KEITEL: I can readily understand the fact that functions of a

ministerial nature which necessarily brought me frequently into contact

with ministers of the Reich—in the course of a war everything is tied

up with the Wehrmacht in some way or other—would seem to indicate that

I had exercised a political function in these matters. The same

conclusion can be drawn from other events. That is, my presence at State

visits and similar functions as indicated by many documents might

suggest that I was exercising political functions or in some way had

been called to exercise such functions. Neither is true; neither in

regard to internal German ministerial functions nor in regard to matters

connected with foreign policy. There were naturally a great many things

to be settled with the ministries, the technical ministries. The

Wehrmacht had to participate and had a voice in almost all the decrees

which were issued by the civilian ministries. This work was naturally

done in Berlin. The fact that I had to remain with the Führer at his

headquarters kept me away; and this meant that my offices, the offices

of the OKW, had to settle these questions with the Reich departments and

their experts rather independently on the whole. Thus it happened,

naturally, that decrees of this kind were drawn up requiring my comments

and the Führer’s consent, which was obtained through me and that in this

connection I was the person who co-ordinated the various wishes and

views of the High Commanders of the Wehrmacht branches and reduced them

to a common Wehrmacht denominator, so to speak. Through these activities

I was naturally drawn into the general apparatus of this work, but I do

not believe that this would justify the application of the term

“political general” to the Führer’s Military Chief of Staff.

DR. NELTE: What can you tell us with regard to foreign policy and the

meetings at which foreign policy was discussed?

KEITEL: Concerning the sphere of foreign policy, I would merely like to

emphasize what the former Reich Foreign Minister has already said about

collaboration with the leaders of the Wehrmacht. If at all, two of the

leading partners marched their own roads, then it was the foreign policy

on one side and the Wehrmacht on the other, especially under the

influence of the Führer himself, who did not desire collaboration and

opposed the mutual exchange of ideas. He kept us in avowedly separate

camps, and wished to work with each one separately. I must emphasize

that most strongly. To conclude, this applied to all other departments

who came to headquarters, that is, everything was discussed with them

alone, and they also left the headquarters alone.

There were contacts with the Foreign Office, as State Secretary Von

Steengracht has stated, with regard to all questions of international

law or, in connection therewith, with questions affecting the prisoners

of war, questions of communication with the protecting powers, and

questions which Von Steengracht may have had in mind when he said, “With

the Wehrmacht the whole field of an attaché’s work,” since all reports

sent by military attachés in neutral and friendly countries to the

Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht branches went through Foreign

Office channels. They all arrived there and we received them from there.

It was quite natural that during the war any news of special interest

might call for special contacts in that we often had to complain that

the reports did not reach us in time from the Foreign Office, and that

our Ministry wanted to have them sent direct and not by a roundabout

way. Otherwise, however, I must emphasize that there was no

collaboration in any other field nor, I might say, any community of work

in the field of strategics with the Foreign Office.

DR. NELTE: About ten days ago Document D-665 was submitted by the

Prosecution. This document is headed “The Führer’s Ideas Regarding the

Waffen-SS” dated 6 August 1940. In this document there is a passage by

the OKW which states the following:

“The Chief of the OKW has decided in this connection that it can

be only desirable for the ideas of the Führer to be given the

utmost publicity.”

Do you know this document?

KEITEL: Yes, I read this document at the time it was submitted, and I

remembered it. To explain the origin of this document I must say

briefly: After the war in France Hitler planned to give an independent

status to the SS units, the Waffen-SS units, or form them into complete

military bodies of troops. Until that time they had been parts of

infantry troops attached to different Army formations. Now these groups

were to be made into independent and fully-equipped units and would thus

become independent formations. This created extreme unrest in the Army,

and caused acute dissatisfaction among the generals. It was said to

denote competition to the Army and the breaking of the promise made to

the army that “there is only one bearer of arms in Germany, and that is

the Wehrmacht.” They asked: “Where would this lead to?”

At that time the Commander-in-Chief of the Army asked Hitler’s chief

adjutant for information about this revolting affair and General

Schmundt, with Hitler’s approval, then wrote the passage mentioned in

this document.

I went to the Führer personally about this question to tell him plainly

that the Army considered it an insult. He decided to handle the matter

through his chief adjutant, as it had nothing to do with the High

Command of the Wehrmacht. This announcement was then made by the Army

itself in order to calm the excited minds. My personal comment that

there was no objection to the widest publicity in this case either was

given to satisfy General Von Brauchitsch, who expressly requested to be

allowed to distribute it to every unit, in order to reassure the Army

that the troops in question were police troops who under all

circumstances had to have experience of active service, as otherwise

they would be denied any recognition at home as troops. That is how that

came about, and if I am asked today about my views on this matter I may

say briefly: I also thought at the time that there ought to be a limit

to these things; I believe 10 percent was the figure mentioned. With the

development of events in connection with the setting up of new

formations after 1942, these troops lost their original character of an

elite selected on physical and racial grounds. There was no mistaking

the fact that considerable pressure was exercised; and I myself was very

much afraid that some day this instrument of the Waffen-SS, which had

swelled to a force more than 20 divisions strong, would grow into a new

Army with a different ideology. We had very grave misgivings in this

respect, especially as what we now saw before us was no longer an elite

in any sense of the term, and since we even saw commissioned and

noncommissioned officers and men transferred from these troops to the

Wehrmacht. It was no longer the pick of volunteers. I do not think there

is anything further to add.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have submitted Document L-211 to me. It is

headed “War Operations as an Organizational Problem,” and contains the

comments of the OKW on the memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the

Army regarding the organization of the leadership of the Wehrmacht. This

document was submitted to prove that the OKW and you, as Chief of the

High Command of the Wehrmacht, held views which favored aggression and

had expressed them in this study.

I assume that you remember this study. What have you to say about the

accusation which is based on this study?

KEITEL: This study was submitted to me during my preliminary

interrogation and thus I was reminded of its existence. In this

connection I must also give a brief description of the background. It is

not an exaggeration to say that in the early twenties, that is, shortly

after the end of World War I, there was a great deal of literature

produced, I believe, in all countries which had taken part in the war,

on the most efficient organization and co-ordination at the highest

level in the Armed Forces (Kriegsspitzengliederung). I myself wrote on

the subject and I know the opinions held in the United States, England,

and France. At that time everybody was occupied with the question of

that organization, and Von Blomberg said he was in favor of the eighth

solution—seven had already been discarded.

In this connection a struggle developed, led by the High Command of the

Army and the General Staff of the Army, who constantly opposed the idea

of a combined supreme operational command of the Wehrmacht, and demanded

that the supreme authority should be in the hands of the Army General

Staff, as it was before.

When the High Command of the Wehrmacht was created and Blomberg had

gone, the Army thought the moment opportune to return with renewed vigor

to the attack. The result was a memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief

of the Army, written by General Beck, and the answer to this is the

study mentioned here. As I collaborated in the drafting of this answer,

I can vouch for the two men responsible for it, namely, Generaloberst

Jodl and myself, who were the only two who worked on it. I can state

that at that time we were not motivated by any acute problem or by any

preliminary general staff work in preparation for war, but only by the

fact, as I might put it, that of all the many memoranda and

investigations into the most expedient method, the one drawn up by us

appeared to be the most practical.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, does not the document speak for itself? He

says he collaborated in it, but that it was not concerned with war, so

that is all that needs to be said. The document speaks for itself then.

DR. NELTE: But surely he may clarify some of the ideas contained in this

document. Moreover, Mr. President, in regard to this question I took the

liberty of submitting the affidavit in Document Book Number 2: “High

Command of the Wehrmacht and General Staff” which is signed by the

Defendant Keitel as well as by Herr Jodl. It has been submitted to you

as Number 2 of Document Book 2.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that the affidavit of 8 March?

DR. NELTE: 29 March, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The first one in the book, or where is it?

DR. NELTE: No, in the second part.

THE PRESIDENT: But what page?

DR. NELTE: The pages have not been numbered consecutively, it has a

table of contents, and under that you will find it as Number 2.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you quoting them from L-211 now? Are you finished

with that?

DR. NELTE: This affidavit belongs to L-211.

THE PRESIDENT: I thought the witness said he had collaborated in the

study, which is L-211, and that it was not concerned with war. You might

leave it at that.

DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, in this Trial it matters to hear

what the defendants have to say about those documents which allegedly

accuse them. The explanation of Document L-211 which the Defendant

Keitel wishes to make is contained in the affidavit which I submitted in

Document Book Number 2.

THE PRESIDENT: If what he wishes to say was put down in the affidavit

then he should not have been asked about it; the affidavit should have

been read.

DR. NELTE: The difference between the length of his verbal statement and

the length of the affidavit is indicated by the relation of 1 to 10. He

gave only a brief summary of the answer he wished to make. The affidavit

is longer, and therefore I thought I could dispense with reading the

affidavit if he would give us a brief summary of the chief points with

which we are concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: You and I have a different idea of the word summary.

DR. NELTE: May I continue, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.

DR. NELTE: I now come to the question of rearmament, and the various

cases of Austria, Czechoslovakia, _et cetera_. I would like to ask you

about the accusation of the Prosecution that you participated in the

planning and preparation of wars of aggression. So that we can

understand each other, and that you can give your answers correctly, we

must be quite clear as to what is meant by war of aggression. Will you

tell us your views on that subject?

KEITEL: As a soldier, I must say that the term “War of Aggression” as

used here is meaningless as far as I am concerned; we learned how to

conduct actions of attack, actions of defense, and actions of retreat.

However, according to my own personal feelings as a military man, the

concept “war of aggression” is a purely political concept and not a

military one. I mean that if the Wehrmacht and the soldier are a tool of

the politicians, they are not qualified in my opinion to decide or to

judge whether these military operations did or did not constitute a war

of aggression. I think I can summarize my views by saying that military

offices should not have authority to decide this question and are not in

a position to do so; and that these decisions are not the task of the

soldier, but solely that of the statesman.

DR. NELTE: Then you mean to say, and this applies also to all commanders

and offices involved, that the question of whether or not a war is a war

of aggression, or whether it has to be conducted for the defense of a

country, in other words, whether a war is a just war or not, was not in

the field of your professional deliberations and decisions?

KEITEL: No; that is what I wish to express, since...

DR. NELTE: What you are giving is an explanation. But you are not only a

soldier, you are also an individual with a life of your own. When facts

brought to your notice in your professional capacity seemed to reveal

that a projected operation was unjust, did you not give it

consideration?

KEITEL: I believe I can truthfully say that throughout the whole of my

military career I was brought up, so to speak, in the old traditional

concept that one never discussed this question. Naturally, one has one’s

own opinion and a life of one’s own, but in the exercise of one’s

professional functions as a soldier and an officer, one has given this

life away, yielded it up. Therefore I could not say either at that time

or later that I had misgivings about questions of a purely political

discretion, for I took the stand that a soldier has a right to have

confidence in his state leadership, and accordingly he is obliged to do

his duty and to obey.

DR. NELTE: Now let us take up the questions individually. Did you know

Hitler’s plans first in regard to rearmament, and later in regard to any

aggression, as the Prosecution calls it? I am thinking chiefly of the

period from February 1933 to 1938.

KEITEL: It was clear to me that when Hitler became Chancellor, we

soldiers would undoubtedly have a different position in the Reich under

new leadership, and that the military factor would certainly be viewed

differently from what had been the case before. Therefore we quite

honestly and openly welcomed the fact that at the head of the Reich

Government there was a man who was determined to bring about an era

which would lead us out of the deplorable conditions then prevailing.

This much I must confess, that I welcomed the plan and intention to

rearm as far as was possible at that time, as well as the ideas which

tended in that direction. In any event, as early as 1933, in the late

summer, I resigned from my activities in the War Ministry. I spent two

years on active service and returned only at the time when the military

sovereignty had been won back and we were rearming openly. Therefore,

during my absence I did not follow these matters. At any rate, in the

period from 1935 to 1938, during which I was Chief under Blomberg, I

naturally saw and witnessed everything that took place in connection

with rearmament and everything that was done in this field by the War

Ministry to help the Wehrmacht branches.

DR. NELTE: Did you know that the occupation of the Rhineland in the

demilitarized zone, the re-establishment of military sovereignty, the

introduction of conscription, the building up of the Air Force and the

increase in the number of Wehrmacht contingents violated the Versailles

Treaty?

KEITEL: The wording of the Versailles Treaty, as long as it was

considered binding upon us, did not, of course, permit these things. The

Treaty of Versailles, may I say, was studied very closely by us in order

to find loopholes which allowed us, without violating the treaty, to

take measures which would not make us guilty of breaking the treaty.

That was the daily task of the Reich Defense Committee. From 1935 on,

conditions were entirely different, and after my return as Chief, under

Blomberg, I must state frankly that I no longer had any misgivings as to

whether the Treaty of Versailles was violated or not because what was

done, was done openly. We announced that we would raise 36 divisions.

Discussions were held quite openly, and I could see nothing in which we

soldiers could, in any way, see a violation of the treaty. It was clear

to all of us, and it was our will to do everything to free ourselves of

the territorial and military fetters of the Treaty of Versailles. I must

say honestly that any soldier or officer who did not feel similarly

about these things would in my estimation have been worthless. It was

taken as a matter of course if one was a soldier.

DR. NELTE: During this Trial, an order, C-194, which bears your

signature, was submitted. It concerns aerial reconnaissance and

movements of U-boats at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland.

This order leads to the inference that you participated in the

occupation of the Rhineland. In what capacity did you sign this order?

KEITEL: The order shows already the future introductory phrasing: “The

Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Minister Von Blomberg, upon report,

has ordered...” I transmitted in this form an instruction which General

Von Blomberg had given me, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force

and I recall that it concerned the introduction of control measures

during the days when the three battalions were marching into the

demilitarized zone.

DR. NELTE: Did you, up to the time of your appointment as Chief of the

OKW, learn from Hitler himself or from other sources, that there were

plans in existence which, contrary to Hitler’s avowed peace assurances

could be put into effect only by force, that is, through a war?

KEITEL: During this period of time until the first practical measures

were taken in the case of Austria, I cannot remember having had any

knowledge of a program, or the establishment of a program or

far-reaching plan, or one covering a period of years. I must say also

that we were so occupied with the reorganization of this small army of

seven divisions into an expanded force of twice or three times its

original size, apart from the creation of a large air force which had no

equipment at all, that in those years a visit to our office would have

shown that we were completely occupied with purely organizational

problems, and from the way Hitler worked, as described by me today, it

is quite obvious that we saw nothing of these things.

DR. NELTE: Did you have any personal connection with Hitler before 4

February 1938?

KEITEL: In the years from 1935 to 1938, as chief under Blomberg, I saw

the Führer three times. He never spoke one word to me and so he did not

know me. If he knew anything at all about me it could have been only

through Herr Von Blomberg. I had absolutely no contact with the Führer

either personally or through other people who were prominent in the

Party or in politics. My first conversation with him was in the last

days of January before I was appointed to this office.

DR. NELTE: Did you hear anything of the meeting or discussion with

Hitler in November 1937? I am referring to a conference in which Hitler,

as it is alleged, made public his last will.

KEITEL: I already stated under oath at the preliminary interrogation

that I did not know about this, and that I saw a document or the minutes

or a record of this meeting at this Trial for the first time. I believe

it is the Hossbach document and I do not remember that Von Blomberg gave

me any directions to take preparatory steps after this conference. That

is not the case.

DR. NELTE: Did you know of any of Hitler’s intentions regarding

territorial questions?

KEITEL: Yes. I must answer that in the affirmative. I learned of them,

and I also knew from public political discussions that he proposed to

settle in some form, gradually, sooner or later, a series of territorial

problems which were the result of the Treaty of Versailles. That is

true.

DR. NELTE: And what did you think about the realization of these

territorial aims, I mean the manner in which they were to be solved?

KEITEL: At that time I saw these things and judged them only according

to what we were capable of in military terms. I can only say, when I

left the troops in 1935, none of these 24 divisions which were to be

established existed. I did not view all this from the standpoint of

political aims, but with the sober consideration: Can we accomplish

anything by attack and the conduct of war if we have no military means

at our disposal? Consequently for me everything in this connection

revolved around the programs of rearmament, which were to be completed

in 1943-1945, and for the Navy in 1945. Therefore, we had 10 years in

which to build up a concentrated Wehrmacht. Hence, I did not consider

these problems acute even when they came to my attention in a political

way, for I thought it impossible to realize these plans except by

negotiations.

DR. NELTE: How do you explain the general directives of June 1937 for

preparation for mobilization?

KEITEL: This document is actually an instruction for mobilization kept

in general terms and was in line with our traditional General Staff

policy before the war and before the World War, the World War I, that on

principle something of the kind must be prepared beforehand. In my

opinion, this had nothing to do with any of Hitler’s political plans,

for at that time I was already Chief of Staff under Blomberg, and

General Jodl was at that time the Chief of the National Defense

Division. Perhaps it sounds somewhat arrogant for me to say that we were

very much satisfied that we were at last beginning to tell the Wehrmacht

each year what it had to do intellectually and theoretically. In the

former General Staff training which I received before the World War, the

chief aim of these instructions was that the General Staff tours for the

purpose of study should afford an opportunity for the theoretical

elaboration of all problems. Such was the former training of the Great

General Staff. I no longer know whether in this connection Blomberg

himself originally thought out these salient ideas of possible

complications or possible military contingencies, or whether he was

perhaps influenced by the Führer.

It is certain that Hitler never saw this. It was the inside work of the

General Staff of the Wehrmacht.

DR. NELTE: But in it you find a reference to a “Case Otto,” and you know

that that was the affair with Austria.

KEITEL: Of course I remember the Case Otto, which indicated by its name

that it concerns Otto von Hapsburg. There must have been—were of

course—certain reports about an attempted restoration, and in that case

an intervention, eventually an armed one, was to take place. The Führer,

Adolf Hitler, wished to prevent a restoration of the monarchy in

Austria. Later this came up again in connection with the Anschluss. I

believe that I can omit that now and perhaps explain later. In any

event, we believed that on the basis of the deliberations by the Army

some sort of preparations were being made which would bring into being

Case Otto, because the code word was “Case Otto comes into force.”

DR. NELTE: You mean to say that no concrete orders were given in regard

to Case Otto on the basis of this general directive?

KEITEL: You mean the Anschluss at the beginning of February?

DR. NELTE: I beg your pardon?

KEITEL: I can state here only what I experienced when Hitler sent me to

the Army. I went into General Beck’s office and said: “The Führer

demands that you report to him immediately and inform him about the

preparations which have already been made for a possible invasion of

Austria”, and General Beck then said, “We have prepared nothing; nothing

has been done, nothing at all.”

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution contends that you participated in planning

the action against Austria as it was put into effect in March of 1938. I

have here the directive regarding Case Otto, C-102.

Can you still affirm that the whole matter was improvised?

KEITEL: I remember that this order was not issued to the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army and to the other Commanders-in-Chief

until the whole project was under way. Nothing had been prepared. It was

all improvised and this was to be the documentary registration of facts

which were being put into practice. The commands were given verbally and

individually regarding what was to be done and what actually was done on

the morning of 12 March, when Austria was invaded.

DR. NELTE: I must now return to the events preceding the case of

Austria. You know that in General Jodl’s diary it is stated:

“Schuschnigg signs under strongest political and military pressure.” In

what manner did you participate in this conference at the Obersalzberg

which took place with Schuschnigg?

KEITEL: May I add to my previous answer that we can see from this that

the invasion took place on the morning of 12 March and the order was

issued late in the evening of 11 March. Therefore this document could

not have had any real influence on this affair. Such an order cannot be

worked out between 10 in the evening and 6 in the morning.

I can say the following in regard to my participation at Obersalzberg on

10 or 11 February:

It was the first official action in which I took part. In the evening of

4 February Hitler left Berlin. He summoned me to be at Obersalzberg on

10 February. There, on that day the meeting with the Austrian Federal

Chancellor, Schuschnigg, which has been frequently discussed here, took

place. Shortly after I arrived—I had no idea why I had been

summoned—General Von Reichenau arrived from Munich, and General of the

Air Force, Sperrle; so that we three Generals were present when at about

10:30 Herr Schuschnigg arrived with Herr Von Papen. Since I had never

attended a conference or a political action or any meeting of that

nature, I did not know what I was there for. I must tell you this

frankly, otherwise you will not understand it. In the course of the day

the reason for the presence of the three representatives of the

Wehrmacht naturally became clear to me. In certain respects they

represented a military, at least a military demonstration—I may safely

call it that. In the preliminary interrogation and also in later

discussions I was asked the significance of the fact that in the

afternoon my name was suddenly called through the house and I was to

visit the Führer. I went to him in his room. Perhaps it sounds strange

for me to say that when I entered the room I thought that he would give

me a directive but the words were “Nothing at all.” He used the words,

“Please sit down.” Then he said, “Yes, the Federal Chancellor wishes to

have a short conference with his Foreign Minister Schmidt; otherwise I

have nothing at all.” I can only assure you that not one word was said

to me about a political action apart from the fact that Herr Schuschnigg

did not leave until the evening and that further conferences took place.

We Generals sat in the anteroom, and when in the evening, shortly before

my departure, I received the direction to launch reports that we were

taking certain measures for mobilization, of which you have been

informed here through a document, then it became quite clear to me that

this day had served to bring the discussions to a head by the

introduction of military representatives, and the directive to spread

reports was to keep up the pressure, as has been shown here.

Upon my return to my apartment in Berlin, in the presence of Goebbels

and Canaris, we discussed the reports which were to be sent out and

which Canaris then broadcast in Munich. Finally, in order to conclude

this matter, it might be interesting to point out that the Chief of

Intelligence in the Austrian Federal Ministry, Lahousen, who has been

present here in court, told Jodl and me when later on he came into the

service of the Wehrmacht: “We were not taken in by this bluff.” And I

indubitably gave Jodl a basis for his entry in the diary, even though it

is somewhat drastically worded, for I was naturally impressed by this

first experience.

DR. NELTE: What is your position on the measures against Austria?

KEITEL: Nothing further need be said concerning the further developments

of the affair. It has already been presented here in detail. On the day

of the invasion by the troops I flew with Hitler to the front. We drove

along the highways through Braunau, Linz. We stayed overnight and

proceeded to Vienna. And to put it modestly, it is true that in every

village we were received most enthusiastically and the Austrian Federal

Army marched side by side with the German soldiers through the streets

over which we drove. Not a shot was fired. On the other side the only

formation which had a certain military significance was an armored unit

on the road from Passau to Vienna which arrived in Vienna with very few

vehicles. This division was on the spot for the parade the next day.

That is a very sober picture of what I saw.

DR. NELTE: Now we come to the question of Czechoslovakia. When did

Hitler for the first time discuss with you the question of

Czechoslovakia and his intentions in that respect?

KEITEL: I believe 6 to 8 weeks after the march into Austria, that is,

after the Anschluss toward the end of April. The Anschluss was about the

middle of March and also took the form of a sudden summons, one evening,

to the Reich Chancellery where the Führer then explained matters to me.

This resulted in the well-known directive in the Case Green. The history

of this case is well known by the Schmundt Files all of which I

identified in the preliminary interrogation. At that time he gave me

first directives in a rather hasty manner. It was not possible for me to

ask any questions, as he wished to leave Berlin immediately. These were

the bases for the questions regarding the conditions under which a

warlike action against Czechoslovakia could or would arise.

DR. NELTE: Did you have the impression that Hitler wanted to attack

Czechoslovakia?

KEITEL: In any event the instructions which he gave me that evening were

to the effect that preparations for a military action with all the

preliminary work, which was the responsibility of the General Staff,

were to be made. He expressed himself very precisely although he

explained explicitly that the date was quite open and said that for the

time being it was not his intention. These were the words: “...for the

time being it is not my intention.”

DR. NELTE: In this connection was a difference made between the

Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia?

KEITEL: I do not believe that we discussed it at all that evening during

that short conference. The Führer did not discuss with me the political

aspects; he merely assigned me to the consideration of the necessary

military measures. He did not say whether he would be content with the

Sudetenland or whether we were to break through the Czechoslovakian line

of fortification. That was not the problem at that time. But in any

event—if they had to be settled by going to war—then the war had to be

prepared; if it came to a conflict with the Czech Army, that is, a real

war it would have to be prepared.

DR. NELTE: You know that the record of the Hitler-General Keitel

Conference on 21 April, of which there are two versions, speaks of a

lightning action being necessary in case of an incident. In the first

one after the word “incident” it reads: “for example, the assassination

of the German Minister” following a demonstration hostile to Germany. In

the second one, after the word “incident” it reads only “for example,

action in case of an incident.” Will you please explain to what this

note, which is not a record in the proper sense of the word, can be

attributed?

KEITEL: I saw the Schmundt notes for the first time here. We did not

receive it at that time as a document to work with. It is not a record.

These are notes made subsequently by an adjutant. I do not want to doubt

their correctness or accuracy, for memory would not permit me to recall

today the exact words which were used. However this question, which is

considered significant here, the assassination of the German Minister in

Prague, is a situation which I have never heard of, if only for the

reason that no one ever said such a thing. It was said it might happen

that the Minister is assassinated whereupon I asked which minister, or

something similar. Then, as I recall it, Hitler said that the war of

1914 also started with an assassination at Sarajevo, and that such

incidents could happen. I did not in any way get the impression at that

time that a war was to be created through a provocation.

DR. NELTE: You will have to tell me some more on that point.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

NINETY-NINTH DAY

Wednesday, 4 April 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte.

DR. NELTE: Yesterday we discussed last the meeting on 21 April of you,

Hitler, and Adjutant Schmundt. I am again having Document 388-PS brought

to you and ask you to answer when I ask you. Was this not a conference

of the kind which you said yesterday in principle did not take place?

KEITEL: To a certain extent it is true that I was called in and to my

complete surprise was presented with ideas concerning preparation for

war against Czechoslovakia. This took place within a very short time,

before one of Hitler’s departures for Berchtesgaden. I do not recall

saying one word during these short instructions, but I asked only one

question, and then with these extremely surprising directives I went

home.

DR. NELTE: What happened then, so far as you were concerned?

KEITEL: My reflections during the first hour after that were that this

could not be carried out in view of the military strength which I knew

we then possessed. I then comforted myself with the thought that the

conversation premised that nothing had been planned within a measurable

lapse of time. The following day I discussed the matter with the Chief

of the Operations Staff, General Jodl. I never received any minutes of

this discussion, nor any record. The outcome of our deliberations was

“to leave things alone because there was plenty of time, and because any

such action was out of the question for military reasons.” I also

explained to Jodl that the introductory words had been: “It is not my

intention to undertake military action against Czechoslovakia within a

measurable lapse of time.”

Then, in the next weeks, we started theoretical deliberations; this,

however, without taking into consultation the branches of the Wehrmacht

because I considered myself not authorized to do so. In the following

period it is to be noted, as can be seen from the Schmundt File, that

the adjutants, the military adjutants, continuously asked innumerable

detailed questions regarding the strength of divisions, and so on. These

questions were answered by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to the best of

their knowledge.

DR. NELTE: I believe we can shorten this considerably, Herr Marshal,

however important your explanations are. The decisive point now is—if

you would take the document in front of you and compare the draft which

you finally made on pressure from Obersalzberg and tell me what happened

after that.

KEITEL: Yes. About four weeks after I had been given this job, I sent to

Obersalzberg a draft of a directive for the preparatory measures. In

reply I was informed that Hitler himself would come to Berlin to speak

with the commander-in-chief. He came to Berlin at the end of May, and I

was present at the conference with Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. In

this conference the basic plan was changed altogether, namely, to the

effect that Hitler expressed the intention to take military action

against Czechoslovakia in the very near future. As reason why he changed

his mind he gave the fact that Czechoslovakia—I believe it was on the

20th or 21st of May—had ordered general mobilization, and Hitler at

that time declared this could have been directed only against us.

Military preparations had not been made by Germany. This was the reason

for the complete change of his intentions, which he communicated orally

to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and he ordered him to begin

preparations at once. This explains the changes in the basic

orders—that is to say, the directive which was now being issued had as

its basic idea: “It is my irrevocable decision to take military action

against Czechoslovakia in the near future.”

DR. NELTE: War against Czechoslovakia was avoided as a result of the

Munich Agreement. What was your opinion and that of the generals about

this agreement?

KEITEL: We were extraordinarily happy that it had not come to a military

operation, because throughout the time of preparation we had always been

of the opinion that our means of attack against the frontier

fortifications of Czechoslovakia were insufficient. From a purely

military point of view we lacked the means for an attack which involved

the piercing of the frontier fortifications. Consequently we were

extremely satisfied that a peaceful political solution had been reached.

DR. NELTE: What effect did this agreement have on the generals regarding

Hitler’s prestige?

KEITEL: I believe I may say that as a result this greatly increased

Hitler’s prestige among the generals. We recognized that on the one hand

military means and military preparations had not been neglected and on

the other hand a solution had been found which we had not expected and

for which we were extremely thankful.

DR. NELTE: Is it not amazing that 3 weeks after the Munich Agreement

that had been so welcomed by everyone, including the generals, Hitler

gave instructions for the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia?

KEITEL: I believe that recently Reich Marshal Göring enlarged on this

question in the course of his examination. It was my impression, as I

remember it, that Hitler told me at that time that he did not believe

that Czechoslovakia would overcome the loss of the Sudeten-German

territories with their strong fortifications; and, moreover, he was

concerned about the close relations then existing between Czechoslovakia

and the Soviet Union and thought that Czechoslovakia could and perhaps

would become a military and strategic menace. These were the military

reasons which were given to me.

DR. NELTE: Was it not pointed out to Hitler by anyone that a solution by

force of the problem regarding the remainder of Czechoslovakia involved

a great danger, namely, that the other powers, that is England, France,

would be offended?

KEITEL: I was not informed of the last conversation in Munich between

the British Prime Minister Chamberlain and the Führer. However, I

regarded this question as far as its further treatment was concerned as

a political one, and consequently I did not raise any objections, if I

may so express myself, especially as a considerable reduction in the

military preparations decided on before the Munich meeting was ordered.

Whenever the political question was raised, the Führer refused to

discuss it.

DR. NELTE: In connection with this question of Czechoslovakia, I should

like to mention Lieutenant Colonel Köchling, who was characterized by

the Prosecution as the liaison man with Henlein. Was the Wehrmacht or

the OKW engaged in this matter?

KEITEL: Köchling’s job remained unknown to me; it was I who named

Köchling. Hitler asked me if an officer was available for a special

mission, and if so he should report to me. After I dispatched Lieutenant

Colonel Köchling from Berlin I neither saw nor spoke to him again. I do

know, however, that, as I heard later, he was with Henlein as a sort of

military adviser.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has pointed out that you were present at the

visit of Minister President Tiso in March 1939, as well as at the visit

of President Hacha, and from this it was deduced that you participated

in the political discussions which then took place. What role did you

play on these occasions?

KEITEL: It is true, I believe in every case, that on the occasion of

such state visits and visits of foreign statesmen I was present in the

Reich Chancellery or at the reception. I never took part in the actual

discussions of political questions. I was present at the reception and

felt that I should be present to be introduced as a high ranking

representative of the Wehrmacht. But in each individual case that I can

recall I was dismissed with thanks or waited in the antechamber in case

I should be needed. I can positively say that I did not say one single

word either to Tiso or to President Hacha on that night, nor did I take

part in Hitler’s direct discussions with these men. May I add that just

on the night of President Hacha’s visit I had to be present in the Reich

Chancellery, because during that night the High Command of the Army had

to be instructed as to how the entry which had been prepared was to take

place.

DR. NELTE: In this connection I wish to establish only this, since I

assume that this question has been clarified by Reich Marshal Göring’s

testimony. You never spoke to President Hacha of a possible bombing of

Prague in the event that he should not be willing to sign?

KEITEL: No.

DR. NELTE: We come now to the case of Poland. Here too the Prosecution

accuses you of having participated in the planning and preparation for

military action against Poland and of having assisted in the execution

of this action. Would you state in brief your basic attitude towards

these Eastern problems?

KEITEL: The question concerning the problem of Danzig and the Corridor

were known to me. I also knew that political discussions and

negotiations with regard to these questions were pending. The case of

the attack on Poland, which in the course of time had to be and was

prepared, was, of course, closely connected with these problems.

Since I myself was not concerned with political matters, I personally

was of the opinion that, as in the case of Munich and before Munich,

military preparations, that is, military pressure if I may call it such,

would play the same kind of role as in my opinion it had played at

Munich. I did not believe that the matter would be brought to an end

without military preparations.

DR. NELTE: Could not this question have been solved by direct preceding

negotiations?

KEITEL: That is hard for me to say, although I know that several

discussions took place concerning the Danzig question as well as

concerning a solution of the Corridor problem. I recall a remark that

impressed me at the time, when Hitler once said he deplored Marshal

Pilsudski’s death, because he believed he had reached or could have

reached an agreement with this statesman. This statement was once made

to me.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has stated that already in the autumn of 1938

Hitler was working on the question of a war against Poland. Did you

participate in this in 1938?

KEITEL: No. This I cannot recall. I should like to believe that, to my

recollection, at that time there were even signs that this was not the

case. At that time I accompanied Hitler on an extensive tour of

inspection of the eastern fortifications. We covered the entire front

from Pomerania through the Oder-Warthe marshland as far as Breslau in

order to inspect the various frontier fortifications against Poland. The

question of fortifications in East Prussia was thoroughly discussed at

that time. When I consider this in this connection today, I can only

assume that for him these discussions were possibly connected with the

Danzig and Corridor problem and he simply wanted to find out whether

these eastern fortifications had sufficient defensive strength, should

the Danzig and Corridor question eventually lead to war with Poland.

DR. NELTE: When were the preparations made for the occupation of Danzig?

KEITEL: I believe that as early as the late autumn of 1938 orders were

issued that Danzig be occupied at a favorable moment by a _coup de main_

from East Prussia. That is all I know about it.

DR. NELTE: Was the possibility of war against Poland discussed in this

connection?

KEITEL: Yes, that was apparently connected with the examination of the

possibilities to defend the border, but I do not recall any, nor was

there any kind of preparation, any military preparations, at that time,

apart from a surprise attack from East Prussia.

DR. NELTE: If I remember rightly you once told me, when we discussed

this question, that Danzig was to be occupied only if this would not

result in a war with Poland.

KEITEL: Yes, that is so. This statement was made time and again, that

this occupation of, or the surprise attack on Danzig was to be carried

out only if it was certain that it would not lead to war.

DR. NELTE: When did this view change?

KEITEL: I believe Poland’s refusal to discuss any kind of solution of

the Danzig question was apparently the reason for further deliberations

and steps.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution is in possession of the directive of 3 April

1939...

KEITEL: I might perhaps add that generally after Munich the situation

also in regard to the Eastern problem was viewed differently, perhaps,

or as I believe, from this point of view: The problem of Czechoslovakia

has been solved satisfactorily without a shot. This will perhaps also be

possible with regard to the other German problems in the East. I also

believe I remember Hitler saying that he did not think the Western

Powers, particularly England, would be interested in Germany’s Eastern

problem and would sooner act as mediators than raise any objection.

DR. NELTE: That is Document C-120, the “Fall Weiss”. According to this,

the directive was issued on 3 April 1939.

KEITEL: Let us take the document first. In the first sentence it is

already stated that this document was to replace the regular annual

instructions of the Wehrmacht regarding possible preparations for

mobilization, a further elaboration of subjects known to us from the

instructions which had been issued in 1937-38 and which were issued

every year. But in fact, at that time or shortly before, Hitler had, in

my presence, directly instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to

make strategic and operative preparations for an attack on, for a war

with Poland. I then issued these first considerations, as can be seen

from this document, that is, the Führer had already ordered the

following: Everything should be worked out by the OKH of the Army by 1

September 1939, and that after this a timetable should be drawn up. This

document was signed by me at that time.

DR. NELTE: What was your attitude and that of the other generals towards

this war?

KEITEL: I must say that at this time, as in the case of the preparations

against Czechoslovakia, both the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the

generals to whom I spoke, and also I, myself, were opposed to the idea

of waging a war against Poland. We did not want this war, but, of

course, we immediately began to carry out the given orders, at least as

far as the elaboration by the General Staff was concerned. Our reason

was that to our knowledge the military means which were at our disposal

at that time, that is to say, the divisions, their equipment, their

armament, let alone their absolutely inadequate supply of munition kept

reminding us as soldiers that we were not ready to wage a war.

DR. NELTE: Do you mean to say that in your considerations only military

viewpoints defined your attitude?

KEITEL: Yes. I must admit that. I did not concern myself with the

political problems but only with the question: Can we or can we not?

DR. NELTE: I want to establish only this. Now, on 23 May 1939, there was

a conference at which Hitler addressed the generals. You know this

address? What was the reason for and the contents of this address?

KEITEL: I saw the minutes of it for the first time in the course of my

interrogations here. It reminded me of the situation at that time. The

purpose of this address was to show the generals that their misgivings

were unfounded, to remove their misgivings, and finally to point out

that the conditions were not yet given and that political negotiations

about these matters still could and perhaps would change the situation.

It was however simply to give encouragement.

DR. NELTE: Were you at that time of the opinion that war would actually

break out?

KEITEL: No, at that time—and this was perhaps rather naïve—I believed

that war would not break out, that in view of the military preparations

ordered, negotiations would take place again and a solution would be

found. In our military considerations a strictly military point of view

was always dominant. We generals believed that France—to a lesser

extent England—in view of her mutual-assistance pact with Poland would

intervene and that we did not at all have the defensive means for this.

For this very reason I personally was always convinced that there would

be no war because we could not wage a war against Poland if France

attacked us in the West.

DR. NELTE: Now then, what was your opinion of the situation after the

speech of 22 August 1939?

KEITEL: This speech was made at the end of August and was addressed to

the generals assembled at Obersalzberg, the commanders-in-chief of the

troops preparing in the East. When Hitler, towards the end of this

speech, declared that a pact had been concluded with the Soviet Union, I

was firmly convinced that there would be no war because I believed that

these conditions constituted a basis for negotiation and that Poland

would not expose herself to it. I also believed that now a basis for

negotiations had been found although Hitler said in this speech, a copy

of which I read here for the first time from notes, that all

preparations had been made, and that it was intended to put them into

execution.

DR. NELTE: Did you know that England actually attempted to act as

intermediary?

KEITEL: No, I knew nothing of these matters. The first thing which was

very surprising to me was that on one of those days which have been

discussed here repeatedly, namely on the 24th or 25th, only a few days

after the conference at Obersalzberg, I was suddenly called to Hitler at

the Reich Chancellery and he said to me only, “Stop everything at once,

get Brauchitsch immediately. I need time for negotiations.” I believe

that after these few words I was dismissed.

DR. NELTE: What followed thereupon?

KEITEL: I at once rang up the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and passed

on the order, and Brauchitsch was called to the Führer. Everything was

stopped and all decisions on possible military action were suspended,

first without any time limit, on the following day for a certain limited

period, I believe it was 5 days according to the calculations we can

make today.

DR. NELTE: Did you know of the so-called minimum demands on Poland?

KEITEL: I believe that I saw them in the Reich Chancellery, that Hitler

himself showed them to me, so that I knew about them.

DR. NELTE: As you saw them, I would like to ask whether you considered

these demands to be serious?

KEITEL: At that time I was always only a few minutes in the Reich

Chancellery and as a soldier I naturally believed that these were meant

perfectly honestly.

DR. NELTE: Was there any talk at that time of border incidents?

KEITEL: No. This question of border incidents was also extensively

discussed with me here in my interrogations. In this situation and in

the few discussions we had at the Reich Chancellery in those days there

was no talk at all on this question.

DR. NELTE: I am now having Document 795-PS brought to you, notes which

deal with the Polish uniforms for Heydrich.

KEITEL: May I add...

DR. NELTE: Please do.

KEITEL: ...namely, that on 30 August, I believe, the day for the attack,

which took place on 1 September, was again postponed for 24 hours. For

this reason Brauchitsch and I were again called to the Reich Chancellery

and to my recollection the reason given was that a Polish Government

plenipotentiary was expected. Everything was to be postponed for 24

hours. Then no further changes of the military instructions occurred.

This document deals with Polish uniforms for border incidents or for

some sort of illegal actions. It has been shown to me, I know it; it is

a subsequent note made by Admiral Canaris of a conversation he had with

me. He told me at that time that he was to make available a few Polish

uniforms. This had been communicated to him by the Führer through the

adjutant. I asked: “For what purpose?” We both agreed that this was

intended for some illegal action. If I remember rightly I told him at

that time that I did not believe in such things at all and that he had

better keep his hands off. We then had a short discussion about Dirschau

which was also to be taken by a _coup de main_ by the Wehrmacht. That is

all I heard of it. I believe I told Canaris he could dodge the issue by

saying that he had no Polish uniforms. He could simply say he had none

and the matter would be settled.

DR. NELTE: You know, of course, that this matter was connected with the

subsequent attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. Do you know anything

of this incident?

KEITEL: This incident, this action came to my knowledge for the first

time here through the testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was

charged to carry out such things and I knew nothing of the raid on the

radio station at Gleiwitz until I heard the testimonies given here

before the Tribunal. Neither do I recall having heard at that time that

such an incident had occurred.

DR. NELTE: Did you know of the efforts of America and Italy after 1

September 1939 to end the war in one way or another?

KEITEL: I knew nothing at all of the political discussions that took

place in those days from the 24th to the 30th, 31st of August or the

beginning of September 1939. I never knew anything about the visits of a

Herr Dahlerus. I knew nothing of London’s intervention. I remember only

that, while in the Reich Chancellery for a short time, I met Hitler, who

said to me: “Do not disturb me now, I am writing a letter to Daladier.”

This must have been in the first days of September. Neither I nor, to my

knowledge, any of the other generals ever knew anything about the

matters I have heard of here or about the steps that were still taken

after 1 September. Nothing at all.

DR. NELTE: What did you say to Canaris and Lahousen in the Führer’s

train on 14 September, that is, shortly before the attack on Warsaw,

with regard to the so-called political “house cleaning”?

KEITEL: I have been interrogated here about this point, but I did not

recall this visit at all. But from Lahousen’s testimony it appeared—he

said, as I remember—that I had repeated what Hitler had said and had

passed on these orders, as he put it. I know that the Commander-in-Chief

of the Army who then directed the military operations in Poland had at

the daily conferences already complained about interference by the

police in occupied Polish territory. I can only say that I apparently

repeated what had been said about these things in my presence between

Hitler and Brauchitsch. I can make no statements regarding details.

I might add that to my recollection the Commander-in-Chief of the Army

at that time complained several times that as long as he had the

executive power in the occupied territories he would under no

circumstances tolerate other agencies in this area and that at his

request he was relieved of his responsibility for Poland in October. I

therefore believe that the statements the witness made from memory or on

the strength of notes are not quite correct.

DR. NELTE: We come now to the question of Norway. Did you know that in

October 1939 Germany had given a declaration of neutrality to Denmark

and Norway?

KEITEL: Yes, I knew that.

DR. NELTE: Were you and the OKW taken into consultation about

declarations of neutrality in this or other cases?

KEITEL: No.

DR. NELTE: Were you informed of them?

KEITEL: No, we were not informed either. These were discussions

referring to foreign policy, of which we soldiers were not informed.

DR. NELTE: You mean you were not informed officially. But you as a

person who also reads newspapers knew of it?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Good. Before our discussion about the problem of aggressive

war I asked you a question which, in order to save time, I would not

like to repeat. However, it seems to me that the question I put to you

in order to get your opinion on aggressive war must be asked again in

this connection because an attack on a neutral country, a country which

had been given a guarantee was bound to cause particular scruples on the

part of people who have to do with these things, with the waging of war.

Therefore, I put this question to you again in this case and ask you to

describe what your attitude and the soldiers’ attitude was to it.

KEITEL: In this connection, I must say we were already at war. There was

a state of war with England and France. It would not be right for me to

say that I interfered in the least with these matters, but I regarded

them rather as political matters, and, as a soldier, I held the opinion

that preparations for military actions against Norway and Denmark did

not yet mean their outbreak and that these preparations would very

obviously take months if such an action was executed at all and that in

the meantime the situation could change. It was this train of thought

which caused me not to take any steps in regard to the impossibility to

consider and to prepare strategically this intervention in Norway and

Denmark; therefore, I left these things, I must say, to those who were

concerned with political matters. I cannot put it any other way.

DR. NELTE: When did the preparations for this action start?

KEITEL: I think the first deliberations took place already in October

1939; on the other hand, the first directives were issued only in

January, that is to say, several months later. In connection with the

discussions before this Tribunal and with the information given by Reich

Marshal Göring in his statements, I also remember that one day I was

ordered to call Grand Admiral Raeder to the Führer. He wanted to discuss

with him questions regarding sea warfare in the Bay of Heligoland and in

the Atlantic Ocean and the dangers we would encounter in waging war in

this area.

Then Hitler ordered me to call together a special staff which was to

study all these problems from the viewpoint of sea, air, and land

warfare. I remembered this also upon seeing the documents produced here.

This special staff dispensed with my personal assistance. Hitler said at

the time that he himself would furnish tasks for this staff. These were,

I believe, the military considerations in the months from 1939 to the

beginning of 1940.

DR. NELTE: In this connection I should only like to know further whether

you had any conversation with Quisling at this stage of preliminary

measures?

KEITEL: No, I saw Quisling neither before nor after the Norway campaign;

I saw him for the first time approximately one or two years later. We

had no contact, not even any kind of transmission of information. I

already stated in a preliminary interrogation that by order of Hitler I

sent an officer, I believe it was Colonel Pieckenbrock, to Copenhagen

for conferences with Norwegians. I did not know Quisling.

DR. NELTE: As to the war in the West, there is once more in the

foreground the question of violation of neutrality in the case of

Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. Did you know that these three

countries had been given assurances regarding the inviolability of their

neutrality?

KEITEL: Yes, I knew and also was told that at that time.

DR. NELTE: I do not want to ask the same questions as in the case of

Norway and Denmark, but, in this connection, however, I should like to

ask: Did you consider these assurances by Hitler to be honest?

KEITEL: When I remember the situation as it was then, I did at that time

believe, when I learned of these things, that there was no intention of

bringing any other state into the war. At any rate, I had no reason, no

justification, to assume the opposite, namely that this was intended as

a deception.

DR. NELTE: After the conclusion of the Polish campaign did you still

believe that there was any possibility of terminating or localizing the

war?

KEITEL: Yes, I did believe this. My view was strengthened by the

Reichstag speech after the Polish war, in which allusions were made

which convinced me that political discussions about this question were

going on, above all, with England, and because Hitler had told me time

and again, whenever these questions were brought up, “The West is

actually not interested in these Eastern problems of Germany.” This was

the phrase he always used to calm people, namely that the Western Powers

were not interested in these problems.

Furthermore, seen from a purely military point of view, it must be added

that we soldiers had, of course, always expected an attack by the

Western Powers, that is to say, by France, during the Polish campaign,

and were very surprised that in the West, apart from some skirmishes

between the Maginot Line and the West Wall, nothing had actually

happened, though we had—this I know for certain—along the whole

Western Front from the Dutch border to Basel only five divisions, apart

from the small forces manning the fortifications of the West Wall. Thus,

from a purely military operative point of view, a French attack during

the Polish campaign would have encountered only a German military

screen, not a real defense. Since nothing of this sort happened, we

soldiers thought of course that the Western Powers had no serious

intentions, because they did not take advantage of the extremely

favorable situation for military operations and did not undertake

anything, at least not anything serious, against us during the 3 to 4

weeks when all the German fighting formations were employed in the East.

This also strengthened our views as to what the attitude of the Western

Powers would probably be in the future.

DR. NELTE: What plans did Hitler have for the West?

KEITEL: During the last phase of the Polish campaign, he had already

transferred all unnecessary forces to the West, in consideration of the

fact that at any time something else might happen there. However, during

the last days of the Polish campaign, he had already told me that he

intended to throw his forces as swiftly as possible from the East to the

West and if possible, attack in the West in the winter of 1939-1940.

DR. NELTE: Did these plans include attacks on and marching through

Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland?

KEITEL: Not in the beginning, but first, if we can express it from the

military point of view, the deployment in the West was to be a

protective measure, that is, a thorough strengthening of the frontiers,

of course preferably to take place where there was nothing except border

posts. Accordingly, already at the end of September and the beginning of

October, a transportation of the army from the East to the West did take

place, as a security measure without, however, any fixed center of

gravity.

DR. NELTE: What did the military leaders know about Belgium and

Holland’s attitude?

KEITEL: This naturally changed several times in the course of the

winter. At that time, in the autumn of 1939—I can speak only for

myself, and there may be other opinions on this matter—I was convinced

that Belgium wanted to remain out of the war under any circumstances and

would do anything she could to preserve her neutrality. On the other

hand, we received, through the close connections between the Belgian and

Italian royal houses, a number of reports that sounded very threatening.

I had no way of finding out whether they were true, but we learned of

them, and they indicated that strong pressure was exerted on Belgium to

give up her neutrality.

As for Holland, we knew at that time only that there were General Staff

relations between her and England.

But then of course, in the months from October 1939 to May 1940 the

situation changed considerably and the tension varied greatly. From the

purely military point of view, we knew one thing: That all the French

swift units, that is motorized units, were concentrated on the

Belgian-French border, and from a military point of view, we interpreted

this measure as meaning that at least preparations were being made for

crossing through Belgium at any time with the swift units and advancing

up to the borders of the Ruhr district.

I believe I should omit details, here, because they are not important

for the further developments, they are of a purely operative and

strategic nature.

DR. NELTE: Were there differences of opinion between the generals and

Hitler with reference to the attack in the West which had to take place

through this neutral territory?

KEITEL: I believe I must say that this at that time was one of the most

serious crises in the whole war, namely, the opinions held by a number

of generals, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch,

and his Chief of General Staff, and I also personally belong to that

group, which wanted at all costs to attempt to prevent an attack in the

West which Hitler intended for that winter. There were various reasons

for this: The difficulty of transporting the Eastern Army to the West;

then the point of view—and this I must state—the fact that we believed

at that time, perhaps more from the political point of view, that if we

did not attack, the possibility of a peaceful solution might still exist

and might still be realizable. Thus we considered it possible that

between then and the spring many political changes could take place.

Secondly, as soldiers, we were decidedly against the waging of a winter

war, in view of the short days and long nights, which are always a great

hindrance to all military operations. To Hitler’s objection that the

French swift forces might march through Belgium at any time and then

stand before the Ruhr district, we answered that we were superior in

such a situation in a war of movement, we were a match for it; that was

our view. I may add that this situation led to a very serious crisis

between Hitler and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and also me,

because I had this trend of thought which Hitler vigorously rejected

because it was, as he declared, strategically wrong. In our talks he

accused me in the sharpest manner of conspiring against him with the

generals of the Army and strengthening them in their opposition to his

views. I must state here that I then asked to be relieved immediately of

my post and given another, because I felt that under these circumstances

the confidence between Hitler and myself had been completely destroyed,

and I was greatly offended. I may add that relations with the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army also suffered greatly from this. But the

idea of my discharge or employment elsewhere was sharply rejected, I

would not be entitled to it. It has already been discussed here; I need

not go into it any further. But this breach of confidence was not to be

mended, not even in the future. In the case of Norway, there had already

been a similar conflict because I had left the house. General Jodl’s

diary refers to it as a “serious crisis.” I shall not go into this in

detail.

DR. NELTE: What was the reason for Hitler’s speech to the

Commanders-in-Chief on 23 November 1939, in the Reich Chancellery?

KEITEL: I can say that this was very closely connected with the crisis

between Hitler and the generals. He called a meeting of the generals at

that time to present and substantiate his views, and we knew it was his

intention to bring about a change of attitude on the part of the

generals. In the notes on this speech, we see that individual persons

were more than once directly and sharply rebuked. The reasons given by

those who had spoken against this attack in the West were repeated.

Moreover, he now wanted to make an irrevocable statement of his will to

carry out this attack in the West that very winter, because this, in his

view, was the only strategic solution, as every delay was to the enemy’s

advantage. In other words, at that time, he no longer counted on any

other solution than resort to force of arms.

DR. NELTE: When, then, was the decision made to advance through Belgium

and Holland?

KEITEL: The preparations for such a march through and attack on Belgium

and Holland had already been made, but Hitler withheld the decision as

to whether such a big attack or violation of the neutrality of these

countries was actually to be carried out, and kept it open until the

spring of 1940, obviously for all sorts of political reasons, and

perhaps also with the idea that the problem would automatically be

solved if the enemy invaded Belgium or if the mobile French troops

entered, or something like that. I can only state that the decision for

the carrying out of this plan was withheld until the very last moment

and the order was given only immediately before it was to be executed. I

believe that there was also one other factor in this, which I have

already mentioned, namely the relationship between the royal houses of

Italy and Belgium. Hitler always surrounded his decisions with secrecy

for he was obviously afraid that they might become known through this

relationship.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal will be glad if when you refer to

Czechoslovakia or any other state you will refer to it by its proper

name, you, and the defendants, and other witnesses.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, the Defendant Keitel wishes to make a slight

correction in the statement which he made earlier upon my question

regarding the occupation in the West during the Polish campaign.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

KEITEL: I said earlier that in the West during the war against Poland,

there were five divisions. I must rectify that statement. I had confused

that with the year 1938. In 1939 there were approximately 20 divisions,

including the reserves in the Rhineland and in the West district behind

the lines. Therefore, the statement I made was made inadvertently and

was a mistake.

DR. NELTE: Now we come to the Balkan wars. The Prosecution, with

reference also to the war against Greece and Yugoslavia, have accused

you of having co-operated in the preparation, planning, and above all in

the carrying out of those wars. What is your attitude toward this?

KEITEL: We were drawn into the war against Greece and against Yugoslavia

in the spring of 1941 to our complete surprise and without having made

any plans. Let me take Greece first: I accompanied Hitler during his

journey through France for the meetings with Marshal Pétain and with

Franco on the Spanish border, and during that journey we received our

first news regarding the intention of Italy to attack Greece. The

journey to Florence was immediately decided upon, and upon arrival in

Florence, we received Mussolini’s communication, which has already been

mentioned by Reich Marshal Göring, namely, that the attack against

Greece had already begun.

I can only say from my own personal knowledge that Hitler was extremely

angry about this development and the dragging of the Balkans into the

war and that only the fact that Italy was an ally prevented a break with

Mussolini. I never knew of any intentions to wage war against Greece.

DR. NELTE: Was there any necessity for Germany to enter into that war or

how did that come about?

KEITEL: At first the necessity did not exist, but during the first

months, October-November, of that campaign of the Italians, it already

became clear that the Italian position in this war had become extremely

precarious. Therefore, as early as November or December, there were

calls on the part of Mussolini for help, calls to assist him in some

form or other.

Moreover, seen from the military point of view, it was clear of course

that for the entire military position in the war, a defeat of Italy in

the Balkans would have had considerable and very serious consequences.

Therefore, by improvised means, assistance was rendered. I think a

mountain division was to be brought in, but it was technically

impossible, since there were no transportation facilities. Then another

solution was attempted by means of air transport and the like.

DR. NELTE: At the time when improvisations ceased, we come, however, to

the plan presented by the Prosecution and called “Marita.” When was

that?

KEITEL: The war in Greece and Albania had begun to reach a certain

standstill because of winter conditions. During that time, plans were

conceived in order to avoid a catastrophe for Italy, to bring in against

Greece certain forces from the North for an attack to relieve pressure,

for such I must call it. That would, and did of course, take several

months.

May I just explain that at that time the idea of a march through

Yugoslavia, or even the suggestion that forces should be brought in

through Yugoslavia was definitely turned down by Hitler, although the

Army particularly had proposed that possibility as the most suitable way

of bringing in troops.

Regarding the “Operation Marita,” perhaps not much more can be said than

to mention the march through Bulgaria, which had been prepared and

discussed diplomatically with Bulgaria.

DR. NELTE: I would like to ask just one more question on that subject.

The Prosecution have stated that even before the overthrow of the

Yugoslav Government, that is to say, at the end of March 1941,

negotiations were conducted with Hungary for the eventuality of an

attack on Yugoslavia. Were you or the OKW informed of this, or were you

consulted?

KEITEL: No. I have no recollection at all of any military discussion on

the part of the OKW with Hungary regarding the eventuality of a military

action in the case of Yugoslavia. That is completely unknown to me. On

the contrary, everything that happened later on—a few words about

Yugoslavia will have to be said later—was completely improvised.

Nothing had been prepared, at any rate not with the knowledge of the

OKW.

DR. NELTE: But it is known to you, is it not, that military discussions

with Hungary had taken place during that period? I assume that you

merely want to say that they did not refer to Yugoslavia.

KEITEL: Of course, it was known to me that several discussions had taken

place with the Hungarian General Staff.

DR. NELTE: You said you wanted to say something else about the case of

Yugoslavia. Reich Marshal Göring has made statements upon that subject

here. Can you add anything new? Otherwise, I have no further questions

with regard to that subject.

KEITEL: I should merely like to confirm once more that the decision to

proceed against Yugoslavia with military means meant completely

upsetting all military advances and arrangements made up to that time.

Marita had to be completely readjusted. Also new forces had to be

brought through Hungary from the North. All that was completely

improvised.

DR. NELTE: We come now to Fall Barbarossa. The Soviet Prosecution,

particularly, have stressed that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

and you as Chief of Staff, as early as the summer of 1940, had dealt

with the plan of an attack against the Soviet Union. When did Hitler for

the first time talk to you about the possibility of a conflict, of an

armed conflict with the Soviet Union?

KEITEL: As far as I recollect, that was at the beginning of August 1940,

on the occasion of a discussion of the situation at Berchtesgaden, or

rather at his house, the Berghof. That was the first time that the

possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union was discussed.

DR. NELTE: What were the reasons which Hitler gave at that time which

might possibly lead to a war?

KEITEL: I think I can refer to what Reich Marshal Göring has said on

this subject.

According to our notions, there were considerable troop concentrations

in Bessarabia and Bukovina. The Foreign Minister, too, had mentioned

figures which I cannot recall, and there was the anxiety which had been

repeatedly voiced by Hitler at that time that developments might result

in the Romanian theater which would endanger our source of petroleum,

the fuel supply for the conduct of the war, which for the most part came

from Romania. Apart from that, I think he talked about strong or

manifest troop concentrations in the Baltic provinces.

DR. NELTE: Were any directives given by you at that time or by those

branches of the Wehrmacht which were affected?

KEITEL: No. As far as I can recollect this was confined firstly to

increased activities of the intelligence or espionage service against

Russia and, secondly, to certain investigations regarding the

possibility of transferring troops from the West, from France, as

quickly as possible to the Southeast areas or to East Prussia. Certain

return transports of troops from the Eastern military districts had

already taken place at the end of July. Apart from that no instructions

were given at that time.

DR. NELTE: How was the line of demarcation occupied?

KEITEL: There were continual reports from that border or demarcation

line on frontier incidents, shootings, and particularly about frequent

crossings of that line by aircraft of the Soviet Union, which led to the

due exchange of notes. But at any rate there were continual small

frontier fights and shootings, particularly in the South, and we

received information through our frontier troops that continual or at

certain times new Russian troop units appeared opposite them. I think

that was all.

DR. NELTE: Do you know how many divisions of the German Wehrmacht were

stationed there at the time?

KEITEL: During the Western campaign there were—I do not think I am

wrong this time—seven divisions, seven divisions from East Prussia to

the Carpathians, two of which, during the Western campaign, had even

been transported to the West but later on were transported back again.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution submitted that at the end of July 1940

Generaloberst Jodl had given general instructions at Reichenhall to

several officers of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to study the Russian

problem, and particularly to examine the railway transport problems.

Since you said a little earlier that not until August did you hear for

the first time from Hitler what the situation was, I am now asking you

whether you were informed about these conferences of Generaloberst Jodl.

KEITEL: No. I did not hear until I came here, that such a conference

took place in Berchtesgaden at the end of July or beginning of August.

This was due to the fact that I was absent from Berchtesgaden. I did not

know of this conference, and I think General Jodl probably forgot to

tell me about it at the time. I did not know about it.

DR. NELTE: What were your personal views at that time regarding the

problem which arose out of the conference with Hitler?

KEITEL: When I became conscious of the fact that the matter had been

given really serious thought I was very surprised, and I considered it

most unfortunate. I seriously considered what could be done to influence

Hitler by using military considerations. At that time, as has been

briefly discussed here by the Foreign Minister, I wrote a personal

memorandum containing my thoughts on the subject, I should like to say,

independently of the experts working in the General Staff and the

Wehrmacht Operations Staff and wanted to present this memorandum to

Hitler. I decided on that method because, as a rule, one could never get

beyond the second sentence of a discussion with Hitler. He took the word

out of one’s mouth and afterwards one never was able to say what one

wanted to say. And in this connection I should like to say right now

that I had the idea—it was the first and only time—of visiting the

Foreign Minister personally, in order to ask him to support me from the

political angle regarding that question. That is the visit to Fuschl,

which has already been discussed here and which the Foreign Minister Von

Ribbentrop confirmed during his examination the other day.

DR. NELTE: Then you confirm what Herr Von Ribbentrop has said, so that

there is no need for me to repeat it?

KEITEL: I confirm that I went to Fuschl. I had the memorandum with me.

It had been written by hand, since I did not want anybody else to get

hold of it. And I left Fuschl conscious of the fact that he wanted to

try to exercise influence on Hitler to the same end. He promised me

that.

DR. NELTE: Did you give that memorandum to Hitler?

KEITEL: Yes. Some time later at the Berghof, after a report of the

situation had been given, I handed him that memorandum when we were

alone. I think he told me at the time that he was going to study it. He

took it, and did not give me a chance to make any explanations.

DR. NELTE: Considering its importance did you later on find an

opportunity to refer to it again?

KEITEL: Yes. At first nothing at all happened, so that after some time I

reminded him of it and asked him to discuss the problem with me. This he

did, and the matter was dealt with very briefly by his saying that the

military and strategic considerations put forward by me were in no way

convincing. He, Hitler, considered these ideas erroneous, and turned

them down. In that connection I can perhaps mention very briefly that I

was again very much upset and there was another crisis when I asked to

be relieved of my post, and that another man be put in my office and

that I be sent to the front. That once more led to a sharp controversy

as has already been described by the Reich Marshal when he said that

Hitler took the attitude that he would not tolerate that a general whose

views he did not agree with should ask to be relieved of his post

because of this disagreement. I think he said that he had every right to

turn down such suggestions and ideas if he considered them wrong. I had

not the right to take any action.

DR. NELTE: Did he return that memorandum to you?

KEITEL: No, I do not think I got it back. I have always assumed that it

was found among the captured Schmundt files, which apparently is not the

case. I did not get it back; he kept it.

DR. NELTE: I do not wish to occupy the time of the Tribunal in this

connection any further. I will leave it to you as to whether you wish to

disclose the contents of that memorandum. I am not so much concerned

with the military presentation—one can imagine what it was—but the

question is: Did you refer to the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 in that

memorandum?

KEITEL: Yes, but I must say that the main part of my memorandum was

devoted to military studies, military studies regarding the amount of

forces, the requirements of effectives, and the dispersal of forces in

France and Norway at the time, and the Luftwaffe in Italy, and our being

tied down in the West. In that memorandum I most certainly pointed to

the fact that this Non-Aggression Pact existed. But all the rest were

military considerations.

DR. NELTE: Were any military orders given at that time?

KEITEL: No. No orders were given at that time except, I think, for the

improvement of lines of communications from the West to the East to

permit speeding up troop transports, particularly to the Southeastern

sector, in other words, north of the Carpathians and in the East

Prussian sector. Apart from that no orders of any kind were given at

that time.

DR. NELTE: Had the discussion with Foreign Minister Molotov already

taken place at that time?

KEITEL: No. On the contrary, at that time, in October the idea of a

discussion with the Russians was still pending. Hitler also told me that

at the time, and he always emphasized in that connection that until such

a discussion had taken place he would not give any orders, since it had

been proved to him by General Jodl that in any case it was technically

impossible to transfer strong troop units into the threatened sectors in

the East which I have mentioned. Accordingly, nothing was done. The

visit or rather discussion with the Russian delegation was prepared, in

which connection I would like to say that I made the suggestion at that

time that Hitler should talk personally with M. Stalin. That was the

only thing I did in the matter.

DR. NELTE: During that conference were military matters discussed?

KEITEL: I did not take any part in the discussions with M. Molotov,

although in this instance too I was present at the reception and at

certain social meetings. I remember that on two occasions I sat next to

Molotov at the table. I did not hear any political discussion, nor did I

have any political discussions with my table companion.

DR. NELTE: What did Hitler say after these discussions had come to an

end?

KEITEL: After the departure of Molotov he really said very little. He

more or less said that he was disappointed in the discussion. I think he

mentioned briefly that problems regarding the Baltic Sea and the Black

Sea areas had been discussed in a general way and that he had not been

able to take any positive or desired stand. He said he did not go into

details. I asked him about military things which had a certain

significance at the time—the strong forces, for instance, in the

Bessarabian sector. I think Hitler evaded the answer and said that this

was obviously connected with all these matters and that he had not gone

into it too deeply, or something similar, I cannot remember exactly. At

any rate, there was nothing new in it for us and nothing final.

DR. NELTE: After that conference were any military orders given?

KEITEL: I think not even then, but Hitler told us at the time that he

wished to wait for the reaction to these discussions in the Eastern area

after the delegation had returned to Russia. Certain orders had been

given to the ambassador, too, in that respect, however not directly

after the Molotov visit.

DR. NELTE: May I ask you to give the date when the first definite

instructions were given?

KEITEL: I can only reconstruct it retrospectively, on the strength of

the instruction Barbarossa which has been shown to me here and which

came out in December. I believe it must have been during the first half

of December that the orders were issued, the well-known order

Barbarossa. To be precise, these orders were given at the beginning of

December, namely, the orders to work out the strategic plan.

DR. NELTE: Did you know about the conference which took place at Zossen

in December and which has been mentioned by the Prosecution here?

Perhaps I may remind you that the Finnish General Heinrichs was present.

KEITEL: No, I knew nothing about the conference in Zossen, and I think

General Buschenhagen was also there, according to the statements he has

made here. I did not know anything about the Finnish General Heinrichs’

presence in Zossen and have heard about it for the first time here. The

only way I can explain this is that the General Staff of the Army wanted

to get information or other things and that for that purpose they

discussed that with the persons concerned. I did not meet General

Heinrichs until May 1941. At that time I had a conference with him and

General Jodl at Salzburg. Before that I had never seen him and I had

never talked to him.

DR. NELTE: Is there any significance in the fact that Directive Number

21 says that Hitler would order the actual deployment of the troops 8

weeks before the operational plan would become effective?

KEITEL: Yes, there was considerable significance attached to that. I

have been interrogated about that by the Soviet Delegation here. The

reason was that according to the calculations of the Army, it would take

about eight weeks to get these troops, which were to be transported by

rail, into position; that is to say, if troops from Reich territory were

to be placed in position on an operative starting line. Hitler

emphasized when the repeated revisions of the plan were made that he

wanted to have complete control of such deployment. In other words,

troop movements without his approval were not to be made. That was the

purpose of this instruction.

DR. NELTE: When did it become clear to you that Hitler was determined to

attack the Soviet Union?

KEITEL: As far as I can recollect, it was at the beginning of March. The

idea was that the attack might be made approximately in the middle of

May. Therefore the decision regarding the transport of troops by rail

had to be made in the middle of March. For that reason, during the first

half of March a meeting of generals was called, that is to say, a

briefing of the generals at Hitler’s headquarters and the explanations

given by him at that time had clearly the purpose of telling the

generals that he was determined to carry out the deployment although an

order had not yet been given. He gave a whole series of ideas and issued

certain instructions on things which are contained in these directives

here for the special parts of Fall Barbarossa. This is Document 447-PS,

and these are the directives which were eventually also signed by me. He

then gave us the directive for these guiding principles and ideas, so

that the generals were already informed about the contents, which in

turn caused me to confirm it in writing in this form, for there was

nothing new in it for any one who had taken part in the discussions.

DR. NELTE: It appears to me, however, that what Hitler told the generals

in his address was something new; and it also seems to me that you who

were concerned with these matters, that is to say, who had to work them

out, understood or had to understand that now a completely abnormal

method of warfare was about to begin, at least when seen from your

traditional point of view as a soldier.

KEITEL: That is correct. Views were expressed there regarding the

administration and economic exploitation of the territories to be

conquered or occupied. There was the completely new idea of setting up

Reich commissioners and civilian administrations. There was the definite

decision to charge the Delegate for the Four Year Plan with the supreme

direction in the economic field; and what was for me the most important

point, and what affected me most was the fact that besides the right of

the military commander to exercise the executive power of the occupation

force, a policy was to be followed here in which it was clearly

expressed that Reichsführer SS Himmler was to be given extensive

plenipotentiary powers concerning all police actions in these

territories which later on became known. I firmly opposed that, since to

me it seemed impossible that there should be two authorities placed side

by side. In the directives here it says: “The authority of the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army is not affected by this.”

That was a complete illusion and self-deception. Quite the opposite

happened. As long as it was compatible with my functions, I fought

against this. I think I ought to say that I have no witness to that

other than General Jodl, who shared these experiences with me.

Eventually, however, Hitler worked out those directives himself, more or

less, and gave them the meaning he wanted. That is how these directives

came about.

That I had no power to order the things which are contained in these

directives is clear from the fact that it says that the Reich Marshal

receives this task...the Reichsführer SS receives that task, _et

cetera_. I had no authority whatever to give orders to them.

DR. NELTE: Was it never actually discussed that if one wanted to launch

an attack on the Soviet Union, one would previously have to take

diplomatic steps or else send a declaration of war, or an ultimatum?

KEITEL: Oh, yes, I discussed that. As early as the winter of 1940-1941,

whenever there were discussions regarding the strength of the Russian

forces on the demarcation line, that is, in December-January, I asked

Hitler to send a note to the Soviet Union so as to bring about a

cleaning-up of the situation, if I may express it so. I can add now that

the first time he said nothing at all, and the second time he refused,

maintaining that it was useless, since he would only receive the answer

that this was an internal affair and that it was none of our business,

or something like that. At any rate, he refused. I tried again, at a

later stage, that is to say I voiced the request that an ultimatum

should be presented before we entered upon an action, so that in some

form the basis would be created for a preventive war, as we called it,

for an attack.

DR. NELTE: You say “preventive war.” When the final decisions were made,

what was the military situation?

KEITEL: I am best reminded of how we, or rather the Army judged the

situation, by a study or memorandum. I believe it is Document 872-PS,

dated the end of January or the beginning of February, a report made by

the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to Hitler on the state of

operative and strategic preparations. And in this document I found the

information we then had on the strength of the Red Army and other

existing information known to us, which is dealt with fully in this

document.

Apart from that, I have to say too that the intelligence service of the

OKW, Admiral Canaris, placed at my disposal or at the Army’s disposal

very little material because the Russian area was closely sealed against

German intelligence. In other words, there were gaps up to a certain

point. Only the things contained in Document 872-PS were known.

DR. NELTE: Would you like to say briefly what it contained, so as to

justify your decision?

KEITEL: Yes, there were—Halder reported that there were 150 divisions

of the Soviet Union deployed along the line of demarcation. Then there

were aerial photographs of a large number of airdromes. In short, there

was a degree of preparedness on the part of Soviet Russia, which could

at any time lead to military action. Only the actual fighting later made

it clear just how far the enemy had been prepared. I must say, that we

fully realized all these things only during the actual attack.

DR. NELTE: You were present during Hitler’s last speech to the

commanders in the East, made on 14 June 1941, in the Reich Chancellery,

were you not? I ask you, without going over old ground, to state briefly

what Hitler said on that occasion, and what effect it had on the

generals.

THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t there a document in connection with this? It must

all be in the document. Isn’t that so?

DR. NELTE: I wanted to ask one question on that subject and then submit

the document; or, if the Tribunal so desires, I will not read the

document at all, but will merely quote the short summaries which are at

the end of the document. Will the Tribunal agree to that?

THE PRESIDENT: But what you did was to ask the defendant what was in the

document.

DR. NELTE: The document contains, if I may indicate it briefly, the

following: The developments, and the ever increasing influence of

organizations alien to the Wehrmacht on the course of the war. It is the

proof that the Wehrmacht, during this war, which must be called a

degenerate war, tried, as far as possible, to keep within the limits of

international law and that when the...

THE PRESIDENT: I only want to know what your question is, that is all.

DR. NELTE: My question to Field Marshal Keitel was to tell me about the

speech on the 14th of June 1941, and what Hitler ordered the generals to

do and what the effect on them was. With that, I intended to conclude

the preparations for the Russian campaign.

THE PRESIDENT: He can tell what the effect was upon himself, but I don’t

see how he can tell what the effect was upon the other generals.

DR. NELTE: He can only assume of course, but he can say whether the

others reacted in one way or another. One can talk and one can take an

opposing stand. I merely wanted to know whether this happened or not.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better ask him what happened that day at

the conference; if you want to know what happened at the conference, why

don’t you ask him?

DR. NELTE: Please, tell us about it.

KEITEL: After short reports regarding the operational orders to the

individual commanders, there followed a recapitulation, which I must

describe as a purely political speech. The main theme was that this was

the decisive battle between two ideologies, and that this fact made it

impossible—that the leadership in this war, the practices which we knew

as soldiers, and which we considered to be the only correct ones under

international law, had to be measured by completely different standards.

The war could not be carried on by these means. This was an entirely new

kind of war, based on completely different arguments and principles.

With these explanations, the various orders were then given to do away

with the legal system in territories which were not pacified, to combat

resistance with brutal means, to consider every local resistance

movement as the expression of the deep rift between the two ideologies.

These were decidedly quite new and very impressive ideas, but also

thoughts which affected us deeply.

DR. NELTE: Did you, or did any other generals raise objections to or

oppose these explanations, directives, and orders?

KEITEL: No, I personally made no remonstrances, apart from those which I

had already advanced and the objections I had already expressed before.

However, I have never known which generals, if any of the generals,

addressed the Führer. At any rate, they did not do so after that

discussion.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think that now the time has come to decide

whether you will accept the affidavits of the Defendant Keitel contained

in my Document Book Number 2 under the Numbers 3 and 5, as exhibits.

Perhaps the Prosecution can express an opinion on this.

Up to now we have merely discussed the history before the actual Russian

war. Insofar as the Defendant Keitel and the OKW is concerned, I should

like to shorten the examination by submitting these two affidavits. The

affidavit Number 3 is an exposé of the conditions governing the

authority for issuing orders in the East. The extent of the territory

and the numerous organizations led to an extremely complicated procedure

for giving orders. To enable you to ascertain whether the Defendant

Keitel, or the OKW, or some other department might be responsible, the

conditions governing the authority to issue orders in the East have been

presented in detail. I believe it would save a great deal of time if you

would accept this document as an exhibit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Mr. Dodd and I have no objection to

this procedure used by the Defense and we believe that it might probably

help the Tribunal to have in front of them the printed accounts.

THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte intend to read or only summarize these

affidavits?

DR. NELTE: I intend merely to submit it to you after I have asked the

defendant whether the contents of the affidavit have been written and

signed by him.

THE PRESIDENT: And the Prosecution, of course, have had these affidavits

for some time?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

DR. NELTE: The same applies, if I understand Sir David correctly, to

affidavit Number 5.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it would be convenient, I think, if you gave

these affidavits numbers in the sequence of your exhibit numbers and

gave us also their dates so that we can identify them. Can you give us

the dates of the affidavits?

DR. NELTE: May I be permitted to arrange the matter in the secretary’s

office during the recess?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The first is dated the 8th of March, isn’t it? The

other is the 18th, is it? Dr. Nelte, you can do it at the recess and

give them numbers. You can give them numbers at the recess.

It is nearly 1 o’clock now, and we are just going to adjourn. You can

give them numbers then. Does that conclude your examination?

DR. NELTE: We come now to the individual cases which I hope, however, to

conclude in the course of the afternoon. Mr. President, I am sorry but I

must discuss the prisoner-of-war affairs and several individual matters.

I think I still need this afternoon for myself. I believe that if I bear

in mind the interests of the Defendant Keitel, I am limiting myself a

good deal.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you desire to put your questions to him now or not?

DR. NELTE: I think—I do not know how the President feels about it—it

would be convenient if we had a recess now so that in the meantime I can

put the affidavits in order. I have not yet finished the discussion of

this subject.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, of the two documents mentioned this morning,

the first document, Number 3 of Document Book Number 2, entitled “The

Command Relationships in the East,” will be given the number 10 of the

Keitel Documents.

THE PRESIDENT: That is dated the 14 March 1946?

DR. NELTE: Yes, 14 March 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: The document that I have got is headed the 23 February

1946, and at the end, the 14 March 1946. Is that the one?

DR. NELTE: The document was first written down and later attested. There

is, therefore, a difference in the two dates.

THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to identify which it is, that is all.

DR. NELTE: It is the document of 14 March 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. NELTE: The affidavit is dated 14 March.

THE PRESIDENT: And you are giving it what number?

DR. NELTE: I give it Number Keitel-10. The second document, which is

fifth in the document book, is dated at the head 18 March 1946 and has

at the end the defendant’s attestation as of 29 March 1946. This

document has received the number Keitel-12. Permit me to read a summary

of a few points on Pages 11 and 12 of the German copy. This, as it

appears to me, is of very great importance for this Trial.

THE PRESIDENT: Of which document?

DR. NELTE: Document Number 12.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. NELTE: The question in this document...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. I do not think the interpreters have found

the document yet, have they? It comes just after a certificate, by

Catherine Bedford, and I think it is about halfway through the book,

and, although the pages are not numbered consecutively, it appears to

have the figure 51 on it.

DR. NELTE: I shall begin where it says, “In summing up...” Those are the

last three pages of this document:

“In summing up it must be established that:

“1. In addition to the Wehrmacht as the legal protector of the

Reich internally and externally (as in every State)”—I

interpolate, ‘in the SS organizations’—“a particular,

completely independent power factor arose and was legalized,

which politically, biologically, in police and administration

matters actually drew the powers of the State to itself.

“2. Even at the beginning of military complications and

conflicts the SS came to be the actual forerunner and standard

bearer of a policy of conquest and power.

“3. After the commencement of the military actions the

Reichsführer SS devised methods which always appeared

appropriate, which were concealed at first, or were hardly

apparent, at least from the outside, and which enabled him in

reality to build up his power under the guise of protecting the

annexed or occupied territories from political opponents.

“4. From the occupation of the Sudeten territory, beginning with

the organization of political unrest, that is, of so-called

liberation actions and ‘incidents,’ the road leads straight

through Poland and the Western areas in a steep curve into the

Russian territory.

“5. With the directives for the Barbarossa Plan for the

administration and utilization of the conquered Eastern

territories, the Wehrmacht was, against its intention and

without knowledge of the conditions, drawn further and further

into the subsequent developments and activities.

“6. I (Keitel) and my colleagues had no deeper insight into the

effects of Himmler’s full powers, and had no idea of the

possible effect of these powers.

“I assume without further discussion that the same holds true

for the OKH, which according to the order of the Führer made the

agreements with Himmler’s officials and gave orders to the

subordinate army commanders.

“7. In reality, it was not the Commander-in-Chief of the Army

who had the executive power assigned to him and the power to

decree and to maintain law in the occupied territories, but

Himmler and Heydrich decided on their own authority the fate of

the people and prisoners, including prisoners of war in whose

camps they exercised the executive power.

“8. The traditional training and concept of duty of the German

officers, which taught unquestioning obedience to superiors who

bore responsibility, led to an attitude,—regrettable in

retrospect,—which caused them to shrink from rebelling against

these orders and these methods even when they recognized their

illegality and inwardly refuted them.

“9. The Führer, Hitler, abused his authority and his fundamental

Order Number 1 in an irresponsible way with respect to us. This

Order Number 1 read, more or less:

“‘1. No one shall know about secret matters which do not belong

to his own range of assignments.

“‘2. No one shall learn more than he needs to fulfill the tasks

assigned to him.

“‘3. No one shall receive information earlier than is necessary

for the performance of the duties assigned to him.

“‘4. No one shall transmit to subordinate offices, to any

greater extent or any earlier than is unavoidable for the

achievement of the purpose, orders which are to be kept secret.’

“10. If the entire consequences which arose from granting

Himmler authority in the East had been foreseen, in this case

the leading generals would have been the first to raise an

unequivocal protest against it. That is my conviction.

“As these atrocities developed, one from the other, step by

step, and without any foreknowledge of the consequences, destiny

took its tragic course, with its fateful consequences.”

Witness, Defendant Keitel, did you yourself write this statement, that

is, dictate it as I have just read it? Are you perfectly familiar with

its contents and did you swear to it?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: I shall submit the document in the original.

[_Turning to the defendant_]: We had stopped at Document C-50, which

deals with the abolition of military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa

area. I do not know whether you still want to express your opinion on

it, or whether that is now superfluous after what has just been read.

KEITEL: I should like to say to this only that these documents, C-50 and

884-PS, beginning at Page 4, are the record of the directives that were

given in that General Staff meeting on 14 June. In line with military

regulations and customs they were given the form of written orders and

then sent to the subordinate offices.

DR. NELTE: I have a few more short questions regarding the war against

America. The Prosecution assert that Japan was influenced by Germany to

wage war against America and have, in the course of their presentation,

accused you of participation and co-operation in this plan. Would you

like to make some statement regarding this?

KEITEL: Document C-75 is a directive by the Supreme Command of the

Wehrmacht which deals with co-operation with Japan. Of course, I

participated in the drawing-up of this order and signed it by order. The

other document, Number 1881-PS, regarding a conference between the

Führer and Matsuoka, I do not know, and I did not know anything about

it. I can say only the following for us soldiers:

In the course of all this time, until the Japanese entry into the war

against America, there were two points of view that were the general

directives or principles which Hitler emphasized to us. One was to

prevent America from entering the war under any circumstances;

consequently to renounce military operations in the seas, as far as the

Navy was concerned. The other, the thought that guided us soldiers, was

the hope that Japan would enter the war against Russia; and I recall

that around November and the beginning of December 1941, when the

advance of the German armies west of Moscow was halted and I visited the

front with Hitler, I was asked several times by the generals, “When is

Japan going to enter the war?” The reasons for their asking this were

that again and again Russian Far East divisions were being thrown into

the fight via Moscow, that is to say, fresh troops coming from the Far

East. That was about 18 to 20 divisions, but I could not say for

certain.

I was present in Berlin during Matsuoka’s visit, and I saw him also at a

social gathering, but I did not have any conversation with him. All the

deductions that might be made from Directive 24, C-75, and which I have

learned about from the preliminary examination during my interrogation,

are without any foundation for us soldiers, and there is no

justification for anyone’s believing that we were guided by thoughts of

bringing about a war between Japan and America, or of undertaking

anything to that end.

In conclusion, I can say only that this order was necessary because the

branches of the Wehrmacht offered resistance to giving Japan certain

things, military secrets in armament production, unless she were in the

war.

DR. NELTE: There was also a letter submitted by the Prosecution, a

letter from Major Von Falkenstein to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

Reich Marshal Göring testified to this in his interrogation. I only

wanted to ask you if you knew of this letter, or if you have anything to

add to Reich Marshal Göring’s testimony?

KEITEL: I have nothing to add, for I never saw this letter by Von

Falkenstein until I saw it here during my interrogation.

DR. NELTE: We come now to the individual facts with which you and the

OKW are charged by the Prosecution. Because of the vast number of points

brought up by the Prosecution I can naturally choose only individual

groups and those with the most serious charges, in order to elucidate

whether and to what extent you were involved and what your attitude was

to the ensuing results. In most cases it is a question of orders from

Hitler, but in your statement on the actual happenings you have admitted

to a certain participation in these things and knowledge of them.

Therefore, we must discuss these points. One of the most important is

that of hostages. In this connection I want to show you Document C-128.

These are orders for operations in the West. Let me ask you, however,

first of all, what is the basis for the taking of hostages as it was

usually carried out by the Wehrmacht?

KEITEL: These are the printed regulations “Secret G-2” (Army Service

Regulation G-2) and headed, according to the order: “Service

Instructions for Army Units.”

DR. NELTE: I ask you, Mr. President, to turn to Document Book Number 1,

Number 7 on Page 65 of my document book. I ask you to establish that

this is a copy from the afore-mentioned Army Regulations, Section 9,

which deals with the question of hostages. This is Document K-7, and it

reads as follows:

“Hostages may be taken only by order of a regimental commander,

an independent battalion commander or a commander of equal rank.

With regard to accommodation and feeding, it is to be noted

that, though they should be kept under strictest guard, they are

not convicts. Furthermore, only senior officers holding at least

the position of a division commander can decide on the fate of

hostages.”

That is, if you want to call it so, the Hostage Law of the German

Wehrmacht.

KEITEL: I might say in this connection that in Document C-128, which is

the preparatory operational order of the Army for the battle in the

West, this is mentioned specially under the heading: “3a. Security

measures against the population of occupied territory. A) Hostages.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you offering that as Keitel-7?

DR. NELTE: I ask to have these printed Army Instructions put in evidence

as Exhibit Keitel-7 (Document Number Keitel-7).

THE PRESIDENT: Would you kindly say what you are putting it in as each

time, because if you simply say “7” it will lead to confusion.

DR. NELTE: Keitel-7.

[_Turning to the defendant_]: Was Document C-128 the order of the High

Command of the Army on the occasion of the march into France?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Now I have here another document, Document Number 1585-PS,

which contains an opinion expressed by the OKW. It is a letter to the

Reich Minister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; and in

this letter, I assume, are contained the convictions held by the office

of which you were head.

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: What do you say today in connection with this letter?

KEITEL: I can say only that it is precisely the same standpoint that I

represent today, because there is here, with reference to the

above-mentioned order, the following paragraph, beginning with the

words, “For the protection against any misuse...” and so on. Then the

order is quoted.

DR. NELTE: This is in reference to Regulation G-2, and further, that the

“decision regarding the fate of hostages...”

KEITEL: It says, “According to which the decision on the fate of

hostages is reserved to senior officers holding at least the position of

a division commander.”

DR. NELTE: Is it correct when I say that this letter was drawn up by the

Legal Department of the OKW after examination of the situation as

regards international law and its implications?

KEITEL: Yes, it is to be seen from the document itself that this point

of view was taken into consideration.

DR. NELTE: Did you issue any general orders on this question of hostages

in your capacity as chief of OKW, apart from those we have had up to

now?

KEITEL: No, the OKW participated only in helping to draw up this order.

No other basic orders or directions were issued on this question.

DR. NELTE: Did you nevertheless in individual cases have anything to do

with this question of hostages? You and the OKW are charged by the

Prosecution with having expressed yourselves in some way or having taken

some kind of attitude when inquiries were made by Stülpnagel and

Falkenhausen.