I ask that this document be given judicial notice.

With this I conclude the series of documents which are to serve me, in

my final speech, as the basis for expounding the conditions of foreign

policy that Ribbentrop found upon his entry into office as Foreign

Minister. I shall refer to these documents when the occasion arises.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you filed them in Court with the Secretary?

DR. HORN: Mr. President, in connection with yesterday’s discussion I

again untied these documents and handed them, signed, to the General

Secretary.

The next documents that I submit serve as substantiation of what I shall

say later regarding Ribbentrop’s participation in the policy that led to

the Anschluss with Austria.

I should like to refer, first of all, to Document 386-PS, already

presented by the Prosecution, which is contained in my document book. I

am unfortunately not in the position to read off the page numbers to the

Tribunal because we ourselves have not yet received the files, that is,

the document book which now follows. This document follows Ribbentrop

Exhibit Number 44, which was on page 90 of the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit Number 44 is the last document in the second

document book. There are not any more, are there? There are not any

more?

DR. HORN: I was informed today that the English Document Book was

finished and had been presented to the Tribunal. We unfortunately have

not yet received a copy, so I cannot compare the page numbers.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we haven’t got it. We have only those two and the

last exhibit in the second book is Number 44, which you have just read.

But, Dr. Horn, as the document has already been put into evidence, it is

not necessary for you to produce it. You can say that you rely upon it;

that is all that is necessary.

DR. HORN: Yes, but I believe that we must immediately decide the

question of the continuation of my presentation. I want to make clear

again that, after the Tribunal had ruled on the way in which documents

were to be presented, I at that time immediately submitted my documents

to the Tribunal for translation in the prescribed way, in that I

presented 6 document books bearing my signature. Unfortunately the

Translation Division was unable to keep up with the pace of the

presentation of evidence by the Defense and I am in the uncomfortable

position of being unable to provide the Tribunal with the assistance of

pointing out the pages in order to continue my delivery smoothly.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn, we think you had better go on, just

notifying us which the documents are and whether they are already in

evidence or whether you are offering them in evidence now. You have told

us Document 386-PS. We can make a note of that—that is already in

evidence. I do not know whether all your other documents are already in

evidence or whether there are any documents which are not and which you

are now going to offer in evidence.

DR. HORN: The following documents are new. As to Document 386-PS, I

should only like to make clear that Von Ribbentrop was not one of those

present at that time. He has also learned here for the first time of

this document and its contents—it concerns the well-known Hossbach

Document.

The next document to which I shall refer in my final speech is Document

Number 2461-PS, already submitted by the Prosecution. It is the official

German communication regarding the meeting between the Führer and Reich

Chancellor with the Austrian Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg in

Berchtesgaden on 12 and 15 February 1938. I refer to this document to

prove to what extent Ribbentrop participated in this discussion.

The next document to which I shall refer, and which I present to the

Tribunal with the request for judicial notice, is Ribbentrop Exhibit

Number 11 (Document Number Ribbentrop-11), which is in my document book.

This document...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think it is really

necessary for you to refer to any documents which are completely in

evidence already unless you are going to read some passage in them and

rely upon some passage in them which has not already been read. I mean,

supposing that the Prosecution read a particular sentence out of a

particular document and you want to refer to some other sentence in it,

then it will probably be right for you to indicate that; but, if the

document has been read in full, any further reference is a mere matter

of argument and is not really a matter of evidence, and you will be at

liberty, you see, to argue it whenever you come to make your speech. So

that, I mean, as a matter of saving time, it would not be necessary to

refer us to 386-PS or 2461-PS unless there is some passage in them which

you rely upon and which has not been read by the Prosecution.

DR. HORN: I may then go on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 11 and present

it to the Court for judicial notice. It concerns an agreement between

the German Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government on 11

July 1936. When, on 12 February 1938, Ribbentrop drove with Hitler to

Berchtesgaden to have a conference with Dr. Schuschnigg, then Chancellor

of Austria, he was not informed about the deviation of Hitler’s plans

from the agreement of the year 1936 between Germany and Austria, and he

conducted his discussion with Schuschnigg also in the spirit of the

agreement of 1936. One month later the Anschluss with Austria came

about.

As proof that this Anschluss corresponded to the wish of the Austrian

population, I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 12 (Document Number

Ribbentrop-12), which I present to the Tribunal for judicial notice. It

is the result of the national plebiscite and of the election to the

Greater German Reichstag of 10 April 1938. From this document it is to

be seen that at that time in Austria a total of 4,484,475 people had the

right to vote, 4,471,477 voted, 4,453,772 voted for the Anschluss, and

only 11,929 voted against it.

THE PRESIDENT: Have we got this document? We do not have it in our

books. Does the clerk of the Court have it?

DR. HORN: It is in the document book as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 12.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it goes from 10 to 14 for some reason. Let me look

at it. There is some mistake, apparently. It has not been copied; that

is all. It is not in our books, but here it is, so it is all right. Go

on.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, it is to be seen from this document that the

Austrian people at that time expressed themselves in favor of the

Anschluss with 99.73 percent of the votes cast.

As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 13 to the

Tribunal for judicial notice. I submit this document as proof that the

Anschluss would hardly have come about by international negotiations,

according to the opinion not only of the German Government, but also of

the English Government. I should like as proof of this assertion to read

the following from this document. It concerns a statement by Under

Secretary of State Butler before the House of Commons, which reads as

follows—it was made on 14 March 1938:

“The English Government discussed the new situation with

‘friends of the Geneva Entente’ and it was unanimously”—I

emphasize the word unanimously—“agreed that a discussion in

Geneva of the situation in Austria would not bring satisfactory

results but that the result would probably again be some kind of

humiliation. The Under Secretary of State stated that England

had never assumed any special guaranty for the ‘independence’ of

Austria which had been forced in the treaty of St. Germain.”

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.

Subsequently to this the reunion of Austria with the German Reich took

place as set down in the law of 13 March 1938, which also was signed by

Ribbentrop.

Herewith I end the submission of those documents of mine that are

related to the question of Austria. I may now...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute Dr. Horn, the only desire of the Tribunal

is to save time, and we observe from the index in your document book

that there are, I think, over three hundred separate documents upon

which you wish to rely, and most of them appear to come from the various

books, the _German White Books_ and these other books, which the

Tribunal provisionally allowed to you. Wouldn’t the most convenient

course be for you to put them in, in bulk, saying that you are putting

in Exhibits 44 to 314, or whatever it may be, rather than simply detail

each document by its number? If you have a particular passage which you

want to read at this moment, you can do so; but it seems to take up

unnecessary time, simply to give each exhibit number one after the

other.

DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President, I shall mention those numbers in

this way which I should like only to bring to judicial notice, briefly

mention from such and such to such and such, when it is a matter of

several numbers; and I shall ask the Court to accept them then.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. HORN: I will now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. The

American Prosecutor stated in his presentation on this question that

this marked the end of a series of events that struck him as one of the

saddest chapters in human history—the violation and destruction of the

weak and small Czechoslovak people. As proof that there was no

Czechoslovak people in the usual sense of the term either before or

after 1939, I would like to read a few extracts from Lord Rothermere’s

book _Warnings and Prophecies_, which has been expressly granted me

through a ruling by the Tribunal. This is Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 45

(Document Number Ribbentrop-45).

THE PRESIDENT: Did the Tribunal allow Lord Rothermere’s book?

DR. HORN: The Tribunal has granted it to me and even put at my disposal

an English copy, which I herewith hand to the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the question of admissibility was to be finally

determined when each book is offered in evidence, and I think you will

remember that the Tribunal stated in one of its orders that the opinions

of particular authors upon matters of ethics, history, and events would

not be admitted.

Lord Rothermere is apparently an author and was not a member of the

British Government; and therefore, unless there is some very particular

reason, it would not appear that his books—or statements in his

books—are in any way evidence.

DR. HORN: The paragraphs to be presented are concerned entirely with

matters of fact; and I therefore request that the Tribunal take judicial

notice of these facts. There is no question of any polemic discussions.

THE PRESIDENT: The distinction which exists is this: The Tribunal under

Article 21 is directed to take judicial notice of official government

documents, reports, _et cetera_. This is not an official government

document. Therefore—you say it is factual evidence—it is not evidence,

for the purpose of this Tribunal, of any facts stated in it. So far as

it is facts, it is not evidence of the facts, and so far as it is

opinion, it is Lord Rothermere’s opinion.

Well, Dr. Horn, can you tell me what you want to prove by it?

DR. HORN: I should like to prove by it, first, a few historical facts;

secondly that the difficulties of a state composed of many

nationalities, of which Czechoslovakia is an example, led to this

conflict with the German minority and consequently with the German

Government. I want to provide you with the reasons and motives that led

to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany.

MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, on behalf of the United States I wish

to object very strongly to this offer for the reason given by Dr.

Horn—the first reason—and for the reason given secondly. If I

understood the translation correctly, I understood him to say in the

first place it was offered to prove that there was no such thing as a

Czech people. I don’t think that is a matter that can properly be raised

certainly here before this Court. We object that it is out of place to

offer such proof. We object furthermore for the reason given in the

second explanation by Dr. Horn.

DR. HORN: May I again point out that I wish to demonstrate by this

means, the motives that led to the separation of the Sudetenland in the

year 1938?

If I wish to adopt an attitude toward some international offense with

which someone is charged and adjudge it, I must also be in a position to

judge the motives underlying it. Otherwise it is impossible for me to

conduct a legal investigation.

I may also point out that I had first of all asked the Tribunal for

documents of the League of Nations as evidence and I would have referred

to these official documents if this evidence had come into my possession

in time; but as I am not yet in possession of them, I have resorted to

presenting facts to the Tribunal instead.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that, about the League of Nations? I did

not catch what you said.

DR. HORN: I have asked the League of Nations’ Library for the

appropriate documents regarding minorities which are in the possession

of the League of Nations, in order to submit them as evidence. The

office of the General Secretary is obtaining this evidence for me, but

so far I have not received it. Consequently I had to refer to this

weaker source of evidence in connection with documents which are

comparable to the government reports of Article 21, or which are

themselves such reports.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you specified the passages in the book to which you

wish to refer? I mean, have you marked them somewhere in some copy of

the book?

DR. HORN: I have requested documents regarding minorities in

Czechoslovakia, as far as these questions have been decided by legal

proceedings conducted by the League of Nations and by the International

Court at The Hague. This is a collection published by the League of

Nations regarding minority matters and constantly brought up to date. It

is an official collection of documents.

THE PRESIDENT: I was only asking you whether you had specified the

particular passages in Lord Rothermere’s book which you want to put in.

DR. HORN: I am sorry. I did not understand your question. Could I

request you to repeat the question?

THE PRESIDENT: The question I asked was whether you have specified the

particular passages in Lord Rothermere’s book which you want to use.

DR. HORN: I have marked these passages, and they are on Pages 137, 150,

138, 151, 161...

THE PRESIDENT: Not so fast, I want to get them down. 137, 138...

DR. HORN: Pages 161, 162, 140, 144, 145, 157. They are in each case just

short paragraphs.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is an appropriate time for us to break off.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will rule upon the admissibility

of these passages from Lord Rothermere’s book when they have had the

translation submitted to them. In the meantime, will you go on

presenting your documents in the way that I suggested, and not stopping

to detail any of them except those that you particularly want to.

DR. HORN: May I explain very briefly that the oppression of German

racial groups in the border territories of Czechoslovakia led to the

formation of the Sudeten German Party, and to the co-operation and

consultation of the latter with official German agencies. Therefore the

Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in his capacity of Reich Foreign Minister and

within the scope of the directives he received, held conferences with

leaders of the national groups. A number of documents have already been

submitted in evidence by the Prosecution and I shall refer to them

later. In this connection may I ask to make a correction in Document

2788-PS, where, on Page 2, approximately in the middle, it says “by the

extent and gradual”—there is an error in translation here. Our document

says “provocation,” whereas the original says “specification

(Präzisierung) of the demands in order to avoid entering the

government.” I request the correction of this error, as it distorts the

meaning.

In the course of the Prosecution’s presentation Von Ribbentrop was said

to have supported the high-handed conduct of the Sudeten German leaders.

As evidence to the contrary I refer to a part of Document 3060-PS which

has not yet been read and from which the contrary can be gathered, that

is, that the then Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop took measures against

the high-handedness of the Sudeten German leaders with the help of his

Ministry in Prague. As evidence of this, may I quote the first and

second paragraphs of this document. I quote:

“The rebuff to Frank”—that is, the leader of the Sudeten German

Party at that time—“has had a salutary effect. I have discussed

matters with Henlein, who had avoided me recently, and with

Frank, separately, and have received the following promises:

“1. The policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party must

follow exclusively the lines of German foreign policy as

transmitted through the German Legation. My directives must be

obeyed implicitly.”

These directives do not apply within the frame of the general policy

which had as its aim the avoidance of direct interference in Czech

affairs or in the policy of the Sudeten German Party.

Regarding the details of the activity of the German Government and of

the Foreign Office in their relations with the Sudeten German Party, I

shall question Herr Von Ribbentrop when he is called as a witness.

I now pass on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 46 (Document Number

Ribbentrop-46), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. This

document is a report from the Legation of the Czechoslovak Republic in

Paris. It is concerned with the meaning and purpose of Lord Runciman’s

mission to Prague. It shows that that mission was entrusted to him by

England for the purpose of gaining time for rearmament. I should like to

read the document.

“Paris, 5 August 1938. Secret. Mr. Minister,

“Massigli considers the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague a

good thing. Anthony Eden said, during a conversation with

Ambassador Corbin (the French Ambassador to London) that on

earnest reflection the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague was a

step in the right direction, as he is said to be going to engage

England more directly with Central Europe than has been the case

up to now. Massigli says that the English know that there will

be war, and that they are trying every means to delay it. He is

perfectly aware that Lord Runciman’s mission to Prague for the

purpose of settling that dispute is per se a danger to

Czechoslovakia; for Lord Runciman might, for the alleged purpose

of gaining time, propose something which could be tremendously

detrimental to Czechoslovakia.

“To this view of Massigli’s I add further information which is

extremely instructive. During the recent grain conference held

in London; the British, the Dominions, the United States, and

France conducted separate discussions. The French Delegate had a

discussion with Minister Elliot (British Minister of Health) and

Morrison (British Minister for Agriculture) as well as with the

distinguished expert, Sir Arthur Street, who was in the Ministry

of Agriculture and who had been entrusted with a leading post in

the Air Ministry. From the speeches, conduct, and negotiations

of the British Delegation, the French Delegate gathered the

positive impression that the British were interested in

organizing grain supplies not so much to prevent the conflict as

to win the conflict. The ministers Elliot and Morrison are both

supposed to believe in the possibility of a conflict.

“Sir Arthur Street said that in 6 months’ time he would have put

British aviation on its feet. Therefore much importance is

attached to the gaining of time in England.

“I mention this information at this point in connection with

Lord Runciman’s mission to Prague; because, as I said already,

the question of gaining time plays an important if not decisive

role in the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague.

“With best greetings, yours sincerely—Ususky.”

On 29 September 1938, the Munich Pact was concluded, in which Von

Ribbentrop also participated. Just how far, is something I shall

demonstrate when the defendant is examined in the witness box regarding

his policy.

On 30 September there was a mutual declaration, which I submit to the

Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 47 (Document Number

Ribbentrop-47). That declaration by the Führer and the British Prime

Minister Chamberlain, dated 30 September 1938, was planned to serve the

purpose of removing all differences still pending between Germany and

England.

The reaction to this agreement differed in Germany and in England. As

evidence for the British reaction I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number

48 (Document Number Ribbentrop-48), which I am offering to the Tribunal

with the request for judicial notice. This is an extract from the speech

of the British Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons on 3

October 1938. May I quote the following from its first paragraph:

“If there is a lesson we can learn from the experiences of these

last weeks it is the fact that lasting peace cannot be attained

by sitting still and waiting for it. Active and positive efforts

are required to attain this peace. We, in this country have

already been busy for a long time with a rearmament program

whose speed and extent increase constantly. Nobody should

believe that, because of the signing of the Munich Agreement by

the four powers, we can at present afford to reduce our efforts

regarding this program....”

As evidence of this rearmament program, which Chamberlain himself said

was constantly growing in speed and size, I should like to prove this

assertion by reference to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 49 (Document Number

Ribbentrop-49). This is a speech of the British Secretary of State for

War, Hore-Belisha, at the Mansion House in London, given on 10 October

1938, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this speech

also, from the extracts which I am submitting. May I quote a few words

from them?

“More still, however, is to be done to give full force and

opportunity to the territorial army as a whole.”

I am now skipping one paragraph and read the following paragraph,

Paragraph 5, which says:

“As regards the organization of new formations, infantry

brigades will in future have three battalions, as in the Regular

Army, instead of four. Employing the material that we have, we

find that we can form nine complete divisions on the Regular

Army model...

“We have provided also a considerable number of modern corps and

army units, such as Army Field and Survey regiments. R.A. and

Signal Corps will be ready to take their place in such

formations should war eventuate. This is also in accordance with

Regular Army organization.”

So much for the quotation from the speech of the Secretary of State for

War.

In Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 50 (Document Number Ribbentrop-50) further

stress is laid on armament. It concerns a speech of Winston Churchill’s

of 16 October 1938, and I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of

this speech in connection with extracts from it as a document. I am

quoting only a few sentences from it:

“We must arm... We shall no doubt arm.

“Britain, casting away habits of centuries, will decree national

service upon her citizens. The British people will stand erect

and will face whatever may be coming. But

arms—instrumentalities, as President Wilson called them—are

not sufficient by themselves. We must add to them the power of

ideas. People say we ought not to allow ourselves to be drawn

into a theoretical antagonism between Nazidom and democracy, but

the antagonism is here now.”

I prove the fact that England was arming energetically in the air far

beyond the normal needs of defense, by Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 51

(Document Number Ribbentrop-51), which I am offering to the Tribunal

with the request for judicial notice. This is a declaration of the

British Secretary of State for Air in the House of Commons, dated 16

November 1938...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought you understood what the Tribunal

wanted you to do, which was to put in the documents all together. I

think I have said from 44—wasn’t it the document that you had got

to?—to 300 something, that you could put them in all together. But now

you have gone through 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and you seem to be

going through each one in detail, doing exactly what I asked you not to

do. Didn’t you understand what I said?

DR. HORN: The way I understood you, Mr. President, was that I may read

important parts from them. That is what I did. It concerns only

important extracts.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to find an important passage in each of the

300 documents?

DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, certainly not; but if I cannot read these

documents, these extracts, then I would like to ask the Tribunal to

accept my whole document book as evidence so that I can refer to it

later.

THE PRESIDENT: That is what we intended to do. What we want you to do is

to offer in evidence now, stating that you offer from Exhibit 44 up to

300 or whatever the number is, and we will allow you, of course, to

refer to them at a later stage when you make your speech; and if there

is any passage which the Prosecution object to, they can inform you

about it beforehand and the matter can then be argued. But what we do

not desire to do is to take up the time of the Tribunal by either

offering each of these documents by its number individually, 44, 45, and

so on, or that you should read anything except passages which are of

especial importance at this moment. After all, you are not putting

forward your whole case now; you are only introducing your evidence.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I had...

THE PRESIDENT: I am reminded that of these last few exhibits to which

you have been referring, you have referred to about six, all of them

upon British rearmament. That is obviously cumulative, isn’t it?

Therefore, it cannot be that all those are all particularly important to

you.

We only desire to get on, and we desire you, as I have said, to put in

these documents, if I may use the phrase, in bulk; and we do not desire

you to refer to any of them beyond that.

DR. HORN: In that case I am offering Number 51...

COL. POKROVSKY [_Interposing_]: If I understand rightly, Dr. Horn up to

now has not drawn any conclusions from those directions which were given

him, time and again, by the Tribunal.

I had an opportunity, that is, as far as I could, actually to acquaint

myself with those translations that are gradually coming to me, and, by

the way, Dr. Horn turned over these documents, not 3 weeks ago, as he

said, but considerably later. As far as I can see up to now, I have a

whole series of objections.

Most of the documents in general are altogether irrelevant to the

matter, and in particular, absolutely irrelevant to the case of

Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we have already indicated that we do

not want to deal with questions of admissibility at the moment, because

the documents are not before us. I do not understand the purpose of your

objections. We haven’t got the documents here. How can we tell whether

they are admissible or not?

COL. POKROVSKY: I have an objection in principle. Part of the

documents—I will not quote their contents but merely for illustration

will name two or three numbers. Some of them are direct filthy and

slanderous attacks by private persons against such statesmen as Mr.

Roosevelt, the late President of the United States. I have in mind the

Documents Number Ribbentrop-290(4), 290(3), 290(1). Some of them are

just provocative forged documents. I have in mind Document Number

Ribbentrop-286.

There is a whole series of documents which fall directly under the terms

of those directions that were given to Dr. Horn by the Tribunal, and it

seems to me that if Dr. Horn will continue reading those documents into

the record...

THE PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: Colonel Pokrovsky, as I have said, we

haven’t got these documents before us. You say documents 290(1), 290(3),

290(4), and 286—I don’t know even what the documents are. I have never

seen them.

I think the best way would be for the Chief Prosecutors to submit their

objections in writing, and then they will be considered by the Tribunal.

The documents aren’t here. We can’t do anything until we see what the

documents are. In order to try and get on with this case, we are

allowing Dr. Horn to put in the documents in bulk. But your objections

now are really simply taking up time and doing no good at all. If you

would put in your objections in writing, saying that you object on

certain grounds to these documents, that matter would be considered; but

we can’t consider it without that.

COL. POKROVSKY: My objection was dictated by the wish to save time and

is of a very practical nature.

From the moment when a certain document—well, at least the contents of

it—from the moment even a brief account of it is recorded in the

transcript this material becomes the property of the press; and it seems

to me that it is not in our interests to have a document which is a

known falsification, and the fate of which has not been determined by

the Tribunal, that such a document should be turned over to certain

circles and that it should be made public.

Meanwhile, among the documents which have been presented by Dr. Horn,

there are such documents; and it is not quite clear to me why these

particular documents were delayed in translation, why these documents

were presented later than others. And on the basis of this consideration

I thought it my duty to address the Tribunal, and I think that the

Tribunal will consider the reason for my objections.

THE PRESIDENT: I follow what you mean now with reference to documents

being communicated to the press, and steps ought to be taken on that.

The Tribunal will rule now that documents, upon the admissibility of

which the Tribunal has not ruled, are not to be given to the press. I

believe there have been some infractions of that in the past; but that

is the Tribunal’s ruling, that documents should not be given to the

press until they have been admitted in evidence before this Court.

COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: I ought perhaps to add that the Tribunal are not in

complete control of this matter. It is for the Prosecution to see—and

also possibly for the Defense—that documents should not be given to the

press until they have been admitted in evidence here.

COL. POKROVSKY: Up to now the order was such if the documents mentioned

in Court are recorded in the transcript, then they become public

property.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor, I wonder if I could help on that

practical point, because it is one which has given us a little concern.

As Your Lordship knows, the practice has been that the documents have

been given some 24 hours before they are produced in Court, on the

understanding which has been practically entirely, completely, complied

with, that the press would not publish until the document is put in

evidence. And, My Lord, I am sure that if the Tribunal expressed the

wish that where any objection is taken to a document and the Tribunal

reserves the question of admissibility, the press would, in the spirit

with which they have complied with the previous practice, comply at once

with the Tribunal’s desire and not publish it in these circumstances. I

think that in practice that would solve the difficulty which Your

Lordship has just mentioned.

THE PRESIDENT: The only thing is, of course, that we are now dealing

with a very large number of documents which Dr. Horn wants to submit;

and, as you have heard, for purposes of trying to save time we have

asked him to submit those documents in bulk.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And of course it is very difficult, if not impossible,

for members of the Prosecution to make their objections to documents

when they are offered in bulk in that way. Therefore, I think the most

convenient course would probably be if, as soon as the translation of

those documents has been made, the Prosecution could indicate any

objections they have to them and the Tribunal would consider them. And

after the order of the Tribunal has been made upon them, they should

then be made available to the press.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I respectfully and entirely agree. My

Lord, the Prosecutors did confer. Of course the only material that they,

had to confer upon was the short description of the document in Document

Book Number 1, and on that it appeared to all of us that there were a

number of documents which might be and probably were objectionable. But,

clearly, from our point of view it would be much more satisfactory if we

had the opportunity of seeing the actual document in translation, and

then we should gladly comply with what Your Lordship has suggested,

namely, that we will make the objections in writing to such of those as

we think are objectionable and let the Tribunal have them.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them, I believe, are in

English, and you could let us have your objections as soon as possible.

Perhaps the press would act in accordance with our wishes and not make

public those documents to which objection is taken until we have ruled

upon them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, yes. We will make our

objections as soon as we have had the opportunity of reading the

documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. HORN: May I, Mr. President, state that none of my material has been

handed to the press by me up to now. I may further state that by an

order of the Tribunal only that part was to be translated which was

considered relevant by the Prosecution. On the basis of this ruling I

cannot rightly comprehend the one point of Colonel Pokrovsky’s objection

regarding the intrinsic value of the documents. I do not believe that

the Prosecution, on the strength of that ruling, would translate

anything which, as Colonel Pokrovsky emphasized, must be designated as

dirty in its contents. I think that would have been rejected already

before now by the Prosecution and therefore the danger does not exist at

all that any such translation or original will reach the press.

THE PRESIDENT: I haven’t seen the documents, so I can’t say, but if you

would continue in accordance with the scheme that I have suggested to

you, I think that would be the best course for you to take.

DR. HORN: May I now submit the documents referring to armament, military

as well as economic, which at the same time show the co-operation

between Britain and France? These are the Documents Number Ribbentrop-51

to 62, in my document book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice

of these documents.

I come to the question of Czechoslovakia. As evidence for the fact that

Slovakia requested to be taken under German protection I shall present

to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit Numbers 63, 64, and 65 (Documents

Ribbentrop-63, 64, and 65) with the request that they be given judicial

notice. Furthermore, I shall examine the Defendant Ribbentrop concerning

this subject when he takes the stand and, as far as is necessary, I

shall have him express an opinion regarding these particular documents.

Now I shall submit Documents Numbers 66 to 69 (Documents Ribbentrop-66

to 69) to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They contain statements

regarding the reaction in Britain to the occupation of the rest of the

Czech country on 15 March 1939 by Germany. Regarding the details as to

how the creation of the protectorate came about I shall again question

the Defendant Von Ribbentrop concerning the individual documents.

As the next group of exhibits, I present to the Tribunal the document

which refers to Article 99 of the dictate of Versailles and which

specifically refers to the international legal position of the Memel

territory. We are concerned here with Documents Ribbentrop-70 and 71 of

my document book.

Regarding the fact that in accordance with the presentation of evidence

up to now, I had timed myself not to proceed any further today than to

this document, I should like to ask your Lordship’s permission to submit

the rest of the documents to the Tribunal tomorrow. For up to now, on

the strength of the existing practice of the Tribunal that the documents

be partly read with connecting text, I had expected not to go any

further than to this document.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, why don’t you put them all in now? You say you

have an index of them. All you have to say is that you offer in evidence

the documents from 71 to 300 and something and then they go in, and then

if the Prosecution should take an objection to them, of course you can

be heard upon the question of the objection.

DR. HORN: May I have your permission to confer with my colleague for one

moment and see how much material he has here, so that I can then offer

evidence on the separate subjects to the Tribunal? May I again ask Your

Lordship?—I gather from this ruling of the Tribunal that submission of

evidence here is no longer to take place but merely presentation of

exhibits quite apart from the contents.

THE PRESIDENT: Presumably when these documents are submitted for

translation which I understand you say you have done—but at any rate,

if you haven’t done it already you will be doing it—you will mark the

passages upon which you rely. Some may be in books, and there you will

indicate only certain parts; in documents you will indicate the parts

upon which you rely, which is what we desired you to do. You described

all these documents by numbers and gave them exhibit numbers in your

document book and all we want you to do now is to offer them in evidence

and then the Prosecution, when they have been translated, will have the

opportunity of objecting to them on the grounds of their being

cumulative or of their being inadmissible for some other reasons; and,

if necessary, you will be heard upon that. All we want you to do now is

to get on. What difficulty there can be in submitting these documents,

all of which you have indexed in your document book, the Tribunal is

quite unable to see.

DR. HORN: Until now, however, the ruling of the Tribunal was to this

effect that we, in the Defense presentation, were not only allowed to

submit our documents but also to deliver them with a connecting text so

as to indicate the attitude of the Defense. Just recently, Mr. Justice

Jackson suggested that, on the contrary, the documents should be handed

over in their entirety and that objections could be raised subsequently

by the Prosecution against the individual documents without their being

presented. This suggestion was turned down on the strength of

representations made by Dr. Dix, and the Tribunal intended to continue

the established procedure, namely, that the documents could be read and

brought forward with a connecting text. Now, we come today to a complete

departure from this procedure, in which only the documents, and these in

bulk, are presented to the Tribunal for judicial notice. That is

naturally such a deviation that one first of all has to regroup all

these documents, in order to be able to submit them to the Tribunal in

their proper order, for up to now we had planned to deliver at least

some part of the contents.

THE PRESIDENT: I am not aware of any order of the Tribunal which refers

to an interconnecting text. We did not rule that you should not be

allowed to read any passage from the documents, but what we did rule was

that we wished the documents to be presented and put in evidence and

that the passages upon which you relied should be marked and that the

Prosecution should, if they wished to object to them as being so

irrelevant that they needn’t be translated, that they should do so, and

that the Tribunal should rule, if there was a conflict upon that. Dr.

Horn, of course, you can put any document to your witnesses in the

course of their examination and ask them to explain it. It isn’t as

though you are confined to this presentation of the documents in bulk.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, may I add another word? This matter appears to

me to be again such a question of principle that I do not wish to

prejudice my colleagues and I should like to have an opportunity first

of all to confer with my colleagues about it. That is indeed a basic

departure from the established procedure which was allowed the Defense.

I would not like therefore to take it upon myself now simply to alter

these matters for myself and then in so doing, also commit my

colleagues. I hope that Your Lordship will understand that.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the only material order which the Tribunal has

made, as far as I am aware, is this: It is the order of the 4th of

February 1946, 2(a):

“During the presentation of a defendant’s case, the defendant’s

counsel will read documents, will question witnesses, and will

make such brief comments on the evidence as are necessary to

insure a proper understanding of it.”

DR. HORN: Mr. President, this ruling could naturally only be interpreted

by us to the effect that we were granted approximately the same

procedure as the Prosecution, for that certainly belongs to the

fundamental principles of any trial, that a certain equality of rights

exists between Prosecution and Defense.

So as to save time, we are prepared to adapt ourselves to the Court to

the extent that we submit the documents to the Tribunal in bulk, insofar

as they refer to a definite problem; but still with the reservation to

make those statements upon their contents required in order to

understand the whole problem. This possibility, however, is taken away

from us, if we must now simply submit the entire documentary material

and can make no statements about it at all; for we certainly cannot make

any comments on a document if I now, for example, submit 10 pieces

altogether for a specific problem.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will adjourn now for a few minutes

to consider this question and will return in a short time and announce

their decision so that you can prepare yourself for tomorrow on the

lines which they wish.

DR. DIX: Before the Tribunal confer, may I ask only one question. I have

understood the course of the discussion up to now in this way: That the

difficulty has arisen owing to the fact that as the Russian and French

translations are not available, some of the Prosecution are still unable

to form an opinion with reference to this material and consequently

cannot decide whether they wish to raise objections or not. On the other

hand the Tribunal wants to avoid quotations being read here concerning

matters on which it has not yet been decided whether the Prosecution

want to raise objections. This is the situation which appears to me to

be the cause of the difficulties arising at present.

I have not understood the statements of the Tribunal, of His Lordship,

to mean—I beg to be corrected if I am wrong—that there is to be a

deviation from the already announced decision or from the procedure

followed up to now, that we may quote essential and important portions

of the documents submitted by us, when they have been admitted as

relevant by the Tribunal.

I believe that I am right in my impression that no exception is to be

made to this principle and that no basic new decision is to be made here

now, but only an interim ruling is being sought: How can we surmount the

difficulties that Dr. Horn may not at the moment read individual

passages from his documents because the Tribunal is not yet in a

position to decide their relevancy and admit them, because the Tribunal

cannot yet hear the attitude of the Prosecution?

Before we adjourn, therefore, so that we have a definite basis for our

discussion, I should like to ask the Court if my interpretation is

correct. Is it now merely a question of finding a way out while

basically maintaining the right of the Defense to speak connecting

words, words of explanation of the documents, that is, such words

without which the documents could not be understood, and to read

individual relevant parts, but that on principle only these technical

interim questions are to be decided?

I should be grateful to Your Lordship if I could be told if this

conception of mine, regarding the nature of these difficulties which

have arisen, is correct.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now and we will return to Court very

shortly and we will consider what you have said.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: On the 22 March 1946, the Tribunal made this ruling,

repeating a ruling of 8 March 1946:

“To avoid unnecessary translations Defense Counsel shall

indicate to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents

which they propose to use in order that the Prosecution may have

an opportunity to object to irrelevant passages.

“In the event of disagreement between the Prosecution and the

Defense as to the relevancy of any particular passage, the

Tribunal will decide what passages are sufficiently relevant to

be translated. Only the cited passages need be translated unless

the Prosecution require translation of the entire document.”

That rule has not, for very likely sufficient reason, been able to be

carried out, and therefore certainly the Tribunal have not got the

translations, and they understand that the Prosecution have not got, at

any rate, all the translations. The difficulty which has arisen, the

Tribunal thinks, is in part, at any rate, due to that fact.

The Tribunal, in citing that order of 8 March 1946, on 22 March 1946,

said this:

“In considering the matters which have been raised this morning

the Tribunal has had in mind the necessity for a fair trial and

at the same time for an expeditious trial, and the Tribunal has

decided that for the present it will proceed under rules

heretofore announced, that is to say:

“First, documents translated into the four languages may be

introduced without being read, but in introducing them counsel

may summarize them or otherwise call their relevance to the

attention of the Court and may read such brief passages as are

strictly relevant and are deemed important.

“Second, when a document is offered the Tribunal will hear any

objections that may be offered to it.”

In this connection the Tribunal then went on to read the order of 8

March, which deals with translations.

Now, in the present case, the translations not being in the hands of the

Tribunal or of all the prosecutors, it has been impossible for the

prosecutors to make their objections and impossible for the Tribunal to

rule upon the admissibility of the documents. Therefore, it is natural

that the Prosecution have objected to the Defense reading from documents

which they had not seen.

The Tribunal understands that the translations of these documents of Dr.

Horn’s will be ready tomorrow. They hope, therefore, that the order

which I have just read will be able to be carried out tomorrow, and they

propose for the present, and if the order is reasonably and fairly

carried out by Defense Counsel, to adhere to it. They would draw the

attention of the defendants’ counsel again to the first paragraph of the

order and would remind them that they must adhere strictly to that

order:

“The documents having been translated into the four languages

may be introduced without being read, but in introducing them

counsel may summarize them, or otherwise call their relevance to

the attention of the Court and may read such brief passages as

are strictly relevant and are deemed important.”

In that connection I would add: “and are not cumulative”.

The Tribunal cannot sit here and have three or four hundred documents

read to them and commented upon and argued, and therefore it is

absolutely essential in the opinion of the Tribunal that counsel must

summarize briefly and indicate the relevance of the documents briefly

and read only such passages as are really strictly relevant and are not

cumulative.

The Tribunal are prepared to adhere to that rule, as I say, if counsel

will adhere strictly to it themselves, and they think if Dr. Horn will

state, after offering the documents either in one complete bulk or in a

group or in groups, the relevancy of each group and confine himself to

the reading of only passages which are really necessary to be read in

order to understand the documents, that will be satisfactory to them.

But they cannot sit here to hear either each of those documents offered

in evidence by its number or to hear a short speech or even a longer

speech about the relevancy of each of the documents or to hear passages

read from each of those documents. The number of documents is very great

and it is impossible for the Tribunal to carry on an expeditious trial

unless the rule which they have laid down is interpreted in the way in

which I have indicated.

As I have already indicated in the emphasis which I threw upon the

words, this rule was expressly made for the present and unless it is

marked by the Defense Counsel in a reasonable way the rule will be

altered.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 28 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

NINETY-THIRD DAY

Thursday, 28 March 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. HORN: In accordance with the request of the Tribunal, I am now

presenting in groups the documents not yet named, as follows:

First of all, the group concerning the Polish question. In my document

book, you will find a document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 200 (Document

Number Ribbentrop-200) which I am submitting to the Tribunal for

judicial notice. In this document, Prime Minister Chamberlain, in a

letter to Hitler dated 22 August 1939, defines his attitude regarding

the basis for conflict between Germany and Poland. In this connection he

emphasizes the question of minorities as one of the main causes of the

conflict. As proof of the fact that this minority question already

played an important part when the Polish State came into being, I refer

to the document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 72 (Document Number

Ribbentrop-72), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. This

contains observations by the German Peace Delegation on the peace

conditions.

In a further document—Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 74 (Document Number

Ribbentrop-74), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice—the

President of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers,

Clemenceau, once again draws the attention of the Polish Prime Minister,

Paderewski, to this problem. May I offer as proof...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I want to explain the position of the

Prosecution.

We have not yet received these documents, and therefore we are in the

position that we have been able to make only a tentative selection of

those to which we object. All this book of documents has been objected

to as far as we know. I want only to make it clear that we are

admitting, without protest, the course taken by Dr. Horn on the basis

which Your Lordship announced yesterday, that he is putting them in _en

bloc_, subject to our right to object formally when we have the

documents.

Therefore it is only right that we must preserve our position, because I

have arranged, and all my colleagues agree, that there should be

objections to a number of these documents on our present state of

knowledge.

DR. HORN: May I ask Your Lordship to hear me for a moment?

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to say something? Were you going to add

something to what Sir David had said?

DR. HORN: In view of the objections raised by the Prosecution I request

that a general ruling be made now as to whether the Defense have to

submit to disadvantages arising out of technical deficiencies and for

which they are not responsible, and whether our already limited

presentation of evidence shall be made practically impossible by our

being unable to discuss even in a general way, documentary material with

the Prosecution and the Tribunal.

May I ask, therefore, that the presentation of documents in their

shortened form, as requested by the Tribunal yesterday, be postponed

until the document books are available.

THE PRESIDENT: The difficulty seems entirely to arise from the fact that

your document books are not ready. That is what causes the difficulty.

If the document books had been ready and had been submitted to the

Prosecution, the Prosecution would be in a position to object to them.

That is the reason why Sir David is objecting in this provisional form.

But if you have witnesses whom you are going to call, why do you not

call them while your books are being got ready? That seems to the

Tribunal to be the obvious course.

Call your witnesses and then we can have the documents introduced at a

later stage, when we can see them. That is the only reasonable course

and why you do not adopt it I do not know.

DR. HORN: An officer of the Translation Division informed me recently,

that he is not in a position, with the personnel at his disposal, to

catch up with translations. That is the cause of the trouble and it is

beyond my control. I submitted the documents in good time for

translation.

THE PRESIDENT: That was not the point I was dealing with. Perhaps the

interpretation did not come through correctly.

What I said was that if you have witnesses whom you propose to call, why

do you not call them now?

DR. HORN: I had intended to call the witnesses in the course of my

presentation of documents and in accordance with the groups of questions

on which witnesses could make statements.

THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you had, but as your documents are not here to

be presented to the Court, then you must get on, and the only way to get

on with your case is to call your witnesses.

DR. HORN: In that case, may I ask for 5 minutes so that I can have a

short conversation with a woman witness and then I shall call her?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. Wait one moment.

Yes, Mr. Dodd?

MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I would not begrudge any counsel 5

minutes. This woman witness has been here for a long time. She stood

outside all day yesterday. I think Dr. Horn has talked to her before. He

has had ample opportunity to confer with her. He knew he was going to

call her; he asked this Court for permission to call her. I think we are

faced here with almost a one-man filibuster at this time.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the witness must be called at

once.

DR. HORN: In that case I wish to have Fräulein Blank called as a

witness.

[_The witness Blank took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?

MARGARETE BLANK (Witness): My name is Margarete Blank.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. HORN: When did you first meet Herr Von Ribbentrop?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: I met him at the beginning of November 1934 in Berlin,

when he was delegate for disarmament questions.

DR. HORN: When did you become secretary of the former Foreign Minister

Von Ribbentrop?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: On 1 November 1934 I was engaged as secretary in the

Ribbentrop office. His personal secretary gave notice and, as her

successor did not turn up, Von Ribbentrop asked me whether I was willing

to take the post. I said “yes” and became his personal secretary on 1

February 1935.

DR. HORN: What was Von Ribbentrop’s attitude towards Hitler?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge Herr Von Ribbentrop always showed

the greatest admiration and veneration for Adolf Hitler. To enjoy the

Führer’s confidence, to justify it by his conduct and work was his chief

aim, to which he devoted all his efforts. To achieve this aim no

sacrifice was too great. In carrying out the tasks set him by the Führer

he showed utter disregard for his own person. When speaking of Hitler to

his subordinates he did so with the greatest admiration. Appreciation of

his services by the Führer, as for instance the award of the Golden

Party Badge of Honor, the recognition of his accomplishments in a

Reichstag speech, a letter on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday,

full of appreciation and praise, meant to him the highest recompense for

his unlimited devotion.

DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop adhered to Hitler’s views even if

he himself was of a different opinion?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: What I just said shows that in cases of differences of

opinion between himself and the Führer, Herr Von Ribbentrop subordinated

his own opinion to that of the Führer. Once a decision had been made by

Adolf Hitler there was no more criticism afterwards. Before his

subordinates Herr Von Ribbentrop presented the Führer’s views as if they

were his own. If the Führer expressed his will, it was always equivalent

to a military order.

DR. HORN: To what do you attribute this attitude?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: I attribute it first of all to Ribbentrop’s view that

the Führer was the only person capable of making the right political

decisions.

Secondly, I attribute it to the fact that Herr Von Ribbentrop, as the

son of an officer and as a former officer himself, having taken the oath

of allegiance to the Führer, felt himself bound in loyalty and

considered himself a soldier, so to say, who had to carry out orders

given him, and not to criticize or change them.

DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Ribbentrop having tendered his

resignation several times?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, that happened several times. But about such

personal matters Ribbentrop would not speak to his subordinates. I

remember only the resignation handed in by him in 1941. I assume that

this resignation, as well as the later ones, was tendered by a

handwritten letter. The reason for this resignation lay in differences

with other departments as to competency; in view of their encroachments

upon the competence of the Foreign Office, Herr Von Ribbentrop felt he

could no longer take responsibility for the Reich’s foreign policy.

DR. HORN: What was the result of these offers to resign?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: They were turned down.

DR. HORN: Were you with Von Ribbentrop while he was Ambassador in

England?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes.

DR. HORN: Is it true that Ribbentrop over a number of years worked for

close alliance between Germany and England?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. For this reason Von Ribbentrop, in the summer of

1936, asked the Führer to send him as ambassador to England. The Naval

Agreement of 1935 was only a first step. Subsequently an air pact was

contemplated, but, for reasons unknown to me, was not concluded.

DR. HORN: Do you know anything about Von Ribbentrop’s views on the

British theory of balance of power on the continent?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: From numerous statements by Ribbentrop I know he was of

the opinion that England still adhered to her traditional balance of

power policy. In this his ideas were opposed to those of the Führer, who

was of the opinion that with the development of Russia a factor had

arisen in the East which necessitated a revision of the old balance of

power policy—in other words, that England had a vital interest in the

steadily increasing strength of Germany. From Ribbentrop’s attitude it

could be inferred that he expected that in the Polish crisis the English

guarantee for Poland would be honored.

DR. HORN: What political aims did Von Ribbentrop want to achieve by the

conclusion of the Tripartite Pact?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Tripartite Pact was to be a pact for the limitation

of war.

DR. HORN: Do you know whether Ribbentrop endeavored to keep America out

of the war?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, the Tripartite Pact was signed with this end in

view.

DR. HORN: And now another set of questions. What was Herr Von

Ribbentrop’s attitude in church questions?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: As far as I can judge, his attitude in church questions

was very tolerant.

To my knowledge, he left the Church already in the twenties, but in this

respect he exercised no pressure or influence on his personnel or,

rather, he did not bother about it at all. His tolerance went even so

far that in 1935 he let his two eldest children have their wish and

rejoin the Church. His tolerance in personal questions of religion was

in line with his political attitude towards the Church. In this

connection I remember Von Ribbentrop’s sending the Führer a fundamental

memorandum in which he advocated a tolerant church policy. In the winter

of 1944 he received Bishop Heckel to discuss church matters with him. On

the occasion of a journey to Rome in 1941 or 1942, he paid a long visit

to the Pope.

DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop of an introspective and secluded character, or

was he not?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, although I was his personal secretary for 10 years,

I hardly ever saw him in a communicative mood. His time and thoughts

were so completely occupied by his work, to which he devoted himself

wholeheartedly, that there was no room for anything private. Apart from

his wife and children there was nobody with whom Von Ribbentrop was on

terms of close friendship. This, however, did not prevent him from

having the welfare of his subordinates at heart and from showing them

generosity, particularly in time of need.

DR. HORN: Is it true that you often felt that there were certain

differences of opinion between Ribbentrop and Hitler?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. True to his attitude, which I mentioned before, Von

Ribbentrop never discussed such differences with his subordinates, but I

do remember distinctly that there were times when such differences

surely did exist. At such times the Führer refused for weeks to receive

Herr Von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop suffered physically and mentally under

such a state of affairs.

DR. HORN: Was Ribbentrop independent in the attainment of the goals of

his foreign policy, or was he bound by orders and directives of the

Führer?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Ribbentrop often used the phrase that he was only the

minister responsible for carrying out the Führer’s foreign policy. By

this he meant that, in formulating his policy, he was not independent.

In addition, even in carrying out the directives given him by the

Führer, he was to a large extent bound by instructions from Hitler.

Thus, for instance, the daily reports of a purely informative nature

transmitted by the liaison officer, Ambassador Hewel, between the

Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Führer were often accompanied by

requests for the Führer’s decision on individual questions and by draft

telegrams containing instructions to the heads of missions abroad.

DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop suffer by the fact that, although he was

responsible for foreign policy, he was not allowed to direct it?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: He never complained about it in my presence, but I had

the feeling that he did suffer.

DR. HORN: What was Hitler’s attitude toward the Foreign Office?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: The Führer saw in the Foreign Office a body of ossified

red-tape civil servants, more or less untouched by National Socialism. I

gathered from men of his entourage, that he often made fun of the

Foreign Office. He considered it to be the home of reaction and

defeatism.

DR. HORN: In what way did Ribbentrop try to bring the Foreign Office

closer to Hitler?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: When taking over the Foreign Office in February 1938,

Herr Von Ribbentrop intended to carry out a thorough reshuffle of the

entire German diplomatic service. He also intended to make basic changes

in the training of young diplomats. These plans did not go beyond the

initial stage because of the war. In the course of the war they were

taken up again when the question of new blood for the Foreign Office

became acute. Ribbentrop’s anxiety to counteract the Führer’s animosity

towards the Foreign Office led him to fill some of the posts of heads of

missions abroad, not with professional diplomats, but with tried SA and

SS leaders.

DR. HORN: What were Ribbentrop’s views and intentions regarding Russia?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: His intentions regarding Russia were shown by the

Non-aggression Pact of August 1939, and the Trade Agreement of September

1939.

DR. HORN: Do you know that, in addition to the Non-aggression Pact and

the Trade Agreement, a further agreement was concluded in Moscow?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, there was an additional secret agreement.

GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! It appears to me that the witness who has

been called to attend the present sitting of the Tribunal is, by the

very nature of her position as secretary to the former Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, able to testify only to the personality of

the defendant, to his way of life, to the reticence or frankness of his

character, and so forth. But the witness is quite incompetent to pass an

opinion on matters pertaining to agreements, foreign policy, _et

cetera_. In this sense I consider the questions of the Defense

absolutely inadmissible and request that they be withdrawn.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, that is the same matter that is raised, is it

not, upon the affidavit of Dr. Gaus? I mean, you said that you were

going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gaus which dealt with a secret

agreement between—can’t you hear me? I beg your pardon. I ought to have

said that Dr. Seidl was going to produce an affidavit of Dr. Gaus with

reference to this alleged agreement. That is right, is it not?

DR. HORN: I assume so, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Soviet Prosecutor objected to that agreement being

referred to until the affidavit should be admitted, until it had been

seen. Well, now, is the agreement in writing?

DR. HORN: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Is the alleged agreement between the Soviet Government

and Germany in writing?

DR. HORN: Yes. It was put down in writing, but I am not in possession of

a copy of the agreement, and I should therefore like to ask the

Tribunal, in case the decision depends on the affidavit of Ambassador

Gaus, to allow me to obtain, at the appropriate time, an affidavit from

Fräulein Blank who saw the original. Would Your Lordship be agreeable to

that?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you a copy of the agreement itself?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, there are only two copies of this agreement.

One copy was left in Moscow on 23 August 1939. The other copy was taken

to Berlin by Von Ribbentrop. According to an announcement in the press

all the archives of the Foreign Office were confiscated by the Soviet

troops. May I, therefore, request that the Soviet Government or the

Soviet Delegation be asked to submit to the Tribunal the original of the

agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: I asked you a question, Dr. Seidl. I did not ask you for

an argument. I asked you whether you have a copy of that agreement

available.

DR. SEIDL: I, myself, am not in possession of a copy of the agreement.

The affidavit of Ambassador Gaus only states the contents of the secret

agreement. He was able to give the contents of the secret agreement

because he drafted it. The secret agreement, as drafted by Ambassador

Gaus, was signed by Foreign Commissar Molotov and Herr Von Ribbentrop.

That is all I have to say.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I wish to make the following statement:

With regard to what was mentioned here by Defense Counsel Seidl, about

the agreement allegedly seized by Soviet troops in connection with the

capture of the archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—that is,

the agreement concluded in Moscow in August 1939—I would draw the

attention of the Defense Counsel, to the newspaper in which this

agreement, the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, was

published. That is a known fact.

Insofar as other agreements are concerned, the Soviet Prosecution

considers that Dr. Seidl’s application for the incorporation into the

record of affidavits by Friedrich Gaus should be denied, and for the

following reasons:

Gaus’ testimony on this pact and on the history immediately preceding

the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact is irrelevant. The presentation

of such affidavits, which, moreover, do not shed a true light on events,

can be looked upon only as an act of provocation. This is clearly borne

out by the fact that Ribbentrop himself repudiated this witness even

though his affidavits describe Ribbentrop’s activities, even though

Defense Counsel for Hess has accepted testimonies from this witness and

applied for their incorporation into the record, despite the fact that

they contain no reference to Hess. On the strength of these

considerations, of these circumstances, I request the Tribunal to reject

the request made by Defense Counsel Seidl and to consider the question

submitted by Defense Counsel Horn as being irrelevant to the matter

under our consideration.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl? Do you want to say something?

DR. SEIDL: May I add something? The translation of what the Soviet

Prosecutor has just said has come through incompletely. I could not make

out whether General Rudenko wanted to deny altogether that such an

agreement was concluded or whether he wanted only to state that the

contents of this secret agreement are not relevant.

In the first case, I repeat my application that the Soviet Foreign

Commissar Molotov be called and interrogated before this Tribunal; in

the latter case, I ask to be given the opportunity here and now to

submit to the Tribunal my points regarding the relevance of this secret

agreement.

THE PRESIDENT: At the moment we are considering an objection to the

evidence of this witness, so we won’t trouble with that.

The Tribunal will adjourn for a few moments.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal desires to point out to Counsel for the

Defense, that there was no mention of this alleged treaty in his

application for evidence to be given by the witness now in the witness

box, but as the matter has now been raised the Tribunal rules that the

witness may be questioned upon the matter.

DR. HORN: [_To the witness._] You were speaking about the secret

agreement. How did you come to know about the conclusion of this

agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: I am told that what I said was wrongly translated into

the Russian language. At any rate, I don’t know whether it was rightly

translated into the German language; but what I said was that the

witness may be questioned, not that the witness may not be questioned.

Is that clear to you?

DR. HORN: Thank you. I understood the question correctly.

[_Turning to the witness._] Taking up your previous statement about the

secret agreement I should like to ask you how you came to know about the

conclusion of this agreement?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Owing to illness, I could not accompany Von Ribbentrop

on his two trips to Russia. I was also absent when the preparatory work

for the agreements was being done. I learned of the existence of this

secret agreement through a special sealed envelope which, according to

instructions, was filed separately and bore an inscription something

like “German-Russian secret or additional agreement.”

DR. HORN: You were also responsible for filing separately these secret

matters? Is this correct?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes.

DR. HORN: I should like to turn now to another group of questions. Did

Von Ribbentrop endeavor to keep the pact with Russia in any case?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Having signed the German-Russian pacts, Von Ribbentrop

was, of course, interested in their being kept. Moreover, he realized

fully the great danger a German-Russian war would mean for Germany;

accordingly he informed and warned the Führer. For this very purpose, as

far as I recall, Embassy Counsellor Hilger from Moscow and Ambassador

Schnurre were called to Berchtesgaden to report. Also, in the spring of

1941 Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg was again ordered to report,

to back up and to corroborate and reinforce Herr Von Ribbentrop’s

warnings to the Führer.

DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop was informed beforehand of

Hitler’s intent to attach Austria to the Reich?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: At the time of the German march into Austria, Ambassador

Von Ribbentrop, who in February had been appointed Foreign Minister, was

in London on his farewell visit. There he heard to his surprise of the

Anschluss of Austria. He himself had had a different idea of a solution

of the Austria question, namely an economic union.

DR. HORN: Do you know whether Von Ribbentrop made repeated efforts to

end the war by diplomatic methods?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. One of his moves was to send Minister Professor

Berber to Switzerland in the winter of 1943-1944. Later on these moves

were intensified by sending Herr Von Schmieden to Bern and Dr. Hesse to

Stockholm. As the Führer had not given official authority to initiate

negotiations, it was possible only to try to find out on what conditions

discussions might be opened between Germany and the Allies. Similar

missions were entrusted to the German Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid,

Minister Von Bibra, Consul General Möllhausen in Lisbon, and the

Ambassador to the Vatican, Von Weizsäcker. A former member of the Office

Ribbentrop living in Madrid was instructed to make a similar attempt

with the British Government.

On 20 April Von Ribbentrop dictated to me a detailed memorandum for the

Führer in which he asked for official authorization to initiate

negotiations. I do not know the outcome of this request because I left

Berlin.

DR. HORN: In the course of your duties did you get to know what Hitler’s

basic attitude to this question was?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: From what I heard from men of his entourage I know that

the Führer did not expect much of it, or that he would have been in

favor of initiating negotiations only at a time of military successes.

If and when, however, there were military successes, he was likewise

against diplomatic initiative. As to the mission of Dr. Hesse—after its

failure, he, it was disclosed by an indiscretion, remarked that he had

not expected much of it anyway.

DR. HORN: Just one more question: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop was

notified of the impending invasion of Norway and Denmark only a very

short time before this action?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes, just a few days previously.

DR. HORN: Have you heard anything to the effect that Von Ribbentrop was

of the opinion England would fight for Poland?

FRÄULEIN BLANK: Yes. In line with his view that England would adhere to

the old balance of power policy, he was of the opinion that England

would honor her guarantee to Poland.

DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any

questions of this witness? [_There was no response._] Do the

Prosecution?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have very carefully

considered this matter. They hope that the Tribunal will not hold it

against them that they accept everything that this witness says, but

they feel that all the matters could be more conveniently put to the

defendant himself, and therefore they do not intend to cross-examine.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the Tribunal has permitted the question

concerning the secret agreement to be put to the witness. The witness

knew only of the existence of this agreement, not its contents.

May I please be told whether the admission of this question to the

witness is to be considered as implying the decision by the Tribunal on

the admissibility of Ambassador Gaus’ affidavit, and whether I might now

be given the opportunity of reading an excerpt from this affidavit?

THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been submitted to the Prosecution?

DR. SEIDL: Last Monday—that is, 3 days ago—I submitted six copies of

the affidavit to the Translation Division or to Lieutenant Schrader of

the Defendants’ Information Center. I assume that in the meantime, since

3 days have elapsed, the Prosecution have received a copy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution have not received the

copies. I have not seen the affidavit yet. Neither has my friend Mr.

Dodd, nor have my other colleagues, General Rudenko, or M. Champetier de

Ribes.

THE PRESIDENT: Then I think we had better wait until the document is in

the hands of the Prosecution, then it can be considered.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything in my power to

furnish the Prosecution with the affidavit. I have no influence on the

General Secretary’s business, and I should be obliged if the Tribunal

would assist in this matter.

THE PRESIDENT: Nobody has said that you have done anything wrong about

it, Dr. Seidl.

Yes, Dr. Horn.

DR. HORN: As my next witness I should like to call Minister Paul

Schmidt.

[_The witness Schmidt took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?

DR. PAUL OTTO SCHMIDT (Witness): Schmidt is my name.

THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?

SCHMIDT: Dr. Paul Otto Schmidt.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

DR. HORN: Witness, you took part in some of the decisive discussions

between the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, and members of the

Reich Government before the outbreak of war. Is it correct that you were

present at the conference on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von

Ribbentrop and the British Ambassador?

[_There was a pause in proceedings._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until a quarter to 2.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1345 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. HORN: Witness, is it correct that you were present at the conference

on 30 August 1939 between the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the British

Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson?

SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.

DR. HORN: Where did that conference take place?

SCHMIDT: It took place in the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs

in the Foreign Office in Berlin.

DR. HORN: In what capacity did you take part in that conference?

SCHMIDT: I took part in that conference as interpreter and recorder.

DR. HORN: Since when had you been employed in this capacity in the

Foreign Office and for whom did you work?

SCHMIDT: I had been working in the Foreign Office as interpreter for

conferences since 1923, and in this capacity I interpreted for all

foreign ministers, from Stresemann to Von Ribbentrop, as well as for a

number of German Reich Chancellors such as Hermann Müller, Marx,

Brüning, Hitler, and for other cabinet members and delegates who

represented Germany at international conferences. In other words, I

participated as interpreter in all international conferences at which

Germany was represented since 1923.

DR. HORN: Did you have the opportunity to act as interpreter during the

discussion between Ribbentrop and Sir Nevile Henderson?

SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that opportunity as the discussion was

conducted in German.

DR. HORN: Was Ambassador Henderson able to speak German fluently?

SCHMIDT: Ambassador Henderson’s knowledge of German was rather good, but

not perfect. Hence it could happen that in moments of excitement he did

not quite understand certain points, as is proved by an incident which

occurred during the conference just mentioned; and it was not always

easy for him to express himself in German; but when speaking to Germans

he usually preferred to conduct these discussions in German.

DR. HORN: In the course of the conference Herr Von Ribbentrop read out

to Henderson a memorandum containing the German proposals for a

settlement of the questions pending between Germany and Poland. And now

I am asking you, Witness, did Henderson ask you during that discussion

to translate to him the contents of the memorandum Ribbentrop had read

out?

SCHMIDT: No, he did not do that.

DR. HORN: Did you get the impression from his attitude that Sir Nevile

Henderson had fully understood the contents of the memorandum?

SCHMIDT: That is, of course, very hard to say. You cannot tell what goes

on inside a person’s mind, but I doubt whether he understood the

document in all its details.

DR. HORN: Did Ribbentrop, when he read out the document to Sir Nevile

Henderson, give him any explanations?

SCHMIDT: Yes, while reading out the document the Foreign Minister now

and then commented to Henderson about some points which might not have

been quite clear.

DR. HORN: Did Sir Nevile Henderson himself ask for such explanations?

SCHMIDT: No, Sir Nevile Henderson sat and listened to the document being

read out and the comments which were made.

DR. HORN: What atmosphere prevailed during that conference?

SCHMIDT: The atmosphere during that conference was, I think I can say,

somewhat charged with electricity. Both participants were extremely

nervous. Henderson was very uneasy; and never before, and perhaps only

once afterwards, have I seen the Foreign Minister so nervous as he was

during that conference. An incident which occurred during the first part

of the discussion can perhaps serve to illustrate the atmosphere. The

matter under discussion was the specifying of all the points Germany had

against Poland and her government, and the Foreign Minister had done

that in all details and concluded with the words: “So you see, Sir

Nevile Henderson, the situation is damned serious.” When Sir Nevile

Henderson heard those words, “damned serious” he started up, half raised

himself and pointing a warning finger at the Foreign Minister said: “You

have just said ‘damned.’ That is not the language of a statesman in so

serious a situation.”

THE PRESIDENT: To what charge in the Indictment is this relevant?

DR. HORN: To the point in the Indictment that on 30 August 1939, Von

Ribbentrop read out the memorandum, the decisive memorandum, so quickly

that Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson was not able to grasp its contents

and transmit it to his government and have it forwarded to the Polish

Government in order to continue negotiations between Germany and Poland.

England at that time had offered her good offices as intermediary

between both governments. Germany on the basis...

THE PRESIDENT: Which passage of the Indictment are you referring to? You

may be right, I do not know. I only want to know which passage in the

Indictment you are referring to.

DR. HORN: I am referring to the preparation of, that is, to the failure

to prevent aggressive war for which Ribbentrop is indicted as a

co-conspirator.

THE PRESIDENT: That is on Page 9, is it not, from (F) 4? There is

nothing about the way in which this document was handed over to Sir

Nevile Henderson. Presumably you have got the Indictment. Where is it in

the Indictment?

DR. HORN: It has been presented by the Prosecution and it has also been

presented in the House of Commons where Chamberlain insisted that

Ribbentrop had read it out so rapidly that it was impossible to grasp

the contents and transmit them through diplomatic channels, which

England had expressly offered to do. Thus the Defendant Von Ribbentrop

is directly indicted for having prevented this last chance of further

negotiations with Poland. The statement of the witness will prove that

the Defendant Von Ribbentrop cannot be charged with this.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, you made the point that it was read in

that way. There is no charge about it in the Indictment at all. It may

be that the Prosecution referred to it in the course of the history. You

have made the point, surely it is not necessary to go on at length about

it.

DR. HORN: In that case may I proceed?

[_Turning to the witness._] Then you had the impression that both these

statesmen were extremely agitated?

SCHMIDT: Yes, I did have that impression.

DR. HORN: To what causes do you attribute this agitation?

SCHMIDT: To the tension which prevailed during the negotiations, to the

numerous conferences which had taken place almost without interruption

during the preceding days and which had made considerable demands upon

the nerves of all participants.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, as Sir Nevile Henderson

maintains in his book, said in the worst possible language that he would

never ask the Polish Ambassador to call on him?

SCHMIDT: That I cannot remember. The Foreign Minister merely said that

he could receive the Polish Ambassador for negotiations or discussions

only if he came to him with the necessary authority to negotiate.

DR. HORN: Ambassador Lipski did not have that authority?

SCHMIDT: He answered a question respecting this, put to him by the

Foreign Minister when Ambassador Lipski was with him with an emphatic

“no.” He said he had no authority.

DR. HORN: Thereupon, Ribbentrop declared to Sir Nevile Henderson that he

could not receive the ambassador, is that right?

SCHMIDT: No. I was speaking about a conference which the Foreign

Minister had with the Polish Ambassador in the course of which the

latter was asked whether he had authority to negotiate. To this he

replied “no,” whereupon the Foreign Minister said that in this case

naturally no conversation could take place.

DR. HORN: Then Von Ribbentrop did not hand the memorandum which we

mentioned previously to Sir Nevile Henderson. Did you have the

impression that Ribbentrop did not submit the text of the ultimatum to

Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson because he did not wish to or because he

was not allowed to do so?

SCHMIDT: It is difficult for me to give a clear-cut answer to this

question as I was not present at the preliminary discussions which

Hitler doubtless had with the Foreign Minister regarding that point

before the conference with the British Ambassador. I, therefore, have to

rely on the impressions I got during the conference with the British

Ambassador; and from these I can draw my conclusions as to the

instructions Hitler may have given the Foreign Minister for this

conference. In this connection I can say the following:

When Henderson requested that the document containing the German

proposals be submitted to him, the Foreign Minister said: “No, I cannot

give you the document.” These are the words he used. This of course was

a somewhat unusual procedure because normally Sir Nevile Henderson had

the right to expect that a document which had just been read out would

be handed to him. I myself was rather surprised at the Foreign

Minister’s answer and looked up because I thought I had misunderstood. I

looked at the Foreign Minister and heard him say for the second time: “I

cannot give you the document.” But I saw that this matter caused him

some discomfort and that he must have been aware of the rather difficult

position in which he found himself by this answer, because an uneasy

smile played on his lips when he said in a quiet voice to Sir Nevile

Henderson these words, “I cannot give you the document.” Then I looked

at Sir Nevile Henderson as I of course expected him to ask me to

translate the document, but this request was not forthcoming. I looked

at Henderson rather invitingly, since I wanted to translate the

document, knowing how extraordinarily important a quick and complete

transmission of its contents to the British Government was. If I had

been asked to translate I would have done so quite slowly, almost at

dictation speed, in order to enable the British Ambassador in this

roundabout way to take down not merely the general outline of the German

proposal, but all its details and transmit them to his Government. But

Sir Nevile Henderson did not react even to my glance so that the

discussion soon came to an end and events took their course.

DR. HORN: Did you, on the morning of 3 September 1939, receive the

British ultimatum to the German Government?

SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.

DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this ultimatum?

SCHMIDT: On the morning of the 3rd, at about 2 or 3 o’clock, the British

Embassy telephoned the Reich Chancellery, where I was still present with

the Foreign Minister in order to be available for possible conferences,

to give the information that the British Ambassador had received

instructions from his government, according to which, at exactly 9

o’clock, he was to make an important announcement on behalf of the

British Government to the Foreign Minister. He therefore asked to be

received by Herr Von Ribbentrop at that time. He was given the reply

that Ribbentrop himself would not be available but that a member of the

Foreign Office, namely I, would be authorized to receive the British

Government’s announcement from the British Ambassador on his behalf.

Thus it happened that at 9 o’clock in the morning I received the British

Ambassador in Ribbentrop’s office. When I asked him to be seated

Henderson refused and while still standing he read to me the well-known

ultimatum of the British Government to the German Government, according

to which, unless certain conditions were fulfilled by Germany, the

British Government would consider themselves at war with Germany at 11

o’clock that morning.

After we had exchanged a few words of farewell, I took the document to

the Reich Chancellery.

DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this document there?

SCHMIDT: In the Reich Chancellery I gave it to Hitler, that is to say, I

found Hitler in his office in conference with the Foreign Minister and I

translated the document into German for him. When I had completed my

translation, there was at first silence.

DR. HORN: Was Hitler alone in the room?

SCHMIDT: No, as I said before, he was in his office with the Foreign

Minister. And when I had completed my translation, both gentlemen were

absolutely silent for about a minute. I could clearly see that this

development did not suit them at all. For a while Hitler sat in his

chair deep in thought and stared somewhat worriedly into space. Then he

broke the silence with a rather abrupt question to the Foreign Minister,

saying, “What shall we do now?” Thereupon they began to discuss the next

diplomatic steps to be taken, whether this or that ambassador should be

called, _et cetera_. I, of course, left the room since I had nothing

more to do. When I entered the anteroom, I found assembled there—or

rather I had already seen on my way in—some Cabinet members and higher

officials, to whose questioning looks—they knew I had seen the British

Ambassador—I had said only that there would be no second Munich. When I

came out again, I saw by their anxious faces that my remark had been

correctly interpreted. When I then told them that I had just handed a

British ultimatum to Hitler, a heavy silence fell on the room. The faces

suddenly grew rather serious. I still remember that Göring, for

instance, who was standing in front of me, turned round to me and said,

“If we lose this war, then God help us.” Goebbels was standing in a

corner by himself and had a very serious, not to say depressed,

expression. This depressing atmosphere prevailed over all those present,

and it naturally lives in my memory as something most remarkable for the

frame of mind prevailing in the anteroom of the Reich Chancellery on the

first day of the war.

DR. HORN: So you did not have the impression, then, that these men

expected a declaration of war?

SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that impression.

DR. HORN: Witness, were you in a position to observe how Ribbentrop

reacted to the news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor?

SCHMIDT: I had no direct opportunity, but in the Foreign Office it was

generally known that the news of Pearl Harbor took the Foreign Minister,

as indeed the whole Foreign Office, completely by surprise. This

impression was confirmed by what a member of the Press Department told

me. The Press Department had a listening station for radio news and the

official on duty had instructions to inform the Foreign Minister

personally of important news at once. When the first news of Pearl

Harbor was received by the listening station of the Press Department,

the official on duty considered it of sufficient importance to report it

to his chief, that is to say, the head of the Press Department, who in

turn was to pass it on to the Foreign Minister. He was, however—so I

was told—rather harshly rebuffed by the Foreign Minister who said it

must be an invention of the press or a canard, and he did not wish our

Press Department to disturb him with such stories. After that, a second

and third message about Pearl Harbor was received, I think a Reuters

report had also been received by the listening station; and the head of

the Press Department then again plucked up courage and, in spite of the

order not to disturb the Foreign Minister, he once more gave him this

news.

THE PRESIDENT: This evidence seems to be utterly uninteresting and

irrelevant to the Tribunal.

DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop is accused also of having prepared aggressive

war against the United States of America.

THE PRESIDENT: What you were telling was the reactions of the press.

What have we got to do with the reactions of the press?