I show you Document 1594-PS.

KEITEL: This document, 1594-PS, is a communication from Von

Falkenhausen, the Military Commander of Belgium, and is directed to the

OKH, General Staff, Quartermaster General, and, further, to the

Commander-in-Chief and Military Commander in France and for the

information of the Wehrmacht Commander in the Netherlands and Luftgau

Belgium.

I do not know this document nor could I know it, for it is directed to

the Army. The assumption expressed by the French Prosecutor that I

received a letter from Falkenhausen is not true. I do not know this

letter and it was not sent to me. Official communication between the

military commanders in France and Belgium took place only between the

OKH and these two military commanders subordinate to it. These

commanders were not subordinate either to the OKW or to me.

DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution has submitted Document Number UK-25

and has asserted that this document was the basis for the hostage

legislation in France, that there is, in other words, a basic connection

between the order you signed on 16 September 1941 and the treatment of

hostages in France. I will show you these documents, 1587-PS and

1588-PS, in addition to UK-25 and request you to comment on them.

KEITEL: I must first answer the question as to whether I had any

discussion on individual matters with military commanders regarding the

question of hostages. Did you not ask me that?

DR. NELTE: With regard to Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen?

KEITEL: Yes, with regard to Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen. It is possible,

and I do recall one such case, Stülpnagel called me up from Paris on

such a matter because he had received an order from the Army to shoot a

certain number of hostages for an attack on members of the German

Wehrmacht. He wanted to have this order certified by me. That happened

and I believe it is confirmed by a telegram, which has been shown to me

here. It is also confirmed that at that time I had a meeting with

Stülpnagel in Berlin. Otherwise, the relations between myself and these

two military commanders were limited to quite exceptional matters, in

which they believed that with my help they might obtain certain support

with regard to things that were very unpleasant for them, for example,

in such questions as labor allocation, that is, workers from Belgium or

France destined for Germany, where also, in one case, conflicts arose

between the military commanders and their police authorities. In these

cases I was called up directly in order to mediate.

Permit me, please, to look at the documents first.

DR. NELTE: You must begin with UK-25, 16 September 1941.

KEITEL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It is impossible for the Tribunal to carry all these

documents in their heads by reference to their numbers, and we do not

have the documents before us. We do not know what documents you are

dealing with here. It is quite impossible for us.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, for this reason, I took the liberty of

submitting to the Tribunal before the beginning of the sessions a list

of documents. I am sorry if that was not done. I could not submit the

documents themselves. You will always find a number to the left of this

list.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see that, but all that I see here is 1587-PS,

which is not the one that you are referring to, apparently, and it is

described as a report to the Supreme Command of the Army. That does not

give us much indication of what it is about. The next one is 1594-PS, a

letter to OKH. That again does not give us much indication of what it is

about, except that they have something to do with the hostage question.

DR. NELTE: It is concerned with the question which the Defendant Keitel

is about to answer. Do you not also have the order bearing Document

Number C-128?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have that. That is directions for the operation in

the West.

DR. NELTE: And UK-25?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. NELTE: And 1588-PS?

THE PRESIDENT: We have got them all. The only thing that I was pointing

out to you was that the description of them is inadequate to explain to

us what they mean and what they are. Perhaps by a word or two you can

indicate to us when you come to the document what it is about.

DR. NELTE: Document UK-25, about which the Defendant Keitel is about to

testify, is an order of 16 September 1941, signed by him, regarding

“Communist Uprisings in the Occupied Territories.” It contains, among

other things, the sentence, “The Führer has now ordered that most severe

measures should be taken everywhere in order to crush this movement as

soon as possible.” The French Prosecution asserted that, on the basis of

this order, hostage legislation was promulgated in France, which is

contained in Document 1588-PS. If you have Document 1588-PS, you will

find on the third page a regular code regarding the taking and treatment

of hostages.

The defendant is to state whether such a causal relation did exist, and

to what extent the OKW and he himself were at all competent in these

matters.

KEITEL: Document UK-25, the Führer Order of the 16 September 1941, as

has just been stated, is concerned with communist uprisings in occupied

territories, and the fact that this is a Führer order has already been

mentioned. I must clarify the fact that this order, so far as its

contents are concerned, referred solely to the Eastern regions,

particularly to the Balkan countries. I believe that I can prove this by

the fact that there is attached to this document a distribution list,

that is, a list of addresses beginning, “Wehrmacht Commander Southeast

for Serbia, Southern Greece, and Crete.” This was, of course,

transmitted also to other Wehrmacht commanders and also to the OKH with

the possibility of its being passed on to subordinate officers. I

believe that this document, which, for the sake of saving time, I need

not read here, has several indications that the assumption on the part

of the French Prosecution that this is the basis for the hostage law to

be found in Document Number 1588-PS is false, and that there is no

causal nexus between the two. It is true that the date of this hostage

law is also September—the number is hard to read—but, as far as its

contents are concerned, these two matters are, in my opinion, not

connected. Moreover, the two military commanders in France and Belgium

never received this order from the OKW, but they may have received it

through the OKH, a matter which I cannot check because I do not know.

Regarding this order of 16 September 1941, I should like to say that its

great severity can be traced back to the personal influence of the

Führer. The fact that it is concerned with the Eastern region is already

to be seen from the contents and from the introduction and does not need

to be substantiated any further. It is correct that this order of 16

September 1941 is signed by me.

DR. NELTE: We come now to the second individual fact, “Nacht und Nebel.”

The Prosecution charges you of having participated in the Nacht und

Nebel decree of 12 December 1941, Document Number L-90...

KEITEL: May I say one more thing regarding the other question?

DR. NELTE: Please, if it appears to be necessary. In the communication

of 2 February 1942 we find the words, “In the annex are transmitted: 1)

A decree of the Führer of 7 December 1941...” You wanted to say

something more; if it is important, please. Do you have Document Number

L-90?

KEITEL: L-90, yes.

DR. NELTE: What was the cause for this order, so terrible in its

consequences?

KEITEL: I must state that it is perfectly clear to me that the

connection of my name with this so-called “Nacht und Nebel” order is a

serious charge against me, even though it can be seen from the documents

that it is a Führer order. Consequently I should like to state how this

order came about. Since the beginning of the Eastern campaign and in the

late autumn of 1941 until the spring of 1942, the resistance movements,

sabotage and everything connected with it increased enormously in all

the occupied territories. From the military angle it meant that the

security troops were tied down, having to be kept on the spot by the

unrest. That is how I saw it from the military point of view at that

time. And day by day, through the daily reports we could picture the

sequence of events in the individual occupation sectors. It was

impossible to handle this summarily; rather, Hitler demanded that he be

informed of each individual occurrence, and he was very displeased if

such matters were concealed from him in the reports by military

authorities. He got to know about them all the same.

In this connection, he said to me that it was very displeasing to him

and very unfavorable to establishing peace that, owing to this, death

sentences by court-martial against saboteurs and their accomplices were

increasing; that he did not wish this to occur, since from his point of

view it made appeasement and relations with the population only more

difficult. He said at that time that a state of peace could be achieved

only if this were reduced and if, instead of death sentences—to shorten

it—in case a death sentence could not be expected and carried out in

the shortest time possible, as stated here in the decree, the suspect or

guilty persons concerned—if one may use the word “guilty”—should be

deported to Germany without the knowledge of their families and be

interned or imprisoned, instead of lengthy court-martial proceedings

with many witnesses.

I expressed the greatest misgivings in this matter and know very well

that I said at that time that I feared results exactly opposite to those

apparently hoped for. I then had serious discussions with the legal

adviser of the Wehrmacht, who had similar scruples, because there was an

elimination of ordinary legal procedures. I tried again to prevent this

order from being issued or to have it modified. My efforts were in vain.

The threat was made to me that the Minister of Justice would be

commissioned to issue a corresponding decree, should the Wehrmacht not

be able to do so. Now may I refer to details only insofar as these ways

were provided in this order, L-90, of preventing arbitrary application,

and these were primarily as follows:

The general principles of the order provided expressly that such

deportation or abduction into Reich territory should take place only

after regular court-martial proceedings, and that in every case the

officer in charge of jurisdiction, that is, the divisional commander

must deal with the matter together with his legal adviser, in the legal

way, on the basis of preliminary proceedings.

I must say that I believed then that every arbitrary and excessive

application of these principles was avoided by this provision. You will

perhaps agree with me that the words in the order, “It is the will of

the Führer after long consideration...” put in for that purpose, were

not said without reason and not without the hope that the addressed

military commander would also recognize from this that this was a method

of which we did not approve and did not consider to be right.

Finally we introduced a reviewing procedure into the order so that

through the higher channels of appeal, that is, the Military Commander

in France and the Supreme Command or Commander of the Army, it would be

possible to try the case legally by appeal proceedings if the verdict

seemed open to question, at least, within the meaning of the decree. I

learned here for the first time of the full and monstrous tragedy,

namely, that this order, which was intended only for the Wehrmacht and

for the sole purpose of determining whether an offender who faced a

sentence in jail could be made to disappear by means of this Nacht und

Nebel procedure, was obviously applied universally by the police, as

testified by witnesses whom I have heard here, and according to the

Indictment which I also heard, and so the horrible fact of the existence

of whole camps full of people deported through the Nacht und Nebel

procedure has been proved.

In my opinion, the Wehrmacht, at least I and the military commanders of

the occupied territories who were connected with this order, did not

know of this. At any rate it was never reported to me. Therefore this

order, which in itself was undoubtedly very dangerous and disregarded

certain requirements of law such as we understood it, was able to

develop into that formidable affair of which the Prosecution have

spoken.

The intention was to take those who were to be deported from their home

country to Germany, because Hitler was of the opinion that penal

servitude in wartime would not be considered by the persons concerned as

dishonorable in cases where it was a question of actions by so-called

patriots. It would be regarded as a short detention which would end when

the war was over.

These reflections have already been made in part in the note. If you

have any further questions, please put them.

DR. NELTE: The order for the carrying out of this Nacht und Nebel decree

states that the Gestapo was to effect the transportation to Germany. You

stated that the people who came to Germany were to be turned over to the

Minister of Justice, that is, to normal police custody. You will

understand that, by the connection with the Gestapo, certain suspicions

are raised that it was known from the start what happened to these

people. Can you say anything in elucidation of that matter?

KEITEL: Yes. The order that was given at that time was that these people

should be turned over to the German authorities of justice. This letter

signed “by order” and then the signature, was issued 8 weeks later than

the decree itself by the Amt Ausland Abwehr as I can see from my

official correspondence. It indicates the conferences, that is, the

agreements, which had to be reached at that time, regarding the method

by which these people were to be taken from their native countries to

Germany. They were apparently conducted by this Amt Abwehr, which

evidently ordered police detachments as escorts. That can be seen from

it.

I might mention in this connection—I must have seen it—that it did not

seem objectionable at that time, because I could have, and I had, no

reason to assume that these people were being turned over to the

Gestapo, frankly speaking, to be liquidated, but that the Gestapo was

simply being used as the medium in charge of the transportation to

Germany. I should like to emphasize that particularly, so that there can

be no doubt that it was not our idea to do away with the people as was

later done in that Nacht und Nebel camp.

DR. NELTE: We come now to the question of parachutists, sabotage troops,

and Commando operations. The French Prosecution treat in detail the

origin and effect of the two Führer Orders of 18 October 1942 regarding

the treatment of Commandos.

Does the Tribunal have a copy of this Führer Order? It is 498...

THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t got a copy of the order. You mean 553-PS or

498?

DR. NELTE: The second is Document Number 553-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: We have not got that either, “Combating of Individual

Parachutists, Decree of 4. 8. 42.”

DR. NELTE: Could you please repeat your statement? What you just said

did not come through.

THE PRESIDENT: 553-PS, “Combating of Individual Parachutists, Decree of

4. 8. 42.” That is what we have, nothing else. You also have 498...

DR. NELTE: Document Number 553-PS is a memorandum signed by Keitel. The

French Prosecution has assumed correctly that there is some connection

between the Document 553-PS and the Führer Order of 18 October 1942. The

defendant is to testify what were the reasons that lay behind this

Führer Order and this notice.

KEITEL: First of all, Document 553-PS, the note: This memorandum was

issued by me in August 1942. As I have already described in connection

with the Nacht und Nebel Decree, sabotage acts, the dropping of agents

by parachute, the parachuting of arms, ammunition, explosives, radio

sets and small groups of saboteurs reached greater and greater

proportions. They were dropped at night from aircraft in thinly

populated regions. This activity covered the whole area governed by

Germany at that time. It extended from the west over to Czechoslovakia

and Poland, and from the East as far as the Berlin area. Of course, a

large number of the people involved in these actions were captured and

much of the material was taken. This memorandum was to rally all

offices, outside the Wehrmacht, as well, police and civilian

authorities, to the service against this new method of conducting the

war, which was, to our way of thinking, illegal, a sort of “war in the

dark behind the lines.” Even today, after reading this document through

again—it has already been given to me here—I consider this memorandum

unobjectionable. It expressly provides that members of enemy forces,

that is members of any enemy force, if captured by the police, should be

taken to the nearest Wehrmacht office after being identified. I know

that in the French sector the French police did their full share in

arresting these troops and putting them in safe charge. They

collaborated in preventing these acts of sabotage. It will perhaps make

clear how extensive these activities were if I mention that on certain

days there were as many as 100 railways blown up in this way. That is in

the memorandum.

Now, as to the Führer orders of 18 October 1942, which have been

mentioned very often here and which I may describe as the further

development of the regulations mentioned in this memorandum: As to these

methods, this way of conducting illegal warfare kept on increasing, and

individual parachutists grew into small Commando units which landed from

heavy aircraft or by parachute and were systematically employed, not to

create disturbances or destruction in general, but to attack specific,

vital, and important military objectives. In Norway, for instance, I

recall that they had the task of blowing up the only aluminum works. It

may sound strange, but during this period half to three-quarters of an

hour of the daily discussion on the situation was devoted to the problem

of how to handle these incidents. These incidents in all sectors caused

the Führer to demand other methods, vigorous measures, to combat this

activity, which he characterized as “terrorism” and said that the only

method that could be used to combat it was severe countermeasures. I

recall that in reply to our objections as soldiers the following words

were spoken: “As long as the paratrooper or saboteur runs the danger

only of being taken captive, he incurs no risk; in normal circumstances

he risks nothing; we must take action against this.” These were the

reasons behind his thoughts. I was asked several times to express myself

on this subject and to present a draft. General Jodl will also recall

this. We did not know what we, as soldiers, were to do. We could make no

suggestion.

If I may sum up briefly, we heard Hitler’s bursts of temper on this

subject almost every day, but we did nothing, not knowing what we could

do. Hitler declared that this was against the Hague Convention and

illegal, that it was a method of waging war not foreseen in the Hague

Convention and which could not be foreseen. He said that this was a new

war with which we had to contend, in which new methods were needed.

Then, to make it short, as I have already testified in the preliminary

investigation, these orders—this order itself and the well-known

instructions that those who did not carry out the first order should be

punished—were issued in a concise form and signed by Hitler. They were

then distributed, I believe, by the Chief of the Operations Staff, Jodl.

I might add that many times the commanders who received these orders

asked questions about how they were to be applied, particularly in

connection with the threat that they would be punished if they did not

carry them out. The only reply we could make was, “You know what is in

the orders,” for we were not in a position to change these signed

orders.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have accused you personally of having issued

the order to kill the English saboteurs captured in the Commando

operations at Stavanger. In this connection I submit to you Documents

498-PS, 508-PS, and 527-PS. [_The documents were submitted to the

defendant._]

This, Mr. President, was a Commando mission in the vicinity of

Stavanger. The troops who fell into German hands had to be killed,

according to the Führer decree. There was a remote possibility of

interrogating these persons, if that was demanded by military necessity.

In this case the Commander-in-Chief in Norway, General Von Falkenhorst,

dealt with the matter. He turned to the OKW, as he has already testified

in the minutes of an interrogation.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Would you make any statement in this

connection?

KEITEL: I was interrogated on this subject, and in the course of the

interrogation I was confronted with General Von Falkenhorst. As I

recall, I did not remember his having asked me questions regarding the

carrying out of this order. I did not know of it. Even the event itself

was no longer in my memory, and I remembered it again only after I had

seen the documents. During the interrogation, I told the interrogator

that I had no authority to change that order, that I could refer any one

concerned only to the order, as such. As regards my confrontation with

General Von Falkenhorst, I should like to say only what is stated here

in the minutes, “He obviously shelved the answers and altered his

earlier statements, but did not deny them. Keitel did not deny having

had this talk with me but denied that the subject of it was what I

said.”

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I can only say that this is a summary of the

interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst, a document which was submitted

by the Prosecution without having a document number.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Have you finished your statement?

KEITEL: Yes. I believe that suffices.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Prosecution did not put in this document,

did they? They have not offered it in evidence?

DR. NELTE: I believe they did.

THE PRESIDENT: I think they must have put it to the Defendant Keitel in

one of his interrogations, did they not? Isn’t that right? That does not

mean that it is put in evidence, because the interrogation itself, you

see, need not be put in evidence. You must put it in now if you want it

to go in.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is some error here. This document was

put in by the Prosecution here as proof of the assertion that the

Defendant Keitel had given the order to kill these paratroopers. I

received the document here.

THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will tell me if that is so, but I cannot

think of any document having been put in here that has not had an

exhibit number.

MR. DODD: We have no recollection of having put it in. Many of these

interrogations did not have document numbers; but, of course, if they

were put in, they would have USA or Great Britain exhibit numbers.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps the best way would be for Counsel for the

Prosecution to verify whether it was read in evidence.

MR. DODD: That will take me a few minutes, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I mean at your leisure. Would that be a convenient

time to break off for 10 minutes?

DR. NELTE: Yes.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at a quarter to

5. They will then sit again in this Court in closed session, and they

desire that both Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense

should be present then, as they wish to discuss with those counsels on

both sides the best way of avoiding translating unnecessary documents.

There have, as you know, been a very great number of documents put in,

and a great burden has fallen upon the Translation Division. That is the

problem which the Tribunal wish to discuss in closed session with

Counsel for the Prosecution and Counsel for the Defense; They will,

therefore, as I say, sit here in closed session where there is room for

all the Defense Counsel. That is at 5 o’clock.

DR. NELTE: Do you remember an inquiry of the Commander-in-Chief West, in

June 1944, regarding the treatment of sabotage troops behind the

invasion front? A new situation had been created by the invasion and,

therefore, by the problem of the Commandos.

KEITEL: Yes, I remember, since these documents too have been submitted

to me here, and there were several documents. It is true that the

Commander-in-Chief West, after the landing of Anglo-American forces in

Northern France, considered that a new situation had arisen with

reference to this Führer Order of 18 October 1942 directed against the

parachute Commandos.

The inquiry was, as usual, reported, and General Jodl and I represented

the view of the Commander-in-Chief West, namely, that this order was not

applicable here. Hitler refused to accept that point of view and gave

certain directives in reply, which, according to the document, had at

least two editions; after one had been cancelled as useless, the

Document 551-PS remained as the final version as approved by the Führer

during that report.

I remember all this so accurately because, on the occasion of presenting

that reply during the discussion of the situation, this handwritten

appendix was added by General Jodl with reference to the application in

the Italian theatre, too. With that appendix, this version, which was

approved and demanded by Hitler, was then sent out to the

Commander-in-Chief West.

DR. NELTE: In this connection, was the question discussed as to how the

active support of such acts of sabotage by the population could be

judged from the point of view of international law?

KEITEL: Yes, that question arose repeatedly in connection with the order

of 18 October 1942, and the well-known memorandum previously discussed.

I am of the opinion that, giving any assistance to agents or other enemy

organs in such sabotage acts, is a violation of the Hague Rules for Land

Warfare. If the population takes part in, aids, or supports such action,

or covers the perpetrators—hides them or helps them in any way or in

any form—that, in my opinion, is clearly expressed in the Hague Rules

for Land Warfare, namely that the population must not commit such

actions.

DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have submitted a letter of 30 July

1944, which is Document 537-PS. This document is concerned with the

treatment of members of foreign military missions caught together with

partisans. Do you know this order?

KEITEL: Yes I do. Yes, I have already been interrogated on this Document

537-PS during the preliminary investigation, and I made the statement

which I will repeat here: It had been reported that, attached to the

staffs of these partisans, particularly those of the leaders of the

Serbian and Yugoslav partisans, there were military missions which, we

believed, were certainly individual agents or teams for maintaining

liaison with the states with which we were at war. It had been reported

to me, and I had been asked what should be done if such a mission, as it

was called, were captured. When this was reported to the Führer he

decided to reject the suggestions of the military authority concerned,

namely, to treat them as prisoners of war, since, according to the

directive of 18 October 1942, they were to be considered as saboteurs

and treated as such. This document is, therefore, the transmission of

this order which bears my signature.

DR. NELTE: The problem of terror-fliers and lynch law has been mentioned

during the examination of Reich Marshal Göring. I shall confine myself

to a few questions which concern you personally in connection with that

problem. Do you know what we are concerned with in the conception of

terror-fliers and their treatment? What was your attitude toward this

question?

KEITEL: The fact that, starting from a certain date in the summer of

1944, machine-gun attacks from aircraft against the population as has

already been mentioned here, increased considerably, with 30 to 40 dead

on certain days, caused Hitler to demand categorically an adequate

ruling on this question. We soldiers were of the opinion that existing

regulations were sufficient, and that new regulations were unnecessary.

The question of lynch law was dragged into the problem and the question

of what was meant by the term terror-flier. These two groups of

questions resulted in the very large quantity of documents which you all

know, and which contain the text of the discussion on these subjects.

DR. NELTE: I think it will not be necessary to repeat the details which

have already been discussed. In connection with your responsibility, I

am interested in the words which you have written across this document.

Please, will you explain those?

KEITEL: I merely wanted to state, first of all, that I had suggested,

following the lines of the warning issued when German prisoners of war

taken at Dieppe were shackled, that a warning should be issued here,

too, in the form of a similar official note, saying that we should make

reprisals unless the enemy commanders stopped the practice of their own

accord. That was turned down as not being a suitable course of action.

And now let us turn to the documents, which are important to me.

DR. NELTE: Document 735-PS.

KEITEL: There are some notes in handwriting made by Jodl and myself.

That is the record of a report written by me in the margin which runs as

follows: “Courts-martial will not work”; at least that was the content.

That was written at the time because the question of sentence by

courts-martial came up for discussion since this very document laid down

in detail for the first time what a terror-flier was, and because it

stated that terror attacks were always attacks carried out from

low-flying aircraft with machine guns. I was led to think that crews

attacking in low-level flights could not, generally speaking, in 99 out

of 100 cases be captured alive, if they crashed; for there is no

possibility of saving oneself with a parachute from a low-level attack.

Therefore, I wrote that remark in the margin. Furthermore, I considered,

apart from the fact that one could not conduct proceedings against such

a flier, one would, secondly, not be able to conclude a satisfactory

trial or a satisfactory investigation if an attack had been carried out

from a considerable height, because no court, in my opinion, would be

able to prove that such a man had had the intention of attacking those

targets which possibly were hit.

Finally, there was one last thought, which was that, in accordance with

the rules, court-martial sentences against prisoners of war had to be

communicated to the enemy state through the protecting power, and 3

months’ grace had to be given during which the home state could object

to the sentence. It was, therefore, out of the question that, through

those channels the deterrent results desired could be achieved within a

brief period. That was really what I meant. I also wrote another note,

and this refers to lynch law. It states: “If you allow lynching at all,

then you can hardly lay down rules for it.”

To that I cannot say very much, since my conviction is that there is no

possibility of saying under what circumstances such a method could be

regulated or considered justified by mob justice, and I am still of the

opinion that rules cannot be laid down, if such proceedings are

tolerated.

DR. NELTE: But what was your attitude regarding the question of lynch

law?

KEITEL: It was my point of view that it was a method completely

impossible for us soldiers. One case had been reported by the Reich

Marshal in which proceedings against a soldier who had stopped such

action were suppressed. I know of no case where soldiers, with reference

to their duty as soldiers, behaved towards a prisoner of war in any way

other than that laid down in the general regulations. That is unknown to

me.

I should also like to state, and this has not been mentioned yet, that I

had a discussion with Reich Marshal Göring at the Berghof about the

whole question, and he, at that time, quite clearly agreed with me: We

soldiers must reject lynch law under any circumstances. I requested him

in this awkward position in which we found ourselves to approach Hitler

once more personally, to persuade him not to compel us to give an order

in these matters or to draft an order. That was the situation.

DR. NELTE: We are now turning to questions relating to prisoners of war.

KEITEL: May I just say finally that an order from the OKW was never

submitted and never issued.

DR. NELTE: There is hardly any problem in the law of warfare in which

all nations and all people are so passionately interested as the

prisoner-of-war question. That is why, here too, the Prosecution have

stressed particularly those cases which were considered to be violations

of laws for prisoners of war, according to the Geneva Convention, or to

international law in general.

Since the OKW, and you as its Chief, were responsible for

prisoner-of-war questions in Germany, I should like to put the following

questions to you: What had been done in Germany to make all departments

and offices of the Wehrmacht acquainted with international agreements

which referred to prisoners of war?

KEITEL: There was a special military manual on that subject, which I

think is available, and which contained all the clauses in the existing

international agreements and the provisions for carrying them out. That

is, I think, Directive Number 38, which applied to the Army and the

Navy, and also to the Luftwaffe as a military manual. That was the

basis, the basic order.

DR. NELTE: How was that put into practice? Were people who were

concerned with such questions in practice instructed, or was it

sufficient to draw their attention to the Army directives?

KEITEL: Every department right down to the smallest unit had these

directives, and every soldier up to a certain point was instructed on

them. Apart from that, no further explanations and regulations were

issued at the beginning of the war.

DR. NELTE: I am thinking of the courses of instruction instituted in

Vienna for that particular purpose. Do you know that they took place in

Vienna?

KEITEL: It is known to me that such matters were the subject of courses

of instructions suitable for those people who were actually in contact

with prisoner-of-war matters. They took the form of training courses.

DR. NELTE: Is it, furthermore, correct that every soldier had a leaflet

in his pay book?

KEITEL: Yes. That has already been confirmed by General Milch the other

day, who had it with him.

DR. NELTE: When were the first instructions regarding prisoners of war

given in our case?

KEITEL: As far as I know, the first instructions appeared after the

beginning of the Polish campaign in the East, since every—I should like

to say—preparatory measure for reception of prisoners of war had been

rejected by Hitler. He had prohibited it. Afterwards things had to be

improvised at very short notice.

DR. NELTE: What was ordered?

KEITEL: It was ordered that the three branches of the Wehrmacht, the

Navy, Army and Luftwaffe—the latter had to do with it only to a limited

extent—but particularly the Army should make appropriate preparations

for camps, guards, and whatever was necessary for the establishment and

the organization of such things.

DR. NELTE: Please tell us what the functions of the OKW were regarding

the treatment and care of prisoners of war?

KEITEL: The principal instruction was treatment according to Directive

KGV-38 (Prisoner of War Regulation 38) based on international

agreements; in my opinion it contained absolutely everything which the

people concerned should know. Apart from that, no additional

instructions were issued at that time, but the above directive was

applied.

DR. NELTE: I should like to know first of all how far the OKW had

jurisdiction regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.

KEITEL: The OKW was, shall I say, the ministerial directing department

which had to issue and prepare all basic regulations and directives

concerning these questions. It was entitled to make sure, by means of

inspections and surprise visits, that the instructions were carried out.

In other words, it was the head office which issued directives and was

entitled to make inspections, but was not in command of the camps

themselves.

DR. NELTE: Should one not add the contact with the Foreign Office?

KEITEL: Of course, I forgot that. One of the main tasks of the entire

Wehrmacht, and therefore of the Navy and Luftwaffe too, was to

communicate with the protecting powers, through the Foreign Office and

also to communicate with the International Red Cross and all agencies

interested in the welfare of prisoners of war. I had forgotten that.

DR. NELTE: Therefore the OKW was, generally speaking, the legislator and

the control organ.

KEITEL: That is correct.

DR. NELTE: What did the branches of the Wehrmacht have to do?

KEITEL: The Navy and the Luftwaffe had camps under their command, which

were restricted to prisoners of war belonging to their own arms; and so

did the Army. But owing to the large numbers belonging to the Army, the

deputy commanding generals of the home front, that is, the commanders of

the Wehrkreise were the commanding authorities who in their area were in

charge of the camps.

DR. NELTE: Now, let us take the prisoner-of-war camps. Who was at the

head of such a camp?

KEITEL: In the Wehrkreis command, there was a commander or a general

responsible for questions relating to prisoners of war in the Wehrkreis

concerned, and the camp itself was under the charge of a camp commandant

who had a small staff of officers, among them an intelligence officer

and similar personnel who were necessary for such matters.

DR. NELTE: Who was the superior officer of the general for

prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis?

KEITEL: The commander of the Wehrkreis was the superior officer of the

commander for prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis.

DR. NELTE: Who was the superior of the Wehrkreis commander?

KEITEL: The Wehrkreis commanders were under the Commander-in-Chief of

the Home Army and the Reserve, and he in turn under the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDREDTH DAY

Friday, 5 April 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. NELTE: The last question I asked you yesterday concerned the channel

through which orders were transmitted in matters concerning prisoners of

war. You said that orders went from the camp commander to the army

district commander and then by the commander of the reserve army to the

OKH, the High Command of the Army. I should now like to have you tell me

who was responsible if something happened in a PW camp which violated

the Geneva Convention or was a breach of generally recognized

international law. Was that your business? Was the OKW responsible?

KEITEL: The OKW was responsible in the case of incidents which violated

general orders, that is, basic instructions issued by the OKW, or in the

case of failure to exercise the right to inspect. In such circumstances

I would say that the OKW was responsible.

DR. NELTE: How did the OKW exercise its right to inspect camps?

KEITEL: At first, in the early days of the war, through an inspector of

the Prisoners of War Organization (the KGW), who was at the same time

the office or departmental chief of the department KGW in the General

Office of the Armed Forces. In a certain sense, he exercised a double

function. Later on, after 1942 I believe, it was done by appointing an

inspector general who had nothing to do with the correspondence or

official work on the ministerial side.

DR. NELTE: What was the control by the protecting powers and the

International Red Cross?

KEITEL: If a protecting power wished to send a delegation to inspect

camps, that was arranged by the department or the inspector for the

prisoner-of-war matters, and he accompanied the delegation. Perhaps I

ought to say that, as far as the French were concerned, Ambassador

Scapini carried out that function personally and that a protecting power

did not exist in this form.

DR. NELTE: Could the representatives of the protecting powers and the

Red Cross talk freely to the prisoners of war or only in the presence of

officers of the German Armed Forces?

KEITEL: I do not know whether the procedure adopted in camps was always

in accordance with the basic instructions, which were to render possible

a direct exchange of views between prisoners of war and visitors from

their own countries. As a general rule, it was allowed and made

possible.

DR. NELTE: Did you as the chief of the OKW concern yourself personally

with the general instructions on prisoner-of-war matters?

KEITEL: Yes. I did concern myself with the general instructions. Apart

from that, my being tied to the Führer and to headquarters naturally

made it impossible for me to be in continuous contact with my offices.

There were, however, the KGW branch office and the inspector, as well as

the Chief of the General Armed Forces Office who was, in any case,

responsible to me and dealt with these matters. These three departments

had to deal with the routine work; and I, myself, was called on when

decisions had to be made and when the Führer interfered in person, as he

frequently did, and gave orders of his own.

DR. NELTE: According to the documents presented here in Court, Soviet

prisoners of war seem to have received different treatment from the

other prisoners. What can you say on that subject?

KEITEL: It is true that in this connection there was a difference in

treatment due to the view, frequently stated by the Führer, that the

Soviet Union on their part had not observed or ratified the Geneva

Convention. It was also due to the part played by “ideological

conceptions regarding the conduct of the war.” The Führer emphasized

that we had a free hand in this field.

DR. NELTE: I am now going to show you Document EC-388, Exhibit USSR-356.

It is dated 15 September 1941.

Part 1 is the minutes of a report by the Foreign Intelligence Department

of the OKW. Part 2 is a directive from the OKW, dated 8 September 1941,

regarding the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war. Part 3 is a

memorandum on the guarding of Soviet prisoners of war, and the last

document is a copy of the decree by the Council of People’s Commissars

regarding the prisoners of war matters dated 1 July 1941.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

KEITEL: Perhaps I can say by way of introduction that these directives

were not issued until September, which can be attributed to the fact

that at first an order by Hitler existed, saying that Russian prisoners

of war were not to be brought back to Reich territory. This order was

later on rescinded.

Now, regarding the directive of 8 September 1941, the full text of which

I have before me, I should like to say that all these instructions have

their origin in the idea that this was a battle of nationalities, for

the initial phrase reads, “Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of National

Socialist Germany.” That, in my opinion, immediately shows the basis on

which these instructions were made and the motives and ideas from which

they sprang. It is a fact that Hitler, as I explained yesterday, did not

consider this a battle between two states to be waged in accordance with

the rules of international law but as a conflict between two ideologies.

There are also several statements in the document regarding selection

from two points of view: Selection of people who seem, if I may express

it in this way, not dangerous to us; and the selection of those who, on

account of their political activities and their fanaticism, had to be

isolated as representing a particularly dangerous threat to National

Socialism.

Turning to the introductory letter, I may say that it has already been

presented here by the Prosecutor of the Soviet Union. It is a letter

from the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the OKW, Admiral Canaris,

reminding one of the general order which I have just mentioned and

adding a series of remarks in which he formulates and emphasizes his

doubts about the decree and his objections to it. About the memorandum

which is attached I need not say any more. It is an extract, and also

the orders which the Soviet Union issued in their turn I think on 1

July, for the treatment of prisoners of war, that is, the directives for

the treatment of German prisoners of war. I received this on 15

September, whereas the other order had been issued about a week earlier;

and after studying this report from Canaris, I must admit I shared his

objections. Therefore I took all the papers to Hitler and asked him to

cancel the provisions and to make a further statement on the subject.

The Führer said that we could not expect that German prisoners of war

would be treated according to the Geneva Convention or international law

on the other side. We had no way of investigating it and he saw no

reason to alter the directives he had issued on that account. He refused

point-blank, so I returned the file with my marginal notes to Admiral

Canaris. The order remained in force.

DR. NELTE: What was the actual treatment accorded to Soviet prisoners of

war? Was it in compliance with the instructions issued or was it handled

differently in practice?

KEITEL: According to my own personal observations and the reports which

have been put before me, the practice was, if I may say so, very much

better and more favorable than the very severe instructions first issued

when it had been agreed that the prisoners of war were to be transported

to Germany. At any rate, I have seen numerous reports stating that labor

conditions, particularly in agriculture, but also in war economy, and in

particular in the general institution of war economy such as railways,

the building of roads, and so on, were considerably better than might

have been expected, considering the severe terms of the instructions.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, may I refer on this occasion to Document

Number 6 in the document book?

THE PRESIDENT: Which document book?

DR. NELTE: Document Number 6, in Document Book Number 1—in my document

book, Number 6—“Conditions of employment for workers from the East, as

well as Soviet Russian prisoners of war.” In this document book I have

included from the book I am submitting only those passages which concern

the conditions of employment for Soviet Russian prisoners of war. I am

submitting this book in evidence as Exhibit K-6, and beg the Tribunal to

admit it in evidence without my having to read from it. These

instructions refer expressly to the points which indicate that at a

later period Soviet Russian prisoners of war were to be treated in

accordance with the Geneva Convention as laid down by the OKW, author of

the decree.

May I continue?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. You do not wish to read from it?

DR. NELTE: No, I do not want to.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, will you explain to me just what

relations existed between the police, or rather Himmler, on the one hand

and the Prisoners of War Organization, the KGW, on the other?

KEITEL: May I say, first of all, that there was constant friction

between Himmler and the corresponding police services and the

departments of the Wehrmacht which worked in this sphere and that this

friction never stopped. It was apparent right from the first that

Himmler at least desired to have the lead in his own hands, and he never

ceased trying to obtain influence of one kind or another over

prisoner-of-war affairs. The natural circumstances of escapes, recapture

by police, searches and inquiries, the complaints about insufficient

guarding of prisoners, the insufficient security measures in the camps,

the lack of guards and their inefficiency—all these things suited him;

and he exploited them in talks with Hitler, when he continually accused

the Wehrmacht behind its back, if I may use the expression, of every

possible shortcoming and failure to carry out their duty. As a result of

this Hitler was continually intervening, and in most cases I did not

know the reason. He took up the charges and intervened constantly in

affairs so that the Wehrmacht departments were kept in what I might term

a state of perpetual unrest. In this connection, since I could not

investigate matters myself, I was forced to give instructions to my

departments in the OKW.

DR. NELTE: What was the underlying cause and the real purpose which

Himmler attempted to achieve?

KEITEL: He wanted not only to gain influence but also, as far as

possible, to have prisoner-of-war affairs under himself as Chief of

Police in Germany so that he would reign supreme in these matters, if I

may say so.

DR. NELTE: Did not the question of procuring labor enter into it?

KEITEL: Later on that did become apparent, yes. I think I shall have to

refer to that later but I can say now that one observation at least was

made which could not be misinterpreted: The searches and inquiries, made

at certain intervals in Germany for escaped persons, made it clear that

the majority of these prisoners of war did not go back to the camps from

which they had escaped so that obviously they had been retained by

police departments and probably used for labor under the jurisdiction of

Himmler. Naturally, the number of escapes increased every year and

became more and more extensive. For that, of course, there are quite

plausible reasons.

DR. NELTE: The prisoner-of-war system, of course, is pretty closely

connected with the labor problem. Which departments were responsible for

the employment of prisoners of war?

KEITEL: The departments which dealt with this were the State Labor

Offices in the so-called Reich Labor Allocation Service, which had

originally been in the hands of the Labor Minister and was later on

transferred to the Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor. In

practice it worked like this: The State Labor Offices applied for

workers to the Army district commands which had jurisdiction over the

camps. These workers were supplied as far as was possible under the

existing general directives.

DR. NELTE: What did the OKW have to do with the allocation of labor?

KEITEL: In general, of course, they had to supervise it, so that

allocation was regulated according to the general basic orders. It was

not possible, of course, and the inspector was not in a position to

check on how each individual was employed; after all, the army district

commanders and their generals for the KGW were responsible for that and

were the appropriate persons. The actual fight, as I might call it, for

prisoner-of-war labor did not really start until 1942. Until then, such

workers had been employed mainly in agriculture and the German railway

system and a number of general institutions, but not in industry. This

applies especially to Soviet prisoners of war who were, in the main,

agricultural workers.

DR. NELTE: What was the actual cause for these labor requirements?

KEITEL: During the winter of 1941-42 the problem of replacing soldiers

who had dropped out arose, particularly in the eastern theater of war.

Considerable numbers of soldiers fit for active service were needed for

the front and the armed services. I remember the figures. The army alone

needed replacements numbering from 2 to 2.5 million men every year.

Assuming that about 1 million of these would come from normal recruiting

and about half a million from rehabilitated men, that is, from sick and

wounded men who had recovered, that still left 1.5 million to be

replaced every year. These could be withdrawn from the war economy and

placed at the disposal of the services, the Armed Forces. From this fact

resulted the close correlation between the drawing off of these men from

the war economy and their replacement by new workers. This manpower had

to be taken from the prisoners of war on the one hand and

Plenipotentiary Sauckel, whose functions may be summarized as the task

of procuring labor, on the other hand. This connection kept bringing me

into these matters, too, since I was responsible for the replacements

for all the Wehrmacht—Army, Navy, and Air Force—in other words, for

the recruiting system. That is why I was present at discussions between

Sauckel and the Führer regarding replacements and how these replacements

were to be found.

DR. NELTE: What can you tell me about the allocation of prisoners of war

in industry and in the armament industry?

KEITEL: Up to 1942 or thereabouts we had not used prisoners of war in

any industry even indirectly connected with armaments. This was due to

an express prohibition issued by Hitler, which was made by him because

he feared attempts at sabotaging machines, production equipment, _et

cetera_. He regarded things of that kind as probable and dangerous. Not

until necessity compelled us to use every worker in some capacity in the

home factories did we abandon this principle. It was no longer

discussed; and naturally prisoners of war came to be used after that in

the general war production, while my view which I, that is the OKW,

expressed in my general orders, was that their use in armament factories

was forbidden; I thought that it was not permissible to employ prisoners

of war in factories which were exclusively making armaments, by which I

mean war equipment, weapons, and munitions.

For the sake of completeness, perhaps I should add that an order issued

by the Führer at a later date decreed further relaxation of the

limitations of the existing orders. I think the Prosecution stated that

Minister Speer is supposed to have spoken of so many thousands of

prisoners of war employed in the war economy. I may say, however, that

many jobs had to be done in the armament industry which had nothing to

do with the actual production of arms and ammunition.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have frequently stated that prisoners of war

were detained by the police and even placed in concentration camps. Can

you give an explanation about that?

KEITEL: I think the explanation of that is that the selection process

already mentioned took place in the camps. Furthermore there are

documents to show that prisoners of war in whose case the disciplinary

powers of the commander were not sufficient were singled out and handed

over to the Secret State Police. Finally, I have already mentioned the

subject of prisoners who escaped and were recaptured, a considerable

number of whom, if not the majority, did not return to their camps.

Instructions on the part of the OKW or the Chief of Prisoners of War

Organization ordering the surrender of these prisoners to concentration

camps are not known to me and have never been issued. But the fact that,

when they were handed over to the police, they frequently did end up in

the concentration camps has been made known here in various ways, by

documents and witnesses. That is my explanation.

DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have presented a document which bears

the Number 1650-PS. This is an order, or, rather, an alleged order, from

the OKW ordering that escaped prisoners of war who are not employed are

to be surrendered to the Security Service. After what you have just told

us, you will have to give an explanation of that. I am showing you, in

addition, Document 1514-PS, an order from the Wehrkreiskommando VI (Area

Command), from which you will be able to see the procedure adopted by

the OKW in connection with the surrender of prisoners of war to the

Secret State Police.

KEITEL: First of all, I want to discuss Document 1650-PS. To begin with,

I have to state that I did not know of that order, that it was never in

my hands, and that so far I have not been able to find out how it came

to be issued.

DR. NELTE: Wouldn’t you like to say, first of all, that the document as

such is not a document of the OKW?

KEITEL: I am coming to that.

DR. NELTE: I am afraid you must start with that in order to clear up the

matter.

KEITEL: The document starts like a document which has been confiscated

in a police department. It starts with the words, “The OKW has ordered

as follows:”; after that come the Numbers 1, 2, 3 and then it goes on to

say, “In this connection I order...”, and that is the Supreme Police

Chief of the Reich Security Head Office; it is signed by Müller, not

Kaltenbrunner but Müller. I have certainly not signed this order OKW 1

to 3, and I have not seen it; there is no doubt about that. The fact

that technical expressions, “Stage 3 b” _et cetera_, are used proves

that in itself. These are terms used by the police and they are unknown

to me. I must say, therefore, that I am not sure how this document was

drafted. I cannot explain it. There are assumptions and possibilities,

and I should like to mention them briefly because I have given a great

deal of thought to the matter. First, I do not believe that any

department of the OKW, that is, the Chief of Prisoners of War

Organization or the Chief of the General Wehrmacht Office, could have

issued this order independently without instructions to do so. I

consider that quite impossible, as it was completely contrary to the

general tendency. I have no recollection that I have ever received any

instructions of this kind from Hitler or that I have passed any such

instruction on to anybody else. I conclude that even if this may look

like an excuse, there were, of course, other channels which the Führer

used without regard to competency. And, if I must supply an explanation,

such orders could have been given through an adjutant without my

knowledge. I emphasize that this is a supposition and that it cannot

absolve me from blame.

There is only one thing that I would like to say, and that is with

reference to the Document 1514-PS. This is a captured order from the

Wehrkreiskommando VI, at Münster, dated 27 July 1944, in other words,

the summer of 1944. It deals with escaped prisoners of war and how they

are to be dealt with. It says “Reference,” and then it quotes seven

different orders from the year 1942 up to the beginning of July 1944.

This order deals with the question of escaped prisoners of war and ought

to have been incorporated in this document, if the military office of

Wehrkreis VI had had such an OKW order. That fact is remarkable, and it

led me to the conclusion that there never was a written order and that

the military authorities in question never received such an order at

all. I cannot say more about it since I cannot prove it.

DR. NELTE: You know that the Prosecution have submitted an order,

according to which Soviet Russian prisoners of war were to be marked by

means of tattooing, so that they could be identified. Would you please

make a statement on that?

KEITEL: The facts are as follows: During the summer of 1942, the Führer

called the Quartermaster General of the Army to headquarters for a

report lasting several hours, at which the Führer asked him to report on

conditions in the Eastern rear army territory. I was suddenly called in

and told that the Quartermaster General was saying that thousands of

Russian prisoners of war were escaping every month, that they

disappeared among the population, immediately discarded their uniforms,

and procured civilian clothes, and could no longer be identified. I was

ordered to make investigations and to devise some means of

identification which would enable them to be identified even after they

had put on civilian clothing. Thereupon I sent instructions to Berlin,

saying that such an order should be prepared but that investigations

should first be made by the international law department of the Foreign

Office to find out whether such an order could be given at all; and,

secondly, whether it could be carried out technically.

I should like to say that we were thinking of tattoo marks of the kind

found on many seamen and bricklayers in Germany. But I heard no more

about it. One day I met the Foreign Minister at headquarters and talked

to him about the question. Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop knew about

the inquiry submitted to the Foreign Office and considered the measure

extremely questionable. That was the first news I had about the subject.

I gave immediate instructions, whether personally or through the

adjutant I cannot remember, that the order was not to go out. I had

neither seen a draft nor had I signed anything. At any rate I gave an

unmistakable order: “The order is in no circumstances to be issued.” I

received no further detailed information at the time. I heard nothing

more about it and I was convinced that the order had not been issued.

When I was interrogated, I made a statement on those lines. I have now

been told by my Defense Counsel that the woman secretary of the Chief of

the Prisoners of War Organization has volunteered to testify that the

order was rescinded and was not to be issued and, further, that she had

received those instructions personally. She said in her statement,

however, that this did not happen until several days after the order had

actually gone out and that that was the only possible explanation of how

that order came to be found in the police office as still valid.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I shall submit the affidavit of the witness

which has been received at the appropriate time.

[_Turning to the defendant._] We now turn to the case of Sagan. The

Prosecution originally accused you of giving the order for the killing

of 50 Royal Air Force officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III at

Sagan.

I am no longer clear as to whether the Prosecution still maintain this

grave accusation since Reich Marshal Göring and the witness Westhoff

have been interrogated, the latter outside these proceedings. I have the

report of Westhoff’s interrogation before me and I have also submitted

it to you. I should like to ask you now to amplify the statement which

the witness Westhoff made during the preliminary proceedings and which

he will make shortly in this court, and to say what you yourself know

about this extremely grave incident.

KEITEL: The facts are that one morning it was reported to me that the

escape had taken place. At the same time I received the information that

about 15 of the escaped officers had been apprehended in the vicinity of

the camp. I did not intend to report the case at the noon conference on

the military situation held at Berchtesgaden, or rather, at the Berghof,

as it was highly unpleasant, being the third mass escape in a very short

period. As it had happened only 10 or 12 hours before, I hoped that in

the course of the day the majority of them would be caught and that in

this way the matter might be settled satisfactorily.

While I was making my report Himmler appeared. I think that it was

towards the end of my report that he announced the incident in my

presence, as he had already started the usual general search for the

escaped prisoners. There was an extremely heated discussion, a serious

clash between Hitler and myself, since he immediately made the most

outrageous accusations against me on account of this incident.

Things are sometimes incorrectly represented in Westhoff’s account, and

that is why I am making a detailed statement. During this clash the

Führer stated in great excitement, “These prisoners are not to be sent

back to the Armed Forces; they are to stay with the Police.” I

immediately objected sharply. I said that this procedure was impossible.

The general excitement led Hitler to declare again and with considerable

emphasis, “I am ordering you to retain them, Himmler; you are not to

give them up.”

I put up a fight for the men who had already come back and who should,

according to the original order, be brought out again and handed over to

the police. I succeeded in doing it; but I could not do anything more.

After that very grave clash...

DR. NELTE: Will you tell me, please who was present during that scene?

KEITEL: As far as I remember, Colonel General Jodl was certainly

present, at least for part of the time, and heard some of it, though

perhaps not every word, since he was in the adjoining room at first. At

any rate, Jodl and I returned to our quarters together. We discussed the

case and talked about the extremely unpleasant consequences which the

whole matter would have. On returning to my quarters I immediately

ordered General Von Graevenitz to report to me the following morning.

In this connection I must explain that Reich Marshal Göring was not

present. If I was a little uncertain about that during my interrogation

it was because I was told that witnesses had already stated that Göring

was present. But right from the beginning I thought it improbable and

doubtful. It is also incorrect, therefore, that Göring raised any

accusations against me at the time. There had not been a conference in

Berlin either. These are mistakes which I think I can explain by saying

that Graevenitz, who came with Westhoff and saw me for the first time,

was present during the report and witnessed a scene of a kind unusual in

military life, because of the violence of my remarks in connection with

the incident.

Do you want me to say anything more about the discussion with

Graevenitz?

DR. NELTE: The only thing which interests me in this connection is,

whether you repeated to Graevenitz the order previously given by Hitler

in such a way that both Graevenitz and Westhoff who was also present,

might get the impression that you yourself had issued the order for the

shooting of the escaped officers.

KEITEL: According to the record of Westhoff’s interrogation, which I

have seen, I can explain it, I think, as follows: first of all, I made

serious accusations. I myself was extraordinarily excited, for I must

say that even the order that the prisoners were to be retained by the

police caused me extreme anxiety regarding their fate. I frankly admit

that the possibility of their being shot while trying to escape remained

in my subconscious mind. I certainly spoke in extreme agitation at the

time and did not weigh my words carefully. And I certainly repeated

Hitler’s words, which were, “We must make an example,” since I was

afraid of some further serious encroachments upon the Prisoners of War

Organization in other ways, apart from this single case of the prisoners

not being returned to the Wehrmacht. On reading the interrogation report

I saw the statement by Graevenitz, or rather, Westhoff, to the effect

that I had said, “They will be shot, and most of them must be dead

already.” I probably said something like, “You will see what a disaster

this is; perhaps many of them have been shot already.”

I did not know, however, that they had already been shot; and I must

confess that in my presence Hitler never said a word about anybody being

shot. He only said, “Himmler, you will keep them; you will not hand them

over.” I did not find out until several days later that they had been

shot. I saw among other papers also an official report from the British

Government stating that not until the 31st—the escape took place on the

25th—that not until the 31st were they actually shot.

Therefore Westhoff is also wrong in thinking that orders had already

been issued saying that an announcement was to be made in the camp

stating that certain people had been shot or would not return and that

lists of names were to be posted. That order did not come until later,

and I remember it; I remember it because of the following incident:

A few days afterwards, I think on or about the 31st, before the

situation report, one of the adjutants told me that a report had been

received that some had been shot. I requested a discussion alone with

Hitler and told him that I had heard that people had been shot by the

police. All he said was that he had received it too—naturally, since it

was his report. In extreme disgust I told him my opinion of it. At that

time he told me that it was to be published in the camp as a warning to

the others. Only upon this the announcement in the camp was ordered. In

any case, Westhoff’s recollection of some of the facts, which he has

sworn to, is not quite accurate, even if such expressions as those used

by him and explained by me here may have occurred. We shall hear his own

account of that.

DR. NELTE: Did Hitler ever tell you that he had ordered those men to be

shot?

KEITEL: No, he never told me that. I never heard it from him. I heard it

very much later, as far as I can remember, from Reich Marshal Göring,

with whom the whole incident was, of course, the subject of discussions

and conversations, especially as an Air Force camp was involved.

DR. NELTE: I should like to say in conclusion: Are you stating under

oath, here, that you yourself neither ordered these Royal Air Force

officers to be shot, nor did you receive and pass on such an order, nor

did you yourself learn who gave the order?

KEITEL: That is correct. I neither received that order nor did I know or

hear of it; nor did I pass on such an order. I can repeat this herewith

under oath.

DR. NELTE: We now turn to deportations. What the Prosecution refer to as

deportation of workers is the removal of bodily fit citizens of the

occupied territories to Germany or other occupied territories for the

purpose of using them for “slave labor” on defense work or other tasks

connected with warfare. That is the accusation which I have read to you.

The Prosecution have repeatedly coupled your name with these accusations

and have said that you, that is, the OKW, had co-operated in supplying

workers for the German war economy. You know that in fact the Defendant

Sauckel was the Plenipotentiary in that field. I should like to ask you

whether workers had been taken from the occupied territories and brought

to Germany before Plenipotentiary Sauckel was appointed.

KEITEL: As far as I know, workers came from occupied territories,

especially those in the West: Belgium, Holland—I do not know about

Holland, but certainly France—to Germany. According to what I heard, I

understood at the time that it was done by recruiting volunteers. I

think I remember that General Von Stülpnagel, the military commander of

Paris, told me in Berlin once during a meeting that more than 200,000

had volunteered, but I cannot remember exactly when that was.

DR. NELTE: Was the OKW the competent authority on these matters?

KEITEL: No, the OKW had nothing to do with it. These questions were

handled through the usual channels, the OKH, the Military Commanders in

France and in Belgium and Northern France with the competent central

authorities of the Reich at home, the OKW never had anything to do with

it.

DR. NELTE: What about civilian administration in occupied territories?

KEITEL: In occupied territories with civilian administration, the

Wehrmacht was excluded from any executive powers in the administration,

so that in these territories the Wehrmacht and its services had

certainly nothing to do with it. Only in those territories which were

still operational areas for the Army were executive powers given to

military troops, high commanders, army commanders, _et cetera_. The OKW

did not come into the official procedure here either.

DR. NELTE: According to an interrogation report submitted here the

Defendant Sauckel said that you, that is, the OKW, were responsible for

giving instructions to the military commanders in the occupied

territories and that he, Sauckel, was to have their support in his

recruiting campaigns for getting the quotas. What can you say about

that?

KEITEL: The view held by Plenipotentiary Sauckel can obviously be

explained by the fact that he knew neither the official service channels

nor the functions of the Wehrmacht, that he saw me at one or two

discussions on the furnishing of manpower, and, thirdly, that he

sometimes came to see me when he had made his report and received his

orders alone. He had probably been given orders to do so, in Hitler’s

usual way: Go and see the Chief of the OKW; he will do the rest. The OKW

had no occasion to do anything. The OKW had no right to give orders, but

in Sauckel’s case I did take over the job of informing the OKH or the

technical departments in the General Quartermaster’s office. I have

never issued orders or instructions of my own to the military commanders

or other services in occupied territories. It was not one of the

functions of the OKW.

DR. NELTE: A document has been submitted here according to which

Generals Stapf and Nagel had agreed to ask you to exercise pressure or

coercion during the recruiting campaigns in the East. That, at any rate,

is the assertion by the Prosecution. Do you know of this happening?

KEITEL: I remembered it when the document was presented. It was

obviously an attempt on the part of Stapf, who had worked with me in the

Army for many years, to get the Führer’s support or assistance through

my mediation. Stapf, who was the director of the Economic Staff East at

the time, and General Nagel, who was also mentioned in this connection

and who was in charge of the Economic Inspectorate Department in the

East, had obviously tried to involve me in the matter. According to the

document, some pressure had to be applied from higher quarters; but I

took no steps at all as I had nothing to do with these things.

DR. NELTE: I am now going to deal with the question of the pillage of

art treasures.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we might adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have accused you, among other things,

of issuing directives regarding the safeguarding and confiscation of

objects of art, libraries, _et cetera_. Were any military orders,

directives, or instructions laid down before the campaign in the West or

in the East, with regard to objects of art, libraries, and their

treatment in occupied territories?

KEITEL: No, as far as I know, there was nothing at all about these

matters, although thorough provision had been made for everything else

which might happen in the course of a war. I am not aware of any orders

which were given with that in mind.

DR. NELTE: I am going to show you three documents submitted by the

French Prosecution, which mention you in connection with Rosenberg’s

special staff, which has already been mentioned here on various

occasions. These are Documents 137-PS, 138-PS, and 140-PS. These are

documents from the Chief of the OKW to the Commander-in-Chief of the

Army in France and in the Netherlands.

KEITEL: The first two documents, 137-PS and 138-PS, came from

headquarters. They were dictated in part by myself and sent to offices

of the Army. One says “To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,” the other

one “To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Occupied France” and to

the “Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands.” They originated

partly in answers to queries from various military offices which

considered themselves responsible for the safekeeping or guarding of

whatever was in the occupied territories, and also from offices which

obviously were going to collect, inspect, to register, or otherwise

investigate these art treasures, libraries, _et cetera_, and to

confiscate them. In one case I was called up on the phone by the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army, I think, who protested against this, at

other times by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. The Führer directed me to

instruct military services to acquiesce in this and to state their

agreements, as they were directives which he had issued and approved

himself. The way in which the documents are drawn up shows, in itself,

that they did not emanate from an OKW office. My adjutant signed them;

but I myself dictated them on the Führer’s orders and sent them out.

These queries may have been made just because no provision had been made

and no orders given. I did not know what was to be done with these art

treasures, _et cetera_; but I naturally took the view that the object

was to safeguard them. No mention was made of transport, or

confiscation, or expropriation; and the question did not occur to me; I

merely gave these instructions in quite a brief form and did not bother

any further about the matter. I took them to be precautionary measures

and they did not seem to me to be unjustified.

DR. NELTE: Then you mean the OKW had no jurisdiction over these affairs?

KEITEL: No.

DR. NELTE: It was a question of merely transmitting letters to the

military authorities to make known Hitler’s wishes to assist Rosenberg

in his task?

KEITEL: That is correct.

DR. NELTE: I should like to put a personal question to you in this

connection. Have you ever appropriated to yourself any of the art

treasures from public or private ownership in the occupied countries, or

did any office whatever assign any work of art to you?

KEITEL: No, I never had anything to do with these things.

DR. NELTE: We now come to the so-called economic exploitation of

occupied territories. You are accused of participating, in your official

position as Chief of the OKW, in the economic exploitation of the

occupied Eastern countries and the Western occupied countries. This

question has already been discussed in Reich Marshal Göring’s

examination, so I can treat it relatively briefly. It is, however,

necessary for you to clarify the extent to which the OKW, and yourself

in particular, were connected with these matters, for both the OKW and

yourself are mentioned in this connection, as well as the

Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt (Economic Armament Office), which was a branch of

the OKW. General Thomas of that office prepared a compilation which was

produced by the Prosecution. What can you say about this question, if I

have Document 1157-PS and USSR-80 shown to you?

KEITEL: 1157-PS deals with “Plan Barbarossa Oldenburg.” I would like to

say this:

The Wehrwirtschaftsamt (War Economy Office), which even then was no

longer known as the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt carried out under its chief,

General Thomas, certain organizational preparations, first for the

campaign in the West and later for campaign Barbarossa in the East. They

were made by the military economic organization at home, in the Reich,

which had teams attached to all Wehrkreiskommandos. As a result,

advisers and some personnel with experience in problems of war economy

supplies and a few small detachments called Feldwirtschaftskommandos

(Field Economic Detachments) were assigned to the Army Commands (the

A.O.K’s).

The personnel attached to the Quartermaster Staffs at the A.O.K. were

responsible for securing, or causing to be secured, supplies, fuel, and

food stuffs found in occupied or conquered territories, as well as other

articles suitable for the immediate requirements of the troops. They

should then co-operate with the Senior Quartermaster, who looks after my

army supplies, and the intendant in charge of the transport of supplies,

in making them available for the fighting troops. Information obtained

regarding war economy in the important areas of France and Belgium, as

far as such information could be obtained, was kept for later use. The

East, as I believe Reich Marshal Göring has already explained at length,

was organized on quite a different basis with a view not only to

supplying the troops, but also to exploiting the conquered territories.

An organization serving this aim was built up, called

Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost-Oldenburg (Economic Organization

East-Oldenburg). Its connection with the OKW lay in the fact that the

necessary preparations for organizing and developing panels of experts

and technical branch offices had to be discussed with the Ministry of

Economics, the Four Year Plan, and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

That was Wirtschaftsorganisation Oldenburg. The OKW and its Chief, that

is myself, had no power to give orders or instructions affecting its

activities. The organization was created and placed at the disposal of

those responsible for putting it in action, giving it instructions and

working with it. If General Thomas wrote in his book, which was produced

here as a document...

DR. NELTE: 2353-PS (Exhibit Number USA-35), Page 386. Perhaps you will

just read that, so that you can give us a summary.

KEITEL: Yes. This is an excerpt from the book of General Thomas, where

he describes in detail his own functions and those of the organization

which he directed in the OKW, from its origin until far into the war. He

says here:

“The functions exercised by the Economic Armament Office

(Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt) while the Eastern campaign was going on

consisted mainly in the organizational management of the

economic machinery set in motion and in advising the Operational

Staff for War Economy East.”

DR. NELTE: You need read only Paragraph 4 for your summary.

KEITEL: The Operational Staff for Military Economy East, attached to the

Four Year Plan as Barbarossa-Oldenburg, was responsible for the entire

economic direction of the whole of the Eastern area. It was responsible,

for the technical instructions of the State Secretaries in the

Operational Staff for Military Economy, for the organization of Thomas’

Economic Armament Office, and for applying all measures to be taken by

the Operational Staff for Military Economy East under the direction and

command of the Reich Marshal.

DR. NELTE: How were conditions in the West?

KEITEL: I described very briefly the small group of experts attached to

the High Command quartermaster departments in the West. Later on, as I

have already stated, at the beginning of June, the entire economic

direction was transferred to the Four Year Plan and the

plenipotentiaries for the Four Year Plan, as far as anything passed

beyond current supplies intended to cover daily requirements, fuel, _et

cetera_. This was done by a special decree, which has already been

mentioned by the Reich Marshal and which had been issued by the Führer.

DR. NELTE: That was laid down by General Thomas on Page 304 in Document

2353-PS, which we have already mentioned. There is no need for me to

read this; and I request the Tribunal to allow me to present the

defendant’s affidavit in Document Book Number 2 for the Military

Economic Armament Office of the OKW, as Document Keitel-11 in evidence,

so that no further questions on the subject may be necessary. I assume

that the Prosecution will agree to this procedure.

THE PRESIDENT: What number is it in Book 2?

DR. NELTE: Number 4 in this Document Book Number 2. It is Page 27 and

following, in Document Book 2, submitted to the Court. The document is

dated 29 March 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: What date did you say it is?

DR. NELTE: The 29th of March 1946. I do not think there is any date in

the document book. I will present the original, which I have here.

THE PRESIDENT: How is it described in the document itself? We have a

document dated 4 March 1946, “The Economic Armament Office of the

Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.” Is that right?

DR. NELTE: The document was written on 4 March 1946, but the affidavit

was added on 29 March 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: But that appears to have been 8 March? Is it that

document?

DR. NELTE: The Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt in the OKW. It is possible.

THE PRESIDENT: That’s here.

DR. NELTE: In any case, there is no doubt about the identity of the

document.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now I come to a topic which is presented

again and again before the high Tribunal and which is very difficult

because the reason for these questions is not properly understood.

The charge has been made against you that in your capacity as a member

of the government, as the Prosecution contend, you knew, or must have

known of the happenings in the concentration camps. I am therefore

compelled to ask you what you know about the existence of the

concentration camps, how much you knew and what you had to do with them.

Did you know of their existence? Did you know that concentration camps

existed?

KEITEL: Yes, I knew already before the war that concentration camps

existed; but at that time I knew only two of them by name; and I

supposed and assumed that there were other concentration camps besides

the two I knew. I had no further particulars about the existence of

concentration camps. As far as internees in such camps were concerned, I

knew that they included habitual criminals and political opponents. As

Reich Marshal Göring has said, that was the basis of the institution.

DR. NELTE: Did you hear anything about the treatment of internees?

KEITEL: No, I heard nothing precise about it. I assumed that it was a

severe form of detention, or one which brought severe measures in its

train, under certain specific circumstances. I knew nothing about the

conditions found there, especially ill-treatment of internees, tortures,

_et cetera_.

I tried in two cases to free individuals who were in concentration

camps. One was Pastor Niemöller, by intervention of Grossadmiral Raeder.

With the help of Canaris and at the request of Grossadmiral Raeder, I

tried to get Pastor Niemöller out of the concentration camps. The

attempt was unsuccessful. I made a second attempt at the request of a

family in my home village, in a case where a peasant was in a

concentration camp for political reasons; and in this case I succeeded.

The individual involved was set free. That was in the autumn of 1940. I

had a talk with this man; and when I asked him what things were like

there, he gave me a non-committal reply to the effect that he had been

all right. He gave me no details. I know of no other cases.

DR. NELTE: When you talked to this man did you have the impression that

anything had happened to him?

KEITEL: Undoubtedly he did not give that impression. I did not see him

directly after his release. I saw him later when I was at home. The

reason that I talked to him was because he came to thank me. He said

nothing about being badly treated or anything like that at all.

DR. NELTE: It has been stated here that now and again these

concentration camps were visited by members of the Wehrmacht, by

officers—and high ranking officers, too. How do you explain that?

KEITEL: I am convinced that these visits took place on Himmler’s

invitation. I myself once received a personal invitation from him to pay

a visit to the Dachau Camp from Munich. He said he would like to show it

to me. I know also that large and small groups of officers and

commissions were shown through the camps. I think I need scarcely say

how these visits were handled as regards the things that were shown to

them. To supplement my statement I would like to say it was not uncommon

to hear such remarks as “You’ll end up in a concentration camp!” or “All

sorts of things go on there.” I do know, however, that whenever anyone

came to me with these rumors and stories and I asked what exactly they

knew and where the information came from, the reply was always: “I

really do not know; I just heard it.” So that whatever one might think,

one never got at the facts and never could get at them.

DR. NELTE: You heard that medical experiments were made on these

internees, and that this was done by agreement with higher quarters. I

ask you whether you had knowledge of that, either personally or from the

Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.

KEITEL: No, I never heard anything about the medical experiments on

internees, which have been described here in detail, either officially

or otherwise. Nothing.

DR. NELTE: I turn now to a group of questions relating to the

Prosecution’s assertion that you intended to have General Weygand and

General Giraud assassinated or, at least, were participating in plans to

that end. You know that witness Lahousen, on 30 November 1945 stated

that Admiral Canaris had been pressed by you for some time,

November-December 1940, to do away with the Chief of the French General

Staff, General Weygand.

Lahousen added that Canaris told his departmental heads that after a

talk with you. Did you discuss the case of General Weygand with Canaris?

KEITEL: That is probably correct, for there were reports at the time

that General Weygand was traveling in North Africa, visiting the troops,

and inspecting the colonial troops. I consider it quite natural that I

told Canaris, who was the Chief of Counterintelligence, that it should

be possible to determine the object of General Weygand’s journey, the

places at which he stopped in North Africa, and whether any military

significance could be attached to this visit, as regards putting

colonial troops into action or the introduction of other measures

concerning them in North Africa. He is sure to have received

instructions to try to get information through his Intelligence

Department as to what was taking place.

DR. NELTE: I assume, also to keep an eye on him?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Could the Counterintelligence department send members of its

staff to North Africa?

KEITEL: I believe that certain channels of information existed via

Spanish Morocco; and I know that Canaris maintained intelligence links

with Morocco by way of Spain.

DR. NELTE: My question was meant to find out whether it was officially

possible to visit North Africa in agreement with France.

KEITEL: Of course it was possible. After the Armistice, there were

Disarmament Commissions in North Africa, as well as in France. We had

several Army departments there in connection with checking up the

armaments of the North African troops.

DR. NELTE: What was the point, or was there any point, in wishing

General Weygand ill? Was he a declared opponent of the policy Germany

wished to carry through? What was the reason?

KEITEL: We had no reason to think that General Weygand might be, shall

we say, inconvenient. In view of the connection with Marshal Pétain,

which was started about the end of September and the beginning of

October of that year, and the well-known collaboration policy which

reached its height in the winter of 1940-41, it was absurd even to think

of doing away with the Marshal’s Chief of Staff. An action of this kind

would not have fitted into the general policy followed in dealing with

the situation in North Africa. We released a large number of officers in

the regular French Colonial Army from French prisoner-of-war camps in

the winter of 1940-1941 for service with the colonial forces. There were

generals among them; I remember General Juin in particular who, as we

knew at the time, had been Chief of the General Staff in North Africa

for many years. At my suggestion he was put at the disposal of the

Marshal by Hitler, obviously with the aim of utilizing him in the

colonial service. There had not been the slightest motive for wishing

General Weygand ill or to think of anything of the sort.

DR. NELTE: Is it correct that conferences even took place with the

French General Staff and Laval about co-operating in operations in

Africa and the strengthening of West Africa?

KEITEL: Yes. Among the documents of the French Armistice Delegation

there ought to be a large number of documents asking for all sorts of

concessions in connection with North Africa and more especially Central

and West Africa, owing to the fact that during the winter of 1940-41

riots had taken place in French Central Africa against which the French

Government wanted to take measures. I believe that in the spring of 1941

a conference lasting several days took place in Paris with the French

General Staff, in order to prepare measures in which the German

Wehrmacht, which already had troops stationed in Tripoli in the Italian

area, would participate.

DR. NELTE: So there is no apparent motive?

KEITEL: No.

DR. NELTE: Something must have been said, however, in this conversation

with Canaris, which led to this misunderstanding. Can you suggest

anything which might have caused this misunderstanding?

KEITEL: It can only be that, according to the very comprehensive details

given by Lahousen in his testimony, I said at a later meeting, “What

about Weygand?” That was the phrase Lahousen used; and he might have

drawn the conclusion that, perhaps, in that sense of the word, as he

represented it, he kept on saying “in that sense of the word,” and when

asked what that meant, he said, “To kill him.” It is due only to that,

it can be due only to that. I must say that Canaris was frequently alone

with me. Often he brought the chiefs of his departments along. When we

discussed matters by ourselves, I thought he was always perfectly frank

with me. If he had misunderstood me, there would certainly have been

discussions about it, but he never said anything like that.

DR. NELTE: Is it clear to you that if there had been any idea of putting

Weygand out of the way, it would have constituted an act of high

political significance?

KEITEL: Yes, of course. In the collaboration of the Führer Adolf Hitler

and Marshal Pétain an act of that kind would have had the greatest

imaginable political significance.

DR. NELTE: Then you still believe that if it had happened, it would have

meant the breaking-off of the policy initiated by Hitler?

KEITEL: Certainly one would have had to expect that.

DR. NELTE: Only with regard to the great importance of General Weygand’s

personality?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Can you give any other explanation, or any proof that the

designs attributed to you, but thanks be to God were never put into

practice, had no foundation in fact?

KEITEL: Although it was at a much later date that General Weygand was

taken to Germany, on the occupation of the hitherto unoccupied zone of

Southern France, I was told by the Führer himself that he had given

orders only for the general to be interned in his own home, without

being inconvenienced by guards—an honorable arrest and not the

treatment accorded to an ordinary prisoner of war. Of course, that was

in 1942.

DR. NELTE: Therefore, you finally and repeatedly deny under oath that

you gave any order or expressed yourself in any way which might lead

your hearers to conclude that you intended or wished General Weygand to

be put out of the way?

KEITEL: Yes. I can expressly reaffirm that.