VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, but may I be allowed to say that we are not, in
this case, dealing with an agent. Herr Haushofer was a free collaborator
of ours, interested in politics in general, and in the question of the
German minorities in particular. If he was in Tokio at that time, and he
doubtless was there, although it has slipped my memory, then I must have
told him to speak to several persons over there and report to me. He
apparently, as I have only just gathered from this letter, either
because he liked to be busy or for some other reason unknown to me, or
because he knew the other gentlemen, placed these reports at the
disposal of these other gentlemen, on his own initiative. But he
certainly was no agent sent out by different departments. I think the
only person who knew him well was Rudolf Hess; otherwise, I believe, he
knew nobody at all. I fear I am not giving you quite the right ideas; he
was a private tourist, who submitted his impressions.
COL. AMEN: Now, I believe you have told the Tribunal that you were not
very close to Himmler; is that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have always said that my relations with Himmler were
good during the first few years, but I regret to say that in the latter
years I was not on good terms with him. I naturally—it was not very
noticeable to the outside world—but I do not wish to discuss this
matter in detail. Many things have already been said about it and there
were serious and violent divergencies, due to many reasons...
COL. AMEN: I do not care what the divergencies were. In what years did
you get along closely with him?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand your question.
COL. AMEN: In what years were you close to him?
VON RIBBENTROP: The first divergencies between Himmler and myself arose,
I believe, in 1941, over Romania and difficulties in Romania. These
divergencies were smoothed over, and naturally to all outward
appearances we had to work together as before, and we often exchanged
letters on our respective birthdays and on other occasions. But later on
relations were not very good. The final break came in 1941. Formerly I
had been on good terms with him and also shared his opinion for the
creation of a leadership class, at which he was aiming.
COL. AMEN: And you had at least 50 social appointments with Himmler in
1940 and 1941?
VON RIBBENTROP: How many?
COL. AMEN: Fifty?
VON RIBBENTROP: Fifty? No, that certainly could not have been the case.
Perhaps five or thereabouts, I cannot say for certain. But after 1941
relations between us were more strained, and later they were not very
good. Others, I believe, have already testified to that effect.
COL. AMEN: Well, I do not want to take any more time, except...
THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing with social appointments between
Ribbentrop or something other?
COL. AMEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that a matter which the Tribunal has to go into?
COL. AMEN: Well, I expect, Sir, that any person that has as many
appointments as are indicated by these books certainly has discussed
with Himmler the matter of concentration camps and the entire matters
which Himmler was exclusively handling. He has told the Tribunal that he
had never heard anything about concentration camps from Himmler.
VON RIBBENTROP: I wish to repeat my statement that at no time did
Himmler discuss this matter with me. As for our 50 meetings, I do not
know, we may have met frequently, despite everything, but I cannot
remember 50 meetings. Possibly five or ten, I do not know. I do not
believe it to be of vital importance since it is not a decisive factor.
Of course we had to work together in various fields and this
collaboration was mostly very difficult.
COL. AMEN: Well, there were many business appointments which you had
with him also, were there not? Just take a look at this sheet of entries
from Himmler’s appointment book and tell me whether that conforms to
your...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal does not want this matter gone
into any further.
COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir, but these were business appointments as
distinguished from social. There are no further questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, during the last sessions of the
Tribunal you explained in great detail the bases of German foreign
policy. I should like to ask you a few comprehensive questions and
request you to answer these questions laconically in terms of “yes” or
“no.” Do you consider the Anschluss as an act of German aggression?
Please answer this.
VON RIBBENTROP: Austria?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression. It was the accomplishment of a
purpose.
GEN. RUDENKO: I must request you...
VON RIBBENTROP: But I presume I can say a few sentences at least, after
saying “yes,” or must I never say anything else but “yes” and “no”?
GEN. RUDENKO: I must beg you to answer my questions. You have replied
far too extensively. I would like you to summarize your replies,
precisely by saying “yes” or “no.”
VON RIBBENTROP: That depends on my state of health. I must ask you to
forgive me.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand.
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not consider the Anschluss as an act of aggression,
that is “no.” I consider it the realization of the mutual purpose of
both nations involved. They had always wished to be together and the
government before Adolf Hitler had already striven for it.
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more: Please answer “yes” or “no.” Do you
consider that the Anschluss was not an act of German aggression? Do you
consider...
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, he gave you a categorical answer to
that; that it was not an aggression.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: And we have already ruled that the witnesses are not to
be confined to answering “yes” or “no.” They must answer “yes” or “no”
first, and then make a short explanation if they want to. But, anyhow,
with reference to this question, he has answered it categorically.
GEN. RUDENKO: The second question: Do you consider the seizure of
Czechoslovakia as an act of aggression by Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was no aggression in that sense, but a union in
accordance with the right of self-determination of nations, as laid down
in 1919 by the President of the United States, Wilson. The annexation of
the Sudetenland was sanctioned by an agreement of four great powers in
Munich.
GEN. RUDENKO: You evidently have not understood my question. I asked you
whether you considered the seizure of Czechoslovakia, of the whole of
Czechoslovakia, as an act of aggression by Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not an act of aggression by Germany. I
consider, according to the words of the Führer, and I believe he was
right, that it was a necessity resulting from Germany’s geographical
position. This position meant that the remaining part of Czechoslovakia,
the part which still existed, could always be used as a kind of
aircraft-carrier for attacks against Germany. The Führer therefore
considered himself obliged to occupy the territory of Bohemia and
Moravia, in order to protect the German Reich against air attack—the
air journey from Prague to Berlin took only half an hour. The Führer
told me at the time that in view of the fact that United States had
declared the entire Western Hemisphere as its particular sphere of
interest, that Russia was a powerful country with gigantic territories,
and that England embraced the entire globe, Germany would be perfectly
justified in considering so small a space as her own sphere of interest.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Poland as an act of
aggression by Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No. I must again say “no.” The attack on Poland was
rendered inevitable by the attitude of the other powers. It might have
been possible to find a peaceful solution to the German demands, and I
think the Führer would have trodden this path of peace, had the other
powers taken this path with him. As matters stood, the situation had
become so tense that Germany could no longer accept it as it was, and as
a great power Germany could not tolerate Polish provocations any
further. That is how this war arose. I am convinced that primarily the
Führer was never interested in conquering Poland.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Denmark as an act of
aggression by Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, the “invasion” of Denmark, as it is called, was,
according to the Führer’s words and explanation, a purely preventive
measure adopted against imminent landings of British fighting forces.
How authentic our information was is proved by the fact that only a few
days later English and German troops were engaged in battle in Norway.
That means that it was proved that these English troops had been ready
for a long time for fighting in Norway, and it came out from the
documents discovered later on and published at the time, and from orders
issued, that the English landing in Scandinavia had been prepared down
to the smallest detail. The Führer therefore thought that by seizing
Scandinavia, he would prevent it from becoming another theater of war. I
do not therefore think that the invasion of Denmark can be considered as
an act of aggression.
GEN. RUDENKO: And you do not consider this attack on Norway as an act of
aggression on the part of Germany either?
VON RIBBENTROP: We have just been talking about Norway. I was talking
about Norway and Denmark, a combined action.
GEN. RUDENKO: Together with Denmark. All right, it was a simultaneous
action. Do you consider the attack on Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg
as an act of aggression on the part of Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is the same question. I must again say “no,” but I
would like to add an explanation.
GEN. RUDENKO: Just a moment. I would like you to give shorter replies
because you explain the basic questions far too extensively. You deny
that this was an act of aggression on the part of Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Russian Prosecutor will understand that we are
dealing with very important questions, which are not easily explained in
a sentence, especially since we did not have the opportunity to explain
the matter in detail. I shall be quite brief.
GEN. RUDENKO: I quite appreciate that you have already been answering
questions of this nature for 3 days running.
VON RIBBENTROP: I shall now be very brief. After the Polish campaign
military considerations proved to be the decisive factors. The Führer
did not wish the war to spread. As for Holland, Belgium, and France, it
was France who declared war on Germany and not we who declared war on
France. We therefore had to prepare for an attack from this direction as
well. The Führer told me at the time that such an attack on the Ruhr
area was to be expected, and documents discovered at a later date have
proved to the world at large beyond a shadow of doubt that this
information was perfectly authentic. The Führer therefore decided to
adopt preventive measures in this case as well and not to wait for an
attack on the heart of Germany, but to attack first. And so the
timetable of the German General Staff was put into practice.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider the attack on Greece as an act of
aggression on the part of Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: The attack on Greece and Yugoslavia by Germany has
already been discussed. I do not believe I need give any further details
on this point. That is here...
GEN. RUDENKO: I also do not think it is necessary to give detailed
replies. I ask whether you consider the attack on Greece as an act of
aggression on the part of Germany? Answer “yes” or “no.”
VON RIBBENTROP: No, and I consider that the measures adopted in
Yugoslavia and the measures taken by Greece in granting bases, _et
cetera_, to the enemies of Germany justified the intervention of Adolf
Hitler, so that here too one cannot speak of aggressive action in this
sense. It was quite clear that British troops were about to land in
Greece, since they had already landed in Crete and the Peloponnesos, and
that the uprising in Yugoslavia by the enemies of Germany, in agreement
with the enemies of Germany, as I mentioned yesterday, had been
encouraged with the intent of launching an attack against Germany from
that country. The documents of the French General Staff discovered later
in France showed only too clearly that a landing in Salonika had been
planned...
GEN. RUDENKO: Witness Ribbentrop, you have already spoken about that in
much detail. You explained it yesterday at great length. Now will you
please answer “yes” or “no” to my last question: Do you, or do you not
consider the attack on the Soviet Union as an act of aggression on the
part of Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was no aggression in the literal sense of the word,
but...
GEN. RUDENKO: You say that in the literal sense of the word it was not
an act of aggression. Then in what sense of the word was it an
aggression?
THE PRESIDENT: You must let him answer.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I offer a few words of explanation? I must be
allowed to say something.
GEN. RUDENKO: You...
VON RIBBENTROP: The concept of “aggression” is a very complicated
concept, which even today the world at large cannot readily define. That
is a point I should like to emphasize first. We are here dealing,
undeniably, with a preventive intervention, with a war of prevention.
That is quite certain, for attack we did. There is no denying it. I had
hoped that matters with the Soviet Union could have been settled
differently, diplomatically, and I did everything I could in this
direction. But the information received and all the political acts of
the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1941 until the outbreak of war, persuaded
the Führer, as he repeatedly told me, that sooner or later the so-called
East-West pincers would be applied to Germany, that is, that in the
East, Russia with her immense war potential, and in the West, England
and the United States, were pushing steadily towards Europe with the
purpose of making a large-scale landing. It was the Führer’s great worry
that this would happen. Moreover, the Führer informed me that close
collaboration existed between the General Staffs of London and Moscow.
This I do not know; I personally received no such news. But the reports
and information which I received from the Führer were of an extremely
concrete nature. At any rate, he feared that, one day, Germany, faced
with this political situation, would be threatened with catastrophe and
he wished to prevent the collapse of Germany and the destruction of the
balance of power in Europe.
GEN. RUDENKO: In your testimony you have frequently stated that, in the
pursuit of peaceful objectives, you considered it essential to solve a
number of decisive questions through diplomatic channels. Now this
testimony is obviously arrant hypocrisy since you admitted just now that
all these acts of aggression on the part of Germany were justified.
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not mean to say that; I said only that we were not
dealing with an act of aggression, Mr. Prosecutor, and explained how
this war came to pass and how it developed. I also explained how I had
always done everything in my power to prevent the war at its outbreak
during the Polish crisis. Beyond the precincts of this Tribunal, history
will prove the truth of my words and show how I always endeavored to
localize the war and prevent it from spreading. That, I believe, will
also be established. Therefore, in conclusion I should like to say once
more that the outbreak of war was caused by circumstances which, at long
last, were no longer in Hitler’s hands. He could act only in the way he
did, and when the war spread ever further all his decisions were
principally prompted by considerations of a military nature, and he
acted solely in the highest interests of his people.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now I beg you to answer the following
questions:
I understand that you have submitted to the Tribunal a document, Number
311, written by yourself, which is an appreciation of Hitler entitled
the “Personality of the Führer.” You wrote that document not so very
long ago. I am not going to quote from it, since you doubtlessly
remember it, as you wrote it a very short time ago.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am not quite sure what document that is. May I
look at it?
GEN. RUDENKO: This document was submitted by you to your own defense
counsel, as Exhibit Number 311, and submitted to the Tribunal by your
attorney. On Page 5 there...
VON RIBBENTROP: Will you be kind enough to give a copy of this document?
GEN. RUDENKO: It is Document Number 311.
THE PRESIDENT: It cannot have been submitted to the Tribunal as 111,
without anything more. What is it, 111-PS or 111?
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is a document of the Defense submitted
as Ribbentrop-311. We have only a Russian translation here, which came
to us together with a German document book. I presume that the document
book has been submitted to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: It is R-111—it is Ribbentrop-111, you mean. It is not
111; it is Ribbentrop-111.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this is Document 311.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I’ve got it now. It is in Document Book Number 9.
GEN. RUDENKO: May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: On Page 5 of the document, your appreciation of Hitler,
you state, “After the victory over Poland and in the West, under an
influence which I mainly ascribe to Himmler, Hitler’s plans were
extended, that is, in the direction of establishing German hegemony in
Europe.” Do you remember the passage of the document you wrote yourself,
Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON RIBBENTROP: May I see this document? I do not know it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to ask counsel for Defendant
Ribbentrop to submit this document to his client.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are dealing here with...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is inclined to think that this document is quite
irrelevant. It is apparently a document prepared by the Defendant
Ribbentrop, upon the personality of the Führer. I do not know when it
was prepared, but it seems to us to be irrelevant.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I too am of the opinion that it is
irrelevant. I included this document only in case the defendant did not
have an opportunity to speak in greater detail of his relation to
Hitler. Since he has had that opportunity I should like to withdraw the
document.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal consider the document quite
irrelevant.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this document was presented by the defense
counsel in the Document Book. It was written by the Defendant Ribbentrop
in the course of this Trial. All the prosecutors considered it
admissible since this document, this appreciation, presented by the
Defendant Ribbentrop would justify us in asking a large number of
questions. But if the Tribunal considers that it really is quite
irrelevant to the case, I shall, of course, refrain from quoting it.
THE PRESIDENT: We have not yet had an opportunity of ruling on the
admissibility of these documents. It is the first time we have seen them
this morning. We all consider this document irrelevant.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I should like to put a few questions with
regard to German aggression against Yugoslavia. I should like you to
acquaint yourself with Document 1195-PS. This document is entitled
“Preliminary Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.” I invite your
attention to Paragraph 4 of the first section of the document. It
states: “The Führer has, in connection with the partition of
Yugoslavia...” Have you found the place?
VON RIBBENTROP: Can you tell me, please, on what page it is?
GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4: “In connection with the partition of
Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions...”
VON RIBBENTROP: I must have the wrong document.
GEN. RUDENKO; Document 1195-PS.
VON RIBBENTROP: Ah, yes. The beginning.
GEN. RUDENKO: I begin again:
“In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued
the following instructions:
“The transfer of territories occupied by the Italians is being
prepared for by a letter of the Führer to the Duce and will be
carried out by detailed directive of the Foreign Office.”
Have you found the place?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not see the place.
GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4, beginning with the words: “The
Führer...” Do you have it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have already read this paragraph into the record.
VON RIBBENTROP: It begins: “In connection with the partition of
Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions.” That is
how the document begins. May I ask—now what passage are you quoting?
GEN. RUDENKO: It ends with the following words: “...will be carried out
according to a detailed directive of the Foreign Office.” And then
reference is made to a teletype from the Quartermaster General of the
OKH.
VON RIBBENTROP: There must be some mistake. It is not mentioned here.
GEN. RUDENKO: Probably you did not find it in the document.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, it is 12:45 now. Perhaps this would be a
good time to adjourn.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, have you acquainted yourself with
the contents of the document?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have.
GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with the entire document or
with Paragraph 4 only?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have read Paragraph 1 of which you spoke previously.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you find the passage referring to the plenary powers
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the partition of the
territory of Yugoslavia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it says in my document that the surrender of the
territory occupied by the Italians is to be prepared by a letter from
the Führer to the Duce and put into effect on further instructions from
the Foreign Office.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct. That is precisely the passage which I had
in view, that is, Section 2 of this document, which is headed “The
Delimitation of the Frontiers.” It is stated there—Section 2, Page 2 of
the Document—it is stated:
“As far as the delimitation of the frontiers was not in the
foregoing Section I, this is done in agreement with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs....”
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see that.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have only one question to ask in this connection. May I
assume that this document defines the part played by the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs in the partition of Yugoslav territory? Is this correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: That appears from the fact that the Foreign Office was
to take part in fixing the other frontiers, in addition to those defined
here, the main lines of which were probably, already, fairly clear. That
is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is quite evident. I should like to put two more
questions to you concerning Yugoslavia.
On 4 June 1941—this no longer refers to the previous document—a
conference was held in the German Legation, presided over by the German
Minister in Zagreb, Siegfried Kasche, at which it was decided forcibly
to evacuate the Slovenes to Croatia and Serbia and the Serbs from
Croatia into Serbia. This decision results from a telegram from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Number 389, dated 31 May 1941. Do you know
about these measures?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I do not know them, but perhaps I
may read through them.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please do.
VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect that resettlement was undertaken there but I
do not know the details.
GEN. RUDENKO: It goes without saying that it must be very difficult for
you to remember all the details at the present time. But you do remember
that such deportations did actually take place and precisely in
accordance with the directives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. It states here that the Führer had approved a
resettlement program, but I do not know the details. At any rate, we
undoubtedly had something to do with it, for this meeting definitely
took place in the Foreign Office; that is certain. Unfortunately I
cannot add any details since I am not informed.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand you. There is one more question in this
connection. This was a compulsory resettlement of the population?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know; I cannot say. No.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know? All right. And now the last question in
connection with Yugoslavia: After Germany’s attack on Yugoslavia about
200 employees of the Yugoslav Foreign Office attempted to leave for
Switzerland. They were arrested; and then, in spite of protests
addressed to your Ministry, they were forcibly taken to Belgrade whence
many of them were sent to concentration camps and there died. Why did
you not take the measures which you were obliged to take after such a
glaring breach of diplomatic immunity?
VON RIBBENTROP: I must say that at the moment I cannot recollect it at
all; but, as far as I know, instructions have always followed the
principle that diplomats must be treated as diplomats and sent back to
their own countries. If it did not happen in this case, I do not know
why it was not done. However you yourself say that they were sent to
Belgrade. That, at any rate, is certainly in accordance with my
instructions. Why or whether they were later interned in Belgrade, I
must say I do not know. I do not think we had anything to do with that.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know that they were interned in concentration
camps?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Now for a further series of questions. Who,
beside Hitler, signed the decree regarding the Sudetenland of 21
November 1938? Can you remember?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know to which order you are referring. May I
look through it? I see that I am one of those who signed it. This is the
law regarding the reincorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich.
GEN. RUDENKO: You remember that you actually signed this decree?
VON RIBBENTROP: No doubt. If it says so here, then it must certainly
have been so. At the moment, of course, I do not remember it exactly.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is evident. Who, beside Hitler, signed the decree
regarding the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, of 16 March 1939,
which by its very nature destroyed any remaining vestige of the
sovereignty of the Czechoslovakian Republic?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that I was one of those who signed that one,
too. At least so I assume. Yes, I see that I signed it; here it is.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, surely all these documents speak for
themselves. The defendant has not challenged his signature upon these
documents.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I only want to remind the
defendant. Since he appears to forget I simply present the documents to
him.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You also signed the decree of 12 October
1939 regarding the occupation of the Polish territories. Do you remember
that?
VON RIBBENTROP: 12 October ’39? No, I do not remember it. I signed a
great many things during those years but I cannot remember them in
detail.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is the decree dated 12 October.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if he does not dispute his signature,
why should you waste time in putting these documents to him? His
signature is on the document. He does not dispute it. This is a mere
waste of time.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Mr. President. Then I have only one more question in
this connection.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Your signature also appears on the decree
of 18 May 1940, regarding the annexation by Germany of the Belgian
territories, Eupen and Malmédy.
I put these questions so that I may conclude with the following
question. Am I right in stating that each time the Hitler Government was
attempting to lend the appearance of legality to their territorial
annexation by a decree, this decree invariably bore the signature of the
Reich Minister Ribbentrop?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe not. If any territorial changes were
undertaken, it was the Führer who ordered them; and, as is probably
evident from these documents, the various ministers who were in any way
concerned then countersigned the Führer’s order or the laws decreed by
the Führer, and, of course, I probably countersigned most of these
orders myself.
GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now, I should like you to acquaint yourself
with the document already submitted in evidence to the Tribunal as
Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document Number USSR-120). It is your agreement
with Himmler for the organization of intelligence work. It is an
extensive document and I should like you to acquaint yourself with
Subparagraph 6 of this document.
VON RIBBENTROP: I beg your pardon. This is a different document. This
concerns the intelligence service. You spoke of slave labor, but this
concerns the intelligence service.
GEN. RUDENKO: This has been incorrectly translated to you. I was not
speaking about slave labor; I was speaking about intelligence work.
Please refer to Subparagraph 6 of this document. It is an extensive
document and the time of the Tribunal should not be taken up unduly. It
is stated here, and I quote:
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives every possible assistance
to the Secret intelligence service. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs, as far as this is compatible with the requirements of
foreign policy, will install certain members of the intelligence
service in the diplomatic missions.”