on Pearl Harbor. Von Ribbentrop did not know that the Japanese were
about to attack Pearl Harbor or that they were about to attack America
at all. Neither was there such an agreement between Japan and Germany.
It is therefore not correct that Ribbentrop prepared an aggressive war
against the United States of America. That is...
THE PRESIDENT: You were talking about the press. I am not saying that
you ought not to ask him whether the Foreign Minister knew nothing about
the attack upon Pearl Harbor. That was not what I said. What I said was
that the Tribunal was not interested and thought it was irrelevant for
you to go into the reactions of the press.
DR. HORN: Witness, you were present at the negotiations regarding the
Naval Agreement with England. Can you tell us how those negotiations
proceeded, and whether Von Ribbentrop was sincere, and what aims he
pursued?
SCHMIDT: These negotiations, at which I was also present as interpreter,
went perfectly smoothly after some difficulties had been overcome. The
aims which the Foreign Minister...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand it, this is the Naval
Agreement of 1935. In my recollection—I am just trying to check
it—that was one of the matters which we discussed on the application
for witnesses, and the Tribunal ruled against going into the
negotiations antecedent to the conclusion of that treaty. It came up on
application for witnesses. One or two witnesses who were going to give
the negotiations were asked for and, I think, to deal with this exact
point which Dr. Horn put in his last question, namely, the state of mind
of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I found one or two—there is Lord Monsell,
for example, who was on the list of witnesses—who were denied by the
Court, and a number of German ones were denied on the same point. My
Lord, it is in the Tribunal’s statement of the 26th of February; and
Your Lordship will see, on Page 2, I think, certainly the witness
Monsell, who happens to be the one most familiar to myself; but I am
sure there were other witnesses, too. I know that we discussed this
point quite fully on the application for witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Who were the others, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have a list of witnesses who were refused.
There is Admiral Schuster...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he is one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...who was relevant on this question as to who
initiated the treaty. And then there is Sir Robert Craigie, Number 24.
There is Lord Monsell...
THE PRESIDENT: He was refused.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These are on the same points, Number 25.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I think these are the three.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what do you say to this? Those three
witnesses—Schuster, Craigie, and Monsell—who as alleged by you were to
give evidence on this 1935 treaty, were all refused. As to the witness
you are now examining, no such reference was contained regarding him in
the application. He was asked for only as an interpreter in the Foreign
Office.
DR. HORN: I was under the impression that these other three witnesses
had been refused because they were cumulative and I was not going to
question the witness on the Naval Agreement but I merely want to ask him
about the attitude shown by Ribbentrop when the agreement was concluded
and afterwards in order to prove to the Tribunal that Von Ribbentrop was
not, in any case at that time, deliberately working towards an
aggressive war, nor was he participating in a conspiracy to initiate a
war of aggression, at least not at that time. And I wish to prove
further that this agreement was not “eyewash” as the afore-mentioned
British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, put it.
THE PRESIDENT: Your application with reference to Ambassador Craigie was
this: The witness can give evidence that in 1935 Ribbentrop approached
England with a proposal that the Naval Treaty should be signed and
Ribbentrop’s initiative brought about an agreement by France to this
treaty which involved the Treaty of Versailles. Thus the treaty has come
into effect.
Is it not in connection with that, that you were going to ask this
witness questions?
DR. HORN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have nothing about the Naval treaty of 1935, then
you can go on.
DR. HORN: Witness, in 1944, you were present at a conference between
Horthy and Hitler at Klessheim, in which Von Ribbentrop also took part
and during which the solution of the Jewish question in Hungary was
discussed. What did Von Ribbentrop say to you about this question?
SCHMIDT: During this conference there had been a certain difficulty,
when Hitler insisted that Horthy should proceed more energetically in
the Jewish question, and Horthy answered with some heat, “But what am I
supposed to do? Shall I perhaps beat the Jews to death?”—Whereupon
there was rather a lull, and the Foreign Minister then turned to Horthy
and said, “Yes, there are only two possibilities—either that, or to
intern the Jews.” Afterwards he said to me—and this was rather
exceptional—that Hitler’s demands in this connection might have gone a
bit too far.
DR. HORN: On 25 August 1939, you took part in a conference between
Hitler, Henderson, and Ribbentrop, at which Ribbentrop and Hitler once
more expressed their wish to come to an agreement with Poland, using
Britain as intermediary. Is it correct that Ribbentrop then sent you
with a draft note on this conference to Henderson at the Embassy to ask
him to back this proposal as far as possible and to try to put it
through? Is that correct?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is so.
DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this telegram from Sir
Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax? (Document Number TC-72, Number 69.)
[_Turning to the witness._] Is it correct, Witness, that on 28 August
1939, Herr Von Ribbentrop in a further discussion with Sir Nevile
Henderson again stressed that an agreement between Germany and Britain
after a settlement of the Polish question was Chamberlain’s greatest
wish, as the British Prime Minister had stated to Ribbentrop and that
Von Ribbentrop then repeated this to Henderson? Is that true?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is true.
DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal the memorandum in question as an
exhibit?
THE PRESIDENT: You offer a copy of that in evidence, do you?
DR. HORN: I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the
document.
THE PRESIDENT: What number?
DR. HORN: The one number has already been submitted by the Prosecution.
It bears the Document Number TC-72 and another number, and the second
number has also been submitted by the Prosecution. I submit it again to
the Tribunal because I have referred to it just now. (Document Number
TC-72, Number 75).
Witness, one last question: In your extensive experience as an
interpreter, you had much opportunity to observe Hitler in contact with
foreigners. What impression, according to your observations, did Hitler
make on foreign statesmen?
SCHMIDT: Naturally, it is not quite so easy to answer this question, as
one cannot look into the hearts and minds of other people. But as an
observer one can naturally draw certain conclusions from the attitude...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think really that this is
a matter which is relevant, the effect that Hitler’s demeanor had on
foreign statesmen. It does not influence us in the least.
DR. HORN: Then I withdraw my question. I have no further questions to
put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other defendants’ counsel who wish to ask
questions?
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Witness, were you
present at a conversation which, about one year before the outbreak of
war, took place between Lord Londonderry and Field Marshal Göring at
Karinhall?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present at this conversation.
DR. STAHMER: Describe briefly to the Tribunal the substance of this
conversation.
SCHMIDT: After so long a time I cannot, of course, remember the details,
but I recall merely that the subject of conversation was the
Anglo-German rapprochement, or rather the elimination of any points of
dispute between Germany and England, and that in addition, of course,
quite a number of technical questions regarding aviation and the air
force were dealt with. I have always remembered very clearly one
particular remark made by Göring in the course of this conversation,
when at the end of a discussion which was to prove how desirable it was
that Germany and England be friendly and avoid conflicts, he said the
following:
“If our two countries should be involved in a war against each
other, then there will naturally be a victor and a vanquished,
but the victor in this bitter conflict will in the moment of
victory have just enough strength left to strike the last blow
at the defeated and will then fall to the ground himself gravely
wounded and for this reason alone our two countries should get
along with each other without conflict and without war.”
DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in the negotiations in Munich in the
autumn of 1938?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I did take part in these negotiations.
DR. STAHMER: Was the then Field Marshal Göring also present?
SCHMIDT: During the first part he was not present, but later when the
circle of those present became larger he likewise took part.
DR. STAHMER: In what way did he participate in the negotiations?
SCHMIDT: He intervened only in individual questions of lesser
importance. However, he did take part in a way which showed that through
his intervention he wanted to remove insofar as possible, any
difficulties arising from certain technical points which might hamper
the progress of the negotiations. In other words, he was anxious that
the Munich negotiations should not collapse over such technical points
of procedure, which played an important role in the second part of the
negotiations.
DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conversation which took place in the
autumn of 1937 between Lord Halifax and the then Field Marshal Göring
and followed a conference between Lord Halifax and Hitler at the
Berghof?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present.
DR. STAHMER: What course did this conversation take? Briefly, please.
SCHMIDT: First I must say that at the Obersalzberg the conversation with
Lord Halifax had taken a very unsatisfactory turn. The two partners
could in no way come to an understanding, but in the conversation with
Göring the atmosphere improved. The same points were dealt with as at
Obersalzberg, the subjects which were in the foreground at the time,
namely, the Anschluss, the Sudeten question, and finally the questions
of the Polish Corridor and Danzig. At Obersalzberg Hitler had treated
these matters rather uncompromisingly, and he had demanded more or less
that a solution as he conceived it be accepted by England, whereas
Göring in his discussions always attached importance to the fact or
always stressed that his idea was a peaceful solution, that is to say, a
solution through negotiation, and that everything should be done in this
direction, and that he also believed that such a solution could be
reached for all three questions if the negotiations were properly
conducted.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were present at numerous political
conferences of Hitler’s. Did you notice on such occasions that high
military leaders tried to influence him to enlarge German territory in a
peaceful way or by war?
SCHMIDT: No, no such efforts on the part of the military came to my
notice, because at political negotiations the military representatives
were for the most part not present at the beginning when the large
problems were dealt with and they were called in only when purely
military problems were discussed; and then, of course, they stated their
opinion only on purely military questions and did not speak on any
political matters.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I have one more question: On the occasion of such
discussions, did you find that high military leaders were anxious to
exert political influence upon the Reich Government?
SCHMIDT: No, I did not find that, and you could not have found it, since
they were hardly ever present.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you first of all to tell the
Tribunal quite shortly the general background of your views. Do you
remember on 28 November making an affidavit at Oberursel; do you
remember?
SCHMIDT: I cannot remember the date clearly, but I do remember that I
made an affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it. [_Handing the document to
the witness._] Paragraph 1 sets out your experience, the number of
conferences, _et cetera_.
My Lord, I ought to have said that this document is Document Number
3308-PS and will be Exhibit GB-288.
[_Turning to the witness._] Then, in Paragraph 2 you give the basis of
your experience. Would you follow it while I read:
“Whatever success and position I have enjoyed in the Foreign
Office I owe to the fact that I made it my business at all times
to possess thorough familiarity with the subject matter under
discussion, and I endeavored to achieve intimate knowledge of
the mentality of Hitler and the other leaders. Throughout the
Hitler Regime I constantly endeavored to keep myself apprised as
to what was going on in the Foreign Office and in related
organizations, and I enjoyed such a position that it was
possible to have ready access to key officials and to key
personnel in their offices.”
And then, if you will look at the third paragraph, which gives your
impression from that basis of the objectives of the foreign policy:
“The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent
from the start, namely, the domination of the European
Continent, to be achieved, first, by the incorporation of all
German-speaking groups in the Reich, and secondly, by
territorial expansion under the slogan of ‘Lebensraum.’ The
execution of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be
characterized by improvisation. Each succeeding step apparently
was carried out as each new situation arose, but all consistent
with the ultimate objectives mentioned above.”
Is that right, Herr Schmidt? Does that express your views?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I go on to deal with particular
matters, I want you to develop your impressions a little further. You
have told us that you acted under or with every foreign minister since
Herr Stresemann. Did you notice a considerable difference between the
style of living of the Nazi ministers and those who had preceded them?
SCHMIDT: As far as the style of living is concerned, there were certain
differences, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take the Defendant Ribbentrop. Before the
Defendant Ribbentrop went into politics, had he one house in
Berlin-Dahlem? I think Lenze-Allee 19. Was that his possession?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when he was Foreign Minister, had he six
houses? Let me remind you and take them one by one. You can tell me if I
am right. There was a house in Sonnenburg, somewhere near Berlin, with
an estate of 750 hectares, and a private golf course. That was one, was
it not?
SCHMIDT: I knew that there was a house at Sonnenburg, but I did not know
how large it was.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then there was one at Tanneck bei Düren, near
Aachen, a house that he used for horse breeding?
SCHMIDT: I did not know about that house.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then there was one near Kitzbühl that he
used for chamois hunting?
SCHMIDT: That is not known to me in detail.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not in detail, but its existence was known?
SCHMIDT: I consider that it is not at all improbable that the house
existed, but I have not heard any details about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, of course, there was the Schloss Fuschl;
that is in Austria, is it not?
SCHMIDT: Near Salzburg, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Near Salzburg, yes. That was taken over as a
state residence. I will ask you about the circumstances a little later.
Then there was a Slovakian hunting estate called “Pustepole,” was there
not?
SCHMIDT: The name is familiar to me, and I know that Herr Von Ribbentrop
sometimes went hunting there, but I know nothing regarding the
proprietorship.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then he also used a hunting lodge, near
Podersan, that had been that of Count Czernin, near Podersan, in
Bohemia, in the Sudetenland?
SCHMIDT: There was a hunting house or something similar, I do not know
the name, where receptions took place, as for instance, that given for
Count Ciano. But I think it had a different name.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the one—where Ciano visited. That is
the one I was indicating to you. I think I am right that it previously
belonged to Count Czernin.
Tell me, was the salary fixed for Reich Ministers?
SCHMIDT: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me put it quite clearly. Was a salary—that
is, a fixed annual remuneration—appointed for Reich Ministers?
SCHMIDT: Yes, that is quite right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How much was that?
SCHMIDT: That I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was kept secret?
SCHMIDT: That is not the reason that I cannot give you any information.
I was not at all interested in how large a salary the Reich Foreign
Minister received.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know?
SCHMIDT: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you say that you do not know, that is good
enough for me. I think, perhaps, you can answer this question. Had any
previous Reich Foreign Minister been able to run six country houses and
estates of various sizes on his salary, anyone that you had worked with?
SCHMIDT: Whether he could have done it I cannot say, but he did not do
it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not. We will leave it there for a moment.
Now, I want you to apply your mind to May 1939. That is about four
months before the war, when the Polish question was just coming up. I
mean, it was getting to be quite a serious question. Do you remember
what I think they call in the German Foreign Office a _conduite de
langage_ that was issued by Ribbentrop about that time and put out by
Baron Von Weizsäcker?
SCHMIDT: No, I do not know that, or at any rate I should say that I
cannot remember it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me try to remind you, to see if this draws
it to your recollection:
“The Polish problem will be solved by Hitler in 48 hours; the
Western Powers will be unable to give any assistance to Poland;
the British Empire is doomed within the next 10 years; France
will bleed to death if she tries to intervene.”
Do you remember a _conduite de langage_ to that effect issued by the
Foreign Minister?
SCHMIDT: I cannot remember a _conduite de langage_ of that kind. It
appears to me rather to resemble a _conduite de langage_ for propaganda
purposes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that Von Ribbentrop issued
instructions that no official of the Foreign Office was to issue any
different views?
SCHMIDT: That is right, that one was to adhere to those _conduites de
langage_.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember what he told Baron Von
Weizsäcker to say would happen to anyone who expressed different views?
SCHMIDT: No, I do not recollect that, but I can imagine that severe
penalties would have been threatened to such a person. But I do not
remember the actual case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that he said they would be
shot by him personally?
SCHMIDT: That such a statement may have been made by him on some
occasion when he was angry, I consider perfectly possible, but I do not
believe that it was meant seriously.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I thought you might remember—I just
suggest it to you—was the distress and difficulty that Baron Von
Weizsäcker had in deciding how he was to say it to the official
conference at the Foreign Office. Do you not remember that?
SCHMIDT: At that time I had not yet been admitted to the morning
conferences. I was not present at that time so I cannot tell you
anything about it, but I can imagine that the State Secretary may have
had quite some trouble in translating that statement into official
language.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want to deal quite shortly with the
points that have been put to you about August 1939. I only want to get
the facts quite clear.
Do you remember that you were with Hitler at the time that he was
expecting the reactions of the Western Powers to the Soviet treaty?
SCHMIDT: No, I was attached to the delegation in Moscow and therefore
not with Hitler.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So did you come back with the Defendant
Ribbentrop on the 24th?
SCHMIDT: Yes, but I remained in Berlin and did not go to Berchtesgaden.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now you remember that Hitler saw
Sir Nevile Henderson at 1:30 on the 25th and gave him what has been
called a _note verbale_? Do you remember that?
SCHMIDT: I think that I was not present at that conference, because just
at that time I was in Moscow. It must be possible to establish the date.
I was not present at a conference between Hitler and the British
Ambassador which took place on the Obersalzberg during the time of our
Moscow journey. I think that is the conference to which you are
referring.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is the day after the defendant came back
from Moscow?
SCHMIDT: No, I remained in Berlin. I was not up there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to remind you of the day. If you
were not present, I will pass from it; but were you present when Signor
Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, produced a communication from
Mussolini?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the day I am asking you about. Do you
remember that a communication came from Signor Attolico that afternoon
that the Italian Army and Air Force were not in a condition to go to
war?
SCHMIDT: Yes, indeed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to try to help me because it is
rather important as to the time. Was that not about 3 o’clock in the
afternoon?
SCHMIDT: That could be so; but with the many conferences which took
place at the time, the question of hours and dates is naturally a bit
confused.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember the news that the
Anglo-Polish Treaty would be signed that evening coming through about 4
o’clock?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember about 4 o’clock M.
Coulondre, the French Ambassador, having an interview with Hitler?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, were you aware that on that day the orders
for an attack on Poland the next morning were countermanded?
SCHMIDT: I remember that military orders had been withdrawn, but just
what orders these were I naturally never learned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would not ask you about that, Herr Schmidt,
but you knew that orders had been countermanded. I wondered if you could
help me on this point: Was not the countermanding of the orders at
6:15—1815 hours—after the interview with the French Ambassador, M.
Coulondre, was not that the time when they were countermanded?
SCHMIDT: I cannot recall whether that was the time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And equally could you help the Tribunal on this
point: Were they not issued about 2 o’clock—1400 hours—after the
interview with Sir Nevile Henderson? Do you know that?
SCHMIDT: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You cannot help us on that point.
Well, now. I am not going to take time about the interview on the night
of the 30-31 August between Sir Nevile Henderson and the Defendant
Ribbentrop, except to ask you this: You have told us that the Defendant
Ribbentrop was very excited; when he read these terms over, did he raise
his voice at times, shouting?
SCHMIDT: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How did he show his nervousness, then?
SCHMIDT: It manifested itself during some incidents which I mentioned
before, which had occurred during the conversation; previously during
those incidents the nervousness became apparent, but not during the
reading of the document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, but you remember and were very much
astounded at the time at the refusal to hand over the vital document to
the British Ambassador?
SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to see if you can help us with one
or two other incidents. It has been suggested by a witness that we heard
yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop knew very little about
concentration camps. I want to make it clear that was suggested. I think
perhaps you can help us on one or two inhabitants of concentration camps
that he knew about. Do you remember a man called Martin Luther? Not the
religious gentleman but a contemporary?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that the Defendant Ribbentrop
brought him into his office, the Bureau Ribbentrop, in 1936?
SCHMIDT: I am not sure about the year, but I do know that he got his job
through the Bureau.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I think it was not received with great joy
by the older members of the German Foreign Office.
SCHMIDT: No, certainly not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There had been some trouble about a small matter
of 4,000 Reichsmark that Mr. Luther had had to deal with in the past?
SCHMIDT: Yes. We learned about that afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was taken into the Foreign Office and
received rapid promotion to counsellor, that is to say minister, and
Under Secretary of State, did he not?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, do you remember that in 1943 he had a
quarrel with the Defendant Ribbentrop?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he sent to Himmler—I think he did it
through Lieutenant Büttner—suggesting that Ribbentrop’s state of mind
was not such that he ought to continue as Foreign Secretary, and
suggesting that Werner Best, I believe it was, should be appointed. Do
you remember that?
SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that; but I did not know that he suggested
Werner Best as successor.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, he suggested that Ribbentrop should
go. I think he was quite blunt about it. I believe he suggested that his
mental powers were no longer up to it.
SCHMIDT: I did not see the report. I only heard rumors about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In consequence of that, of course, after an
interview with Ribbentrop, Ribbentrop had Luther put in a concentration
camp, did he not?
SCHMIDT: I do not know whether that happened on Ribbentrop’s initiative,
or whether it came from some other source, but it was said among us in
the office that Luther had landed in a concentration camp.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, the sequence of events was that
Luther had this disagreement with Ribbentrop and shortly afterwards he
appeared in a concentration camp. And not only did he go into a
concentration camp, but is it not correct that even the SS asked that he
should come out of the concentration camp, and Ribbentrop would not
agree to it?
SCHMIDT: That I cannot say, because the whole matter was, of course,
treated rather confidentially in the office by Herr Von Ribbentrop and
the members of the old Foreign Office, of whom I was one, did not have
his confidence to such an extent that they were informed of all such
details. In other words, I heard about the whole Luther affair only by
way of rumor, through special channels—actually through prohibited
channels—so that I cannot therefore give you any authentic information
but I can repeat only what I have heard unofficially.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure you desire to be absolutely frank with
the Tribunal, and the point I am putting to you is that everyone in the
Foreign Office knew that Luther had landed in a concentration camp and,
quite clearly, the Defendant Ribbentrop knew that he had landed in a
concentration camp. That is right, is it not?
SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, let us just take one other incident
relating to this if I may comment as to his extraordinary innocence
about concentration camps.
You remember two unfortunate people called Herr and Frau Von Remitz, to
whom the Schloss Fuschl used to belong? I think the name is either
Remitz or Raenitz. Do you remember?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Schloss Fuschl—would you tell me how
it is pronounced?
SCHMIDT: Well, regarding these matters I am so little...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I want you to tell me how it is pronounced.
SCHMIDT: Fuschl.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
The Schloss Fuschl used to belong to the people that I have just
mentioned. Frau Von Remitz was a sister of August Thyssen, was she not?
SCHMIDT: I cannot say anything about that, since all these questions
refer to the private household of Herr Von Ribbentrop and I had nothing
to do with that. My connections with him were purely official and
limited at that to routine matters and the important political
interpretation affairs in the Foreign Office. I only heard about the
other matters, and naturally not in such a way that I could make any
authentic statements about them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will ask you only one question. After
the Schloss had become the property, or at any rate had come to the use
of the Foreign Minister, did not Herr Von Remitz spend several years in
a concentration camp, where he ultimately died? You knew that, did you
not?
SCHMIDT: I knew it as a rumor; I was told that it had happened in that
way.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did he not hear of other stories stronger
than these, that came out of concentration camps?
SCHMIDT: I do not believe that any authentic reports were made there
regarding conditions because naturally, particularly in front of the
Foreign Office, it was treated as taboo by these people who were
responsible for concentration camps, since we were in any case regarded
as not quite reliable and as not belonging to them. Such matters were of
course diligently covered up and concealed from us. Therefore, any
concrete details never became known to us at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you knew, did you not, even in the Foreign
Office, that there were a large number of concentration camps in which a
vast number of people were shut up?
SCHMIDT: We knew that, but our source of information was mostly the
foreign press, which we read, of course; and the foreign radio reports
which appeared on our table, translated, every morning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that if you knew it from the foreign press
and the foreign radio, whoever else in that dock did not know about
concentration camps, the Defendant Ribbentrop, as foreign Minister, did
know. Is that not right?
SCHMIDT: I would like to put it this way: Of course, he had access to
that foreign news material. Just how he evaluated it, whether he
considered it true or completely false, or exaggerated, naturally I
cannot say. Of course he also received the reports as such, but as
reports from abroad and, during the war, as reports from hostile
countries.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Doctor, I will not pursue that further at the
moment. I want you just to tell me this: You have given us your account
of the interview between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Horthy
when the question of the Jews was discussed, on the 17th of April 1943.
I just wanted on record that your account is based on the fact that you
actually made the minutes; the minutes are signed by you.
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to pass to another point. From 1943 to
1945 were you still going to Hitler’s headquarters for occasional
interpreting and attending of meetings and the like?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: For example—I do not know if you can remember
it, but I am sure you will try—on the 27th of February 1944, do you
remember a visit of Marshal Antonescu?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you present at that?
SCHMIDT: I remember I was always present during all the visits of
Antonescu, since the discussion could not take place any other way.
Regarding the date I cannot tell you anything exact at the moment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was actually the 27th of February. I wanted
to try and fix it by an incident which might remind you of it, that
Antonescu was there. Now, do you remember on that occasion that the
Defendant Dönitz was present?
SCHMIDT: It is possible, but I have no exact recollection. It is quite
possible that he was present during the military discussions.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Exhibit, My Lord, is GB-207, and it is dealt
with on Page 2705 of the shorthand notes (Volume V, Page 249). The
document was originally Number D-648.
[_Turning to the witness._] I want you to tell the Tribunal about the
general governmental setup. There has been considerable evidence given
before the Tribunal that the Reichsregierung, as such, did not meet
after the beginning of the war. Several people have told us that.
Instead of a cabinet meeting, was it not a fact that the Government of
Germany was carried on by these constant meetings at Hitler’s
headquarters?
SCHMIDT: I consider it possible, but naturally I have no exact
knowledge, since I never took part in such internal conferences. I went
to headquarters only whenever I had to accompany a foreigner there.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You came only when there was a foreign visitor,
but you know that these meetings were continuously taking place and that
the Defendant Göring, the Defendant Speer, the Defendant Keitel, the
Defendant Jodl, the Defendant Dönitz were constantly attending these
meetings.
SCHMIDT: I do not know, of course, whether you can describe that
conference as a meeting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not mean to play with words with you at
all. I used the word only to describe what was happening. If you prefer
to call it a conference, I am willing to do that.
SCHMIDT: I admit that on occasions conferences with Hitler took place or
could have taken place, while these people you have just named were
present at the headquarters.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you agree with me, do you not, that as
far as one can find any organism or organization through which the
government of the Reich was being carried on, it was this succession of
meetings or conferences at Hitler’s headquarters; is that not so?
SCHMIDT: Well, I do not know whether you can regard that as governmental
activity, because if I drew a parallel with the conferences at which I
was present with these foreign gentlemen, then you will find that the
person who spoke and who pushed through decisions was Hitler alone. If
it was the same at those conferences, then you could call it a
government discussion; but it was only a one-man government. The others
were there only as an audience or to be questioned regarding individual
points. That is how I imagine it, but I was not present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite appreciate your point, but these were
the occasions at which each service and each department and each
organization—like the SS through the Reichsführer SS, Himmler—put its
point of view and put the facts before Hitler on which decisions were
come to, were they not? And that is what happened for the last 2 years
of the war.
SCHMIDT: One could have drawn that conclusion from the presence of those
people, yes, but as I say it could of course have been that there was
only a sort of taking of orders at headquarters. Both possibilities
exist, but which is applicable I cannot say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, I think you will agree with this,
will you not, Herr Schmidt, that there was no other place at which the
government of Germany took place except that?
SCHMIDT: Yes. That is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you be good enough to look at your
affidavit? I will just read the rest of it. It is quite short, but I
want it to be on the record. Paragraph 4:
“The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on
25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the
Foreign Office, because these events discredited Germany in the
eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had
been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted
Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge
within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi
methods both in foreign and domestic policy. This concern over
the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by
a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence
in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December
1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning
by the Nazis.
“5. The announcement in March of the establishment of a German
Air Force and of the reintroduction of conscription was followed
on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual-assistance pact
between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the
Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning
as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but
the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude towards the
Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be
intimidated. At this time, the career officials at least
expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I
do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these
expressions of concern to Hitler.
“6. The re-entry of the German military forces into the
Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in
February. A German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed
that the French-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance was
incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the Covenant of the
League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no
real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France.
Considered against the background statements in _Mein Kampf_,
offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest
that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I
do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was
decided upon. I personally knew about it and discussed it
approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear
had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning
the risks of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many
in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign
Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in government
circles, consulted by Hitler, who felt confident that the
Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from
Britain and France. Neurath’s position throughout this period
was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath
than in the general run of ‘old school’ diplomats whom Hitler
tended to hold in disrespect.”
Then there is a paragraph about the sanctions in Italy which I do not
think is a relevant matter before the Tribunal; and then, in Paragraph
8, I will go on:
“Plans for annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program
from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of
Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach to this
problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy by the
League, plus the rapid increase of German military strength,
made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. When Göring
visited Rome early in 1937 he declared that a union of Austria
and Germany was inevitable and could be expected sooner or
later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained
silent, and protested only mildly when I translated them into
French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a
Party matter, in which Von Papen’s role was to preserve smooth
diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more
devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move. The
speech delivered by Papen on 18 Feb. 1938, following the
Berchtesgaden meeting, interpreted the Berchtesgaden agreement
as the first step towards the establishment of a Central
European Commonwealth under the leadership of Germany. This was
generally recognized in the Foreign Office as a clear prophecy
of a Greater Germany which would embrace Austria.”
The final paragraph says these matters are true and that you have made
this affidavit voluntarily and without compulsion. That is right, is it
not, Herr Schmidt?
Now, just one more point and then I have finished with you. It is
correct, is it not, that in his period as Foreign Minister the Defendant
Ribbentrop brought a number of people who had rank in the SS, or, in the
old days in the SA into the Foreign Office and made them part of the
staff?
SCHMIDT: Yes. Principally they were members of his so-called
Bureau—that is to say, his former organization. They were taken into
the Office, not all, but some of them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other prosecutor want to cross-examine? Dr.
Horn, do you want to re-examine?
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): Mr. President, I have just one
question to ask the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Keep the witness.
DR. LÖFFLER: May I have your permission to put one question to the
witness?
THE PRESIDENT: Would you say whom you are appearing for?
DR. LÖFFLER: Dr. Löffler, Defense Counsel for the SA.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you were, as a rule, personally
present during the visit of highly placed foreign statesmen. Were you
also present during the visit of statesmen during the Olympic Games of
1936?
SCHMIDT: Yes.
DR. LÖFFLER: Did any one of the foreign statesmen express the wish to
inspect the German institutions and the establishments set up by the
National Socialists—in particular in the social sphere—before or after
1936?
SCHMIDT: Whether any such wishes were expressed during the Olympic Games
I cannot remember at the moment; but that such wishes were expressed and
that they were fulfilled becomes clear from a number of facts—for
instance, from Lloyd George’s visit to the Obersalzberg and, later on,
his inspection of social institutions in Germany; from the visit of a
number of interested foreign persons who, in my opinion, took a very
lively interest in the social institutions in Germany.
DR. LÖFFLER: You were present personally during these inspections. Do
you remember an inspection during which you were present?
SCHMIDT: Mostly I was not present at these inspections. I only recollect
that, for instance, the Labor Front had an organization which was called
“Joy and Work” and that was an international organization which held a
great annual congress at Hamburg, during which I often acted as
interpreter.
DR. LÖFFLER: Do you know anything about the impressions made by these
institutions on foreign statesmen?
SCHMIDT: The social institutions, as far as I know, always made quite a
favorable impression.
DR. LÖFFLER: Do you remember the visit of the Prince of Wales to
Germany?
SCHMIDT: Yes. I acted as interpreter there.
THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the charges in the
Indictment? Dr. Löffler, your duty was to ask any question you have got
at the same time as the other defense counsels. I asked you whether you
had any questions to ask. You said “no,” or you indicated that you had
not. You now get up and say you have one question to ask and you have
asked about—I don’t know how many you are going to ask, but they are
all, in the opinion of the Tribunal, I think, irrelevant.
DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I am putting are caused
by the cross-examination by Sir David. Sir David has mentioned the SA,
and I want to put a corresponding counterquestion to the witness, and
apart from that...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David had not asked any question as to the social
conditions of Germany, and he did not ask any questions about the
Olympic Games of 1936. In any event, you are not the right person to
re-examine.
DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I have put are
important, because, through those visits which were made here and
through the statements made by the foreign statesmen afterwards, a
number of our members got the impression that the important statesmen
abroad were giving their recognition to the leaders of National
Socialism. And that is of quite decisive importance in the question of
the guilt or innocence of millions of Germans whom I represent here,
since these millions of Germans regarded the attitude of those foreign
statesmen as authoritative. It is therefore not irrelevant, but for us,
in fact, decisive, and he is the only witness who can really make an
authentic report about it. However, I am finished with my questions
about the Olympic Games and I have only two more questions to ask. I ask
you to permit me to put these because Sir David...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the questions you are putting do
not arise out of the cross-examination and are entirely irrelevant, and
they will not hear any further questions from you.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, as you know perfectly well, this is not
the time to put questions on behalf of Von Papen. You have had your
opportunity, and you have not done it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I merely propose to rectify some words
which were probably incorrectly repeated through translation, since I
did not receive copies of the affidavit. I heard that in that affidavit
a speech of Von Papen of 8 or 18 February 1938 was mentioned...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if that is correct, you can correct anything
in the translation you want to.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I would like to mention that the names “Hitler” and
“Papen” were mentioned here just now. I heard “Papen” in the
translation, but Papen never made such a speech, and any conclusions
drawn about Papen from that speech are incorrect.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you will receive the affidavit. You will
have an opportunity to look at the affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall look at the affidavit, and, if necessary, apply
in writing to have it rectified.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If there is any mistake in the affidavit it must be
corrected.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It really says “Papen” in the text, but that is
completely wrong since he has never made such a speech. On Page 4 of the
text it says “The speech delivered by Papen.”
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is what the affidavit said.
Learned counsel says it is completely wrong; he did not make a speech.
But with the greatest respect to the learned counsel, I must suggest, if
he wants to refute the affidavit, he will have the opportunity of
recalling Von Papen and giving evidence then.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, in this case would it not be of value to
put the one short question to the witness as to whether he really meant
Papen?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; put the question to the witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you think that you said that Papen made a
speech on 18 February 1938? Where was this speech supposed to have been
made?
SCHMIDT: That, in my opinion, is a mistake which may have crept in when
I made the affidavit; because if the speech was not made—at any rate,
at the moment I no longer remember such a speech as I described in that
affidavit. It is, therefore, perfectly possible that a mistake crept in.
And perhaps that mistake is excusable if you consider that this
affidavit was submitted to me at a time when I was rather seriously ill
in bed in a hospital. It can very well have happened that upon reading
through the affidavit I did not notice the mistake and I really consider
it to be a mistake.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: That makes the actual fact established and the
conclusions drawn from it unnecessary?
SCHMIDT: After what I have said, yes. I cannot remember the speech, and
I think it can be traced to a mistake on my part and I attribute it to
the circumstances under which I signed the document; I was seriously ill
at the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn.
The witness can now retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. HORN: May I once more ask the Tribunal whether it can be ascertained
if the translations of the documents will be available by tomorrow
morning. I would like to base the further presentation of evidence on
them. If I have translations in the morning, then I would begin now to
examine the Defendant Von Ribbentrop as a witness. If translations
cannot be completed by tomorrow morning, then I would ask the Tribunal
to allow me to submit my documents now.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, this Trial has been going on for many months,
and it is taking a very much longer time than anybody anticipated, at
any rate longer than any member of the Tribunal anticipated, and they
cannot have it put off any longer. You must go on. Have you got any
further witnesses to call?
DR. HORN: No, I have no further witnesses, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you not going to call the Defendant Von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Why can you not put him in the box now?
DR. HORN: I can examine him, but I asked the President whether I can
have the assistance of the Tribunal, whether I can have the documents by
tomorrow morning. Then I would start now to examine the Defendant as a
witness and submit the documents when the Prosecution have their
documents too and can raise their objections here at the same time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the documents are translated, you shall
have them, of course. We have sent out to find out whether they will be
available by tomorrow morning, but we have got 35 minutes now before 5
o’clock. We want to occupy the time.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. In that case I shall examine the
Defendant as witness now.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on please, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: Yes. In that case I shall continue to present the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you said you were going to call the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop. We have not got the documents here, and you must do as
you said.
DR. HORN: Then I request to be given permission to examine the defendant
as a witness.
[_The Defendant Von Ribbentrop took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you say your full name?
JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP (Defendant): Joachim Von Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”
[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. HORN: Please give the Tribunal a brief explanatory report about the
most important points of your life.
VON RIBBENTROP: I was born on 30 April 1893 at Wesel. I came from an old
family of soldiers. My mother came from the country. I went to school at
Kassel and Metz in Alsace-Lorraine. There, in Alsace-Lorraine, I had my
first contact with the domain of French culture; and at that time we
learned to love that country dearly.
In 1908 my father resigned from active military service. The reason was
that there were differences at that time connected with the person of
the Kaiser. My father already had a strong interest in foreign politics
and also social interests, and I had a great veneration for him.
At that time we moved to Switzerland and after living there for about
one year I went to London as a young man, and there, for about one year,
I studied, mainly languages. It was then that I had my first impression
of London and of the greatness of the British Empire.
After about one year, in 1910, I went to Canada. Originally I wanted to
go to the German colonies, but then I went to America instead. I wanted
to see the world. I remained in Canada for several years, approximately
two years as a worker, a plate layer on the railroad, and later on I
turned to the bank and building trade.
In 1914 the first World War caught me in Canada. Like all Germans at the
time we had only one thought—“Every man is needed at home and how can
we help the homeland?” Then I traveled to New York, and finally in
September 1914, after some difficulties, I arrived in Germany. After
serving at the front, for approximately 4 years, and after I had been
wounded, I was sent to Constantinople, to Turkey, where I witnessed the
collapse of Germany in the first World War. Then I had my first
impression of the dreadful consequences of a lost war. The Ambassador at
that time, Count Bernstorff, and the later Ambassador, Dr. Dieckhoff,
were the representatives of the Reich in Turkey. They were summoned to
Berlin in order to take advantage of Count Bernstorff’s connections with
President Wilson and to see—it was the hope of all of us—that on the
strength of these Points perhaps a peace could be achieved and with it
reconciliations.
After some difficulties, in March 1919, I came to Berlin and I became
adjutant of the then General Von Seeckt for the peace delegation at
Versailles. Subsequently, when the Treaty of Versailles came, I read
that document in one night and it was my impression that no government
in the world could possibly sign such a document. That was my first
impression of foreign policy at home.
In 1919 I resigned from the Armed Forces as a first lieutenant, and I
turned to the profession of a businessman. Through these business
contacts, I came to know particularly England and France rather
intimately during the following years. Several contacts with politicians
were already established at that time. I tried to help my own country by
voicing my views against Versailles. At first it was very difficult but
already in the years 1919, 1920, and 1921, I found a certain amount of
understanding in those countries, in my own modest way.
Then, it was approximately since the years 1929 or 1930, I saw that
Germany after the seeming prosperity during the years 1926, 1927, and
1928, was exposed to a sudden economic upheaval and that matters went
downhill very fast.
During the year 1931 and 1932, one noticed as a businessman, which I was
at the time, that in practice the consequences of Versailles were such
that German economic life was becoming more and more prostrate. Then I
looked around. At that time, I was closely attached to the German
People’s Party and I saw how the parties became always more and more
numerous in Germany. I remember that in the end we had something like 30
parties or more in Germany, that unemployment was growing steadily, and
that the government was losing the confidence of the people more and
more. From these years I clearly recollect the efforts made by the then
Chancellor Brüning, which were doubtlessly meant sincerely and honestly
but which nevertheless had no success.
Other governments came, that is well known. They, too, had no success.
The export trade in Germany no longer paid for itself. The gold reserves
of the Reichsbank dwindled, there was tax evasion, and no confidence at
all in the measures introduced by the government. That, roughly, was the
picture which I saw in Germany in the years 1930 and 1931. I saw then
how strikes increased, how discontented the people were, and how more
and more demonstrations took place on the streets and conditions became
more and more chaotic.
I do not think that I am exaggerating if I say that the picture which
presented itself in the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, particularly 1932,
in Germany was not unlike the symptoms of civil war. For me as a
German—and I think I have always been a patriot like many other
Germans—it made a frightful impression. Actually I was not very close
to the political world, but during those years I realized that something
had to be done and that everyone, wherever he might be, would have to
help or assist to create a national front on a broad basis which would
once more have the confidence of men and particularly of the large
working masses of the people. At the same time, I was aware that most of
the men who were responsible for Versailles had not intended this—I am
sure of it—but it was a fact which I believe no one can deny today. I
have already mentioned the disappointment I experienced as a young
officer through personal contacts, in particular, with the German
Ambassador at that time, Dieckhoff, who is a distant relative of mine or
relative by marriage, the disappointment which in fact we all
experienced in the German Armed Forces, among the German people, and in
government circles naturally even more—that these Points of Wilson had
been so quickly abandoned. I do not propose to make a propaganda speech
here. I merely want to represent the facts soberly as I experienced them
at the time. There is no doubt that the defenselessness of the German
people at that time led to the fact that unfortunately a tendency was
maintained among our enemies not toward conciliation but toward hatred
or revenge. I am convinced that this was certainly not the intention of
Wilson, at that time President of the United States, and I myself
believe that in later years, he suffered because of it. At any rate that
was my first contact with German politics.
This Versailles now became...
But it is known that even the severe stipulations of Versailles as we
experienced them, from the closest personal observation, were not
adhered to as is well known. That, too, is perhaps a consequence, an
after-effect of a war, in which men drifted in a certain direction and
just could not or would not adhere to certain things. It is known that
the stipulations of Versailles were not observed then either
territorially speaking or in other very important points. May I mention
that one of the most important questions—territorial questions—at that
time was Upper Silesia and particularly Memel, that small territory. The
events which took place made a deep impression on me personally. Upper
Silesia particularly, because I had many personal ties there and because
none of us could understand that even those severe stipulations of
Versailles were not observed. It is a question of minorities which also
played a very important part. Later I shall have to refer to this point
more in detail, particularly in connection with the Polish crisis. But
right from the beginning, German minorities, as is known, suffered very
hard times. At that time it was again Upper Silesia particularly, and
those territories which were involved and suffering under that problem,
under that treatment. Further, the question of disarmament was naturally
one of the most important points of Versailles. And that, too, has
already been referred to in this courtroom. Therefore I do not want to
go into detail.
At any rate, it was the denial of equality in all these spheres, the
denial of equal rights, which made me decide that year to take a greater
part in politics. I would like to say here quite openly that at that
time I often talked to French and British friends, and of course it was
already a well-known fact, even then—after 1930 the NSDAP received over
100 seats in the Reichstag—that here the natural will of the German
people broke through to resist this treatment, which after all meant
nothing more than that they wanted to live. At the time these friends of
mine spoke to me about Adolf Hitler, whom I did not know at the time,
they asked me, “What sort of a man is Adolf Hitler? What will come of
it? What is it?” I said to them frankly at that time, “Give Germany a
chance and you will not have Adolf Hitler. Do not give her a chance, and
Adolf Hitler will come into power.”
That was approximately in 1930 or 1931. Germany was not given the
chance, so on 30 January 1933 he came—the National Socialists seized
power.
DR. HORN: How and when did you come to know Adolf Hitler?
VON RIBBENTROP: I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time on 13 August 1932
at the Berghof. Since about 1930 or 1931 I had known Count Helldorf in
Berlin, whose name as a National Socialist is known. He was a regimental
comrade of mine in my squadron, and we went through 4 years of war
together. Through him I became acquainted with National Socialism in
Berlin for the first time. I had asked him at that time to arrange a
meeting with Hitler for me. He did so that time, as far as I remember,
through the mediation of Herr Röhm. I visited Adolf Hitler and had a
long discussion with him at that time, that is to say, Adolf Hitler
explained his ideas on the situation in the summer of 1932 to me. I then
saw him again in 1933—that has already been described here by Party
Member Göring—at my house at Dahlem which I placed at their disposal so
that I, on my part, should do everything possible to create a national
front. Adolf Hitler made a considerable impression on me even then. I
noticed particularly his blue eyes in his generally dark appearance, and
then, perhaps as outstanding, his detached, I should say reserved—not
unapproachable, but reserved—nature, and the manner in which he
expressed his thoughts. These thoughts and statements always had
something final and definite about them, and they appeared to come from
his innermost self. I had the impression that I was facing a man who
knew what he wanted and who had an unshakable will and who was a very
strong personality. I can summarize by saying that I left that meeting
with Hitler convinced that this man, if anyone, could save Germany from
these great difficulties and that distress which existed at the time. I
need not go further into detail about the events of that January. But I
would like to tell about one episode which happened in my house in
Dahlem when the question arose whether Hitler was to become Reich
Chancellor or not. I know that at that time, I believe, he was offered
the Vice Chancellorship and I heard with what enormous strength and
conviction—if you like, also brutality and hardness—he could state his
opinion when he believed that obstacles might appear which could lead to
the rehabilitation and rescue of his people.
DR. HORN: Did you believe in the possibility of a revision of the
Versailles Treaty by means of mutual understanding?
VON RIBBENTROP: I must say that the numerous business trips which in the
years of 1920 to 1932 took me abroad proved to me how endlessly
difficult it was or would have to be under the system which then existed
to bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty by means of
negotiations. In spite of that, I felt how from year to year the circles
grew in England and France which were convinced that somehow Germany
would have to be helped. During those years, I established many contacts
with men of the business world, of public life, of art and science,
particularly in universities in England and France. I learned thereby to
understand the attitude of the English and the French. I want to say now
that even shortly after Versailles it was my conviction that a change of
that treaty could be carried out only through an understanding with
France and Britain. I also believed that only in this way could the
international situation be improved and the very considerable causes of
conflict existing everywhere as consequences of the first World War be
removed. It was clear, therefore, that only by means of an understanding
with the Western Powers, with England and France, would a revision of
Versailles be possible. Even then, I had the distinct feeling that only
through such an understanding could a permanent peace in Europe really
be preserved. We young officers had experienced too much at that time.
And I am thinking of the Free Corps men in Silesia and all those things
in the Baltic, _et cetera_. I should like to add, and say it quite
openly, that right from the beginning, from the first day in which I saw
and read the Versailles Treaty, I, as a German, felt it to be my duty to
oppose it and to try to do everything so that a better treaty could take
its place. It was precisely Hitler’s opposition to Versailles that first
brought me together with him and the National Socialist Party.
DR. HORN: Did you attempt to tell Hitler your views regarding this?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is 5 o’clock and the Tribunal thinks they
had better adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]
NINETY-FOURTH DAY
Friday, 29 March 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Before the examination of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop
goes on, the Tribunal desires me to draw the attention of Dr. Horn and
of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to what the Tribunal has said during the
last few days.
In the first place, the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal has allowed the
Defendant Göring, who has given the evidence first of the defendants and
who has proclaimed himself to be responsible as the second leader of
Nazi Germany, to give his evidence without any interruption whatever,
and he has covered the whole history of the Nazi regime from its
inception to the defeat of Germany. The Tribunal does not propose to
allow any of the other defendants to go over the same ground in their
evidence except insofar as is necessary for their own defense.
Secondly, the Tribunal ruled that evidence as to the injustice of the
Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is inadmissible.
Thirdly, though this is not an order of the Tribunal, I must point out
that the Tribunal has been informed on many occasions of the view of the
defendants and some of their witnesses that the Treaty of Versailles was
unjust and therefore any evidence upon that point, apart from its being
inadmissible, is cumulative, and the Tribunal will not hear it for that
reason.
And lastly, the Tribunal wishes me to point out to Dr. Horn that it is
the duty of counsel to examine their witnesses and not to leave them
simply to make speeches, and if they are giving evidence which counsel
knows is inadmissible according to the rulings of the Tribunal it is the
duty of counsel to stop the witness. That is all.
Dr. Seidl, if you are going to refer to Gaus’ affidavit the Tribunal
will not deal with that matter now, it will be dealt with after the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop has given evidence.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I agreed with Dr. Horn, Counsel for the
Defendant Ribbentrop...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I do not care whether you spoke to Dr. Horn or
not or what arrangement you may have made with Dr. Horn; it is not
convenient for the Tribunal to hear Dr. Gaus’ evidence at the present
moment; they want to go on with Ribbentrop’s evidence.
[_Turning to the defendant._]
DR. HORN: Yesterday at the end you were speaking about your political
impressions in England and France. In connection with that I should like
to put the following question: Did you make efforts to tell Hitler of
your views on French and British politics at that time?
VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, after 30 January 1933 I saw Hitler repeatedly and
of course told him about the impressions which I gathered on my frequent
travels, particularly to England and France.
DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s attitude toward France and England at that
time?
VON RIBBENTROP: Hitler’s attitude was as follows: He saw in France an
enemy of Germany because of the entire policy which France had pursued
with regard to Germany since the end of World War I, and especially
because of the position which she took on questions of equality of
rights. This attitude of Hitler’s found expression at the time in his
book _Mein Kampf_.
I knew France well, since for a number of years I had had connections
there. At that time I told the Führer a great deal about France. It
interested him, and I noticed that he showed an increasing interest in
French matters in the year 1933. Then I brought him together with a
number of Frenchmen, and I believe some of these visits, and perhaps
also some of my descriptions of the attitude taken by many Frenchmen,
and all of French culture...
DR. HORN: What Frenchmen were they?
VON RIBBENTROP: There were a number of French economists, there were
journalists and also some politicians. These reports interested the
Führer, and gradually, he got the impression that there were, after all,
men in France who were not averse to the idea of an understanding with
Germany.
Above all I acquainted the Führer with an argument which sprang from my
deepest conviction and my years of experience. It was a great wish of
the Führer, as is well known, to come to a definitive friendship and
agreement with England. At first the Führer treated this idea as
something apart from Franco-German politics. I believe that at that time
I succeeded in convincing the Führer that an understanding with England
would be possible only by way of an understanding with France as well.
That made, as I still remember very clearly from some of our
conversations, a strong impression on him. He told me then that I should
continue this purely personal course of mine for bringing about an
understanding between Germany and France and that I should continue to
report to him about these things.
DR. HORN: Then you became Hitler’s foreign political advisor, not the
Party advisor? How was that?
VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I reported to Hitler about my
travel experiences. These impressions which I brought from England and
France were of interest to him, and, without any special conferences or
discussions being arranged, I was often received by Hitler. I spoke with
him repeatedly and in that way it came about of itself that, apart from
the official channels, he acknowledged my co-operation and my advice as
to what I had seen and heard in foreign countries.
Of course, he was particularly interested in all questions concerning
England. I told him about public opinion and personalities and
introduced to him, besides Frenchmen, a number of Englishmen with whom
he could exchange ideas outside the official channels, something which
he loved to do.
DR. HORN: In what did your personal co-operation in the efforts made by
Hitler to come to an agreement with France in the years 1933 to 1935
consist?
VON RIBBENTROP: At that time the solution of the Saar question was one
of the first problems up for discussion. I tried through my own private
channels to make it clear to the French in Paris that a reasonable and
quiet solution of the Saar question in the spirit of the plebiscite, as
laid down in the Versailles Treaty, would be a good omen for the
relations between the two countries. I spoke with a number of people
during those years in Paris and also made the first contact with members
of the French Cabinet. I might mention that I had conversations with the
then French President Doumergue, with the Foreign Minister Barthou, who
was later assassinated, with M. Laval, and especially with M. Daladier.
I remember that in connection with the Saar question in particular I met
with considerable understanding on the part of the latter. Then somewhat
later I noticed during the visits of Frenchmen to Hitler that it was
always mentioned, “Yes, but there is _Mein Kampf_ and your policy toward
France is contained in that book.” I tried to get the Führer to bring
out an official revision of this passage of _Mein Kampf_. The Führer
said, however—and I remember the exact words—that he was determined
through his policy, as put into practice, to prove to the world that he
had changed his view in this respect: Things once written down could not
be changed, they were a historical fact, and his former attitude toward
France had been caused by France’s attitude toward Germany at that time.
But one could now turn over a new leaf in the history of the two
countries.
Then I asked Adolf Hitler to receive a French journalist, in order that
possibly by a public statement this revision of the view expressed in
his book _Mein Kampf_ could be made known to the world.
He agreed to this and then received a French journalist and gave him an
interview in 1933. I do not recall the exact date. I believe this
article appeared in _Le Matin_ and created a great deal of excitement. I
was very glad, for thereby a large step toward an understanding with
France had been taken. Then I contemplated what could further be done
and how, from this simple public article, one could work up to a direct
contact between French and German statesmen.
DR. HORN: At that time were you not contemplating the means for bringing
Hitler and Daladier together? What practical efforts did you make?
VON RIBBENTROP: I was just going to come to that. At that time Daladier
was the French Premier. I had several conversations with him and
suggested to him that he meet Adolf Hitler so that quite frankly, man to
man, they could carry on a discussion and see whether Franco-German
relations could not be put on an entirely new basis. M. Daladier was
quite taken by this idea. I reported this to Hitler and Hitler was ready
to meet M. Daladier.
The meeting place was to be in the German Odenwald and was already
agreed upon. I went to Paris to make the last arrangements with
Daladier.
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I am reluctant to interfere in any
respect with this examination of this defendant, but my colleagues and I
feel that this particular part of the examination is quite immaterial
and in any event much too detailed and that we will never get along
here. If counsel would abide by the instruction of the Court given this
morning, we could move along much more directly and much more quickly.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that the objection is
really well founded. The defendant is dealing with a period between 1933
and 1935 and the efforts which he made for good relations with France.
Well now, that is very remote from any question which we have to decide
in this case, and therefore to deal with it in this detail seems to the
Tribunal a waste of time.
DR. HORN: Then I will put other questions, which concern his direct
co-operation.
What caused Hitler to appoint you Plenipotentiary for Disarmament?
VON RIBBENTROP: I believe I was appointed Commissioner for Disarmament
in the year—in March or April. The reason was as follows:
Hitler was of the opinion that there should be equality of armament. He
believed that this would be possible only through negotiations with
France and England. That was also my point of view. Because of my
efforts to establish good relations between Germany and England, since
this was the earnest wish of the Führer, I was at that time in London
and there was able to make contacts with men influential in English
politics.
It was mainly the contact with Lord Baldwin. I spoke to Lord Baldwin and
the then Prime Minister, MacDonald, about the German desire for equality
and found that these ministers had an open ear. As the result of a long
conversation which I had with the Lord Chancellor of that time, the
present Lord Baldwin—the latter, I believe on 1 December 1933, made a
speech in the House of Commons, in which he pointed out that one should
meet Germany halfway. Armament equality had been promised and therefore
it would have to be reached somehow. For this purpose there were three
possibilities: One would be, that Germany arm up to the level of the
other powers, and that was not desired; the second possibility, that the
others would disarm to the level of Germany, and that could not be
carried out; and therefore one would have to meet halfway and permit
Germany a limited rearmament, and the other countries for their part
would have to disarm. Adolf Hitler was very happy then about this
attitude, for he considered it a practicable way of carrying through
equality for Germany. Unfortunately it was not at all possible in the
ensuing course of events to put into practice these good and reasonable
ideas and statements made by Baldwin. Adolf Hitler therefore took the
view that within the system now prevailing in the world it was
apparently impossible to attain, by means of negotiations, armament
equality—equality of rights—for Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait. The interpreter isn’t hearing you clearly. Could
you put the microphone a little bit more in front of you? And would you
repeat the last few sentences you said?
VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler saw that unfortunately, within the
international system prevailing at that time, the good ideas of Lord
Baldwin could not be carried out by means of negotiations.
DR. HORN: What practicable steps in limitation of armament did you
obtain in London?
VON RIBBENTROP: It is known that Adolf Hitler, that means Germany, left
the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference because it was
impossible to carry through the German desires by way of negotiations.
Hitler therefore saw no other possibility, except to achieve this aim
through the efforts of the German people themselves. He knew and, of
course, realized that a risk was involved, but after the experiences of
the preceding few years no other means remained, so that then Germany
started to rearm independently.
[_Dr. Horn attempted to interrupt._]
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to finish my answer to your question.
As a practical result of this, the following happened: In the course of
the year 1934 there came about a closer contact between the German and
the British Governments. There followed visits by British statesmen to
Berlin, by Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden, and during these visits the
suggestion was brought up as to whether it would not be possible to come
to an agreement or an understanding at least as far as naval matters
were concerned.
Hitler was very much interested in this idea and in the course of the
negotiations between the British and the German Governments it was
agreed that I should be sent to London to attempt to come to a naval
agreement with the British Government.
It is not necessary for me to go into details of the pact which actually
materialized. Hitler himself had said from the beginning that, in order
to come to a final understanding with England, one would have to
acknowledge the absolute naval supremacy of Great Britain once and for
all. It was he who suggested the naval ratio of 100 to 35, which was an
entirely different ratio from that which was negotiated between Germany
and England before 1914.
After relatively short negotiations this naval agreement was then
concluded in London. It was very important for future Anglo-German
relations, and at that time it represented the first practical result of
an actual armament limitation.
DR. HORN: At that time did France agree to this rearmament and what were
your personal efforts in this step?
VON RIBBENTROP: I might say in advance that Hitler and I were extremely
happy about this pact. I know, it was then styled once by certain
circles, to use an English expression, an “eyewash.” I can say here from
my own personal experience that I have never seen Adolf Hitler so happy
as at the moment when I was able to tell him personally, in Hamburg, of
the conclusion of this agreement.
DR. HORN: And what was France’s attitude to this pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: With France the situation was, of course, a little
difficult. I had already noticed this while the negotiations were taking
place, for one had deviated from the armament limitation of the
Versailles Treaty. Then I myself proposed to the gentlemen of the
Foreign Office—I can mention their names, they were Sir Robert Craigie
in particular and also Little, who was then a British Admiral—that I
would go to France so that I also could utilize my relations with French
statesmen and make clear to them the usefulness of this agreement for a
future German-Anglo-French understanding.
I should like to point out something here. In this courtroom, sometime
ago, a film was shown in which a speech I made for the newsreels of that
time, at the conclusion of this naval agreement, was presented as proof
of the duplicity of German diplomacy. At that time I purposely made this
speech in London in order to record and to declare before the whole
world that this did not concern merely one-sided British-German matters,
but that it was the wish of Hitler—and also the spirit of the naval
agreement—to bring about a general limitation of armament, and that
this naval pact was also designed to improve finally the relations
between France and Germany. This wish was real and sincere.
I then went to France, spoke with French statesmen and, I believe, did
help to some extent so that this first step in the limitation of
armaments was considered a reasonable measure by many Frenchmen in view
of the fact that in the long run equality of rights could not be
withheld from the German people.
DR. HORN: Then you were appointed Ambassador to London. What led to this
appointment?
VON RIBBENTROP: That came about as follows: In the time following the
naval agreement, which was hailed with joy by the widest circles in
England, I made great efforts to bring Lord Baldwin and the Führer
together, and I should like to mention here that the preliminary
arrangements for this meeting had already been made by a friend of Lord
Baldwin, a Mr. Jones. The Führer had agreed to fly to Chequers to meet
Lord Baldwin, but unfortunately Lord Baldwin declined at the last
minute. What led to his declining, I do not know, but there is no doubt
that certain forces in England at the time did not wish this
German-British understanding.
Then in 1936, when the German Ambassador Von Hoesch died, I said to
myself, that on behalf of Germany one should make one last supreme
effort to come to a good understanding with England. I might mention in
this connection, that at that time I had already been appointed State
Secretary of the Foreign Office by Hitler and had asked him personally
that that appointment be cancelled and that I be sent to London as
Ambassador.
The following may have led to this decision of Hitler’s. Hitler had a
very definite conception of England’s balance of power theory, but my
view perhaps deviated somewhat from his. My conviction was that England
would always continue to support her old balance of power theory,
whereas Hitler was of the opinion that this theory of balance of power
was obsolete, and that from now on, England should tolerate, that is,
should welcome a much stronger Germany in view of the changed situation
in Europe, and in view of Russia’s development of strength. In order to
give the Führer a definite and clear picture of how matters actually
stood in England—that was at any rate one of the reasons why the Führer
sent me to England. Another reason was that at that time we hoped,
through relations with the still very extensive circles in England which
were friendly to Germany and supported a German-English friendship, to
make the relations between the two countries friendly and perhaps even
to reach a permanent agreement.
Hitler’s goal was finally and always the German-English pact.
DR. HORN: In what way was your ambassadorial activity hampered in
England?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to say first that I was repeatedly in
England in the 1930’s, mainly from 1935 to 1936, and, acting on
instructions from the Führer, I sounded out the opinions there on the
subject of a German-British pact. The basis of this pact is known. It
was to make the naval ratio of 100 to 35 permanent. Secondly the
integrity of the so-called Low Countries, Belgium and Holland, and also
France was to be guaranteed by the two countries forever and—this was
the Führer’s idea—Germany should recognize the British Empire and
should be ready to stand up, if necessary even with the help of her own
power, for the preservation and maintenance of the British Empire; and
England, in return, should recognize Germany as a strong power in
Europe.
It has already been said, and I should like to repeat, that these
efforts in the 1930’s unfortunately did not lead to any results. It was
one of the Führer’s deepest disappointments—and I must mention that
here, for it is very important for the further course of events—that
this pact upon which he had placed such very great hopes and which he
had regarded as the cornerstone of his foreign policy did not
materialize in these years. What the forces were which prevented its
materializing I cannot say, because I do not know. In any case we got no
further.
I came back to this question several times while I was Ambassador in
London and discussed it with circles friendly to Germany. And I must say
that there also were many Englishmen who had a very positive attitude
towards this idea.
DR. HORN: Did you also meet with any attitude that was negative?
VON RIBBENTROP: There was naturally a strong element in England which
did not look favorably upon this pact or this idea of close relations
with Germany, because of considerations of principle and perhaps because
of traditional considerations of British policy against definite
obligations of this kind. I should like to mention here briefly, even
though this goes back to the year 1936, that during the Olympic Games in
the year 1936 I tried to win the very influential British politician,
the present Lord Vansittart, to this idea. I had at that time a very
long discussion of several hours’ duration with him in Berlin. Adolf
Hitler also received him and likewise spoke with him about the same
subject. Lord Vansittart, even though our personal relations were good,
showed a certain reserve.
In the year 1937, when I was in London, I saw that two clearly different
trends were gradually forming in England; the one trend was very much in
favor of promoting good relations with Germany; the second trend did not
wish such close relations.
There were—I believe that I do not need to mention names, for they are
well known—those gentlemen who did not wish such close relations with
Germany, Mr. Winston Churchill, who was later Prime Minister, and
others.
I then made strenuous efforts in London in order to promote this idea
but other events occurred which made my activity there most difficult.
There was first of all, the Spanish policy. It is well-known that civil
war raged in Spain at that time and that in London the so-called
Nonintervention Commission was meeting.
I therefore, as Ambassador to the Court of St. James, had a difficult
task. On the one hand, with all means at my disposal, I wished to
further German-English friendship and to bring about the German-English
pact, but on the other hand, I had to carry out the instructions of my
government in regard to the Nonintervention Commission and Spain. These
instructions, however, were often in direct opposition to certain aims
of British policy. Therefore it came about that this sort of League of
Nations which the Nonintervention Commission represented at that time,
and of which I was the authorized German member, prejudiced the chief
aim with which Adolf Hitler had sent me to London.
But I have to say here—if I may and am supposed to explain that period
openly in the interest of the case—that it was not only the policy
regarding Spain, but that in these years, 1937 until the beginning of
1938, that section which did not want a pact with Germany, doubtless
made itself constantly more evident in England; and that, today, is a
historical fact. Why? The answer is very simple, very clear. These
circles regarded a Germany strengthened by National Socialism as a
factor which might disturb the traditional British balance of power
theory and policy on the Continent.
I am convinced that Adolf Hitler at that time had no intention at all of
undertaking on his part anything against England, but that he had sent
me to London with the most ardent wish for really reaching an
understanding with England. From London I reported to the Führer about
the situation. And before this Tribunal now I wish to clarify one point,
a point which has been brought up very frequently and which is relevant
to my own defense. It has often been asserted that I reported to the
Führer from England that England was degenerate and would perhaps not
fight. I may and must establish the fact here, that from the beginning I
reported exactly the opposite to the Führer. I informed the Führer that
in my opinion the English ruling class and the English people had a
definitely heroic attitude and that this nation was ready at any time to
fight to the utmost for the existence of its empire. Later, in the
course of the war and after a conference with the Führer, I once
discussed this subject in public, in a speech made in 1941.
Summarizing the situation in London in the years 1937 and 1938, while I
was ambassador, I can at least say that I was fully cognizant of the
fact that it would be very difficult to conclude a pact with England.
But even so, and this I always reported, all efforts would have to be
made to come by means of a peaceful settlement to an understanding with
England as a decisive factor in German policy, that is, to create such a
relation between the development of German power and the British basic
tendencies and views on foreign policy that these two factors would not
conflict.
DR. HORN: During the time you were ambassador you concluded the
so-called Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. How was it that just you, the
ambassador, concluded that pact?
VON RIBBENTROP: I should like to make the preliminary remark that in
1938 I was appointed Foreign Minister on 4 February. On 4 February I was
in Berlin. The Führer called me and informed me that he had appointed me
Foreign Minister. After that—I am not sure, are you talking of the
Three Power Pact?
DR. HORN: No, you have misunderstood me. During your activity as
ambassador you concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, which in 1937
was joined by Italy and later on by Spain, as well as other countries.
How was it that you, as ambassador, concluded this pact?