: I can think of many things since I have lost sons of my own in
the war. I am not the inventor of this idea; it did not originate with
me; I only transmitted it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate the difference, Defendant,
between the point which you made and the point which I make. Losing sons
in a war is a terrible tragedy. Taking severe measures against a mother
of a boy who wants to go and fight for his country’s allies, I am
suggesting to you, is despicable. The one is a tragedy; the other is the
height of brutality. Do you not agree?
KEITEL: I can only say that it does not state the consequences of the
investigations and findings. I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is all the answer you can make I
will ask you to look at something else.
KEITEL: No, I should like to add that I regret that any families were
held responsible for the misdeeds of their sons.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will not waste the time by taking up the
word “misdeed.” If you think that is a misdeed it is not worth our
discussing it further. I just want to protest against your word.
Now, let us see; that was not an isolated case. Just look at Page 110
(a) of the document book which you have, Page 122. This is an order
quite early on 1 October 1941.
“Attacks committed on members of the Armed Forces lately in the
occupied territories give reason to point out that it is
advisable that military commanders always have at their disposal
a number of hostages of different political tendencies, namely:
“(1) Nationalists,
“(2) Democratic-bourgeois, and
“(3) Communists.
“It is important that these should include well-known leading
personalities, or members of their families whose names are to
be made public.
“Hostages belonging to the same group as the culprit are to be
shot in case of attacks.
“It is asked that commanders be instructed
accordingly.—Signed—Keitel.” (Document 1590-PS).
Why were you so particular that, if you happened to arrest a
democratic-bourgeois, your commanders should have a sufficient bag of
democratic-bourgeois to shoot as hostages? I thought you were not a
politician.
KEITEL: I was not at all particular and the idea did not originate with
me; but it is in accordance with the instructions, the official
regulations, regarding hostages which I discussed yesterday or on the
day before and which state that those held as hostages must come from
the circles responsible for the attacks. That is the explanation, or
confirmation, of that as far as my memory goes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with that as a course of action,
that if you found a member of a democratic-bourgeois family who had been
taking part in, say, sabotage or resistance, that you should shoot a
number of democratic-bourgeois on his behalf? Did you approve of that?
KEITEL: I have already explained how orders for shooting hostages, which
were also given, were to be applied and how they were to be carried out
in the case of those deserving of death and who had already been
sentenced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am asking you a perfectly simple question,
Defendant. Did you or did you not approve of a number of
democratic-bourgeois to be taken as hostages for one
democratic-bourgeois who happened to be...
KEITEL: It does not say so in the document; it says only that hostages
must be taken; but it says nothing about shooting them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you mind looking at it since you corrected
me so emphatically? Depending upon the membership of the culprit, that
is, whether he is a nationalist, or a democratic-bourgeois or Communist,
“hostages of the corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks.”
KEITEL: If that is in the document then I must have signed it that way.
The document referring to the conference with the commanders shows
clearly how it was carried out in practice.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now answer my question. Did you approve of that?
KEITEL: I personally had different views on the hostage system, but I
signed it, because I had been ordered to do so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you had a different view. Will you just
look at a letter from Herr Terboven, who was in charge in Norway,
Document 870-PS, and it is Page 85, 71 (a), RF-281. This is a report
from Terboven for the information of the Führer and I want you to look
at Paragraph 2, “Counter-measures”, Subparagraph 4. Do you see it? Have
you got it, Defendant? I am sorry, I did give you the number; probably
you did not hear it, 71 (a), Page 71 (a) of the document book. So sorry
I did not make it clear. My Lord, I am told that this has been put in by
the French Prosecution as Exhibit RF-281. I gave it a GB number, as I
recall.
THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?