VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler at that time considered the ideological

difference between Germany, that is, National Socialism and communism

actually one of the decisive factors of his policy. Therefore, the

question arose as to how a way could be found at all to win over other

countries to counter communistic tendencies. The problem, therefore, was

an ideological one. In the year 1933, I believe, Hitler discussed with

me for the first time, the question of whether a closer contact with

Japan could be established in some form or other. I replied that I

personally had certain connections with Japanese persons and would

establish contact. When I did so it came to light that Japan had the

same anti-Comintern attitude as Germany. Out of these conversations of

the years 1933, 1934, 1935, I believe, the idea gradually crystallized

that one might make these common efforts the subject of a pact. I

believe it was one of my assistants who had the idea of concluding the

Anti-Comintern Pact. I presented this idea to the Führer and the Führer

approved of it. However, since it was, so to speak, an ideological

question, he did not wish at that time that it be done through the

official channels of German politics and therefore he instructed me to

prepare this pact which then was concluded in my office in Berlin, as I

believe, in the course of the year 1936.

DR. HORN: If I understand you correctly, this pact was concluded by you

because you were the head of the Bureau Ribbentrop?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct. The Bureau Ribbentrop consisted chiefly

of me and just a few aides. But it is correct to say that the Führer

wished that I conclude this pact because he did not wish to give it an

official air.

DR. HORN: Did this pact have aims of practical policy or only

ideological aims?

VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain that this pact, on principle, I should

say, had an ideological aim. It was meant to oppose the work of the

Comintern in the various countries at that time. But naturally it also

contained a political element. This political element was anti-Russian

at the time, since Moscow was the representative of the Comintern idea.

Therefore, the Führer and I had a notion that through this pact, a

certain balance or counterbalance against the Russian efforts or against

Russia was being created in a political sense as well, because Russia

was at odds with Germany in respect to ideology and also, of course, to

politics.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you and the defendant really think it is

necessary to take as long as the defendant has taken to tell us why he,

as an ambassador in London, was called upon to sign the Anti-Comintern

Pact?

DR. HORN: It is very difficult for me to hear Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: What I asked you was whether you and the defendant think

it necessary for the defendant to make such a long speech in answer to

your question, why he, as ambassador in London, was employed to sign the

Anti-Comintern Pact. He has spoken for at least 5 minutes about it.

DR. HORN: On 4 February 1938, you were made Foreign Minister. What were

the reasons for this appointment?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that on 4 February 1938 I was in

Berlin. The Führer called me and informed me that, because of a shift in

various higher positions, he was going to appoint a new Foreign

Minister, also that he had appointed the then Foreign Minister Von

Neurath, President of the Secret Cabinet Council. I replied to the

Führer that I, of course, would be glad to accept this appointment.

DR. HORN: On this occasion you also received a high rank in the SS? The

Prosecution have asserted that this rank was not purely honorary. Is

that true?

VON RIBBENTROP: I must correct this point, I believe. I had received a

rank in the SS prior to this time and I do not recall whether it was on

the occasion of this appointment or later on that I became SS

Gruppenführer. The Führer bestowed on me the rank and the uniform of an

SS Gruppenführer. That was a position, which formerly in the Army used

to be known as a rank _à la suite_. It happened that I agreed definitely

with the SS idea at that time. My relations with Himmler were also quite

good at the time. I considered the SS idea at that time the possible

basis for producing and creating an idealistic class of leaders,

somewhat like that existing in England, and such as emerged symbolically

through the heroism of our Waffen-SS during the war. Later on, it is

true, my attitude towards Himmler changed. But the Führer bestowed this

rank on me because he wished that within the Party and at the Party

meetings, I should wear the Party uniform and have a Party rank.

May I at this time state briefly my attitude toward the Party. Yesterday

or the day before yesterday, I believe, the question was raised as to

whether I was a true National Socialist. I do not claim to be competent

to judge this question. It is a fact that it was only in later years

that I joined Adolf Hitler. I did not pay very much attention to the

National Socialist doctrines and program nor to the racial theories,

with which I was not very familiar. I was not anti-Semitic, nor did I

fully understand the church question, although I had left the church a

long time ago. I had my own inner reasons for doing so, reasons

connected with the early 20’s and the development of the church in

Germany in those years. However, I believe that I have always been a

good Christian. What drew me to the Party, as I recognized at the time,

was the fact that the Party wanted a strong, flourishing, and

socialistic Germany. That was what I wanted too. For that reason, in the

year 1932, I did, after thorough deliberation, become a member of the

NSDAP.

DR. HORN: Had you put your services at the disposal of the Party before

that date, as the Prosecution assert, namely, from 1930 on?

VON RIBBENTROP: It was in 1930 when in the large Reichstag election

National Socialism obtained more than 100 seats in the German Reichstag.

I set forth yesterday, and perhaps do not need to go into detail any

more, what conditions in Germany were at that time. However, during the

years 1930, 1931 and 1932 I gradually came nearer to the Party. Then

from 1932 on—I believe I entered the Party in August 1932—from that

moment on until the end of this war I devoted my entire strength to

National Socialist Germany and exhausted my strength in so doing. I wish

to profess frankly before this Tribunal and before the world that I have

always endeavored to be a good National Socialist and that I was proud

of the fact that I belonged to a little group of men, idealists, who did

not want anything else but to re-establish Germany’s prestige in the

world.

DR. HORN: What foreign political problems did Hitler describe to you as

requiring solution, when you took office? What directives did he give

you for the conduct of foreign policy?

VON RIBBENTROP: When I took office, the Führer said relatively little to

me. He said only that Germany had now assumed a new position, that

Germany had once more joined the circle of nations having equal rights

and that it was clear that in the future certain problems would also

still have to be solved. In particular, I recall that he pointed out

four problems which, sooner or later, would have to be solved. He

emphasized that such problems could be solved only with a strong

Wehrmacht, not by using it, but through its mere existence, because a

country which was not strongly armed could practice no foreign policy

whatsoever, but rather such a country operated, so to speak, in a vacuum

as we had experienced during the past years. He said we would have to

achieve clear-cut relations with our neighbors. The four problems he

enumerated were, first of all, Austria; then he mentioned a solution of

the Sudeten questions, of the question of the tiny Memel district and of

the Danzig and the Corridor question, all problems which would have to

be solved in one way or another. It would be my duty, he said, to assist

him diplomatically in this task. From this moment on I did my best to

assist the Führer in the preparation of some solution of these problems

in a way agreeable to Germany.

DR. HORN: Shortly after your appointment you...

THE PRESIDENT: I believe this would be a good time to break off.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. HORN: Which course did German foreign policy take after you were

appointed Foreign Minister?

VON RIBBENTROP: First I tried to get an overall picture of the pending

affairs of the Foreign Office and of the situation. German foreign

policy, as I said before, had reached a certain stage, that is, Germany

had regained prestige in the eyes of the world, and the future task

would be to solve in some way or other the important and vital problems

created in Europe by the Versailles Treaty. This was all the more

necessary since, by way of example, ethnic questions always were

material for conflict, that is, contained possibilities for conflict

dangerous to a peaceful development in Europe.

During the period following I familiarized myself with the affairs of

the ministry. That was at first not easy, as I was dealing with

altogether new men. I should like to mention here that Hitler’s attitude

towards the Foreign Office was not always positive and, in continuing

the efforts of Minister Von Neurath, my predecessor, I considered it my

most important task to bring the Foreign Office closer to Hitler and to

bridge the two spheres of ideas.

It was clear to me from the very beginning, after I took over the

ministry, that I would be working, so to speak, in the shadow of a titan

and that I would have to impose on myself certain limitations, that is

to say, that I would not be in a position, one might almost say, to

conduct the foreign policy as it is done by other foreign ministers, who

are responsible to a parliamentary system or a parliament. The

commanding personality of the Führer naturally dominated the foreign

policy as well. He occupied himself with all its details. It went like

this more or less: I reported to him and forwarded to him important

foreign policy reports through a liaison man, and Hitler in turn gave me

definite orders as to what views I should take in regard to problems of

foreign policy, _et cetera_.

In the course of these conversations the problem of Austria crystallized

as the first and most important problem which had to be brought to some

solution or other. Austria had always been a matter very close to the

Führer’s heart, because he was himself a native of Austria and

naturally, with Germany’s power growing, the efforts already long in

existence for bringing Germany and Austria more closely together became

even more pronounced. At that time I did not yet know very much about

this problem, since Hitler himself handled this problem for the most

part.

DR. HORN: When you took over your office, or later, did you get to know

the minutes of a conference of 5 November 1937 which has become known

here under the name of the Hossbach document?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know this document, which has been mentioned

here in various connections. I saw it here for the first time.

DR. HORN: Did Hitler ever say anything to you which conforms to the

contents of this document?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall all the details of the contents of this

document, but it was the Führer’s practice to speak very little at all

about his aims and intentions and his attitude in matters of principle.

At any rate, this was his practice in dealing with me. He did say that

Germany had to solve certain problems in Europe, as I said before, and

that for this reason it was necessary to be strong. He also mentioned

the possibility that this might lead to disagreements, but he said to me

nothing more specific about this. On the contrary, he always emphasized

to me that it was his desire to solve by diplomatic means these problems

in Europe which had to be solved and that, once he had solved these

problems, he had the intention of creating an ideal social state of the

people and that the Germany he would then create would be a model modern

social state with all the new edifices to which he attached special

value. In other words, to me he did casually admit the possibility of an

armed conflict, but he always said it was his unalterable aim, and that

it had always been and was his intention, to achieve this solution of

the “impossibility of Versailles,” as he sometimes called it, in a

peaceful way.

DR. HORN: Shortly after your appointment as Foreign Minister you were

called by Hitler to Berchtesgaden to the conference with Schuschnigg.

What was discussed there and what was your role in these conferences?

VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler informed me—I recall this was on 12 February

1938—that he was going to meet Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg at the

Obersalzberg. I do not remember the details. I see from my notes that

this was on 12 February. One thing I know is that he told me that the

solution to be achieved was that, in some form or other, the German

National Socialists in Austria must be given assistance. Difficulties of

all sorts had arisen there, the details of which I no longer recall. At

any rate, I believe, there were a great many National Socialists in

jail, and, as a consequence of the natural efforts of these Austrian

people to bring about a closer contact with the Reich, this Austrian

problem threatened to become a really serious problem between Germany

and Austria.

Adolf Hitler told me at the time that I should be present in the

Berghof. Later it was said, and I have heard it said here, that Adolf

Hitler once declared that he intended to fight for the right for these 6

million Germans to decide their own fate under all circumstances during

the year 1938. I do not recall that he said so but it is very well

possible that he did say so. On the occasion of Schuschnigg’s reception

I was at the Obersalzberg. Hitler received Schuschnigg alone and had a

long conversation with him. The details of this conversation are not

known to me because I was not present. I recall that Schuschnigg saw me

after this conversation and that I in turn had a long conversation with

him.

DR. HORN: Did you at that time put Schuschnigg under political pressure,

as the Prosecution asserts?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not true. I remember very clearly my

conversation with Schuschnigg, whereas the other details of what was

going on at the Obersalzberg are not so clear in my memory, since I was

not present at either the first or the second meeting between

Schuschnigg and Hitler. My discussion with Schuschnigg proceeded in a

very amicable fashion. I felt that Schuschnigg obviously was very

greatly impressed by the Führer and the Führer’s personality. I wish to

say first that I do not know exactly the details of what Hitler wanted

to achieve or discuss with Schuschnigg, so that on this subject matter I

could say to him very little, or rather nothing. Our discussion

therefore was confined to more general subjects. I told Schuschnigg that

in my opinion these two countries must come into closer contact and that

perhaps it was his historical task to assist in this and to co-operate;

that the fact was undeniable that both nations were German, and two such

German nations could not forever be separated by artificial barriers.

DR. HORN: Was it already at this conference that a recision of the

German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 was discussed?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not discuss this point with Schuschnigg and I

believe that the Führer did not do so either in any way because

according to what Schuschnigg told me, the Führer had told him that

certain measures would have to be carried out in Austria in order to

eliminate the reasons for conflict between the two countries. That is

what I understood him to say without remembering any details. As I said,

my discussion with him was very amicable, and I might mention that, when

I suggested to Schuschnigg that the two countries would have to get into

closer contact, Schuschnigg showed an altogether positive attitude

towards this idea so that, to a certain extent, I was even surprised by

his positive attitude at that time. There can be no talk of any pressure

exerted on Schuschnigg during our discussion. However, the Führer’s

discussion with him, I believe, was conducted in very clear language,

because the Führer wanted to reach some improvement in relations in

order to solve the problems between the two countries, and to achieve

this it was necessary for the two statesmen to reveal their thoughts

openly. I have heard here, and I think this is from an entry in General

Jodl’s diary, that heavy political and military pressure was exerted. I

believe I can testify here that I knew nothing of any military or strong

political pressure at this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. I may

reiterate that I am sure that the Führer used clear and frank language

with Schuschnigg, but I certainly did not notice any pressure of a

military or a political kind, or anything in the nature of an ultimatum.

Also I assume that General Jodl’s remark—I do not believe he was

present—is a diary entry based on hearsay. I should like to add that at

that time—and I have also stated this to several persons who were with

me and also to the Führer—I had an altogether positive and pleasant

impression of Schuschnigg’s personality. Schuschnigg even said that the

two countries, and I remember these words exactly, were bound together

by fate and that he would have to assist in some way in bringing these

two countries closer together. There was no mention in this discussion

of an Anschluss or any such thing. Whether the Führer mentioned that, I

do not know, but I do not believe so.

DR. HORN: At that time, or shortly after, did Hitler mention to you that

he wished to deviate from the German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 and find

some other solution?

VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler did not discuss this matter with me. If at all, I

spoke very little with him about the Austrian problems. This may sound

surprising, but it can be understood from the fact that it was only on 4

February that I took over the Foreign Office and that I first had to get

familiar with all the problems. The Austrian problem was anyway, as I

already said, a problem which was always dealt with by Hitler himself

and which consequently was, so to speak, merely taken note of in the

Foreign Ministry, whereas it was directed by him personally. I know and

I remember that the then Ambassador Von Papen also had the right to

report directly to Hitler and that the Foreign Office received copies of

these reports. These reports, I believe, were presented directly to

Hitler by the Reich Chancellery, so that the problem was anchored rather

in the Reich Chancellery than in the Foreign Office.

DR. HORN: You then went back to London in order to give up your post as

ambassador. What did you hear in London regarding the development of the

Austrian question?

VON RIBBENTROP: I may say the following in this connection: I myself had

always the idea that the Austrian problem should be solved by bringing

about a treaty, a customs and currency union, between the two countries,

since I personally believed that this was the most natural and the

easiest way to bring about a close connection between the two countries.

I might perhaps remind you at this point, that this idea of a currency

union, or at least a customs union, was nothing new and had already been

pursued by the governments before Hitler; it did not materialize at that

time, I believe, because of the veto of the Allied powers. But it was a

long-cherished wish of both countries. I might first answer your

question concerning London. According to my notes, I went to London on 8

March. As I have already mentioned, I happened to be in Berlin for the

celebration of the seizure of power on 30 January, I believe, and then

was appointed Foreign Minister on 4 February. Because of this

appointment I did not have the opportunity to take official leave in

London. On 8 March 1938 I went to London. Before resigning my post I had

a short conversation with Hitler, primarily about English matters. I

remember that he remarked on this occasion that the Austrian problem

beyond a doubt was progressing very nicely in line with the arrangements

agreed upon with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. I wish to add that I did

not know all the details of the agreements but I still remember a small

detail about which we sent an inquiry to the Reich Chancellery only a

few weeks later for the information of our specialist on the Austrian

question. After I arrived in London, I believe it was in the afternoon,

I happened to hear over the radio in the embassy building a speech made

by the then Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg in Innsbruck or in Graz, I

believe. I must say this speech took me very much by surprise. To go

into details would take too long. Nor do I remember all the details. I

do know that the entire manner, and, as it seemed to me, also the tone

of this speech, was such that I immediately had the impression that the

Führer would not tolerate this, and that the entire speech, without any

doubt, contradicted at least the spirit of the agreements made with the

Führer at the Obersalzberg. As I said, I was convinced that Adolf Hitler

would do something about it; and I should like to say quite openly

before this Tribunal that it appeared quite in order to me that the

question be solved in some way or other, I mean, that one would have to

speak to Schuschnigg very frankly, to prevent matters leading to a

catastrophe, perhaps even a European catastrophe. Then, on the next

morning, I had a long discussion with Lord Halifax. Lord Halifax had

also received reports from Austria, and I tried, without knowing the

situation fully, to explain to him that it was better to solve this

problem now in one form or another, and that this would be precisely in

the interests of the German-English efforts toward friendly relations;

that in the long run the assumption would prove false that the

friendship between Germany and England, as striven for by both

countries, could be broken up by such a problem. Lord Halifax was not

alarmed by the situation and told me, as far as I remember, that I

should still have an opportunity to discuss these matters with the

British Prime Minister Chamberlain at the breakfast which was to follow.

After this I had breakfast with the then Prime Minister Chamberlain;

during or after this breakfast I had a long conversation with

Chamberlain. During this conversation Mr. Chamberlain again emphasized

his desire to reach an understanding with Germany. I was extremely happy

to hear this and told him that I was firmly convinced that this was also

the Führer’s attitude. He gave me a special message for the Führer that

this was his desire and that he would do everything he could in this

direction. Shortly after this conversation telegrams arrived from

Austria, from Vienna, I believe from the Minister or the British Consul.

Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax asked me to come to their office. I

believe the breakfast took place at 10 Downing Street and I went then to

their office in order to discuss these telegrams. I told them that of

course I had no precise reports; then the news of an ultimatum came, and

later of the entry of German troops. We arranged that I should try to

contact my government and that Lord Halifax would come to see me in the

German Embassy in the afternoon to discuss these things further. I wish

to emphasize that Mr. Chamberlain on this occasion also took a very

composed and, it seemed to me, very sensible attitude towards the

Austrian question. In the afternoon Lord Halifax visited me and we had a

long talk. In the meantime the entry of German troops had become known.

I should like to emphasize the fact that this talk with Lord Halifax was

very amicable and that at the end of it I invited the English Foreign

Minister to pay Germany another visit. He accepted with the remark that

he would be glad to come and perhaps another exhibition of hunting

trophies could be arranged.

DR. HORN: On the next morning you had a telephone conversation with the

Defendant Göring. This telephone conversation has been put in evidence

by the Prosecution, with the assertion that it is a proof of your

double-crossing policy. What about that?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is not true. Reich Marshal Göring has already

testified that this was a diplomatic conversation, and diplomatic

conversations are carried on all over the world in the same way. But I

may say that through this telephone conversation I learned for the first

time of the details of the events in Austria. Without going into details

I heard, first of all, that this vote without doubt was not in

accordance with the true will of the Austrian people, and a number of

other points which Göring asked me to mention in my conversations with

the British ministers. But I should like to say that actually such

conversations did not take place because I had already taken leave of

the official English circles. In fact, I did not have any further talks

after my conversation with Göring; just a few hours after this

conversation I left London and went to Berlin and later to Vienna.

I might say that first I flew to Karinhall to visit Göring and talked to

him and found him just as happy about the Anschluss—that is, not about

the Anschluss but about the whole Austrian development as I myself was.

We all were happy. Then I flew, I believe, on the same day, to Vienna

and arrived there at about the same time as Adolf Hitler. In the

meantime I heard about the Anschluss and it was only in Vienna that I

learned that the idea of the Anschluss, had definitely not occurred to

Hitler until his drive through Austria. I believe it was prompted by a

demonstration in Linz and then he decided very quickly, I think, to

accomplish the Anschluss.

DR. HORN: What problem did Hitler mention to you as the next one which

you should solve following the Anschluss?

VON RIBBENTROP: The next problem which Hitler outlined to me on 4

February was the problem of the Sudeten Germans. This problem, however,

was not a problem posed by Hitler or the Foreign Office or any office,

it was a _de facto_ problem that existed of itself. I believe it was the

American prosecutor who said here that with the dissolution of

Czechoslovakia a chapter ended which was one of the saddest in the

history of nations, namely, the oppression and destruction of the small

Czechoslovak nation. I should like to state the following from my own

knowledge of these matters.

One may speak in this sense of a Czechoslovak State but not of a

Czechoslovak nation, because it was a state of different nationalities,

a state which comprised the most varied national groups. I mention,

besides Czechs, only Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians,

Carpatho-Ukrainians, Slovaks, _et cetera_. This shows that quite

heterogeneous elements had been welded together in 1919 to form the

state. It is certain, and probably a historical fact, that the efforts

of the different nationalities within the artificially welded state were

divergent to a certain extent and that the Czechs, following their own

tendencies, tried to surround these nationalities with a strong ring, I

should like to say, with an iron ring. This produced pressure as

pressure always created counterpressure, counterpressure from the

various nationalities of this state, and it is evident that a strong

Germany, a Germany of National Socialism at that time, exerted a strong

power of attraction on all the national segments in Europe; or, at any

rate, on those living close to the German border and partly, I might

say, on the others as well. So it came about that the German minorities

in the Sudetenland, who, since 1919, had been constantly exposed to a

considerable pressure on the part of Prague, now were subjected to still

greater pressure. I do not believe I have to go into details, but I can

say from my own knowledge, and even from my own discussions while I was

ambassador in London, that the question of the Sudetenland was very

clearly understood by the Foreign Office in London and that it was

precisely England that very often before 1938 had supported certain

interests of the Sudeten Germans in co-operation with Konrad Henlein.

After the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler the suppression of these

German minorities undoubtedly increased. I should also like to point

out, and I know this from having read the files of the Foreign Office at

the time, that the League of Nations’ Committee for Minorities had a

tremendous amount of documents on the Sudeten Germans and the great

impediments encountered by the Germans in practicing and living their

own cultural life.

I do not believe it is too much to say that the manner in which the

Sudetenland was treated by Prague was, even in the opinion of the

competent and unprejudiced authorities of the League of Nations, in no

way in accord with the provisions of the League of Nations regarding

minorities. I myself thought it was absolutely necessary to reach some

solution in order that this problem might not become a matter of

conflict, whereby again, as in the case of Austria, all Europe would be

stirred up. I should like to emphasize that the Foreign Office and I

always endeavored, from the very beginning, to solve the Sudeten German

problem by way of diplomatic negotiations with the main signatory powers

of Versailles. And I might add that it was my personal conviction, which

I also expressed to Hitler, that with sufficient time on hand and

appropriate action, the Germany that we had in 1938 could solve this

problem in a diplomatic, that is, peaceful way.

The Prosecution have charged me with having stirred up unrest and

discord in Czechoslovakia by illegal means and thereby with having

consciously helped to bring about the outbreak of this crisis. I do not

deny in any way that between the Sudeten German Party and the NSDAP

there had been connections for a long time which aimed at taking care of

the Sudeten-German interests. Nor do I wish to deny, for example, what

was mentioned here, that the Sudeten German Party was supported with

certain funds from the Reich. I might even say, and I believe the

Czechoslovak Government will confirm this, that that was an open secret

which was well known in Prague. However, it is not correct to say that

anything was done on the part of the Foreign Office and by me to direct

these efforts in such a way that a really serious problem might arise. I

do not want to go into further detail, but I should like to mention one

more point. Documents have been mentioned about arrests of Czech

nationals in Germany as reprisals for Czech treatment of Sudeten

Germans. To that I can say merely that these were measures which can be

understood and explained only in view of the situation at that time, but

which were not brought about by us in the Foreign Office in order to

make the situation more critical. On the contrary, in the further course

of events, I attempted through the legation in Prague as well as through

efforts of the gentlemen of my office to restrain the activities of the

Sudeten German Party. I believe that this has to some extent been proved

clearly by the documents which have been made known here. I do not have

these documents before me, so I cannot deal with them in greater detail;

but I believe that perhaps the Defense have the opportunity to make

these matters clear in detail.

DR. HORN: What brought about the critical situation in the summer?

VON RIBBENTROP: It is natural and has always been the case that such a

nationality has its own dynamics. This question of the split of German

groups bordering on Germany was often referred to by us in the Foreign

Office as “the sinister problem,” that is a problem which could not be

solved in a way compatible with the interests of foreign policy. We had

to deal here not with letters and paragraphs but with living people who

had laws and dynamics of their own. Therefore the Sudeten German Party

naturally strove for greater and greater independence; it cannot be

denied that a number of influential leaders, at least at that time,

demanded absolute autonomy, if not the possibility of joining the Reich.

This is perfectly clear, and that was also the goal of the Sudeten

German Party. For the Foreign Office and German foreign policy, as well

as for Hitler, of course, manifold difficulties arose because of this.

As I said before, I tried to get the foreign policy affairs under

control. At the time I received Konrad Henlein—I believe once or twice,

I do not remember exactly—and asked him not to do anything, as far as

Prague was concerned, in the pursuit of his political goals that might

put German foreign policy into a state of emergency. This was perhaps

not always so easy for Henlein either, and I know that the leaders of

the Sudeten German Party could naturally approach and be received by

other offices of the Reich; also Adolf Hitler himself, who was

interested in this problem, occasionally received these leaders. The

crisis, or rather the whole situation, developed more and more

critically, because on the one hand the Sudeten Germans insisted on

their demands in Prague more and more openly and stubbornly and because

the Czechs, the Government in Prague, opposed these demands, which

resulted in excesses, arrests and so on. Thus the situation became even

more critical. At that time I often spoke with the Czech Minister. I

asked him to meet the demands of the Sudeten Germans for autonomy and

all their demands to the furthest extent possible. However, matters

developed in such a way that the attitude displayed by Prague became

more stubborn, and so did the attitude of the Sudeten Germans.

DR. HORN: What brought about Chamberlain’s visit? What were the reasons

for this visit and for the role played by you on that occasion?

VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to interpolate here that in the summer of

1938 the situation was driving more and more toward a crisis. Ambassador

Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin, with whom I had often discussed this

problem and who was making efforts on his part to bridge matters,

undoubtedly made continuous reports to his government. I do not know

exactly today, but I believe that it was through his initiative that

Lord Runciman went to Prague. Runciman undoubtedly went to Prague in

good faith and tried to get a clear picture of the situation. He also

rendered an opinion which, as far as I recall, was to the effect—I do

not remember the wording—that the right to exercise self-determination,

immediate self-determination, should not be denied the Sudetenland.

Thus, I believe, this opinion was favorable for the Sudeten Germans.

Nevertheless, the crisis was there. I do not remember exactly what the

date was, but I believe it happened that through Ambassador Henderson,

Chamberlain got in touch with the Reich Government. In this way

Chamberlain’s visit to the Führer at the Obersalzberg came about during

the first half of September. Regarding this visit, there is not very

much to be said. The Führer spoke alone with Chamberlain on that

occasion. I do know, however, and we all felt it, that the visit took

place in an altogether good and pleasant atmosphere. As far as I

remember the Führer told me that he had told Chamberlain frankly that

the demand of the Sudeten Germans for self-determination and freedom in

some form or other would have to be met now. Chamberlain, I believe—and

this was the substance of that conference—replied that he would inform

the British Cabinet of these wishes of the German Government and that he

would then make further statements.

DR. HORN: How did the second visit of Chamberlain to Godesberg come

about afterwards?

VON RIBBENTROP: As far as I recall, matters did not progress

satisfactorily. The situation in the Sudetenland became more difficult

and threatened to develop into a very serious crisis, not only within

Czechoslovakia but also between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and thereby

into a European crisis. The result was that Chamberlain once more took

the initiative and thus his visit to Godesberg came about; I believe

this was in the middle of September or during the second half of

September.

DR. HORN: How, then, was the Sudeten German question solved, and what

was your part in this solution?

VON RIBBENTROP: May I first report about Godesberg? In view of the

crisis which had developed, Hitler informed Mr. Chamberlain at Godesberg

that now he had to have a solution of this question under all

circumstances. I might emphasize that I knew nothing regarding details

of a military nature at that time, but I do know that the Führer

concerned himself with the possibility that this problem might have to

be solved by military power. He told Mr. Chamberlain at Godesberg that a

solution of the Sudeten German problem would have to be found as rapidly

as possible. Mr. Chamberlain was of the opinion that it would be

difficult to win Prague over so quickly to a solution, and finally

things broke down altogether at the conference. Adolf Hitler then

personally dictated a memorandum which he or I was to give to Mr.

Chamberlain. Then Sir Horace Wilson, a friend of Mr. Chamberlain,

visited me, a man who deserves much credit in bridging disagreements. I

succeeded in arranging for another meeting in the evening. During this

meeting, which started in a rather cool atmosphere, the Führer received

a report of Czechoslovakia’s mobilization. This was a most deplorable

circumstance since Hitler, just at this moment, resented that very

strongly, and both he and Mr. Chamberlain wanted to break off the

conference. This happened, I believe, exactly at the moment when the

interpreter was about to read the Führer’s memorandum containing a

proposal for the solution of the Sudeten German problem. By a remark and

a short conversation with Hitler and then with Chamberlain, I succeeded

in straightening matters out. Negotiations were resumed, and after a few

hours of negotiations the result was that Mr. Chamberlain told the

Führer he could see now that something had to be done and that he was

ready, on his part, to submit this memorandum to the British Cabinet. I

believe he also said that he would suggest to the British Cabinet, that

is to say, to his ministerial colleagues, that compliance with this

memorandum be recommended to Prague. The memorandum contained as a

solution, in general outlines, the annexation of the Sudetenland by the

Reich. I believe, the Führer expressed his desire in the memorandum

that, in view of the critical situation there, it would be advisable

that this be carried out, if possible, within a definite period of

time—I believe, by 1 October, that was within 10 days or two weeks. Mr.

Chamberlain then departed and a few days passed. The crisis did not

improve but rather became worse. I remember that very well. Then, during

the last part of September, I do not have the date here, the French

Ambassador came and said that he had good news about the Sudeten German

question. Later on the British Ambassador also called. At the same

time—Reich Marshal Göring has already testified to this—Italy wanted

to take part in the solution of the crisis acting on a wish made known

to Göring by Mussolini and offered to mediate. Then came Mussolini’s

proposal that a conference be held, which proposal was accepted by

England, France, and Germany. The French Ambassador, and later on the

British Ambassador, saw the Führer and outlined on a map the approximate

solution which apparently was being proposed by France, England, and

Italy as a solution of the Sudeten problem. I still remember that the

Führer in the first place stated to the French Ambassador that this

proposal was not satisfactory, whereupon the French Ambassador declared

that of course further discussions should be held regarding this

question and the question of where Germans really were living and how

far the Sudetenland extended; all these questions could still be

discussed in detail.

Anyway, as far the French Government was concerned—and I believe, Sir

Nevile Henderson used similar words later at his reception by the

Führer—the Führer could be assured that the British as well as the

French intended to contribute to the solution of this problem in

conformity with the German view.

Then came the Munich conference. I take it I need not go into the

details of this conference; I should like only to describe briefly the

results of it. The Führer explained to the statesmen, with the aid of a

map, the necessity, as he saw it, of annexing a particular part of the

Sudetenland to the German Reich to reach final satisfaction. A

discussion arose; Mussolini, the Italian Chief of Government, agreed in

general with Hitler’s ideas. The English Prime Minister made at first

certain reservations and also mentioned that perhaps the details might

be discussed with the Czechs, with Prague. Daladier, the French

Minister, said, as far as I recall, that he thought that since this

problem had already been broached, the four great powers should make a

decision here and now. In the end this opinion was shared by all the

four statesmen; as a result the Munich Agreement was drawn up providing

that the Sudetenland should be annexed to Germany as outlined on the

maps that were on hand. The Führer was very pleased and happy about this

solution, and, with regard to other versions of this matter which I have

heard during the Trial here, I should like to emphasize here once more

particularly that I also was happy. We all were extremely happy that in

this way in this form the matter had been solved.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 minutes past 2.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow morning from 10 o’clock

until 1 in open session. And now before going on, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal

wish me to say that they think that entirely too much time is being

taken up by the defendant in detailed accounts of negotiations which led

up to an agreement which is a matter of history and which is perfectly

well known to everybody. That is not the case which the defendant has to

meet; what the defendant has to meet is not the making of agreements

which are perfectly well known, but the breach of those agreements by

Germany and any part which he may have played in the breach of those

agreements. It is very important that the time of this Tribunal should

not be taken up by unnecessary details of that sort.

DR. HORN: What foreign political reaction did the Munich Agreement have?

VON RIBBENTROP: The Munich Agreement is well known. Its contents were

the following: Germany and England should never again wage war; the

naval agreement on the ratio of 100 to 35 was to be permanent and, in

important matters, consultations were to be resorted to. Through this

agreement the atmosphere between Germany and England was undoubtedly

cleared up to a certain degree. It was to be expected that the success

of this pact would lead to a final understanding. The disappointment was

great when, a few days after Munich, rearmament at any cost was

announced in England. Then England started on a policy of alliance and

close relationship with France. In November 1938 trade policy measures

were taken against Germany, and in December 1938 the British Colonial

Secretary made a speech in which a “no” was put to any revision of the

colonial question. Contact with the United States of America was also

established. Our reports of that period, as I remember them, showed an

increased—I should like to say—stiffening of the English attitude

toward Germany; and the impression was created in Germany of a policy

which practically aimed at the encirclement of Germany.

DR. HORN: You are accused by the Prosecution of having contributed to

the separation of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia in violation of

international law. What part did you take in the Slovakian declaration

of independence?

VON RIBBENTROP: There is no doubt that there were relations between

Slovakians and quite a number of members of the National Socialist

German Workers Party. These tendencies naturally were known to the

Foreign Office, and it would be wrong to say that we in any way did not

welcome them. But it is not correct to say that the autonomy was

demanded or forced by us in any way. I remember that Dr. Tiso proclaimed

this autonomy; and the Prague Government, under the influence of Munich,

also recognized the autonomy. What the situation was like at the time

after Munich can be seen from the fact that all minorities of

Czechoslovakia wanted autonomy and independence. Shortly thereafter the

Carpatho-Ukrainians declared their independence and others as well had

similar aspirations. In the Munich Agreement, I should like to add,

there was a clause according to which Germany and Italy were to give

Czechoslovakia a guarantee; but a declaration to this effect was not

made. The reason for that was that Poland, after the Munich Agreement,

sent an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, and on her own initiative, severed

the Polish minorities and occupied these areas. The Hungarians also

wanted autonomy, or rather, incorporation of Hungarian areas; and

certain areas of Czechoslovakia were thereupon given to Hungary by the

Vienna decision. The situation in Czechoslovakia, however, was not yet

clear and also remained difficult during the following period. Then the

Slovak, Tuka, approached us. He wanted to win Germany’s approval for

Slovakia’s independence. The Führer received Tuka at that time and,

after a few interludes, the final result was the declaration of

independence of Slovakia made by Tiso on 13 March. The Prosecution have

submitted a document in which I am alleged to have said, during the

conversation which took place between the Führer and Tiso, that it was

only a matter of hours, not of days, that Slovakia would have to come to

a decision. However, this was to be understood to mean that at that time

preparations for an invasion had been made by Hungary in order to occupy

Carpatho-Ukrainia as well as some other regions of Slovakia. We wanted

to prevent a war between Slovakia and Hungary or between Czechoslovakia

and Hungary; Hitler was greatly concerned about it, and therefore he

gladly complied with Tiso’s desire. Later, after the declaration of

Slovakia’s independence by the Slovak parliament, he complied with

Tiso’s request and took over the protection of Slovakia.

DR. HORN: What brought about Hacha’s visit to Berlin on 14 March 1939?

VON RIBBENTROP: Events in Slovakia had their repercussions, of course,

and chiefly very strong excesses against racial Germans in the area of

Prague, Brünn, Iglau, _et cetera_, were reported to Hitler. Many

fugitives came into the old Reich. In the winter of 1938-39 I repeatedly

attempted to discuss these matters with the Prague Government. Hitler

was convinced that a development was being initiated in Prague which

could not be tolerated by the German Reich. It was the attitude of the

press and the influential government circles in Prague. The Führer also

wished that the Czech nation should reduce her military power, but this

was refused by Prague.

During these months I tried repeatedly to maintain good German relations

with Prague. In particular I spoke frequently with Chvalkovsky, the

Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister. In the middle of March, Chvalkovsky,

the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, turned to our German

representative in Prague to find out whether Hitler would give Hacha the

opportunity of a personal interview. I reported this to the Führer and

the Führer agreed to receive Hacha; however, he told me that he wished

to deal with this matter personally. To that effect I had an exchange of

telegrams with Prague: A reserved attitude should be taken in Prague but

Hacha should be told that the Führer would receive him.

At this point I should like to mention briefly that the Foreign Office

and I myself did not know anything at this date of impending military

events. We learned about these things only shortly before they happened.

Before the arrival of Hacha I asked the Führer whether a treaty was to

be prepared. The Führer answered, as I recall distinctly, that he had

the intention of going far beyond that. After the arrival of Hacha in

Berlin I visited him at once and he told me he wanted to place the fate

of the Czech State in the Führer’s hands. I reported this to the Führer

and the Führer instructed me to draft an agreement. The draft was

submitted to him and corrected later on, as I remember. Hacha was then

received by the Führer and the results of this conference, as far as I

know, are already known here and have been submitted in documentary form

so that I do not need to go into it.

I know that Adolf Hitler at that time spoke pointedly to Hacha and told

him that he intended to occupy Czechoslovakia. It concerned old historic

territory which he intended to take under his protection. The Czechs

were to have complete autonomy and their own way of living, and he

believed that the decision which was being made on that day would result

in great benefit for the Czech people. While Hacha talked to the Führer,

or rather afterwards—I was present at the Führer’s conference with

Hacha—I had a long discussion with the Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky. He

adopted our point of view fairly readily and I asked him to influence

Hacha so that the Führer’s decision and the whole action might be

carried out without bloodshed.

I believe it was the deep impression made on him first of all by the

Führer and then by what Adolf Hitler had told him which caused Hacha to

get in touch by telephone with his Government in Prague and also, I

believe, with the Chief of the General Staff. I do not know this

exactly. He obtained the approval of his Government to sign the

agreement which I mentioned at the beginning. This agreement was then

signed by Hitler, Hacha, and both the Foreign Ministers, that is by

myself also. Then Hacha, as I recall, gave instructions that the German

Army should be received cordially and, as far as I know; the march into

and the occupation of Czechoslovakia, that is Bohemia and Moravia, was

completed without serious incident of any kind.

After the occupation I went to Prague with the Führer. After the

occupation, or maybe it was in Prague, the Führer gave me in the morning

a proclamation in which the countries of Bohemia and Moravia were

declared to be a protectorate of the Reich. I read out this proclamation

in Prague which, I may say, was somewhat a surprise to me. No protest of

any sort was made as far as I recall, and I believe I might mention that

the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, which the Führer considered

necessary in the ultimate interest of the Reich, took place for

historical and economic reasons and above all for reasons of security

for the German Reich. I believe that Göring has given the details.

DR. HORN: What did the European situation look like to you at the time

of the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia?

VON RIBBENTROP: I might say that after the proclamation at Prague I had

a lengthy discussion with the Führer. I pointed out to the Führer that

this occupation, of course, would have considerable repercussions in

British-French circles. In this connection I should like to point out

that in England those circles which had turned against Germany had grown

larger and were led by important persons. In this connection I should

like to come back to or mention briefly one incident which took place

while I was still Ambassador in London, when Mr. Winston Churchill paid

me a visit at the Embassy. Mr. Winston Churchill was not in the

government at that time, and I believe he was not leader of the

opposition—it has already been discussed—but he was one of the most

outstanding personalities in England. I was especially interested in

arranging a meeting between him and Adolf Hitler and therefore had asked

him to come to see me at the Embassy. We had a conversation which lasted

several hours and the details of which I recall exactly. I believe it

would go too far to relate all the details of this conversation. But

whereas important men like Lord Vansittart in 1936...

THE PRESIDENT: Documents with reference to Mr. Winston Churchill at this

time when he was not a member of the government have already been ruled

by the Tribunal to be irrelevant and what he said and such a

conversation as this appears to the Tribunal to be absolutely irrelevant

and the Tribunal will not hear it.

VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I called the Führer’s attention

to the British reaction. Adolf Hitler explained to me the necessity of

the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, especially on historic and

strategic grounds. I remember that in this connection he quoted

especially the former French Minister of Aviation, Pierre Cot, who had

called Bohemia and Moravia, that is Czechoslovakia, the “airplane

carrier” against Germany. I believe it was Reich Marshal Göring who

already mentioned that at that time we received intelligence reports of

Russian pilots or Russian missions being on Czech airdromes.

Hitler said to me, and I remember these words distinctly, that he could

not tolerate an inimical Czech thorn in the German flesh. One could get

along well enough with the Czechs, but it was necessary for Germany to

have in her hands the protection of these countries. He mentioned Soviet

Russia, allied with Czechoslovakia, as a factor of inestimable power.

When I mentioned England and her reaction he said that England was in no

position to take over the protection of the Germans in Czechoslovakia.

Furthermore, the structure of the Czechoslovakian State had

disintegrated and Slovakia had become independent. Therefore he thought

it was necessary in the interest of future German-English relations that

the countries of Bohemia and Moravia should come into a close contact

with the Reich. A protectorate seemed to him to be the appropriate form.

Adolf Hitler said that while this question was utterly unimportant to

England it was absolutely vital for Germany. This becomes evident if one

glances at the map—this is what he literally said. Besides, he said, he

was unable to see how this solution could disturb the co-operation which

was being striven for between Germany and England. Hitler pointed out

that England—by chance I still remember the figure—had about 600

dominions, protectorates, and colonies and therefore should understand

that such problems have to be solved.

I told Adolf Hitler about the difficulties which might confront Mr.

Chamberlain personally because of this action on the part of Germany,

that England might consider this an increase of Germany’s power and so

on; but the Führer explained the whole question with the reasons I have

mentioned before.

The English reaction at first, in the person of Mr. Chamberlain in the

House of Commons, was rather a positive one. He said it was not a

violation of the Munich Agreement and the British Government was not

bound by any obligation. The Czechoslovakian State had disintegrated and

the guarantee which England had said she would give had not come into

effect, or rather the obligations of the guarantee did not apply under

the circumstances.

I might say that all of us were glad that this attitude was taken in

England. I believe it was 2 or 3 days later when Mr. Chamberlain in

Birmingham...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what have we got to do with the reactions in

England unless they took the form of a note? I do not see what it has to

do with it. What we want to know is the part that the Defendant

Ribbentrop played in the breach of the Munich Agreement.

DR. HORN: The Defendant Von Ribbentrop is accused of having participated

in a conspiracy when he was Foreign Minister, and it is charged that his

foreign policy contributed to the bringing about of aggressive war. If

the Defendant Von Ribbentrop wishes and is allowed to defend himself

against these charges then he must be permitted to describe the

circumstances as he saw them and the motives behind his actions. I am

putting only such questions to the defendant in this case as have

reference to his forming certain opinions.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don’t think you asked him any question about it.

He was just...

DR. HORN: It is not coming through quite audibly.

THE PRESIDENT: What I said was, I did not think you asked him any

questions as to the reactions in England.

THE INTERPRETER: The channels seem to be disturbed in some way. I think

they are getting more than one language.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had better adjourn, I think.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what I was attempting to say to you when the

system broke down was that it seems to the Tribunal that the defendant

ought to be able to keep his evidence within stricter limits and not to

go into so much detail, and that, with regard to the reactions, the

political reactions in England, they are not relevant in themselves, and

that the bearing which they may have upon the case is really remote.

DR. HORN: What caused Hitler to commission you, in October 1938, to

enter into negotiations with Poland?

VON RIBBENTROP: There had always been the minority problem in Poland,

which had caused great difficulties. Despite the agreement of 1934, this

situation had not changed. In the year 1938 the “de-Germanization”

measures against German minorities were continued by Poland. Hitler

wished to reach some clear settlement with Poland, as well as with other

countries. Therefore he charged me, I believe during October 1938, to

discuss with the Polish ambassador a final clarification of the problems

existing between Germany and Poland.

DR. HORN: Besides the minority problem, what other problems were

involved?

VON RIBBENTROP: There were two questions: One, the minority problem, was

the most burning one; the second problem was the question of Danzig and

the Corridor, that is to say, of a connection with East Prussia.

DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s and your attitude toward the Danzig and

Corridor questions?

VON RIBBENTROP: It is clear that these two questions were the problems

that had caused the greatest difficulties since Versailles. Hitler had

to solve these problems sooner or later one way or another. I shared

this point of view. Danzig was exposed to continual pressure by the

Poles; they wanted to “Polandize” Danzig more and more and by October of

1938 from 800,000 to a million Germans, I believe, had been expelled

from the Corridor or had returned to Germany.

DR. HORN: How did the Polish Ambassador take your suggestions in October

1938?

VON RIBBENTROP: The Polish Ambassador was reticent at first. He did not

commit himself, nor could he do so. I naturally approached him with the

problem in such a way that he could discuss it at ease with his

government, and did not request, so to speak, a definitive answer from

him. He said that of course he saw certain difficulties with reference

to Danzig, and also a corridor to East Prussia was a question which

required much consideration. He was very reticent, and the discussion

ended with his promise to communicate my statements, made on behalf of

the German Government, to his government, and to give me an answer in

the near future.

DR. HORN: How did your second discussion with Ambassador Lipski on 17

November 1938 end?

VON RIBBENTROP: On 17 November 1938 Lipski came to see me and declared

that the problem involved considerable difficulties and that the Danzig

question in particular was very difficult in view of Poland’s entire

attitude.

DR. HORN: Did you then, on Hitler’s order, submit the request to Lipski

to take up direct negotiations with Foreign Minister Beck?

VON RIBBENTROP: I invited Foreign Minister Beck to Berlin.

DR. HORN: When did Foreign Minister Beck come to Berchtesgaden?

VON RIBBENTROP: Unfortunately, Minister Beck did not come to Berlin; he

went to London.

DR. HORN: You misunderstood my question. When did Foreign Minister Beck

come to Berchtesgaden?

VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler had said that he wanted to speak with Mr. Beck

personally about this problem. Thereupon Mr. Beck came; I do not know

the date exactly...

DR. HORN: It was the beginning of January, on 5 January.

VON RIBBENTROP: ...to Berchtesgaden and had a long talk with Adolf

Hitler.

DR. HORN: What was the result of this talk?

VON RIBBENTROP: I was present at that conversation. The result was that

Adolf Hitler informed Beck, once more in detail, of his desire for good

German-Polish relations. He said that a completely new solution would

have to be found in regard to Danzig, and that a corridor to East

Prussia should not give rise to insurmountable difficulties. During this

conversation Mr. Beck was rather receptive. He told the Führer that

naturally the question of Danzig was difficult because of the mouth of

the Vistula, but he would think the problem over in all its details. He

did not at all refuse to discuss this problem, but rather he pointed out

the difficulties which, due to the Polish attitude, confronted a

solution of the problem.

DR. HORN: Is it true that Beck was, as a matter of principle, willing to

negotiate and therefore invited you, at the end of January, to make a

visit to Warsaw?

VON RIBBENTROP: One cannot put it quite that way. After the meeting at

Berchtesgaden with the Führer, I had another lengthy conversation with

Beck in Munich. During this conversation Beck explained to me again that

the problem was very difficult, but that he would do everything he

could; he would speak to his governmental colleagues, and one would have

to find a solution of some kind. On this occasion we agreed that I would

pay him a return visit in Warsaw. During this visit we also spoke about

the minority question, about Danzig and the Corridor. During this

conversation the matter did not progress either; Mr. Beck rather

repeated the arguments why it was difficult. I told him that it was

simply impossible to leave this problem the way it was between Germany

and Poland. I pointed out the great difficulties encountered by the

German minorities and the undignified situation, as I should like to put

it, that is, the always undignified difficulties confronting Germans who

wanted to travel to East Prussia. Beck promised to help in the minority

question, and also to re-examine the other questions. Then, on the

following day, I spoke briefly with Marshal Smygly-Rydz, but this

conversation did not lead to anything.

DR. HORN: At that time did you ask Beck to pay another visit to Berlin,

and did this visit take place, or did Beck decide on a different course?

VON RIBBENTROP: What happened was that I invited Foreign Minister Beck

to Berlin, because his first visit was not an official one.

Unfortunately, however, Beck did not come to Berlin, but, as I have

already said, he went to London.

DR. HORN: What was the effect of his visit to London on the subsequent

negotiations?

VON RIBBENTROP: The effect of this London visit was a complete surprise

to us. Minister Lipski, I believe it was on 21 March, yes, it was,

suddenly handed us a memorandum.

DR. HORN: Let me interrupt you. On 21 March you had previously another

conversation with Lipski regarding the partition of Czechoslovakia and

the problems arising from the establishment of the Protectorate?

VON RIBBENTROP: That may be true, in that case I meant 26.

DR. HORN: Yes.

VON RIBBENTROP: That is right; on the 21st I had a talk with Lipski,

that is true, and in this talk Lipski expressed certain doubts

concerning Slovakia and the protection afforded by Germany. He expressed

the wish that between Hungary and Poland, two countries which had always

had close relations with each other, a direct, common boundary might be

established and asked whether or not this would be possible. He also

inquired indirectly whether the protection afforded to Slovakia was

directed in any way against Poland. I assured Mr. Beck that neither

Hitler nor anybody else had been motivated by the slightest intention of

acting against Poland when the protection was promised. It was merely a

measure to point out to Hungary that the territorial questions were now

settled. However, I believe I told Mr. Lipski to look forward to such a

link being established via the Carpatho-Ukraine.

DR. HORN: Is it true that consultations were initiated between Poland

and the British Government, the French Government and the Russian

Government about 20 March?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right. These consultations, as far as I

recall, go back to a suggestion made by Lord Simon. A common declaration

was to be made with regard to Poland. But Poland did not regard this as

satisfactory, and made it clear in London that this solution was out of

the question for Poland.

DR. HORN: Is it true that Poland worked toward a concrete alliance with

England and France?

VON RIBBENTROP: There can be no doubt, and it is a historical fact that

Poland strove for an alliance with England.

DR. HORN: When did the German Government find out that Poland had been

promised support by England and France?

VON RIBBENTROP: That became known, I cannot tell you the date precisely,

but it was, at any rate, during the latter part of March. Anyway, I

know, and we all were convinced of what, I believe, is an established

fact today, that these relations taken up during the latter part of

March between Warsaw and London determined the answer which was, to our

surprise, communicated to us by memorandum on 26 March, I believe.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that this memorandum stated that a further

pursuit of German aims regarding a change in the Danzig and Corridor

questions would mean war as far as Poland was concerned?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. That was a great surprise to us. I

know that I read the memorandum, and for a moment I simply could not

believe that such an answer had been given, when one considers that for

months we had tried to find a solution, which—and I wish to emphasize

this—only Adolf Hitler, at that time, with his great authority over the

German people could bring about and be responsible for.

I do not want to get lost in details, but I do want to say that the

Danzig and Corridor problem, since 1919, had been considered by

statesmen of great authority the problem with which somehow the revision

of Versailles would have to start. I should like to remind you of the

statement by Marshal Foch and other statements by Winston Churchill, who

also elaborated on this subject, as well as by Clemenceau, _et cetera_.

All these statesmen were undoubtedly of the opinion that a territorial

revision of this Corridor would really have to be undertaken. But

Hitler, for his part, wanted to make it an overall settlement and reach

an understanding with Poland on the basis of his putting up with the

Corridor and taking only Danzig back into the Reich, whereby Poland was

to be afforded a very generous solution in the economic field. That, in

other words, was the basis of the proposals which I had been working on

for 4 to 5 months on Hitler’s order. All the greater was our surprise

when, suddenly, the other side declared that a further pursuit of these

plans and solutions, which we regarded as very generous, would mean war.

I informed Hitler of this, and I remember very well that Hitler received

it very calmly.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that on the following day you stated to the

Polish Ambassador that the memorandum of 26 March 1939 could not serve

as the basis for a solution?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. I just said that Hitler received this

harsh and serious message of the Polish Ambassador very calmly. He said,

however, that I should tell the Polish Ambassador that of course no

solution could be found on this basis. There should be no talk of war.

DR. HORN: Is it true that thereupon, on 6 April 1939, the Polish Foreign

Minister Beck traveled to London and returned with a temporary agreement

of mutual assistance between Poland, England, and France?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.

DR. HORN: What was the German reaction to this pact of mutual

assistance?

VON RIBBENTROP: The German reaction—here I might refer to Hitler’s

Reichstag speech in which he stated his attitude toward this whole

problem. We felt this pact of mutual assistance between Poland and

England to be not in agreement with the German-Polish pact of 1934, for

in the 1934 pact any application of force was excluded between Germany

and Poland. By the new pact concluded between Poland and England without

previous consultation with Germany, Poland had bound herself for

example, to attack Germany in case of any conflict, between Germany and

England. I know that Adolf Hitler felt that it was also not in

conformity with the agreements between him and Mr. Chamberlain in

Munich, namely, the elimination of any resort to force between Germany

and England, regardless of what might happen.

DR. HORN: Is it true that Germany then sent through you a memorandum to

Poland on 28 April by which the German-Polish declaration of 1934 was

rescinded?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. It was, I believe, on the same day as the

Reichstag speech of the Führer. This memorandum stated more or less what

I have just summarized here, that the pact was not in agreement with the

treaty of 1934 and that Germany regarded this treaty as no longer valid.

DR. HORN: Is it true that as a consequence of this memorandum

German-Polish relations became more tense and that new difficulties

arose in the minority question?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. During the preceding period

negotiations had been pending in order to put the minority problem on a

new basis. I still remember that no progress was made. That was already

the case before 28 May, and after 28 May the situation of the German

minority became even more difficult. In particular the Polish

association for the Western Territories was very active at that time and

persecution of Germans and their expulsion from hearth and home was the

order of the day. I know that just during the months following 28 May,

that is to say, in the summer of 1939, the so-called refugee reception

camps for German refugees from Poland showed a tremendous influx.

DR. HORN: How did you and Hitler react to the British-French

declarations of guarantee to Romania and Greece, and later on Turkey?

VON RIBBENTROP: These declarations could be interpreted by the German

policy only as meaning that England was initiating a systematic policy

of alliances in Europe which was hostile to Germany. That was Hitler’s

opinion and also mine.

DR. HORN: Is it true that these declarations of guarantee and

Roosevelt’s message of 14 April 1939 were then, on 22 May 1939, followed

by the German-Italian pact of alliance? And what were the reasons for

this pact?

VON RIBBENTROP: It is known that between Germany and Italy friendly

relations had naturally existed for a long time; and when the European

situation became more acute these relations were, at Mussolini’s

suggestion, intensified and a pact of alliance, which was discussed

first by Count Ciano and me in Milan, was drawn up and provisionally

signed on the order of the Government heads. This was an answer to the

efforts of English-French policy.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that the crisis with Poland became acute through

the fact that on 6 August in Danzig a dispute with the customs

inspectors took place by which Germany was forced to take a stand?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. A quarrel had arisen between the Polish

representative and the Senate of the City of Danzig. The Polish

representative had sent a note to the President of the Senate informing

him that certain customs officers of the Senate wanted to disobey Polish

regulations. This information proved later to be false, was answered by

the Senate, and led to a sharp exchange of notes between the Senate and

the Polish representative. On Hitler’s order I told the State Secretary

of the Foreign Office to lodge appropriate protests with the Polish

Government.

DR. HORN: Is it true that Weizsäcker, the then State Secretary, on 15

August called the English and French Ambassadors in order to inform both

these ambassadors in detail of the seriousness of the situation?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. He did that on my order.

DR. HORN: On 18 August was Ambassador Henderson again asked to see your

State Secretary because the situation was becoming more acute in Poland

and Danzig?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. A conversation took place a few days later between

the English Ambassador and the State Secretary. The State Secretary

explained to him in very clear words the great seriousness of the

situation and told him that things were taking a very serious turn.

DR. HORN: Is it true that in this phase of the crisis you made up your

mind, on the basis of a suggestion made to you, to initiate negotiations

with Russia, and what were your reasons for doing that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Negotiations with Russia had already started sometime

previously. Marshal Stalin, in March 1939, delivered a speech in which

he made certain hints of his desire to have better relations with

Germany. I had submitted this speech to Adolf Hitler and asked him

whether we should not try to find out whether this suggestion had

something real behind it. Hitler was at first reluctant, but later on he

became more receptive to this idea. Negotiations for a commercial treaty

were under way, and during these negotiations, with the Führer’s

permission, I took soundings in Moscow as to the possibility of a

definite bridge between National Socialism and Bolshevism and whether

the interests of the two countries could not at least be made to

harmonize.

DR. HORN: How did the relations taken up by the Soviet Russian

commercial agency in Berlin with your Minister Schnurre develop?

VON RIBBENTROP: The negotiations of Minister Schnurre gave me within a

relatively short period of time a picture from which I could gather that

Stalin had meant this speech in earnest. Then an exchange of telegrams

took place with Moscow which, in the middle of August, led to Hitler’s

sending a telegram to Stalin, whereupon Stalin in answer to this

telegram invited a plenipotentiary to Moscow. The aim in view, which had

been prepared diplomatically, was the conclusion of a non-aggression

pact between the two countries.

DR. HORN: Is it true that you were sent to Moscow as plenipotentiary?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is known.

DR. HORN: When did you fly to Moscow, and what negotiations did you

carry on there?

VON RIBBENTROP: On the evening of 22 August I arrived in Moscow. The

reception given me by Stalin and Molotov was very friendly. We had at

first a 2-hour conversation. During this conversation the entire complex

of Russo-German relations was discussed. The result was, first, the

mutual will of both countries to put their relations on a completely new

basis. This was to be expressed in a pact of non-aggression. Secondly,

the spheres of interests of the two countries were to be defined; this

was done by a secret supplementary protocol.

DR. HORN: Which cases were dealt with in this secret supplementary

protocol? What were its contents and what were the political bases?

VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say, first of all, that this secret

protocol has been spoken about several times here in this Court. I

talked very frankly during the negotiations with Stalin and Molotov, and

the Russian gentlemen also used plain language with me. I described

Hitler’s desire that the two countries should reach a definitive

agreement, and, of course, I also spoke of the critical situation in

Europe. I told the Russian gentlemen that Germany would do everything to

settle the situation in Poland and to settle the difficulties peacefully

in order to reach a friendly agreement despite everything.

However, I left no doubt that the situation was serious and that it was

possible that an armed conflict might break out. That was clear anyway.

For both statesmen, Stalin as well as Hitler, it was a question of

territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. It

is, therefore, wrong to look at these things from any other point of

view. And just as Adolf Hitler was of the opinion which I expressed in

Moscow, that in some form or other this problem would have to be solved,

so also the Russian side saw clearly that this was the case.

We then discussed what should be done on the part of the Germans and on

the part of the Russians in the case of an armed conflict. A line of

demarcation was agreed upon, as is known, in order that in the event of

intolerable Polish provocation, or in the event of war, there should be

a boundary, so that the German and Russian interests in the Polish

theater could and would not collide. The well-known line was agreed upon

along the line of the Rivers Vistula, San, and Bug in Polish territory.

And it was agreed that in the case of conflict the territories lying to

the west of these rivers would be the German sphere of interest, and

those to the east would be the Russian sphere of interest.

It is known that later, after the outbreak of the war, these zones were

occupied on the one side by Germany and on the other side by Russian

troops. I may repeat that at that time I had the impression, both from

Hitler and Stalin, that the territories—that these Polish territories

and also the other territories which had been marked off in these

spheres of interest, about which I shall speak shortly—that these were

territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. And

both statesmen undoubtedly held the opinion that if these

territories—if, I should like to say, the last chance for a reasonable

solution of this problem was exhausted—there was certainly a

justification for Adolf Hitler to incorporate these territories into the

German Reich by some other procedure.

Over and above that, it is also known that other spheres of interest

were defined with reference to Finland, the Baltic States, and

Bessarabia. This was a great settlement of the interest of two great

powers providing for a peaceful solution as well as for solution by war.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that these negotiations were drawn up

specifically only in the event that, on the basis of the non-aggression

pact and the political settlement between Russia and Germany, it might

not be possible to settle the Polish question diplomatically?

VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that it was clearly stated that this solution

was designed only to provide for the event that, despite the Pact of

Non-aggression with Russia, the Polish conflict might not be solved by

diplomatic means and that the treaty was to become effective only in

this case?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. I stated at that time that on the

German side everything would be attempted to solve the problem in a

diplomatic and peaceful way.

DR. HORN: Did Russia promise you diplomatic assistance or benevolent

neutrality in connection with this solution?

VON RIBBENTROP: It could be seen from the Pact of Non-aggression and

from all the conferences in Moscow that this was so. It was perfectly

clear, and we were convinced of it, that if, due to the Polish attitude,

a war broke out, Russia would assume a friendly attitude towards us.

DR. HORN: When did you fly back from Moscow, and what sort of situation

did you find in Berlin?

VON RIBBENTROP: The Pact of Non-aggression with the Soviet Union was

concluded on the 23rd. On the 24th I flew back to Germany. I had thought

at first that I would fly to the Führer, to the Berghof in

Berchtesgaden, but during the flight or prior to it—I do not know

exactly—I was asked to come to Berlin.

We flew to Berlin, and there I informed Hitler of the Moscow agreements.

The situation which I found there was undoubtedly very tense. On the

next day I noticed this particularly.

DR. HORN: To what circumstances was this aggravation of the

German-Polish situation to be attributed?

VON RIBBENTROP: In the middle of August all sorts of things had happened

which, as I should like to put it, charged the atmosphere with

electricity: frontier incidents, difficulties between Danzig and Poland.

On the one hand, Germany was accused of sending arms to Danzig, and, on

the other hand, we accused the Poles of taking military measures in

Danzig, and so on.

DR. HORN: Is it true that on your return from Moscow to Berlin, you were

informed of the signing of the British-Polish Pact of Guarantee and what

was your reaction and that of Hitler to this?

VON RIBBENTROP: That was on 25 August. On 25 August I was informed about

the conversation which the Führer had had with Ambassador Henderson

during my absence from Germany, I believe at Berchtesgaden on 22 August.

This was a very serious conversation. Henderson had brought over a

letter from the British Prime Minister which stated clearly that a war

between Germany and Poland would draw England into the picture.

Then, early on the 25th I—the Führer then answered this letter, I

believe on the same day—and the answer was couched so as to mean that

at the moment a solution by diplomatic means could not be expected. I

discussed with the Führer on the 25th this exchange of letters and asked

him to consider this question once more and suggested that one more

attempt might be made with reference to England. This was 25 August, a

very eventful day. In the morning a communication came from the Italian

Government, according to which Italy, in the case of a conflict over

Poland, would not stand at Germany’s side. The Führer decided then to

receive Ambassador Henderson once more in the course of that day. This

meeting took place at about noon of the 25th. I was present. The Führer

went into details and asked Henderson once more to bear in mind his

urgent desire to reach an understanding with England. He described to

him the very difficult situation with Poland and asked him, I believe,

to take a plane and fly back to England in order to discuss this whole

situation once more with the British Government. Ambassador Henderson

agreed to this and I sent him, I believe in the course of the afternoon,

a memo or a _note verbale_ in which the Führer put in writing his ideas

for such an understanding, or rather what he had said during the

meeting, so that the ambassador would be able to inform his government

correctly.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that after the British-Polish Pact of Guarantee

became known, you asked Hitler to stop the military measures which had

been started in Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is so. I was just about to relate that. During

the course of the afternoon—I heard in the course of the day that

certain military measures were being taken and then in the afternoon I

received, I believe, a Reuters dispatch, at any rate it was a press

dispatch—saying that the Polish-British Pact of Alliance had been

ratified in London.

I believe there was even a note appended that the Polish Ambassador

Raczynski had been sick but had nevertheless suddenly given his

signature in the Foreign Office.

DR. HORN: Was this treaty signed before or after it was known that Italy

refused to sign the Italian mobilization?

VON RIBBENTROP: This treaty was undoubtedly concluded afterwards. Of

course, I do not know the hour and the day, but I believe it must have

been on the afternoon of 25 August, and Italy’s refusal had already

reached us by noon; I believe in other words, it had undoubtedly been

definitively decided in Rome in the morning or on the day before. At any

rate, I can deduce this from another fact. Perhaps I might, however,

answer your other question first, namely, what I did upon receipt of

this news.

DR. HORN: Yes.

VON RIBBENTROP: When I received this press dispatch, of which I was

informed once more when I came to the Chancellery, I went immediately to

Hitler and asked him to stop at once the military measures, whatever

they were—I was not familiar with military matters in detail—and I

told him that it was perfectly clear that this meant war with England

and that England could never disavow her signature. The Führer reflected

only a short while and then he said that was true and immediately called

his military adjutant, and I believe it was Field Marshal Keitel who

came, in order to call together the generals and stop the military

measures which had been started. On this occasion he made a remark that

we had received two pieces of bad news on one day. That was Italy and

this news, and I thought it was possible that the report about Italy’s

attitude had become known in London immediately, whereupon the final

ratification of this pact had taken place. I still remember this remark

of the Führer’s very distinctly.

DR. HORN: Did you and Hitler, on this day, make efforts with Henderson

to settle the conflict, and what were your proposals?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have already stated that the Führer, I believe it was

in the early afternoon, saw Henderson on the 25th and told him that he

still had the intention of reaching some final understanding with

England. The question of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved

in some way and he wanted to approach England with a comprehensive offer

which was not contained in the _note verbale_, in order to settle these

things with England on a perfectly regular basis.

DR. HORN: Is it true that Hitler then put an airplane at Henderson’s

disposal so that the latter could submit these proposals to his

government at once and request his government to make their promised

mediation effective in regard to Poland?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. I know that Henderson—I believe it

was on the next day, the 26th—flew to London in a German airplane. I do

not know the details, but I know that the Führer said during the

meeting, “Take an airplane immediately and fly to your government.”

DR. HORN: What results did Ambassador Henderson bring back to Berlin on

28 August?

VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say in this connection, that in view of

the critical situation between Poland and Germany, which, of course, was

also known to the British Ambassador, Hitler expressed to me a certain

disappointment that the British Ambassador had not returned more quickly

with his answer, for the atmosphere was charged with electricity on that

day. On the 28th, Henderson then had another discussion with the Führer.

I was also present. The answer brought back by Sir Nevile Henderson from

London appeared at first not very satisfactory to the Führer. It

contained various points which seemed unclear to the Führer. But the

main point was that England announced her readiness for a wholesale

solution of the existing problems between Germany and England, on the

condition that the German-Polish question could be brought to a peaceful

solution.

In the discussion Adolf Hitler told Sir Nevile Henderson that he would

examine the note and would then ask him to come back. Then he...

DR. HORN: Is it true that in this memorandum England suggested that

Germany take up direct negotiations with Poland?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. One of the points in the note—I intended

to go into that—was that the English suggested that German-Polish

direct negotiations would be the most appropriate way to reach a

solution and, secondly, that such negotiations should take place as soon

as possible, because England had to admit that the situation was very

tense because of the frontier incidents and in every respect.

Furthermore the note stated that no matter what solution might be

found—I believe this was in the note—it should be guaranteed by the

great powers.

DR. HORN: Did England offer a mediator to forward to Poland German

proposals for direct negotiations?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.

DR. HORN: What were these German proposals like, which on 29 August

1939, were given by Hitler to Henderson in answer to Henderson’s

memorandum?

VON RIBBENTROP: The situation was this: On the 29th Adolf Hitler again

received the British Ambassador and on this occasion told him that he

was ready to take up the English suggestion of the 28th, that is to say,

that despite the great tension and despite the Polish attitude, which he

resented so profoundly, he was prepared to offer his hand once more for

a peaceful solution of the German-Polish problems, as suggested in the

British note of the 28th.

DR. HORN: What were the reasons for including in this German proposal a

request that a Polish plenipotentiary be sent by 30 August?

VON RIBBENTROP: In Adolf Hitler’s communication to Ambassador Henderson

for the British Government it was stated that the German Government, in

view of the tense situation, would immediately set about working out

proposals for a solution of the Danzig and Corridor problems. The German

Government hoped to be in a position to have these proposals available

by the time a Polish negotiator arrived who was expected during the

course of 30 August.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that Hitler included this condition or this

request to send a plenipotentiary within 24 hours because he was afraid

that a conflict might arise due to the fact that the mobilized armies of

the two countries faced each other?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely true. I might say that during the

meeting on the 29th Ambassador Henderson, as I recall, asked the Führer

whether this was an ultimatum. The Führer answered “No,” that that was

not an ultimatum, but rather, I believe he said, a practical proposal or

a proposal arising from the situation, or something of that sort. I

should like to repeat that it was a fact that the situation near the

frontiers of Danzig and the Corridor during the last days of August

looked, one might say, as if the guns would go off on their own unless

something was done rather soon. That was the reason for the relatively

short respite which was made a condition by the Führer. He feared that

if more time were allowed, matters would drag out and danger of war not

decrease but rather increase.

DR. HORN: Is it true that, despite this information given to Ambassador

Henderson, the answer of the British Government called this proposal

unreasonable?

VON RIBBENTROP: I know of the British reaction from several documents

that I saw later. The first reaction came during my discussion with

Henderson on 30 August.

DR. HORN: Is it true that on 30 August you received a confidential

communication regarding Poland’s total mobilization?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is true. On the 30th Hitler awaited word from the

Polish negotiator. This, however, did not come, but, I believe, on the

evening of the 30th the news arrived that Poland had ordered, although

not announced, general mobilization. I believe it was not announced

until the next morning. This, of course, further aggravated the

situation enormously.

DR. HORN: Is it true that the British Government then practically

withdrew their offer to mediate by suggesting that Germany take

immediate and direct steps to prepare negotiations between Germany and

Poland?

VON RIBBENTROP: You mean on the 30th?

DR. HORN: Yes, on the 30th.

VON RIBBENTROP: That is so. As I said before, we had been waiting on the

30th, but the Polish negotiator had not arrived. In the meantime, Hitler

had prepared the proposals which he wanted to hand to a Polish

negotiator who, as he had expressly promised Sir Nevile Henderson, would

be able to negotiate with Germany on the basis of complete equality. Not

until shortly before midnight, or at least in the late evening, a call

came through saying, that the British Ambassador wanted to transmit a

communication from his government. This meeting, I believe, was then

postponed once more; at any rate at midnight on 30 August the well-known

conversation between Henderson and me took place.

DR. HORN: You heard yesterday Minister Schmidt’s description of this

meeting. Do you have anything to add to his description of it?

VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to add the following about this

conversation. It is perfectly clear that at that moment all of us were

nervous, that is true. The British Ambassador was nervous and so was I.

I should like to and must mention here the fact that the British

Ambassador had had on the day before a minor scene with the Führer which

might have ended seriously. I succeeded in changing the subject.

Therefore, there was also a certain tension between the British

Ambassador and myself. However, I intentionally received the British

Ambassador composedly and calmly, and accepted his communication. I

hoped that this communication would, in the last moment, contain his

announcement of a Polish negotiator.

However, this did not happen. Rather, Sir Nevile Henderson told me:

1. That his government could not recommend this mode of procedure,

despite the tense situation, which had been aggravated still more by the

Polish total mobilization; rather the British Government recommended

that the German Government use diplomatic channels.

2. That, if the German Government would submit the same proposals to the

British Government, the British Government would be ready to exert their

influence in Warsaw in order to find a solution, as far as these

suggestions appeared to be reasonable. In view of the whole situation

this was a very difficult answer because, as I said, the situation was

extremely tense and the Führer had been waiting since the day before for

a Polish emissary. I, in turn, feared also that the guns would go off by

themselves unless a solution or something else came quickly, as I have

said. I then read to Henderson the proposals given to me by the Führer.

I should like to state here once more under oath that the Führer had

expressly forbidden me to let these proposals out of my hands. He told

me that I might communicate to the British Ambassador only the substance

of them, if I thought it advisable. I did a little more than that; I

read all the proposals, from the beginning to the end, to the British

Ambassador. I did this because I still hoped that the British Government

wanted to exert their influence in Warsaw and assist in a solution. But

here too I must state frankly that from my talk with the British

Ambassador on 30 August, from his whole attitude, which Minister Schmidt

also described to a certain extent yesterday, as well as from the

substance of the communication of the British Government, I got the

impression that England at this moment was not quite prepared to live up

to the situation and, let us say, to do her utmost to bring about a

peaceful solution.

DR. HORN: What did the German Government do after the contents of the

note were made known to Ambassador Henderson?

VON RIBBENTROP: After my conversation with the British Ambassador I

reported to the Führer. I told him it had been a serious conversation. I

told him also that in pursuance of his instructions I had not handed the

memorandum to Sir Nevile Henderson despite the latter’s request. But I

had the impression that the situation was serious and I was convinced

that the British guarantee to Poland was in force. That had been my very

definite impression from this conversation. Then, in the course of the

31st the Führer waited the whole day to see whether or not some sort of

Polish negotiator would come or whether a new communication would come

from the British Government. We have heard here about Reich Marshal

Göring’s intervention, how he informed Mr. Dahlerus of the contents of

this note in every detail. There can thus be no doubt that during the

course of that night, at the latest in the morning of the 31st the

precise proposals of the Reich Government were in the hands of both the

London Government and the Warsaw Government. On the 31st the Führer

waited the whole day and I am convinced, and I want to state it very

clearly here, that he hoped that something would be done by England.

Then in the course of the 31st the Polish Ambassador came to see me. But

it is known that he had no authority to do anything, to enter into

negotiations or even to receive proposals of any sort. I do not know

whether the Führer would have authorized me on the 31st to hand

proposals of this sort to him, but I think it is possible. But the

Polish Ambassador was not authorized to receive them, as he expressly

told me. I might point out briefly that regarding the attitude in Warsaw

the witness Dahlerus has already given additional testimony.

DR. HORN: It is correct that England did not forward the German

proposals to Warsaw until the evening of 31 August?

VON RIBBENTROP: Please repeat the question.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that the German proposals which had been

submitted by you on the preceding evening of the 30th to Ambassador Sir

Nevile Henderson were not forwarded to Warsaw until the evening of 31

August?

VON RIBBENTROP: You mean from London?

DR. HORN: From London.

VON RIBBENTROP: That I cannot tell you precisely, but that can

undoubtedly be verified from official documents.

DR. HORN: What considerations then led to the final decision to take

military action against Poland?

VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you the details of this. I know only that

the Führer—that the proposals which I had read to the British

Ambassador in the night of the 30th were published by broadcast, as I

believe, on the evening of the 31st. The reaction of the Warsaw radio, I

remember this reaction exactly, was unfortunately such as to sound like

a veritable battlecry in answer to the German proposals which, as I

heard, had been characterized by Henderson as reasonable. I believe they

were characterized by the Polish radio as an insolence, and the Germans

were spoken of as Huns or the like. I still remember that. At any rate,

shortly after the announcement of these proposals a very sharp negative

answer came from Warsaw. I assume that it was the answer which persuaded

the Führer in the night of the 31st to issue the order to march. I, for

my part, can say only that I went to the Reich Chancellery, and the

Führer told me that he had given the order and that nothing else could

be done now, or something to this effect, and that things were now in

motion. Thereupon I said to the Führer merely, “I wish you good luck.”

I might also mention that the outbreak of these hostilities was the end

of years of efforts on the part of Adolf Hitler to bring about

friendship with England.

DR. HORN: Did Mussolini make another proposal of mediation and how did

this proposal turn out?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. On 3 September, in the morning, such

a proposal of mediation arrived in Berlin stating that Mussolini was

still in a position to bring the Polish question in some way before the

forum of a conference, and that he would do so if the German Government

agreed rapidly. It was said at the same time that the French Government

had already approved this proposal. Germany also immediately agreed. But

a few days later—I cannot now state the time precisely—it was reported

that, in a speech I believe, by the British Foreign Minister Halifax in

the House of Commons or in some other British declaration, this proposal

had been turned down by London.

DR. HORN: Do you know whether France also turned down this proposal?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that we received along with the

proposal, I believe through the Italian Government, the information that

the French Government either was in favor of the suggestion or had

already accepted it.

DR. HORN: Did you see any possibilities for peace after the conclusion

of the Polish campaign and were they pursued?

VON RIBBENTROP: After the conclusion of the Polish campaign I had some

lengthy conversations with Adolf Hitler. The situation was then such

that beyond a doubt there was a certain lack of enthusiasm for this

whole war on the part of the French. During these weeks military people

occasionally used the expression “potato war in the West.” Hitler, as

far as I can judge from everything that he told me, was not interested

in bringing the war in the West to a decision, and I believe this was

true of all of us members of the Government. I should like to remind you

of the speech made by Reich Marshal Göring to this effect at that time.

Hitler then made a speech in Danzig, and I believe later somewhere else,

perhaps in the Reichstag, I believe in the Reichstag, in which he twice

told England and France in unmistakable language that he was still ready

to open negotiations at any time. We tried to find out also very

cautiously by listening to diplomatic circles what the mood was in the

enemy capitals. But the public replies to Adolf Hitler’s speeches

clearly demonstrated that there could be no thought of peace.

DR. HORN: What did you do from then on to prevent the war from becoming

more extended?

VON RIBBENTROP: It was, I should like to say, my most ardent endeavor

after the end of the Polish campaign to attempt to localize the war,

that is, to prevent the war from spreading in Europe. However, I soon

was to find out that once a war has broken out, politics are not always

the only or rather not at all, the decisive factor in such matters, and

that in such cases the so-called timetables of general staffs start to

function. Everybody wants to outdo everybody else. Our diplomatic

efforts were undoubtedly everywhere, in Scandinavia as well as in the

Balkans and elsewhere, against an extension of the war. Nevertheless,

the war did take that course. I should like to state that according to

my conversations with Adolf Hitler, and I am also convinced that the

German military men were of the same opinion, Hitler wished in no way to

extend the war anywhere.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that you received information which pointed to

the intention of the Western Powers to invade the Ruhr?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is true. We received numerous reports all the

time. Our intelligence service was such that we had a great many

channels doing intelligence work. All of these channels led to the

Führer. The Foreign Office had relatively little intelligence service,

but relied rather on official diplomatic channels. But we too received

reports and news at that time which undoubtedly allowed inferences to be

drawn. We in the Foreign Office also received reports implying that the

Western Powers had the intention of advancing into the Ruhr area at the

first appropriate opportunity. The situation in the West was such that

the West Wall was a very strong military barrier against France and this

naturally gave rise to the idea that such an attack might come through

neutral territory, such as Belgium and Holland.

THE PRESIDENT: How much longer will you take, Dr. Horn?

DR. HORN: I believe an hour to an hour and a half, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has listened with great patience to a

very great deal of detail. All I can say is that this exaggerated going

into detail does not do the defendant’s case any good in my opinion. We

will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

NINETY-FIFTH DAY

Saturday, 30 March 1946

_Morning Session_

MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Dönitz is absent from

Court this morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn.

DR. HORN: On 16 February 1923 a conference of ambassadors transferred to

Lithuania the sovereignty over the territory of Memel, which had already

been annexed in 1923 by a surprise attack by Lithuanian troops. What

caused Hitler to issue these directives for the reintegration of the

Memel territory in 1939?

VON RIBBENTROP: The small territory of Memel, being the land mentioned

in our National anthem, was always very dear to the hearts of the entire

German people. The military facts are well known. It was placed under

the control of the Allied Powers after the World War I and was later

seized and occupied by Lithuanian soldiers by a _coup de main_. The

country itself is ancient German territory, and it was natural that it

should wish to become a part of Germany once more. As early as 1938, the

Führer referred to this problem in my presence as one which would have

to be solved sooner or later. In the spring of 1939 negotiations were

begun with the Lithuanian Government. These negotiations resulted in a

meeting between Urbisk, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, and myself, and

an agreement was signed, by means of which the Memel territory was once

more to become part of the Reich. That was in March 1939. I do not need

to describe the sufferings which this region has had to endure in the

past years. At any rate it was quite in accordance with the principle of

the self-determination of peoples, that the will of the people of Memel

was granted in 1939, and all that the agreement did, was to restore a

perfectly natural state of affairs and one which would have had in any

case to be established sooner or later.

DR. HORN: It was followed half a year later by the war with Poland.

What, in your opinion, were the decisive causes which brought about this

war?

VON RIBBENTROP: I gave evidence in this matter yesterday. The decisive

factor was the English guarantee extended to Poland. I do not need to

elaborate this point. This guarantee, combined with the Polish

mentality, made it impossible for us to negotiate with the Poles or to

come to an understanding with them. As for the actual outbreak of war,

the following reasons for it can be given: