in May that Hitler’s real view was that Danzig was not the subject of
the dispute at all, but that his real object was the acquisition of
Lebensraum in the East?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know it in that sense. The Führer talked
sometimes about living space, that is right, but I did not know that he
had the intention to attack Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at Page 117, or it may be
118, of your document. On Page 117 you will find the minutes of the
conference on the 23rd day of May 1939 at the new Reich Chancellery.
VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 117?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 117. I want you to look at it. It may be on Page
118, and it begins with the following words:
“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a
question of expanding our Lebensraum in the East and of securing
our food supplies and of the settlement of the Baltic problem.
Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas.
Added to the natural fertility, the German, through cultivation,
will enormously increase the surplus. There is no other
possibility for Europe.” (Document Number L-79)
Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never explained that view to
you?
VON RIBBENTROP: It may be strange to say so, but I should like to say
first that it looks as though I was not present during this conference.
That was a military conference, and the Führer used to hold these
military conferences quite separately from the political conferences.
The Führer did now and then mention that we had to have Lebensraum; but
I knew nothing, and he never told me anything at that time, that is in
May 1939, of an intention to attack Poland. Yes, I think this was kept
back deliberately, as had been done in other cases, because he always
wanted his diplomats to stand wholeheartedly for a diplomatic solution
and to bring it about.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean to say that Hitler was deliberately
keeping you in the dark as to his real aims; that Danzig was not the
subject of dispute and what he really wanted was Lebensraum; is that
your story?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I assume that he did that deliberately because...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the very short paragraph
a little further on where he says:
“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with no
alternative but to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.
There will be fighting. The task is to isolate Poland.”
Do you tell the Tribunal that he never said that to his Foreign
Minister?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand that question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a perfectly simple one. Do you tell the
Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned what I have just read from his
speech, that there is to be no question of sparing Poland, that you had
to attack Poland at the first opportunity, and your task was to isolate
Poland? Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned that to
his Foreign Minister, who would have the practical conduct of foreign
policy?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not do that at that time; but, according to
my recollection, only much later, in the summer of 1939. At that time he
did say that he was resolved—and he said literally—to solve the
problem one way or another.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you say that you didn’t know in May that
Hitler wanted war?
VON RIBBENTROP: That he wanted what?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know in May that Hitler wanted war?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not convinced of that at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear from the document that he did
want war, isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: This document, no doubt, shows the intention of an
action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used strong language
to his military men, that is, he spoke as though he had the firm
intention of attacking a certain country in some way, but whether he
actually would have carried it out later politically is an entirely
different question. I know that he repeatedly told me that one had to
talk with military men as if war was about to break out here or there on
the next day.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about another point. You
said on Friday that you had never expressed the view that Great Britain
would stay out of war and would fail to honor her guarantee to Poland.
Do you remember saying that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you to look at one
or two other documents. Do you remember on the 29th of April 1939
receiving the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister at 3:30
in the afternoon?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we have the minutes of your meeting signed
by Von Erdmannsdorff, I think. Did you say this to the Hungarian Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister:
“The Reich Foreign Minister added that it was his firm
conviction that, no matter what happened in Europe, no French or
English soldier would attack Germany. Our relations with Poland
were gloomy at the moment.”
Did you say that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think I ever said that. I consider that
impossible.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you got a copy...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I perhaps have a look at the document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, with pleasure. This will become
Exhibit GB-289, Document D-737.
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot, of course, tell you now in detail what I said
at that time, but it may be possible that there was an effort at that
time to reassure the Hungarians who were probably concerned about the
Polish problem; that is absolutely possible. But I hardly believe that I
said anything like this. However, it is certain that the Führer knew,
and I had told the Führer that England would march to the aid of Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are a little doubtful would you look at
Document Number D-738, which will be Exhibit GB-290. Apparently you saw
these gentlemen again 2 days later. Just look at the last sentence of
that:
“He (the Reich Foreign Minister) pointed out again that Poland
presented no military problem for us. In case of a military
clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.”
That is quite straight speaking, isn’t it, “The British would coldly
leave the Poles in the lurch”?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know on just what page that is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 7, and it is the report of the
1st of May, the last sentence of my quotation. It is signed by a
gentlemen called Von Erdmannsdorff; it appears above his signature. The
words I am asking you about are, “In case of a military clash the
British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.”
VON RIBBENTROP: Is that on Page 8 or where? On what page, if I may ask?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My heading is Paragraph 7. It begins:
“The Reich Foreign Minister then returned to our attitude
towards the Polish question and pointed out that the Polish
attitude had aroused great bitterness.”
VON RIBBENTROP: It is perfectly conceivable that I said something like
that, and if it has been said it was done in order not to alarm the
Hungarians and to keep them on our side. It is quite clear that that is
nothing but diplomatic talk.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think there is any requirement to tell
the truth in a political conversation?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was not the point; the point was to bring about a
situation which made it possible to solve this and the Polish question
in a diplomatic way. If I were to tell the Hungarians today, and this
applies to the Italians also, that England would assist Poland and that
a great war would result, then this would create a diplomatic situation
which would make it impossible to solve the problem at all. There is no
doubt that during the entire time I had to use very strong language,
just as the Führer had always ordered, for if his own Foreign Minister
had hinted at other possibilities, it would naturally have been very
difficult, and I venture to say, it would have meant that this would, in
any case, have led to war. But we wanted to create a strong German
position so that we could solve this problem peacefully. I may add that
the Hungarians were somewhat worried with regard to the German policy,
and that the Führer had told me from the start to use particularly clear
and strong language on these subjects. I used that kind of language also
quite frequently to my own diplomats for the same reasons.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You want us to assume that you were telling lies
to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That
is what it comes to shortly, isn’t it? That is what you want us to
understand—that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are
telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what you want us to
understand isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether one can talk of lies in this case,
Mr. Prosecutor. This is a question of diplomacy; and if we wanted to
create a strong position, then of course we could not go beating about
the bush. Consider what the impression would have been if the German
Foreign Minister had spoken as if at the slightest German step the whole
world would attack Germany! The Führer used frequently such strong
language and expected me to do the same. I want to emphasize again that
often I had to use such language, even to my own Foreign Office, so that
there was no misunderstanding. If the Führer was determined on the
solution of a problem, no matter what the circumstances, even at the
risk of war if it had to be, our only chance to succeed was to adopt a
firm stand, for had we failed to do that, war would have been
inevitable.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you to have in mind what Count
Ciano says that you said to him on, I think the 11th or 12th of August,
just before your meeting at, I think it was at Salzburg, with you and
Hitler. You remember that according to Count Ciano’s diary he said that
he asked you, “What do you want, the Corridor or Danzig?” and that you
looked at him and said, “Not any more; we want war.” Do you remember
that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is absolutely untrue. I told Count Ciano at
that time, this is on the same line, “the Führer is determined to solve
the Polish problem one way or another.” This was what the Führer had
instructed me to say. That I am supposed to have said “we want war” is
absurd for the simple reason that, it is clear to every diplomat, those
things are just not said, not even to the very best and most trusted
ally, but most certainly not to Count Ciano.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should just like you to look at a report of
the subsequent conversation that you had with Mussolini and Count Ciano
not very long after, on the 10th of March 1940, that is, about 9 months
later. If you look at Document Number 2835-PS, which will become Exhibit
GB-291, and if you will turn to, I think it is Page 18 or 19...
VON RIBBENTROP: You mean Page 18?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I remind you again, a conversation between you
and Mussolini and Ciano on the 10th of March 1940. It begins by saying:
“The Reich Foreign Minister recalled that he actually had stated
in Salzburg to Count Ciano that he did not believe that England
and France would assist Poland without further questions, but
that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of
intervention by the Western Powers. He was glad now about the
course of events, because, first of all, it had always been
clear that the clash would have to come sooner or later and that
it was inevitable.”
And then you go on to say that it would be a good thing to finish the
conflict in the lifetime of the Führer.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was after the outbreak of war; is that it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. What I am putting to you are these words:
“He was glad now about the course of events, because, first of
all, it had always been clear that the clash would have to come
sooner or later and that it was inevitable.”
And if you will look at where it says “secondly”...
VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; but what I am suggesting to you is that
that shows perfectly clearly that Count Ciano is right, and that you
were very glad that the war had come, because you thought this was an
appropriate time for it to happen.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree. On the contrary, it says here also
“that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of intervention
by the Western Powers.” It says so here quite clearly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is the second part that I am putting to
you. I pass from that point about British intervention. I say, “he was
glad now about the course of events,” and if you will look down at the
paragraph where it says “secondly,” so that you will have it in mind,
the third line says:
“Secondly, at the moment when England introduced general
conscription it was clear that the ratio of war strength would
not develop in the long run in favor of Germany and Italy.”
VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask where it says that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A few lines further down. The word “secondly” is
underlined, isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not here. Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Secondly, at the moment when England introduced
general conscription...” It is about 10 lines further on.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, what does the British Prosecutor try to prove with
that; I do not quite understand?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at the next sentence before
you answer my question.
“This, along with the other things, was decisive for the
Führer’s decision to solve the Polish question, even under the
danger of intervention by the Western Powers. The deciding fact
was, however, that a great power could not take certain things
lying down.”
What I am saying...
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that appears correct to me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was your view at the time and the view
that you declared afterwards as being your view, that you were
determined that you would solve the Polish question even if it meant
war? Count Ciano was perfectly right in saying that you wanted war. That
is what I am putting to you.
VON RIBBENTROP: No; that is not correct. I told Count Ciano at the time
at Berchtesgaden that the Führer was determined to solve the problem one
way or another. It was necessary to put it in that way because the
Führer was convinced that whatever became known to Rome would go to
London and Paris at once. He wanted therefore to have clear language
used so that Italy would be on our side diplomatically. If the Führer or
myself had said that the Führer was not so determined to solve that
problem, then it would have been without doubt passed on immediately.
But since the Führer was determined to solve the problem, if necessary
by war if it could not be solved any other way, this would have meant
war, which explains the clear and firm diplomatic attitude which I had
to adopt at that time in Salzburg. But I do not know in what way this is
contradictory to what is being said here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to pass on to the last week in August
and take that again very shortly, because there is a lot of ground to
cover.
You agreed in your evidence that on the 25th of August the Führer called
off the attack which was designed for the morning of the 26th. You
remember that? I just want you to have the dates in mind.
VON RIBBENTROP: I know that date very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were here in court the day Dahlerus gave his
evidence, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And let me remind you of the date, that on the
evening of the 24th the Defendant Göring asked Herr Dahlerus to go to
London the next morning to carry forward a preliminary outline of what
the Führer was going to say to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th. So you
remember that was his evidence? And on the 25th, at 1:30...
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the dates exactly, but I suppose they
are correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I know these dates pretty well, and the Tribunal
will correct me if I am wrong, but I am giving them as I have looked
them up. That was the night of the 24th; Dahlerus left on the morning of
the 25th, and then at 1:30 on the 25th—you said about noon, I am not
quarreling with you for a matter of minutes—midday on the 25th the
Führer saw Sir Nevile Henderson...
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And gave him what is called a _note verbale_,
that is, an inquiry in general terms.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was given to him in the evening. At noon he had
only talked to him and in the evening I had Minister Schmidt take the
_note verbale_ to him, I think that is the way it was, with a special
message in which I asked him again to impress upon his Government how
serious the Führer was about this message or offer. I think that is
contained in the _British Blue Book_.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Whenever you gave him the actual note, Herr
Hitler told him the general view in the oral conversation which he had
with Sir Nevile in the middle of the day?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the actual calling off of the attack on the
morning of the 26th, as you have said, was not done until you had had
the message from Signor Mussolini at about 3 o’clock, and the news that
the Anglo-Polish formal agreement was going to be signed that evening
about 4 o’clock. That is what you have said.
Now, the first point that I am putting to you is this: That at the time
that Herr Dahlerus was sent, and the time of this note, when the words
were spoken by the Führer to Sir Nevile Henderson, it was the German
intention to attack on the morning of the 26th; and what I suggest is
that both the message to Herr Dahlerus and the words which were spoken
to Sir Nevile Henderson were simply designed in order to trouble the
British Government, in the hope that it might have some effect on them
withdrawing from their aid to Poland; isn’t that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: Do you want me to answer that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly; I am asking you.
VON RIBBENTROP: The situation is that I am not familiar with the message
of Dahlerus, I cannot say anything about it. Regarding the meeting
between Hitler and Sir Nevile Henderson, I can say that I read the
correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Hitler in the morning, I
think it was dated the 22d, and somehow had arrived at a sort of
deadlock. I talked to the Führer afterwards, about whether or not
another attempt should be made in order to arrive at some kind of a
solution with England. Subsequently, towards noon, I think it was 1 or 2
o’clock, the Führer met Sir Nevile Henderson in my presence and told him
he should take a plane and fly to London in order to talk to the British
Government as soon as possible. After the solution of the Polish problem
he intended to approach England again with a comprehensive offer. He
gave, I believe, a rough outline of the offer already in the _note
verbale_; but I do not recall that exactly. Then Sir Nevile Henderson
flew to London. While the Führer was having that conversation, military
measures were under way. I learned of that during the day, because
Mussolini’s refusal had arrived, I believe, not at 3 o’clock, but
earlier in the course of the morning or at noon. Then at 4 or 5 in the
afternoon I heard about the ratification of the Polish-British
agreement. I went to the Führer immediately and suggested to him to
withdraw the military measures; and he did so after short deliberation.
There is no doubt that in the meantime certain military measures had
been taken. Just how far they went I regret not to be able to say. But
when the Führer sent that offer, that _note verbale_ to England I was
convinced and under the impression that if England would respond to it
in some way, it would not come to an armed conflict, and that in this
case the military measures which, I believe, were automatically put in
effect, would somehow have been stopped later on. But I cannot say
anything about that in detail. I recollect only one thing, and that is
that when I received the _note verbale_ from the Führer, which I think
was in the afternoon or in the evening, these measures had already
either been stopped or were, at any rate, in the process of being
stopped. I cannot give it to you in chronological order at the moment.
For that I have to have the pertinent documents which, unfortunately,
are not at my disposal here. But one thing is certain, the offer of the
Führer to England was made in order to try once again to come to a
solution of the Polish problem. When I saw the _note verbale_ I even
asked him, “How about the Polish solution?” and I still recollect that
he said, “We will now send that note to the British, and if they respond
to it then we can still see what to do, there will still be time.”
At any rate, I believe, the military measures had either been stopped
when the note was submitted, or they were stopped shortly after.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you were not present at the meeting of the
Führer and his generals on the 22d of August, but you must have heard
many times the account of it read out since this Trial started. You
remember the Führer is reported, according to minutes, to have said:
“I shall use propagandistic reasons for starting the war; never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting and
making the war, not the right is what matters but victory.”
(Document Number 1014-PS).
That is what was said at Obersalzberg. Has Hitler ever said anything
like that to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say the 27th?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the 22d. What I am asking you is, has Hitler
said anything similar to that to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, at the meeting on the 22d, I was not present; I
think I was on my way to Moscow.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said you were not present. That is why I put
it in that way. Has he ever said anything similar to you? You say “no.”
Well, now, I want you to come to the 29th.
VON RIBBENTROP: May I say something about that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No; if you say that he has not said it to you, I
am not going to pursue it, because we must not waste too much time on
each of these details. I want you to come to the 29th of August when you
saw Sir Nevile Henderson, and while accepting, with some reservations,
the idea of direct negotiation with Poland, you said that it must be a
condition of that negotiation that the Poles should send a
plenipotentiary by the next day, by the 30th. You remember that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, well, it was like this...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I really do not want to stop you, but I do want
to keep it short on this point.
VON RIBBENTROP: In that case I must say “no”. May I make a statement?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, because this is only preliminary. I
thought it was common ground that you saw Sir Nevile on the 29th, that
you put a number of terms. One of the terms was that a Polish
plenipotentiary should be present by the 30th. If you don’t agree with
that, please tell me if I am wrong, because it is my recollection of all
documents.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, on the 30th you have told us that your
reason for not giving a copy of the terms to Sir Nevile was, first,
because Hitler had ordered you not to give a copy. And I think your
reason given at the time was that the Polish plenipotentiary had not
arrived, and therefore it was no good giving a copy of the terms. That’s
right, isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, these terms that were given, that were read
out by you, were not ready on the 29th, because in your communication
demanding a plenipotentiary you said if he came on the 30th you would
have the terms ready by that time. So may I take it that these terms
were drawn up by Hitler with the help of the Foreign Office between the
29th and the 30th?
VON RIBBENTROP: He dictated them personally. I think there were 16
points, if I remember rightly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you really expect after the treatment
of Von Schuschnigg, of Tiso, of Hacha, that the Poles would be willing
to send a fly into the spider’s parlor?
VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly counted on it and hoped for it. I think
that a hint from the British Government would have sufficed to bring
that envoy to Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And what you hoped was to put the Poles in this
dilemma, that either these terms would stand as a propagandistic cause
for the war, to use Hitler’s phrase—or else you would be able, by
putting pressure on the Polish plenipotentiary, to do exactly what you
had done before with Schuschnigg and Tiso and Hacha, and get a surrender
from the Poles. Wasn’t that what was in your mind?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, the situation was different. I must say, that on the
29th the Führer told the British Ambassador that he would draft these
conditions or this agreement and by the time of the arrival of the
Polish Plenipotentiary, would make them also available to the British
Government—or he hoped that this would be possible, I think that is
what he said. Sir Nevile Henderson took note of that, and I must repeat
that the Führer, after the British reply had been received on the 28th,
once more, and in spite of the extremely tense situation between Poland
and Germany, agreed to that kind of negotiation. The decisive thing in
these crucial days of the 30th and 31st is, therefore, the following:
The Führer had drafted these conditions, England knew that the
possibility of arriving at a solution existed. All during the 30th of
August we heard nothing from England, at least nothing definite. Only at
midnight, I think, did the British Ambassador report for this
discussion. In the meantime, I must mention that at 7 o’clock in the
evening news of the general mobilization in Poland had been received,
which excited the Führer extremely. Through that, the situation had
become extraordinarily acute. I still remember exactly the situation at
the Chancellery where almost hourly reports were received about
incidents, streams of refugees, and so forth. It was an atmosphere
heavily charged with electricity. The Führer waited all through the
30th; no definite answer arrived. Then, at midnight of the 30th, that
conversation took place. The course of that conversation has already
been described here by me and also by a witness, the interpreter
Schmidt. I did more then than I was allowed to do, in that I had read
the entire contents to Sir Nevile Henderson. I was hoping that England
perhaps might do something yet. The Führer had told Sir Nevile Henderson
that a Polish plenipotentiary would be treated on equal terms.
Therefore, there was the possibility of meeting somewhere at an
appointed place, or, that someone would come to Berlin, or that the
Polish Ambassador Lipski would be given the necessary authority. Those
were the possibilities. I would even like to go further. It was merely
necessary, during the 30th or the 31st, until late that night, or the
next morning when the march began, for the Polish Ambassador Lipski to
have authority at least to receive in his hands the German proposals.
Had this been done, the diplomatic negotiations would in any case have
been under way and thus the crisis would have been averted, at least for
the time being.
I also believe, and I have said so before, that there would have been no
objections. I believe the Führer would have welcomed, if the British
Ambassador had intervened. The basis for the negotiations, I have also
mentioned this here before, was called reasonable by Sir Nevile
Henderson personally. One hint from the British Government during the
30th or 31st, and negotiations would have been in course on the basis of
these reasonable proposals of the Führer, termed reasonable even by the
British themselves. It would have caused no embarrassment to the Poles,
and I believe that on the basis of these reasonable proposals, which
were absolutely in accord with the Covenant of the League of Nations,
which provided for a plebiscite in the Corridor area, a solution,
perfectly acceptable for Poland, would have been possible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal desire me to say that they think
that your answers and your explanations are too long, too argumentative,
and too repetitive, and they are upon matters which have been gone over
and over again before the Tribunal, so they would therefore ask you to
try to keep your answers as short as possible.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did I understand you correctly, Witness, on
Friday, that you didn’t know about the connection between Quisling and
the Defendant Rosenberg in the spring and summer of 1939? It was well
before the war, in the spring and summer, before June of 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I knew that Rosenberg had friends
in Norway and that the name of Quisling was mentioned, but this name
meant nothing to me at that time. On the request of the Führer, at that
time I gave Rosenberg certain amounts of money for his friends in
Norway, for newspapers, propaganda, and similar purposes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know, as I understand your testimony,
that some of Quisling’s men had been in a schooling camp in Germany in
August of 1939, before the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: No I do not remember that. I learned of it here through
a document. But I do not recall having known anything about it. At any
rate, if I knew anything about it, I did not know any of the details.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the Germans living in Norway
had been used to enlarge and extend the staff of the various German
official agencies, the legation and the consulates, soon after the
beginning of the war?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that at the moment, at all. At
that time I probably never did learn correctly about that, if that was
the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the quotation from the _Yearbook of the
NSDAP_. All I want to know at the moment is whether or not you knew
about that. If you say you did not...
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know and cannot say a thing about it, I’m
afraid...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know at the time, in December 1939, that
Quisling had two interviews with Hitler on the 16th and 18th of
December?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either. What was the date, may I
ask?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 16th and 18th December 1939, through the
Defendant Raeder.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing of these interviews, according to my
recollection.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that practically the first matter that you
knew about in regard to Norway was, first, when you got the letter from
Raeder, dated the 3rd of April?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that was a letter from Keitel. I believe
this is a misunderstanding.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your pardon. It is a mistake of mine. I am
sorry. Do you remember a letter from Keitel, where he says:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway had been, by
command of the Führer, long in preparation by the High Command
of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht had
therefore ample time to deal with all questions connected with
the carrying out of this operation.”
So really, Witness—I may perhaps be able to shorten the matter—you are
really not a very good person to ask about the earlier preparations with
regard to Norway, because you weren’t in on these earlier discussions
with Quisling and with Raeder and Hitler. Is that right? If so, I will
leave the subject.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not in on these discussions. But I should like
to clarify one thing briefly: that I received this letter—why, I do not
know—only some days later. The first intimation of the intention to
occupy Norway, due to the anticipated landing of the British, I received
about 36 hours ahead of time from the Führer. The letter was probably
longer under way than it should have been. I saw it only afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall not occupy time, because there is a
good deal to cover, and I will take you straight to the question of the
Low Countries. You have heard me read, and probably other people read,
more than once, the statement of Hitler’s on the 22d of August 1939:
“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and
Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well
as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available
means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of
these countries.” (Document Number 798-PS)
That is what Hitler said on the 22d of August. You weren’t there, and I
ask you again if he expressed the same opinion to you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that from a very early date, on the
7th of October 1939, an army group order was given that Army Group B is
to make all preparations, according to special orders, for immediate
invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so
demands. Did you know of that order on the 7th of October?
VON RIBBENTROP: No; I believe I have seen it here; I did not know it
before.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that on the 9th of October
Hitler issued a directive:
“A longer delay would not only result in the abandonment of
Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality in favor of the
Western Powers, but would also serve to strengthen the military
power of our enemies to an increasing degree, and would lessen
the confidence of neutral states in final German victory.
Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern
flank of the Western Front, crossing the area of Luxembourg,
Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon
and as forcibly as possible.” (Document Number C-62)
Did you know that Hitler issued that directive on the 9th of October?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that as far as you were concerned you are
telling the Tribunal that Hitler gave his assurance, the many
assurances, in August and October, without telling his Foreign Minister
that on the 7th and 9th of October, he had given the directive for the
attack on the Low Countries, that he did not tell you about his order or
his directive for his attack on the Low Countries? Are you sure of that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am pretty sure of that, otherwise I should recall it.
I know one thing, that such ideas, as to whether or not an offensive
should be assumed in the West, after the Polish Campaign, had
occasionally been discussed, but I never heard about any orders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. If you say that is the state of your
knowledge, we will pass on to something about which you did know a
little bit more. Do you remember the meeting of Hitler and yourself with
Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August 1939?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I saw the document, the minutes, about it, here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I want you just to look at that
document, and it is on Page 181. I want you to follow while I read one
passage, which should be about 182. It is on my second page and it is a
paragraph which begins, “As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude
that in case of conflict...”
VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you look for that “As Poland makes it
clear by her whole attitude...”
VON RIBBENTROP: On Page 2?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It should be on Page 2, on my Page 2. It may be
further on in yours.
VON RIBBENTROP: Is that the beginning of the paragraph?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. “As Poland makes it clear...” It is two
paragraphs on from a single line that says at the point “Count Ciano
showed signs of...”
VON RIBBENTROP: I have found it, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at the next sentence: “Generally
speaking...” This is the next sentence but one:
“Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the
pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This could be done fairly
easily if one Axis partner protected the rear of the other, who
was just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and _vice
versa_. For Italy, Yugoslavia was to be considered such an
uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul, he, (the
Führer) had suggested, particularly in consideration of Italy,
that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis
by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the
Axis, and Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of Nations. Prince
Paul had agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent had
been in London and sought reassurance of the Western Powers. The
same thing was repeated that had happened in the case of
Gafencu, who had also been very reasonable during his visit to
Germany, and had denied any interest in the aims of the Western
democracies.” (Document Number 1871-PS)
Now, that was Hitler’s formulation of his policy, and may I take it that
that was the policy which you were assisting to carry out, to liquidate
the pseudo-neutrals one after the other, and include among these
pseudo-neutrals Yugoslavia?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not to be understood in that way. I must
state the following in this connection. The situation was this at that
time: Hitler wanted under all circumstances to keep Italy on our side.
Italy was always a very unreliable partner. For that reason the Führer
spoke at that time in a way designed to tell Italy, so to speak, that,
if it came to difficulties with Yugoslavia, he would support Italy. It
can be understood only from the situation which was this: Germany, with
Italy’s assistance, had already peacefully carried out some of her
revisions in Europe, except for Danzig and the Corridor, in which
Mussolini supported Hitler. I remember the situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite a long explanation. But it is not
an explanation of the words I put to you which is the important thing.
“It would be best to liquidate uncertain neutrals one after the other.”
Are you denying that that was your policy, to liquidate uncertain
neutrals?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was not that. That cannot be taken so literally,
for in diplomatic discussions—and I do not think it is different in
other countries—many things are said sometimes...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to...
VON RIBBENTROP: This was the question of Yugoslavia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This had always been Mussolini’s view, hadn’t
it, that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible
opportunity?
VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, would you look at Document 2818-PS. My
Lord, this will be Exhibit GB-292. Remember this is the secret
additional protocol to the Friendship and Alliance Pact between Germany
and Italy made on the 22d of May 1939, and appended to it there are some
comments by Mussolini on the 30th of May 1939. Do you see?
VON RIBBENTROP: What page?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just wanted you to look at two passages.
Do you see where the comments by Mussolini begin? Under the Pact itself,
do you see the comment by Mussolini?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, Number 1 says:
“The war between the plutocratic and, therefore, selfishly
conservative nations and the densely populated and poor nations
is inevitable. One must prepare in the light of this situation.”
Now, if you will turn to Paragraph 7, you will see Mussolini is hoping
that the war will be postponed, and he is saying what should happen if
the war comes; he says that:
“The war which the great democracies are preparing is a war of
exhaustion. One must therefore start with the worst premise,
which contains 100 percent probability. The Axis will get
nothing more from the rest of the world. This assumption is
hard, but the strategic positions reached by the Axis diminish
considerably the vicissitude and the danger of a war of
exhaustion. For this purpose one must take the whole Danube and
Balkan area immediately after the very first hours of the war.
One will not be satisfied with declarations of neutrality but
must occupy the territories and use them for the procurement of
necessary food and industrial war supplies.”
Do you see that?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you agree that it was Mussolini’s view
that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible moment?
VON RIBBENTROP: They are utterances of Mussolini which I see here for
the first time. I did not know them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to the remarks of Hitler
which you have seen considerably more than once. You remember, after the
Simovic _coup d’état_ on the 26th of March, there was a meeting, a
conference with Hitler, where he announced his policy:
“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in
order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a state. With
regard to foreign policy neither will diplomatic inquiries be
made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav
Government, which cannot be trusted in any case in the future,
will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the
means and troops available for it are ready.” (Document Number
1746-PS)
Do you remember Hitler’s saying that on the 27th of March?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. Could I perhaps see the
document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember it? It has been read many
times in this court, Hitler’s statement.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember it, not the individual words, but in
general.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that was the sense of it, and I
read his words. Now, that was the policy...
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what you mean by “the sense of it.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I’ll put it to you now. What I mean is
this, that it was your policy to attack Yugoslavia without asking them
for assurances, without any diplomatic action of any kind. You decided
to attack Yugoslavia and to bomb Belgrade. Isn’t that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was entirely different; and I ask to be permitted
to explain the actual state of the case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want your explanation of these points which I
have specifically read and mentioned to you. “No diplomatic inquiries
will be made.” Why did you decide, or why did Hitler decide, and you
help, to attack Yugoslavia without making any diplomatic inquiries,
without giving the new government any chance to give you assurances? Why
did you do it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Because the new government had been formed mainly by
England, as one of the British interrogation officers himself, in the
course of the preliminary hearings, admitted to me. Therefore it was
perfectly clear to the Führer, when the Simovic Putsch was carried out,
that the enemies of Germany at that time stood behind Simovic’s
government and that it mobilized the army—this information had been
received—in order to attack the Italian army from the rear. It was not
my policy, for I was called into the conference of which you are
speaking only later, I believe, and at that time Hitler categorically
announced his position without being contradicted by anyone. I ask you
to question the military men about that. I was present, and had a
serious encounter with the Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think it right to attack this country
without any diplomatic measures being taken at all, to cause military
destruction, to use Hitler’s words, “with unmerciful harshness” and to
destroy the capital of Belgrade by waves of bomber attacks? Did you
think that was right? I ask you a simple question: Did you think it was
right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot answer this question either with “yes” or “no,”
as you want it, without giving an explanation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you need not answer it. If you cannot
answer that question “yes” or “no,” you need not answer it at all. And
you come on to the next point, which is the question of Russia. Now, as
far as I could understand your statement, you said that Hitler had
decided to attack the Soviet Union after Mr. Molotov’s visit to Berlin
on, I think, the 12th of November of 1940.
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not say that, because I did not know it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, as I understood it, one of the reasons
which you were giving as a justification for the attack on the Soviet
Union was what was said by Mr. Molotov during his visit of November
1940. Isn’t that what you said?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was one of the reasons that caused the Führer
concern. I did not know anything about an attack at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that the Defendant Jodl says that even
during the Western campaign, that is, May and June 1940, Hitler had told
him that he had made a fundamental decision to take steps against this
danger, that is, the Soviet Union, “the moment our military position
made it at all possible.” Did you know that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I learned that first now here in Nuremberg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is Document L-172, USA-34, Jodl’s lecture.
And did you know that on the 14th of August 1940 General Thoma was
informed during a conference with Göring that the Führer desired
punctual deliveries to the Russians only until the spring of 1941; that
“later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the
Russian demands.” Did you know that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you know that in November of 1940,
General Thoma and State Secretaries Körner, Neumann, Becker, and General
Von Hannecken were informed by Göring of the action planned in the East?
Did you know that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know now, don’t you, that a long time before
any of the matters raised in Molotov’s visit came up for discussion,
Hitler had determined to attack the Soviet Union?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that at all. I knew that Hitler had
apprehensions but I knew nothing about an attack. I was not informed
about military preparations, because these matters were always dealt
with separately.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Even on 18 December, when Hitler issued the
directive Number 21 on “Barbarossa,” he told you nothing about it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, because just in December, as I happen to remember
exactly, I had another long talk with the Führer in order to obtain his
consent to win the Soviet Union as a partner to the Three-Power Pact,
and to make it a four-power pact. Hitler was not altogether enthusiastic
about this idea, as I noticed; but he told me, “We have already made
this and that together; perhaps we will succeed with this too.” These
were his words. That was in December. I believe there is also an
affidavit about that from a witness, which the Defense is going to
present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you understand what you are saying? This is
after the Defendant Göring had announced it to General Thoma and these
under-secretaries, after the directive had actually gone out for
Barbarossa, that Hitler let you suggest that you should try to get the
Soviet Union to join the Tripartite Pact, without ever telling you that
he had his orders out for the attack on the Soviet Union. Do you really
expect anyone to believe that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question was, do you really expect anyone to
believe that after it had been announced time and again that the Reich
was going to attack the Soviet Union, and after the actual directive had
gone out for the attack, that Hitler let you tell him that you were
thinking of asking them to join the Tripartite Pact? Is that your
evidence?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is exactly the way it was. I suggested this to
Hitler again in December, and received his consent for further
negotiations. I knew nothing in December of an aggressive war against
the Soviet Union.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And it was quite clear that, as far as your
department was concerned, you were getting the most favorable reports
about the Soviet Union and about the unlikeliness of the Soviet Union
making any incursion into political affairs inimical to Germany? Is that
right, so far as your reports from your own ambassador and your own
people in Russia were concerned?
VON RIBBENTROP: Reports of this sort came from the embassy in Moscow. I
submitted them repeatedly, or rather always, to the Führer but his
answer was that the diplomats and military attachés in Moscow were the
worst informed men in the world. That was his answer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But that was your honest view, based on your own
information, that there was no danger from Russia, that Russia was
keeping honestly to the agreement that she had made with you. That was
your honest view, was it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that. I said those were the reports
from the diplomats, which we received from Moscow.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn’t you believe them? Didn’t you believe your
own staff yourself?
VON RIBBENTROP: I was very skeptical myself as to whether these reports
were reliable, because the Führer, who received reports, had reports of
an altogether different nature and the political attitude also pointed
in a different direction.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, in the spring of 1941, your office
joined in the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, did it
not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know precisely when, but in the spring things
came to a head and there must have been conferences between some offices
that dealt with the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union.
However, I do not recall details about that any more.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Again, I do not want to occupy too much
time over it, but it is right, is it not, that in April of 1941 you were
co-operating with Rosenberg’s office in preparing for the taking over of
Eastern territories, and, on the 18th of May, you issued a memorandum
with regard to the preparation of the naval campaign?
VON RIBBENTROP: So far as the preparations with Rosenberg are concerned,
that is in error. I spoke, according to my recollection, about this
matter to Rosenberg only after the outbreak of war. So far as that Navy
memorandum is concerned, I saw that document here; I had not known of it
previously. I believe it is an expert opinion on international law about
matters which might arise in connection with a war in the Baltic Sea.
Such expert opinion was doubtless submitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It says, “The Foreign Office has prepared, for
use in Barbarossa, the attached draft of a declaration of operational
zones.” Don’t you remember anything about that?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I believe that did not reach me at all at that time.
That was acted upon by another office. Of course I am responsible for
everything that happens in my ministry.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn’t Ambassador Ritter the liaison officer
between your office and the Wehrmacht?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, again, I want you to help me about one or
two other matters. You have told us that you negotiated the
Anti-Comintern Pact back in 1936; and, of course, at that time the
Anti-Comintern Pact—and I think you said so yourself—was directed
against the Soviet Union. That is so, isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it was more an ideological pact, which, of course,
had certain political implications. That is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was extended by the Tripartite Pact of
the 27th of September 1940? That was an extension of the first pact, was
it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: It had in itself nothing to do with the first pact,
because this one was a purely political, economic, and military pact.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the fact is—and I think I can take
this quite shortly—that you were urging Japan to enter the war quite
early in March of 1941, weren’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: That could be; at that time for an attack on England.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I am taking it shortly, because you have
given your explanation. You say you were at war with England, and
therefore you were entitled to see an ally in the Japanese. That is your
point, is it not?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not believe that I did anything other than what
other diplomats would do, for instance, what those of Great Britain have
done in America, and later in Russia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to put any points to you on that
actual fact; but it did occur to you quite early, didn’t it, that if
Japan came into the war, then it was a possibility that the United
States might be brought in very shortly after? And you agreed, in April
of 1941, that if the coming in of Japan produced the fact that Japan
would be involved with the United States, you would be prepared to fight
the United States too. That is right isn’t it?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. I believe I did everything I
could, until the day of Pearl Harbor, to keep America out of the war. I
believe also that that is proved by many documents that I have seen here
for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, since you said that, I would like you
to look at the Document 352 of your book, at Page 204 of the English
document book.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know this document; I have read it here already.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that was a week before Pearl Harbor, on
the 29th of November; and according to the Japanese Ambassador, you are
saying this to him—if you look at Paragraph 1:
“Ribbentrop: ‘It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in
East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been,
and probably never will be, a time when closer co-operation
under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at
this time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European
New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United
States will be concentrated against Japan. As the Führer Hitler
said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right
to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We
have received advice to the effect that there is practically no
hope of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded
successfully, because of the fact that the United States is
putting up a stiff front.
“‘If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a
decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident
that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan
jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan
herself.’” (Document D-656)
Do you still say, in view of that document and that statement that you
made to the Japanese Ambassador, that you were trying to prevent war
with the United States? I suggest to you that you were doing everything
to encourage Japan to go to war with the United States.
VON RIBBENTROP: I must contradict you there, Mr. Prosecutor; that is not
true. I do not know this document, nor do I know where it comes from. At
any rate, under no circumstances did I express it that way; and I regret
that all the other documents which prove that I tried again and again to
keep the United States out of the war, have not yet been read here. I
have seen this document here and I have been pondering all the time as
to how this passage would have gotten into the document. All the other
documents, I believe a dozen or a dozen and a half, which have been
presented here prove clearly my wish to keep America out of the war. I
can prove that for years I had made efforts in all fields, despite the
intransigent attitude of the United States, not to undertake anything
against America. I can explain this only as follows: The Japanese
Ambassador earnestly desired that his country should take some action
and I know he sent many telegrams to Tokio in order to get Japan to
participate in the war, particularly against Singapore. I can only
presume that this is perhaps, if I may say so, an incorrect
interpretation of this conference. I ask you to give the Defense an
opportunity to submit all the other documents up to this date, which
will prove the exact opposite of what is laid down in this one
paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, this is the official report to the
Government of the Japanese Ambassador. You say that he is wrong when he
says that you told him—he gives your exact words—that you were
comforted that it would not only be in the interest of Germany and Japan
jointly but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself.
Well, just look at the next document, if you deny that one, on Page 356.
This is another report of the Japanese Ambassador and he said, the day
after Pearl Harbor:
“At 1 o’clock... I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and
told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal
declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that
Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general
headquarters, discussing how the formalities of declaring war
could be carried out, so as to make a good impression on the
German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at
once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out
properly.”
Now, look at the last three lines:
“At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th,
Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack
American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them.”
(Document Number D-657)
That was 3 days before the declaration of war. You say that that report
of the Japanese Ambassador is also wrong?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that it is an error.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is wrong about it?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe it is an error. That was after the attack on
Pearl Harbor?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Exactly, the day after Pearl Harbor.
VON RIBBENTROP: That was an order of Adolf Hitler’s to attack America
who, as everyone knows, had been attacking our ships for months. This is
an altogether different affair.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When you say “attacking German ships,” do you
mean defending themselves against German submarines?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, so far as I know, some months earlier, I cannot tell
you the exact date; but it was a long time before Pearl Harbor, we had
delivered an official protest to the United States, in which we pointed
out, in the case of the two ships _Greer_ and _Kerne_, that these two
boats had pursued German submarines and had thrown depth charges at
them. I believe the Secretary of the Navy Knox admitted this openly in a
press conference. I mentioned yesterday that Hitler said in his speech
in Munich that he did not give the order to shoot or to attack American
vessels but he had given the order to fire back if they fired first.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I want to know from you is this: Did you
approve of the policy of ordering the entire German Navy to attack
American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them 3 days before
war was declared? Did you approve of that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that now, because I do not
remember it and do not even know the document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about another point. Do
you remember that the...
VON RIBBENTROP: It would have been understandable, that I must add.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given your answer. Do you remember, in
June 1944, that there was a conference about which we have heard
evidence, regarding the shooting of what is known as “terror-fliers”?
Now, just listen to this question and try to answer it directly, if you
would. Is it correct, as is stated in the report, that you wished to
include among terror-fliers every type of terror attack on the German
civilian population, that is, including bombing attacks on cities? Is it
right that you wished to include the airmen engaged in attacks on German
cities as terror-fliers?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not true like that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at Page 391. This is a report signed
by General Warlimont on the conference on the 6th of June, and in the
fourth line—well, let me read it. It says:
“Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy chief of
the Operations Staff in Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th
that a conference on this question had been held shortly before,
between the Reich Marshal, the Reich Foreign Minister, and
Reichsführer SS. Contrary to the original suggestion made by
Ribbentrop, who wished to include every type of terror attack on
the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on
cities, it was agreed at the above conference that only attacks
carried out with aircraft armament should be considered as
criminal actions in that sense.” (Document Number 135-PS)
Do you say that Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he said that you wished to
include every type of attack?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yesterday I answered this question at length. I do not
know whether I should refer to this point again. I dealt with this
point, I think, very exhaustively. If you wish, I can repeat it now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I do not want you to repeat it. I want you
to answer my question. Do you say that Kaltenbrunner was wrong when he
said at this conference that you wished to include those who were
engaged in bombing of cities?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is not so. First of all, so far as I remember, this
conference never took place; and, secondly, I stated my attitude
perfectly clearly yesterday, how I wished to treat terror-fliers.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, answer my question.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not true as you have stated it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Then answer this question. Did you
approve that those you called “terror-fliers” were to be left to be
lynched by the population or handed over to the SS?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that was not my attitude.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look on Page 393, Page 214
of the English? This, as you know, is a memorandum from the Foreign
Office; and it is stated on Page 396 that General Warlimont states that
Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone that the Minister for
Foreign Affairs has approved this draft (Document 740-PS). The draft
deals with the two actions in Paragraph 1, that of lynching, and the
draft says, “The German authorities are not directly responsible, since
death occurred before a German official intervened” (Document 728-PS).
Do you agree with that view? Is that your view of the lynching of
fliers?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not my view. I explained that yesterday
quite exhaustively and stated what my attitude was toward this document.
This document is an expert opinion of the Foreign Office, which was
submitted to me. I do not know how it originated, upon my order or upon
a statement of the military authorities. I did not approve this expert
opinion as it is submitted to me here, but I did send it to the Führer
and asked him to decide about it. The Führer then called this document
“nonsense,” I believe, and therewith this expert opinion of the Foreign
Office was rejected and did not come into effect.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that, with regard to this, you say that when
Warlimont says that Ambassador Ritter advised the Wehrmacht by telephone
on 29 June that you approved the draft, that either Warlimont is not
speaking the truth or Ritter is not speaking the truth?
VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, it is not true, because it can be seen from
another document which I have also seen here that this document was sent
to the Führer and that I said there that the Führer must approve it. I
did see also another document regarding it. That is also my recollection
of the matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, if you referred to the Führer’s
view, let us just have a look at what that was. Have a look at Document
3780-PS, which will be GB-293, which is an account of a meeting that you
and Hitler had with Oshima on the 27th of May 1944. It is on Page 11,
Lines 9 to 12. Do you remember in your presence Hitler advising Oshima
that the Japanese should hang, not shoot, every American terror pilot,
that the Americans will think it over before making such attacks? Did
you agree with that view?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree with that view. If that is in this
document, that is not my meaning, not my opinion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now...
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not even know where what you said here is in the
document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will find it on Page 11, Lines 9 to 12.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that, but I can only say that this
attitude of Hitler’s as it appears in this document was brought about by
the terrible results of the air attacks at that time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I heard all that before. I asked you whether you
agreed or not; you said “no.” I want you now to deal with another point.
VON RIBBENTROP: I want to say something further, however, regarding this
point because it is of decisive importance.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will say that to learned Counsel after you
have answered my question on this. I want you now to direct your
attention to Stalag Luft III. You may have heard me asking a number of
witnesses a certain number of questions about it. These were the 50
British airmen who were murdered by the SS after they escaped. Do you
know that? Do you know what I am talking about?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I do.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that my colleague, Mr. Eden, made a
strong statement in the House of Commons, saying that these men had been
murdered and that Great Britain would exact justice upon the murderers?
Do you remember that, in June of 1944?
VON RIBBENTROP: I heard of this through the speech made by Mr. Eden in
the House of Commons, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that the Reich Government
issued a statement saying that, in a communication by the Reich
Government conveyed to the British via Switzerland, this unqualifiable
charge of the British Foreign Minister had been sharply refuted, that
being issued in July 1944? Do you remember that being issued?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember it. I remember only the following:
That at that time we received evidence of what had happened and that it
was communicated to us in a note from the protecting powers. That is all
I know about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to ask you: Did you know
at the time that this statement was issued—did you know that these
officers had been murdered in cold blood?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not. I heard that these men had been shot
while trying to escape. At that time, to be sure, we did have the
impression that everything was not in order, I know that. I remember
that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me take it in two stages. Who told you the
lie that these men had been shot trying to escape? Who informed you of
that lie?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember in detail. At that time we received
the documentation from the competent authorities and a memorandum was
forwarded to the Swiss Government.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From whom did you get your documentation which
contained that lie? Did you get it from Himmler or Göring?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you told us, I think, that you had a good
idea that things were not all right, hadn’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. Now, I want you to tell us a word
about your connection with the SS. You are not suggesting, are you, at
this stage that you were merely an honorary member of the SS? It has
been suggested by your counsel, and I am sure it must have been on some
misunderstanding of information, that you were merely an honorary member
of the SS. That is not the case, is it?
VON RIBBENTROP: That is no misunderstanding. This is exactly how it was:
I received the SS uniform from Adolf Hitler. I did not serve in the SS,
but as ambassador and later as Foreign Minister it was customary to have
a rank of some sort and I had received the rank of SS Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you that that is entirely untrue,
that you joined the SS by application before you became
ambassador-at-large in May 1933, isn’t that right?
VON RIBBENTROP: I know that. At any rate I always belonged to the SS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said just now it was honorary, because
Hitler wanted you to have a uniform. I am putting it to you; you applied
to join the SS in May 1933, in the ordinary way. Did you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Of course, one had to make an application; but the fact
was this, that I occasionally went around in a grey greatcoat and
thereupon Hitler said I must wear a uniform. I do not remember when that
was. It must have been 1933. As ambassador I received a higher rank, as
Foreign Minister I received a still higher one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And in May 1933, after you made application, you
joined the SS in the not too high rank of Standartenführer, didn’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that could be.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you became an Oberführer only on the 20th of
April 1935, a Brigadeführer on 18 June 1935, and Gruppenführer on the
13th of September 1936—that was after you became an ambassador—and
Obergruppenführer on the 20th of April 1940. Before you were made an
ambassador you had been in the SS for 3 years and you had received
promotion in the ordinary way, when you did your work with the SS, isn’t
that so?
VON RIBBENTROP: Without ever taking any steps or doing anything myself
in the SS, yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look. It is Document D-744(a), Exhibit
GB-294. The correspondence is 744(b). You may take it; you need not go
through it in detail. That is your application, with all the
particulars. I just want to ask you one or two things about it. You
asked to join, did you not, the “Totenkopf,” the Death’s-Head Division
of the SS?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that cannot be true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember getting a special
Death’s-Head ring and dagger from Himmler for your services? Don’t you?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember. I never belonged to a
Death’s-Head Division. You were just talking about a Death’s-Head
Division, were you not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A Death’s-Head Division.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. If it says so here, it is not true.
But I think that I at one time received a so-called dagger, like all SS
Führer. That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the ring, too. Here is a letter dated the
5th of November 1935, to the Personnel Office of the Reichsführer SS:
“In reply to your question I have to inform you that Brigadeführer Von
Ribbentrop’s ring size is 17. Heil Hitler,” (signed) (Adjutant)
“Thorner.” Do you remember getting that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that everyone received such a ring but I do
not remember precisely. No doubt it is true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you took, didn’t you, continuous interest in
the SS from 1933 up to well into the war? I think your correspondence
with Himmler goes on to well into 1941 or 1942.
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite possible, that is certainly correct.
Of course, we had a great deal to do with the SS in all fields. That is
quite clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had, and especially in the field of
concentration camps, hadn’t you? Are you saying that you did not know
that concentration camps were being carried on in an enormous scale?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I knew nothing about that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look around for the moment. [_A
map behind the witness box was uncovered._] That is an enlargement of
the exhibits put in by the French Prosecution and these red spots are
concentration camps. Now, I would just like you to look at it. We will
see now one of the reasons for the location of your various residences.
There, one north of Berlin, Sonnenburg. Do you see roughly where that is
on that map?
VON RIBBENTROP: Sonnenburg is 1 hour’s auto ride from Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: North of Berlin?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, east of Berlin.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another house. You are quite near it
yourself, your schloss or tower at Fuschl. That is quite near the
border; just over the border, and very near it, the group of camps which
existed around Mauthausen. Do you see them, just above your right hand?
Do you see the group of camps, the Mauthausen group?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to state on my oath that I heard the name
of “Mauthausen” for the first time in Nuremberg.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take another of the places. You say you
did not go there very often, but you used to...
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe I can make this much more brief for you. I can
say that I heard of only two concentration camps until I came here—no
it was three: Dachau, Oranienburg, and Theresienstadt. All the other
names I heard here for the first time. The Theresienstadt camp was an
old people’s home for Jews, and I believe was visited a few times by the
International Red Cross. I never heard previously of all the other
camps. I wish to make that quite clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that near Mauthausen there were 33
camps at various places, within a comparatively short distance, and 45
camps as to which the commandant did not give the names because there
were so many of them, and in the 33 camps there were over 100,000
internees? Are you telling the Tribunal that in all your journeys to
Fuschl you never heard of the camps at Mauthausen, where 100,000 people
were shut up?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me, and I can produce
dozens of witnesses who can testify to that. Dozens.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not care how many witnesses you produce. I
ask you to look at that map again. You were a responsible minister in
the Government of that country from the 4th of February 1938 till the
defeat of Germany in May 1945, a period of 7 and a quarter years. Are
you telling the Tribunal that anyone could be a responsible minister in
that country where these hundreds of concentration camps existed and not
know anything about them except two?
VON RIBBENTROP: It may be amazing but it is 100 percent true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that it is not only amazing,
but that it is so incredible that it must be false. How could you be
ignorant of these camps? Did you never see Himmler?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, I never saw him about these things. Never. These
things were kept absolutely secret and we heard here, for the very first
time, what went on in them. Nobody knew anything about them. That may
sound astounding but I am positively convinced that the gentlemen in the
dock also knew nothing about all that was going on.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will hear from them in their turn. Did you
know that at Auschwitz alone...
VON RIBBENTROP: I heard the name Auschwitz here for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the German official of Auschwitz has sworn
an affidavit that 4 million people were put to death in the camp. Are
you telling the Tribunal that that happened without your knowing
anything about it?
VON RIBBENTROP: That was entirely unknown to me. I can state that here
on my oath.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, there is one other subject, which I
would like you to deal with; and here, fortunately, I am in the position
of assisting your memory with some documents. It is a question of the
partisans. I want you to look at a few documents, three documents, with
regard to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish tonight?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall, if Your Lordship will allow me 5
minutes. That is what I have been trying to do.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you agree that you were in favor of the
harshest treatment of people in the occupied countries?
VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand. Could you repeat the question?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question is, would it be a fair way of
expressing your point of view to say that you were in favor of the
harshest treatment of—I will put it first of all—of partisans?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I ever expressed myself about the
treatment of partisans. I do not recall having done so. In any case, I
was against it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, look at Document D-735, which will be
Exhibit GB-295. That is a discussion between you and Count Ciano in the
presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Cavallero in the Führer’s
headquarters after breakfast on the 19th of December 1942. Now, if you
will look at Page 2, you will see that there is a passage where Field
Marshal Keitel told the Italian gentlemen that:
“The Croatian area was to be cleaned up by German and Italian
troops working in co-operation; and this while it was still
winter, in view of the strong British influence in this area.
The Führer explained that the Serbian conspirators were to be
burned out, and that no soft methods were to be used in doing
this. Field Marshal Keitel here interjected that every village
in which partisans were found had to be burned down. Continuing,
the Reich Foreign Minister declared that Roatta must not leave
the third zone, but must on the contrary advance, and this in
the closest collaboration with the German troops. In this
connection Field Marshal Keitel requested the Italian gentlemen
not to regard the utilization of Croatian troops to help in this
cleaning-up operation as a favoring of the Croatians. The Reich
Foreign Minister stated in this connection that the Poglavnik to
whom he had spoken very clearly, was 100 percent ready to come
to an agreement with Italy.”
Did that represent your view, that “the Serbian conspirators should be
burned out”?
VON RIBBENTROP: Please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did that represent your view, that “the Serbian
conspirators should be burned out”?
VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know that expression. At any rate it is certain
that they should have been locked up.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What it means is that their villages should be
razed to the ground by fire.
VON RIBBENTROP: Where did I say that? I do not believe I said that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the Führer’s point of view. Was it your
point of view?
VON RIBBENTROP: The Führer took a very harsh attitude on these
questions, and I know that occasionally harsh orders had to be issued
also from other offices, including the military. It was a struggle for
life and death. One should not forget that it was war.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you denying...
VON RIBBENTROP: At any rate, I do not see where I said anything about
partisans, that is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that is not your point of view? Is that
what you are saying? That is not your point of view? Are you saying that
it is not your point of view as to the way to treat them? Do not look at
the next document. Tell me, is that your point of view?
VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question that you want me to answer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you say that you were not in favor of harsh
treatment of partisans?
VON RIBBENTROP: I am of the opinion that the partisans who attack the
troops in the rear should be treated harshly. Yes, I am of that opinion,
I believe everyone in the Army is of that opinion, and every politician.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Including women and children?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, by no means.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at that, if you deny this attitude to
women and children. Look at the document, Number D-741.
My Lord, that will be Document D-741; this will be GB-296.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at the end of that. That is
a conference between you and Ambassador Alfieri in Berlin on 21 February
1943. The last paragraph says:
“Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that the
conditions which Roatta’s policy had helped to produce in
Croatia were causing the Führer great concern. It was
appreciated on the German side that Roatta wished to spare
Italian blood, but it was believed that he was, as it were,
trying to drive out Satan with Beelzebub by this policy. These
partisan gangs had to be exterminated, including men, women, and
children, as their further existence imperiled the lives of
German and Italian men, women, and children.”
Do you still say that you did not want harsh treatment of women and
children?
VON RIBBENTROP: What page is that on?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is on Pages 10 to 13. It is the last
paragraph of my translation.
“These partisan gangs had to be exterminated, including men,
women and children, as their further existence imperiled the
lives of German and Italian men, women, and children.”
VON RIBBENTROP: If I did say that at any time, it must have been under
great excitement. In any case, it does not correspond to my opinion
which I have proved by my other acts during the war. I cannot say
anything else at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just show you one of your other acts,
which will be the final one, if the Tribunal will bear with me. It is
Document D-740, which will be GB-297. This is a memorandum of the
conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Secretary of State
Bastianini in the presence of Ambassadors Von Mackensen and Alfieri at
Klessheim castle on the afternoon of the 8th of April 1943. If you will
look at the beginning, I think you were discussing some strike in Italy.
You say:
“The Reich Foreign Minister’s supposition that this strike had
perhaps been instigated by British agents was energetically
contested by Bastianini. There were Italian communists who were
still in Italy and who received their orders from Moscow. The
Reich Foreign Minister replied that, in such a case, only
merciless action would remedy.”
And then, after a statement with regard to the information, you say:
“He (the Reich Foreign Minister) did not want to discuss Italy
but rather the occupied territories, where it had been shown
that one would not get anywhere with soft methods or in the
endeavor to reach an agreement. The Reich Foreign Minister then
explained his views by a comparison between Denmark and Norway.
In Norway brutal measures had been taken which had evoked lively
protests, particularly in Sweden.”
And then you go on, and after a certain criticism of Dr. Best...
VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot find it; what page is it on, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The paragraph begins: “The Reich Foreign
Minister’s supposition that this strike has perhaps been instigated by
British agents...”
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, here it is.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see what I have put to you. You say:
“Only merciless action would be any good. In Norway brutal
measures had been taken.”
And at the beginning of the next paragraph:
“In Greece, too, brutal action would have to be taken if the
Greeks should sense a change for the better. He was of the
opinion that the demobilized Greek Army should be deported from
Greece with lightning speed, and that the Greeks should be shown
in an iron manner who was master in the country. Hard methods of
this kind were necessary if one was waging a war against Stalin,
which was not a gentleman’s war but a brutal war of
extermination.”
And then, with regard to France, after some statement about the French
you say:
“Coming back to Greece, the Reich Foreign Minister once again
stressed the necessity of taking severe measures.”
And in the third line of the next paragraph:
“The Führer would have to take radical measures in the occupied
territories to mobilize the local labor potential in order that
the American armament potential might be equaled.”
Do you agree? Does that fairly express your view, that you wanted the
most severe measures taken in occupied territories in order to mobilize
labor to increase the Reich war potential?
VON RIBBENTROP: I can say the following in regard to this document. I
know that at that time...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE; Well, you can say that, but you can answer my
question first. Do these views express your view that...
VON RIBBENTROP: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...severe measures should be taken with foreign
labor and with people in occupied territories. Does that document
express your view?
VON RIBBENTROP: No, it does not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why did you say it? Why did you say these
things?
VON RIBBENTROP: Because at that time, on the commission of the Führer, I
had to keep the Italians’ noses to the grindstone, since there was
complete chaos in some of the areas and the Italians always attempted to
cause complete confusion in the rear areas of the German Army by some of
the measures they took there. That is why I occasionally had to speak
very harshly with the Italians. I recall that very distinctly. At that
time the Italians were fighting together with the Chetniks partly
against German troops; it was complete chaos there and for this reason I
often used rather earnest and harsh language with the diplomats—perhaps
an exaggerated language. But things actually looked quite different
afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was not a bit exaggeration, was it, in both
Norway and Greece? You were taking the most brutal measures against the
occupied countries.
VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so. We had absolutely nothing to say in
Norway; we always tried to do things differently. And in Denmark we did
everything to reduce these harsh measures, which were in part necessary,
because of the paratroopers and so forth, and tried not to have them
carried out.
I think it can be proved, from a number of other documents, that I and
the Foreign Office always worked toward compromise in the various
occupied countries. I do not believe that it is quite fair and correct
to take only one or two such statements from the innumerable documents
where occasionally I did use harsh words. It is certain that in the
course of 6 years of war harsh language must be used from time to time.
I may remind you that foreign statesmen also used harsh language
regarding the treatment of Germany. But I am sure they did not mean it
that way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me this: Every time today when you have
been confronted with a document which attributes to you some harsh
language or the opposite of what you have said here you say that on that
occasion you were telling a diplomatic lie. Is that what it comes to?
Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, do you have all these documents in evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-SEVENTH DAY
Tuesday, 2 April 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Von Ribbentrop resumed the stand._]
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Your Lordship will have noticed that I
did not deal with the question of Jews. That will now be taken up by my
learned friend, M. Faure, of the French Delegation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I say a few words on an important
question? A map was discussed here yesterday, the map which is now
visible in court. From that map the Prosecution conclude that a large
number of concentration camps were distributed all over Germany. The
defendants are contradicting this statement as energetically as
possible. In the treatment of my case, the case of the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner, I hope to adduce evidence to the effect that only a very
few of the red spots on this map are accurate. I wish to make this
statement here and now, in order that the impression does not arise over
again, in the subsequent cases, that this map is a correct one.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, this is only a reproduction of what has
already been put in evidence.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, but I am at liberty to adduce proof to the contrary.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course you are, but it is not necessary for you to say
so now. The fact that the evidence was put in by the Prosecution at an
earlier date, of course, gives you every opportunity to answer it, but
not to answer it at this moment.
M. FAURE: Defendant, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, you were the chief
of the diplomatic personnel, were you not?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.