THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You have them all cumulative or irrelevant
starting with 76. You mean the cumulative?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, I am afraid to say, Your Honor, this was
originally got out purely as a working note, and that is rather an
error. It should be irrelevant on account of TC-21.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I was going to say that perhaps I might
anticipate an objection that Dr. Horn has been good enough to tell me
that he will make to this, that yesterday he contended that certain
incidents before Munich had been condoned by the Munich Agreement, and
that the argument I have just put up is on the same lines as that which
the Tribunal turned down yesterday.
But, of course, there is this difference, that the Munich Agreement was
negotiated in ignorance of the Fall Grün and that, from the point of
view of condoning previous incidents, it is not on the same footing as
an agreement negotiated in full knowledge of the circumstances.
So, My Lord, taking Group 3, Poland and the first phase of it, the
Prosecution would suggest—looking at the middle column on Page
2—allowing Number 75, which is the Polish Treaty of 1919, and TC-21,
which I have already mentioned, which reaffirmed the Kellogg Pact, and
Number 123 and TC-72, Number 14 and 16, which I have already mentioned.
The remainder, perhaps, might all be said to be irrelevant; but it would
be reasonable, perhaps, to allow Numbers 117, 149, 150, 153, 154, 159,
160, 163, and TC-72, Number 18. These were largely discussions between
ambassadors and heads of state, which may have rather more importance
than the other documents in this particular group.
As a matter of fact, My Lord, I think they are all in anyhow, those that
I have just mentioned.
That goes up to 182. Starting now at 182, and the first five, 182 to
186...
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to 155 which is the calling out of
Polish reserves, 155 to 158?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, My Lord, the objection to that was simply based
on the fact that...
THE PRESIDENT: I think they are all mentioned in the conversation which
is 159, and that is probably the reason.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. I am obliged, Your Lordship. I think that it is
so, but I do not think the objection to them could be very strong.
THE PRESIDENT: No.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 182 to 186, My Lord, they are reports by the
German chargés d’affaires in various capitals, and the Prosecution say
that those would not be proper evidence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why not?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are just accounts of the German chargés
d’affaires’ observations and conclusions of fact, for the most part by
them, transmitted to their Foreign Office.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you mean they are irrelevant on the ground
of hearsay?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I beg your pardon.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Because they are hearsay they should not be
admitted; is that what you mean?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, of course, partly hearsay. They are
also vague, and again, they are transmitted with an object in view. At
least that has been the submission of the Prosecution, that they are
transmitted to color the picture from the German point of view.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Would you admit these if they were made by
chargés d’affaires of other states?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: If they were made by chargés d’affaires of other
states?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they would be admissible if they were put in as
government reports by Allied nations under the Charter; but they are not
really admissible if they are German documents.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry; I do not know what you mean.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Article 21 of the Charter...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry. Perhaps I do not make myself
clear. I do not quite understand why these are different from any other
official reports made by chargés d’affaires of any country. Is it
because they are German reports?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Because they are German reports.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see. In other words, you think German
reports should be excluded.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think under the Charter they should be excluded,
except, of course, if they are used by the Prosecution as admissions
against the German Government itself.
THE PRESIDENT: We are going to hear you in a moment, Dr. Horn. Anyhow,
Mr. Barrington, your objection to 182 to 214 is that it is self-serving
evidence and therefore not admissible; is that it?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is right, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other objection to them?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, as I said, conclusions of fact drawn
by an observer in a foreign country. They tend to get rather vague.
THE PRESIDENT: That might apply to a great deal of the evidence.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 187 to 192 and TC-77 there is no objection to.
Number 193 and 194 are German Foreign Office memoranda and they are mere
discussions, internal to the German Foreign Office. 193 is a memorandum
of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, and it deals with a visit
to him of the French Ambassador. And Number 194 is similar, a visit of
the British Ambassador. Number 195, that is Sir Nevile Henderson’s White
Paper, _Failure of a Mission_, and there are a number of extracts from
that; it is a book and there are a number of extracts from that in the
document book and it is contended that they are cumulative of evidence
which has already been given and that in particular most of them are
really provocative. That applies particularly to the first extract.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by provocative?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Your Lordship will see that in the first extract
there are some rather strongly worded opinions.
THE PRESIDENT: Which book are they in?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: They are in Book 6, My Lord. There are some rather
strongly worded opinions about the position of Soviet Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Number 196 and 197 are German memoranda and reports
for Foreign Office use, and they cover the same category as 193 and 194.
One of them is internal to the Foreign Office and the other from the
German chargé d’affaires in Washington.
Numbers 198 to 203 are all right.
Number 204 is objected to as not being evidence; it is a memorandum of
the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office in
Berlin, and it merely talks of a report in the _Berliner Börsenzeitung_.
It is merely secondhand evidence.
Number 205 and 206 are not objected to.
The next one, TC-72, Number 74, is not objected to.
Number 207 is the same document as the previous one. It is a mere
repetition.
Now, Number 208, My Lord, consists of a collection of extracts from the
_British Blue Book_, and I am afraid I have not had time to check up
which of them are actually in evidence already. But it is clear that the
majority of them are obviously relevant, but it is suggested that those
in the left-hand column do include unnecessary detail in view of the
rest of them.
Number 209, there is no objection.
Number 210 is a conversation between the Defendant Ribbentrop and Sir
Nevile Henderson on the 30th of August 1939, and that of course has been
the subject of evidence already and is perhaps in any event cumulative
for that reason.
Number 211(a) and 211(b) are just repetitions of documents quoted from
the _British Blue Book_.
Number 212 is a Polish wireless broadcast, and Number 213 is a German
communiqué to the German public, and it is contended that those have no
evidential value.
Number 214 is an extract from a book which the Tribunal has already
refused to the defendants.
Now, the next page of the note, My Lord, deals with my next group, which
is Norway and Denmark.
THE PRESIDENT: Group 4, is it? Group 4, is that right?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is Group 4, My Lord, yes.
215(a) and 215(b) deal with the case of Iceland and Greenland. They are
not very long documents; they are just considered to be irrelevant.
Objection to them could not be very strong.
There is no objection to 216(a) and 216(b), which are already in
evidence, I think; and D-629 is also already in evidence.
Number 217 is simply an interview which the Defendant Ribbentrop gave to
the press, which the Prosecution says is not proper evidence.
Number 004-PS is already in evidence.
Number 218 and 219, I think, are also in evidence.
Number 220 again is objected to as it is simply an interview with the
press.
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to those two Ribbentrop communications
to the press?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: It is self-created evidence, My Lord. He has
presumably given that evidence already. He had not given it at the same
time.
THE PRESIDENT: What he said 6 years ago might be relevant.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, if Your Lordship thinks so; but the point I was
making is simply that it is self-created evidence and created at the
time with a view to create an impression. It is propaganda.
THE PRESIDENT: You may say that, yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Then, My Lord, the next group is the Low Countries.
That group really began at 218, of course, and it goes on to 240...
THE PRESIDENT: Is this another group? Communiqué of the 5th group?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: This is the fifth group, My Lord, yes. That goes on
from 218 to 245, and I shall not deal in detail with that because the
French Chief Prosecutor is going to speak about that. And the same with
the next group, Number 6, which is the Balkans. The French Chief
Prosecutor will deal with that, Documents 246 to 278.
The next group, Number 7, is Russia, that is, Documents 280 to 295, with
the exception, I think of 285(a), which seems to have got there by
mistake; it appears to refer to the United States.
Number 279—I cannot identify from the English translation what it is at
all. Perhaps Your Lordship will be good enough to make an amendment
against Numbers 232 and 283; they should be put into the middle column,
there being no objection to them. But there is an objection to all the
other Russian documents. Your Lordship will see, beginning at the bottom
of the group, 291 to 295, they all concern the Anticomintern Pact.
Working up the page again from the bottom, 290, 1 to 5, are extracts
from the book which the Tribunal has already refused. And, of the
documents above that, 280 is Hitler’s speech about Russia in October
1939. And 281 is a repetition of a document we have already had, Number
274, which is the Three Power Pact. That will be dealt with.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that that is a textual reproduction?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think I am right in saying that it is actually a
textual reproduction.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But why is there an objection if it is simply
a textual reproduction? The Prosecution has been given textual
reproduction.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: There is no objection at all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean it is not in the right column?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I was putting in the Allied column only the ones which
could make up a complete set according to the Prosecution’s views.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that true of 284 also, the Soviet-German
pact?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not know whether that has come before...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why do you object to that then?
THE PRESIDENT: By “Pact,” is it the German Pact of the 28th of September
1939?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: This is the 28th of September 1939. I am told that
there is no objection to that.
Number 285 is again simply a German report which draws conclusions of
facts, and the Prosecution says that has no proper evidential value. It
is a very long report by the German Foreign Office concerning the
agitation in Europe against the German Reich by the Soviet Union, and it
is full of conclusions of fact and opinions.
THE PRESIDENT: It is after the date of the beginning of war against
Russia?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: It is after the beginning of that war, My Lord, yes.
Number 286 and 287, those are objected to as being without value as
evidence. They come from the _Völkischer Beobachter_.
Number 288 is said to be a captured Soviet document; but it has
deteriorated generally in the English version, had no date and no
signature, and it seems of very doubtful value.
Number 289 is a report from the Yugoslav military attaché in Moscow,
which is also thought to be irrelevant by the Prosecution.
Then Group Number 8, My Lord, is the group concerning the United States
of America, Documents 299 to 310, and including 285(a). The first ten
documents, Your Lordship will see, are reports from, we would say they
come from a very indirect source, the process report by the Polish
Ambassador on the political situation in the United States in 1939. The
next one seems to come from Portugal, the next from the Polish
Ambassador again, the next two also from the Polish Ambassador. Then the
next one, Number 300, is President Roosevelt’s Quarantine Speech in
1937, which seems too far back to be of any proper relevance. Number 301
is a German summary of events in the United States, which we say is
irrelevant for the reasons I have stated: That they are German
summaries, rather more unreliable than irrelevant. Number 302 again is
the Polish Ambassador’s report. Number 303 is a statement by President
Roosevelt in 1936, and Number 304 is President Roosevelt’s message to
Congress on the 4th of January 1939. I do not think there is anything
very objectionable about that. To numbers 305 to 308, there is no
objection; 309—in my copy there are two different versions of 309. The
first one is a German summary of the facts without any dates and with no
sources indicated. It seems to be of no proper value as evidence, and
the second one, 309 and 309(a), are declarations of the Pan-American
Conference and the German note in reply to it. I do not think the
Prosecution can take a very strong objection to that, but it does not
seem to be very closely in point.
TC-72, Number 127, and TC-72, Number 124, are both appeals of President
Roosevelt to Hitler and are not objected to. 310 is another German
summary of facts without any sources indicated.
The ninth group is simply a miscellaneous group; and, if My Lordship
will turn back to the first page of my note, it is the first 8 documents
on that page, down to Number 45. They are all allowed. There is no
objection to them, except Number 12, which is the announcement of the
Reichstag election results. It does not seem to matter one way or the
other whether that is in.
Number 45 is Lord Rothermere’s book of predictions and prophecies,
_Warnings and Prophecies_. I think the Prosecution contends that it is
not relevant evidence in this case.
The next lot of miscellaneous ones is on Page 2, Numbers 70 to 73.
Number 71 is the German-Lithuanian treaty about Memel, and there is no
objection. Number 70 is thought to be rather irrelevant. Numbers 72 and
73 are objected to because they deal with the Fourteen Points of
President Wilson.
The next lot of miscellaneous ones is on the last page of one of my
notes right down at the bottom, Number 296, and that is a speech by
Hitler on the Rhineland. You have all the evidence that has been given.
It appears to be rather cumulative, if it is not in already. I have not
actually checked whether it is in.
Number 298 on the top of the next page is, in fact, superfluous. It is
the same as Number 274. And down at the bottom of the last page, My
Lord, 311, is a paper written by the Defendant Ribbentrop on the
Führer’s personality.
THE PRESIDENT: That has already been ruled out.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That, I think, has been ruled out this morning by Your
Lordship. Number 312 is an affidavit of Frau Von Ribbentrop. Number 313
is an affidavit of Dr. Gottfriedsen. I understand from Dr. Horn that,
although he had been allowed Dr. Gottfriedsen as a witness, he thinks it
will save time if he reads the affidavit or a part of it. Perhaps, if
Your Lordship will allow the Prosecution to make what comments they
think fit when he comes to do that, it would be the best way of treating
it.
That is all—all my points, My Lord. There are just the Low Countries
and the Balkans.
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, it is true that Mr. Barrington has
spoken for all of us; and I do not intend to go over any of these
documents, except this, because I fear there is some question in the
minds of the members of the Tribunal about our objection running from 76
through 116, 118 to 122, and 114 to 148, the Polish documents. We also
say, of course, with Major Barrington that they are cumulative, but it
seems to me there is a much more basic objection. Perhaps they all have
to do with the alleged incidents inside Poland and they were published
in these _White Papers_. These incidents involved the mistreatment of
Polish citizens inside Poland, who were perhaps of German extraction.
Well, it is our view that such documents are irrelevant here because
that is no defense at all to the charges; and we cannot permit, we say,
a nation to defend itself or these defendants to defend themselves on
charges such as have been preferred here, by proving that citizens of
another state, although they may have been of German extraction or any
other extraction, were mistreated inside that state. Beginning with 76
running through to 116, 118 through 122, 114 through 148, and 151
through 152—it is 124 through 148 rather than 114 through 148, 124
through 148. The last are 151 and 152.
M. AUGUSTE CHAMPETIER DE RIBES (Chief Prosecutor for the French
Republic): I will ask the Tribunal’s permission to make two short
remarks about documents which are part of the fifth and sixth group, and
which concern entirely French documents taken from the _German White
Book_. It is, as a matter of fact only for this reason, that the French
Prosecution has any knowledge of them, for, contrary to what the
Tribunal believes, the French Prosecution has not yet received a
translation of the documents submitted by Dr. Horn. The first group,
Number 5, Documents 221 to 245; these are General Staff documents; and
it appears that from them Dr. Horn wishes to draw the conclusion that
England and France violated the neutrality of Belgium. If we ask the
Tribunal to reject the 25 documents, it is only because we see a grave
risk of the Tribunal’s losing time in useless discussions. Far from
having any reason to fear discussion, we feel that on the contrary
France and Britain would both be found to have respected scrupulously
the two pacts which they had signed: The first being to respect the
neutrality of Belgium, and the second being to respect the pact by which
they had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium.
What is the precise issue here, Gentlemen? Only to find out whether
Germany, France, or England violated the neutrality of Belgium. The
Defendant Ribbentrop has been asked this by his counsel, and has
answered it in the clearest possible manner, during Saturday’s session,
in a statement which the Tribunal is certain to remember. The Defendant
Ribbentrop said, “Of course it is always very hard in a war like this to
violate the neutrality of a country; and you must not think that we
enjoyed doing things like that.”
That, Gentlemen, is a formal admission that Germany violated the
neutrality of Belgium. Why should we waste time in discussing the
relevance of these 25 documents now?
I go on to the second group, Group Number 6. These are General Staff
documents, which Germany claims to have seized; and they concern events
in the Balkans in 1939 and 1940. The French Prosecution asks you to
reject the 22 documents submitted by Dr. Horn for the two reasons
following: They have absolutely no claim to be considered authentic, and
they are not relevant. They have absolutely no claim to be considered
authentic—they are all extracts from the _White Book_; and the Tribunal
knows the Prosecution’s views on this point. Moreover, the great
majority of these documents are extracts from documents originating with
the Allied general staffs. No originals have been produced; and the
supposed copies are not even submitted in their entirety. In the second
place, they are not relevant, for they all concern plans studied by the
general staffs in the last months of 1939 and the early part of 1940.
These plans for French or British intervention in Yugoslavia and Greece
naturally presupposed the consent of the governments concerned as an
indispensable condition. The plans were never carried through. They were
definitely abandoned after the Armistice of June 1940. The documents
date from 1939 and 1940; and the Tribunal will remember that the
aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece occurred on 6 April 1941 at a
time when the Hitler Government no longer had any reason to fear plans
made in 1939.
These documents, which have no claim to be considered authentic, are
also in no way relevant to the present discussion; and for that reason
the French Prosecution asks the Tribunal to reject them.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Horn. Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that you may
possibly, in view of the evidence which the Defendant Ribbentrop has
given, find it possible to withdraw some of these documents, in view of
the time that has been taken up. I mean the Defendant Ribbentrop has
dealt with the subject very fully; and it may be, therefore, that you
will be able to withdraw some of these documents in order to save time.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I will withdraw all the documents which
are cumulative. I should like first...
THE PRESIDENT: If you let us know now what it is you wish to withdraw...
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.
To begin with may I state my position on a few basic questions? That is
the probative value of the _White Books_ and the ambassadors’ reports. I
would like to point out that these documents had a decisive influence on
political opinion. That applies to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop as well
as Hitler. And in addition, I would like to point out that the
Prosecution have relied largely on reports of this kind. I should like,
therefore, to ask for equal rights for the Defense.
Then I would like to say a few words about the documents of the French
General Staff which were found in the town of La Charité during the
French campaign. If the High Tribunal shares the doubts and misgivings
expressed by the representative of the French Prosecution, I ask
permission to question the Commander of Army Group 10, Field Marshal
Leeb, as to the fact that these General Staff documents were found in
the town of La Charité.
The Polish documents to which I have referred were found in the Polish
Foreign Ministry at Warsaw. The Commander-in-Chief at that time, Field
Marshal or Generaloberst Blaskowitz, can testify to that effect. And in
this connection I would also name Generaloberst Blaskowitz as a witness,
if the Tribunal has any misgivings.
Moreover, I can summarize the opinion of the Defense by saying that I
believe that objections can be raised against a document only if its
inaccuracy is obvious from the contents or if it can be shown to be a
forgery. I ask the Tribunal to admit all the other documents contained
in the _White Books_ or the ambassadors’ reports.
As to the documents on Polish minority questions I would like to point
out that Prime Minister Chamberlain himself described the minority
question as being the decisive question between Germany and Poland.
Since these negotiations, of which the main subject, besides Danzig and
the Corridor, was the minority question, led to war, the minority
question is therefore one of the causes of the war. Therefore I ask that
the documents on this point, which prove continuous violation of the
minority pacts on the part of Poland be admitted in evidence.
If the High Tribunal agree, I will now begin to submit the documents to
the Tribunal for judicial notice or to read certain essential passages;
and I would like to tell the Tribunal now which documents I will
dispense with.
DR. DIX: I should be grateful to the Tribunal if I might just state my
position—not as regards the case of Ribbentrop, with whom I am not
concerned; my colleague, Dr. Horn, is dealing with him—but simply on
principle, not exclusively from the Defense point of view, but quite
objectively and basically in regard to the various problems which the
Tribunal must consider before making their decision as to the
admissibility of any piece of evidence—either in the form of a question
put to a witness or a document to be submitted.
I am not asking for permission to talk for the sake of talking, but
because I believe that by doing so I can shorten the later stages of the
proceedings; because I hope that the Tribunal will be in agreement with
the main points of my statements and that therefore it will be
unnecessary for the Defense to make these statements at a later stage.
I have naturally to leave it entirely to the Tribunal whether they
consider it now the appropriate time or whether I shall do it only after
my colleague Horn has finished with his documentary evidence. At any
case I should like to make the statements before the Tribunal have ruled
upon the applications of the Prosecution and of Dr. Horn.
I should like to ask Your Lordship whether the Tribunal will allow me
now to make clear, as shortly as possible, the position I take up in
principle on the questions which I consider of vital importance for the
decision. May I do this?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. DIX: I believe, without wishing to criticize the juridical value of
the statements which we have heard here, that there has been some
confusion of ideas. We must keep the distinction quite clear in our
minds: 1. Is an item of evidence—and that applies to witnesses as well
as documents—relevant? 2. Is an item of evidence useful as such? 3. Is
an item of evidence cumulative and therefore to be rejected?
If the Tribunal rule that something offered in evidence is not relevant,
not useful, or cumulative, then it must refuse the application for it at
this stage of the proceedings. On the other hand, the question of the
credibility of something offered in evidence—that is, whether the
answer of a witness is to be believed or not, whether the contents of a
document may be considered credible, whether expositions set forth in a
_White Book_, for instance, are to be believed or not believed—that, in
my opinion, is a question which can be decided only when the evidence in
question has been brought into the proceedings and the Tribunal have
taken judicial notice of it and are able, when freely evaluating the
evidence—a course which is open to the Tribunal—to pass judgment on
its credibility or otherwise. For that reason I think that at the
present moment there seems to be no reason for saying, for instance that
this document cannot be used at all because it is part of a _White Book_
published by the German Government. No one will deny that a _White
Book_, that is, a publication, an official publication, issued by any
government, can as such be useful and relevant evidence. Whether the
passage read and introduced into the proceedings is such that the
Tribunal can give it credence is a question that can be decided after
the evidence in connection with the _White Book_ has been introduced
into the proceedings, and the Tribunal have taken official notice of the
passage in question.
Now, I turn to the question of relevancy and effectiveness. The
representative of the British Prosecution has stated here that the
reports sent by the German ambassadors to their Foreign Minister are,
_per se_, not useful. At least, that is the way I understood him. They
will be admitted only if the Prosecution wishes to use them. In other
words, they are to be admitted only if the Prosecution, wishes to use
them to the detriment of the defendants. I do not think that this point
of view can be maintained. The representative of the British Delegation
cited Article 21 of the Charter in this connection. Article 21 of the
Charter has nothing whatsoever to do with this question. Article 21 of
the Charter merely states, so far as I remember it—I do not have the
Charter on hand but I believe I know the contents of it very well—that
documents referring to the investigation by the governments of the
victorious powers of war crimes committed in their own countries do not
have to be read, but may merely be submitted to the Tribunal for
judicial notice. This question however has nothing whatsoever to do with
the question of the usefulness or relevancy of a report submitted at any
time by a German ambassador to his Foreign Office. Whether this report
has been admitted, or is to be admitted, can be decided according to
whether the Tribunal consider as relevant the subject which it concerns
and which it is to prove—if the fact which is to be proved by it is
considered relevant by the Tribunal and is adequately established by one
or both parties. Then, in my opinion, this ambassador’s report should be
admitted; and after its admission the Tribunal can, by freely weighing
the evidence, consider the value of the evidence, that is, its
credibility, and moreover its objective as well as its subjective
credibility. So much for the clear-cut differentiation of the concepts
of relevancy and usefulness and for the concept of the value of
evidence, that is, the objective and subjective credibility of evidence.
Now, with regard to the question of whether evidence is cumulative. It
is certain that every jurist in this courtroom agrees that cumulative
evidence should not be admitted; but the question of whether evidence is
cumulative may in no circumstances be judged formally, so to speak,
mechanically. I can well imagine that a question with the same wording
as one that has already been put, need not necessarily be cumulative,
for reasons which I will enumerate in a moment and that a question which
in form does not resemble one already put, may nevertheless be
cumulative because it requires an answer from the witness regarding the
same evidence, but expressed in different words. The fact that a
question may be identical in wording with one which has already been put
does not necessarily mean that it is cumulative as shown by the old
proverb _Si duo faciunt idem non est idem_. If, for instance, I ask a
witness who bears the stamp of a fanatical adherent of the Nazi regime
for his subjective impression of something and then put the same
question on the same impression to a witness who is known to be a
fanatical opponent of the Nazi regime, then these two questions are
certainly not cumulative, for it is of paramount importance, if the
Tribunal is to be in a position to form an opinion and make a decision,
to find out whether an impression is registered in the same way by two
worlds, so to speak—by two diametrically opposed persons. Therefore one
has to take the witness into consideration in judging whether a question
is cumulative or not. A further example of the fact that a question
which is exactly similar to one previously put need not be cumulative
would be, for instance, if I put the question to the defendant and then
to a witness who is not interested. In saying this I wish in no way to
disparage the evidence given by the defendant under oath. That is far
from being my intention. In principle, the testimony of both the
witnesses is alike. There is, however, a great difference. In order not
to take too long I will cite only one example—whether when
investigating some phase of the defendant’s inner life about which he
himself is best informed, I question a witness who had an impression of
this incident concerning the defendant, or whether I question the
defendant himself for whom this inner impression is a part of the
psychological background of his deed.
I should like to stop at this point, in order not to take up too much of
the Tribunal’s time with theoretical expositions. My intention in making
this statement was only to request the high Tribunal in making their
decision, I repeat in regard to relevancy and usefulness, to make a
clear distinction in the question of the value to be attached to
subjective evidence, which should be decided after its admission, and to
ask the Tribunal, when considering whether evidence is cumulative, not
to be guided solely by the outward form of the question or the document
but to investigate whether it would not be in the interest of truth and
give a deeper insight into the case to put the same question to
different people, or to have the same question confirmed, or not
confirmed, by written statements by different people.
My conscience is uneasy about this academic exposition, but I hope that
the clarification which I have tried to make and in which I may perhaps
have succeeded to some extent, may help to shorten somewhat later stages
of the proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how long you think you
are going to be over these documents, because we are getting further and
further behind. And how long do you anticipate you will be? Have you
made up your mind yet what documents you are prepared to withdraw, if
any?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I should need about two more hours—that is
without objections on the part of the Prosecution, and I believe that in
that time I can finish my entire presentation including the reading of
the most important passages, which are limited to a very few documents.
Therefore, without objections about two hours.
THE PRESIDENT: You have heard the Prosecution’s objections. We have
heard them. We will consider them, and we will consider any answer that
you make to them; but we do not desire at this stage, when we have all
these other defendants’ cases to be heard, that you should go into these
documents in detail now and read them, and we hope that you will not
think it necessary to read from these documents after you have answered
the objections of the Prosecution to certain of the documents.
DR. HORN: I have the intention...
THE PRESIDENT: Have you the idea that you had finished your argument in
answer to the Prosecution’s objections or not? Did you intend to deal
further with the admissibility of any of these particular documents or
not?
DR. HORN: In accordance with the wishes expressed by the Tribunal I
intend to submit these documents in groups, with a brief connecting text
and in each group where the Prosecution has made objections to add a few
remarks on the points raised. I do not intend to do any more.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you see, the position is this. The Prosecution
have objected to certain documents on certain grounds, and we want to
give you a full opportunity to answer those objections. When you have
your full answer to those objections, we think it will be appropriate we
should adjourn and decide upon those objections and upon your arguments.
Do you see? That we should rule that, after you have given your answer
to the objections, we should adjourn and decide which of the documents
we rule to be admissible in evidence.
DR. HORN: If the Tribunal intends to give its ruling after I have taken
my position on the objections of the Prosecution, then I ask that I be
given an opportunity now, for, to begin with, I would like...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Horn. Because you see, it is 5
o’clock, and we shall not be able to conclude it tonight.
Dr. Horn, if you could conclude your arguments in answer to the
questions of principle which have been raised by the Prosecution now, we
think it would be the most convenient course if you could do it in a
fairly short time. I mean, you have heard what the Prosecution say about
these various groups, and it would be more convenient, we think, if you
could answer that in the space of a quarter of an hour now.
DR. HORN: First of all, I would like to refer to documents numbered 48
to 61. In regard to these I can take only the following position.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. HORN: Number 48 to 61. Perhaps I may again use these pages of the
Prosecution, with their objections, as a basis. Documents 48 to 61 were
rejected as irrelevant, but these documents deal with rearmament and
preparation for war by the opposite side. I can arrive at the basic
motives animating Hitler and Ribbentrop only by contrasting the German
evidence with the evidence given by the other side. I cannot judge of
the illegality of an action unless I know all the facts. To know all the
facts, I have to know the attitude taken by the other side. Therefore, I
consider these documents highly relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. HORN: The next group of decisive importance consists of the
documents dealing with the Polish minority problem. The representative
of the Prosecution has said that by the German-Polish agreement of 5
November 1937, the minority problem was sanctioned by both countries.
That is, all violations of international law in regard to minority
questions would be considered a closed chapter if they had occurred
before that year. This view is certainly not correct, because one
agreement cannot sanction the violation of a prior agreement. Moreover,
during the negotiations for the 1934 pact between Germany and Poland it
was expressly agreed, as I can prove by means of these documents that,
after a general political agreement had been made, the minority question
as well as that of Danzig and of the Corridor should be settled.
These questions were expressly held in abeyance pending a further
settlement by agreement, and as no such settlement of the two questions
was made, the documents dealing with the violations by the Poles of
international law with regard to minority pacts cannot be rejected on
account of this agreement. For this agreement, as I should like to
emphasize once more, particularly deals with a further agreement for the
settlement of this question.
The second objection for this group is the fact that the minority
problem on the whole is called irrelevant. Previously I stated briefly
that the British Prime Minister Chamberlain himself realized the need
for regulating this problem. I will submit this document too; it is
Document Number 200 in my document book. All the political circles
concerned thought that the solution must be found for this question and
therefore considered it relevant. I ask the Tribunal therefore to admit
the documents referring to it. These documents cannot be rejected in
part as cumulative, as was done here, for on the strength of these
documents, I wish to prove that these minority pacts have been
repeatedly violated since 1919, and I submit documents from the
international tribunal of The Hague and the League of Nations at Geneva,
showing that these violations took place during a period of over 20
years.
I accept the objections made by the Soviet Delegation to Documents 286
to 289, and I withdraw Documents 286 to 289.
Since the Tribunal recently objected to the book _America in the Battle
of the Continents_, I also withdraw documents presented under Number
290, 1 to 5. I have also referred to that book under several other
numbers, and I withdraw also all those numbers which refer to the book,
_America in the Battle of the Continents_. As for the ambassadors’
reports, I again refer to my statement and the basic statements made
here a moment ago by my colleague, Dr. Dix. I am convinced that, on
principle, and on the strength of the legal arguments adduced and also
in view of the fact that the Prosecution have used such reports
extensively, the Defense should also be granted the right of referring
to these reports, especially as they formed the foundation on which
German political opinion was based.
I shall not be able to dispense with the files of the French General
Staff either, for the reasons I have stated. It has been said that
Documents 221 to 269 are irrelevant. They are not irrelevant, because we
had neutrality pacts with those countries, and in the neutrality pacts
it was agreed that Germany would respect their neutrality as long as the
other side also respected it. As it would now be possible here to prove
that the other side did not respect this neutrality, the proof of
whether a war of aggression against these countries by Germany...
THE PRESIDENT: The point that M. Champetier de Ribes was making was that
France was out of the war by 1940. Therefore documents which were drawn
up by the French General Staff in 1940 had no relevance in 1941. Isn’t
that so? That is the point that he was making.
DR. HORN: You mean the French Prosecutor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the French Prosecutor.
DR. HORN: Yes. However, the fact that breaches of neutrality were
committed by France and were known to the German Government at the time
alters the legal situation completely. You cannot say that Germany waged
an aggressive war against these countries when we knew through our
intelligence service that our opponents intended to occupy these
countries, and did in fact do so, by sending out General Staff officers.
Thus it was the other side which was guilty of violation, and the files
which have been found have only confirmed the intelligence reports
submitted to us at the time; I say, at the time.
Therefore, you cannot accuse Germany of violating the neutrality pact in
these cases. I would like to ask the Tribunal, therefore, to admit those
files as relevant for the reasons stated. With reference to the other
documents, I ask to be permitted to make my statement when I submit the
documents to the Tribunal in the presentation of evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, we want to rule upon it when we have
heard your arguments; we do not want to have to rule again over every
document. We want you to take them in groups, in the way the Prosecution
has, so that we may make up our minds and rule.
DR. HORN: These are the main objections which I have to make to the
arguments of the Prosecution. I ask the Tribunal once more to
differentiate between considerations of principle raised by Dr. Dix, and
between the factual considerations raised by myself with regard to the
individual groups.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-EIGHTH DAY
Wednesday, 3 April 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has read and considered every one of the
documents produced by Dr. Horn on behalf of the Defendant Ribbentrop and
the Tribunal rules as follows:
I will refer only to the documents to which no objection was taken,
where the Tribunal rejects them; that is to say, documents to which no
objection is taken are allowed with the particular exceptions which I
make.
With reference to the documents to which objection was taken, the
Tribunal rejects Numbers 12, 45, 48 to 61 inclusive. It allows Document
62. It rejects Documents 66, 67 and 69. It allows Document 70. It
rejects Documents 72, 73, 74. It rejects Documents 76 to 81 inclusive.
It grants Document 82. It rejects Document 83. It grants Documents 84 to
87 inclusive. It rejects Documents 88 to 116 inclusive. It rejects
Documents 118 to 126 inclusive. It allows Document 127. It rejects
Documents 128 to 134 inclusive. It rejects Documents 135 to 148
inclusive. It rejects Documents 151 and 152. It allows Documents 155 and
156. It rejects Documents 157 and 158. It rejects Document 161. It
allows Document 162. It allows Document 164. It allows Documents 165 to
183 inclusive. It rejects Document 184. It allows Documents 185 and 186.
It rejects Document 191. It allows Documents 193 and 194. It rejects
Document 195, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. It grants Document 195,
Paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. It rejects Documents 196 and 197 and 198. It
rejects Document 204. It rejects Document 207. It grants the whole of
Document 208. It grants Document 210. It rejects Document 211 (a) and
(b) and Document 212. It grants Document 213. It rejects 214. It rejects
215 (a) and (b). It grants Documents 217 and 220. It grants Documents
221 to 245, except Document 238, and it also excludes all comments
contained in those documents. It rejects Documents 246 to 269. It
rejects 270 and 271. It rejects 275. It rejects 276. It grants 277 and
278. As to 279, the Tribunal would like Dr. Horn to inform them what
that document is because in the copy that they have got it is
unidentified. That is 279, Dr. Horn, in Book 8, I think.
DR. HORN: The document contains the Non-aggression Treaty between
Germany and the Soviet Union, of 23 August 1939. It contains the text of
that treaty.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well, then that will be allowed. 280 and 281 are
granted. 282, 283, and 284 are granted. 285 is rejected. 286 to 289 were
withdrawn. 290 was withdrawn. 291 is granted. 292 is rejected, 293 is
rejected, 294 is rejected. 295 is rejected. 296 is granted. 298 to 305,
inclusive, are rejected. 306 is granted. 307 is rejected. 308 is
granted. 309 and 309 (a) are both rejected. 310 is rejected. 311 had
already been ruled out. 313 is granted. 314 is rejected. 317 is granted.
318 is rejected. Well, 312 is granted; it had not been objected to. I do
not have a note of 315 and 316; are they asked for?
DR. HORN: 315, Mr. President, is the reproduction of a PS number, that
is 1834-PS, and has already been submitted and therefore need not be
submitted again.
THE PRESIDENT: Does that apply also to 316, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: 316 also has a PS number and therefore need not be
resubmitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, that deals with all the numbers, I think.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I will dispense with Number 312, and ask
instead for Number 317. This contains a notarized statement under
oath...
THE PRESIDENT: 317 is granted.
DR. HORN: Thank you, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Horn, will you deal with the ones which we have
left in, as far as you wish to deal with them. If you wish to comment
upon any of the ones that we have allowed, you may do so now. We do not
desire you to do so, but if you wish to do so, you may.
DR. HORN: May I ask Your Lordship for permission to present my
arguments. I will present only very brief arguments at a time to be
determined by the High Tribunal, so that I can sort the documents and
need not take up your time unnecessarily? All the documents are fastened
together at present and it would take longer if I were to present my
case now than if I could present the sorted documents. I therefore ask
the Tribunal to set a time when I may present these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The application is granted.
DR. HORN: Yes. I will then have concluded my case and will need only a
relatively short time to comment briefly on some but not all of the
documents.
THE PRESIDENT: If Dr. Nelte is already to go on with the case of the
Defendant Keitel, the Tribunal suggests possibly you might be able to
deal shortly with your documents at 2 o’clock.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be agreeable to Dr. Nelte?
DR. HORN: I will consult my colleague.
Dr. Nelte has just advised me that he will fetch his documents and then
he can proceed with the presentation of his case immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[_Dr. Nelte returned to the courtroom._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal is much obliged to you for
presenting your argument now.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I will begin the presentation of the case for
Keitel by asking you to summon the defendant to the witness stand, and I
shall question him. The documents which I will use in this interrogation
were submitted with a list yesterday. I hope that those documents are at
your disposal so that you will be able to follow my questions in a
manner which is desirable in the interest of a smoothly conducted
interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you will call the Defendant Keitel?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
[_The Defendant Keitel took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
WILHELM KEITEL (Defendant): Wilhelm Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. NELTE: Please describe your military career briefly.
KEITEL: In the year 1901, in the beginning of March, I became an officer
candidate in an artillery regiment of the Prussian Army. At the
beginning of the first World War, in 1914, I was the regimental adjutant
of my regiment. I was wounded in September 1914, and in the beginning of
November I became chief of a battery of my regiment. Since the spring of
1915 I served in various general staff capacities, first with higher
commands of the field army, later as a general staff officer of a
division. Towards the end I was the first general staff officer of the
Naval Corps in Flanders. Then I joined the Reichswehr as a volunteer.
Beginning with the year 1929 I was Division Head (Abteilungsleiter) of
the Army Organizational Division in the Reichswehrministerium. After an
interruption from 1933 to 1935 I became, on 1 October 1935, Chief of the
Wehrmacht Department (Wehrmachtsamt) of the Reichskriegsminister, that
is Chief of Staff with the Minister of War. While on active service I
became Generalmajor. At that time I was chief of an infantry brigade. On
4 February 1938 to my surprise I was appointed Chief of Staff of the
Führer, or Chief of the OKW—Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. On 1 October
1939, I became General of the Infantry and after the campaign in the
West in 1940 I became Field Marshal.
DR. NELTE: Were you a member of the National Socialist German Labor
Party?
KEITEL: No, I was not a member. According to military law I could not be
or become a member.
DR. NELTE: But you received the Golden Party Badge. For what reason?
KEITEL: That is correct. Hitler presented this Golden Badge of the Party
to me in April 1939, at the same time that the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, General Von Brauchitsch, received it. The Führer said it was to be
in commemoration of the march into Czechoslovakia. The Golden Badge had
“16 and 17 March” engraved on it.
DR. NELTE: In the year 1944 the Military Service Law was changed so that
active soldiers could also become members of the Party. What did you do
at that time?
KEITEL: That is correct. In the late summer or autumn of 1944 the
Military Service Law was changed so that active soldiers could also be
Party members. At that time I was invited to submit personal data for
the Party in order to be listed as a member of the Party. At the same
time I was asked to send in a donation of money to the Party. I
submitted personal data to Party headquarters and also sent in a
donation, but as far as I know I never became a member. I never received
a membership card.
DR. NELTE: To what extent did you participate at Party functions?
KEITEL: Owing to my position and to the fact that I accompanied the
Führer constantly, I participated at public functions of the Party
several times, for example, at the Party rallies in Nuremberg, also each
year when the Winter Relief Work campaign was launched. Finally,
according to orders, each year on the 9th of November, I had to attend,
together with a representative of the Party a memorial service at the
graves of the victims of 9 November 1923. It took place symbolically in
memory of the fight on 9 November, between the Party and the Wehrmacht.
I never participated in internal conferences or meetings of the Party
directorate. The Führer had let me know that he did not want this. Thus,
for example, every year on 9 November I was in Munich, but never
participated in the gatherings of the so-called Hoheitsträger (bearers
of power) of the Party.
DR. NELTE: What decorations did you receive during the war?
KEITEL: During the war—it must have been in the winter of 1939-1940—I
received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross. I did not receive any
other German war decorations.
DR. NELTE: Do you have any sons?
KEITEL: I had three sons, all of whom served at the front as officers
during this war. The youngest one died in battle in Russia in 1941. The
second was a major in Russia and has been missing in action, and the
eldest son, who was a major, is a prisoner of war.
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Keitel, beginning with essential matters, I
would like to put the following basic questions to you: What basic
attitude did you, as a soldier, an officer, and a general, have toward
the problems with which you had to deal in your profession?
KEITEL: I can say that I was a soldier by inclination and conviction.
For more than 44 years without interruption I served my country and my
people as a soldier, and I tried to do my best in the service of my
profession. I believed that I should do this as a matter of duty,
laboring unceasingly and giving myself completely to those tasks which
fell to me in my many and diverse positions. I did this with the same
devotion under the Kaiser, under President Ebert, under Field Marshal
Von Hindenburg, and under the Führer, Adolf Hitler.
DR. NELTE: What is your attitude today?
KEITEL: As a German officer, I naturally consider it my duty to answer
for what I have done, even if it should have been wrong. I am grateful
that I am being given the opportunity to give an account here and before
the German people of what I was and my participation in the events which
have taken place. It will not always be possible to separate clearly
guilt and entanglement in the threads of destiny. But I do consider one
thing impossible, that the men in the front lines and the leaders and
the subleaders at the front should be charged with the guilt, while the
highest leaders reject responsibility. That, in my opinion, is wrong,
and I consider it unworthy. I am convinced that the large mass of our
brave soldiers were really decent, and that wherever they overstepped
the bounds of acceptable behavior, our soldiers acted in good faith,
believing in military necessity, and the orders which they received.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution, in presenting evidence regarding violations
of the laws of war, Crimes against Humanity, repeatedly point to
letters, orders, _et cetera_, which bear your name. Many so-called
Keitel orders and Keitel decrees, have been submitted here. Now we have
to examine whether and to what degree you and your actions are guilty of
and responsible for the results of these orders. What do you wish to say
to this general accusation?
KEITEL: It is correct that there are a large number of orders,
instructions, and directives with which my name is connected, and it
must also be admitted that such orders often contain deviations from
existing international law. On the other hand, there are a group of
directives and orders based not on military inspiration but on an
ideological foundation and point of view. In this connection I am
thinking of the group of directives which were issued before the
campaign against the Soviet Union and also which were issued
subsequently.
DR. NELTE: What can you say in your defense in regard to those orders?
KEITEL: I can say only that fundamentally I bear that responsibility
which arises from my position for all those things which resulted from
these orders and which are connected with my name and my signature.
Further, I bear the responsibility, insofar as it is based on legal and
moral principles, for those offices and divisions of the OKW which were
subordinate to me.
DR. NELTE: From what may your official position and the scope of your
legal responsibility be inferred?
KEITEL: That is contained in the Führer’s decree of 4 February 1938
which has been frequently cited.
DR. NELTE: I am submitting this decree to you so that you can have the
text before you. In this Führer decree, Paragraph 1, you will find:
“From now on I will directly and personally take over the Supreme
Command of the entire Wehrmacht.”
What did that mean compared with the conditions that had existed until
then?
KEITEL: Until that time we had a Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht,
Field Marshal Von Blomberg. In addition there was the Supreme Commander
of the Wehrmacht who, according to the constitution, was the head of the
State—in this case, Hitler. With the resignation of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Von Blomberg, there was only one
Supreme Commander and that was Hitler himself. And from that time on he
himself exercised command of all three arms of the Wehrmacht: The Army,
Navy, and Air Force. It also says “from now on directly.” That should
establish unequivocally that any intermediary position with authority to
issue orders was no longer to exist, but that Hitler’s orders as Supreme
Commander were issued directly to the three arms of the Wehrmacht and
their Commanders. It also says here “directly” and “personally.” That,
too, had its meaning, for the word “personally” was to express the fact
that there was and would be no, I would say, “deputizing” of this
authority.
DR. NELTE: I assume therefore that you never signed your orders “acting
for”?
KEITEL: No, I do not remember a single instance in which I signed
“acting for.” According to our military principles, if the question had
arisen to appoint a deputy, it could have been only one person, the
Commander-in-Chief of the three arms of the Wehrmacht, namely the one
highest in rank.
DR. NELTE: In Paragraph 2 of the decree of 4 February 1938 it says:
“...the former Wehrmacht office in the Ministry of War, with its
functions is placed directly under my command as OKW and as my
military staff.”
What does this signify in regard to the staff which was thereby formed?
KEITEL: The Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht had his military staff
in the Wehrmachtsamt, that is to say, the Wehrmachtsamt in the Ministry
of War. Hitler, as Supreme Commander, took over the Wehrmachtsamt as his
military staff. Thus, this staff was to be his personal working staff.
At the same time that the post of Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht was
eliminated, that of Reich Minister of War was also removed. There was no
War Ministry and no Minister of War as heretofore. Thus one could
clearly see what Hitler wanted, namely, that between him and the
Wehrmacht divisions there was to be no one holding office with any
authority either in command channels or in ministerial functions.
DR. NELTE: When this decree was issued you were installed as holder of a
new office with the title of “Chief OKW.” Will you please clarify
whether this term “Chief OKW” is correct; that is, whether it really was
what the title seems to indicate.
KEITEL: I must add that I realize only now that this term in its
abbreviated form is not quite apt. To be exact one should have said,
“Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht,” and not the
abbreviation, “Chief OKW.” From the case presented by the Prosecution I
gathered that the idea of “Chief” was interpreted as if that were a
commander, chief of an office, with authority to issue orders. And that,
of course, is an erroneous conclusion. It was neither a position of a
chief in the sense of a commander, nor, as might have been assumed or
has been assumed, was it a position as chief of a general staff. That
too, is incorrect. I was never Chief of the General Staff of the
Wehrmacht. It was Hitler’s unmistakable wish to concentrate in his own
person all the authority, all the power of command. That is not merely a
retrospective statement. He clearly expressed this desire to me on
several occasions, partly in connection with the fact that he told me
repeatedly, “I could never put this through with Blomberg.”
DR. NELTE: I have here a statement made by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch
and submitted by the Prosecution.
KEITEL: Perhaps I might add something further. I was discussing the fact
that it was not a position of Chief of the General Staff, since it was
Hitler’s basic view that commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches
each had his own general staff, or operations staff, and that he did not
want the High Command of the Wehrmacht, including the Wehrmacht
Operations Staff, to take over the functions of a general staff.
Therefore, in practice the work was done by the general staffs of the
Wehrmacht branches, while the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the OKW,
which was purposely kept small, was a working staff for Hitler, a staff
for strategic planning and for special missions.
DR. NELTE: Then Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch’s statement in his
affidavit, of which I have already spoken, is correct? It says here:
“When Hitler had decided to use military pressure or military
power in attaining his political aims, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army, if he participated, received his instructions first
orally, as a rule, or by an appropriate order. Thereupon the OKW
worked out the operation and deployment plans. When they had
been submitted to Hitler and were approved by him, a written
order from the OKW to the branches of the Wehrmacht followed.”
Is that correct?
KEITEL: Yes, in principle it is correct insofar as the final formulation
of the order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army took the form of a
directive, as we called it, based on the general plans which had already
been submitted and approved. This work was done by the Wehrmacht
Operational Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab); thus the Wehrmacht
Operational Staff was not an office which became independently active
and did not handle matters concerning the issuing of orders
independently; rather the Wehrmacht Operational Staff and I took part in
the basic determination or approval of these proposals and formulated
them in the manner in which they were then carried out by Hitler as
Commander-in-Chief. To speak technically we then passed these orders on.
DR. NELTE: Then I have an affidavit by Generaloberst Halder which deals
with the same subject. You know this affidavit Number 1. I believe I can
dispense with the reading of it and as evidence refer only to Halder’s
affidavit Number 1, which has been submitted by the Prosecution
(Document Number 3702-PS).
In addition the Prosecution submitted another treatise without a special
number. The title of the treatise is “Basis for the Organization of the
German Wehrmacht.”
THE PRESIDENT: Is this the document which you say the Prosecution
offered in evidence but did not give a number to?
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, this document was given to us by the
Prosecution, I believe by the American Prosecution, on 26 November 1945.
I do not know...
THE PRESIDENT: You mean it never was deposited in evidence by the
Prosecution?
DR. NELTE: I do not believe I can decide that. I assume that a document
which has been submitted to the Defense Counsel was submitted to the
High Tribunal at the same time, if not as evidence, then at least for
judicial notice.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the document? Is it an affidavit or not?
DR. NELTE: It is not an affidavit; it is really a study by the American
Prosecution. And, I assume, it is a basis for the indictment of the
organization OKW, and so forth.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your document book or not?
DR. NELTE: No, I do not have it in the document book, because I assumed
that was also at the disposal of the High Tribunal. Besides, Mr.
President, it is a short document.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, Mr. Dodd can tell us what it is.
MR. DODD: If I could see it I might be able to be helpful. I am not
familiar with it. It is probably one of the documents which we submitted
to the Defense but which we did not actually introduce in evidence, and
that happened more than once, I think, in the early days of the Trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: I refer to a single short paragraph of this study which I
would like to read. Perhaps we can thus obviate submitting the document.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering in evidence the whole of the affidavit?
I do not mean at this moment, but are you proposing to offer it?
DR. NELTE: I assume that the Prosecution have already submitted it. I am
only referring to it.
THE PRESIDENT: The whole affidavit? What is the number of it, if it has
been submitted?
DR. NELTE: This affidavit also does not have a number. The
Prosecution...
THE PRESIDENT: It has not been submitted if it has not a number on it
then.
It is suggested to me that possibly the Halder affidavit was offered and
then rejected.
DR. NELTE: No. At that time a series of affidavits was submitted: By
Brauchitsch, Halder, Heusinger, and many other generals who are in
Nuremberg. None of these affidavits had an exhibit number.
MR. DODD: This affidavit was put in by the United States as an exhibit.
I do not have the number handy, but I think it was submitted at the time
Colonel Telford Taylor submitted the case on behalf of the Prosecution
against the High Command and the OKW. This Halder “affidavit,” the first
document which Doctor Nelte referred to, is not an affidavit. It was a
paper submitted to the Tribunal and to the Defense by Colonel Taylor. It
set out some of the basic principles of the organization of the High
Command and the OKW wholly before he presented his part of the case. It
is really just the work of our own staff here in Nuremberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Nelte, as the document you are referring to, not
the Halder affidavit, appears to be a mere compilation, the Tribunal
thinks it should not go in as an exhibit, but you can put a question to
the witness upon it.
DR. NELTE: [_Turning to the defendant._] In the essay which you have
before you, the Prosecution asserted the following: After 1938 there
were four divisions: The OKW (High Command of the Wehrmacht); the OKH
(High Command of the Army); the OKL (High Command of the Air Force); the
OKM (High Command of the Navy); and each had its own general staff. What
can you tell us about that?
KEITEL: I can say only that this is not correct, and also contradicts
the description which I have already given of the functions of the High
Commands of the Wehrmacht branches and of the OKW. There were not four
such departments. There were only three: The High Command of the Army,
the High Command of the Navy, and the High Command of the Air Force.
As I have just stated, the High Command of the Wehrmacht as a personal,
direct working staff, was in no way an independent authority in that
sense. The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches were
commanders, had the authority to issue orders and exercised this power
over troops which were subordinate to them. The OKW had neither the
power to issue orders, nor subordinate troops to which orders could have
been issued. It is also not correct, if I recall the speeches of the
Prosecution, to use the expression “Keitel was Commander-in-Chief of the
Wehrmacht.” I am mentioning it only to emphasize this point. Further, I
would like, briefly, to call attention to the diagram on the last page
of the document which has been shown to me.
DR. NELTE: This sketch is the diagram which is called “The Wehrmacht.”
It is an exposition, a diagrammatic exposition of the entire Wehrmacht
and its branches.
KEITEL: I believe I should point briefly to the fact that it is this
diagram which was the basis for this erroneous conception, because in it
the High Command of the Wehrmacht is designated as a special office or
office of command, and that is incorrect.
DR. NELTE: What tasks had you in this military sector as the Chief of
the OKW?
KEITEL: First of all, it was an essential task to secure for the Führer
with and through the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, all the documents and
all the numerous informations and reports which he desired. I dare say
that the Wehrmacht Operational Staff had, in this connection, the
function to one might say arrange and establish direct and close
communication between Hitler and the general staffs of the branches of
the Wehrmacht. In addition to securing a countless number of such
documents which were demanded daily, there was a second function, namely
to be regularly present at all conferences in which the
commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches and the chiefs of their
staffs participated as well as the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational
Staff. On those occasions as soon as a series of oral orders was given,
these orders, in compliance with military principles, naturally had
later to be confirmed in writing. Only in this way could we prevent
mistakes or misunderstandings from arising, that is, by confirming these
orders to those who had already received them orally the orders were
made clear. That is the purpose and meaning of the order.
DR. NELTE: How did you sign the orders and documents which you drew up?
KEITEL: It is correct that this form of orders and directives were
almost exclusively signed by me. They were actually orders which had
already been given and which had already long since been transmitted
through military channels. As can be seen from the bulk of the documents
submitted here, this gave rise to the form which I made a habit of using
in which I always wrote at the beginning or after a few preliminary
words, “The Führer has therefore ordered...”
In the large majority of cases this order was no longer a surprise to
the office which received it. It was nothing new but it was only a
confirmation. In a similar way I naturally had also a considerable
number of organizational and other directives and orders also in not
purely operational fields worked out under my supervision and passed on.
In this respect I should like to point out particularly that in no case
did I send out orders without having shown them again to my supreme
commander when making the daily reports, in order to be certain that I
had not misunderstood him in any form or manner or that I was not
issuing anything which—and this I would like to emphasize—did not have
his approval to the letter.
DR. NELTE: There was another category of orders and directives...
KEITEL: May I perhaps add a few words?
DR. NELTE: Please do.
KEITEL: In order to clarify this: Among the documents submitted here are
those which Hitler personally signed and released under the heading “The
Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.” There are some
exceptions in which such directives were signed by me “by order of,” I
would like to explain this matter also. In this case it is also true
that if these directives, which for the most part had been corrected
several times by Hitler personally, had to be issued urgently and the
Supreme Commander was prevented from signing himself, it was necessary
for me to let the signature go out in this form, never as “deputy” but
always as “by order of.” Otherwise, orders were issued as I have already
stated, in the form of directives which were signed by me.
At the same time I should like to mention that even if we have a series
of documents here headed “Chief, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht”
or—some of them are different: “High Command of the Wehrmacht”—if they
are signed, “by order, Jodl,” I can say that it can be proved almost
automatically that I did not happen to be there at the time; otherwise I
would have signed it myself, knowing that I was Chief of Staff who, in
accordance with military regulations, had to sign such documents.
DR. NELTE: The memorandum which you have before you contains the
following sentence:
“The OKW united in itself the activity of a staff and of a
ministry; the matters involved, which had previously been taken
care of by the Reich War Ministry, have probably also been
turned over to the OKW.”
Please clarify the ministerial function of the OKW.
KEITEL: Yes, this formulation as set down in this document is not
exactly incorrect, but it is on important points at least, open to
misunderstanding, for it was not at all true that all functions which
had been previously carried out by the War Minister were turned over to
the OKW. There were many functions and rights which the War Minister, in
his capacity as minister, and thus the person responsible for them,
could and did decide even for the branches of the Wehrmacht and their
commanders, which were never transmitted to the Chief of the OKW, that
is, to me.
The following things happened at that time: Everything in this
connection involving authority to issue orders or exercise supreme
command, and which the Führer did not wish to take over personally, was
transferred to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht
as far as supreme authority and authority to make decisions were
concerned. To touch on the subject briefly, I should like to mention a
few essential facts which I remember. For example, the officers’
personnel records, decisions on complaints, documentary material on
budget questions, court jurisdiction and court authority, which formerly
belonged to the Minister of War, were transferred to the
commander-in-chief, as well as all questions concerning officials and
all questions of the rights of officials. I could mention still more,
but I merely wished to point out that even in cases where decisions had
to be made, as for example, removing an official or dismissing an
employee, the chief of the OKW did not decide. These powers were
delegated to the commanders-in-chief in addition to the powers they held
previously and which were transferred from the War Minister’s
jurisdiction. There were only certain reservations which the Führer made
for himself. Similarly some of the other fields of the OKW were limited
in their assignments in the course of the following years through the
dissolution of the Economic Armament Office. The position of Armament
Minister was created because of the dissolution of the Amt Ausland
Abwehr, that is, the Counterintelligence Service, of which only the
branch self-protection of the troops was left with the Wehrmacht;
everything else was transferred, and so forth.
My authority included the following: It was my duty in all cases to get
Hitler’s decision on all basic questions with which this ministerial
section was concerned. I was free from the necessity of doing this only
in current matters or if there was complete agreement between the
persons involved in a ministerial or administrative question and the
branches of the Wehrmacht in my department. In such a case a decision by
Hitler was not necessary. I must emphasize again, in summary, that the
OKW had no authority of its own, and that one can say only that Hitler
actually functioned as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, just as the
functions of the War Minister were combined in his person so as to, to
repeat that, to eliminate an intermediary official at all costs. That
is, there was to be no intermediary between him and the
commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht branches.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, although the Tribunal did say that they would
hear Dr. Horn at 2 o’clock, they would not wish to interrupt the
examination of the Defendant Keitel if you prefer to go on with that
now. It is a matter for you to consider whichever you like.
DR. NELTE: Dr. Horn agrees that I continue the interrogation of Keitel
now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, for the assistance of the Tribunal
I have ascertained that the first Halder affidavit, referred to this
morning by Dr. Nelte, was introduced as Exhibit USA-531 (Document Number
3702-PS) on 4 January, by Colonel Taylor; and the second Halder
affidavit referred to by Dr. Nelte was introduced as Exhibit USA-533
(Document Number 3707-PS) on 5 January, by Colonel Taylor.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd was kind enough to put at my disposal
a number of copies of the pamphlet, “Principles of Organization of the
German Armed Forces” so that I can submit them to the Tribunal. I do so
now.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You last explained that on 4 February
1938, part of the authority of the War Ministry was transferred to
branches of the Armed Forces, and part to the High Command of the
Wehrmacht. In the decree which has been mentioned it says, concerning
this matter:
“The OKW at the same time is taking care of the affairs of the
Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the OKW, on my orders will
exercise the authority which the Reich Minister of War had
heretofore.”
Tell me briefly to which fields this applied. I myself will submit to
the Tribunal a diagram which has already been sent to the Translation
Division for translation. I do not know, however, if the Tribunal
already has the translation.
KEITEL: The ministerial functions actually transferred to the OKW were
executed by a number of offices. I shall name the most important now,
indicating their functions:
First of all, a few words about the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
(Wehrmachtführungsstab) which, being an office of the OKW, was
subordinated to it in the same way as the other offices of the OKW were,
but which was on a higher level than the other offices. As the name
implies, the Wehrmacht Operations Staff was an organ of the Führer’s
High Command with which he frequently—I might say, mostly—collaborated
personally. It had no ministerial powers.
Then there was the General Armed Forces Office (Allgemeines
Wehrmachtsamt) which took care mainly of ministerial and administrative
questions. One could almost call it a war ministry on a small scale.
Then the office of Counterintelligence Service (Amt Ausland Abwehr),
which was to a large extent ministerial but to some degree an aid in
operational questions.
Then the Economic Armament Office, in regard to which I must point out
that in the year 1940 this office was dissolved and only a small Defense
Economy Office (Wehrwirtschaftsamt) remained, which was mainly concerned
with questions of supply of all consumer goods needed by the Armed
Forces, such as fuel, coal, gasoline, _et cetera_, and which I need not
mention further.
Then an important field of activity: Replacements Administration for the
entire Armed Forces, or abbreviated, Recruiting, a central office which
was designed mostly to take care of personnel questions within the OKW.
Then the Legal Administration, the Budget Department, and a number of
other offices which it is not necessary to enumerate.
In these offices the ministerial functions of the OKW were carried out.
I would like...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think the Tribunal has followed the
distinction which the defendant has made between the General Staff for
the High Commands and the position of the OKW; but is it necessary for
the Tribunal to go into all these details?
DR. NELTE: I had finished dealing with this section.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: I want to put just one more...
THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document that you have just put
before the Tribunal, this diagram, are you desiring to make an exhibit
of that?
DR. NELTE: I would like to submit it in evidence. You will also be given
a translation.
THE PRESIDENT: If so, what number will you give it? You must number all
your exhibits.
DR. NELTE: Please number it, Keitel-1(a).
THE PRESIDENT: Who prepared it?
DR. NELTE: We prepared it and the technical division of the Prosecution
has reproduced it. The Prosecution also are in possession of the
diagram.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you asked the defendant to confirm that it is
correct?
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal, would you please look at this diagram and
confirm whether it is correct?
KEITEL: Yes, I recognize the diagram...
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, the Prosecution have not received this
diagram. Therefore, the Prosecution would like, before making
conclusions, to acquaint themselves with this diagram.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any more copies of it, Dr. Nelte?
DR. NELTE: They can be obtained and distributed right away. Then I would
like the Tribunal to reserve its decision until the diagrams have been
submitted in sufficient numbers.
KEITEL: I recognize this diagram as correct. It does not contain the
minor changes which occurred from the time of the creation of the OKW up
to the time which I have mentioned, changes brought about by the
reorganization of the armament ministries, _et cetera_, but it shows the
manner in which it actually worked during the last years.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: In order to terminate this group of questions I would like to
say the following: Is it correct that according to this, all the Keitel
orders, Keitel decrees, which have been submitted by the Prosecution,
were in reality Führer orders, that is to say, orders which were the
expression of Hitler’s will, based on his instructions and commands?
KEITEL: Yes, that is the correct definition of the summary of the
testimony I have given. I would like to state again in summarizing that,
as I have stated from the beginning, I assume and have assumed
responsibility for these orders insofar as they are connected with my
name, for the position was this: I, of course, knew the contents of
these orders which I executed. I recognize my signature, of course, in
the documents which have been submitted to me and therefore I accept the
documents as authentic. I may add that insofar as I had military or
other objections to the orders, I naturally expressed them very forcibly
and that I endeavored to prevent orders being given which I considered
controversial. But I must state in all truth that if the decision had
been finally made by Hitler, I then issued these orders and transmitted
them, I might almost say, without checking them in any way.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, before I enter upon the next phase of my
questions I should like to state the following:
The Prosecution have deduced Keitel’s participation in the many crimes
which have been described here from various facts, facts which cannot
always be connected with each other and made to agree. The Prosecution
have stated that he was a powerful and important staff officer. That is
set out in the Indictment. Then the Prosecution stated that he was a
tool without a will of his own and that the relation between himself and
Hitler was an intimate one.
You will understand that if the defendant wants to clarify or to protest
against these things he must explain the relation between himself and
Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, that is what the defendant has been doing. He
has been explaining his relationship to Hitler, and if you want to
elucidate it further you must ask him further questions.
DR. NELTE: I only wanted to let him speak about the private relation to
Hitler. So far we have been concerned only with the official relation.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Would you please tell us something about
the co-operation between you and Hitler? I ask you to be as brief as
possible and tell us only the most necessary facts, but at the same time
give us a correct picture.
KEITEL: The co-operation can be characterized only as one between a high
military superior and his subordinate. In other words, the same
relations as I have always had in my military career with the senior
officers of whose staff I was a member. The relation between Hitler and
myself never departed from this strictly military and soldierly
relationship. Of course, it was my right and my duty to express my
opinions. How difficult that was can be judged only by someone who knows
that Hitler, after a few words, was wont to take over the entire
discussion and to exhaust the subject entirely from his point of view.
It was then very difficult, of course, to come back to the subject
again. I may say that due to my various positions in high staff offices
I was quite used to dealing with the superior commanders, if I may use
that expression. However, I was quite unaccustomed to the conditions
which I encountered here. They surprised me, and not infrequently they
reduced me to a state of real uncertainty. That can be understood if one
knows that Hitler, in soldiering or military questions, if I were to
express myself very cautiously, was a man with far-reaching plans for
reform with which I, with my 37 years of service as a soldier of the old
school, was confronted.
DR. NELTE: Was it the same during the war or do you refer to the time
before the war?
KEITEL: During the war these controversies were moderated by the events,
so that actuality was strongly influenced by the urgency of the
situation. Therefore, these things did not appear in that form. On the
other hand, the position then was that Hitler in his discussions about
the situation had a comparatively large circle of about twenty people
assembled around him, and speaking in military terms, unsparingly made
his accusations—objections and criticism—directed, as a rule, at
people who were not present. I took the part of the absent person as a
matter of principle, because he could not defend himself. The result was
that the accusations and criticism were then aimed at me, and my
training as a soldier finally forced me to control myself, because it is
unseemly to answer back or to oppose or to attempt to contradict a
superior before very young subordinates, such as those who were present.
Opposition to a superior or to personalities, no matter what their rank,
was unbearable to the Führer. One could then attempt to speak to him
about these things only in private.
DR. NELTE: Had you the feeling that you had Hitler’s confidence?
KEITEL: I could not say yes. I must frankly admit that Hitler’s
confidence in me was not without reservations, and today I know only too
well that there were many things concerning which he had never spoken
frankly to me and about which he never took me into his confidence. It
was a fact that Hitler was very suspicious of the old or elderly
generals. For him they were products of an old and antiquated school and
in this sense he was to us old soldiers a man who brought new
revolutionary ideas into the Wehrmacht and wished to incorporate them
into Wehrmacht training. This frequently led to serious crises. I
believe I do not have to elaborate on that. The real evil, however, was
that this lack of confidence led him to believe that I was in conspiracy
with the Army generals behind his back and that I supported them against
him. Perhaps that was a result of my habit of defending them because
they could not defend themselves. At various instances that led to
extremely acute and serious crises.
DR. NELTE: Much will depend upon stating how your co-operation with
Hitler has to be valued, particularly to what extent you could be
considered his collaborator or adviser. Will you tell me whether Hitler
discussed his plans with you in the manner which is customary in close
collaboration?
KEITEL: In general I must deny that. It was not in any way in keeping
with Hitler’s peculiar disposition and personality to have advisers of
that kind, that is, if you call an adviser someone who gives advice in
the sense of presenting, let us say, a great number of military elements
from long experience as an officer, but not in the sense of an adviser
to help to formulate a decision, such far-reaching decisions which are
doubtlessly meant here. On principle, such a decision was preceded by
weeks or months of careful consideration. During that time one had to
assist by procuring documents, but concerning the main point, the
decision itself, he did not brook any influence. Therefore, strange as
it may sound, the final answer always was: “This is my decision and it
is unalterable.” That was the announcement of his decision.
DR. NELTE: But if various departments were competent for these
decisions, were there no general conferences?
KEITEL: No. I cannot recall that any one of the really important
decisions after the year 1938 had ever been formulated as the result of
joint counsel for instance between the politicians, the soldiers or
other ministers, because it was Adolf Hitler’s own way to speak,
privately as a rule, to each department and each department chief, to
learn from him what he wanted to know, and then to find out some element
that could be used in the elaboration of his plans. Things were not at
all as would appear from the documents here of minutes of conferences of
generals, of meetings and similar things with a list of those present.
Never did such a meeting have the character of a deliberation. There
could be no question of that. Rather, the Führer had a certain idea, and
if for various reasons he thought that we opposed that idea even
inwardly, he used that as a reason to clarify his thoughts before a
large circle without any discussion. In other words, in these
assemblies, which the documents here speak of as conferences, there was
never any deliberation. I must add that even the external form which
these things took was such that, following the military example, the
senior commander convened a certain number of generals, everyone was
seated, the Führer arrived, spoke and went out. No one in such a
situation could have found an opening to say anything. To use just one
word for it, and I certainly do not exaggerate, it was the issuing of an
order but not a conference.
DR. NELTE: To come to a different subject, the Prosecution have asserted
that you had been a member of the Reich Government. What do you have to
say about that?
KEITEL: I never belonged to the Reich Government and I was also never a
member of the Cabinet. I must also state that I never became a minister,
but as is stated in the decree of 1938, “he has the rank of a Reich
minister,” not “he is Reich minister.” The expression “minister” is, of
course, simply intended to indicate the rank of minister and there was a
good reason for that. I need point out only what I said this morning: It
was not intended that there should be anyone holding an office with the
authority of a minister between Hitler and the Wehrmacht, and the
branches of the Wehrmacht. I must clarify the question which has been
frequently raised by the Prosecution that “He had the rank of a
minister,” by saying that, before the decree was issued, I asked whether
I was to deal with the State secretaries or with the ministers, and
Hitler said, “If on my orders you deal with other ministers of the
Reich, then, of course, you can do so only with the rank of a minister,
not on the level of a state secretary.”
That is the explanation of the expression in the decree “He has the rank
of a Reich minister.”
DR. NELTE: Did you, in the headquarters have any conferences with other
important and competent personalities, such as Ribbentrop, Rosenberg,
Speer, Sauckel, _et cetera_?
KEITEL: Ministers or special plenipotentiaries visited headquarters
according to a plan which very seldom led to the simultaneous presence
of several of them. Generally, it was carefully arranged so that a
special time was set aside for each one. As a rule, I was of course
informed that “the Foreign Minister is here” or “Minister Speer is here”
or the “Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor Sauckel is
here.” However, I was called in only in regard to purely military
questions which the Führer discussed with these gentlemen in private and
I could give instances of this. However, as has already been mentioned
recently, during the interrogation of State Secretary Steengracht, it
would be false to believe that these gentlemen who came to headquarters
formed a small or select cabinet. Hitler dealt with each of these
officials and functionaries separately, gave him his orders, and
dismissed him. It sometimes happened that on the way home, these
gentlemen visited me, mostly to ask me about small questions and small
favors which I could do for them or with instructions to inform me about
a decision or with the order to forward a decision to those military
offices which had to be notified.
DR. NELTE: In concluding, I would like to know whether the expression
“intimate” which is contained in the Indictment, is correct in order to
describe the relations between you and Hitler, privately or officially?
KEITEL: I found the word “intimate” in the Indictment and I asked myself
the question, “Where does this conception originate?” To be quite frank,
I have but one answer for it, that is that no one ever heard a single
word from me about the actual and constant difficulties that I had. I
deliberately kept quiet about them. Intimate relations are, according to
my definition of “intimate”—I do not know if in the English translation
“intimate” expresses the same thing which we call “intim”—relations
where there is confidence and frank discussion and these did not exist.
I have already characterized it. Intimacy was not Hitler’s attitude
towards the generals, to whose senior generation I also belonged. Apart
from the very formal intercourse which sometimes lasted for weeks and in
which even the external forms were hardly observed—I do not want to
discuss this in detail here—the relation never reached a point where it
could be classified as that of a close adviser or a close collaborator
as I conceived it in my Army staff positions. I must say that for my
part I have been faithful and loyal and I always fulfilled my duties in
that manner. However, I must also say that a sincere and personal
relation based upon mutual understanding and confidence never existed.
It has always been correct, but it was military and official, and never
went beyond that.
DR. NELTE: By the decree of 4 February 1938 a Secret Cabinet Council was
established. According to the contents of that decree, you are supposed
to have been a member of the Cabinet Council. In order to save time, I
merely wish to ask you: Do you confirm from your own knowledge the
statement made by Reich Marshal Göring, that the Secret Cabinet Council
was established only for appearances and that a Secret Cabinet Council
was never constituted and that it never had a session?
KEITEL: I can answer only, “Yes, never.”
DR. NELTE: I come now to the question of the Reich Defense Council
(Reichsverteidigungsrat). In the session of 23 November, the prosecutor
submitted in evidence, as proof of the rearmament and the active
participation of the Wehrmacht in the planning of war of aggression,
among others:
Document EC-177, which was designated as “Meeting of the Reich Defense
Council of 22 May 1933.” I must say that I have taken the translation
from the minutes and I am not sure whether the expression
“Reichsverteidigungsrat” was translated correctly. In the minutes it
states that it is a meeting of the working committee. For your
information may I say that the Reichsverteidigungsrat was supposed to be
a sort of ministerial body and that in addition, there was a working
committee.
A second document, EC-405, was submitted concerning a meeting of the
same body on 7 March 1934; and a third document, 2261-PS, dealing with
the Reich Defense Law of 1935 and the simultaneous appointment of Dr.
Schacht as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.
Beyond doubt, you have been active in questions of national defense.
These documents are also submitted as evidence against you. I ask you,
therefore, to state whether these meetings in which you participated and
which you conducted, were concerned with preparations for war and
rearmament.
KEITEL: From the very beginning, as long as we were working on these
things and by means of a committee of experts from which everything else
evolved, I personally participated in these matters, and I may call
myself the founder of that committee of ministerial experts which was
set up to co-operate with the War Ministry. As Chief of the
Organizational Department of the Army, in the winter of 1929 and 1930,
that is, 3 years before Hitler came to power, I formed and personally
assembled that committee after the Chancellor—I believe it was
Brüning—and the Prussian and Reich Minister of the Interior Severing
had consented to it. I would like to add that a representative of
Minister Severing was always present to make sure that nothing took
place which would have been in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
This work was very difficult, because no Reich minister and no
department head was officially obliged to carry out the wishes of the
National Ministry of Defense, this was purely voluntary. Consequently,
the work went along haltingly and slowly. In this committee of experts
which met perhaps two or three times a year, we dealt with, if I may put
it briefly, what assistance the Civilian Department could render, in
order to set free the small army of 100,000 soldiers for purely military
tasks, naturally limiting ourselves to the defense of our frontiers, as
stated in the Treaty of Versailles: “The Defense of the Frontiers”; I
could perhaps still repeat our discussion from memory, since, with the
exception of the period from 1933 to 1935, I conducted every one of
these meetings myself, that is as leader of the discussion, not as
chairman. I can, however, refer you now to the _Mobilization Handbook
for Civil Authorities_, which was the outcome of this work and about
which I shall speak later. It may be possible to submit it here. We were
concerned only with questions of defense, such as the protection of our
frontiers, and, in order to make myself clear, I should like to mention
some of them. The Wehrmacht was to be free to protect railway property,
post office property, repeater stations, radio stations, and to man the
frontiers with security units for which the Customs Services were to be
responsible. Cable and sea communications with East Prussia were also to
be improved.
I will not bore you with all this. They were all defensive measures with
a view to freeing the few soldiers for purely military functions,
because for purposes of actual military operations I need not tell you
what we could have done with an army of only 100,000 men. Any questions
which went beyond this were never dealt with in that committee. The
manner in which we worked was this: I asked the experts to submit their
wishes to the heads of departments or state secretaries and then to try
to persuade the heads of departments to take over the tasks from us, so
that we could say that was being done by others and we need not bother
about it. I can guarantee that operational questions, strategic
questions, armament questions, questions of supply of war equipment,
were never discussed in this committee. They were only organizational
questions of the taking over of functions which generally should be
performed by a soldier, but which we wanted to transfer to the civil
authorities.
Now, as to the meeting of 22 May 1933, which has been discussed several
times, it was already stated in the heading of the minutes which we have
before us: “Competency—heretofore the Reichswehrminister, now the Reich
Defense Council”—I have just explained that. Hitherto
Reichswehrminister, over the committee, voluntary participation of the
ministers of other departments, now obligatory activity of the heads of
departments, that is, the group of ministers who received the title of
“Defense Council.” I will express that even more clearly, so that it
cannot be misunderstood. Every member of the committee represented a
ministry. The minister to whom the committee member was responsible,
along with his colleagues, formed the Reich Defense Council, as
envisaged by us then. They were the Council and we were the Committee.
Therefore, “heretofore the Reichswehrminister”—now, one could say, as I
have just expressed it, the other ministers were obliged to do that.
In Paragraph 3 the working plans were particularly mentioned. These
working plans, in a word, are the forerunner of the _Mobilization Book_,
which is the final stage; whereas the working plans of about 1933 were
the intermediary stage. Then as regards the concluding words at the
meeting of 22 May 1933, which have been given special prominence here by
the Prosecution, and which deal with the need for secrecy—the passage
where I said, according to the minutes, that nothing which could lead to
objections at the Disarmament Conference should be left lying in the
desks of the ministries—that is correct. I did say that, and I have
said it because the experts told me that, with the exception of a small
wooden box or a drawer in a desk which could not be locked, they had no
place in which to keep anything, and because Von Blomberg, Reich War
Minister at that time, who had been in Geneva at the Disarmament
Conference for almost two years, gave me the definite order before this
meeting, to point out these things, because in Geneva one was surrounded
by an extremely large number of agents who were only waiting to be able
to present proof that, in spite of the disarmament negotiations, there
were things going on which could be interpreted as violations of the
Versailles Treaty. That is what I had to say about the document.
DR. NELTE: I have given to you now the _Mobilization Book for the Civil
Administration_. It is Document 1639-PS. It has been submitted in order
to prove that aggressive wars were being planned. Would you explain to
us the purpose of this book?
KEITEL: I have already stated that at an earlier stage, that is, during
the years 1932-33, the individual ministries had so-called working
plans, indicating what they were to do if something happened which
necessitated their participation in defending the country. In the course
of years, naturally, a number of new tasks were added and that finally
led to this _Mobilization Book_ for the civil authorities and civil
administration, the study of which would certainly show nothing which
might have anything to do with strategic, operational, or other
preparations for war. On the other hand, I am not in a position to prove
that everything contained in this book could never have been useful in
military operations which could develop from an aggressive war plan.
Many measures, one could almost say most measures, in the event of
mobilization would not indicate on the surface whether it is a measure
for defense or a measure which is necessary or indispensable for
aggressive action. That cannot be determined. But I believe I can say,
because I, myself, have been engaged so deeply in this work, perhaps
more than in any other, that there was no reason at all to burden the
civilian experts—they were high government counsellors—with strategic
or operational planning. I do not believe that it is necessary to prove
that such work is not within their scope. I have looked through and
studied this mobilization book here. I do not wish to bore you by citing
points which are of a purely defensive nature. I could name them:
barriers, reinforcement of the frontier defenses, demolitions, cutting
of railroads and similar things, all this is in the book. One of the
most important chapters, which, if I remember correctly, we discussed
during four or five of these sessions, was the question of evacuation,
that is, evacuating territories close to the border of valuable war
material and personnel, so that, in case of war with the neighbor, they
should not fall into the hands of the enemy. This problem of evacuation
was one of the most difficult, because the extent to which one can
evacuate, that is, what things can be evacuated, is perhaps one of the
most difficult decisions to make.
I would like to say one more thing about the Reich Defense Committee,
supplementing the ideas which I expressed before. Until the year 1938,
no meeting or session of the Reich Defense Council was ever held, that
is, the ministers who were the superiors of the committee members never
met, not even once. I would have known about it, although at the cabinet
meeting, I believe as early as March 1933, we passed a resolution to
make these ministers responsible for a Reich Defense Council which
should deal with these tasks, and to oblige them to take over these
tasks as their necessary contribution to the defense of the Reich, and,
of course, to finance them. That was the main purpose, otherwise the
Reich Defense Council never met.
DR. NELTE: Actually, the minutes which have been presented, for the
period of ’33 to ’38, are of the meetings of the working committee. But
you know that about eight days ago two documents were submitted which
appeared to be the minutes of the meetings of the Reich Defense Council.
One session or assembly is supposed to have taken place in November
1938, and the second one in March 1939. Unfortunately these documents
have not been submitted to me, but I have looked at them and you have
also seen them. Can you explain to us how these minutes, that is, these
meetings came about and what they mean?
KEITEL: I merely wish to add a few supplementary words to the statement
which Reich Marshal Göring has already made. In December 1938, there was
passed the Reich Defense Law, which had been drawn up in 1935, a shelved
law, that is, a law which had not been made public and which required
modification, the reason being that the Reich Defense Law of ’35 was
devised by the Reich War Minister, Commander-in-Chief Von Blomberg, who
no longer held office. I was with Reich Marshal Göring at that time to
discuss this with him and to find a new basis for this law, which until
then had not been published. This law of the autumn of 1938 had a number
of supplementary clauses as compared to the old one, and perhaps I will
be able to give details later. Among other things, according to this law
also, Reich Marshal Göring was the delegate of the Führer, a function
formerly held by the Reich War Minister and which I could not exercise.
This conference in November 1938, to recall it briefly, had been
convened by Reich Marshal Göring in order to present this law which had
not been published, and which was not to be published, to a large circle
of members of the ministries. There were about seventy or more persons
present to whom the Reich Marshal explained the purpose and the essence
of this law in the form of a speech. There was no discussion, apart from
that speech, and there was certainly no question of a meeting of the
Reich Defense Council at that time.
You also recently showed me the second document of a meeting of the
Reich Defense Council as it is called and as also appears in the heading
of the minutes of the summer 1939.
DR. NELTE: No, March 1939.
KEITEL: That has been mentioned here, and I believe it was the second
meeting of the Reich Defense Council. I can explain that. This is how it
was: I called a meeting of the committee and, of course, furnished Reich
Marshal Göring with the agenda and the names of the people who were to
be present. Reich Marshal Göring informed me that he would come himself
and that since he wished to discuss other questions, he would
accordingly enlarge the attendance. This conference, therefore, had an
agenda which I had planned for the committee, and concrete questions
were also brought up for debate. It is, however, remarkable that
according to the list of those present, that is, according to the
numbers, the members of the Reich Defense Council were represented by
only a very small number, almost not at all, although there were about
forty or fifty people present. The Reich Defense Council itself was a
body of 12 people, and it needs no further explanation that, from the
form in which these two conferences took place, one could not say that
this was a plenary session of the Reich Defense Council based upon a
clearly defined agenda, but rather that there were two meetings, the
motive and extent of which I have described here.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal thinks that you might get on a
little more quickly with the defendant. The Tribunal recall that you
asked a few days ago that you might submit an affidavit of the
defendant’s evidence, and there is in your document book an affidavit.
You have been over all those matters in the affidavit at very much
greater length than you would have gone into them if you read the
affidavit, and we hope that you will be able to deal more shortly with
the evidence in future.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I made every effort to be as brief and concise
as possible in my questions, but testimony is, of course, always
subjective. The defendant is unfortunately the one who is mentioned most
frequently in this Trial and naturally he is interested in clarifying
those matters which he considers essential in order to present his case
clearly.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Nelte, I do not think it is necessary to
discuss the matter further; but the Tribunal have expressed their wish.
DR. NELTE: As far as I am able, I shall comply with your request, Mr.
President.
[_Turning to the defendant._]
Field Marshal Keitel, you have just given us an explanation of the Reich
Defense Council and the Reich Defense Committee. You probably realize
that we are not and should not be so much concerned with whether
decisions are made by a Reich Defense Council or a Reich Defense
Committee. We are interested in what actually took place and whether or
not these things justify the imputations of the Prosecution. In this
respect I ask you to tell me if those things which you discussed and
planned on the Reich Defense Committee justify the suspicion that you
were considering aggressive war?
KEITEL: I realize fully that we are not concerned with the formality of
whether it was the Council or the Committee, since the Council was a
board of ministers while the Committee was a board of minor experts. We
are concerned with what actually did take place and what was done. With
the exception that in the year 1934 and until the autumn of 1935 I was
not present at these discussions, and therefore cannot vouch for every
word which was spoken at that time, I must state that nothing about the
planning of wars, the preparing for wars, the operational, strategical,
or armed preparedness for war, was ever discussed.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has labeled you as a member of the Three Man
College, from which they have deduced that you had special powers to act
within the German Reich Government. I am submitting to you Document
2194-PS. In this document in the Reich Defense Law of 1938, Paragraph 5,
Subsection 4, you will find the source of this term which in itself is
not official.
KEITEL: The Reich Defense Law of 1938 provided for a plenipotentiary
general for administration in order to restrict the size of the body.
The Reich Minister of the Interior was to have this office and further,
according to Paragraph 5, Subsection 4, the Supreme Command of the Army
was to have priority influence in regard to the State Railways and the
State Postal Services, for in the event of mobilization, transports must
run and the services for the transmission of news must be available, as
is the case in all countries.
The Three Man College is a concept which I have never heard of until
just now. It probably refers to the Plenipotentiary General for
Administration, the Plenipotentiary General for Economy and the Chief of
the OKW. It referred to these three. There is no doubt about it,
because, in line with the Reich Defense Law, they were already supposed
to have a number of decrees ready in the drawers which were to be
published when this law was made public, and each one of the three had
to make the necessary preparations in his own sphere. From the right to
assume these functions by reason of these authorities the Three Man
College concept originated.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution then contended that according to Document
2852-PS you were a member of the Council of Ministers for Defense of the
Reich. Did you become a minister through this membership in the Reich
Defense Council?
KEITEL: I might perhaps say a few words to begin with about the Council
of Ministers, insofar as the Reich Defense Law, the Reich Defense
Committee and the Reich Defense Council, disappeared as a result of the
law regarding the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, that
is, they were never made public and never put into effect. The Council
of Ministers for Defense of the Reich was newly created on 1 September
1939 and this made all these preparations on paper in the Reich Defense
Council, Reich Defense Committee and the law null and void and put in
its place a new thing, an institution. This institution, the Council of
Ministers for Defense of the Reich, was now the small war cabinet,
which, if I may say so, should previously have been the Reich Defense
Council with their limited number of members. Thus, a new basis was
established, and new decrees which were necessary were put into effect
by the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Reich, after it had been
created and officially confirmed.
I was called into this Council of Ministers or rather I received a chair
in this Council of Ministers. I prefer not to give the reasons, because
they were entirely private. It was a compensation for opposition against
these things—I never became active in this Council of Ministers for
Defense of the Reich, but I was a member; it was not necessary to be
active since in the purely military sphere, that is, things with which
the Wehrmacht immediately was concerned, the Führer personally, without
the Council of Ministers, issued the necessary decrees with his own
signature and the detour via the Council of Ministers in Berlin was not
necessary; and in my opinion I must deny that I became a minister by
this appointment. The authority to exercise the functions of a minister
was in no way given. I was only the representative of the Wehrmacht in
this Council of Ministers.
DR. NELTE: However, your name is indisputably at the bottom of many laws
and decrees which were issued. How do you explain the signature on these
laws?
KEITEL: Yes, I did sign a series of decrees issued by the Council of
Ministers because they were submitted to me by the Secretariat, that is,
the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Minister Lammers, with a request for
my signature. When I questioned the necessity for doing this, I received
a formal answer from Lammers to the effect that other Reich departments
might see that the Wehrmacht was not excluded from these decrees or
laws. That is why my signature is included. It means that the Wehrmacht
must also obey these decrees and laws. That is why I had no misgivings
in signing my name.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution further accuse you of having been a political
general. Undoubtedly you appeared at various special functions. Will you
please answer this accusation and tell us how it came about?