You have testified that in August or September 1940 in the Schloss
Fuschl, you met the Defendant Keitel to discuss a memorandum on the
possibility of an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union. Consequently,
nearly one year prior to that attack on the Soviet Union, you were
already informed of the plans for this attack, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. The Defendant Keitel was with
me at the time at Fuschl, and on that occasion he told me that the
Führer had certain misgivings regarding Russia and could not leave the
possibility of an armed conflict out of his calculations. He said that,
for his part, he had prepared a memorandum which he proposed to discuss
with the Führer. He had doubts as to the wisdom of any conflict of that
kind in the East, and he asked me at the time if I would also use my
influence with the Führer in that direction. I agreed to do so. But an
attack or plans for an attack were not discussed; I might say that all
this was a discussion more from a General Staff point of view. He made
no mention to me of anything more concrete.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not want to detain the attention of the Tribunal on
this question, because it has already been sufficiently investigated.
But I want to ask you in this connection the following question: You
replied to Keitel during this conversation that you would express your
opinion regarding the war with the U.S.S.R. to Hitler. Did you have a
conversation with Hitler on that subject?
VON RIBBENTROP: I discussed the subject several times with Hitler, and
on this occasion I spoke of the danger of preventive wars to him. Hitler
told me of his misgivings, which I have already mentioned here.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, you have testified in that sense. Tell me, did you
know that the so-called “Green File” of the Defendant Göring, containing
directives for the plunder and exploitation of the temporarily occupied
territories of the Soviet Union was prepared a long time prior to the
attack on the Soviet Union? Did you know this?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. I heard the term “Green File”
here for the first time.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right—you did not know the name. And when did you
learn about the contents? The contents of this file?
VON RIBBENTROP: Neither the file nor the name.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know. All right. You knew that already before
the war directives were drafted for the extermination of the peaceful
Soviet population?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either.
GEN. RUDENKO: And when did you know about that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I heard nothing at all about such plans.
GEN. RUDENKO: And the directives?
VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding the preparation of such plans...
GEN. RUDENKO: And regarding the directives concerning jurisdiction in
the Barbarossa region? You evidently did know about that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding what? I did not understand that.
GEN. RUDENKO: Regarding jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region. It is a
supplement to Plan Barbarossa.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I have never occupied myself
personally with that subject. It might be possible that some department
in my office did have a hand in it somewhere; but as far as I remember
I, myself, was never concerned with the subject of jurisdiction; for
after the outbreak of the conflict with the Soviet Union the Foreign
Office had nothing more to do with these territories.
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you to take cognizance of a telegram which
you addressed on 10 July 1941, at 1451 hours, to the German Ambassador
in Tokio. We are submitting this document, Number 2896-PS, to the
Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-446. You must remember this telegram.
VON RIBBENTROP: To whom is it addressed? It does not say here.
GEN. RUDENKO: To the German Ambassador in Tokio. Do you remember?
VON RIBBENTROP: Oh, Tokio, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You apparently remember it. I must ask you to pay
attention to the words on Page 4 at the end of this document. They are
underlined in pencil for the sake of convenience. Have you found the
passage? I shall read only that part into the record.
VON RIBBENTROP: Which part are you referring to? The last page?
GEN. RUDENKO: It is on Page 4. It is underlined.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have found it now.
GEN. RUDENKO: I am going to read this passage into the record.
“I request you to use every means in your power to influence
Matsuoka, in the way I have indicated, so that Japan will
declare war on Russia as soon as possible; for the sooner this
happens, the better it will be. It must still be our natural aim
to shake hands with Japan on the Trans-Siberian railway before
the winter. With the collapse of Russia the position of the
countries participating in the Three Power Pact will be so
strong that the collapse of England or the complete annihilation
of the British Isles will be only a question of time.”
Have you found this passage?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have the passage; yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: What is it? Is it one of your efforts to localize the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand that last question?
GEN. RUDENKO: I say, is this one of your efforts to localize the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: The war against Russia had started, and I tried at the
time—the Führer held the same view—to get Japan into the war against
Russia in order to end the war with Russia as soon as possible. That was
the meaning of that telegram.
GEN. RUDENKO: This was not only the policy of the Führer; it was also
your policy as the then Minister for Foreign Affairs?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask. You state that you
never heard a thing about the cruelties perpetrated in the concentration
camps?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: During the war you, as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
studied the foreign press and the foreign newspapers. Did you know what
the foreign press was saying?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is true only up to a certain point. I had so
much to read and so much work to do every day that, on principle, I
received only the foreign political news selected for me from the
foreign press. Thus, during the whole of the war I never had any news
from abroad about the concentration camps, until one day your armies,
that is, the Soviet Russian armies, captured the camp at Maidanek in
Poland.
On that occasion news came from our embassies and I asked for press
news, _et cetera_, to be submitted to me. How I took these news releases
to the Führer and what resulted from that has already been discussed
here. Before that I knew nothing about any atrocities or any measures
taken in the concentration camps.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know about the notes of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Soviet Union, Molotov, concerning the atrocities
committed by the German fascists in the temporarily occupied territories
of the Soviet Union, the deportation into slavery of the people of the
Soviet, the pillaging?
VON RIBBENTROP: I think that note reached me somehow through diplomatic
channels. I am not quite sure how; it may have come through news
agencies. However, I do remember that at the time—I believe there were
even several notes—at any rate I remember one of these notes which I
submitted to the Führer. But since the beginning of the Russo-German war
we could not carry out any action in these territories, and we had no
influence there. Therefore, I am not informed about details.
GEN. RUDENKO: I was primarily interested in one fundamental fact,
namely, that you were aware of the notes from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Soviet Union. Tell me, please, do you know that millions
of citizens were driven into slavery to Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know! And that those citizens were used as
slaves in Germany—you were not aware of that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No. According to what I heard, all these foreign workers
are supposed to have been well treated in Germany. I think it is
possible, of course, that other things might have happened, too; but on
the whole, I believe that a good deal was done to treat these workers
well. I know that on occasion departments of the Foreign Office
co-operated in these matters with a view to preventing those possible
things. Generally speaking, however, we had no influence in that sphere,
as we were excluded from Eastern questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: Why were you informed that foreign laborers were treated
well and why were you not informed that they were being treated as
slaves?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think that this is correct. We in the Foreign
Office—in the case of the French, for instance, and quite a number of
other foreign workers—co-operated in getting musicians, _et cetera_,
from France for them. We advised on questions concerning their welfare.
And I know that the German Labor Front did everything in its power, at
least with regard to the sector which we could view to some extent, to
treat the workers well, to preserve their willingness to work, and to
make their leisure pleasant. I know, at least, that those of its efforts
in which we co-operated were on these lines.
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I now present a penultimate group of questions in
connection with the activities of the “Ribbentrop Battalion.” I must now
request you to read the testimony of SS Obersturmbannführer Norman Paul
Förster. This document is submitted as Exhibit Number USSR-445 (Document
Number USSR-445). Please pay particular attention to Page 3 of Förster’s
testimony. This passage is underlined. It is stated there:
“When in that same month, August 1941, I reported to the address
given to me in Berlin, I learned that I had been transferred to
Special Command SS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A member
of the Foreign Ministry, Baron von Kunsberg, was at the head of
the SS Special Command... In this command there were about 80 to
100 men altogether and 300 or 400 men were added later. The
special command was later rechristened the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Battalion ‘z.b.V.’ (for special employment).
“I was received by Baron von Kunsberg in a building belonging to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the Sonderkommando was
quartered. He explained to me that the Sonderkommando was
created on instructions from the Reich Minister of Foreign
Affairs Von Ribbentrop. According to Von Ribbentrop’s
instructions, our Sonderkommando was to move forward with the
front-line troops in occupied territory in order to protect the
cultural treasures—museums, archives, scientific institutions,
art galleries, and so forth—from ruin and destruction by the
German soldiers, to confiscate them and transport them to
Germany.”
Here I omit a few lines and then:
“On the evening of 5 August 1941, in the presence of Nietsch,
Paulsen, Krallat, Remerssen, Lieben, and others, Von Kunsberg
informed us of Von Ribbentrop’s verbal order according to which
all scientific institutions, libraries, palaces, _et cetera_, in
Russia were to be thoroughly ‘combed out’ and everything of
definite value was to be carried off.”
Did you find that passage in the document?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. Shall I answer?
GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you first of all to reply to my question,
reading as follows: You know that such a battalion of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs existed, and that in accordance with your directives, it
was especially concerned—as is stated in this document—with the
preservation of cultural treasures? Please reply to this question.
VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite incorrect as it appears in this document. I
cannot acknowledge it in any way and I must object to it. The following
is correct:
This Herr Von Kunsberg is a man who was appointed, with a few
assistants, long before the Russian campaign with the idea even at that
time of confiscating in France documents, important documents, which
might be found there and which might be of importance or value to us.
Any order which—at the same time, I may say, he had orders to see to it
that there should be no unnecessary destruction of art treasures, _et
cetera_. In no circumstances did he receive from me orders to transport
these things to Germany or to steal any of them. I do not know how this
statement came to be made; but in this form it is certainly not correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have protested against a great many of the documents
here. That does not mean that they are incorrect. I am not going to
quote from this testimony any further. I shall now refer to a document;
it is a letter from the Defendant Göring addressed to the Defendant
Rosenberg. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal under Document
Number 1985-PS. I shall here quote Paragraph 2 of the document. It has
already been submitted, so I shall read this letter addressed by Göring
to Rosenberg into the record. He writes:
“After all the fuss and bother I very much welcomed the fact
that an office was finally set up to collect these things,
although I must point out that still other offices refer here to
authority received from the Führer, especially the Reich
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who sent a circular to all the
organizations several months ago, stating amongst other things,
that he had been given authority in the occupied territories for
the preservation of cultural treasures.”
We can assume that the Defendant Göring is better acquainted with the
circumstances anent the preservation of art treasures. Don’t you
remember those things at all?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know how this letter from Reich Marshal Göring
came to be written. I do not know, but if there is any mention in it of
authorities or anything of that kind, that could only refer to the fact
that these art treasures were secured in these territories. I have
already stated here that during the war neither I myself nor the Foreign
Office confiscated or claimed any art treasures whatsoever, whether for
my personal use or for our use. It is possible that these art treasures
were temporarily placed in safekeeping. Certainly none of them passed
into our possession. Therefore it might be a misunderstanding in this
letter because I remember clearly that at that time we were dealing with
the safekeeping of art treasures. In France, for instance, at that time
robberies were beginning to be committed in private houses and art
galleries, _et cetera_; and I still remember asking the Wehrmacht to
provide guards to keep a watch on these art treasures, _et cetera_. At
any rate we in the Foreign Office never saw any of these works of art
ourselves.
GEN. RUDENKO: I think we had better not go too deeply into details. I
should like to ask another question in this connection. Don’t you think
that the term “safekeeping of art treasures in the occupied territories”
actually concealed the looting of art treasures?
VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly never intended that; and I have never given
any order to that effect. I should like to state that here,
emphatically. Perhaps I may add that when I heard that Kunsberg had
suddenly assembled such a large staff, I immediately ordered the
dissolution of his entire battalion—it was not a battalion; that is
badly expressed—at any rate, its immediate dissolution; and I think I
even remember dismissing him from the Foreign Office, because he did not
do what I wanted. I think he was removed from his office.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I am closing my interrogation. You were
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the fascist Germans from 4 February 1938.
Your appointment to this post coincided with the initial period, when
Hitler had launched on a series of acts involving a foreign policy which
in the end led to the World War. The question arises: Why did Hitler
appoint you his Minister of Foreign Affairs just before embarking on a
wide program of aggression? Don’t you consider that he thought you were
the most suitable man for the purpose, a man with whom he could never
have any differences of opinion?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you anything about Adolf Hitler’s
thoughts. He did not tell me about them. He knew that I was his faithful
assistant, that I shared his view that we must have a strong Germany,
and that I had to get these things done through diplomatic and peaceful
channels. I cannot say more. What ideas he may have had, I do not know.
GEN. RUDENKO: Here is my last question. How can you explain the fact
that even now, when the entire panorama of the bloody crimes of the
Hitler regime has been unfolded before your eyes, when you fully realize
the complete crash of that Hitlerite policy which has brought you to the
dock—how can we explain that you are still defending this regime; and,
furthermore, that you are still praising Hitler and that you are still
declaring that the leading criminal clique consisted of a group of
idealists? How can you explain that?
THE PRESIDENT: That seems to be a number of questions in one, and I do
not think it is a proper question to put to the witness.
GEN. RUDENKO: I thought that this was only one question which summarizes
everything.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you answer please, Defendant
Ribbentrop?
THE PRESIDENT: I told you, General Rudenko, that the Tribunal does not
think it a proper question to put.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you want to re-examine?
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the defendant, Mr.
President.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat.
Now, Dr. Horn, I understand that you are going to deal with your
documents now, are you not?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I see the time; we might perhaps adjourn for 10 minutes
now.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to announce that the Tribunal will
not sit on Good Friday or the Saturday afterwards nor on Easter Monday.
MAJOR J. HARCOURT BARRINGTON (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom):
May it please the Tribunal, I am speaking for all the four prosecutors,
to put the Prosecution’s comments on the document books which the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop has put in. I am speaking for all the four
prosecutors, with one exception, that the French Chief Prosecutor wishes
to speak on two particular groups of documents which are of special
interest to the French Delegation. I think, if it is convenient to the
Tribunal, I might put the whole of the Prosecution’s position before Dr.
Horn puts his answer if that is agreeable to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree, Dr. Horn, that he might put his view first?
Is it agreeable to you that Mr. Barrington should put the position
first?
DR. HORN: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: There are, in all, nine books in the English version;
and the last two have been received only today, so, as they contain
perhaps about 350 documents, I regret that I have not been able to agree
in the list with Dr. Horn, himself, although I have acquainted him with
the comments that the Prosecution proposes to make.
The first two books, comprising Documents 1 to 44, have already been
read in open court on the 27th of March by Dr. Horn, and I take it that
Your Lordship does not want them gone into again.
THE PRESIDENT: No.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: So that leaves simply Books 3 to 9, and I have made
out a working note of which I have copies. I do not know whether the
members of the Tribunal have them.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Oh, yes; Your Lordship will see that on the left
column are the documents which the Prosecution would object to, and in
the middle column are those that they would allow, and there are remarks
on the right-hand side.
Although this does not show it, I have, for convenience, divided these
documents up into nine groups; and so I think I need not go through all
the documents in detail unless there is any particular question on any
one of them.
Before saying what the groups are, perhaps I might make two general
remarks, that the Prosecution takes the position that the _German White
Books_, which figure very largely in this list—_White Books_ issued by
the government of the Nazi conspirators,—cannot be regarded as evidence
of facts, stated therein; and secondly, that there are among these
documents a considerable number which are only discussions of subjects
in a very vague and tentative stage, and a great many of them, in the
Prosecution’s view, are cumulative.
Now, of the first of the nine groups, I have broken them down to
Czechoslovakia; and if you will look at the note that I have handed up,
that consists of the first few documents down to 45. I beg your
Lordship’s pardon. That is wrong. From after 45, there are six PS
documents which are already exhibits and there are 46 and 47 and over
the page there are 7 more on Czechoslovakia, and the Prosecution’s
position on those is that six PS documents are allowed and 46 and 47;
but, over the page, 66, 67, and 69 are objected to purely on the ground
that they are cumulative—cumulative, I think of Number 68.
THE PRESIDENT: Which volume are they in, 66 and 69?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: In Volume 3, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: As they have already been translated does it make much
difference if there are objections that they are cumulative?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, there is not any difference, My Lord, at all,
except if they are going to be read into the record.
THE PRESIDENT: They have all been translated?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: They have all been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: And in the other languages, too?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I understand so, My Lord, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: So they need not be read into the record.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: If your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the rule, isn’t it, that if they have been
translated into the four languages, they need not be read into the
record?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That would apply to all the documents in all these
nine books now because they all have been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it would; but there may be other objections to the
documents besides their being cumulative.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: There will be, according to the Prosecution’s
submission, a very large number that are cumulative _in toto_.
THE PRESIDENT: There will be a very large number?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the point was that, being translated, they are
there already.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is the only point the Prosecution has against
those. The thing is, My Lord, the Prosecution say they are cumulative.
Of course, Dr. Horn might not say so and perhaps he would welcome a
ruling as to whether they should be used or not.
THE PRESIDENT: No. What I was suggesting to you was that if the only
objection to them was that they were cumulative they may just as well go
in, be put in evidence, because they have already been translated—it
saves time—as to have them all argued.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord, unless Dr. Horn wishes to read any of
these documents and refer to them specifically.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you mean that he might read them all and then...
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not know what Your Lordship is going to allow him
to do. I understood perhaps he would read some of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably, if he reads many that are cumulative, we
shall stop him.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: I will pass on to the second group, which are Numbers
48 to 62 inclusive, and those are on the subject of Allied rearmament
and alleged warlike intentions before the outbreak of war. Number 54
appears to be missing from my book, and I do not know whether it was
intentionally left out.
The Prosecution would object to all those on the ground that they are
irrelevant. They are in Book 3, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: 59 is different, isn’t it? 59 is dealing with a speech by
Sir Malcolm MacDonald about the colonies.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. That is not exactly rearmament, but of course it
is on the same theme in a way, that it is a provocation to war. It is
certainly in rather a different category from the others.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: The third group deals with Poland, and that is a very
large group because it includes all the negotiations before the outbreak
of the war, and the numbers involved in that group are 74 to 214.
I think it would perhaps be convenient to break that group down into two
phases. The first one would be the questions of the minorities and
Danzig and the Corridor and the incidents connected with them, and the
second phase—slightly overlapping in time, but roughly it follows after
the other one—would be the diplomatic events involving countries other
than Poland, that is to say, very approximately from the 15th of March
1939 onwards. The first phase of that group would be Numbers 74 to 181,
and the second phase 182 to 214.
Now, in regard to the first phase, there are two points. The Prosecution
says that these are, with very few exceptions, irrelevant because they
treat of incidents and the problems arising out of these minority
questions, and the Prosecution says those are irrelevant for two
reasons. One of the documents among them consists of an exchange of
notes between the German and Polish governments on the 28th of April
1939. That is TC-72, Number 14, in Book 5. And that exchange of notes
consists of a confirmation that both parties unconditionally renounce
the use of force on the basis of the Kellogg Pact. That had been done
previously on the 26th of January 1934, as appears in another document
here. It is on Page 2 of my note, TC-21.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of TC-72?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: TC-72, Number 14, was the 28th of April 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: And on the footing that the two countries
unconditionally renounced, the use of force on the basis of the Kellogg
Pact, added to the fact that the Defendant Ribbentrop has himself said
that during 1938 Germany was on very good terms with Poland. And also
there was a declaration made by Germany and Poland on the 5th of
November 1937 about minorities—that is Number 123 in this list of
documents; it occurs at the top of Page 4 in the note. In view of these
things, the Prosecution says that the accounts of these and reports of
these incidents and minority problems are irrelevant and very old
history.