MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I generalized this morning and I repeat
my assertion of yesterday that I am most reluctant to interfere here
with this examination. But as the witness has said himself, we did go
all through this yesterday, we have heard this whole story already in
the occasion of yesterday afternoon’s session. My point is that the
witness himself, before going into his answer, stated that he had
already given the causes for the war, yesterday afternoon, and I quite
agree. I think it is entirely unnecessary for him to go over it again
today. I might add parenthetically that we had some great doubt about
the relevancy or the materiality of it even on yesterday’s occasion, but
surely we do not have to hear him again.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: I would like to say that the former German Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who is accused of being co-responsible for a war of
aggression, might perhaps say a few words about the decisive causes,
which according to him led to this war. The defendant, of course, should
not repeat what he said yesterday. I want him to give only some details
on points to which he referred in only a general way yesterday, and it
will not take up very much of the Tribunal’s time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Horn, provided, of course, that he does
not go over the identical ground that he went over yesterday.
DR. HORN: Please tell us very briefly the facts that determined your
attitude.
VON RIBBENTROP: There are just a few brief facts that I would like to
mention, and they concern only the events of these last 2 days:
First of all, there is no doubt that on 30 and 31 August, England was
well aware of the extreme tension of the situation. This fact was
communicated to Hitler in a letter, and Hitler said that the decision
must be made and a way of solving the problem found, with all possible
speed. This was Chamberlain’s letter to Hitler.
Secondly: England knew that the proposals made by Germany were
reasonable, for we know that England was in possession of these
proposals in the night of 30 to 31 August. Ambassador Henderson himself
declared that these proposals were reasonable.
Thirdly: It would have been possible, therefore, on 30 or 31 August, to
give a hint to Warsaw and tell the Poles to begin some sort of
negotiations with us. This could have been done in three different ways:
Polish negotiator could have flown to Berlin, which would have been, as
the Führer said, a matter of an hour to an hour and a half; or, a
meeting could have been arranged between the foreign ministers or the
heads of the states to take place on the frontiers; or else, Ambassador
Lipski could simply have been instructed at least to receive the German
proposals. If these instructions had been given, the crisis would have
been averted and diplomatic negotiations could have been initiated.
England herself, had she wished to do so, could have sent her ambassador
to represent her at the negotiations, which action, after what had gone
before, would undoubtedly have been regarded very favorably by Germany.
This, however, did not take place, and, as I gather from documents which
I saw for the first time here, nothing was done during this period to
alleviate this very tense situation. Chauvinism is natural to the Poles;
and we know from Ambassador Henderson’s own words and from the testimony
of Mr. Dahlerus that Ambassador Lipski used very strong language
illustrative of Polish mentality. Because Poland was very well aware
that she would, in all circumstances, have the assistance of England and
France, she assumed an attitude which made war inevitable to all intents
and purposes. I believe that these facts really are of some importance
for the historical view of that entire period. I would like to add that
I personally regretted this turn of events. All my work of 25 years was
destroyed by this war; and up to the last minute I made every possible
effort to avert this war. I believe that even Ambassador Henderson’s
documents prove that I did make these attempts. I told Adolf Hitler that
it was Chamberlain’s most ardent desire to have good relations with
Germany and to reach an agreement with her; and I even sent a special
messenger to the Embassy to see Henderson, to tell him how earnestly the
Führer desired this, and to do everything in his power to make this
desire of Adolf Hitler’s clear to his government.
DR. HORN: Denmark and Norway were occupied in April 1940. You had
concluded a non-aggression pact with Denmark on 31 May 1939 and on the
basis of these facts you are accused by the Prosecution of perfidious
diplomacy. When and in what way did you receive knowledge of the
imminent occupation of Denmark and Norway?
VON RIBBENTROP: It had always been the Führer’s wish and mine to keep
Scandinavia neutral. In accordance with Adolf Hitler’s policy, I did my
best to prevent the war from spreading.
One day in April 1940 Hitler summoned me to the Chancellery. He told me
that he had received reports stating that the British were on the point
of occupying Norway, or of landing troops there. He had therefore
decided to occupy Norway and Denmark on the morning of the day after
next. That was the first I heard of it. I was amazed; and the Führer
then showed me the documentary evidence which he had received through
his intelligence service. He ordered me to prepare notes at once,
informing the Norwegian and the Danish governments that German troops
were about to march in. I reminded the Führer that we had a
non-aggression pact with Denmark and that Norway was a neutral country,
and told him that reports received from our Legation at Oslo did not
indicate any landing. When the documents were shown to me, however, I
realized how grave the situation was and that these reports had to be
taken seriously.
The next day along with my assistants, I prepared diplomatic notes to be
sent by plane to Oslo and Copenhagen on 8 April. On that day we worked
day and night in order to finish these notes. The Führer had given
orders that these notes were to arrive shortly before the German
occupation. The order was executed.
The occupation of Denmark was completed without trouble, as far as I
know. I believe that hardly a shot was fired. As soon as we had occupied
the country, we negotiated with the Danish Government, under Stauning,
and made agreements so that everything should go on without disturbances
and as far as possible in a friendly atmosphere. Denmark’s integrity was
fully guaranteed, and matters went on, even in the later stages, in a
comparatively quiet and orderly way.
The situation was rather different in Norway. Resistance had developed.
We tried to keep the King of Norway in the country and to induce him to
stay there. We negotiated with him but we had no success. He went north,
I believe, to Narvik; and so there was no longer any possibility of
negotiating with Norway. Norway was occupied, as you know, and a civil
administration established. After this date, Norway was no longer any
concern of the Foreign Office; but one thing I should like to add: that
the Führer told me repeatedly that the measures he had taken were
extremely necessary, and that documents found after the landing of
British troops in Norway, and published at a later date, showed that the
occupation of these countries and the landing in Norway had doubtlessly
been planned for a long time by England.
Frequent allusions have been made in the course of this Trial to the
great sufferings of the Norwegian and Danish peoples. I personally am of
the opinion that whatever one may think of the German occupation, for
all intents and purposes it prevented Scandinavia from becoming a
theater of war, and I believe, that in that way the Norwegian and Danish
peoples were spared untold suffering. If war had broken out between
Germany and the Scandinavian countries, these people would have been
exposed to much greater suffering and privation.
DR. HORN: Did you have anything to do with Quisling before the
occupation of Norway?
VON RIBBENTROP: I must explain that the name of Quisling became known
only at a much later date. Before the occupation of Norway his name
meant nothing to me. It is true that Herr Rosenberg contacted me with a
view to assisting pro-German Scandinavians within the frame of the
former Nordic Movement (Nordische Bewegung) and that was a perfectly
natural thing to do. At that period, we also provided funds for
newspapers, propaganda, and also for political activities in Norway.
At these discussions, I remember this distinctly, no mention was ever
made of any seizing of political power through certain circles in
Norway, or of military operations.
DR. HORN: What influence did the Foreign Office have in Denmark after
the occupation of the country?
VON RIBBENTROP: After the occupation of Denmark the Foreign Office was
represented by a minister at the Danish Court. Later, because of certain
events—I believe it would take too long to enumerate them—the Danish
Government resigned and a Reich Plenipotentiary was appointed. There was
also a Military Commander in Denmark and later on a Higher SS and Police
Leader.
The activities of the minister of the Danish Court were those of an
ordinary and very influential minister, who tried to straighten out all
the difficulties which might naturally arise during an occupation; and
later on the function of the Reich Plenipotentiary, according to my
instructions, was to treat Denmark, not as an enemy of Germany, but as a
friend. This was always a guiding principle in Denmark and even at a
much later period, when more serious difficulties arose as a result of
the intensified warfare, there was really complete quiet and calm in
Denmark throughout the long years of war and we were very well satisfied
with conditions there.
Later, because of the activities of enemy agents against our measures,
_et cetera_, things took a more rigorous turn; the Reich Plenipotentiary
always had instructions from me not to aggravate things but to
straighten them out and to work on the continuation of good relations
between the Danes and the Germans. His task was not always an easy one;
but on the whole, I believe, he did his work satisfactorily.
DR. HORN: Since when and how did you receive reports about the intention
of the Franco-British General Staff to include Belgium and Holland in
their theater of operations?
VON RIBBENTROP: Great importance has obviously been attached to this
question during the proceedings here as well. The situation was as
follows: In 1937, Germany declared that she had made an agreement with
Belgium in which Germany undertook to respect Belgium’s strict
neutrality on condition that Belgium on her part would maintain her
neutrality.
After the Polish campaign the Führer told me on several occasions that,
according to his intelligence reports, the enemy intended to cross Dutch
and Belgian territory to attack the Ruhr. We also sometimes received
reports of this kind; these were of a less concrete nature.
In any event, Adolf Hitler believed that an attack on the Ruhr district,
which was Germany’s most vital area, was a possibility that had to be
reckoned with at all times. I had a good many discussions with the
Führer about that time, regarding the importance of Belgian neutrality
for the world in general; but I knew, too, that we were involved in a
struggle, a hard struggle of larger dimensions where completely
different standards would have to be applied.
In the course of events, in the spring of 1940, our intelligence reports
about an attack of this kind became more and more concrete, and I may
mention that documents belonging to the French General Staff, _et
cetera_, which were found later and published by the German Foreign
Office, proved conclusively that the reports which Germany had received
were absolutely true and that an attack on the Ruhr area had actually
been repeatedly considered by the enemies of Germany, that is, by those
who were her enemies at the time.
In this connection I would like to call attention to a document
concerning a meeting between Prime Minister Chamberlain and M. Daladier
in Paris, at which Mr. Chamberlain suggested an attack for the
destruction of the vitally important industrial areas of the Ruhr
through the so-called “chimneys” of Holland and Belgium. I believe this
document is here and has been granted to the Defense.
The situation before the offensive in the West on which the Führer had
decided was therefore such that an attack by the enemy through these
great areas had to be expected at any time. For this reason he decided
to attack across this area, across these two neutral territories, and I
believe that after the attack—the military authorities will confirm
this—further documents were found and facts established, which as far
as I remember, showed that the closest co-operation had existed between
the Belgian and I believe also the Dutch General Staffs, and the British
and French General Staffs.
Of course it is always a very grave matter in such a war to violate the
neutrality of a country, and you must not think that we dismissed it, so
to speak, with a wave of the hand. It cost me many a sleepless night and
I would like to remind you that the same questions arose on the other
side and other statesmen also discussed them at the time. I remind you
of a statement to the effect that “one got tired of thinking of the
rights of neutrals”; and this assertion was made by the eminent British
statesman, Winston Churchill.
DR. HORN: What caused Germany to violate the integrity of Luxembourg?
VON RIBBENTROP: Luxembourg was in much the same situation as Belgium and
Holland. It is a very small country, and obviously in a war on the scale
of this one the armies cannot suddenly bypass one particular country.
But I would like to point out just one thing in connection with
Luxembourg: The summer before, that is during the summer of 1939, we had
started negotiations with France and Luxembourg with a view to making
perfectly definite pacts of neutrality to be established by treaties. At
first, the negotiations seemed to be going very well; but they were
suddenly broken off by both France and Luxembourg. At the time we did
not understand the reason for this, but I know that when I reported it
to the Führer, it made him a little distrustful as to the motives that
may have been of importance on the other side. We never knew the exact
reason.
DR. HORN: How far was the German Foreign Office able to exert its
influence in France after the partial occupation of the country?
VON RIBBENTROP: After the occupation or partial occupation of France,
although we were not yet at peace with France and there was therefore
really no reason to resume diplomatic relations, as only an armistice
had been declared, the Führer, at my request, appointed an ambassador to
the Vichy Government. I was especially anxious for this to be done
because it had always been my aim to come to a closer co-operation with
France. I would like to emphasize the fact that I resumed my efforts in
this direction immediately after the victory and the armistice. I
have—the Führer readily agreed to this and also initiated the so-called
Montoire Policy at my request, by meeting Marshal Pétain at Montoire
after a meeting with General Franco. I was present at this meeting.
I believe I may say in the interests of historical truth that Adolf
Hitler’s treatment of the head of the defeated French nation is probably
unexampled and must be described as chivalrous. There cannot be many
parallel cases in history. Adolf Hitler immediately made proposals to
Marshal Pétain for a closer collaboration between Germany and France,
but Marshal Pétain, even at the very first meeting, adopted an attitude
of marked reserve towards the victor, so that, to my great personal
regret this first meeting came to an end somewhat more quickly than I
had really hoped it would. In spite of this, we continued to try to
carry out a systematic policy of conciliation and even of close
collaboration with France. Our lack of success was probably due to the
natural attitude of France and the will of influential circles. Germany
did not fail to make every effort.
DR. HORN: What influence did you yourself, and the German Foreign Office
have on conditions in Belgium after the occupation?
VON RIBBENTROP: We had no influence whatsoever on conditions in Belgium
or in Holland. The Führer set up military and civilian administrations,
and the Foreign Office had no further connection with them, beyond being
represented by a liaison officer who, in practice, had nothing or almost
nothing to do. I would like to add that it was rather different in
France, inasmuch as we were naturally in a position to exercise a
certain amount of influence on the Vichy Government through our
ambassador. I did so, for instance, in matters of finance.
We have heard here in court a good deal about the activities of Herr
Hemmen. I should just like to say that, no matter how his powers may
have been defined, I appointed him for the express purpose of preventing
inflation and the collapse of the French currency. That was the special
mission entrusted to Hemmen. Even if France was no longer willing to
co-operate politically with Germany, she was undoubtedly of economic
importance to us; and I wanted to keep her on a sound basis and to
preserve her system of finance. That was the real reason for Herr
Hemmen’s mission.
DR. HORN: What plans did Hitler have with regard to his foreign policy
after the conclusion of the campaign in the West?
VON RIBBENTROP: After the conclusion of the campaign in the West, I
discussed future developments with the Führer at his headquarters. I
asked him what his further intentions were with regard to England. The
Führer and I proposed at the time, whether we had not better make
another attempt with England. The Führer seemed to have had the same
idea and was delighted with my proposal for making a fresh peace offer
or attempting to make peace with England. I asked the Führer whether I
should draft such a treaty for this case. The Führer spontaneously
replied: “No, that will not be necessary, I will do that myself, that
is, there is no need to do it at all.”
He said, word for word: “If England is ready for peace, there are only
four points to be settled. Above all, after Dunkirk, I do not want
England in any circumstances to suffer a loss of prestige, so under no
circumstances do I want a peace which would involve that.”
With regard to the contents of such a treaty, he enumerated four points:
1. Germany is ready to recognize in all respects the existence of the
British Empire.
2. England must, therefore, acknowledge Germany to be the greatest
continental power, if only because of the size of her population.
3. He said, “I want England to return the German colonies. I would be
satisfied with one or two of them, because of the raw materials.”
4. He said that he wanted a permanent alliance with England for life and
death.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that at the end of 1939, you heard from Hitler
that conferences had taken place between the Greek and French General
Staffs and that French officers had been sent to Greece?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. It came within the scope of the
Führer’s policy for preventing the war from spreading, as entrusted to
me, that I should keep a sharp watch on these things and, of course,
especially on the Balkans; Adolf Hitler wished in all circumstances to
keep the Balkans out of the war.
As for Greece the situation was as follows: Greece had accepted a
British guarantee. Also, there were close links between Yugoslavia and
England and, especially, France. Through the Führer’s intelligence
service and through military channels we repeatedly heard about staff
conferences between Athens, Belgrade, London and Paris, which were
supposed to be taking place. About that time I summoned the Greek
Minister on several occasions and drew his attention to these things. I
asked him to be very careful, and told him that Germany had no intention
of taking any steps against the Greek people, who had always been very
much liked in Germany.
However, further intelligence reports came in to the effect that Britain
had been given permission to establish naval bases in Greece. I
believe—and all this led up to the intervention of Italy, which we did
not desire at all—I believe Reich Marshal Göring has already discussed
this topic. It was impossible to prevent this intervention, for when we
arrived in Florence—I was with Adolf Hitler at the time—for his
conference with Mussolini, it was too late and Mussolini said: “We are
on the march.”
The Führer was very much upset and depressed when he heard this news. We
then had to do everything in our power so that the war between Greece
and Italy might at least be prevented from spreading. Yugoslav policy
was naturally the decisive factor here. I tried in every possible way to
establish closer links with Yugoslavia and to win her over to the
Tripartite Pact which had already been concluded then. It was difficult
at first, but with the help of the Regent Prince Paul and the
Zvetkovitch Government, we finally succeeded in inducing Yugoslavia to
join the Tripartite Pact. We knew very well, however, that there was
strong opposition in Belgrade to the adhesion of Yugoslavia to the
Tripartite Pact and to any kind of closer connection with Germany. In
Vienna at the time the Führer said that the signing of the Tripartite
Pact seemed like a funeral to him.
All the same, we were very much surprised when—I think it was 2 or 3
days after the conclusion of this pact—the government was overthrown by
General Simovic’s coup and a new government was set up which certainly
could not be described as friendly to Germany.
Reports came from Belgrade concerning close collaboration with the
British General Staff. I believe American observers in this field are
informed on the point, and during the last few months I have heard from
English sources that British elements had played a part in this coup.
That was quite natural, for we were at war.
All these events caused the Führer to intervene in the Balkans, first of
all, to help Italy, whom the courageous resistance of the Greeks had
forced into a very difficult position in Albania; and secondly, to
prevent a possible attack from the north on the part of Yugoslavia,
which might have made the Italian situation still more serious or even
brought about a crushing defeat for our Italian ally.
Those were the military and strategic factors which induced the Führer
to intervene and to conduct the campaign against Greece and Yugoslavia.
DR. HORN: If I understood you correctly, Greece put bases on her
territory at the disposal of the British Navy before the Italian attack
in October 1940, in spite of the fact that she had declared her
neutrality. Is that correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was the substance of the military reports which I
received.
DR. HORN: In September 1939, General Gamelin, then French
Commander-in-Chief, approved the project for an Allied landing at
Salonika. When did Germany receive knowledge of this intention?
VON RIBBENTROP: We first learned the exact details from the files of the
French General Staff on the outbreak of war. But I know that from the
very beginning all the reports which the Führer received from the
various intelligence branches of the Reich caused him to fear the
possibility that a new front might be built up at any moment in Salonika
as had happened in the first World War, and that would mean a
considerable dispersal of the German forces.
DR. HORN: In September 1939 you made a second trip to Moscow. What was
the reason for this visit and what was discussed there?
VON RIBBENTROP: My second visit to Moscow was made necessary by the
ending of the Polish campaign. I flew to Moscow toward the end of
September, and this time I received an especially cordial reception. The
situation then was such that we had to create clear conditions in the
Polish territory. Soviet troops had occupied the eastern regions of
Poland, and we had occupied the western parts up to the line of
demarcation previously agreed upon. Now we had to fix a definite line of
demarcation. We were also anxious to strengthen our ties with the Soviet
Union and to establish cordial relations with them.
An agreement was reached in Moscow, fixing a definite line in Poland,
and an economic treaty to put economic relations on an entirely new
basis was envisaged. A comprehensive treaty regulating the exchange of
raw materials was envisaged and later on concluded. At the same time
this pact was politically amplified into a treaty of friendship, as is
well known. One question remained, about the territory of Lithuania. For
the sake of establishing particularly trustful relations between Moscow
and Berlin, the Führer renounced influence over Lithuania and gave
Russia predominance in Lithuania by this second treaty, so that there
was now a clear understanding between Germany and Soviet Russia with
respect to territorial claims as well.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that on 15 June 1940, after the delivery of an
ultimatum, the Russians occupied the whole of Lithuania, including the
part which was still German, without notifying the Reich government?
VON RIBBENTROP: There was no special agreement concerning this, but it
is well known that these areas were actually occupied.
DR. HORN: What further Russian measures caused Hitler anxiety as to
Russia’s attitude and intentions?
VON RIBBENTROP: Various things made the Führer a little sceptical about
the Russian attitude. One was the occupation of the Baltic States, which
I have just mentioned. Another was the occupation of Bessarabia and
North Bukovina after the French campaign and of which we were simply
informed without any previous consultation. The King of Romania asked us
for advice at that time. The Führer, out of loyalty to the Soviet pact,
advised the King of Romania to accept the Russian demands and to
evacuate Bessarabia. In addition, the war with Finland in 1940 caused a
certain uneasiness in Germany, among the German people who had strong
sympathies for the Finns. The Führer felt himself bound to take this
into account to some extent. There were two other points to consider.
One was that the Führer received a report on certain communist
propaganda in German factories which alleged that the Russian trade
delegation was the center of this propaganda. Above all, we heard of
military preparations being made by Russia. I know after the French
campaign he spoke to me about this matter on several occasions and said
that approximately 20 German divisions had been concentrated near the
East Prussian border; and that very large forces—I happen to remember
the number, I think about 30 army corps—were said to be concentrated in
Bessarabia. The Führer was perturbed by these reports and asked me to
watch the situation closely. He even said that in all probability the
1939 Pact had been concluded for the sole purpose of being able to
dictate economic and political conditions to us. In any case, he now
proposed to take countermeasures. I pointed out the danger of preventive
wars to the Führer, but the Führer said that German-Italian interests
must come first in all circumstances, if necessary. I said I hoped that
matters would not go so far and that, at all events, we should make
every effort through diplomatic channels to avoid this.
DR. HORN: In November, from 12 to 14 November 1940 to be exact, the
Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov visited Berlin. On whose initiative
did this visit take place and what was the subject under discussion?
VON RIBBENTROP: The conferences with Molotov at Berlin concerned the
following subjects: I might interpolate that when we were trying to
effect a settlement with Russia through diplomatic channels, I wrote a
letter to Marshal Stalin, with the Führer’s permission, in the late
autumn of 1940 and invited Mr. Molotov to come to Berlin. This
invitation was accepted, and Russo-German relations were discussed in
their entirety during a conversation between the Führer and Mr. Molotov.
I was present at this discussion. Mr. Molotov first discussed with the
Führer Russo-German relations in general and then went on to mention
Finland and the Balkans. He said that Russia had vital interests in
Finland. He said that when the delimitation of zones of influence had
been settled, it had been agreed that Finland should be included in the
Russian sphere of influence. The Führer replied that Germany also had
extensive interests in Finland, especially with regard to nickel, and
furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the entire German people
sympathized with the Finns. He would therefore ask Mr. Molotov to
compromise on this question. This topic was brought up on several
occasions.
With regard to the Balkans, Mr. Molotov said that he wanted a
non-aggression pact with Bulgaria, and generally closer ties with
Bulgaria. He also thought of establishing bases there. The Führer
replied, or rather asked, whether Bulgaria had approached Molotov in the
matter, but that apparently was not the case. The Führer then said that
he could not express any opinion on this question until he had discussed
it with Mussolini, who was his ally and who was naturally interested in
the Balkans too.
Various other points were also discussed, but no final settlement was
reached at this discussion. The discussion rather proceeded on lines
which seemed to me not those best calculated to lead to a bridging of
all contrasts. As soon as the meeting was over, I requested the Führer
to authorize me to take up again the discussions with Mr. Molotov and
asked him if he would consent to my discussing with Mr. Molotov the
possibility of Russia’s joining the Tripartite Pact. That was one of our
aims at the time. The Führer agreed to this and I had another long
discussion with the Russian Foreign Commissar. In this conversation the
same topics were discussed. Mr. Molotov alluded to Russia’s vital
interest in Finland; he also referred to Russia’s deep interest in
Bulgaria, the kinship between the Russian and the Bulgarian people, and
her interest in other Balkan countries. It was finally agreed that on
his return to Moscow he should speak to Stalin and try to arrive at some
solution of the question. I proposed that they join the Tripartite Pact
and further proposed that I should discuss with the Führer the various
points which had been raised. Perhaps we could still find a way out. The
general result of this conversation was that Molotov went back to Moscow
with the intention of clearing up through the embassies the differences
still existing between us.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, surely, as these negotiations did not eventuate
in any agreement, they are very remote from anything we are considering.
You are not suggesting that any agreements were come to, are you?
DR. HORN: No. I wanted to prove only that Germany made efforts to
prevent the conflict with Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: There was no question of a conflict with Russia in any of
these negotiations.
DR. HORN: No. It is evident from all the efforts made by Germany, and
from Ribbentrop’s testimony, that they wanted to eliminate as far as
possible any differences which might lead to a conflict between Germany
and Russia. As regards a deliberate—the Prosecution assert that the
pact with Russia was made with the intention of violating it and
attacking Russia, that it was intended to attack Russia all along. I
want to prove with this evidence that this was not the case.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me to be very remote, indeed. It only goes to
show that Ribbentrop entered into certain negotiations with Russia which
had no result. That is all. You may go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: In one of your previous answers you spoke of troop
concentrations on the East Prussian border mentioning 20 German
divisions. I assume that that was just a _lapsus linguae_ on your part.
VON RIBBENTROP: I meant to say Russian divisions. The Führer, I know,
mentioned this many times. He said, I believe, that we had only one
division in the whole of East Prussia.
DR. HORN: Was not the occupation of Balkan territory by the Russians the
reason for your discussion with Molotov?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand the question. Please repeat
it.
DR. HORN: Was not the Russian occupation of territory in the Balkans and
also in the Baltic States the reason for inviting Molotov to Berlin?
VON RIBBENTROP: In the Balkans, no; for there were no Russian occupation
zones there. But it did apply to Bessarabia, which is not a Balkan
country in the strictest sense of the term. It was the occupation of
Bessarabia, which took place with surprising speed, and that of Northern
Bukovina, which had not been agreed to fall within the Russian sphere of
influence in the discussions at Moscow—and which was, as the Führer
said at the time, really an old Austrian crown land—and the occupation
of the Baltic territories. It is true that this caused the Führer a
certain amount of anxiety.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that in the summer of 1940 you and Hitler were
informed that a Franco-British military commission was in Moscow?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes—no. What was the date, please?
DR. HORN: The summer of 1940; that is, after June 1940?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. Such reports came in continually,
but I cannot say now how far that was correct for the summer of 1940.
When I arrived in Moscow in 1939, I found French and English military
commissions there, with instructions from the British and French
governments to conclude a military alliance between Russia, England, and
France. This was part of the policy which the Führer described as
“British encirclement policy” in his speech to the Reichstag, I think on
28 May, and which Mr. Churchill in 1936 in the embassy had made quite
evident to me.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that at these conferences between...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am trying very hard to follow this. I
wonder if I could be helped? Did the witness refer to 1940? I wanted to
get it clear whether it was 1940 or 1939. It makes a big difference.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean about an English mission? 1940, I believe.
VON RIBBENTROP: I was going to reply to that. I have already said that I
am not quite sure about 1940; I said only that these reports existed. I
know, however, that this mission was there in 1939.
DR. HORN: During Molotov’s visit to Berlin in the year 1940, was any
allusion made to the fact that Russia was not satisfied with the last
Russo-Finnish peace treaty and that she intended to annex the whole of
Finland?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was not as definite as that, but it was clear from
her attitude that Russia considered Finland as her sphere of influence.
What measures Russia intended to take there is not in my power to say.
DR. HORN: On 5 April 1941 a Russian-Yugoslav Non-aggression and
Friendship Pact was concluded. What was the effect of this conclusion
upon Germany?
VON RIBBENTROP: This seemed to the Führer to confirm the fact that
Russia had deviated from the 1939 policy. He considered it an affront,
to use his own words, for he said that he had concluded a pact with the
other government and Russia only a short time afterwards had concluded a
pact with the government which was definitely hostile to Germany.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Hitler thereupon forbade you to take any
further diplomatic steps in connection with Russia?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. I told the Führer at the time that we
must now make even more determined efforts to come to an understanding
about Russia’s attitude. He said that would be useless and he did not
think it would change the Russian attitude.
DR. HORN: What were the causes which led to the outbreak of the conflict
with Russia?
VON RIBBENTROP: I must say this here: In the winter of 1940-41 the
Führer was confronted with the following situation. I think it is most
important to make this clear.
England was not prepared to make peace. The attitude of the United
States of America and of Russia was therefore of decisive importance to
the Führer. He told me the following about this—I had a very lengthy
discussion with him on the subject and asked him to give me clearly
defined diplomatic directives. He said that Japan’s attitude was not
absolutely secure for Germany; although we had concluded the Tripartite
Pact, there were very strong oppositional elements at work in Japan and
we could not know what position Japan would take; Italy had proved to be
a very weak ally in the Greek campaign. Germany might, therefore, have
to stand entirely alone.
After that, he spoke of the American attitude. He said that he had
always wanted to have good relations with the United States, but that in
spite of extreme reserve the United States had grown steadily more
hostile to Germany. The Tripartite Pact had been concluded with a view
to keeping the United States out of the war, as it was our wish and our
belief that in that way those circles in the United States which were
working for peace and for good relations with Germany could be
strengthened. We were not successful in this, however, as the attitude
of the United States was not favorable to Germany after the conclusion
of the Tripartite Pact. The Führer’s basic idea, and mine, namely, that
if the United States did enter the war in Europe, they would have to
reckon with a war on two fronts and therefore would prefer not to
intervene, was not realized.
Now the further question of Russia’s attitude came up and in this
connection the Führer made the following statement: We have a friendship
pact with Russia. But Russia has assumed the attitude which we have just
been discussing and which causes me a certain amount of concern. We do
not know, therefore, what to expect from that side. More and more troop
movements were reported; he had himself taken military countermeasures,
the exact nature of which was, and still is, unknown to me. However, his
great anxiety was that Russia on the one hand and the United States and
Britain on the other, might proceed against Germany. On the one hand,
therefore, he had to reckon with an attack by Russia and on the other
hand with a joint attack by the United States and England, that is to
say with large-scale landings in the West. All these considerations
finally caused the Führer to take preventive measures, to start a
preventive war against Russia on his own initiative.
DR. HORN: What actual political reasons were there for the Tripartite
Pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Tripartite Pact was concluded, I believe, in
September 1940. The situation was as I have just described it, that is
to say, the Führer was alarmed that the United States might sooner or
later enter the war. For this reason I wanted to do all I could, in the
field of diplomacy, to strengthen Germany’s position. I thought we had
Italy as an ally, but Italy showed herself to be a weak ally.
As we could not win France over to our side, the only friend apart from
the Balkan States was Japan. In the summer of 1940 we therefore tried to
achieve closer collaboration with Japan. Japan was trying to do the same
with us and that led to the signing of the pact. The aim, or substance,
of this pact was a political, military, and economic alliance. There is
no doubt, however, that it was intended as a defensive alliance; and we
considered it as such from the start. By that I mean that it was
intended in the first place to keep the United States out of the war;
and I hoped that a combination of this kind might enable us to make
peace with England after all. The pact itself was not based on any plan
for aggression or world domination, as has often been asserted. That is
not true; its purpose was, as I have just said, to arrive at a
combination which would enable Germany to introduce a new order in
Europe and would also allow Japan to reach a solution acceptable to her
in East Asia, especially in regard to the Chinese problem.
That was what I had in mind when I negotiated and signed the pact. The
situation was not unfavorable; the pact might possibly keep the United
States neutral and isolate England so that we might all the same arrive
at a compromise peace, a possibility of which we never lost sight during
the whole course of the war, and for which we worked steadily.
DR. HORN: What effect, according to the embassy reports which reached
you, did the Anschluss of Austria and the Munich Agreement have on the
United States?
VON RIBBENTROP: There is no doubt that the occupation of Austria and the
Munich Agreement produced a much more unfavorable feeling towards
Germany in the United States.
DR. HORN: In November 1938 the American Ambassador at Berlin was
recalled to Washington to report to his government, and the normal
diplomatic relations with Germany were thus broken off. According to
your observations, what were the reasons for this measure?
VON RIBBENTROP: We never really found out the details, and we very much
regretted it, as it forced us to recall our own Ambassador in
Washington, at least to call him back to make a report. It is, however,
evident that this measure was determined by the whole attitude of the
United States. Many incidents took place about that time which gradually
convinced the Führer that sooner or later they would bring the United
States into the war against us.
Permit me to mention a few examples. President Roosevelt’s attitude was
defined for the first time in the “quarantine speech” which he made in
1937. The press then started an energetic campaign. After the ambassador
was recalled the situation grew more critical and the effect began to
make itself felt in every sphere of German-American relations.
I believe that many documents dealing with the subject have been
published in the meantime and that a number of these have been submitted
by the Defense, dealing, for instance, with the attitude adopted by
certain United States diplomats at the time of the Polish crisis; the
cash-and-carry clause was then introduced which could benefit only
Germany’s enemies; the ceding of destroyers to England; the so-called
Lend-Lease Bill later on; and in other fields the further advance of the
United States towards Europe: The occupation of Greenland, Iceland, on
the African Continent, _et cetera_; the aid given to Soviet Russia after
the outbreak of this war. All these measures strengthened the Führer’s
conviction that sooner or later he would certainly have to reckon with a
war against America. There is no doubt that the Führer did not, in the
first instance, want such a war; and I may say that I myself, as I think
you will see from many of the documents submitted by the Prosecution,
again and again did everything I could, in the diplomatic field, to keep
the United States out of this war.
DR. HORN: In the summer of 1941 President Roosevelt gave his so-called
“firing order” to the American Fleet in order to protect transports
carrying armaments to England. How did Hitler and German diplomacy react
to this order?
VON RIBBENTROP: It was a very regrettable event for us. I am not
competent to deal with technical details but I remember exactly that
Hitler was greatly excited about this order. I believe it was in a
speech at some meeting—probably at Munich, but I do not remember
exactly—that he replied to this speech and issued a warning in answer
to the announcement. I happen to remember the form which his reply took,
because at the time I thought it rather odd. He said that America had
given the order to fire on German ships. “I gave no order to fire but I
ordered that the fire be returned”; I believe that is the way he
expressed it.
Documentary evidence of these events reached us in the diplomatic
service, but the Navy is better informed on the subject than I am. After
that, I believe, there were protests and publications about the measures
which made the German attitude plain; I cannot give you exact details of
these protests without referring to the documents themselves.
DR. HORN: Did Japan notify Germany in advance of her attack on Pearl
Harbor?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, she did not. At the time I tried to induce Japan to
attack Singapore, because it was impossible to make peace with England
and I did not know what military measures we could take to achieve this
end. In any case, the Führer directed me to do everything I could in the
diplomatic field to weaken England’s position and thus achieve peace. We
believed that this could best be done through an attack by Japan on
England’s strong position in East Asia. For that reason I tried to
induce Japan, at that time, to attack Singapore.
After the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I also tried to make Japan
attack Russia, for I thought that in this way the war could be ended
most speedily. Japan, however, did not do that. She did then—she did
neither of the things we wanted her to do, but instead, she did a third.
She attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. This attack came as a
complete surprise to us. We had considered the possibility of Japan’s
attacking Singapore, that is England, or perhaps Hong Kong, but we never
considered an attack on the United States as being to our advantage. We
knew that in the case of an attack on England, there was a possibility
that the United States might intervene; that was a question which,
naturally, we had often considered. We hoped very much, however, that
this would not happen and that America would not intervene. The first
news I received of the attack on Pearl Harbor was through the Berlin
press, and then from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima. I should like to
say under oath that all other reports, versions, or documentary evidence
are entirely false. I would like to go even further to state that the
attack came as a surprise even to the Japanese Ambassador—at least he
told me that.
DR. HORN: Does Your Lordship wish for a recess now?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, how much longer are you going to take?
DR. HORN: Not much more, Your Honor. I should say 15 or 20 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will recess for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. HORN: What considerations caused Hitler and you to enter the war
against the United States on the side of Japan?
VON RIBBENTROP: When the news of Pearl Harbor came, the Führer had to
make a decision. The text of the Tripartite Pact bound us to assist
Japan only in case of an attack against Japan herself. I went to see the
Führer, explained the legal aspect of the situation and told him that,
although we welcomed a new ally against England, it meant we had a new
opponent to deal with as well, or would have one to deal with if we
declared war on the United States.
The Führer then decided that the United States had already fired upon
our ships and thereby had practically created a state of war; that it
was therefore only a question of form, or, at least, that this official
state of war might supervene at any moment, as a result of an incident;
and that in the long run it was impossible that this state of affairs in
the Atlantic continue without a German-American war.
He then instructed me to draft a note—which he subsequently
altered—and to hand the American Ambassador his papers.
DR. HORN: How did the Foreign Office co-operate with Germany’s allies
during the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: We naturally had close co-operation with Italy. By that
I mean that in the further course of war, we were forced to all intents
and purposes to take charge of all military operations there ourselves,
or, at least, to take joint charge of them.
Co-operation with Japan was very difficult, for the simple reason that
we could communicate with the Japanese Government only by air. We had
contact with them from time to time through U-boats, but there was no
co-ordinated military or political plan of campaign. I believe that on
this point General Marshall’s view is correct, namely, that there was no
close strategic co-operation or planning of any kind; and, really, there
was not any.
DR. HORN: How was co-operation with Italy?
VON RIBBENTROP: As I have just said, we naturally had very close
co-operation with Italy, but difficulties arose through the many
heterogeneous influences at work; and Italy proved herself, right from
the start, to be a very weak ally in every respect.
DR. HORN: Why, in the course of the Russian campaign, did you suggest to
Hitler the conclusion of separate peace agreements?
VON RIBBENTROP: A certain atmosphere of confidence between the Soviet
Government and ourselves had been created at Moscow, between Stalin,
Molotov and myself, and also extending to the Führer. For instance, the
Führer told me that he had confidence in Stalin, whom he considered one
of the really great men of history, and whose creation of the Red Army
he thought a tremendous achievement; but that one could never tell what
might happen. The power of the Soviets had grown and developed
enormously. It was very difficult to know how to deal with Russia and
make an agreement with her again. I myself always tried, through
diplomatic and other channels, to maintain contact to a certain extent,
because I still believed and hoped that some sort of peace could be made
which would relieve Germany in the East and allow her to concentrate her
forces in the West and even lead, perhaps, to a general peace. With this
in view, I proposed to the Führer, for the first time, in the winter of
1942, it was before Stalingrad, that an agreement should be reached with
Russia. I did that after the Anglo-American landing in Africa which
caused me great misgivings. Adolf Hitler—I met him in the train at
Bamberg—most emphatically rejected the idea of any such peace or peace
feelers, because he thought that if it became known, it would be liable
to create a spirit of defeatism, _et cetera_. I had suggested to him at
the time that we should negotiate peace with Russia on a very moderate
basis.
Secondly, in 1943, I again advised the Führer in a lengthy, written
exposition, to seek such a peace. I think it was after the collapse of
Italy. The Führer was at that time open to consider such a peace; and he
drafted a possible mutual line of demarcation which might be adopted,
and said that he would let me know definitely on the following day. Next
day, however, I did not receive any authorization or directive from him.
I think that the Führer probably felt that it was impossible to heal the
breach between National Socialism and communism and that such a peace
would be no more than an armistice.
I made one or two further attempts but the Führer held the view that a
decisive military success must be achieved first, and only after that
could we start negotiations, otherwise the negotiations would be
useless.
If I were asked to express an opinion as to whether such negotiations
would have been likely to succeed, I would say that I think it very
doubtful. I believe that, considering the strong stand taken by our
opponents, especially England, even since the beginning of the war,
there was never any real chance of Germany’s attaining peace; and that
holds good for both the East and the West. And I am convinced that with
the formulation at Casablanca of the demand for unconditional surrender,
the possibility ceased entirely to exist. I base my opinion not on
purely abstract considerations, but on continuous feelers, made through
indirect channels, often unidentifiable as such, by the other side, and
which expressed the opinion of important personalities with a guiding
influence on policy in those countries. They were determined to fight it
out to the bitter end. I think the Führer was right when he said that
such negotiations would serve no purpose.
DR. HORN: To come to a different subject, the witness Lahousen has
testified here that in September 1939 a conversation took place in
Hitler’s private train at which you were also present, and which dealt
with the instigation of a rebellion in the Polish Ukraine. What led to
this conversation and what part did you play in the discussion?
VON RIBBENTROP: I remember that in the course of the Polish campaign
Admiral Canaris, who was at the time Chief of the Wehrmacht
Counterintelligence Service, came to see me, as he sometimes did when he
was making a short personal visit. I was in my compartment on the
Führer’s train at the time. I do not remember that the witness Lahousen
was present; I had the impression when I saw Herr Lahousen here that I
had never seen him before. Canaris came to me from time to time to tell
me about his activities in the Intelligence and other fields. He did so
on this occasion; and I believe it was he who told me that he had set
all his agents to fomenting a revolt among the Ukrainian and other
minorities in the rear of the Polish Army. He certainly received no
instructions or directives from me, as was alleged here—and cannot have
received any, for these two reasons:
1. The German Foreign Minister was never in a position to give any
directives to a military authority.
2. At the beginning of the Polish campaign, the German Foreign Office
was not at all concerned with the question of the Ukraine, and similar
questions—or at any rate I myself was not. I was not even sufficiently
well acquainted with the details to be able to give directives.
DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a circular issued by the
Foreign Office...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something more about this? The witness
Lahousen has alleged that I said that houses were to be burned down or
villages were to be burned down and the Jews were to be killed. I would
like to state categorically that I never said such a thing.
Canaris was with me in my car at that time, and it is possible, although
I do not remember it exactly, that I may have seen him going out later
on. Apparently he received instructions which originated with the Führer
as to the attitude he was to take in Poland with regard to the Ukrainian
and other questions. There is no sense in the statement ascribed to me,
because especially in the Ukraine—the Ukrainian villages—those were
Ukrainians living in them, and they were not our enemies but our
friends; it would have been completely senseless for me to say that
these villages should be burned down. Secondly, as regards killing the
Jews, I can only say that this would have been entirely contrary to my
inner conviction and that the killing of the Jews never entered the mind
of anybody at that time. I may say, in short, that all this is
absolutely untrue. I have never given instructions of this kind, nor
could I have done so, nor even a general indication on those lines. May
I add that I remember that Herr Lahousen himself was not quite convinced
that I had made this statement; at least, that was my impression.
DR. HORN: Have you anything to say about the Foreign Office circular
submitted by the Prosecution and bearing the title: “The Jewish question
as a factor in foreign politics in the year 1938”?
VON RIBBENTROP: I saw this circular here for the first time. Here are
the facts: There was a section in the Foreign Office which was concerned
with Party matters and questions of ideology. That department
undoubtedly co-operated with the competent departments of the Party.
That was not the Foreign Office itself. I saw the circular here. It
seems to me that it is on the same lines as most of the circulars issued
at the time for the information and training of officials, and so on. It
even might possibly have gone through my office, but I think that the
fact that it was signed by a section chief and not by myself or by the
state secretary, should prove that I did not consider the circular very
important even if I did see it. Even if it did go through my office or
pass me in some other way, I certainly did not read it because in
principle I did not read such long documents, but asked my assistants to
give me a short summary of the contents. I may add that I received
hundreds of letters in the course of the day’s work, some of which were
read to me, and also circulars and decrees which I signed, and many of
which I did not acquaint myself with. I wish to state, however, that if
one of my officials signed the circular it goes without saying that I
assume full responsibility for it.
DR. HORN: The Prosecution have several times spoken of the Geneva
Convention. Your name was frequently mentioned in this connection also.
What was your attitude toward the Geneva Convention?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe, and many people will and could confirm it,
that from the beginning of the war the Foreign Office and I have always
supported the Geneva Convention in every way. I should like to add that
the military authorities always showed much understanding for these
things—at least, for the affairs I had to deal with. If, later on, this
no longer held good in every respect, it was due to the rigors of war,
and possibly to the harshness of the Führer.
As to the terror-fliers I must state that in 1943 and 1944 the English
and American air raids gradually became a terrible threat to Germany. I
saw this for the first time in Hamburg, and I remember this event
because I was with the Führer at the time and I described to him the
terrifying impression I had received. I do not believe that anyone who
has not experienced such a raid and its results can imagine what it
means. It is evident that we Germans, and especially Adolf Hitler,
continually sought means to master this menace.
I must also mention the terrible attack on Dresden, and I would like to
ask the Tribunal’s permission to name a witness, the former Danish
Minister Richard, who was there during the attack and described it to me
2 days later. It was, therefore, self-evident that the problem of
terror-fliers had to be solved somehow by the Führer. This was in
contrast to our view insofar as we wanted to find a solution which would
not infringe upon the Geneva Convention, or at least a solution which
could be publicly proclaimed to our enemies. My department was not
directly concerned with the question, for we had nothing to do with
defense problems which were taken care of by the military authorities,
the police and those responsible for home policy. But we were indirectly
concerned where the matter was affected by the Geneva Convention, and my
point of view, which I frequently expressed, was that if any steps were
taken an official proclamation should be published, giving a definition
of a terror-flier, and stating that these terror-fliers convicted or
airmen suspected of an attack upon the civilian population would be
tried by courts-martial. Geneva would then be officially notified of
this measure or preparatory measure and then the enemy would be informed
through the protecting powers. Fliers found guilty of deliberate
terrorist raids by the courts-martial would be sentenced; if not, they
would revert to the normal status of prisoners of war. But this was
never carried out in practice. It was not a suggestion by me but an idea
which I expressed to Hitler in the course of conversations on one or two
occasions and which was not put into practice because, in practice, it
was impossible to find a definition for these raids. I believe some
mention was also made of a conference supposed to have taken place in
Klessheim during which I was said to have proposed or supported
farther-reaching measures. I remember quite clearly that this conference
did not take place. I do not believe, or at least, I do not remember,
that I ever discussed this question at that time with Himmler, with whom
I was not at that time on good terms, or Göring, whom I did not see very
often. I believe that it is possible that the subject was brought up in
a conversation during an official visit to Klessheim, as often happened,
with the Führer, but that I do not know any more, I do know one thing
that if allusion is made to a more thorough-going proposal emanating
from me it can refer only to the following: At the time we were anxious
to arrive at a clear definition of these attacks by terror-fliers and in
the course of discussion various suggestions were made for the
definition of certain categories of attacks, such as machine-gunning
from the air, as terror attacks. It is possible that this note, or
whatever it was, came into being in this way: That the person in
question knew my views, that is, the person trying to find a practical
solution—if one was arrived at—to agree officially with the Geneva
Convention or could, at least, have been officially discussed with
Geneva.
Another document has also been submitted in this connection. I believe
it was a suggestion for an expert opinion on this question by the
Foreign Office. I do not remember exactly how this expert opinion came
to be given, whether it was done on my orders or whether it was the
result of a discussion with the Wehrmacht authorities concerned, who
wanted to know the opinion of the Foreign Office. All I know is that the
Wehrmacht always attached great importance to an exact knowledge of our
opinion with regard to the Geneva Convention. I remember that expert
opinion, however, and that I have seen it. I am now said to have
approved it. It would take too long to go into details, but that is not
correct. I remember that I submitted that expert opinion to the Führer
as being a very important matter which I could not deal with alone. I
think that the Führer—or I remember rather exactly, that the Führer
dismissed it as nonsense at the time, so this expert opinion was not
well received by the Führer. In the further course of events all we
heard, because we were only concerned indirectly, was that no order of
any sort was issued by the Führer or any Wehrmacht authority, because
the Wehrmacht shared our very views on this subject. Admittedly, I do
not know that in detail; but I can say with absolute certainty that
since this question of defense against terror-fliers was under
consideration, and afterwards, not a single case of lynching came to my
ears. I did not hear that this had happened until I was here.
DR. HORN: The other day witness Dahlerus was brought here. How long have
you known Dahlerus?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that I saw Dahlerus here for the first time.
Of course, it is possible that I may have seen him once from a distance
or possibly in the Reich Chancellery during one of his apparently
frequent visits to the Führer. But I do not remember him, and when I saw
him here I had the impression that I had never seen him before.
DR. HORN: Were you in a position to exercise influence regarding planes
for visitors to the Reich Government?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I had no such influence.
DR. HORN: One more question on a different subject. What real estate was
at your disposal in your official capacity as Foreign Minister?
VON RIBBENTROP: The other day the British Prosecutor declared that, to
begin with, I had one house and later on I had six. I want to clear this
matter up for the Court. After losing my entire fortune in America, I
became quite wealthy again through my own work. As such, and in other
ways, too, I had certain possibilities and I also had funds through
relatives, through my wife. I built a house in Berlin-Dahlem in 1922-23
and bought several lots there. We lived there for many years.
Furthermore, in 1934—I want to emphasize the fact that this had nothing
to do with my political activities, because at the time I had only just
started them—I bought a small house and estate called Sonnenburg, near
Berlin, with some funds which my wife inherited, I think, and from funds
of my own.
The other—or I should say rather that since that time I have not
acquired a square yard of property in Germany or anywhere else. The
other houses mentioned by the British Prosecutor, that is, the so-called
Schloss Fuschl, this became known because various foreign statesmen were
received there during the war. That is not really a castle but a tower,
an old hunting tower of the Archbishops of Salzburg. The Führer had put
it at my disposal to have a roof over my head when I was at
Obersalzberg, because he did not want me to stay in the hotel, which was
always very crowded, and I had to bring my staff with me. Fuschl was
never my personal property, but was a so-called Foreign Office
establishment, which belonged exclusively to the state and was kept up
by the state. I knew the former owners of this castle or tower only by
name and, therefore, I cannot give any information about them. I only
heard that this building was confiscated by the Reich Government, along
with other property belonging to political opponents in Austria.
The second house mentioned here was, I think, a house in Slovakia. There
was also a question of a third house in Sudetenland, which was alleged
to be the property of a Count Czernin. I believe I can explain this
also. Here are the facts: The Führer had given me permission to arrange
hunting parties to which I could invite foreign statesmen for the
purpose of more informal talks. I was also a hunter, so the Foreign
Office, that is to say the Reich Government, had leased ground from some
of the farmers in Sudetenland for hunting purposes, along with a
suitably impressive house. I believe they were rented for only a couple
of years; they were not even purchased. The same thing was done in the
case of a hunting ground in Slovakia. I do not think that this was our
property at all. The Slovak Government placed it at our disposal for a
few days every year, to shoot deer. It was a hunting lodge in which I
once or twice spent 2 or 3 days, but it has nothing to do with my own
property.
Another place was mentioned, a house called Tanneck. I may mention that
I have never even seen this house, situated, I believe, in the
Rhineland. According to the description which I have received, it is a
small house occupied by a man responsible for looking after several
horses. I had formerly served in the cavalry and was interested in
horses which had been purchased in France by the State, from the
well-known racing stable owner, the Aga Khan in Normandy, as they would
otherwise have been ruined. I should like to emphasize the fact that
full compensation—I always paid particular attention to this—was paid
for the horses, as I think the Aga Khan will gladly confirm. They were
brought to Germany with the Führer’s full consent, although he was not
greatly interested in horses; but he understood my point of view. These
horses were later to be put in the stud farm Grabitz, which belonged to
the Reich Government.
If the Tribunal permits, I would like to say that, as far as my personal
affairs are concerned, my Defense Counsel will present the necessary
testimony. I gave instructions at that time that I did not want to have
a single Reichsmark more at the end of my term of office than I had at
the beginning, with the exception of two gifts which I received from the
Führer, but most of which, or at least part of which, I believe, has
since been spent by the State for my official expenses.
DR. HORN: One last question: During your activities, in regard to
foreign policy, did you see any possibility of realizing prospects of
revision which had been conceded to Germany but which had not
materialized?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was precisely the great problem out of which, in
the final analysis, this war developed. As Adolf Hitler often told me,
he wanted to build up an ideal social state in Europe after the solution
of the problems which he had recognized as vital. He wanted to erect
buildings, _et cetera_; that was his aim. Now, the realization of these
aims defined as vital by the Führer was greatly hampered by the
petrified political system, which had been established in Europe and the
world in general.
We, the Führer, and then I myself on his order—so I believe I can be
the chief witness—always tried to solve these problems through
diplomatic and peaceful channels. I brooded many nights over the League
of Nations—day and night over Paragraph 19 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, but the difficulty was that the Führer was not in a
position, or was convinced that it was simply impossible to obtain
results through negotiation—at least, without having strong armed
forces to back him up. The mistake was, I believe, that, although
Paragraph 19 was a very good paragraph of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, and one which we all would have been very willing to sign and
follow or one which we did sign and would have followed, no means of
putting it into practice existed. That gradually created a situation in
which the powers, and that is quite natural, who wanted to retain this
state of petrifaction, as I might call it, or _status quo_, opposed any
steps taken by Germany, which of course, caused reaction on the part of
the Führer, until finally it reached the point, the very tragic point,
where this great war began over a question like Danzig and the Corridor,
which could have been solved comparatively easy.
DR. HORN: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I do not think it would be possible to go any
further with the examination of the witness today, but the Tribunal
would welcome your assistance and the assistance of the Prosecution with
reference to your documents, if you could tell us what the position is
with reference to your documents, and if the Prosecution could tell us
how far they have been able to see these documents since they have been
translated and how far they have been able to make up their minds as to
what documents they wish to object to and what documents they are
prepared to admit as being offered in evidence before us. Could you tell
us what the position is with reference to these documents; how many of
your documents have been translated?
DR. HORN: A gentleman from the British Prosecution told me this morning
that the English Document Book will be ready on Monday and that I can
discuss with him the question of what documents will be admitted. He
also told me that the British Prosecution would arrange everything with
the other delegations of the Prosecution, so that on Tuesday I should be
in a position to submit the remaining documents and, I believe, this
could be done in 2 or 3 hours. I want to submit these documents in
groups and do not wish to read too much from them, but only explain to
the Tribunal my reason for asking them to take judicial notice of these
documents.
THE PRESIDENT: You said, did you not, it would take you no longer than 2
or 3 hours to explain the documents after you had come to the
arrangement with the Prosecution?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And have you any other witnesses to call besides the
defendant?
DR. HORN: No. I would like only to submit an affidavit by a witness
requested by me, Counsellor of Legation Gottfriedsen, dealing with the
personal financial circumstances of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, former
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Gottfriedsen was the Foreign Office
official whose task was to look after the official income of the Foreign
Minister and who is also very well acquainted with his private financial
affairs. He can give information about the personal and official estates
belonging to the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry. I have
embodied this information in the form of a few questions in an
affidavit. If the Prosecution have no objection to this affidavit, I
could dispense with the calling of the witness, Gottfriedsen. However,
if the Prosecution want him to appear, then I would question him on the
contents of the affidavit.
I have no other witnesses for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. When all my
documents will have been presented, the case for the Defense will be
concluded.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the Prosecution tell us their view on this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as far as the British Prosecution is
concerned, we have now had six document books, I think, taking us up to
Number 214, roughly two-thirds of the documents which Dr. Horn wishes to
tender, and we have been able to go through up to Number 191. I made out
a list—I could hand one to the Court and give Dr. Horn another one—of
those documents that we object to, which are very briefly set out. I
should think we object to something like 70 or 80, between the Numbers
45 and 191, maybe a little more. The Soviet Delegation are, I think, in
a position to tender their objections, which are practically entirely in
accord with ours, though they were prepared separately. M. Champetier de
Ribes has at least two batches of documents to which he wishes to make
objections. I think I may say that Mr. Dodd is more or less leaving this
point to me and will act in accordance with the British Delegation’s
view on the point. So that is the position. It probably would be
convenient if I handed in a very outlined list of objections which I
have up to date.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know, Sir David, what the
position of the Prosecution is about the translation of the documents.
You remember that the Tribunal did make an order that the Prosecution
should object to documents, if possible, before they were translated, so
as to avoid unnecessary translations, and in the event of any
disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense any matter should
be referred to the Tribunal. It was thought that there were a great
number of documents on which agreement could be achieved in that way,
and the labor and time taken up in translating would be obviated.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The difficulty we have been in over these
documents, is that we did our best to try to formulate our view on the
index, but it is a very difficult matter to form a view when you get a
short description of only a line and a half about a document. But it
might be that that would be the most practical way of doing it, despite
its difficulty. If the Prosecution were given an index with as good a
description as possible of the document, the Prosecution then formulated
their objections on the index, and the Tribunal heard any outstanding
differences before the documents were translated, I should think—I am
afraid I can put it only tentatively—it would be worth a trial.
Otherwise, you would get a terrible blockage in the Translation Division
of the Tribunal by a vast number of documents, such as we have had in
this case, to which ultimately we are going to make full and numerous
objections, but that holds up the translation of all the documents
belonging to the subsequent proceedings. So I should be prepared—and I
think my colleagues would support me—in making a trial, if the Tribunal
thought it could be done, to hand in an objection on a list of documents
and see if we could in that way arrive at the results which would
obviate the necessity of translating them all.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be of assistance to the Prosecution, supposing
the defendants’ counsel were to give them the entire documents in German
with also a full index in English, and then the Prosecution, or some
member of the Prosecution who is familiar with German, could go through
the documents in German and the Prosecution can then make up their minds
in that way? Would that be an assistance to the Prosecution? They would
have not only the index to inform them as to what was the nature of the
documents, but they would have the documents in German.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think that would be a great help, especially
if he underlined the more material passages.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, with the co-operation of the defendants’ counsel,
some measure of agreement might be arrived at as to what were the
necessary documents to lay before the Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I think that could be done, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, Sir David, with reference to the immediate
future, on Monday, of course, some of the defendants’ counsel may wish
to ask questions of the Defendant Ribbentrop and then the Prosecution
may wish to cross-examine him, and that, I suppose, might possibly take
all Monday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think that is highly probable, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Under those circumstances, if the scheme which Dr. Horn
has outlined is carried out, there would not necessarily be any delay at
all, because by Tuesday morning his documents would have been all
examined by the Prosecution and the objections to them would have been
put in, and he could then go through, as he says, in 2 or 3 hours, the
documents which remain for the consideration of the Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I respectfully agree, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal would like to know what the position is
with reference to the next defendant. It may be that on Tuesday after
the midday adjournment the case of Defendant Keitel would come on. Now,
are his documents in order? As far as I remember, most of his documents
are documents which have already been put in evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A great many.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not so?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Dr. Nelte could help us.
THE PRESIDENT: If he would, yes.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am ready to begin at any time. The documents
have been presented and affidavits were already presented to the
Prosecution last week. I am waiting only for the Prosecution to decide
as to the relevancy of those documents which the defendant has submitted
as his own statements and which are to be submitted in order to shorten
the examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not had the chance of going through them
myself but, as a matter of principle, we have always been quite prepared
that a statement should be read so long as the witness is there to be
cross-examined. If the Tribunal has no objection, there will be none
from the Prosecution on that procedure.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal has no objection at all to that method
of presenting written documents, provided the Prosecution does not
object to them, and, therefore, no cross-examination is necessary. Could
Dr. Nelte tell us whether the documents which he wishes to present,
insofar as they have not already been put in evidence, have been
translated yet?
DR. NELTE: They all were sent to the translation office and the last two
documents were sent 3 days ago. I assume, therefore, that the
delegations of the Prosecution have, in the meantime, received the
translations.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you received them, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, we have not received them.
DR. NELTE: Perhaps they have not been distributed yet. Several or about
two-thirds of the documents were translated into French and English
about two weeks ago and are ready. I subsequently also sent these
documents to the Russian Delegation so that they could be translated
into Russian.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am told, My Lord, from General Mitchell, that
the documents are translated. They have not yet been distributed.
THE PRESIDENT: Then there ought to be no cause for delay in connection
with the Defendant Keitel’s case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not think so.
DR. NELTE: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, does the same apply to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner,
who is the next one? Dr. Kauffmann, are your documents yet translated?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have only a very few affidavits and
there is no doubt that they will be in the hands of the Prosecution in
due time.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. So that you will be quite ready to go on
then?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, after Keitel, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, after Keitel, very well. Sir David, then you will
present to us the objections which you are making to Dr. Horn’s
documents, and the Soviet Prosecutor will present his objections.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall hand them in as far as I have gone,
if I may, at once.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and M. Champetier de Ribes, so far as he has any.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If My Lordship pleases, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-SIXTH DAY
Monday, 1 April 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Von Ribbentrop resumed the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Have any of the defendants’ counsel any questions they
want to put to the defendant?
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Your Honor. Witness, the preamble to the secret pact
concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939 is
worded more or less as follows:
“In view of the present tension between Germany and Poland, the
following is agreed upon in case of a conflict...”
Do you recall whether the preamble had approximately that wording?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact wording, but it is
approximately correct.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the chief of the legal department of the
Foreign Office, Ambassador Dr. Gaus, participated as legal adviser in
the negotiations in Moscow on 23 August 1939 and drafted the treaty?
VON RIBBENTROP: Ambassador Gaus participated partly in the negotiations
and drafted the agreements with me.
DR. SEIDL: I shall now read an extract from the statement by Ambassador
Gaus and ask you a few questions in connection with it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, what document are you going to read?
DR. SEIDL: I shall read from Paragraph 3 of the statement made by Dr.
Gaus and in connection with it ask a few questions of the witness,
because some points concerning this pact do not seem to have been
sufficiently clarified as yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not know, Mr. President, what relation these
questions have with the Defendant Hess, who is defended by Dr. Seidl, or
with the Defendant Frank. I do not wish to discuss this affidavit, as I
attach no importance whatsoever to it. I wish only to draw the attention
of the Tribunal to the fact that we are not investigating the problems
connected with the policy of the Allied nations, but are investigating
the charges against the major German war criminals; and such questions
on the part of the Defense Counsel is an attempt to divert the attention
of the Tribunal from the issues we are investigating. I therefore think
it proper that questions of this kind should be rejected as not
relevant.
[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred._]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the questions.
DR. SEIDL: Gaus stated, under Paragraph 3 of his affidavit:
“The plane of the Reich Foreign Minister whom I had to accompany
as legal adviser in the intended negotiations arrived in Moscow
at noon on 23 August 1939. On the afternoon of the same day the
first conversation between Herr Von Ribbentrop and Mr. Stalin
took place at which, on the German side, besides the Reich
Foreign Minister, only Embassy Counsellor Hilger, as
interpreter, and perhaps also Ambassador Count Schulenburg, but
not myself, were present.
“The Reich Foreign Minister returned very satisfied from this
long conference and indicated that it was as good as certain
that it would result in the conclusion of the agreements desired
on the part of Germany. The continuation of the conference, at
which the documents to be signed were to be discussed and
completed, was scheduled for later in the evening. At this
second conference I participated personally and so did
Ambassador Count Schulenburg and Embassy Counsellor Hilger. On
the Russian side the negotiations were conducted by Messrs.
Stalin and Molotov, whose interpreter was Mr. Pavlov. An
agreement on the text of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact
was reached quickly and without difficulties.
“Herr Von Ribbentrop himself had inserted in the preamble to the
agreement which I had drafted a rather far-reaching phrase
concerning the formation of friendly German-Soviet relations to
which Mr. Stalin objected with the remark that the Soviet
Government could not suddenly present to the public
German-Soviet assurances of friendship after they had been
covered with pails of manure by the Nazi Government for 6 years.
Thereupon this phrase in the preamble was deleted or rather
changed.
“Besides the Non-aggression Pact there were negotiations for
quite some time on a separate secret document, which according
to my recollection was called a ‘secret agreement’ or ‘secret
additional agreement’ and the terms of which were aimed at a
demarcation of the mutual spheres of interest in the European
territories situated between the two countries. Whether the
expression ‘spheres of interest’ or other such expressions were
used therein, I do not recall. In the document, Germany declared
herself politically disinterested in Latvia, Estonia and Finland
but considered Lithuania to be part of her sphere of influence.
“Regarding the political disinterest of Germany in the two
Baltic countries mentioned, controversy arose when the Reich
Foreign Minister, in accordance with his instructions, wanted to
have a certain part of the Baltic territory exempted from this
political disinterest; this, however, was rejected on the part
of the Soviets, especially on account of the ice-free ports in
this territory.
“Because of this point, which apparently had already been
discussed in Ribbentrop’s first conversation, the Foreign
Minister had put in a call to Hitler which came through only
during the second discussion, and during which, in direct
conversation with Hitler, he was authorized to accept the Soviet
standpoint. A demarcation line was laid down for the Polish
territory. I cannot remember whether it was drafted on a map
which was to be attached to the document or only described in
the document. Moreover, an agreement was reached in regard to
Poland, stating approximately that the two powers would act in
mutual agreement in the final settlement of questions concerning
this country. It could, however, be possible that this last
agreement regarding Poland was reached only when the change of
the secret agreement mentioned later in Paragraph 5 was made.
“Regarding the Balkan States, it was confirmed that Germany had
only economic interests there. The Non-aggression Pact and the
secret agreement were signed rather late that same evening.”
Witness, in the affidavit of Gaus, a pact is mentioned whereby the two
powers agree to act in mutual agreement with regard to the final
settlement of the questions concerning Poland. Had such an agreement
already been reached on 23 August 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. At that time the serious
German-Polish crisis was acute, and it goes without saying that this
question was thoroughly discussed. I should like to emphasize that there
was not the slightest doubt in either Stalin’s or Hitler’s mind that, if
the negotiations with Poland came to naught, the territories that had
been taken from the two great powers by force of arms could also be
retaken by force of arms. In keeping with this understanding, the
eastern territories were occupied by Soviet troops and the western
territories by German troops after victory. There is no doubt that
Stalin can never accuse Germany of an aggression or of an aggressive war
for her action in Poland. If it is considered an aggression, then both
sides are guilty of it.
DR. SEIDL: Was the demarcation line in this secret agreement described
merely in writing or was it drawn on a map attached to the agreement?
VON RIBBENTROP: The line of demarcation was roughly drawn on a map. It
ran along the Rivers Rysia, Bug, Narew, and San. These rivers I
remember. That was the line of demarcation that was to be adhered to in
case of an armed conflict with Poland.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of that agreement, not
Germany but Soviet Russia received the greater part of Poland?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the exact proportions, but, at any rate,
the agreement was that the territories east of these rivers were to go
to Soviet Russia and the territories west of these rivers were to be
occupied by German troops, while the organization of this territory as
intended by Germany was still an open question and had not yet been
discussed by Hitler and myself. Then, later the Government General was
formed when the regions lost by Germany after World War I were
incorporated into Germany.
DR. SEIDL: Now, something else. You stated last Friday that you wanted
Russia to join in the Tripartite Pact. Why did that fail?
VON RIBBENTROP: That failed because of Russian demands. The Russian
demands concerned—I should perhaps say first that I had agreed with M.
Molotov in Berlin to conduct further negotiations through diplomatic
channels. I wanted to influence the Führer regarding the demands already
made by Molotov in Berlin in order that some sort of an agreement or
compromise might be arrived at.
Then Schulenburg sent us a report from Moscow with the Russian demands.
In this report was, first of all, the renewed demand for Finland. To
this the Führer, as is well known, told Molotov that he did not wish
that after the winter campaign of 1940 another war should break out in
the North. Now the demand for Finland was raised again, and we assumed
that it would mean the occupation of Finland. It was difficult since it
was a demand which the Führer had already turned down.
Another demand of the Russians was that of the Balkans and Bulgaria.
Russia, as is well known, wanted bases there and wished to enter into
close relations with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government, with whom we
got in touch, did not want this. Moreover, this Russian penetration of
the Balkans was for both the Führer and Mussolini a difficult question
because of our economic interests there: grain, oil, and so on. But
above all it was the will of the Bulgarian Government themselves, which
was against this penetration.
Then, thirdly, there was the demand of the Russians for outlets to the
sea and military bases on the Dardanelles; and then the request which
Molotov had already expressed to me in Berlin, to secure somehow at
least an interest in the outlets of the Baltic Sea. M. Molotov himself
told me at that time that Russia naturally was also very much interested
in the Skagerrak and Kattegat.
At that time I discussed these demands and requests fully with the
Führer. The Führer said we would have to get in touch with Mussolini,
who was very much interested in some of these demands. This took place,
but neither the demands for the Balkans nor the demands for the
Dardanelles met with the approval from Mussolini. As far as Bulgaria is
concerned I have already stated that she did not want it either; and
with regard to Finland, neither Finland nor the Führer wanted to accede
to the demands of the Soviet Union.
Negotiations were then carried on for many months. I recall that upon
receipt of a telegram from Moscow in December 1940 I had another long
conversation with the Führer. I had an idea that, if we could bring
about a compromise between the Russian demands and the wishes of the
various parties concerned, a coalition could be formed which would be so
strong that it would eventually induce England to remain at peace.
THE PRESIDENT: What is this all an answer to? What was your question
that this is supposed to be an answer to?
DR. SEIDL: In essence he has already answered the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if he has answered the question you should
stop him.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. I now come to another question: What was Adolf
Hitler’s opinion regarding the military strength of Russia?
VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler once said to me—he expressed himself
thus—and this was when he became worried about what was taking place in
Russia in the way of preparations against Germany: “We do not know of
course what is concealed behind this gate, if some day we should really
be forced to kick it open.” From this and other statements which the
Führer made at this time I concluded that, on the basis of reports about
Russia, he suffered great anxiety about the strength and the possible
display of might by the Soviet Union.
DR. SEIDL: My next question: What circumstances induced Hitler to
anticipate the threatening danger of an offensive by the Soviet Union?
VON RIBBENTROP: This was as follows...
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t this been dealt with extensively and exhaustively
by the Defendant Göring? You are here as counsel for Hess.
DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal is of the opinion that this has been dealt
with exhaustively, I shall withdraw the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you sit down, Dr. Seidl, you were putting Gaus’
affidavit to the defendant, I suppose with the intention that he should
say that the affidavit was true; is that right?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You didn’t put to him Paragraph 4 of the affidavit at
all, did you?
DR. SEIDL: I read only Paragraph 3 of the affidavit. I did not read
Paragraph 1, 2, 4, and 5 in order to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: The answer to my question was, “yes,” that you did not
put it. Should you not put the end of Paragraph 4 to him, which reads in
this way:
“The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner
that he let a warlike conflict of Germany with Poland appear not
as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent
possibility. No statements which could have included the
approval or encouragement for such a conflict were made by the
Soviet statesmen on this point. Rather the Soviet
representatives limited themselves in this respect simply to
taking cognizance of the explanations of the German
representatives.”
Is that correct?
DR. SEIDL: That is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking the witness. Is that correct?
VON RIBBENTROP: I may say the following to this. When I went to Moscow
no final decision had been reached by the Führer...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, couldn’t you answer the question directly? I asked
you whether the statement in the affidavit was correct or not. You can
explain afterwards.
VON RIBBENTROP: Not quite correct, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you can explain.
VON RIBBENTROP: It is not correct insofar as at that time the decision
to attack Poland had in no way been made by the Führer. There is,
however, no doubt that it became perfectly clear during the discussions
in Moscow that there was at any time the possibility of such a conflict,
if the last effort at negotiations failed.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the difference between that and what I have
just read to you? What I read to you was this:
“The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner
that he let a warlike conflict of Germany with Poland appear not
as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent
possibility.”
I should have thought your explanation was exactly the same as that.
That’s all.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I mention something briefly in this
connection? This witness Gaus was present only at the second conference.
He was, however, not present at the long conference which took place
previously between the witness Ribbentrop on the one hand and Molotov
and Stalin on the other hand. At these conferences only Embassy
Counsellor Hilger was present and I ask the Tribunal to call witness
Hilger, who has, in view of the importance of this point, already been
granted me.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, as you know, you can make any application in
writing for calling any witness that you like; and also the Tribunal
wishes me to say that if the Prosecution wish to have the witness Gaus
here for a cross-examination they may do so.
DR. SEIDL: Then I should like to put in as Hess Exhibit Number 16
(Document Number Hess-16) the sworn affidavit of Ambassador Gaus.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, as far as I understand, there is
some slight danger of the witness Gaus being removed from Nuremberg. I
would like to state at this time that we would like to have him retained
here for long enough time for possible cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Do any other members of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?
DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel states that in the autumn of 1940, when
the idea of a war with Russia was discussed by Hitler, he went to Fuschl
in order to talk to you about this question. He believed that you too
had misgivings about it. Do you recall that Keitel at the end of August
or at the beginning of September was in Fuschl?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. He did visit me at that time.
DR. NELTE: Do you recall that Keitel at that time stated to you his
opinion about the probably imminent war?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. He spoke of that at the time. I
believe he said that the Führer had discussed it with him.
DR. NELTE: What I am driving at is this: Keitel states that he spoke
with you about a memorandum he intended to submit to Hitler which
referred to the considerations which were to be taken into account in
case of war with Soviet Russia.
VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. Field Marshal Keitel told me at that
time that he intended to submit a memorandum to Hitler, and he expressed
his misgivings concerning a possible conflict between the Soviet Union
and Germany.
DR. NELTE: Did you have the impression that Field Marshal Keitel was
opposed to the war at that time?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I had absolutely that impression.
DR. NELTE: Is it true that he, as a result of this discussion, asked you
to support his point of view with Hitler?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct, and I told him at that time that I
would do so, that I would speak to Hitler, and he ought to do the same.
DR. NELTE: Another question, regarding the escape of the French General
Giraud. Is it true that Keitel, when the French General Giraud escaped
from Königstein, asked you to take steps with the French Government to
bring about the voluntary return of General Giraud?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. At that time he asked me whether it
would not be possible, by way of negotiations with the French
Government, to induce Giraud to return to imprisonment in some way or
other.
DR. NELTE: Did a meeting then take place with General Giraud in occupied
France through the intervention of Ambassador Abetz?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, such a meeting took place. I believe Ambassador
Abetz met Giraud, who, as I recall, appeared in the company of M. Laval.
The Ambassador did everything he could in order to induce the General to
return, but finally did not succeed. The General was promised safe
conduct for this meeting and upon its conclusion the General and Laval
left.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution has submitted an order, the subject of which
was the branding of Soviet prisoners of war. The Defendant Keitel is
held responsible for this order. He states that he spoke with you about
this question at headquarters located at the time in Vinnitza; that he
had to do it because all questions pertaining to prisoners of war also
concerned the department for international law of the Foreign Office. Do
you recall that in this connection Keitel asked you whether there were
any objections from the point of view of international law to this
branding which Hitler wished.
VON RIBBENTROP: The situation was this: I heard about the intention of
marking prisoners of war and went to headquarters to speak with Keitel
about this matter because it was my opinion that the marking of
prisoners in such a way was out of the question. Keitel shared my
opinion; and, so far as I recall, I believe he gave later orders that
this intended form of marking was not to be used.
DR. NELTE: I have no further question.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Witness,
when did you make the acquaintance of Admiral Dönitz?
VON RIBBENTROP: I made his acquaintance after he was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That was in 1943?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe so.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Admiral Dönitz before or after this time
exert or try to exert any influence on German foreign policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have never heard that Admiral Dönitz tried to exert
any influence on German foreign policy.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you recall Marshal Antonescu’s visit to
the Führer headquarters on 27 February 1944?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do recall the visit but not the date. Marshal
Antonescu used to visit the Führer frequently. I should say every six
months or so; I believe you said at the beginning of 1944?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, on 27 February 1944.