the beginning of 1944.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you recall whether Antonescu, at that
time, attended the discussion of the military situation, as guest?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am quite certain, because this was usually the case
when Antonescu came to see the Führer. The Führer always explained the
military situation to him, that is, he invited him to the so-called noon
discussion of the military situation. I do not recall exactly now, but
there can be no doubt that Marshal Antonescu attended the discussion of
the military situation in February.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Besides the military discussions were there
also political discussions with Antonescu?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, every visit with Marshal Antonescu began by the
Führer’s withdrawing either with the Marshal alone or sometimes also
with me, but mostly with the Marshal alone, because he was the chief of
state; a long detailed political discussion would ensue, to which I was
generally called in later.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz take part in these
political discussions?
VON RIBBENTROP: Certainly not, because the Führer seldom invited
military leaders to these political discussions with Marshal Antonescu.
Later however, he did occasionally, but I do not recall that Admiral
Dönitz took part in a discussion with Antonescu.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions.
DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Witness, the
Prosecution have submitted a document concerning a discussion between
you and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 March 1941. The
document carries the Document Number 1877-PS, and is Exhibit Number
USA-152. A part of this document was read into the record by the
Prosecution, and on Page 1007 of the German transcript (Volume III, Page
379) can be found among other things, the following passage which
concerns Grossadmiral Raeder:
“Next, the RAM (Foreign Minister) turned again to the Singapore
question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of
possible attacks by submarines based in the Philippines, and of
the intervention of the English Mediterranean and Home Fleets,
he had again discussed the situation with Grossadmiral Raeder.
The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year
would have its hands so full in English home waters and in the
Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single
ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral Raeder had described the
United States submarines as so poor that Japan need not bother
about them at all.”
Witness, as the Defendant Raeder clearly remembers, you, as Foreign
Minister, never spoke with him about strategic matters regarding Japan
or even about the worth or worthlessness of American submarines. I
should be obliged to you if you could clarify this point, whether there
might be some confusion as to the person involved in this discussion.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is altogether possible. I do not recall that I ever
spoke with Admiral Raeder about German-Japanese strategy. The fact was
that we had only very loose connections with Japan on these questions.
If at that time I said to Matsuoka what is written there, it is quite
possible that I quoted the Führer that he had said it to me. Naturally I
could not have said it on my own initiative, because I did not know
about it. I know that the Führer spoke to me frequently about such
points particularly with regard to Japan. It is possible therefore that
this did not originate with Admiral Raeder but the Führer. I do not know
who made this note. Is it a...
DR. SIEMERS: The document is entitled, “Notes on the conference between
the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister,
Matsuoka...”
VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that here. It is possible that the Führer
said that to me. In fact, I consider that probable. It is possible that
some mistake was made in the note; that I do not know.
DR. SIEMERS: Witness, did you inform the Defendant Raeder of such
political discussions as you had with Matsuoka or Oshima?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not the case.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you ever speak with Grossadmiral Raeder about other
political questions or have him present at political negotiations?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not our practice. Generally, the Führer
kept military and political matters strictly separate, so that I, as
Foreign Minister, never had an opportunity to discuss military or
strategic matters at my office; but when questions of foreign policy
were to be discussed, this took place at the Führer headquarters, but as
I have seen from documents which I read for the first time here, matters
were kept separate even there. In other words, if such discussions took
place at all, a fact which I cannot recall at the moment, it could have
been only at the Führer headquarters.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the State Secretary of the Foreign Office,
Steengracht, who was heard here as a witness, answered in the negative
my question as to whether the high military leaders were regularly
informed by him about current political matters. Now I ask whether you,
as Foreign Minister, informed high military leaders about political
matters?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must answer this question in the same way as I
answered the previous one. That was not our practice. All political and
military matters were dealt with exclusively by the Führer. The Führer
told me what I had to do in the diplomatic and political field, and he
told the military men what they had to do militarily. I was
occasionally, but very seldom, informed about military matters by the
Führer, and whatever the military men had to know about political
matters they never learned from me; but if they learned at all, it was
from the Führer.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, did you have an order or an
instruction according to which you were to inform the SA leaders of the
development and treatment of foreign political matters?
VON RIBBENTROP: The SA? No. There was no such order, and I had no such
instructions.
HERR BÖHM: Did the SA leadership have any influence on foreign policy at
all?
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
HERR BÖHM: And now I should like to ask a question for my colleague Dr.
Sauter who is ill: Were you in 1943 witness to a conversation between
Hitler and Himmler, in which the question was discussed as to whether
Von Schirach, who was then Reichsleiter, should be summoned before the
Volksgericht (People’s Court)?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
HERR BÖHM: What consequences would such a trial before the Volksgericht
have had for Schirach?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say exactly, of course. I do not know the
details of this matter. I only know that Himmler, in my presence, made
the suggestion to the Führer that Schirach should be brought and tried
before the Volksgericht for some reason or other. I do not know the
details. I was not interested in them. I said to the Führer that this,
in my opinion, would make a very bad impression from the point of view
of foreign policy and I know that Himmler received no answer from the
Führer; at any rate, he did not give the order. What consequences that
would have had I cannot say, but when such a suggestion came from
Himmler, the consequences were very serious.
HERR BÖHM: How is it that you were witness to this conversation and how
did you react to it?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was purely accidental; I have just stated that I told
the Führer as well as Himmler that it would make a very bad impression.
HERR BÖHM: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions on behalf of the
defendants’ counsel?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, when you began to advise Hitler on
matters of foreign policy in 1933, were you familiar with the League of
Nations declaration of 1927?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know which declaration you mean.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember the League of Nations
declaration of 1927?
VON RIBBENTROP: The League of Nations has made many declarations. Please
tell me which one you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It made a rather important one about aggressive
war in 1927, didn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know this declaration in detail, but it is
clear that the League of Nations, like everyone, was against an
aggressive war, and at that time Germany was a member of the League of
Nations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was a member, and the preamble of the
declaration was:
“Being convinced that a war of aggression would never serve as a
means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence
an international crime...”
Were you familiar with that when you...
VON RIBBENTROP: Not in detail, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was rather an important matter to be familiar
with if you were going to advise Hitler, who was then Chancellor, on
foreign policy, wasn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: This declaration was certainly important, and
corresponded exactly with my attitude at that time. But subsequent
events have proved that the League of Nations was not in a position to
save Germany from chaos.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold that as your own view?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold the expression of
opinion I have quoted to you from the preamble as your own view?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was as such my fundamental attitude, but on the
other hand I was of the opinion that Germany should be given help in
some way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I gathered. Now, apart from that, if you were
not familiar in detail with that resolution, were you familiar in detail
with the Kellogg-Briand Pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was familiar with it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with the view expressed in the
preamble and in the pact that there should be a renunciation of war as
an instrument of national policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell us how you carried that
out. Let’s take the first example. Are you telling this Tribunal that as
far as you know, no pressure or threats were made to Herr Von
Schuschnigg?
VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean in the discussions with Hitler at the
Obersalzberg?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, on the 12th of February.
VON RIBBENTROP: At this discussion...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, answer the question first, and then you
can give your explanation. Are you saying that no pressure or threats
were put to Herr Von Schuschnigg on the 12th of February? Answer that
“yes” or “no”, and we will go into the explanation later.
VON RIBBENTROP: Not exactly, no. I believe that the dominating
personality of the Führer and the arguments that he presented made such
an impression on Schuschnigg that he finally agreed to Hitler’s
proposals.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s just look into that.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I continue? I personally had a conversation at that
time with Herr Schuschnigg after his first talk with Adolf Hitler, in
which his reaction to the first conference became very clear to me. This
reaction was one of being deeply impressed by Hitler’s personality and
by the arguments which Hitler submitted to him. Schuschnigg told me in
this conversation, which was extremely cordial, that he too—and I
believe these were his words—regarded it as a historical mission to
bring the two peoples closer together.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were present at the Berghof—I don’t say in
the room, but in the building or about? Were there present Hitler,
yourself, the Defendant Von Papen, the Defendant Keitel, General
Sperrle, and General Von Reichenau?
VON RIBBENTROP: I think that is correct, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the morning of the 12th, I think that
Hitler and Von Schuschnigg were together for about 2 hours before lunch
in the morning, isn’t that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the time exactly. Anyway, they had a
long conversation, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, after lunch, Von Schuschnigg was
allowed to have a short conversation with his own Foreign Minister,
Guido Schmidt, isn’t that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know exactly, but it is possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, Von Schuschnigg and Guido
Schmidt were called before you and the Defendant Von Papen, isn’t that
right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. I do not think so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember that? Just think again.
VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean—then I believe I did not understand the
question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I will put it again. After a conversation
that Schuschnigg had with Guido Schmidt, he and Schmidt came before you
and the Defendant Von Papen and they had a conversation with you, which
I will put to you in a moment. Now, isn’t it right that you and Von
Papen saw Von Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not believe so. I do not believe that is true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember exhibiting to Von Schuschnigg
a typewritten draft containing the demands made on Von Schuschnigg? Now,
just think.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely possible. Hitler had dictated a
memorandum, and it is possible that I gave it to Schuschnigg. I am not
sure of the details now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the subject of that memorandum?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know; and in order to explain my ignorance
about the entire conference I would like to state that at this time I
was not at all informed about the Austrian problem because Hitler had
handled these matters personally and I had become Foreign Minister only
a few days before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you hand someone a memorandum, at an occasion
which you have described to him as a historic meeting, presumably you
can give the Tribunal at any rate an outline of what the memorandum
contained. What were the points in the memorandum?
VON RIBBENTROP: Curiously enough, I really do not remember that in
detail. This meeting was one between the Führer and Schuschnigg, and
everything that was done and agreed upon there was either dictated by
the Führer himself or was suggested to the Führer by someone else. I did
not know the details. I only knew that it was primarily a question of
bringing about better relations between Germany and Austria. Since many
National Socialists had been arrested in Austria the relations between
the two countries had been greatly troubled.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if I remind you, perhaps, it will bring it
back. Were not they the three points for the reorganization of the
Austrian Cabinet, including:
The appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the Ministry of
Security in the Interior; second, a general political amnesty of Nazis
convicted of crimes; and thirdly, a declaration of equal rights for
Austrian National Socialists and the taking of them into the Fatherland
Front?
Are these the points that you were putting to Von Schuschnigg?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember exactly now but that may be about
correct. At that time that corresponded with the vague notion and
knowledge I had about Austrian affairs.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you tell Von Schuschnigg that Hitler had
informed you that these demands which you were offering were the final
demands of the Führer and that Hitler was not prepared to discuss them?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that, but it is possible that I told Von
Schuschnigg something to that effect but at the moment I do not
remember.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say, “You must accept the whole of these
demands?”
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so, I did not say that. I exerted no
pressure whatsoever on Schuschnigg, for I still remember that this
conversation which lasted about an hour to an hour and a half was
confined to generalities and to personal matters and that I gained from
this conversation a very favorable impression of Schuschnigg’s
personality, which fact I even mentioned to my staff later on. I put no
pressure on Schuschnigg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us that before, and I am suggesting to
you that at this conversation you were trying to get Schuschnigg to sign
the document containing these terms which you agree that you may have
had. I want you to remember the answer and remind you of that.
Don’t you remember Herr Von Schuschnigg turning to the Defendant Von
Papen and saying, “Now, you told me that I would not be confronted with
any demands if I came to Berchtesgaden,” and Herr Von Papen apologizing
and saying, “That is so. I did not know you were going to be confronted
with these demands.”
Don’t you remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that. That cannot be quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will just see. Do you remember Von
Schuschnigg being called back to speak to Hitler again and Guido Schmidt
remaining with you to make some alterations in the document which you
were putting?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that changes were made; it is
conceivable, I do not remember the details, though.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you hear that in this second
conversation with Hitler, Hitler telling Schuschnigg that he must comply
with these demands within 3 days?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am hearing that for the first time today. I did
not know that. I was not present at the second conversation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just be a little careful before you say you have
heard that for the first time today, because in a moment I will show you
some documents. Are you sure you did not hear that Hitler told
Schuschnigg that he must comply within 3 days, or Hitler would order the
march into Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that to be out of the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If he had said that, you will agree that that
would be the heaviest military and political pressure? There could be no
other heavier pressure than suggesting a march into Austria, could
there?
VON RIBBENTROP: In view of the tense situation that existed between the
two countries at that time, that, of course, would have been a pressure.
But one thing must be taken for granted; and that is, that under no
circumstances would it have been possible in the long run to find any
solution between the two countries if there were no closer contact, and
from the beginning—I should like to state this here—it was always my
view that the two countries should form some sort of close alliance, and
I visualized a customs and currency union...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve given that view about three times. Let us
come back to this interview which I am putting back to you, that took
place on the 12th of February. Don’t you know that Schuschnigg said: “I
am only the Bundeskanzler. I have to refer to President Miklas, and I
can sign this protocol only subject to reference to President Miklas.”
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that any more in detail.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Hitler opening the door and
calling Keitel?
VON RIBBENTROP: No; I only learned here that this is supposed to have
happened. I have no knowledge whatsoever about that. I heard about it
here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know it is true, don’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know. I heard about it here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Keitel’s going in to speak to
Hitler?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I did not hear about that. I do
not know, I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Von Schuschnigg signed this
document on the condition that within 3 days these demands would be
fulfilled, otherwise Germany would march into Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it would be convenient if the witness
had the German Document Book in front of him. I tried to get most of the
pages agreeing.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps this would be a good time to break
off.
[_A recess was taken._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, will you look first at the Defendant
Jodl’s diary, the entry of the 13th of February, it is the Ribbentrop
Document Book, Page 9, Exhibit Number USA-72, Document Number 1780-PS.
The entry is as follows:
“In the afternoon General K.”—that is Keitel—“asks Admiral
C.”—that is Admiral Canaris—“and myself to come to his
apartment. He tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect
that military pressure by shamming military action should be
kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers
are drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone for
approval.”
You were suggesting on Friday that the Defendant Jodl had got hold of
some rumors or gossip that were going around the Berghof. That rumor or
gossip was a definite order from his superior officer, General Keitel,
wasn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I know absolutely nothing about any military measures,
therefore I cannot pass judgment on the value of this entry. The Führer
did not inform me about any military measures regarding Austria.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal you were there,
that you were taking part, handling the document, and that Hitler never
said a word to you about what he was arranging with the Defendant
Keitel, who was also there?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the next entry for the
14th of February:
“At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer arrives. Canaris
went to Munich to the Counterintelligence Office (Abwehrstelle
VII) and initiated the different measures. The effect was quick
and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is
undertaking serious military preparation.”
Are you telling this Tribunal that you know nothing about either these
military measures or the effect on Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about the military measures, but
I consider it quite possible that the Führer, in order to put more
stress on his wishes, caused something to be done in this field...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, just a moment!
VON RIBBENTROP: ...and that may have contributed in the end to the
solution of the problem.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I quite agree. That is just why I am
putting it to you that it did contribute. But surely you as Foreign
Minister of the Reich, with all the channels available to a foreign
minister, knew something about the effect in Austria, which General Jodl
was remarking, that “the effect was quick and strong.”—the impression
was “created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.”
Are you telling the Tribunal, on your oath, that you knew nothing about
the effect in Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to point out again that I did not know
anything about military measures and, if I had known, I would not have
the slightest reason not to say here that it was not so. It is a fact,
however, that in the days before and after the conversations between the
Führer and Schuschnigg, I was so busy taking over the Foreign Office
that I treated the Austrian problem, at that time, merely as a secondary
matter in foreign policy. I did not play a leading role in the handling
of the Austrian problem...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We know you said that before, that you were
engaged in the Foreign Office, and my question was perfectly clear—my
question was: Are you telling this Tribunal that you did not know
anything about the effect in Austria—you, as Foreign Minister of the
Reich? Now answer the question. Did you or did you not know of the
effect in Austria?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about that effect, and I did not
observe it in detail either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, that is your story and you want that to
be taken as a criterion, a touchstone of whether or not you are telling
the truth; that you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich, say that you knew
nothing about the effect in Austria of the measures taken by Keitel on
the Führer’s orders? Is that your final answer?
VON RIBBENTROP: To that I can tell you again quite precisely, I learned
from the Führer when I went to London a little later, and that is
absolutely the first thing I remember about the entire Austrian affair,
that matters in Austria were working out more or less as agreed upon in
the conversations in Berchtesgaden. I did not make any particular
observations in detail at that time, so far as I remember. It is
possible that this or that detail slipped my memory in the meantime, for
many years have passed since then.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next two entries in Jodl’s
diary:
“15 February. In the evening, an official announcement about the
positive results of the conference at Obersalzberg was issued.”
“16 February. Changes in the Austrian Government and the general
political amnesty.”
Do you remember my putting to you what Herr Von Schuschnigg signed, and
the condition was made that the matters would come into effect within 3
days; within 3 days there was a conference about the effects and the
changes were announced in Austria in accordance with the note that you
had put to Schuschnigg. You can see that that is clear, isn’t it—3
days—you still say...
VON RIBBENTROP: Of these 3 days, as I have told you already, I know
nothing; but it was a matter of course that this meeting would have some
results in the way of appeasing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You call it “appeasing”? Is that your considered
view to the Tribunal, that assuming that the Defendant Jodl is telling
the truth or assuming that the Defendant Keitel said that to him, as
General Jodl was saying, that these military preparations should be put
in hand, isn’t that the most severe political and military pressure that
could be put on the chancellor of another state?
VON RIBBENTROP: If one considers the problem from a higher viewpoint,
no; I have a different opinion. Here was a problem which might possibly
have led to war, to a European war; and I believe, and I also said that
later to Lord Halifax in London, that it was better to solve this
problem than to allow it to become a permanent sore spot on the body of
Europe.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to put words in your mouth. Do you
mean by the last answer, that it was better that political and military
pressure should be put on Schuschnigg, so long as the problem was
solved? Is that your view?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not get that question. May I ask you to repeat it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question was: Is it your view that it was
better that political and military pressure should be put on Herr Von
Schuschnigg if by that means the problem was solved?
VON RIBBENTROP: If by that means, a worse complication, that is to say a
war was actually avoided, I consider that was the better way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just tell me, why did you and your friends keep
Schuschnigg in prison for 7 years?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, at any rate, I believe Schuschnigg—I do
not know the details—must at that time have done something which was
against the State or the interests of the State. But if you say
“prison”, I know only from my own recollection that the Führer said and
emphasized several times that Schuschnigg should be treated particularly
well and decently and that he was not in a prison but lodged in a house
and also, I believe, that his wife was with him. I cannot, however, say
more on the subject from my own experience and from my own observation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean “prison.” I will substitute for it
“Buchenwald” and “Dachau”. He was at both Buchenwald and Dachau. Do you
think he was enjoying himself there?
VON RIBBENTROP: I only heard here that Herr Schuschnigg was in a
concentration camp; I did not know before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just make a change, just try to answer my
question. Why did you and your friends keep Schuschnigg in prison for 7
years?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything on that point. I can only say and
repeat, that, according to what I heard at that time, he was not in
prison but confined in a villa and had all the comforts possible. That
is what I heard to that time and I was glad about it because, as I have
said already, I liked him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is one thing he did not have, Witness, he
did not have the opportunity of giving his account as to what had
happened at Berchtesgaden or of his side of the Anschluss to anyone for
these 7 years, did he? That is quite obvious with all you say, that he
was very comfortable at Buchenwald and Dachau, wherever he was, but
comfortable or not, he didn’t get the chance of putting his side of the
happenings to the world, did he?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I could not judge.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You couldn’t judge? You know perfectly well,
don’t you, that Herr Von Schuschnigg was not allowed to publish his
account of anything while he was under restraint for these 7 years?
Don’t you know that quite well?
VON RIBBENTROP: That may be assumed...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now...
VON RIBBENTROP: It may have been in the interests of the State, however.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is your view of it. We will pass to
another subject.
I am going to ask you a few questions now about your share in the
dealing with Czechoslovakia. Will you agree with me, that in March of
1938, the Foreign Office, that is, you, through your ambassador in
Prague, took over control of the activities of the Sudeten Deutsche
Party under Konrad Henlein?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am sorry but that is not correct. May I explain...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Before you explain, I think you might save time
if you look at the document book on Page 20 in your book, it is Page 31
in the English book, and listen while I refer you to a letter from your
ambassador.
VON RIBBENTROP: Which number, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 20. It is a letter from your ambassador in
Prague to the Foreign Office.
If I may explain to the Tribunal, it is not the defendant’s document
book, it is the Prosecution’s book. I will see, hereafter, that it is
correct.
[_Turning to the defendant_]: Now, this letter from your ambassador to
the Foreign Office...
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know about that letter. May I...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me refer you to Paragraph 1. I refer
you also to Paragraph 3, so you need not be worried that I shall miss
it.
Paragraph 1:
“The line of German Foreign policy, as transmitted by the German
Legation, is exclusively decisive for the policy and tactics of
the Sudeten German Party. My”—that is, your
ambassador—“directives are to be complied with implicitly.”
Paragraph 2:
“Public speeches and the press will be co-ordinated uniformly
with my approval. The editorial staff of _Zeit_ is to be
improved.”
Paragraph 3:
“Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which,
in the end, might lead to political complications, and adopts
the line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. The
objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and
to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action.” (Document Number
3060-PS)
Having read that, don’t you agree with me—what I put to you a moment
ago—that the activities of the Sudeten German Party were to take place
according to the directives?
VON RIBBENTROP: May I state an opinion on that now?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like the answer to that question first,
and I am sure the Tribunal will let you make an explanation. It is
perfectly easy to answer that question “yes” or “no”. Isn’t it right
that that letter shows that the Sudeten German Party was acting under
your directives; isn’t that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to explain. This letter in itself is a
crowning proof of the fact that things were quite to the contrary.
Between the Sudeten German Party and many agencies in the Reich,
connections had been established; this was quite natural, because there
was a very strong movement among the Sudeten Germans which was striving
for closer connection with the Reich, especially after Adolf Hitler had
come to power. These tendencies were beginning to impair the relations
between Germany and Czechoslovakia and this very letter bears proof of
the fact that I attempted gradually to put these uncontrolled
connections, which existed between the Sudeten Germans and the Reich, in
some way under control.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I am asking you, Witness. What
I put to you, and I put it to you three times, I think, quite clearly:
Does this letter show that that Party, the Sudeten German Party, was
from that time acting under your directions? Are you still denying that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I deny that emphatically. The case is just the
opposite. This letter indicates an attempt to direct the German-Czech
relations, which had become very difficult due to the natural desire of
the Sudeten Germans to establish closer relations with the German
people, into right and sensible channels, which however, shortly after
this letter, unfortunately failed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you deny what I have put to you, what is
meant when your ambassador writes to the Foreign Office and says that
the line of German policy, as transmitted by the German Legation, is
exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party?
What does that mean if it doesn’t mean what you have said—that the
Party was acting under your direction? What else can it mean if it
doesn’t mean that?
VON RIBBENTROP: It means exactly what I have said, that the legation
should try to induce the leadership of the Sudeten Germans to adopt a
sensible program, so that the illegal tendencies which were existent
should not lead to difficulties in German-Czech relations. That was at
that time the purport of the conversation with the legation in Prague
and that is quite clearly expressed by this letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us see what this sensible program which you
were suggesting was. The next day, on the 17th of March, Konrad Henlein
writes to you and suggests a personal talk; and if you will turn over to
Page 26 of the German document book—Page 33 of the English—you will
find the note of the personal talk which you had at the Foreign Office
on the 29th of March with Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, and two other
gentlemen whose names are not so well known. (Document Number 2788-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-95) I only want you to look at four sentences in
that, after the first one: “The Reichsminister started out by
emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference, which had been
scheduled, strictly a secret.”
And then you refer to the meeting that the Führer had had with Konrad
Henlein the afternoon before. I just want you to have that in mind.
Now, if you will look down the page, after the “1” and “2”, there is a
paragraph which begins “The Foreign Minister”, and the second sentence
is:
“It is essential to propose a maximum program which as its final
aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It appears
dangerous to be satisfied prematurely with promises of the
Czechoslovakian Government, which, on the one hand, would give
the impression abroad that a solution has been found and, on the
other hand, would only partially satisfy the Sudeten Germans.”
Then, if you will look one sentence further on, after some
uncomplimentary remarks about Beneš, it says:
“The aim of the negotiations to be carried on by the Sudeten
German Party with the Czechoslovakian Government would finally
be to avoid entry into the government”—observe the next
words—“by the extension and gradual specification of the
demands to be made.”
And then you make the position of the Reich Cabinet clear:
“The Reich Cabinet”—the next sentence but one—“itself must
refuse to appear towards the government in Prague or towards
London and Paris as the advocate”—note the next words—“or
peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands.”
The policy which I suggest to you was now to direct the activities of
the Sudeten Germans. They were to avoid agreement with the Czechoslovak
Government, avoid participation in the Czechoslovak Government, and the
Reich Cabinet in its turn would avoid acting as mediator in the matter;
in other words, Witness, that you, through your influence on the Sudeten
Germans, were taking every step and doing your utmost to see that no
agreement could be reached on the difficulties or the minority problem.
Isn’t that right? Isn’t that what you were telling them at that
interview?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Give your explanation. What would you say these
words meant?
VON RIBBENTROP: I summoned Konrad Henlein at that time, and believe it
was the only time, or perhaps I saw him once more; unfortunately, only
once or twice, in order to enjoin him, too, to work for a peaceful
development of the Sudeten German problem. The demands of the Sudeten
Germans were already far-reaching at that time. They wanted to return to
the Reich. That was more or less tacit or was expressed. It seemed to me
a solution which was dangerous and which had to be stopped in some way
or another because otherwise it might lead to a war. Henlein finally
came to see me then, but I wish to point out in advance that it was the
only time, I believe, that I discussed the matter thoroughly with
Henlein, and soon afterwards I lost control of the matter. The entire
Sudeten German problem, that is, what is contained in this letter and
about which there can be no doubt, is:
Firstly, that I wanted to bring the efforts of the Sudeten Germans to a
peaceful development so that we could support it diplomatically also,
which seemed to me absolutely justified.
And secondly, that in this way we should avoid the sudden development of
a situation which, by acts of terror or other wild incidents, would lead
to a German-Czech and European crisis.
Those were at that time the reasons why I summoned Henlein.
Now, as to the various sentences which the Prosecutor has read, it is
clear that the Sudeten German Party had at that time very far-reaching
demands. Naturally, they wanted Adolf Hitler to send an ultimatum to
Prague saying “You must do that, and that is final,” and that is what
they would have preferred.
We did not want that, of course. We wanted a quiet, peaceful development
and solution of these things. Therefore, I discussed with Henlein at
that time the way in which the Sudeten German Party was to proceed in
order to put through their demands gradually. The demands which I had in
mind at that time were demands for a far-reaching cultural autonomy, and
possibly autonomy in other fields too.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you were thinking of cultural and social
autonomy, why were you telling these gentlemen not to come to an
agreement with the Prague Government?
VON RIBBENTROP: I could not specify that now. That may have been for
tactical considerations. I assume that Konrad Henlein made such a
suggestion and that I agreed with it. Naturally I did not know the
problem too well in detail and this note must be—I presume that what
happened was that Henlein himself merely explained his program—the
details are not contained here—and that I agreed to it more or less.
Therefore, I assume that at that time it seemed perhaps advisable to
Henlein for tactical reasons not to enter into the government and assume
responsibilities at that moment, but rather to try first to proceed with
the matter in a different way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the 29th of March, and you have told
the Tribunal a moment ago about your anxiety for peace. You very soon
knew that there wasn’t going to be any question of relying on peaceful
measures, didn’t you? Can you remember? Just try and apply yourself to
it, because you have obviously been applying your mind to this. Can you
remember when Hitler disclosed to you that he was making the military
preparations for occupying Czechoslovakia that autumn?
VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler spoke very little to me about military
matters. I do not remember such a disclosure, but I know of course that
the Führer was determined to solve this problem at a fixed time; and
according to the experiences which Germany had had in past years, it was
for him a matter of course that to do this he was obliged, I might say,
to take some sort of military measures in order to put more pressure on
his demands.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me help you about that. Turn on to Page 31
of your document book. It is Page 37 of the English Document Book.
(Document Number 2360-PS, Exhibit GB-134)
VON RIBBENTROP: Page 31?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 31 of your document book, yes. It is a
quotation from Hitler’s speech in January 1939, but it happens to make
clear this point. You see he says—have you got it, Witness?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “On the basis of this unbearable provocation,
which was still further emphasized by truly infamous persecution and
terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve the
Sudeten German question in a final and radical manner. On 28 May I gave:
“1. The order for the preparation of military steps against this
State”—that is Czechoslovakia—“to be completed by 2 October.
“2. I ordered the intensive and speedy completion of our line of
fortifications in the West.” (Document Number 2360-PS)
I want to remind you of that, because there was a meeting on the 28th of
May, and that is Hitler’s own account of it. Put in another way, he
said, “It is my absolute will that Czechoslovakia should disappear from
the map.” And then he made clear the other thing about the defensive
front in the West.
Now, do you remember that meeting, the 28th of May?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have here, I believe, seen the document about it. I do
not recall the meeting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if—I think Captain Fritz Wiedemann was
still adjutant of the Führer at that time; it was before he went
abroad—he says you were there, would you deny it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that, but I believe that is an error by Herr
Wiedemann.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you think you weren’t there?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am inclined to believe that it is an error. At any
rate I do not remember that meeting. I could not say for sure. Generally
I was not drawn into military affairs, but in this case I cannot say for
sure. But I knew that it was common talk that the Führer, in the course
of the year 1938, became more and more determined to assure the rights,
as he put it, of the Sudeten Germans; I knew that he had made certain
military preparations for that purpose, but I did not know in what form
and to what extent.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just to put your point of view fairly—I don’t
want to put anything more into it—you knew that military preparations
were being made, but you did not know the details of what we know now as
“Fall Grün.”
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know any details; I never heard about
them, but I knew that during the last weeks and months of the crisis...
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I object to this question. I believe I may, in
order to save time, just point out that the entire Sudeten German policy
was sanctioned by the four great powers, England, France, Italy, and
Germany, and by the Munich Agreement which determined this policy.
Therefore, I do not see that in this respect there can be a violation of
International Law.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is perfectly proper.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, at the time you knew enough to discuss the
possible course of the possible war with the foreign personalities.
Would you look on to Page 34, that is Page 40 of the English book. These
are the notes of a discussion with the Italian Ambassador. I do not know
which of your officials it took place with, but I want you to look at
where it says in a handwritten note “only for the Reichsminister.”
“Attolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed
unmistakably to the Italians our intentions against the Czechs.
Also, as to the date he had information so far that he might go
on leave for perhaps 2 months, but certainly not later than...”
(Document Number 2800-PS)
If you look at the date you will see it is the 18th of July, and 2
months from the 18th of July would be the 18th of September. Then if you
will look, a month later there is a note, I think signed by yourself, on
the 27th of August:
“Attolico paid me a visit. He had received another written
instruction from Mussolini, asking that Germany communicate in
time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia.
Mussolini asked for such notification, as Attolico assured me,
in order: ‘to be able to take in due time the necessary measures
on the French frontier.’
“Note: I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former
_démarche_, that I could not give him any date, that, however,
in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of
any decision.” (Document Number 2792-PS)
So that it is quite clear, isn’t it, that you knew that the general
German preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia were under way but
the date had not been fixed beyond the general directive of Hitler, that
it was to be ready by the beginning of October. That was the position in
July and August, wasn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: In August, 27 August, there was, of course, already a
sort of crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia about that problem;
and it is quite clear that during that time there was some alarm as to
the final outcome. And apparently, according to this document, I said to
the Italian Ambassador that in case crisis developed into a military
action, Mussolini would, of course, be notified in advance.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And Mussolini would be ready to make a
demonstration on the French frontier in order to help forward your
military plans; is that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is in this document, but I do not know anything
about it. Perhaps Attolico said that; if it says so here he must have
said it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over to about the same time,
Pages 36 to 38, Pages 41 to 43 of the English book. I do not want to
take up time in reading it all, but that is the account of the meeting
which you had with the Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya. And I
should be very glad if, in the interest of time, you would try to answer
the general question.
Weren’t you trying in your discussions with Imredy and Kanya to get the
Hungarians to be prepared to attack Czechoslovakia, should war
eventuate?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am not very familiar with the contents of this
document. May I read it first, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just read to you...
VON RIBBENTROP: I may perhaps be able to answer it from recollection. I
do not know exactly what the document says, but my recollection is, that
at that time a crisis was impending. It is quite natural, if an armed
conflict about the Sudeten German problem was within the realm of
possibility, that Germany should then establish some sort of contact
with neighboring states. That is a matter of course, but I believe...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you went a little beyond contacting them,
didn’t you? The document says at the end of the sixth paragraph, “Von
Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good
opportunity and participate.” (Document Number 2796-PS)
That is a bit beyond contacting people. What you are saying to the
Hungarians is: “If you want the revision of your boundaries, you have to
come into the war with us.” It is quite clear, isn’t it, Witness, that
is what you were saying, that is what you were trying to do?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is exactly in line with what I just said. I do not
know if that expression was used, but, at any rate, it is clear that at
that time, I remember, I told these gentlemen that the possibility of a
conflict was present and that in such a case it would be advisable if we
reached an agreement regarding our interests. I would like to mention
that Hungary, during all the preceding years, considered it one of the
hardest conditions of the peace treaty that these territories in the
north had been separated from her and naturally she was very much
interested in the agreement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were very much interested in offering them
revision. Just look at the last two paragraphs. It is headed “The 25th.”
It should be Page 38 of your document book. It begins—the very end of
this statement:
“Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness for participation in
case of a German-Czech conflict, Von Kanya mentioned several
days ago that his country would need a period of one or two
years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of
Hungary. During today’s conversation, Von Kanya corrected this
remark and said that Hungary’s military situation was much
better; his country would be ready, as far as armaments were
concerned, to take part in the conflict by 1 October of this
year.” (Document Number 2797-PS)
You see that? What I am putting to you, Witness, is this: That your
position was perfectly clear. First of all, you get the Sudeten Germans
under your control. Then you learned from Hitler that there were
military preparations. Then you get the Italians in line. Then you get
the Hungarians in line. You are getting everyone ready for aggression
against Czechoslovakia. That is what I am putting to you. I want you to
be quite clear about it, to be under no misapprehension. Now, look,
what...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I answer to that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, if you like.
VON RIBBENTROP: I said once before that the Sudeten German Party was
unfortunately not under my control. Moreover, it is and was my view that
it was the fundamental right of the Sudeten Germans, according to the
law of the sovereign rights of peoples which had been proclaimed in
1919, to decide themselves where they wanted to belong.
When Adolf Hitler came, this pressure to join the Reich became very
strong. Adolf Hitler was determined to solve this problem, either by
diplomatic means or, if it had to be, by other means. That was obvious,
and became more so to me. At any rate, I personally did everything to
try to solve the problem diplomatically. On the other hand, however, in
order to bring about a situation such as eventually led to Munich, I
naturally tried my utmost to surround Germany with friends in order to
make our position as strong as possible in the face of such a problem.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew perfectly well, did you not, that the
Fall Grün and Hitler’s military plans envisaged the conquest of the
whole of Czechoslovakia? You knew that, didn’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. As far as the Sudeten-German
problem is concerned, the British Government themselves concluded the
agreement at Munich by which the entire problem was solved in the way I
always strove to achieve it by German diplomacy.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I am not going to argue politics with
you on any point. I only remind you of this: That the Fall Grün and
Hitler’s plans on this matter had been known to His Majesty’s Government
only since the end of the war, when it came into our possession as a
captured document. What I asked you was—you say that as the Foreign
Minister of the Reich, you did not know of these military plans, that
the conquest of the whole Czechoslovakia was envisaged? You say that?
You want the Tribunal to believe that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I repeat again that I read about Fall Grün and the
conception of Fall Grün here for the first time in the documents. I did
not know that term before, nor was I interested. That the Führer
envisaged a more far-reaching solution became, of course, clear to me
later in the course of the subsequent developments and by the
establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment. We will get to that in a moment.
I just want you to look at the final act of preparation which you were
doing, and I am suggesting for this clear aggression; if you will look
at Page 45 in the book in front of you, you will see a note from the
Foreign Office to the Embassy in Prague.
“Please inform Deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get
into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start
their demands for autonomy tomorrow.” (Document Number 2858-PS)
That was your office’s further act, wasn’t it, in order to make things
difficult for the Government in Prague? You were getting your friends to
induce—to use your own word—the Slovaks to start an advance for
autonomy, is that right? Is that what your office was doing?
VON RIBBENTROP: This is, beyond doubt, a telegram from the Foreign
Office. I do no longer recall the details, but according to the
contents, Henlein apparently approached us to send a telegram because
Henlein was apparently of the opinion, at that time, that he should put
the demands for autonomy to the Prague Government. How that came about,
I could not say in detail today. I would like to emphasize again that
Conrad Henlein’s activity—I say, unfortunately, and I said so
before—was far beyond my control. I saw Henlein only once or twice
during that entire time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take you through all the
details. You understand what I’m suggesting to you, that your office was
now taking one of its last steps, because this was in the middle of the
crisis, on the 19th of September, trying to weaken the Czech Government
by inducing demands of autonomy from the Slovaks. You said that you were
only passing on Henlein’s wishes. If you like to leave it at that, I
shall not trouble you further. Besides, you suggested—I come on to what
took place in the spring and ask you one or two questions about that. In
the spring Hitler was out and you acquiesced in his wishes, without—I
was going to say swallowing, but I want to choose my language
carefully—to obtain the adherence of Bohemia and Moravia to the Reich
and to make Slovakia separate from Bohemia and Moravia. Now, just look
on to Page 65 of the book in front of you. That is a telegram in secret
code from the Foreign Office, from yourself in fact; to the Embassy in
Prague.
“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today,
in case you should get any written communications from President
Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take
any other action but pass them on here by ciphered telegrams.
Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the legation
to make a point of not being available during the next few days
if the Czech Government wants to communicate with you.”
(Document Number 2815-PS)
Why were you so anxious that your ambassador should not carry out these
ordinary functions and form a channel of communication with the Czech
Government?
VON RIBBENTROP: That happened as follows. I remember very well. That had
the following reasons: The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia,
Chvalkovsky, on one of these days, it must have been the same day,
approached the envoy in Prague, saying that President Hacha wished to
speak to the Führer. I had reported that to the Führer, and the Führer
had agreed to receive the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister or the
Czechoslovakian President. The Führer said, at the same time, that he
wished to conduct these negotiations himself and that he did not wish
anybody else, even the legation, to interfere in any way. That,
according to my recollection, was the reason for this telegram. No one
was to undertake anything in Prague; whatever was done would be done by
the Führer personally.
I wish to point out that also at that time signs of an impending crisis
between Prague and ourselves became apparent. The visit of President
Hacha or his desire to see the Führer can be explained as being the
result of this situation in general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like to remind you what you
and the Führer were doing on that day. You will find that if you look at
Page 66, which is 71 of the English book. You were having a conference,
you and the Führer, with Meissner and the Defendant Keitel and Dietrich
and Keppler; and you were having the conference with the Slovaks, with
M. Tiso. Do you remember that conference?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember that conference very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I will ask you a general question
and perhaps without putting the details to you. What Hitler and you were
doing at that conference was saying this to the Slovaks: “If you do not
declare your independence of Prague, we shall leave you to the tender
mercies of Hungary.” Isn’t that in a sentence a fair summary of what
Hitler and you were saying at that conference?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct to a certain degree. But I would like to
add a further statement to that. The situation at the time was as
follows, and one has to look at it from a political point of view: The
Hungarians were highly dissatisfied and they wanted to regain the
territories which they had lost by the peace treaty and today form a
part of Czechoslovakia, that is the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. There
were, therefore, constantly great differences between Pressburg
(Bratislava) and Budapest and, chiefly, also between Prague and
Budapest. The outbreak of an armed conflict could be expected at any
time; at least half a dozen times we were given to understand by the
Hungarian Government that this could not go on forever; that they must
have their revision in one way or the other. The situation was such that
for quite some time very strong movements for independence existed among
the Slovaks. We were approached on this matter quite frequently, at
first by Tuka and later by Tiso. In this conference described here, the
situation was that the Führer, who knew for weeks of the endeavors of
the Slovaks to become independent, finally received Tiso, later
President of the State, and told him that now, of course—I believe he
told him during this conversation—that he was not interested in the
question for its own sake. But if anything should happen at all, then
the Slovaks must proclaim their independence as quickly as possible.
There is no doubt that at the time we expected an action by Hungary. It
is, however, correct...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can see how very anxious the Slovaks seemed
to be for independence and what action Hitler and yourself were taking
to secure it; if you try to find it, it will probably be at Page 67; it
is at the end of a paragraph beginning, “Now he has permitted Minister
Tiso to come here...”
And just below the middle of that paragraph, Hitler is reported as
saying that he would not tolerate that internal instability and he had
for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It
was not a question of days but of hours. He stated at that time that, if
Slovakia wished to make herself independent, he would support this
endeavor and even guarantee it; he would stand by his words so long as
Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she
hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he
would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of the events for which
he was no longer responsible.
Then in the next paragraph he asks you if you had anything to say and
you are reported as saying (Document Number 2802-PS, Exhibit USA-117):
“The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the
view that in this case a decision was a question of hours and
not of days. He showed Hitler a message he had just received
which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontier.
The Führer read this report and mentioned it to Tiso and
expressed his hope that Slovakia would soon come to a clear
decision.”
Are you denying, Witness, that Hitler and you were putting the strongest
possible pressure you could on the Slovaks to dissolve connections with
Prague and so leave the Czechs standing alone to meet your pressure on
Hacha which was coming in a couple of days?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. Very strong pressure was not
used. There is no doubt that on the part of Hungary—and my remark
refers to the possibility of warlike developments with the
Hungarians—but wishes for independence had for a long time been
conveyed to us again and again by the Slovaks. It is possible that, at
the time, as the document shows, Tiso was hesitating, because after all
it was an important step. But in view of the wish of the Führer, which
must have been obvious by then, to solve the question of Bohemia and
Moravia in one way or another, it was in the interest of the Führer to
do his part to bring about the independence of Slovakia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: One point. This is my last question before I
come to the interview with President Hacha. Don’t you remember that 2
days before Herr Bürckel—that is in my recollection—Herr Bürckel and
another Austrian National Socialist, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart and a
number of German officers, at about 10 in the evening of Saturday, the
11th of March, went into a Cabinet meeting at Bratislava and told the
_soi-disant_ Slovak Government that they should proclaim the
independence of Slovakia? Don’t you know that? It was reported by our
consul.
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall it in detail, but I believe that
something of the kind took place but I do not know exactly what it was.
I believe that it was directed by the Führer. I had, I believe, less to
do with that. I no longer recall that exactly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal very shortly...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it is a quarter to 1 now. We had better
adjourn until 2.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, you were present at the interview
between President Hacha and Hitler on 15 March 1939, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler’s saying at that
interview that he had given the order for German troops to march into
Czechoslovakia, and that at 6 o’clock in the morning the German Army
would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact words, but I know that Hitler
told Hacha that he would occupy the countries of Bohemia and Moravia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember his saying what I put to you,
that he had given the order for German troops to march into
Czechoslovakia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is what I just said.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the Defendant Göring, as he told
the Tribunal, telling President Hacha that he would order the German Air
Forces to bomb Prague?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that in detail, because at
that discussion I was not...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you for a detailed statement; I
am asking you if you remember what I should suppose was a rather
remarkable statement, that the Defendant Göring said to President Hacha
that he would order the German Air Force to bomb Prague if Czech
resistance was not called off. Do you remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that; I was not present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there during the whole interview, were
you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not. If the British Prosecutor will give me a
chance I shall explain how it was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question at the moment.
You say you do not remember that. At any rate, if the Defendant Göring
said that he said it, would you accept that it happened?
VON RIBBENTROP: If Göring says so, then it must, of course, be true. I
have merely stated that I was not present during that conference between
President Hacha and the then Reich Marshal Göring.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that within 2 days
the Czech Army would not exist any more?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that in detail, no; it was a very long
conference.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that at 6 o’clock
the troops would march in? He was almost ashamed to say that there was
one German division to each Czech battalion.
VON RIBBENTROP: It is possible that something like that was said.
However, I do not remember the details.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If these things were said, will you agree with
me that the most intolerable pressure was put on President Hacha?
VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly Hitler used very clear language. However, to
that I must add that President Hacha, on his part, had come to Berlin in
order to find a solution, together with Hitler. He was surprised that
troops were to march into Czechoslovakia. That I know, and I remember it
exactly. But he agreed to it eventually and then contacted his
government and his chief of staff, so that there would be no hostile
reception for the German troops. He then concluded with Hitler, with the
Czech Foreign Minister and me, the agreement which I had drafted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree with me that that agreement was
obtained through a threat of aggressive action by the German Army and
Air Force?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain, since the Führer told President Hacha
that the German Army would march in, that naturally, this instrument was
written under that impression. That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think you could answer one of my
question directly? I will ask it again. Will you agree with me that that
document was obtained by the most intolerable pressure and threat of
aggression? That is a simple question. Do you agree?
VON RIBBENTROP: In that way, no.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What further pressure could you put on the head
of a country except to threaten him that your army would march in, in
overwhelming strength, and your Air Force would bomb his capital?
VON RIBBENTROP: War, for instance.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is that but war? Do you not consider it war
that the Army would march in with a proportion of a division over a
battalion, and that the Air Force would bomb Prague?
VON RIBBENTROP: President Hacha had told the Führer that he would place
the fate of his country in the Führer’s hands, and the Führer had...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question. My question is
a perfectly simple one, and I want your answer to it. You have told us
that that agreement was obtained after these threats were made.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what you said a moment ago.
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you that that agreement was obtained by
threat of war. Is that not so?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that this threat is incomparably lighter than
the threats under which Germany stood for years through the Versailles
Treaty and its sanctions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, leaving whatever it is comparatively, will
you now answer my question? Do you agree that that agreement was
obtained by threat of war?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was obtained under a pressure, that is under the
pressure of the march into Prague; there is no doubt about that.
However, the decisive point of the whole matter was that the Führer
explained to President Hacha the reasons why he had to do this, and
eventually Hacha agreed fully, after he had consulted his government and
his general staff and heard their opinion. However, it is absolutely
correct that the Führer was resolved to solve this question under any
circumstances. The reason was, that the Führer was of the opinion that
in the remainder of Czechoslovakia there was a conspiracy against the
German Reich; Reich Marshal Göring had already stated that Russian
commissions were said to have been at Czech airdromes. Consequently the
Führer acted as he did because he believed that it was necessary in the
highest interest and for the protection of the German Reich. I might
draw a comparison: For instance, President Roosevelt declared an
interest in the Western Hemisphere; England has extended her interest
over the entire globe. I think, that the interest which the Führer
showed in the remainder of Czechoslovakia was, as such, not unreasonable
for a great power; about the methods one may think as one pleases. At
any rate one thing is certain, and that is that these countries were
occupied without a single drop of blood being shed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were occupied without a single drop of
blood being shed because you had threatened to march in overwhelming
strength and to bomb Prague if they didn’t agree, isn’t that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, not because we had threatened with superiority, but
because we had agreed beforehand that the Germans could march in
unimpeded.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you again, that the agreement was
obtained, however, by your threatening to march in and threatening to
bomb Prague, was it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already told you once that it was not so, but
that the Führer had talked to President Hacha about it and told him that
he would march in. The conversation between President Hacha and Göring
is not known to me. President Hacha signed the agreement after he had
consulted his government and his general staff in Prague by telephone.
There is no doubt that the personality of the Führer, his reasoning, and
finally the announced entry of the German troops induced President Hacha
to sign the agreement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember—would you mind standing up,
General, for a second? [_A Czechoslovakian Army officer arose._] Don’t
you remember that General Ecer asked you some questions once, this
general from Czechoslovakia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say to him that you thought that this
action on the 15th of March was contrary to the declaration of Hitler
given to Chamberlain but, in fact, that Hitler saw in the occupation a
vital necessity for Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I was wrong in the first point; I
will admit that openly; I remembered it afterward. In the Munich
Agreement between Hitler and Chamberlain nothing like that is contained.
It was not intended as a violation of that agreement. In the second
place, I think I stated that Hitler believed he had to act that way in
the interest of his country.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to tell us one or two
general things about your views with regard to Great Britain. Is it
correct that when you went to London as Ambassador of the Reich you
thought there was very little chance of an agreement, in fact that it
was a hundred-to-one chance of getting an understanding with Great
Britain?
VON RIBBENTROP: When I asked the Führer to send me to London
personally...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Here is a simple question I am asking you: Is it
right that when you went to London as Ambassador you thought there was
very little chance of an understanding with England, in fact, that the
chance was a hundred-to-one?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the chances were not good.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These, as you know, are your own words...
VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to add something.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: First answer my question. These are your own
words, aren’t they, that the chance was a hundred-to-one? Do you
remember saying that?
VON RIBBENTROP: A hundred-to-one? I do not remember that, but I want to
add something. I told Hitler that the chance was very small; and I also
told him that I would try everything to bring about an Anglo-German
understanding in spite of the odds.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England did you believe that
war was inevitable? When you left England, when you ceased being
ambassador, did you believe that war was unavoidable?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not of the opinion that it was inevitable, but
that, considering the developments which were taking place in England, a
possibility of war existed, of that I was convinced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to be careful about this. Did you say
that you didn’t think war was unavoidable when you left England?
VON RIBBENTROP: I can neither say that it was unavoidable nor that it
was avoidable; at any rate, it was clear to me that with the development
of the policy towards Germany which was taking place in England, an
armed conflict might lie in the realm of possibility.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at page 211-E of the document book;
English book, 170.
VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 211?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now will you look at the second paragraph? It
reads like this:
“He, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister), had been more than
skeptical even on his arrival in London and had considered the
chances for an understanding as a hundred-to-one. The
warmongers’ clique in England had won the upper hand. When he
(the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable.” (Document Number
1834-PS)
Is that what you said to Ambassador Oshima?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I said exactly that; at any rate,
that is diplomatic language, Mr. Prosecutor, and it is quite possible
that we at that time, as a result of the situation, in consultation with
the Japanese ambassador, considered it opportune to express it that way.
At any rate, that is not the important point; the important thing is
that as I remember, when I left England a certainty and inevitability of
war did not exist. Whether in later years I said this or that has no
bearing on what I said when I left London. I do not think that there is
the least bit of evidence for that. Perhaps I tried to draw him into the
war against England and therefore used forceful language.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As you said “no,” just look at Document Number
TC-75, Exhibit GB-28, and at your conclusions that are to be drawn. You
will see it at the end under Number 5, “Therefore, conclusions to be
drawn by us...” It is about the end of the third page:
“5) Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us:
“1) Outwardly further understanding with England while
protecting the interest of our friends;
“2) Formation, under great secrecy but with all persistence, of
a coalition against England, that is, in practice a tightening
of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the winning over of
all nations whose interests conform with ours, directly or
indirectly; close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats
of the three great powers towards this purpose.”
And the last sentence:
“Every day on which—no matter what tactical interludes of
rapprochement towards us are attempted—our political
considerations are not guided fundamentally by the thought of
England as our most dangerous adversary, would be a gain for our
enemies.”
Why did you tell the Tribunal a minute ago that you had not advised the
Führer that there should be outward friendly relations and in actuality
a coalition against her?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what kind of a document that is at all.
May I see it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by yourself on the 2d of January
1938. It is your own report to the Führer.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite correct as such; that is the
conclusive statement: Only thus can we, some day, come to an agreement
or to a conflict with England. The situation at that time was clearly
this, that England was resisting the German wishes for a revision which
the Führer had declared vital and that only through a strong diplomatic
coalition did it seem possible to induce England, by diplomatic and not
by bellicose means.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You probably told him what was untrue?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, and I also do not know whether the
details have been recorded accurately. It is a long record; I do not
know where it comes from.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your own record of the meeting, from
captured German documents.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is quite possible, but many things are said in
diplomacy every word of which is not weighed carefully. At any rate, the
truth is that when I left London there was no certainty that the war was
inevitable, but there is no doubt that I was skeptical when I left
London and did not know in what direction things would be drifting,
particularly on account of the very strong pro-war party in England.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, will you speak a little bit more slowly?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, Sir.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England, was it not your view
that the German policy should be pretended friendliness toward England
and actual formation of a coalition against her?
VON RIBBENTROP: Put this way, that is not correct. It was clear to me,
when I became Foreign Minister, that the realization of the German
desires in Europe was difficult and that it was principally England who
opposed them. I had tried for years, by order of the Führer, to achieve
these things by means of a friendly understanding with England.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now to answer my question: Did you
advise the Führer that the proper policy was pretended friendliness with
England and in actuality the formation of a coalition against her? Did
you or did you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not the right way of putting it to agree to
these German aspirations. That without doubt, was the situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, Witness, why you told the
Tribunal 5 minutes ago that you had not advised Hitler in the sense in
which I put to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Which advice do you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Outwardly an understanding with England and
formation under great secrecy of a coalition against her. I put that to
you twice and you denied it, I want to know why you did deny it.
VON RIBBENTROP: I said quite clearly that England was resisting the
German requests and that therefore, if Germany wanted to realize these
aspirations, she could do nothing but find friends and bring England
with the help of those friends to the conference table so that England
would yield to these aspirations by diplomatic means. That was my task
at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to direct your attention to the
relations with Poland. I will give you the opportunity of answering a
question generally, and I hope in that way we may save time.
Will you agree that up to the Munich Agreement, the speeches of all
German statesmen were full of the most profound affection and respect
for Poland? Do you agree with that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the purpose of what is shown in the
Foreign Office memorandum of 26 August 1938? I will give you the page
number, Page 107 of your document book. I want you to look at it. I
think it is the fourth paragraph, beginning, “This method of approach
towards Czechoslovakia...”; and you may take it from me that the method
of approach was putting forward the idea that you and Hitler wanted the
return of all Germans to the Reich. I put it quite fairly and
objectively. That is what preceded it. I want you to look at that
paragraph.
VON RIBBENTROP: Which paragraph do you mean? I did not hear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The fourth, “This method of approach towards
Czechoslovakia...” it begins. The fourth on my copy.
VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet. Paragraph 5, yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “This method of approach towards
Czechoslovakia is to be recommended also because of our
relationship with Poland. The turning away of Germany from the
boundary question of the southeast and her change-over to those
of the east and northeast must inevitably put the Poles on the
alert. After the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian question, it
will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn;
but the later this assumption becomes a factor in international
politics, the better.” (Document Number TC-76)
Does that correctly set out the endeavors of German foreign policy at
that time?
VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly no, for, first of all, I do not know what
kind of a document it is. It has apparently been prepared by some
official in the Foreign Office where sometimes such theoretical
treatises were prepared and may have come to me through the State
Secretary. However, I do not remember having read it. Whether it reached
me, I cannot tell you at the moment; but it is possible that such
thoughts prevailed among some of our officials. That is quite possible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now, if you do not agree, would you look
at Page 110, on which you will find extracts from Hitler’s Reichstag
speech on 26 September 1938. I am sorry. I said Reichstag; I meant
Sportpalast.
VON RIBBENTROP: Sportpalast, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the end of this extract the Führer is quoted
as saying with regard to Poland, after a tribute to Marshal Pilsudski:
“We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting
pacification. We realize that here are two peoples who must live
together and neither of whom can do away with the other. A
people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the
sea. A way to understanding, then, had to be found. It has been
found, and it will be continually extended further. Certainly,
things were difficult for this area. The nationalities and small
groups frequently quarreled among themselves, but the decisive
fact is that the two Governments and all reasonable and
clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two
countries possess the firm will and determination to improve
their relations. This is a real work of peace, of more value
than all of the idle talk at the League of Nations Palace in
Geneva.” (Document Number TC-73, Number 42)
Do you think that is an honest statement of opinion?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I believe that that was definitely the Führer’s
view at the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so at that time all the questions of the
treatment of minorities in Poland were very unimportant; is that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, they were not unimportant. They were a latent and
even difficult point between Poland and ourselves, and the purpose of
that particular kind of statement by the Führer was to overcome it. I am
so familiar with the problem of the minorities in Poland because I
watched it for personal reasons for many years. From the time I took
over the Foreign Ministry, there were again and again the greatest
difficulties which, however, were always settled on our part in the most
generous way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate you have agreed with me that the
speeches at that time—and you say quite honestly—were full of praise
and affection for the Poles; is that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, we were hoping that thereby we could bring the
German minority problem, in particular, to a satisfactory and sensible
solution. That had been our policy since 1934.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, immediately after Munich you first
raised the question of Danzig with M. Lipski, I think, in October,
around 21 October.
VON RIBBENTROP: Right, 28 October.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28 October. And the Poles had replied on the
31st; it may have reached you a day later through M. Lipski, suggesting
the making of a bilateral agreement between Germany and Poland, but
saying the return of Danzig to the Reich would lead to a conflict. I put
it quite generally. I just wanted to remind you of the tenor of the
reply. Do you remember?
VON RIBBENTROP: According to my recollection it was not quite like that.
The Führer had charged me—it was on 28 October, to be exact—to request
Ambassador Lipski to come to Berchtesgaden. His order was given because
the Führer in particular, perhaps as a sequel to the speech in the
Sportpalast, but that I do not remember, wanted to bring about a
clarification of the relations with all his neighbors. He wanted that
now particularly with respect to Poland. He instructed me, therefore, to
discuss with Ambassador Lipski the question of Danzig and the question
of a connection between the Reich and East Prussia.
I asked Ambassador Lipski to come and see me, and stated these wishes in
a very friendly atmosphere. Ambassador Lipski was very reserved; he
stated that after all Danzig was not a simple problem but that he would
discuss the question with his government. I asked him to do so soon and
inform me of the outcome. That was the beginning of the negotiations
with Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you will turn—I do not want to
stop you, but I want to get on quickly over this matter—if you will
turn to Page 114, you will find the minutes of M. Beck’s conversation
with Hitler on 5 January. I just want to draw your attention to the last
paragraph, where, after M. Beck had said that the Danzig question was a
very difficult problem:
“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this
problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite
new, some new formula, for which he used the term
‘Körperschaft,’ which on the one hand would safeguard the
interest of the German population and on the other hand the
Polish interest. In addition the Chancellor declared that the
Minister could be quite at ease; there would be no _fait
accompli_ in Danzig and nothing would be done to render
difficult the situation of the Polish Government.” (Document
TC-73, Number 48)
Do you see that, before I ask you the question?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have read that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the summary of your own
conversation with M. Beck on the next day. It is Page 115, at the
beginning of the paragraph, the second paragraph. You will see that,
after M. Beck had mentioned the Danzig question, you said, “In answer,
Herr Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking
any violent solution.” (Document TC-73, Number 49). That was almost word
for word what Hitler had said the day before; do you see that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, turn back to Page 113. (Document Number
C-137, Exhibit GB-33) These are the Defendant Keitel’s orders to—or
rather, to put it exactly—the Defendant Keitel’s transmission of the
Führer’s order with regard to Danzig. It is dated 24 November. That was
some 6 weeks before, and it is supplementary to an order of 21 October,
and you see what it says:
“Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the
instructions of 21 October, preparations are also to be made to
enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops
by surprise. (‘4. Occupation of Danzig’).
“The preparations will be made on the following basis. The
condition is a _coup de main_ occupation of Danzig, exploiting a
politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland.”
(Document Number C-137)
Did you know of these instructions?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. This is the first time that I
have seen that order or whatever it may be. May I add something?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not for the moment. Hitler must have known of
the order, mustn’t he? It is an order of the Führer?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, of course, and therefore I assume—that is what I
wanted to add—that the British Prosecution are aware that political
matters and military matters are in this case two completely different
conceptions. There is no doubt that the Führer, in view of the permanent
difficulties in Danzig and the Corridor, had given military orders of
some kind—just in case—and I can well imagine that it is one of these
orders. I see it today for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Supposing that you had known of the orders,
Witness, would you still have said on the 5th of January that Germany
was not seeking a _fait accompli_ or a violent solution? If you had
known of that order would you still have said it?
VON RIBBENTROP: If I had known this order and considering it an order of
the General Staff for possible cases, as I am compelled to do, then I
would still continue to have the same opinion. I think it is part of the
General Staff’s duty to take into consideration all possible
eventualities and prepare for them in principle. In the final analysis
that has nothing to do with politics.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Nothing to do with politics to have a
cut-and-dried plan how the Free State of Danzig is to be occupied by
German troops by surprise when you are telling the Poles that you won’t
have a _fait accompli_? That is your idea of how matters should be
carried on? If it is I will leave it.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must rather add that I know that the Führer was
alarmed for a long time, particularly during 1939, lest a sudden Polish
attack take place against Danzig; so that to me, I am not a military
man, it appears quite natural to make some preparations for all such
problems and possibilities. But, of course, I cannot judge the details
of these orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when did you learn that Hitler was
determined to attack Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: That Hitler contemplated a military action against
Poland, I learned for the first time, as I remember, in August 1939.
That, of course, he had made certain military preparations in advance to
meet any eventuality becomes clear from this order regarding Danzig. But
I definitely did not learn about this order, and I do not recollect now
in detail whether I received at that time any military communication. I
do remember that I knew virtually nothing about it.