this organization, referred to in this letter, set up to control the
organization of anti-Jewish work abroad? That is the question. Can you
not answer that by “yes” or “no”?
VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office could not exercise general control
since all anti-Jewish questions were principally dealt with in
Rosenberg’s office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well then, what was the purpose of this organization of
the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: By Hitler’s order we had to contact all German
departments and archives in order to collect all the material there, and
we attached importance...
COL. PHILLIMORE: And this was ordered by Ribbentrop, wasn’t it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: As set out in your letter?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. And we thought it important that we get an idea in
this way of what was actually happening to the Jews, _et cetera_, and
therefore we drew in people from all offices.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you in a minute what was actually happening
and out of your own files, but I just want to put this to you:
The point of your putting off the anti-Jewish congress was simply
because you did not want the world to know. You had not the slightest
objection to setting up an anti-Jewish organization in Germany.
Now, will you look at Page 32 of the German text.
My Lord, that is on Page 23 of the English text.
You will see there a letter from Rosenberg’s office to the Foreign
Office, signed by Bräutigam, Page 32 of the German text. It is marked at
the bottom of Page 32.
Bräutigam was your liaison officer with Rosenberg, wasn’t he, Witness?
Was Bräutigam your liaison officer in Rosenberg’s office?
VON STEENGRACHT: No. Bräutigam was, I think, in the Foreign Office in
1941.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And in 1942.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but in 1941, since he had previously been working
on Eastern problems in the Foreign Office, he had been transferred and
was now in the Rosenberg office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. And you will see there he is referring to a
conference with Obersturmbannführer Eichmann, that is, the chief of the
Jewish section of the Gestapo, and a Dr. Wetzel, and he sends you a copy
of an agreement made at Tighina in Romania on the 30th of August 1941
with the request for acknowledgment.
VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, there could be an error here. This
letter is dated 11 March 1942. I became State Secretary in May 1943. I
therefore know nothing about this matter. I should like to remark...
COL. PHILLIMORE: You just listen and wait until you are asked a
question. We shall get on faster if you just listen to the letter:
“I point out especially Number 7 of the agreements... I have
already taken a position in my letter of 5 March 1942.”
Now, that enclosed an agreement made between the German and Romanian
General Staffs, and, if you will look at Paragraph 7, on Page 38 of the
German, Page 27 of the English, this was the agreement they made:
“Deportation of Jews from Transnistria. Deportation of Jews
across the Bug is not possible at present. They must, therefore,
be collected in concentration camps and set to work until a
deportation to the east is possible after the end of
operations.”
And then there’s a note on the file on the next page of the German,
still on Page 27 of the English:
“According to information from Director General Lecca, today
110,000 Jews are being evacuated from Bukovina and Bessarabia
into two forests in the Bug River Area. As far as he could
learn, this action is based upon an order issued by Marshal
Antonescu. Purpose of the action is the liquidation of these
Jews.”
Now, do you doubt that that agreement, enclosed with that letter sent to
the Foreign Office, would have reached the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Well. I see this document and this agreement for the
first time today. Nothing of this entire affair...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Would you answer the question? Do you doubt that
that letter and that agreement enclosed with it would have been shown to
the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time there was an Under Secretary of State
Luther in the Foreign Office who acted quite independently; and I fought
a bitter battle against him although I was not called upon to do it,
because he wanted to introduce National Socialist methods. Whether he
submitted this matter to Ribbentrop or not I cannot decide.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. We come to a time when you were the State
Secretary. Would you look at Page 31 of the German text, Page 20 of the
English.
THE PRESIDENT: What do the words that follow the passage you have just
read mean on Page 27: “Bucharest, 17 October 1941 (Signature
illegible)”—and below—“To be discussed with Vice Minister President
Antonescu. Confidential, Bucharest, 16 October 1943”?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is badly typed. “Bucharest, 17 October
1943” and then follows the next letter. The previous part is a note on
the file.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a note on the German Legation file on Bucharest.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I have not troubled the Tribunal with the following
letters. They deal with the earlier date on the expulsion of Jews from
firms owned by citizens of the German Reich.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now would you look at Page 31 of the German,
Page 20 of the English. You will see there a document sent to...
THE PRESIDENT: When you started that document you didn’t give the date
in full. The year there appears to be 1944, doesn’t it?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not. In 1942, I think, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: It should be April 29, 1942? Is the date at the head of
the document?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the letter I read was dated March ’42 and
marked with a foreign office stamp “Received 13th of March 1942...”
THE PRESIDENT: I am speaking of the whole document, Page 1 of the
document.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is a file, one of those rather inconvenient
documents, a file, and it starts with the earliest date at the bottom
and then works up to 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then the part you read first...
COL. PHILLIMORE: That was 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. What page are you going to now?
COL. PHILLIMORE: I was going to Page 20 now, My Lord.
[_Turning to the witness._] Now, this is a communication from Von
Thadden who was, as you have told us, assistant in the Department Inland
II, to the German Legation in Bucharest. It is dated 12 October 1943,
and it is stamped as received on 18 October. And he encloses a letter
signed by Müller in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, to all German police
authorities abroad. You will see that it goes to the commander of the
Security Police in Prague, The Hague, Paris, Brussels, Metz, Strasbourg,
Luxembourg, Kraków, Kiev, Smolensk, and so on. October ’43. That is
after you had become Secretary of State, isn’t it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were appointed in April?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Turning to the substance of the letter, the subject is
the treatment of Jews with foreign citizenship in the sphere of German
power:
“In agreement with the Foreign Office, all Jews who remain in
the sphere of German power after the end of the so-called
home-bringing action and who have the citizenship of the
following countries may now be included in the evacuation
measures: Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden,
Finland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey.
“Since the evacuation of these Jews to the East cannot yet take
place at the present time, for reasons of foreign policy, a
temporary stay is provided in Concentration Camp Buchenwald for
male Jews over 14 years of age and in the Concentration Camp
Ravensbrück for Jewesses and children.
“The necessary measures are to be carried out on the following
dates:
“a) for Jews with Italian citizenship, immediately;
“b) for Jews with Turkish citizenship, on 20 October 1943;
“c) for Jews with citizenship of other countries mentioned
above, on 10 October 1943.
“A special application for protective custody is not required
for the transfer to the concentration camp, but the
concentration camp headquarters are to be notified that the
transfer to the concentration camp is taking place in keeping
with the evacuation measures.”
And then there are arrangements about baggage. And if you look at 31-e,
you will see at the foot of Page 22, on the English, that that had been
signed by Müller and then was signed again by a clerk of Himmler’s
office. And then on the next page of the English, still on 31-e of the
German, Himmler’s office sends it to the Foreign Office, to Von Thadden,
on 2 October.
Now, did you not see that document when it got to the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, I see this document today for the first time.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were the State Secretary?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. This obviously concerns a measure which was
ordered by another office. Within the German Reich the Foreign Office
had no executive powers at all and no possibilities and consequently...
COL. PHILLIMORE: No executive powers, but it was sent to you for
information.
VON STEENGRACHT: That was sent to us, this affair, solely for our
information, and it was not given to me, this affair.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You had a departmental liaison with the SS, a Mr. Von
Thadden. Was he not a competent official?
VON STEENGRACHT: The exact content of this affair I do not even know
now, because I have not read it through at leisure. I can imagine only
the following in reference to this whole matter: The question whether
the Jews who were in Germany could be returned to their home countries
was discussed for a long time. This, I think, is what we are concerned
with here?
COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t think we are interested in your imagination.
Either you know or do not know. I asked you whether Von Thadden was a
competent official.
VON STEENGRACHT: I have not seen this document.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. Was Von Thadden a
competent official?
VON STEENGRACHT: Von Thadden was a man from the Foreign Office who knew
his job.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, knew his job. And do you not think that as State
Secretary he ought to have shown you this document?
VON STEENGRACHT: He should have done that, certainly, if this matter was
not arranged in another office, and I was completely excluded from the
anti-Jewish action. Also instructions about anti-Jewish actions abroad
never went through my office. I pointed out yesterday, at the beginning
of my statement, that many matters were arranged directly in the highest
places, and that the Foreign Office also was not notified afterwards,
and orders in these matters...
COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a document you were informed about?
VON STEENGRACHT: Müller sent it to the Foreign Office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And you sent it to your legation at Bucharest?
VON STEENGRACHT: He ought certainly to have put that before me. But I
did not see it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And if you just look again at the letter, you notice
how Müller’s instructions start. He begins, “In agreement with the
Foreign Office...”
VON STEENGRACHT: Where does it say so? Unfortunately I have not found
it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At the start of the letter: “Subject: Treatment of Jews
of foreign citizenship in the sphere of German power.” And then he
begins: “In agreement with the Foreign Office...” Does that just mean in
agreement with Mr. Von Thadden?
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that this type of thing went to the competent
experts, and since this concerns a basic matter it was put directly
before Herr Von Ribbentrop. I request that Herr Von Ribbentrop should be
asked whether he knows of this matter or not. I have not seen this
matter.
COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a matter of such importance that it could not
have been agreed with the Foreign Office without Ribbentrop being
consulted; isn’t that the case?
VON STEENGRACHT: In my opinion, I would never have decided alone on this
matter if it had been put before me. I am of the opinion that it was an
affair which would have to be put before Von Ribbentrop.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Good. And, of course, Von Ribbentrop was one of the
most ruthless persecutors of Jews, wasn’t he?
VON STEENGRACHT: That is not correct.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I am going to read you a short passage from a
conference between the Führer, Ribbentrop and the Hungarian Regent,
Horthy. This is Document D-736, which was put in as Exhibit GB-283 by
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, to the Defendant Göring. This was a meeting at
Klessheim Castle on the morning of 17 of April 1943. And you see the
minutes are signed by Schmidt.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: The question of Jews was raised:
“The Führer replied that it was the fault of the Jews who
considered hoarding and profiteering as their main sphere of
activity, even during the World War; in exactly the same way as
in England, sentences for rationing offenses, and the like, now
chiefly concern Jews. To Horthy’s counterquestion as to what he
should do with the Jews, now that he had deprived them of almost
all possibilities of livelihood—he could not kill them off—the
Reich Foreign Minister declared that the Jews must either be
exterminated or taken to concentration camps. There was no other
possibility.”
And then, you see, the Führer goes on to describe them as tuberculosis
bacilli. Now, in the face of that document, do you still say that the
Defendant Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution and
extermination of the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday already that Herr Von Ribbentrop, when
he was with Hitler...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Never mind what you said yesterday. I am putting it to
you now, today. You have now seen that document. Do you still say that
Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution and extermination of
the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: Here, too, I should like to make a distinction between
the real instincts of Von Ribbentrop and what he said when he was under
Hitler’s influence. I said already yesterday that he was completely
hypnotized by Hitler and then became his tool.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, became his tool. And from then on, he was prepared
to do anything that Hitler wanted and was as violent a Nazi as anyone;
isn’t that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: He followed blindly the orders given by Hitler.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. And to the extent of conniving at any and every
atrocity, isn’t that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: Since he had no executive powers he personally did not
commit these cruelties.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other chief prosecutors want to
cross-examine?
COL. AMEN: You testified yesterday that you did not consider Ribbentrop
to be a typical Nazi; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you consider Göring to be a typical Nazi?
VON STEENGRACHT: Göring made speeches at every type of meeting and
fought for the seizure of power, and accordingly he had a completely
different position in the party than Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: I think you can answer my question “yes” or “no.” We are
trying to save time as much as possible.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly.
COL. AMEN: Do you consider Göring to be a typical Nazi according to the
same standards that you were using with Ribbentrop, yes or no?
VON STEENGRACHT: This question one cannot answer in that way with “yes”
or “no.” I am trying every...
COL. AMEN: You answered it that way with respect to Ribbentrop, didn’t
you?
VON STEENGRACHT: Göring was a peculiar type of person. I cannot class
him with the ordinary Nazis, as one usually expresses it.
COL. AMEN: In other words, you don’t know whether you think he is a
typical Nazi or not, is that what you want the Tribunal to understand?
VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical Nazi one understands the “average” Nazi.
Göring is a unique person and one cannot compare his manner of living
with the other National Socialists.
COL. AMEN: Well, are you acquainted with all of the gentlemen in the box
there in front of you?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell me which of those individuals you consider
to be a typical Nazi, according to the standards which you applied
yesterday to Ribbentrop?
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I do not want to interrupt your
cross-examination, but want to say that there is too much laughter and
noise in Court, and I cannot have it. Go on, Colonel, with your
cross-examination.
COL. AMEN: Do you understand my last question? Please name those of the
defendants in the box whom you consider to be typical Nazis, on the same
standard which you yesterday applied to Ribbentrop.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I am convinced that here the witness is making
a decision which in my opinion should be made by the Court at the end of
the proceedings. That is an evaluation which the witness cannot make.
COL. AMEN: This is the subject that was brought up by this very Counsel
yesterday with respect to Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it a perfectly proper question. They
understand that the phrase “a typical Nazi” was used by the witness
himself.
COL. AMEN: And please just give us the names and not a long explanation,
if you can.
VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday that by “typical Nazi” I meant people
who are familiar with the dogma and doctrine. I want to add today that
by “typical Nazis” I mean further those people who during the time of
struggle represented National Socialist ideology and were propagandists
of National Socialism. Rosenberg’s book is known, Herr Frank, as
President of the Academy for German Law is known, these are
really—Hess, of course, too—and these are people whom I want to put
into the foreground very particularly because by their writings and so
forth and by their speeches they became known. No one ever heard
Ribbentrop make an election speech.
COL. AMEN: But you are not answering my question. Am I to assume from
that that in your opinion Rosenberg, Frank and Hess are the only persons
whom you could characterize as being typical Nazis, according to your
standards?
VON STEENGRACHT: Well, shall I go through the ranks of the defendants to
give an opinion on each one?
COL. AMEN: Precisely. Just give me the names. No, I do not want your
opinion. I want to know under your standards which of them you consider
to be typical Nazis.
VON STEENGRACHT: I have already stated the standard before. It can be
proved by whether the people unreservedly represented the National
Socialist ideology in words or at meetings and in this respect I named
the prominent ones.
COL. AMEN: And you consider all of the others not to be typical Nazis?
Correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. Then I would have to go through
them individually.
COL. AMEN: I have asked you to do that three times. Will you please name
them individually?
VON STEENGRACHT: I also see Herr Sauckel. Herr Sauckel was Gauleiter and
was active as a leader in the National Socialist movement. Then I see
the Reich Youth Leader, who educated the Hitler Youth.
COL. AMEN: Who else? Just give me the names. Do not give these
explanations, please.
VON STEENGRACHT: Well, I think that with that I have pointed out the
typical representatives of the Party.
COL. AMEN: Well, how about Streicher?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not see him here, or I would have answered in the
affirmative.
COL. AMEN: In other words, you consider him to be a typical Nazi under
your standards?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but please do not attribute his abuses to all
National Socialists.
COL. AMEN: Now, while you were working with Ribbentrop, do I understand
that you knew nothing about the murders, tortures, starvations and
killings which were taking place in the concentration camps?
VON STEENGRACHT: By the fact that foreign diplomats applied to me, and
by the fact that I was informed by opposition elements in Germany, and
from enemy propaganda, I knew of the existence and some of the methods.
But, I emphasize, only a part of the methods. I learned about the total
extent and degree only in internment here.
COL. AMEN: Did you know that priests were being tortured and starved and
killed in concentration camps while you were working with Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, I heard nothing specific regarding individual
things that occurred there, and if that had happened or has happened to
priests, then I would consider the only authentic information to be that
which the Nuncio or the Vatican had given me; but that did not occur.
But in spite of the fact that, as I said yesterday, the Vatican had no
jurisdiction, I took care of all cases based on humanity, that is, all
humanitarian cases. I took care of them, and always strove to handle
them successfully. I handled 87 cases in which my activity threatened to
bring about my death. I intervened in hundreds of cases, and thus saved,
or at least improved, the lives of thousands and thousands of people.
COL. AMEN: If you don’t confine your answers directly to my questions,
it is very difficult to get through and to save time. Now, will you
please try to answer my questions “yes” or “no,” if possible, and make
your explanations short. Do you understand?
VON STEENGRACHT: I understand perfectly. As far as I can, I shall of
course do so.
COL. AMEN: Did you know that nuns were being tortured and starved and
killed in concentrations camps, while you were working with Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
COL. AMEN: You did not know either about what was happening to priests
or the nuns or to other inmates of concentrations camps? Correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I have just said that I have intervened in hundreds of
cases, in which I was approached by the Nuncio even when it concerned
Jews, for whom the Nuncio was not authorized to act, and in cases in
which the Nuncio was acting on behalf of Polish clergymen, also a sphere
for which he was not authorized. In spite of the fact that I had
strictest orders not to receive such cases, I did receive the cases;
and, in spite of the “Nacht und Nebel” decree, I always gave information
when I could get any information. Details other than those which I
received officially I did not have.
COL. AMEN: And who gave you the instructions not to do anything about
these complaints?
VON STEENGRACHT: These orders came directly from Hitler and came to me
through Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: How do you know?
VON STEENGRACHT: I have already said yesterday that the two notes which
before my time were passed by State Secretary Von Weizsäcker to Hitler
through Ribbentrop were rejected with the remarks that they were blunt
lies and, apart from that, this was not within the jurisdiction of the
Nuncio; these notes were to be returned and in the future such documents
were not to be accepted. Furthermore, there were to be no discussions
and that applied, not only to the Nuncio, it applied to all unauthorized
actions particularly when foreign diplomats intervened in matters in
which they had no jurisdiction.
COL. AMEN: But do you want the Tribunal to understand that you went
ahead and tried to do something about these complaints, whereas
Ribbentrop did nothing; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I tried to settle within my own sphere of jurisdiction
all cases which, according to instructions, I was not permitted to
accept at all. But if a case here and there was of primary importance,
or where the lives of several people could have been saved, I always
applied to Ribbentrop. In most of these cases Ribbentrop took the matter
before Hitler, after we had invented a new competence, so that he could
not raise the objection that the Nuncio had no jurisdiction. Upon this,
Hitler either absolutely rejected them or at least said that the police
would have to investigate the case first. This presented the grotesque
picture that in a humanitarian matter or an affair which under all
circumstances had to be handled as foreign politics, the Foreign
Minister no longer made the decision, but the Criminal Inspector Meier
or Schulze who only needed to state “Undesirable in the interests of
state security.”
COL. AMEN: Did Ribbentrop obey the instructions which you say were
received from the Führer not to do anything about these complaints or
did he not? “Yes” or “no”?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question since I do not know how
many orders he received from Hitler and whether he obeyed in each
individual case.
COL. AMEN: Well, you have been testifying that you received instructions
not to do anything about these complaints from the Vatican; is that not
correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, and I did not obey them.
COL. AMEN: Well, I am now asking you whether Ribbentrop obeyed those
instructions or whether he did not.
VON STEENGRACHT: But he was in a higher position. What orders Hitler
gave to Ribbentrop privately I cannot say since I do not know.
COL. AMEN: Where did you receive your instructions from?
VON STEENGRACHT: From Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: Ribbentrop has testified under interrogation that he knew
nothing of what went on in any of these concentration camps until the
Führer ordered Luther to be placed in a concentration camp. Do you know
who Luther was?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Who was he, please?
VON STEENGRACHT: Luther was an Under Secretary of State of the Foreign
Office who was the head of the “Deutschland” department.
COL. AMEN: And when was he placed in a concentration camp?
VON STEENGRACHT: That must have been about February 1943.
COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact, is it not true that Ribbentrop had
a whole deskful of complaints from the Vatican about killings,
atrocities, the starving of priests and nuns, to which he never made any
reply at all, even an acknowledgment?
VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, what happened before May 1943, I do not
know. As long as I was State Secretary, I never failed to accept a note
or failed to answer it. On the contrary, I accepted all notes and
attempted, as I said before, to assist these people. Regarding
conditions before my term of service, I cannot give you any information
because I do not know them.
COL. AMEN: Well, I am not talking about that time; I am talking about
the period immediately before and following your appearance there in
’43. Now I want to read you from...
VON STEENGRACHT: I am sorry. I would gladly answer your question if I
knew anything about the matter. During my time—I cannot say anything
about it because I do not know.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will read to you from the interrogation of Ribbentrop
and ask you whether what he says conforms with your recollection of the
facts.
VON STEENGRACHT: I should only like to say that until May 1943 I was not
active politically, so that from my own knowledge I cannot make a
statement about it.
COL. AMEN: Well, as I read the testimony to you, you will find that the
interrogation refers to communications which remained in his desk
unanswered for an indefinite period of time. Did you have access to
Ribbentrop’s desk? Did you know what was in it?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
COL. AMEN: “Question: ‘Did you receive from the Vatican a
communication dated 2 March 1943 calling your attention to a
long list of persecutions of bishops and priests, such as
imprisonment, shooting, and other interferences with the
exercise of religious freedom?’
“Answer: ‘I do not recollect at the moment, but I know that we
had protests from the Vatican, that is, we had a whole deskful
of protests from the Vatican.’”
Does that conform with your recollection?
VON STEENGRACHT: That was, I must unfortunately say again, before my
time. I cannot know whether he had a whole drawer full of things.
COL. AMEN: If they had remained in his desk from March until May, then
you would know about them; isn’t that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I? No. I was not Herr Ribbentrop’s servant, who went
over his chairs or drawers.
COL. AMEN: So that your testimony is that you knew nothing about any
protests from the Vatican other than those which you have already
referred to?
VON STEENGRACHT: Apart from those I have mentioned, I know nothing about
protests. I emphasize again that during my time in office I accepted
them all and answered them all.
COL. AMEN: I will read you further from the interrogation:
“Question: ‘Did you reply to these Papal protests?’
“Answer: ‘I think there were very many we did not reply
to—quite a number.’”
Does that conform with your recollection?
VON STEENGRACHT: Certainly, that is correct. That was in accordance with
the instructions which were originally given.
COL. AMEN: By whom?
VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler’s instructions.
COL. AMEN: To whom?
VON STEENGRACHT: Certainly to Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: Those are the instructions which you say that you were
violating on the side, is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Which I did not obey, for otherwise I would not have
been allowed to accept the notes from the Vatican in all those cases
where the jurisdiction was questioned; nor would I have been allowed to
accept, for example, protests from the Swedish Ambassador regarding
mistreatment in Norway, which, however, I also accepted.
COL. AMEN: I will continue to read from the interrogation:
“Question: ‘Now, do you mean to say that you did not even read a
protest from the Vatican that came to your desk?’
“Answer: ‘It is really true. It is so that the Führer took such
a stand in these Vatican matters that from then on they did not
come to me any more.’”
Does that conform with your recollection?
VON STEENGRACHT: That Ribbentrop did not receive the protests any more?
Yes, that is correct, that tallies with what I said, that in all these
cases, where we could not accept them, I tried to settle them on my own
responsibility, since it was against orders.
COL. AMEN: And in the course of reading these complaints from the
Vatican which went unanswered, both you and Ribbentrop learned full
details of exactly what was going on in the concentration camps, did you
not?
VON STEENGRACHT: There was never anything about that in these notes—the
ones I saw—there was never anything about the treatment in them.
Instead they were concerned only with complaints asking why the death
sentence was ever imposed, or why the clergyman was ever arrested, or
similar cases, or the closing of churches or the like.
COL. AMEN: I do not want to take the time of the Tribunal to read to you
the documents which are already in evidence. I am referring to Document
Numbers 3261-PS, 3262-PS, 3264-PS, 3267-PS, 3268-PS and 3269-PS, but in
those documents—I am sorry, sir, 3269 is not in evidence. But in those
documents, Witness, are set forth the details of numerous individual and
collective cases of just what went on in concentration camps. You say
you were not familiar with any of those matters?
VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, I do not think that I expressed myself
in that way. I gave you to understand that everything communicated to me
by foreign diplomats I do, of course, know. In other words, if detailed
reports were received during my term of office, then of course I know
it. I never denied it.
THE PRESIDENT: What you said, Witness, was—at least what I took down
and understood you to say was—that nothing was ever mentioned in the
notes about the treatment in concentration camps.
VON STEENGRACHT: But I remarked with reference to the previous question,
when the question was put generally as to whether I knew about
conditions in concentration camps and the ill-treatment, I said that I
knew everything that had been reported to me by foreign diplomats, by
people of the opposition, and what I could learn from the foreign press.
In other words, if these documents contained details during my time in
office, then I know that too. But may I ask the date of the documents?
COL. AMEN: There are many documents with many dates, which can be
obtained, but we don’t want to take too much of the Tribunal’s time.
What I want to find out is whether or not you and Ribbentrop did not
know all about the murders, tortures, starvations, and killings that
were taking place in the concentration camps, and which were the subject
of constant and continuous protests from the Vatican, which Ribbentrop
has testified were not even read or acknowledged? Do you understand
that, Witness?
VON STEENGRACHT: I understand that. I knew nothing at all of the
ill-treatment in concentration camps to the degree and in the bestial
way that I have heard about here. I must strongly protest against the
suggestion that I had heard things like that through the Vatican at that
time. Also, I am convinced that Herr Von Ribbentrop had no idea of the
details as we have heard them here and as they have been shown in the
films.
COL. AMEN: Isn’t it a fact, Witness, that if you had followed up any of
these complaints from the Vatican which Ribbentrop has testified were
ignored, you would have found out everything which was going on in the
concentration camps to the last detail? “Yes” or “no.”
VON STEENGRACHT: No, that is not correct. I said yesterday already that
perhaps the key to it can be found in the speech made by Himmler on 3
October 1943, in which he said that the action against Jews and the
matter of concentration camps were to be kept just as secret as the
matter of 30 June 1934. And the great majority of the German people will
confirm the fact that until a short time ago they could not discover
anything at all about these events. If I went to Gruppenführer Müller or
other officials I was always told that everything in those concentration
camps was functioning beautifully and that there could be no question of
ill-treatment. Then I insisted that the foreigners, particularly the Red
Cross, inspect a concentration camp, and the Danish Red Cross was taken
to the Concentration Camp Theresienstadt. After that inspection took
place—this was a camp for Jews—the Danish Minister came to me and told
me that contrary to expectation everything had been favorable there. I
expressed my astonishment and he told me, “Yes, our people were there,
there was a theater there, and their own police force, their own
hospital, their own money; the thing is well-run.” I had no reason,
therefore, to doubt that it was true. But I myself could get no idea of
the true conditions from any German department, since they would
certainly have been afraid to tell a member of the Foreign Office
anything about it. But I want to emphasize again that we really had no
idea of the atrocities and such things.
COL. AMEN: Why in the world should they be afraid to advise the Foreign
Office of these atrocities? Had the Foreign Office ever done anything to
discourage them?
VON STEENGRACHT: In all matters which were violations of international
law we attempted to bring the case to the attention of the Red Cross in
one way or another. We did this particularly in all matters relating to
prisoners of war and if anything appeared to be wrong we drew the
attention of the Swiss Delegate to it, on our own initiative: “Go to
this place and see what is going on.” And in this case too, if I had
gone to the Swiss and told them in confidence that this and that has
occurred in the concentration camps, Switzerland and the Red Cross would
probably have interfered, which could ultimately have led to unpleasant
measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I think we ought to have an adjournment for
10 minutes.
COL. AMEN: I have only a few more questions.
[_A recess was taken._]
COL. AMEN: So far as you know, after Ribbentrop had received this
deskful of complaints from the Vatican, which he neither read nor
acknowledged, did Ribbentrop take any steps or do anything to find out
whether those complaints were justified and true, or did he not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the complaints made before my time, I have no
idea.
COL. AMEN: I am asking you about any complaints that were received from
the Vatican that ever came to your attention, with particular reference,
of course, to the deskful to which Ribbentrop himself has testified. Do
you know of any steps that were ever taken by Ribbentrop in connection
with complaints received from the Vatican about the atrocities taking
place in concentration camps? Please try to answer “yes” or “no.”
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I recall he submitted complaints of this sort
to Hitler, when he had the opportunity, and then waited for Hitler’s
order.
COL. AMEN: All right. And when Hitler told him to pay no attention
whatsoever to these complaints, he, as usual, did exactly what the
Führer told him to do, namely, nothing. Is that correct, so far as you
know?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, he obeyed Hitler’s orders.
COL. AMEN: And did nothing?
VON STEENGRACHT: If that is how the order read, he did nothing, yes.
COL. AMEN: Well, didn’t you tell the Tribunal that is what the directive
from the Führer was, to pay no attention to these complaints? “Yes” or
“no,” please.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And so, I say, Ribbentrop, as usual, did nothing about any of
these complaints after the Führer instructed him to disregard them. Is
that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: I could not quite understand that question.
COL. AMEN: I say after Ribbentrop received instructions from the Führer
to disregard these complaints from the Vatican, Ribbentrop, as usual,
did what he was directed, namely, nothing.
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume so, except for those cases where he
nevertheless tried again and then received the same answer. I also know
that he once appealed to Himmler and requested on principle that the
actions against the Jews should not be carried out; and he proposed that
Jewish children and women should, I believe, be turned over to England
and America.
COL. AMEN: And you also know what reply he received to that suggestion,
don’t you?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know the answer.
COL. AMEN: Well, you are certainly familiar with the fact that no such
thing was ever done, are you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: That it was never carried out? I did not understand the
question.
COL. AMEN: The suggestion which you claim that Ribbentrop made to
Himmler. That suggestion was never carried out, was it?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand; in what way not carried out? So
far as I know—Ribbentrop appealed directly to the foreign countries at
that time. I also do not know what answer he received at that time, at
least not in detail.
COL. AMEN: Well, so far as you know, nothing ever came of that
suggestion, correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, nothing came of it.
COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you know that Ribbentrop and
Himmler were not on good terms anyway, do you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: That was a matter of common knowledge to everybody, wasn’t
it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, the enmity became greater in the course of time.
COL. AMEN: So far as you know, did Ribbentrop take bromides every day?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I do not know. He...
COL. AMEN: You never saw him taking any?
VON STEENGRACHT: It could be; I do not know.
COL. AMEN: Well, did you ever see him taking any, or did he ever tell
that he was taking them?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I remember now that he took some sort of red
substance but I did not pay particular attention to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we have anything to do with whether he took bromides?
COL. AMEN: Yes, your Lordship, we will, because in his interrogations he
claims that his memory as to many of these events has been obscured or
removed by the over-use of such medicine.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
COL. AMEN: Now, Witness, were you incarcerated at one time at a place
known as “Ash Can”?
VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can?
COL. AMEN: Outside of Luxembourg.
VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can? I cannot remember it.
COL. AMEN: Near Luxembourg.
VON STEENGRACHT: Locked in a refuse can? No, I do not remember.
COL. AMEN: After you were taken prisoner, where were you incarcerated?
VON STEENGRACHT: Mondorf.
COL. AMEN: For how long a period of time?
VON STEENGRACHT: In Mondorf altogether 11 weeks.
COL. AMEN: And at that time were numerous of the defendants in this case
also incarcerated there?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And while you were there you were free to have conversations
with some of the inmates?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you did, from time to time, have such conversations?
Right?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I was not together with them all the time, because
I was transferred to another camp.
COL. AMEN: Now, in the course of your conversations with one or another
of the inmates there, did you make the statement which I am about to
read to you, either in exact words or in substance? Do you understand
the question? “Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion of decency and truth.
The conception does not exist for him.” Please answer “yes” or “no.” Did
you say that, Witness, did you say that?
VON STEENGRACHT: I should be grateful if I could hear that exactly again
what I am supposed to have said.
COL. AMEN: Now remember, I am asking you whether you said it either in
the exact words or in substance. Do you understand that?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not precisely understand the German translation
of your question.
COL. AMEN: Do you now understand it?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand. I did not exactly understand the
German translation.
COL. AMEN: Yes, but do you understand my question, namely, that you are
to say, whether you used these exact words or some other similar words?
I will now read it to you again. Do you understand?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I would be grateful.
COL. AMEN: “Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion of decency and truth.
The conception does not exist for him.”
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot recall that I ever made such a statement. I
would have to know to whom I am supposed to have said it.
COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement, or is it simply that
you can’t remember whether you did or not?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot remember having said that.
COL. AMEN: Is it possible that you did?
VON STEENGRACHT: It could be that I made such a statement, in some
connection.
COL. AMEN: Very good.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the other prosecutors wish to ask any questions?
MAJOR GENERAL N. D. ZORYA (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): To
save time, I shall restrict myself to a few questions only. Insofar as I
can understand the translation of your testimony, which you submitted
yesterday, you testified to the fact that besides the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs many individuals and organizations had influenced
Germany’s foreign policy.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Tell me, which of the defendants in the present Trial whom
you see in the dock attempted to influence and did, to a certain extent,
influence Germany’s foreign policy.
VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy was, of course, after the beginning of
the war...
GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you here and now not to make any declaration on
Germany’s foreign policy, but to indicate precisely, in the form of a
reply to my question, which of the defendants in the present Trial
attempted to influence and did influence Germany’s foreign policy?
VON STEENGRACHT: The basic lines of foreign policy were determined
solely by Hitler. The fact that we had occupied many countries and in
these various countries had occupied the most varied positions...
GEN. ZORYA: We know all about that. I ask you to indicate by name, which
of the defendants in the present Trial attempted to influence and did
influence Germany’s foreign policy. Is my question clear to you?
VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy, as I stated yesterday, was in its broad
outlines determined by Hitler alone; but those people who were assigned
to special fields naturally exercised some influence in one respect or
another. For example, some one who had a special assignment concerning
the police, carried out police measures; some one who had to take care
of labor problems conducted labor affairs. The same is true of other
sectors.
GEN. ZORYA: You still do not answer my question. I ask you to indicate,
regardless of the form and extent of his influence, which of the
defendants in the current Trial attempted to influence, and did
influence, in one form or another, Germany’s foreign policy, and this
apart from representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that you are asking this question in relation
to Russia; as the Foreign Office no longer had jurisdiction after the
entrance of German troops into Russia...
GEN. ZORYA: I request you to understand my question thoroughly and to
answer which of the defendants, and in what form, regardless of concrete
facts of foreign policy, attempted to influence this foreign policy of
Germany and did, in effect, so influence it.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. As regards Russia, the Eastern ministry was
competent for these questions.
GEN. ZORYA: No, not as regards Russia.
VON STEENGRACHT: In Norway Terboven laid down the policy. Quite
naturally he influenced Hitler in his attitude toward Norway and
Norwegian problems. In the same way the individual chiefs of the
administrations in the individual countries exerted influence depending
on how close they could come to Hitler with their reports.
THE PRESIDENT: We don’t want you to make speeches; we want you to answer
the question. You weren’t asked who influenced the foreign policy, but
which of the defendants influenced foreign policy. You may say none, or
you may say some. It is a question that you must be able to answer.
VON STEENGRACHT: I would assume that Rosenberg had something to say
regarding Russia, Frank had something to say regarding Poland,
Seyss-Inquart had something to say regarding Holland. Other matters
touched only special sectors. Naturally the SS had something to say; the
Wehrmacht had something to say, also the various other offices and they
naturally all exerted a certain influence but only a certain influence.
However, the basic policy was conducted solely by Hitler.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you not wish in this connection to name the Defendant
Göring?
VON STEENGRACHT: Göring carried on the Four Year Plan and in this
capacity he naturally also exercised a certain influence on Russia.
GEN. ZORYA: What did this influence consist of?
VON STEENGRACHT: There again I must say that I and the Foreign Office
had nothing to do with Russia, and that we were strictly forbidden to
intervene in Russian affairs. In the sphere of propaganda and the press
we were in no way permitted to become active. For this reason I am
especially badly informed on Russian affairs.
GEN. ZORYA: Did the Defendant Göring have any influence in other
questions besides the Russian question?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand the question in German.
GEN. ZORYA: Besides the Russian question, did the Defendant Göring
exercise any influence on other questions in the sphere of foreign
policy?
VON STEENGRACHT: I would say that until the year 1938 he certainly had
influence over Hitler in matters of foreign policy.
GEN. ZORYA: You have stated in your testimony that in July ’44 the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs participated in preparations for the
anti-Jewish Congress which, it was assumed, would be held in Kraków.
Will you please answer this question briefly, “yes” or “no.”
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you know who were the candidates for honorary membership
in this congress?
VON STEENGRACHT: Probably there were many, Ribbentrop among others, as
far as I still remember today.
GEN. ZORYA: Who else from among the defendants?
VON STEENGRACHT: I really cannot say. As far as I remember, Rosenberg
and a large number of other leading personalities, but I cannot recall
their names any longer. Naturally there are documents on the subject, so
that it can be ascertained without trouble.
GEN. ZORYA: Did Ribbentrop attempt in any form whatsoever to protest
against the inclusion of his name in the roster of honorary members of
this congress?
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can recall he very unwillingly took over
this post, but I do not believe that he really intended to take any
active part in this matter.
GEN. ZORYA: If I have understood you correctly, you have recently
testified to the fact that relations between Ribbentrop and Himmler were
hostile.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, bad relations.
GEN. ZORYA: But can you state whether any contact existed between
Ribbentrop and Himmler in their work, whether they maintained this
contact in any one particular sphere or branch of their work?
VON STEENGRACHT: As a matter of fact, there was no working contact such
as would have been considered right in a well-organized state. Of
course, now and then there were matters somewhere that concerned both of
these men, and to that extent they did have contact, yes.
GEN. ZORYA: What was the nature of this contact, and what, exactly, did
it represent?
VON STEENGRACHT: It really only amounted to this: that Ribbentrop or
Himmler saw each other every few months. Besides that, we had a liaison
man in the Foreign Office for the Reichsführer SS Himmler.
GEN. ZORYA: Then how does all this fit in with the hostility which, as
you have just mentioned, existed between Himmler and Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: I presume you are referring to the second question I
answered. In every normal state it was the case that the ministers saw
each other at least once a year and exchanged opinions. This, however,
did not take place, since, as we have already heard today at some
length, the fields of jurisdiction overlapped to a great extent and the
activity of one man touched very closely on the activity of the other.
Therefore some connection had to be established whether one wanted it or
not.
GEN. ZORYA: Do I understand you to say that Himmler and Ribbentrop never
even met?
VON STEENGRACHT: They met perhaps once every 3 months. It might have
been every 4 months and they usually met only if, by chance, both
Ribbentrop and Himmler were visiting Hitler at the same time.
GEN. ZORYA: And there were no special meetings, no business contact
between them at all?
VON STEENGRACHT: Actually not.
GEN. ZORYA: I should like you to familiarize yourself with Document
Number USSR-120, which has already been submitted as evidence to the
Tribunal. You will see that this is an agreement between Himmler and
Ribbentrop regarding the organization of intelligence work. Are you
familiar with this agreement?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly.
GEN. ZORYA: The contact between Himmler and Ribbentrop was evidently
closer than you wished to describe.
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not believe, Mr. Prosecutor, that I wanted to give
you any impression other than the one that actually existed. This refers
to Hitler’s order of 12 February 1944. On the basis of this order
Himmler took charge of all activity abroad without the participation of
the Foreign Office, and after he had become the successor to Canaris,
through this order he secured a predominant position abroad. And if the
Foreign Office in one way or another had not tried to contact this
organization, then the Foreign Office would have had no influence at all
even in foreign countries. We had to fight vigorously over this
document, for on the basis of this document Himmler was obliged for the
first time to communicate to us also the information that he brought to
Germany. Otherwise he brought these reports in without telling us about
them. That was the reason why we reached this working agreement. But so
far as I recall, it was not put into practice at all, because Hitler’s
order was issued on 12 February 1944 and we had not come to an agreement
until February 1945. Then it gradually came about. That must be
approximately the date. At any rate it took quite a while.
GEN. ZORYA: You say that this agreement never became valid?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. An agreement becomes effective at
the moment in which it is signed. But it was not put into practice or
hardly put into practice.
GEN. ZORYA: I think we shall have to content ourselves with your reply
and pass over to some other questions. Did you ever come in contact with
Kaltenbrunner?
VON STEENGRACHT: Did I come into contact with Kaltenbrunner? Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: On what questions?
VON STEENGRACHT: On precisely those questions which, for example, the
Nuncio addressed to me and also about people who because of the Nacht
und Nebel decree had been deported from abroad and about whom we were
not allowed to give information, I often went privately to Kaltenbrunner
and pointed out to him that this order was inhuman. As a favor
Kaltenbrunner then frequently gave me information; and I, contrary to
the orders, transmitted this information abroad because I considered it
justified for humanity’s sake. Those were the main points of contact
which I had with Kaltenbrunner.
GEN. ZORYA: Did you, in particular, have any conversation with him on
the subject of the Danish policemen interned by the Gestapo in a
concentration camp without any concrete charges presented against them?
Please reply to this question by saying “yes” or “no.”
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: During one interrogation, an interrogation conducted by an
American interrogator, you stated that, although these policemen were
eventually sent back to Denmark, they were very badly treated.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: What did this ill-treatment consist of?
VON STEENGRACHT: I learned at that time, I believe through the Danish
Minister, that 1600 Danish policemen...
GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you to be brief. Of what did the ill-treatment
consist which was meted out to the Danish policemen who were interned in
a concentration camp without any concrete charges being presented
against them?
VON STEENGRACHT: These policemen were transported from Denmark. When I
learned of it, I went to Kaltenbrunner on the same day and asked him
under all circumstances to treat these people as civilian internees or
as prisoners of war.
GEN. ZORYA: I beg your pardon, but you are not answering my question.
What did the ill-treatment of the Danish policemen consist of?
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that you want to know whether Kaltenbrunner is
personally responsible for it and to this I would have to tell you the
opposite. I am...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question? It was repeated. You must
understand what the question is: What was the bad treatment? Either you
know or you do not know. If you know, you can say so.
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can remember, 10 percent of these prisoners
died.
GEN. ZORYA: Is that all you can say in reply to the question?
VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding details of the ill-treatment I was informed
by Denmark that the men were not allowed to keep their uniforms and had
to wear concentration camp clothes, that this concentration camp
clothing was too thin and the men frequently died of inflammation of the
lungs, also that the food was insufficient. I did not learn any more at
the time. They were also flogged.
GEN. ZORYA: Witness, please tell us: Did you ever come across the
activities of the Defendant Sauckel?
VON STEENGRACHT: I came into touch with Sauckel’s activities only
insofar as we objected that so many people from abroad were brought into
Germany by force.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember a conference at which both you and
Sauckel were present? You have already mentioned this fact in the course
of your interrogation prior to the opening of the current Trial.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember you testified in the course of this
interrogation: “But the measures adopted for recruiting people in Russia
and similar countries are beyond description.”
VON STEENGRACHT: In the session—I did not understand the question.
GEN. ZORYA: You stated, during the interrogation of 28 September 1945—I
am quoting verbatim: “But the measures adopted for recruiting people in
Russia and similar countries are beyond description.” Do you remember
your testimony?
VON STEENGRACHT: I confirm that statement.
GEN. ZORYA: Then you confirm it? Will you kindly enumerate, if only in
brief, what precisely were the indescribable measures adopted by the
Defendant Sauckel in Russia and other countries?
VON STEENGRACHT: I know of only one case that was reported to me at the
time. It concerned the fact that in a certain sector, people were
invited to a theatrical performance and the theatre was surrounded, and
the people who were inside were brought to Germany for forced labor. It
concerns these measures of which I have heard.
GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.
COL. POKROVSKY: I request permission to ask one more question, or
rather, to have one more question elucidated.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal has already indicated
that it wishes the cross-examination to be cut down as far as possible,
and it really cannot hear more than one counsel on behalf of each of the
four countries. It doesn’t wish to hear more than one on behalf of each
of the four countries. I am afraid we can’t hear any further
cross-examination from you.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question is not a new one. The witness has not
answered a question which was repeated four times.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a new counsel though.
COL. POKROVSKY: No. The Soviet Prosecutor asked which of the defendants
influenced the foreign policy of Germany. The witness replied, “The
Armed Forces.” I wished to...
THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry, Colonel Pokrovsky, but I have given you the
Tribunal’s ruling. We cannot hear more than one counsel. I hope, as I
say, that the prosecutors will make their examination as short as
possible.
M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): This
witness having been already interrogated at considerable length, I wish
to ask only a very short question.
Witness, I should like you to confirm precisely what you have already
declared, that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of
Ribbentrop and was responsible only to him; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question in German.
M. FAURE: Is it correct from your declaration, and from what you know,
that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of Ribbentrop
and that it was responsible only to him?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
M. FAURE: Does it mean that every important measure taken by the Embassy
would have to be known by the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
M. FAURE: I simply wanted to have this point elucidated in view of the
interrogatory of the witness, and I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President,
I request permission to ask one question which I could not ask before.
The Russian Prosecutor asked whether the witness had discussed the
question of the Danish policemen with Kaltenbrunner. In this connection
it remained entirely unanswered how Kaltenbrunner himself behaved. I
simply want to ask this one question.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, would you please tell the Tribunal how
Kaltenbrunner behaved when you discussed with him the question of the
Danish police who had been inhumanly treated—how Kaltenbrunner behaved
in this connection and what he did.
VON STEENGRACHT: The question is perhaps not quite correct the way you
put it when you say “who had been inhumanly treated,” for they could not
have been dealt with. They had just been turned over to the
concentration camp. So the moment I heard about it I went to
Kaltenbrunner and told him that these people could not be put into a
concentration camp. They had to be treated either as prisoners of war or
as civilian internees.
Kaltenbrunner listened to this and said he was also of that opinion, and
in my presence gave the order that these men should be transferred from
the concentration camp to a prisoner-of-war camp. I therefore assumed
that the matter was thereby settled and then found out a fortnight later
that they were still in the concentration camp. I appealed to
Kaltenbrunner earnestly. Kaltenbrunner said he could find no explanation
for it. I could not find any either, since the order to transfer these
people had been given in my presence. We subsequently carried on many
negotiations regarding this matter. I had the impression that other
influences were at work there and that Kaltenbrunner could not enforce
his opinion.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was he against this inhuman treatment?
VON STEENGRACHT: He always told me that he was in favor of their being
put in a prisoner-of-war camp. That was naturally a substantial
improvement.
DR. KAUFFMANN: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you wish to re-examine this witness?
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of violating the
Treaty of Versailles or was he opposed to that?
VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to say...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you say “yes” or “no” and then explain
later?
VON STEENGRACHT: He wanted a modification.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of the reoccupation
of the Rhineland?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I did not know Ribbentrop and consequently
cannot answer this question.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop opposed to rearmament?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer this question either, because I did not
know him at that time. I saw him for the first time in the year 1936.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Anschluss?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I assume.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Tripartite Pact?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
[_The witness Von Steengracht left the stand._]
DR. HORN: Yesterday I concluded the presentation of my documents with
the submission of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-10)—on page 35 of the document book. From this document I
proved that Von Ribbentrop conducted his foreign policy according to
lines laid down by Hitler. I should like to prove with the following
documents what the foreign political situation was that Ribbentrop found
when he took office in February of 1938. I ask the Court to take
judicial notice of the following documents, the numbers of which I shall
now communicate to the Tribunal, without my reading anything from them
in order that I may later be able to come back to them in my final
speech.
The first of these documents is the document which bears the Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 14 (Document Number Ribbentrop-14). It is a question here
again of an extract from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume
1, and carries the heading “Proclamation of the Reich Government to the
German People of 1 February 1933.” This document describes briefly
Germany’s position at that time and the intentions of the Hitler
Government that came to power on 30 January 1933.
The next document that I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of is
Ribbentrop Exhibit 15 (Document Number Ribbentrop-15). This document is
also taken from the first volume of the _Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik_. It carries the title “Adolf Hitler’s Address on the Occasion
of the Inauguration on 21 March 1933 in Potsdam”. In this document, too,
basic expositions are made regarding the internal and external policy
agreed upon by the new government.
As the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 16 (Document Number Ribbentrop-16). Again it
is a document from the above-mentioned volume of documents. It is headed
“Adolf Hitler’s Speech on His Program at the Meeting of the Reichstag in
the Kroll Opera House on 23 March 1933.”
I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the next document, Ribbentrop
Exhibit Number 17 (Document Number Ribbentrop-17). It is again an
excerpt from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would not like to interrupt Dr. Horn, but not one
single document among those which he now mentions, beginning with Number
14, and as far as I understand, until Number 44, inclusive, was put at
the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution, and I cannot see any possibility
of aiding the Tribunal in the study of these documents until we have
received them. I suppose that the Tribunal will judge it necessary to
put off the studying of these documents until the Soviet Prosecution
have received them.
DR. HORN: May I give a short explanation please. I have inquired as to
what extent the translations have progressed. Three weeks ago I turned
in my documents in the prescribed manner, the last of them about 10 days
ago. I was informed that the Translation Division unfortunately had too
few French and Russian translators available to have the translation of
the documents in these two languages as far advanced as is the case in
the English language up to now. These are, of course, things over which
I have no influence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal appreciates that you have done
what fulfills the obligations which rested upon you and they, therefore,
think that the documents should go in, subject of course to any
objection being taken to them when the translations are available.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, as a precaution I have already informed
Colonel Pokrovsky that this was the case, without knowing in detail what
documents had been translated into Russian. That was as far as I could
possibly go to reach an understanding, because the other thing was
beyond my control.
MR. DODD: I wonder if it would be possible for Dr. Horn to indicate very
briefly the purpose for which he offers these documents as they come up.
We will have objection to some, I know, but some of that objection may
be clarified if we hear beforehand just what the purpose of the offer
is.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, Dr. Horn is putting in a large number of
documents at the present moment and asking the Court to take judicial
notice of them and if the Prosecution finds that there is something
specific that they want to object to, wouldn’t it be best that they
should do that hereafter?
MR. DODD: I thought it might be of assistance and save us from rising
very often if he gave us some idea of the purpose for which the offer is
made.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would take longer probably.
DR. HORN: May I make a short explanation on this subject? Since 1933 my
client has occupied official positions that were closely tied up with
foreign policy. The direction of a foreign policy that had, as its aim,
the waging of aggressive war, has been charged against him. I now submit
with these documents the evidence which demonstrates how the policy
developed and that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop on his part made long
and continuous efforts to avoid a war of aggression, for example,
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 17, (Document Number Ribbentrop-17) of which I
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. It is in the document book on
Page 40 and contains a speech of 17 May 1933 by Hitler before the German
Reichstag on the National Socialist Peace Policy.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: This document of 17 May 1933 I cite as proof of Germany’s
general will to disarm and as proof that the Reich Government made
efforts to bring about a general pacification of Europe.
As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 18 (Document Number Ribbentrop-18). It is
again a document from the same collection and is headed “Treaty of
Agreement and Co-operation of 15 July 1933,” known in brief as the “Four
Power Pact.” It is on Page 42 of the document book. This Four Power Pact
between Germany, France, England, and Italy was inspired by Mussolini.
Its purpose was to bring about general disarmament and particularly, to
make effective the revision article—Number 19—in the Covenant of the
League of Nations. This pact did not come into being because France did
not ratify it.
As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 20 (Document Number Ribbentrop-20). It
concerns a “Proclamation of the Reich Government to the German People in
Connection with the Withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October
1933.” This proclamation of the Reich Government affirms the failure of
the disarmament conference and gives a short account of Germany’s
reasons for withdrawing from the League of Nations. In connection with
this proclamation, Hitler on the same day made a speech over the radio
in order to state the reasons for Germany’s withdrawal from the League
of Nations. I submit this speech to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit
Number 21 (Document Number Ribbentrop-21), and ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of it. The speech is on Page 45 of the document book.
In order to justify the then existing foreign policy to the people as
well as to obtain a confirmation of the policy at that time, Reich
President Von Hindenburg, on 11 November 1933, called the German people
to the ballot box. The proclamation in that connection is contained in
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 23 (Document Number Ribbentrop-23), which is
found on Page 48 of the document book. I present it to the Court again
with the request for judicial notice.
I further ask the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit Number 24
(Document Number Ribbentrop-24) in which the text of the question and
the results of the election are to be found. It is on Page 49 of the
document book which is before you.
In the course of her disarmament policy, Germany, on 18 December 1933,
issued a German Memorandum on the disarmament question and Germany’s
attitude regarding the disarmament problem. I offer the Court this
document for judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 25 (Document
Number Ribbentrop-25).
The next document is contained on Page 51 of the document book and
describes the course of the disarmament negotiations and Germany’s
attitude toward these negotiations. I submit it to the Court for
judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 26 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-26). The document is on Page 51 of the document book, and is
headed “The German Memorandum on Disarmament of 19 January 1934.”
The German view on disarmament is again set forth in the following
document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 27 (Document Number Ribbentrop-27),
set forth on Page 53 of the document book, and is entitled “German
Memorandum of 13 March 1934.” I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice
of this document.
The German Government answered an English disarmament memorandum on 16
April 1934 with an _aide-mémoire_ to the English Government. I ask the
Court to take judicial notice of this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit
Number 28 (Document Number Ribbentrop-28).
In the course of the disarmament negotiations, France, in 1934,
suggested a pact which became known under the name of the “Eastern
Pact.” Regarding this Eastern Pact, the German Government expressed
their view in a communiqué of the German Reich Government of 10
September 1934, which is on Page 56 of the document book, and to which I
have given the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 30 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-30), again with the request that judicial notice be taken of
it.
As the next document, which is on Page 57, I present to the Court for
judicial notice: Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 31 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-31). It concerns a copy of the _Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik_, Volume 3, and shows the reply of the Reich Government of 14
February 1935 to the suggestion for an air pact. Germany’s comments on
this air pact include the following—I read Paragraph 2 from this
exhibit and begin the quotation:
“The German Government welcomes the proposal to increase safety
from sudden attacks from the air by an agreement to be concluded
as soon as possible, which provides for the immediate use of the
air forces of the signatories on behalf of the victim of an
unprovoked air attack.”
In the year 1935 compulsory military service was reintroduced in
Germany. On this occasion the German Government addressed a proclamation
to the German people. This proclamation is on Page 59 of the document
book and carries the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 33 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-33). I request that this excerpt from the proclamation be
given judicial notice.
As Ribbentrop Exhibit 34 (Document Number Ribbentrop-34), I submit a
communiqué of the German Reich Government of 14 April 1935 on Germany’s
attitude toward the Eastern Pact. It is on Pages 61 and following of the
document book and I ask, without my reading anything from it, that the
Tribunal take judicial notice of it.
The introduction of compulsory military service was regarded by the
signatory countries of the Versailles Treaty as an infraction of Part V
of this treaty. The states protested against the reintroduction of
compulsory military service in Germany. A protest was issued by the
Reich Government against this decision of the Council of the League of
Nations of 17 April 1935. This protest is on Page 63 of the document
book. I have this document the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 35 (Document
Number Ribbentrop-35), and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
it. In this document the German Government dispute the right of the
governments represented in the Council of the League of Nations, who
approved the decision of 17 April, to set themselves up as judges over
Germany. In this protest it is stated that this attitude is interpreted
as a manifestation of renewed discrimination against Germany and
consequently is rejected.
I turn now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 36 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-36) which is on Page 64 of the document book. This concerns
the German memorandum to the Locarno Powers of 25 May 1935, and deals
with the incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. The
Defendant Ribbentrop participated decisively in the negotiations that
led to the drawing up of this memorandum and to the presentation of the
German point of view before the League of Nations and the Locarno
Powers. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the document because
it contains Germany’s legal attitude toward this problem.
A further memorandum to the Locarno Powers is to be found on Page 68 of
the document book (Document Number Ribbentrop-36) Exhibit Number
Ribbentrop 36, and it again exposes briefly and clearly the
incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. I ask that
also this German memorandum to the Locarno Powers—it is dated 25 May
1935—be given judicial notice.
The legal point of view which formed the basis for this memorandum was
presented in a speech by Hitler, concerning the peace policy in the
German Reichstag on 21 May 1935, in order again to prove German
willingness for peace and disarmament. At the same time a peace and
disarmament proposal was submitted in London by Ribbentrop. I ask that
this document, this speech by Hitler, be given judicial notice as
Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 37 (Document Number Ribbentrop-37). It is on
Pages 69 and following of my document book.
As the next document to prove that Germany made continuous efforts for
disarmament and attempts at agreement, I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit
Number 38 (Document Number Ribbentrop-38), for judicial notice, which is
on Page 77 of my document book. This concerns the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement of 18 June 1935, in which Ribbentrop played a decisive role,
and for the ratification of which Ribbentrop exerted himself
particularly. He induced the French Government in particular, by his own
efforts, to agree to this treaty. That was necessary because this naval
agreement made necessary a change in Part V of the Versailles Treaty,
already cited—it is the part that is concerned with disarmament
instructions and armament stipulations. At that time Ribbentrop
succeeded in persuading the French Government to give their approval to
this agreement. I submit this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 38,
with the request for judicial notice.
I may, in addition, say in this connection that this treaty was at that
time considered, both by Ribbentrop and Hitler, as the cornerstone of a
far-reaching proposal for an understanding and an alliance with England.
During the succeeding years, as well as during the time he served as
ambassador in London and also as Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop made
constant efforts to bring about such a pact of agreement in some form or
other.
As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 39 (Document
Number Ribbentrop-39), which is on Page 79 of the document book.
Again, and in view of the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the German
Government found themselves compelled on 7 March 1936 to present their
attitude, through a memorandum, to the signatory powers of the Locarno
Pact. This point of view is found in the document just mentioned and I
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
The occupation of the Rhineland had led to a protest by the powers
interested in it. Ribbentrop replied to this protest with a speech
before the Council of the League of Nations in London and then delivered
another protest before the Council of the League of Nations against the
protest of the signatory powers of Locarno. This protest of the then
Ambassador Von Ribbentrop, which I present as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number
40 (Document Number Ribbentrop-40), which is on Page 83 of my document
book, I also submit for judicial notice.
As the next document I present to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 41
(Document Number Ribbentrop-41), on Page 84 of the document book, with
the request for judicial notice. It contains the last peace proposals by
Germany in connection with the disarmament and peace proposals of that
time. It is headed “Peace Plan of the German Government of 31 March
1936.”
In subsequent years Germany made repeated efforts to bring about the
withdrawal of the war guilt lie. In the year 1937 German and Italian
relations became constantly closer; and in connection with these
relations Hitler, on 30 January 1937, on the fourth anniversary of the
National Socialist revolution, made a proposal before the German
Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin, that agreements should be
reached with other European nations in Europe on the same basis as
between Germany and Italy, in order to attain harmonious relations. I
ask that this document be accepted as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43
(Document Number Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the document
book. In this document the withdrawal of the war guilt lie was clearly
requested once more. I quote from the third paragraph of the above:
“Above all, therefore, I solemnly withdraw Germany’s signature
from that statement, extorted against her better judgment from
the weak German government of the day, that Germany is to blame
for the war.”
As the next document I bring...
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. Are you referring to 44?
DR. HORN: I was just referring to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43 (Document
Number Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the document book. Please
pardon me if I left that out.
THE PRESIDENT: There was some passage you read in it which does not
appear to be translated here.
DR. HORN: Did I correctly understand you to say, Mr. President, that
there was no English translation in the document book?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am not quite sure. I did not catch it myself. Did
you read anything which is not in the document book?
DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I have cited only what is in the document
book. It is on Page 88, Paragraph 3 and it is specifically the paragraph
that begins, “And fourthly...”
THE PRESIDENT: Thirdly, isn’t it?
DR. HORN: Paragraph 3, and this paragraph is again divided into four
subparagraphs and I have read the fourth subparagraph.
I come now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 44 (Document Number
Ribbentrop-44), which is on Page 90 in the document book. This document
contains the German note on Belgian inviolability, dated 13 October
1937. This document is of importance in view of the events of 1940; and,
in order to make clear the German view, I should like to read the last
paragraph, which in my document book is on Page 91 and which is preceded
by the Roman numeral II. I quote:
“The German Government assert that the inviolability and
integrity of Belgium are of common interest to the western
powers. They confirm their determination not to impair that
inviolability and integrity under any circumstances and to
respect Belgian territory at all times, excepting of course, in
the case of Belgium collaborating in an armed conflict directed
against Germany in which Germany would be involved.”