The Prosecution has asserted that Von Ribbentrop, after the taking over

of power, for a short period of time was adviser of the Party on foreign

political matters. This assertion is refuted by Document 2829-PS which

is contained in the document book in the hands of the Tribunal. I will

read Paragraph 3, where it says:

“Foreign Policy Collaborator to the Führer, 1933-1938.”

This is the first document of the Ribbentrop document book. According to

it, in the years 1933 to 1938 Von Ribbentrop was only Hitler’s adviser

on foreign political questions. With reference to Document D-472,

Exhibit Number GB-130, the second document in the Document Book

Ribbentrop, which concerns an excerpt from the International

Biographical Archives, the honorable prosecutor claimed that the

defendant even before 1932 worked for the NSDAP, after he had entered

the Party service in 1930. The Prosecution cites Paragraph II, Lines

6-9, of this document, which says:

“Following up his connection with foreign countries, he

established new relations with England and France; having been

in the service of the NSDAP since 1930, he knew how to extend

them to political circles.”

The statement is not correct. The defendant was until 1932 not a member

of any political party in Germany, particularly not of the NSDAP. As far

as his political views were concerned, he leaned toward the Deutsche

Volkspartei—that is the party of Stresemann.

In the year 1932 the defendant came to know Hitler personally. His views

on domestic and foreign political matters brought him...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I do not want to interrupt you unnecessarily,

but I do not understand what you are doing now. You seem to me to be

stating a part of the evidence which presumably the Defendant Von

Ribbentrop will give, and, if so, when he gives it it will be cumulative

to your statement. Also, you seem to be referring to documents which

have been produced by the Prosecution and answering them yourself. Well,

that is not what the Tribunal desires at this stage. It quite

understands that at the appropriate time you will make whatever argument

you think right with reference to the evidence which has been brought

forward, on behalf of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. But, as I have

already said—I thought quite clearly—what the Tribunal wants done now

is to hear all the evidence on behalf of Von Ribbentrop and to have

offered in evidence the documents upon which you will rely, with any

short explanatory statement as to the meaning of the documents. And if

there is any part of a document which has been produced by the

Prosecution but not cited by them which you think it necessary to refer

to, as explanatory of the part of the document which has been used by

them, then you are at liberty to put in, to offer in evidence that part

of the document with any short explanatory words that you wish. But I do

not understand what you are doing now except making a speech.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I was using the opposing fact which I wish to

present against the claims of the Prosecution, because according to my

information and according to my documents, they do not correspond to the

facts. As far as the establishment of Point 1 of what Mr. President has

just said, I would like to state the following: The health of the

Defendant Von Ribbentrop is quite poor at present. This morning the

doctor told me that Ribbentrop is suffering from so-called vasomotor

disturbances in his speech. I wanted to take a part of his evidence

statement from my client by making a statement of it here and thus

showing the position of the defendant to the Tribunal. I do not know

whether the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in view of his present state of

health, that is, his impediment of speech, could make these explanations

as briefly as I myself can. Then, when the defendant is in the box, he

needs only to confirm these statements under oath.

THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is too ill to give

evidence today, then he must give evidence on some future occasion. If

you have any oral witnesses to call other than the Defendant Von

Ribbentrop, then they can give evidence today; and with reference to the

documentary evidence, it is perfectly simple for you to offer those

documents in evidence in the way that it was done by Dr. Stahmer, in the

way that it was done by Dr. Seidl, and the way in which the Tribunal

have explained over and over again.

DR. HORN: I had intended to submit documents first and not to call my

witnesses until later. As far as Von Ribbentrop is concerned, I have

learned that his condition has become constantly worse. I do not know

therefore whether at the end of the presentation of evidence I will be

in a position to summon the Defendant Von Ribbentrop; but I must be

prepared for the possibility that I might not be able to call him. And

otherwise I am concerned with only a very few very general points for

rectification.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you cannot give evidence at any rate and if you

cannot call Von Ribbentrop, then you must, if it is possible to do so,

call some other witnesses who will give the evidence which he would have

given. If, unfortunately, it is not possible to do so, then his case may

suffer; but the Tribunal will give every possible facility for his being

called at any stage. If he is in fact so ill, as you suggest, that he

cannot give evidence, then his evidence may be put off until the end of

the defendants’ case, subject of course to a proper medical certificate

being produced.

DR. HORN: If the Court wants then later to hear the defendant, I will

postpone the matter with the request that if I cannot hear him, that is,

cannot hear him fully—for I emphasize again, there is a speech

disturbance—then he can at least confirm the evidence as a witness.

THE PRESIDENT: You may call any of the witnesses; the Tribunal has not

laid down that the defendant must be called first. You have applied for

eight witnesses, I think, in addition to the defendant and you can call

any of them or you can deal with your documents, but whichever you do,

you must do it in the way which the Tribunal has ordered.

DR. HORN: Then, I will turn now to the occupation of the Rhineland.

On 27 February 1936, there was ratified between the French Republic and

the Soviet Union a mutual-assistance pact, the content of which clearly

violated the Locarno Treaty and the covenant of the League of Nations,

and was solely directed against Germany. At the same time...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you have just said that something or other is

against international law. Now, that is not a reference to any document

which you are offering in evidence, nor is it any comment upon the

production of oral evidence. If you have a document to offer, kindly

offer it and then make any necessary explanatory remarks.

DR. HORN: Then, I wanted next to refer to Document Number 1 in the

Document Book Ribbentrop. We are concerned with a memorandum of the

German Government to the signatory powers of the Locarno Pact, of 7

March 1936.

THE PRESIDENT: Which page is that?

DR. HORN: That is on Page 6 of the document book. In explanation I may

add that this memorandum was submitted to the signatory powers, because

between the French Government and the Republic of the Soviet Union a

treaty of mutual assistance had been ratified and at the same time, the

German Foreign Office received knowledge of a plan which the French

General Staff had worked out and which arranged that the French Army was

to advance along the line of the Main, so that North and South Germany

in this way would be separated, and even to join hands with the Russian

Army across Czechoslovakia.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, for the formality of the record, it is

necessary to offer each document in evidence and the document should be

given a number. You have not yet offered any of these documents in

evidence or given them any numbers, so far as I know.

DR. HORN: I gave this document the number, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 1.

The number is in the upper right hand corner of the document.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. HORN: And I ask—perhaps I may say this in order to save time—I ask

that all these documents quoted as Ribbentrop exhibit number be accepted

in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, and in the order in which you quote them?

DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: They will be numbered that way. Very well.

DR. HORN: As to the particulars just submitted on the reason for this

memorandum being lodged, and as evidence of the fact just cited

regarding the arrangement of the French General Staff, I will call Von

Neurath as a witness. I will question him on this one point, when he is

called into the box. In order to justify the German view, which is

contained in the memorandum and which consists in the fact that the

Locarno Pact and the League of Nations covenant were considered

infringed upon, I would like to refer to Page 3 of the document and wish

to quote the following—this is on Page 8 of the document book:

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, was this document Exhibit Number Ribbentrop-1,

one of the documents for which you applied and which you were allowed in

the applications?

DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President. This document is concerned with excerpts

from the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_ (_Documents of German

Politics_), Volume 4.

I want to stress that this collection of documents was granted to me at

the same time as the two evidence books.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to see the original document.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are not in a position to present original

documents, since the Foreign Office was confiscated by the victorious

powers and with it a great part of the documents. Then I would have to

make an application now that the signatory powers concerned produce

these original documents, for we simply are not able to. We can only

refer to document collections.

THE PRESIDENT: Where does the copy come from?

DR. HORN: This copy, Mr. President, is from the _Dokumente der Deutschen

Politik_, Volume 4, as is shown in the document book which the President

has before him. The document is found on Page 123 of this document

collection.

I should like, Mr. President, to add an explanatory remark: If the Court

is interested in seeing the original, I should have to have the

collection, which is up in the document room now, brought down. It is in

German, and I do not believe that it would be of any value to the

Tribunal at this time. May I mention further...

THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Horn, as a matter of formality and

certainty, the Tribunal ought to have in its record every document which

forms part of the record, whether it is an original or whether it is a

copy; and whatever the document is that is offered in evidence, it ought

to be handed in to the Tribunal and kept by the Tribunal. It ought to be

put in evidence, offered in evidence, and handed to the General

Secretary or his representative, and then the Tribunal has a full record

of every document which is in evidence.

But we cannot have documents such as this, which is a mere copy of the

original document which ought to be offered in evidence. If it is at the

Information Center, then it is quite capable of being produced here.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Court decided that we are justified in

copying documents and certifying to the authenticity in order that these

documents may be submitted as evidence to the Tribunal. Therefore, we

have compared every document with the original we had on hand, or with

the printed copy of the document and at the end of the document we

attested the authenticity of the copy. This document, certified with my

own signature, is in the hands of the Tribunal, I believe in five

copies.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn—Yes, Mr. Dodd.

MR. DODD: We thought that we might be helpful. We say that we are

willing to accept this quotation from the volume referred to, and I do

think that we did put in some documents ourselves and asked the Court’s

indulgence at the time in something of the same fashion.

I think the Court, if I may suggest respectfully, might take this

document on that same basis.

I have conferred only with Sir David, but I feel quite sure that our

French and Russian colleagues will agree as well.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, Mr. Dodd, the point is—and, of course, it is

probably only a formal point—that the only document which is offered in

evidence or put in evidence is a copy which does not contain Dr. Horn’s

signature and therefore there is nothing to show that it is in fact a

true copy. Of course, if we had had Dr. Horn’s signature, we would be

prepared to accept that it was a true copy of the original. What we have

before us is a mere mimeograph, I suppose, of some document which has

not been produced to us.

MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor. I have not had an opportunity to

examine it carefully. We did not get these documents, by the way, until

pretty late last night. We have not had the usual period of time to

examine it, but in any event, I have suggested it might go in, and if

Dr. Horn would verify it, as suggested by the President, and later

furnish the original copy, it might be all right.

THE PRESIDENT: That would be all right, certainly.

Dr. Horn, you understand what I mean. If you will produce to us at some

future date the actual document which you signed yourself, to show that

it was a true copy, that will be quite satisfactory.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, in the entire document book there is no

document which I have not signed and given in five copies to be

translated. Of course, I cannot also sign all the translations. This

document which is contained in the document book submitted to the

President has my signature in the German text.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that you have handed your documents in to be

translated, in German, with your signature at the bottom, saying it is a

true extract, and you do not know where those documents are because they

have gone into the Translation Division? That is right, is it not?

DR. HORN: Only partially, Mr. President. I know that I handed in these

documents, to the proper office, in German, and with my signature. Then

that office kept them and had them translated. From the moment I handed

them in I naturally have had no further control of what happened.

I may also point out that the document books which we used were

available only in a single copy and must be used by all attorneys, even

now, for their future work. Because of that, I cannot produce the

original for the Tribunal since it is not my property. That can be done

in agreement only with the person in charge of the document section,

Lieutenant Commander Schrader.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, if, in the future, you and the other

defendants’ counsel could get your document books ready in sufficient

time, you could perhaps then make the arrangement that you hand in the

document book, when you are offering it in evidence, and then it would

be capable of being handed to the officer of the Court.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I do not believe that that possibility exists

at all, for these _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_—just to use this

example—are available only in one copy for the use of all Defense

Counsel attorneys; I cannot take these books away, if they wish to

continue work with them, in order to submit them to the Tribunal as

evidence. I would not receive them. I receive these books only to use

them, and make excerpts from them, and then I have to return them.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you are putting in evidence now a certain

extract from the book, and all the Tribunal wants is that that extract

be certified, either by you or by some other person who can be trusted,

as a correct extract from the book, and that that document, so signed,

can be produced. It may be difficult to produce it at the moment because

you have handed it in to some official or to somebody in the Translation

Division and therefore you cannot produce it, but it could be arranged

that it should be produced in the future. I do not mean this particular

one, but in the future other defendants’ counsel can produce their

documents certified by themselves or by some other person of authority.

DR. HORN: That has already been done, Mr. President. Five document books

of the same type, signed by me, were handed to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, the rule of the Tribunal happens to be that

they should be handed in, in this Court, at the time that they are being

used, as well as their being handed in to somebody for the purpose of

translation. That is the rule.

But now perhaps we had better get on as we are taking up too much time

over this.

DR. HORN: I have just heard that the German documents which I signed are

being procured from the Secretariat General, so I will be able to submit

them to the Tribunal with signature, in the German.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. HORN: I should like to continue and explain the afore-mentioned

opinion of the legal consequences of the Pact made between France and

Russia in 1936, and I refer to Page 3, that is, Page 8 of the document

book. I quote:

“Consequently, the only question is whether France, in accepting

these treaty obligations, has kept within those limits which, in

her relation to Germany have been laid on her by the Rhine Pact.

“This, however, the German Government must deny.

“The Rhine Pact was supposed to achieve the goal of securing

peace in Western Europe by having Germany on the one hand, and

France and Belgium on the other, renounce for all time employing

military force in their relations to each other. If, by the

conclusion of the pact, certain reservations to this

renunciation of war, going beyond the right of self-defense,

were permitted, the political reason for this was, as is

generally known, solely the fact that France had already taken

on certain alliance obligations towards Poland and

Czechoslovakia which she did not want to sacrifice to the idea

of absolute peace security in the West. Germany at that time

accepted in good faith these reservations to the renunciation of

war. She did not object to the treaties with Poland and

Czechoslovakia, placed on the table at Locarno by the

representative of France, only because of the self-understood

supposition that these treaties adapted themselves to the

structure of the Rhine Pact and did not contain any provisions

on the application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League

of Nations, such as are provided for in the new French-Soviet

agreements. This was true also of the contents of these special

agreements, which came to the knowledge of the German Government

at that time. The exceptions permitted in the Rhine Pact did, it

is true, not expressly refer to Poland and Czechoslovakia, but

were formulated generally. But it was the sense of all

negotiations about this matter to find a compromise between the

German-French renunciation of war and the desire of France to

maintain her already existent pact obligations. If, therefore,

France now takes advantage of the abstract formulation of war

possibilities allowed for in the Rhine Treaty in order to

conclude a new pact against Germany with a highly armed state,

if thus in such a decisive manner she limits the scope of the

renunciation of war mutually agreed upon with Germany, and if,

as set forth above, she does not even observe the stipulated

formal juridical limits, then she has created thereby a

completely new situation and has destroyed the political system

of the Rhine Pact both in theory and literally.”

I will omit the next paragraph and will quote from Page 9 of the

document book as follows:

“The German Government have always emphasized during the

negotiations of the last years that they would maintain and

carry out all obligations of the Rhine Pact as long as the other

partners to the Pact also were willing on their part to adhere

to this Pact. This natural supposition cannot any longer be

regarded as fulfilled by France. In violation of the Rhine Pact,

France has replied to the friendly offers and peaceful

assurances, made again and again by Germany, with a military

alliance with the Soviet Union, directed exclusively against

Germany. Therefore the Rhine Pact of Locarno has lost its inner

meaning and has ceased to exist in any practical sense. For that

reason Germany also on her side does not consider herself bound

any longer by this pact which has become void.”

In consideration of the Franco-Russian pact and the intentions of the

French General Staff, Hitler had the Defendant Von Ribbentrop come to

him in order to question him about the presumable attitude of England to

a possible German reoccupation...

THE PRESIDENT: You are reading from the document, are you not, Dr. Horn?

You begin to tell us something about Hitler.

DR. HORN: Yes, I interrupted at the phrase “as bound by this pact which

has become void,” in order to bring in the role of Ribbentrop briefly.

On the basis of this pact and of the intentions of the French General

Staff, Hitler then had the Defendant Von Ribbentrop...

THE PRESIDENT: We shall hear that from Von Ribbentrop, shall we not?

DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are permitted to add a few connecting words

to the documents. I can now...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Colonel Pokrovsky.

COL. POKROVSKY: As far as I can understand, the Tribunal has already

explained to Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel, Dr. Horn, that the Defense is

now submitting a document. Although Dr. Horn does not consider it

necessary to state when he deviates from the document and when he quotes

from it, I have had the opportunity of noting that in the document he

has just quoted, numbered Ribbentrop-1, there is a complete absence of

any reference to the plans of the French General Staff. Among the

documents in the document book submitted by Ribbentrop’s Defense Counsel

I could not find any copies of the plans of the French General Staff. It

is therefore quite incomprehensible to me how Dr. Horn happens to be

informed about the plans of the French General Staff, and on what

grounds he refers to these plans while presenting evidence, in

Ribbentrop’s case, since they appear to be completely absent among the

documents to which he refers.

DR. HORN: Mr. President...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what you appeared to the Tribunal to be doing

then was not anything explanatory of the document, but telling us what

Hitler did, and what the Defendant Ribbentrop did, in consequence of

what Hitler did. That is not in evidence. You cannot tell us what is not

in evidence. You can only give us explanatory remarks to make the

document itself intelligible.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop is accused on

account of the conduct of the entire foreign policy. The Prosecution

have presented the foreign political activity as they see it, and we

have been permitted, not to give a speech, but, in connection with the

documents submitted, to present our opposing view, as the Defense see

it. In order to do that, I must refer to certain facts, documents and

quotations. I can never give a complete picture if I may just submit a

document without giving a large frame to this matter, a certain

development in the entire policy.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is not expecting you to give

a complete picture at this stage. All you are doing at the present

moment is introducing the evidence. You are going to give the complete

picture when you make your final speech. It is intelligible, this

document. It is a document which is well known; it is perfectly

intelligible without telling us what Hitler or what the Defendant

Ribbentrop did.

DR. HORN: Regarding these questions raised by the Russian Prosecutor, I

have already asked for the Defendant Von Neurath as a witness. I can

interrogate him on this point only after the Defendant Von Neurath is in

the witness box. But I can still refer now to these facts that are

counterevidence.

THE PRESIDENT: But, you see, that would be his function. If you are

going to tell us what you think the Defendant Von Neurath is going to

say in answer to questions which you put to him, that would be making an

opening statement. Well, that has not been provided for by the Charter.

We must wait until you call Von Neurath or until you question Von

Neurath.

DR. HORN: Then I will read from this document just mentioned, Ribbentrop

Exhibit Number 1, on Page 10 of the document book:

“The German Government are now forced to face the new situation

created by this alliance, a situation which is made more

critical by the fact that the Franco-Soviet pact has found its

complement in a pact of alliance of exactly parallel nature

between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In the interest of

the elementary right of a nation to safeguard its borders and to

guarantee its defensive capacities, the German Government have

therefore re-established the full and unrestricted sovereignty

of the Reich in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland,

effective today.”

I ask the Tribunal to accept the entire document as evidence. Through

this step of the German Government certain articles of the Treaty of

Versailles which were concerned with the demilitarization of the

Rhineland zone had become obsolete. Since this morning, by decision of

the Court, the taking of a position on the Versailles Treaty is not

permitted, I will omit the corresponding material from the document book

of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, and turn now to the document Ribbentrop

Exhibit Number 8, which is on Page 21 of the document book.

May I put another question first, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

DR. HORN: Is it permitted to submit the official documents on the Treaty

of Versailles that were exchanged between governments before the

conclusion of the treaty? These are purely government documents and not

any arguments on the treaty itself. May these documents be submitted

after the decision of the Tribunal today?

THE PRESIDENT: Which are they, the one on Page 21?

DR. HORN: This is in regard to the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 3.

THE PRESIDENT: Where is that?

DR. HORN: It is on Page 14 of the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal would like to know what issue in

this Trial this document is relevant to.

DR. HORN: I wanted to explain by it the German opinion of the Treaty of

Versailles. Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 2 is the note of Germany to the

United States that contains the offer for an armistice and conclusion of

peace. And I wanted further to show in the next note again that this

offer was one based on the Wilsonian Fourteen Points. Further, with

Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 4, I wanted to submit evidence that the peace

and the armistice were to be concluded on the basis of the Fourteen

Points with two exceptions. I also wanted to show through Ribbentrop

Exhibit...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I tried not to interrupt, but really

this is the issue that the Tribunal ruled on a fortnight ago when the

Defendant Göring, I think, applied for documents on exactly this issue;

and that also, as I understand, the Tribunal ruled on again this

morning. The issue is perfectly clear; the only issue to which this can

be directed is whether the Treaty of Versailles was in accordance with

the Fourteen Points and if not, was therefore an unjust treaty which

comes directly within the Tribunal’s ruling of an hour ago.

DR. HORN: May I add something more?

As far as I and my colleagues have understood the ruling of the Tribunal

today, the only prohibition is against making before this Tribunal

statements on the injustice of the treaty and on the fact that it

purportedly was concluded under duress. We have not understood the

decision in any other way.

THE PRESIDENT: That was why I asked you to what issue this was relevant,

and you said that it was relevant to showing what the German opinion on

the treaty was. Well, these are documents of the period before the

treaty was made, and they seem to be only relevant upon the question of

whether or not the treaty was a just treaty or not a just treaty.

DR. HORN: I personally did not want to demonstrate through this document

either that it was a just or an unjust peace, but only that it was a

treaty which had many legal inadequacies, since the main treaty was not

in line with the agreements of the preliminary treaty.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if the main treaty was not in accordance with the

preliminary treaty then the main treaty would, according to that

argument be an unfair treaty. That is the very point upon which the

Tribunal has ruled.

DR. HORN: For that reason, Mr. President, I have just omitted these

documents also and said that I will not refer to them in view of this

ruling. I will now turn to Document Number 8.

THE PRESIDENT: As you are going through a lot of documents we might

break off for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. DODD: I do not want to take much of the Tribunal’s time, but in view

of the statement of Dr. Horn concerning the condition of the Defendant

Von Ribbentrop, I think it is required that we inform the Tribunal of

the situation as we understand it, which is something quite different

from the understanding of Dr. Horn.

I have talked with Colonel Andrus and with one of the Army doctors in

attendance. Colonel Andrus has talked with both of them, and our

understanding is that Ribbentrop is not ill and is able to take the

witness stand; that he is nervous, and appears to be frightened, but he

is not disabled in any sense and is capable of testifying.

DR. HORN: I come now to Page 21 of the document book, and ask the Court

to take judicial notice of the document appearing under Ribbentrop

Exhibit Number 8. It is a copy, again from the _Dokumente der Deutschen

Politik_, Volume 4, which I turned over, signed, to the Court. It is the

speech of Ambassador Von Ribbentrop at the 91st session of the League of

Nations Council in London, regarding the Soviet Pact, the Locarno Pact

and the German Peace Plan. The speech was delivered on 19 March 1936. I

refer to Page 3 of the speech and begin my quotation with Number 5. I

quote:

“According to this alliance, France and Russia appoint

themselves judges on their own affairs by independently

determining the aggressor, if occasion arises without a

resolution or a recommendation of the League of Nations, and

thereby are able to go to war against Germany according to their

own judgment.

“This strict obligation of the two countries is clearly and

unequivocally evident from Paragraph 1 of the signatory protocol

to the Treaty of Alliance. That means: In a given case France

can decide, on her own judgment, whether Germany or Soviet

Russia is the aggressor. She merely reserves the right not to be

exposed, on account of military action based on such an

individual decision, to sanctions on the part of the powers

guaranteeing the Rhine Pact, namely, England and Italy.

“From the point of view of law and realistic politics, this

reservation is meaningless.

“In terms of law: How will France be able to foresee, when

determining the aggressor herself, what attitude the guarantors

of the Locarno Pact will afterwards assume towards her one-sided

definition? The answer to the question of whether France would

have to fear sanctions in such a case depends in practice not

only on the faithful adherence to the pact by the

guarantors—about which the German Government do not wish to

raise doubts in any way—but also on the most various

prerequisites of a purely factual nature, the probability or

improbability of which is not to be perceived in advance. In

addition, however, the evaluation of the relationship between

the new Treaty of Alliance and the Rhine Pact cannot be made

dependent on the treaty relationship between France and Germany

on the one hand and the Guaranteeing Powers on the other, but

only on the direct treaty relationship between France and

Germany themselves. Otherwise one would have to expect Germany

to tolerate silently every possible violation of the Rhine Pact

by France, in confidence that the guarantors would have to

provide for her security. That certainly is not the intention of

the Rhine Pact.

“In terms of realistic politics: When a country is attacked by

such a superior military coalition as a consequence of a

decision, incorrect because taken in advance in one of the

party’s own interests, it is an empty consolation to obtain its

right in subsequent sanctions against the aggressors condemned

by the League of Nations Council. For what sanctions could

actually hit such a gigantic coalition reaching from East Asia

to the Channel? These two countries are such powerful and

important members and especially militarily strong factors of

the League of Nations that according to all practical

considerations, sanctions would be unthinkable from the outset.

“Therefore this second reservation dealing with the

consideration of probable sanctions is of no consequence at all

from a realistic political point of view.

“I now ask the members of the Council to bear in mind not only

the legal and practical political scope of this obligation of

France’s to act independently, but to ask yourselves above all

whether the opinion can be advocated that the German Government

of that time, which signed the Locarno Pact, would ever have

taken upon themselves the obligations of this Pact, had it

contained such one-sided stipulations as have now later

developed.”

I now go to Page 26 of the document book, and the same document, and to

clarify the German point of view, I add the following. I quote:

“But the Franco-Soviet Russian alliance means, beyond that—in

the German Government’s view of history—a complete elimination

of the hitherto existing European balance and consequently of

the fundamental political and legal conditions under which the

Locarno Pact was concluded at that time.”

With this, Germany had expressed the legal basis of her attitude toward

the Locarno Pact and the Versailles stipulations regarding the

demilitarization of the Rhineland. In order to prove her will to disarm,

there is in the same document on Page 7, that is, Page 27 of the

document book, an exhaustive and detailed disarmament proposal.

I ask the Tribunal to accept in evidence the document just cited, so

that I may later refer to it.

With this exposition I conclude my presentation on Germany’s reasons for

reoccupying the Rhineland. Regarding the role of the Defendant Von

Ribbentrop in the occupation of the Rhineland, I shall enter upon that

when I call the Defendant to the witness stand.

After the occupation of the Rhineland, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop

returned to London, where he was then ambassador. On 4 February 1938 he

was appointed Foreign Minister, and from that time on, conducted the

foreign policy along the lines laid down by Hitler. In proof of this

statement I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10, to be found in the

document book. This is a very short document that I submit to the

Tribunal for judicial notice. It is an excerpt from the speech of the

Führer before the German Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin on

19 July 1940. I quote:

“I cannot conclude this appraisal without finally thanking the

man who for years has carried out my foreign political

directions in loyal, tireless, self-sacrificing devotion.

“The name of Party member Von Ribbentrop will be linked for all

time with the political rise of the German Nation as that of the

Reich Foreign Minister.”

I submit this quotation to the Tribunal to show according to what

principles the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had to conduct the foreign

policy.

I should like now to ask the Tribunal to hear the witness State

Secretary Von Steengracht.

[_The witness Von Steengracht took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?

ADOLF FREIHERR STEENGRACHT VON MOYLAND (Witness): Adolf von Steengracht.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. HORN: What was your last position in the Foreign Office?

VON STEENGRACHT: From May 1943 I was State Secretary of the Foreign

Office.

DR. HORN: What were your activities?

VON STEENGRACHT: In order to present my activities in a comprehensible

way, I must make the following prefatory remarks:

From the beginning of the war, the Foreign Minister had his office in

the neighborhood of Hitler’s headquarters; that is to say in most

instances several hundred kilometers distant from Berlin. There he

carried on business with a restricted staff. The Foreign Office in

Berlin had duties of a routine and administrative nature. But above all,

its duty was also the execution of the regular intercourse with foreign

diplomats.

Within the limits of this field of duties, I bore the responsibility, as

State Secretary, from May 1943. The molding of foreign political

opinion, the decisions and instructions in foreign policy, on the other

hand, originated from headquarters, mostly without any participation,

sometimes also without any subsequent information to the Foreign Office.

DR. HORN: Who determined the basic lines of the foreign policy?

VON STEENGRACHT: The foreign policy, not only on its basic lines, but

also usually down to the most minute details, was determined by Hitler

himself. Ribbentrop frequently stated that the Führer needed no Foreign

Minister, he simply wanted a foreign political secretary. Ribbentrop, in

my opinion, would have been satisfied with such a position because then

at least, backed by Hitler’s authority, he could have eliminated partly

the destructive and indirect foreign political influences and their sway

on Hitler. Perhaps he might then have had a chance of influencing

Hitler’s speeches, which the latter was accustomed to formulate without

Ribbentrop, even in the foreign political field.

DR. HORN: Were there other offices or personalities, in addition to the

Foreign Office, that concerned themselves with foreign policy?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, there was practically no office in the Party or

its organizations that, after 1933, had no foreign political ambitions.

Every one of these offices had a sort of foreign bureau through which it

took up connections with foreign countries in the attempt to gain its

own foreign political channels.

I should judge the number of these to be approximately thirty. For

example, the Hitler Jugend, the SA, the German Labor Front, the SS, the

Rosenberg office with its Foreign Political office, the Propaganda

Ministry, the office Waldeck, the Ribbentrop office, the Nordic Society;

further, the VDA, the German Academy, the Reich Railways (Reichsbahn)

and others. Besides these offices, the immediate entourage of Hitler and

personalities like Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann had an influence in

the shaping of foreign policy. Göring, too, as I see it, had perhaps a

certain influence, but only until 1938—at any rate, in matters of

foreign politics, scarcely later than that.

DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop make efforts to prevent such influences or

to exclude them?

VON STEENGRACHT: From my own observation, I can give only the following

judgment: Almost every one of those persons, who had never before lived

in foreign countries and who, as an occasional traveling salesman for

the Third Reich, in peacetime, or after the occupation of a foreign

country, had eaten well in the capital of this or that foreign country,

considered himself an unrivaled expert on this country. They all had a

predilection for bringing their enlightenment and discernment to Hitler.

Unfortunately the further they were removed from actual conditions, the

more they were in contradiction to the political requirements and

necessities, and especially, unfortunately, the more so-called strength

was shown and the more they stood in contradiction to the elementary

feelings of humanity, the more they pleased Hitler. For Hitler regarded

such statements and representations as sound judgment, and they had

sometimes an irreparable effect, and formed in Hitler’s mind, together

with his so-called intuition, the start of some fundamental idea. To the

possible objection that it should have been easy for an expert to

criticize such an opinion or view, I should like to point out the

following: As long as the future German Ambassador in Paris was still a

teacher of painting, Hitler read his reports with interest; but when he

became the official representative of the Reich, his reports were mostly

thrown unread into the wastepaper basket. Himmler’s reports, the slanted

opinions of Goebbels, and Bormann’s influence played, on the other hand,

a decisive role, as did reports from agents which could not be checked

and which carried more weight than the opinions of experts on the

countries.

DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for relations with all

foreign countries?

VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to remark further here that I have not

yet answered the second part of your question, namely, regarding the

elimination of this influence.

With Hitler’s methods of work, these so-called counterinfluences simply

could not be eliminated. Against this “organized disorganization”

Ribbentrop waged an unmitigating, bitter war, and that against almost

all German offices. I should like to state further that at least 60

percent of his time was devoted to these things alone.

DR. HORN: Was the Foreign Office responsible for the relations with all

foreign countries?

VON STEENGRACHT: In peacetime, yes.

DR. HORN: Did the position of the Foreign Office change with the

outbreak of war?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. In point of fact, the Foreign Office lost its

competency toward the country concerned at the moment when the German

bayonet crossed the border. The exclusive right to maintain direct

relations with foreign governments was eliminated in all occupied

territories; in most instances even the right to have a representative

of the Foreign Office whose post was for observation only and without

competency. This is particularly true for the Eastern Territories and

for Norway.

Where Ribbentrop made the effort to maintain, in spite of the

occupation, a certain degree of independence of a country, as, for

example, in Norway, this activity of our diplomats was termed weak,

traitorous, stupid, and those responsible had to stop their work at

once, on Hitler’s orders, and disappeared from the Foreign Office.

In general the changed position of the Foreign Office during the war is

best characterized by Hitler’s statement: “The Foreign Office shall, as

far as possible, disappear from the picture until the end of the war.”

Hitler wanted to limit the Foreign Office to about 20 to 40 people, and

it was even partially forbidden to form or to maintain any connection

with the Foreign Office.

The Foreign Office, as such, and its officials were detested by Hitler.

He considered them objective jurists, defeatists, and cosmopolitans, to

whom a matter can be given only if it is not to be carried out.

DR. HORN: Was there any foreign policy, in a traditional sense, in

Germany?

VON STEENGRACHT: No; at least, I never noticed anything of it, for

Hitler had in effect made the statement: “Diplomacy is defrauding the

people. Treaties are childish; they are respected only as long as they

seem useful to the respective partners.” That was Hitler’s opinion of

all diplomats in the world.

DR. HORN: Did the Foreign Office have any influence in the Eastern

territories and the territories that were under civilian administration?

VON STEENGRACHT: T have already touched on this question. I have already

said that in the territories in which there was a military government or

a civilian administration, a representative of the Foreign Office—if he

was tolerated at all—was tolerated only as an observation post, at any

rate had no functions; that was the rule.

I think I would be going too far if I went through the condition in

every country. The situations varied.

DR. HORN: Do you consider Von Ribbentrop a typical National Socialist or

not?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop was, in his whole attitude, no typical

exponent of National Socialism. He knew extraordinarily little of the

dogma and doctrines of National Socialism. He felt himself only

personally bound to Hitler, whom he followed with soldierly obedience,

and he stood under a certain hypnotic dependence on Hitler. However, I

cannot characterize him as a typical exponent of National Socialism.

DR. HORN: Was Hitler a man who was accessible to suggestions and

objections?

VON STEENGRACHT: In the first years after 1933 he is said still to have

been; but during the course of years he shut himself off more and more

from expert objections and suggestions. From the time that I became

State Secretary, I saw him only twice on official occasions. I can thus

speak only on the success or lack of success of our work. In the course

of my activities, covering almost 2 years, I can now recall almost no

case in which he agreed to one of our suggestions. On the contrary, it

was always to be feared that by some suggestion of a personal nature he

would be led to take violent action in an opposite direction. The basic

trait of his character was probably lack of confidence, and this bore

unprecedented fruit. Thus, experts and decent people who tried to

influence Hitler to their way of thinking were engaged, in my opinion,

in an altogether vain task. On the other hand, irresponsible creatures

who incited him to take violent measures, or who voiced their

suspicions, unfortunately found him extremely accessible. These men were

then termed strong, whereas the behavior of anyone who was even halfway

normal was condemned as weak or defeatist; through a reasonable opinion

voiced only once, the influence of that man could be forever destroyed.

DR. HORN: What conclusions did Hitler draw from contradictory viewpoints

in respect to the contradicting persons?

VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question in general terms. I have

already shown it in my previous answers. First of all the reaction

depended very much, in my opinion, on the mood of the Dictator at the

time. It was also a matter of importance as to who contradicted and how

much strength or weakness he had already shown or seemed to have shown.

But what the atmosphere was can perhaps be demonstrated by the following

case, shortly after the death of President Roosevelt, as told by

Ribbentrop’s liaison agent with Hitler, a man named Hewel. He said:

“Today I almost met my doom. Goebbels came from the Führer, and

reported on Germany’s prospects, as far as the Führer saw them

affected by Roosevelt’s death, and he drew up a very hopeful

picture of the future. I, Hewel, was of the opinion that such a

view was not justified and remarked as much cautiously to

Goebbels. Goebbels fell into a rage, called me a spirit who

demoralized everyone, who trampled on the happy moods and hopes

of every decent person. I was forced,” Hewel reports, “to make a

special trip to see Goebbels and to ask him to keep the matter

to himself. For if he had informed the Führer of my attitude,

Hitler would have merely pressed a button, and called

Rattenhuber, the Chief of his Security Service, and had me taken

away and shot.”

DR. HORN: How do you explain the fact that so many people remained in

Hitler’s circle, although they could not agree with him on basic

matters?

VON STEENGRACHT: It is true that many people remained in their positions

although at heart they disapproved of Hitler’s methods of government

and, indeed, were inimical to those methods. There are various reasons

for this.

First, it must be said that the NSDAP had come into power according to

the rules of parliamentary procedure as being the strongest Party in the

Reichstag. The officials employed had no reason at all to retire from

service on account of the change of government. In consequence of the

change to dictatorial government and the completely different concept of

the State which the change of government involved, the individual

suddenly found that he was no longer allowed to take a position of his

own concerning this regime. The notorious reign of terror began.

Everywhere, in the ministries and chancelleries, in private dwellings,

and in restaurants there hovered spies who, out of fanaticism or for

pay, were willing to report everything they heard.

Nevertheless, many would deliberately have risked the gravest

consequences, if their withdrawal could have in any way improved

anything. But it became obvious that such persons merely sacrificed

themselves and especially their families unavailingly, because cases of

the kind were painstakingly withheld from publicity and therefore had no

effect. Worst of all was the fact that the appointment vacated was

filled by an especially radical man. Many people realized this and

remained at their posts in order to prevent the development that I have

just described. The great number of atrocities committed or ordered by

Hitler or Himmler have led many foreigners to the conclusion that the

German people as a whole shared the guilt for these crimes, or at least

had knowledge of them. This is not the case. The majority of people even

in high government positions did not learn details of these matters—or

the extent to which they were carried on—until the war was over.

Perhaps the key to this is found in the speech which Himmler delivered

in Posen on 3 October 1943 to his Gruppenführer, and which I learned of

for the first time here. This speech directed that his special

assignments—that means the actions against the Jews and the

concentration camps—were to be kept just as secret as had been the

events of 30 June 1934, of which the German people have only now learned

the authentic story.

Guilt for all these occurrences rests only on a relatively small group,

to be appraised at a few thousand people. It was these who carried out

this unparalleled terror against the German people. But those who

thought differently and who remained are chiefly to be thanked for the

fact that, for example, the Geneva Convention was not renounced, that

tens or even hundreds of thousands of English or American airmen and

prisoners were not shot, that the unfortunate prisoners, those seriously

wounded, were returned during the war to their families in their home

countries; Greece in her dire need received food; exchange was

stabilized as far as possible, as in Belgium and France, and militarily

pointless destruction ordered in foreign countries and in the home

country could be in part prevented or at least lessened; indeed that the

principles of human justice, in some places at least, remained alive.

These circles were discouraged in their attitude earlier by the fact

that no foreign power had used the conditions in Germany as a reason for

breaking off diplomatic relations, but that almost all, until the

outbreak of war negotiated with National Socialism, concluded treaties

and even had their diplomatic representatives at the National Socialist

Party Days at Nuremberg. It was particularly noted that National

Socialist Germany, outwardly at any rate, received much more

consideration, understanding, and respect from foreign countries than

ever had the Weimar Republic despite all its fidelity to treaties or its

integrity.

Then the war came, and with it special duties for civil servants,

officers, and every individual German. Should, and if so when and how

could these people who still felt themselves to be the servants of the

nation, leave their posts under these circumstances? Would they, above

all, by taking such a step be useful to their country and to humanity?

Would they have frightened Hitler or even warned him?

DR. HORN: Did you make peace suggestions of a foreign political nature

to Von Ribbentrop after the French campaign?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I had at that time, to be sure, no official

position. But I nevertheless felt the need, and I believe it was a

heartfelt wish of many, if not all, Germans, to see peaceful conditions

again in the world as soon as possible. On the day of the capitulation

of the King of the Belgians, I suggested:

Firstly, the creation of a United States of Europe on a democratic

basis. This would have meant independence of Holland, Belgium, Poland,

and so on.

Secondly, if this could not be brought about with Hitler, at any rate to

have as few encroachments on the autonomy of the countries as possible.

DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop speak to Hitler on this matter?

VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. But at that time Hitler

considered such plans as premature.

DR. HORN: Did you speak to Von Ribbentrop again in the winter of 1942-43

on the same subject?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Ribbentrop at that time also worked out very

concrete proposals. They provided for the sovereignty and independence

of all conquered countries, including Poland, and in addition, a

far-reaching economic collaboration.

DR. HORN: How did Hitler react then to these proposals?

VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler turned down these proposals giving as reason the

fact that the time was not suitable, the military situation not

favorable enough, that this would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

DR. HORN: Now to another question. Before the outbreak of the Russian

campaign, did Von Ribbentrop mention to Hitler Bismarck’s statement

about the danger of preventive wars?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop told me several times that he was very

concerned about the pact with Russia. In regard to preventive war, he

had stated to Hitler: “The good God does not let anyone look at His

cards.” I know too that Ribbentrop made efforts to bring our experts on

Russia to Hitler in order to explain to him the situation there and to

advise him against a war. Hitler did not permit these people to see him,

so far as I know. Only Ambassador Count Schulenburg was granted a short

audience. He, who considered such a war ill-advised and emphatically

rejected the idea, could not, however, advance his views on Russia and

the reasons against a war; for Hitler, having delivered a speech of his

own on this subject, after about 20 minutes dismissed him abruptly

without letting him speak a word.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the order of the Tribunal was that witnesses

might refresh their memory by notes, but this witness appears to the

Tribunal to have read practically every word he has said. That is not

refreshing your memory with notes. That is making a speech which you

have written out beforehand, and if that sort of thing goes on the

Tribunal will have to consider whether it is necessary to alter its rule

and adhere to the ordinary rule, which is that no witness is allowed to

refer to any notes at all except those made at the time.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, to be sure, I discussed the questions with the

witness; but his notes, if they have been made, were made by the witness

independently and without my knowledge of the exact contents. I shall

now ask the witness to answer my questions without making use of any

means which I do not know. I do not—that I want to emphasize once

again—know these answers.

Witness, is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop tried to use his

influence with Hitler to stop the damaging tendencies against the Church

and the Jews?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I know that Ribbentrop spoke frequently with

Hitler on this theme. I was absolutely in despair about the policy

toward the Church and the Jews, and for this reason had occasion to

speak to him about it often, as I have said. But he explained to me

again and again when he returned from Hitler: “Hitler cannot be spoken

to on this point. Hitler says that these problems have to be solved

before he dies.”

DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office have any knowledge

of the military planning?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop frequently told me that he was completely in

the dark in military affairs. So far as the Foreign Office was

concerned, it had no ideas whatever of strategic planning.

DR. HORN: What were the relations between Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels,

and Bormann?

VON STEENGRACHT: The relations between Ribbentrop and the aforenamed

gentlemen were as bad as can be imagined. There was a perpetual fight

between them. In my opinion Ribbentrop would have been Himmler’s first

victim if anything had happened to Hitler. A constant struggle and feud,

I should like to state, went on between these men with an exceptionally

sharp exchange of letters.

DR. HORN: What was the relationship in general between the highest Party

and Reich offices?

VON STEENGRACHT: The relationship in the individual departments

naturally varied according to the character and the origin of the

department chiefs. But one can say that the relationship was bad

throughout, and, especially, that reciprocal information, so urgently

necessary for state business, practically never developed. It was almost

more difficult for one minister to discuss a question with another

minister by telephone than to have had the Angel Gabriel himself come

from heaven and speak with one of us. Even on the most important and

essential matters, a factual discussion could not take place. There was,

in other words, practically no connection between these departments.

Moreover, they were very different, both in their character and in their

ideas.

DR. HORN: Is anything known to you about objections on the part of the

Vatican, above all regarding the Polish clergy?

VON STEENGRACHT: I heard about that later, and there must have been two

protests concerning the Catholic Polish clergy. These two notes were

submitted by the Nuncio to the State Secretary of that time. The then

State Secretary turned these over to Ribbentrop according to regulation,

and Ribbentrop in his turn presented them to Hitler. Since the Vatican

had not recognized the Government General, and accordingly the Nuncio

was not competent for these regions, Hitler declared when these notes

were presented to him:

“They are just one blunt lie. Give these notes back to the

Nuncio through the State Secretary in a sharp form, and tell him

that you will never again accept such a matter.”

DR. HORN: Were these notes then dealt with by the Foreign Office?

VON STEENGRACHT: Sharp and precise instructions were then issued that in

all cases in which representatives of countries brought up matters which

were not within their authority, whether in conversations, or notes,

_note verbale_, memoranda, or other documents, these were not to be

accepted, and verbal protests were to be turned down sharply.

DR. HORN: Is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop prevented the shooting

of about 10,000 prisoners of war after the terrible air attack on

Dresden?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I know the following: Von Ribbentrop’s liaison man

with Hitler called me up one day in great excitement. He informed me

that on a suggestion by Goebbels, the Führer intended, as reprisal for

the holocaust of Dresden, to have English and American prisoners of

war—I believe mostly airmen—shot. I went immediately to Ribbentrop and

informed him of this. Ribbentrop became very excited; he turned pale as

death; he was in fact almost stunned and thought it was impossible;

picked up the phone and called up this liaison man in person in order to

verify this report. The liaison man corroborated it. Then Ribbentrop got

up immediately and went to Hitler, came back, I think after half an

hour, and told me that he had succeeded in having Hitler withdraw this

order. That is all I know about this matter.

DR. HORN: Do you know anything about the convocation of an anti-Jewish

congress?

VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the convocation of an anti-Jewish congress I

know something; I believe our liaison man with Hitler informed us that,

on a suggestion of Bormann, Hitler had ordered the calling of an

anti-Jewish congress through the Rosenberg office. Ribbentrop did not

want to believe this; but nevertheless had to accept this too as true,

once he had spoken with our liaison man. Then, since on the basis of

this decision we could do nothing more officially to prevent the thing,

we nevertheless worked our way into it, and we made efforts by a policy

of hesitation, delay, and obstruction to render the convocation

impossible. And although the order was given in the spring of 1944 and

the war did not end until April 1945, this congress never actually took

place.

DR. HORN: Could you observe whether Von Ribbentrop often adopted a stern

manner with his staff, for reasons of state, although he sometimes

thought entirely differently?

VON STEENGRACHT: This would be passing a judgment. But I believe that I

must affirm this: Thinking that he was being loyal to Hitler,

Ribbentrop—it seems to me—in those cases when he went to Hitler with a

preconceived opinion and returned with a totally different view, tried

afterwards to explain to us Hitler’s view. This he always did with

special vehemence. I would assume then that this was contrary to his own

most personal original ideas.

DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop during the course of the war ask that Rome

and Florence be spared?

VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. He did speak with Hitler on

these subjects.

DR. HORN: Are you acquainted with an article by Goebbels in the _Reich_,

or perhaps the _Völkischer Beobachter_, dealing with lynch justice?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Once by chance I came to Ribbentrop when he was

reading a paper and was again very excited. He asked me if I had read

the article yet, this shocking article by Goebbels. It was an article on

lynch justice.

DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop lodge a protest with Goebbels about this

article?

VON STEENGRACHT: As far as I know, he charged our press chief who had

the liaison with Goebbels to lodge a protest against this article. But

to his surprise he was forced to see that this protest was useless since

the article had not only been inspired but, I believe, ordered by

Hitler, and thus there was nothing more to be done.

DR. HORN: What attitude did the Foreign Office take in view of the trend

of this article?

VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office repudiated the article vehemently,

because it comprised an offense against international law and thus made

us depart from international law in another field. Moreover, it appealed

to the lower instincts of man, and both in internal and external policy

did great damage.

Besides, such an article, that has been read by several hundred

thousands or by millions, does irreparable damage anyway. We therefore

insisted that under no circumstances should such things appear in the

press again. I must regretfully state, however, that we had a very

difficult stand in this matter, especially since low-flying enemy craft

often shot peasants in the fields and pedestrians in the streets, that

is to say, purely civilian people, with their murder weapons. And our

arguments that in our field we wanted to observe international law under

all circumstances, were not taken into account at all either by most

German officers, or above all by Hitler personally. On the contrary, in

this case too we were regarded again only as formal jurists. But later

we did try, as much as we could, with the help of military offices, to

prevent the carrying out of this order.

DR. HORN: Do you know of a Battalion Günsberg?

VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know of a Battalion Günsberg. I know, of

course, of a former Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg in the Foreign

Office. This Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg received, as far as I

recall—I did not at that time do any work at all connected with these

matters—received from Ribbentrop the assignment of following, with a

few people from the Foreign Office and a few drivers, the fighting

troops, and seeing to it that, firstly, the foreign missions, for

instance in Brussels and Paris, and so forth, that stood under the

protection of the protective powers, should not be entered by our

troops. And at the same time Günsberg was charged with protecting the

files in the Foreign ministries that were of foreign political interest.

After the conclusion of the French campaign, Günsberg, as far as I

recall, was no longer in the active service of the Foreign Office, but

was listed with the Secret Field Police, from which he had received a

uniform, because as a civilian he could not enter these countries.

DR. HORN: How and when did Günsberg’s job end?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop lost interest after these events in Günsberg

and the original assignment. Then, after the beginning of the Russian

campaign, Günsberg, so far as I remember, reported again for duty and

said that he intended to do the same thing in the East, and Ribbentrop

told him:

“Yes, that is very good. You may go with a few people to the

army groups and see whether anything of interest for us is

happening there and also see to it that when we approach Moscow

the foreign embassies _et cetera_ are not entered, and that the

documents are preserved.”

But he did not consider himself any longer as belonging to the Foreign

Office and apparently received orders from other offices. Then, as I

later heard, he had a large number of men under him and had many

automobiles which he could not have received from the Foreign Office any

more than he could have received a military uniform from the Foreign

Office so he was apparently working for other offices.

DR. HORN: He no longer belonged to the Foreign Office at any rate not in

a military capacity?

VON STEENGRACHT: No. And, in addition, when Ribbentrop heard that he had

undertaken such a large job, he charged me personally to call

immediately on the SS and say that he, Ribbentrop, did not want to have

Günsberg any longer, and at that time I told Obergruppenführer Wolff

that I should like to point out that we wanted nothing more to do with

Günsberg. See to it that you keep him with the Waffen-SS along with all

his subordinates. That is all I know about the matter of Günsberg.

DR. HORN: Would Your Lordship like to interrupt the examination or

should I continue to put further questions?

THE PRESIDENT: Unless you are going to conclude almost immediately, we

had better adjourn. Will you be some time longer with this witness?

DR. HORN: I have a number of further questions.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

NINETY-SECOND DAY

Wednesday, 27 March 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. HORN: Witness, you knew Count Ciano. Where and when did you meet

him?

VON STEENGRACHT: I knew Count Ciano but not in a political sense, only

personally. I cannot remember exactly when I met him; probably it was on

the occasion of a state visit. I was working at the time in the Protocol

Department in the Foreign Office.

DR. HORN: What experiences did you have with Count Ciano?

VON STEENGRACHT: Since I did not work with him politically, I had no

political experience with him.

DR. HORN: Now, another matter. Is it correct that Herr Von Ribbentrop

gave orders that under all circumstances the French franc should be

sustained against inflation?

VON STEENGRACHT: Such measures can apply only to a time when I was not

yet State Secretary. But I know that the basic attitude towards France

and all occupied territories was that under all circumstances their

currency was to be preserved as far as possible, or rather should be

preserved by all means. That is why we often sent gold to Greece in

order to attempt to maintain the value of the currency there to some

extent.

DR. HORN: What was accomplished in Greece by sending this gold there?

VON STEENGRACHT: By sending gold to Greece we lowered the rate of

exchange of foreign currencies. Thus the Greek merchants who had hoarded

food to a large extent, became frightened and threw the food on the

market, and in this way it was made available to the Greek population

again.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop gave strictest orders not to

undertake any confiscation in occupied territories but to deal directly

only with their governments?

VON STEENGRACHT: If you put the question like that, it is basically

correct, but I say, as I said yesterday, that in principle we had no

functions at all in the occupied territories, therefore no power to

confiscate, nor was such power within the jurisdiction of other

agencies; but it is correct that we negotiated only with the foreign

governments and that Von Ribbentrop had most strictly forbidden us to

support any direct measures concerning an occupied country which were

carried out by other departments.

DR. HORN: For the time being I have no further questions to put to this

witness.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Witness, are you

well acquainted with Von Papen as a result of the period during which

you were working in the Foreign Office and particularly during the time

you were active as State Secretary in the Foreign Office?

VON STEENGRACHT: I had known Herr Von Papen for several years before

1933, but privately. Then I lost track of him for some time and

re-established contact with him when I became State Secretary in the

German Foreign Office. Then I was continually associated with him in an

official and unofficial capacity.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, particularly in the last period of your

activities as State Secretary, continually receive the reports which Von

Papen, as Ambassador in Ankara, sent to Berlin?

VON STEENGRACHT: Unless Herr Von Papen sent reports directly to Von

Ribbentrop—which may have been possible; I do not know—I received them

weekly through official channels.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you remember that after two previous refusals Von

Papen took over the post of Ambassador in Ankara, in April 1939, on the

day that Italy occupied Albania, whereby an acute danger of war arose in

the Southeast?

VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I was not State Secretary and also had no

political position, so that I am not acquainted with the events of that

period. But today I have the impression that he took over that position

after the Italians had occupied Albania. And he himself told me later

that at that time there was danger that the Italians would advance

further into the Balkans, possibly causing a conflict with Turkey, as a

result of which world peace would have been endangered. For that reason

he had decided at the time to accept the post. Exactly on which day that

was, I cannot say.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What can you say in general about Herr Von Papen’s

efforts toward peace?

VON STEENGRACHT: I am under the impression that Herr Von Papen always

strove to preserve peace by every means. He certainly considered that it

would be a great disaster for Germany and the world if war were to break

out.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were the efforts which Von Papen made during the war

towards establishing peace aimed at foregoing any annexations regardless

of the military outcome and completely re-establishing the sovereignty

of occupied territories, in short, to achieve, by means of reasonable

renunciation, a bearable status for all European states?

VON STEENGRACHT: In principle it was quite clear that Von Papen always

worked for the re-establishment of peace under conditions which would

have re-established full sovereignty for all countries, and so that no

encroachment nor damage, material or otherwise would be inflicted on any

foreign countries.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was that Von Papen’s attitude even at the time of the

greatest German military successes?

VON STEENGRACHT: I believe that his basic attitude in this respect never

changed.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were his continuous personal efforts to establish peace

held against Von Papen by Hitler, and was he considered a disagreeable

outsider in that connection?

VON STEENGRACHT: I did not have an opportunity to discuss it with

Hitler; I only know that he was quite generally criticized by Hitler and

other persons as a man who always followed a weak line.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen frankly acknowledge that peace would

be impossible as long as Hitler and the Party existed in Germany and the

necessary credit for negotiating abroad was lacking?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I think it must have been about April 1943 or May

1943, that I spoke to Von Papen in detail about the whole subject,

since, at that time, I had just become State Secretary. At that time he

very clearly voiced the opinion to me which you have just sketched. It

was quite plain to him that foreign countries would conclude no peace

with Hitler and the methods he employed.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Just one last question, Witness: The Indictment accuses

the Defendant Von Papen of being an unscrupulous opportunist. You,

Witness, know the defendant from the reports and from all the official

relations the defendant had with his superior office for a number of

years. Did you, on the strength of that knowledge, get the impression

that this characterization of Von Papen is correct, or can you say, on

the strength of these reports and these official relations, that Von

Papen appears to you to be a man who always tells the truth, even when

that truth is disagreeable to his quite unpleasant superiors, and even

when the voicing of that truth involves personal danger for him?

VON STEENGRACHT: I can say that is absolutely so. I find the best

evidence of it is that Herr Von Papen was finally completely eliminated

from the position of Vice-Chancellor and resigned from the government,

then he became a private citizen and only in the greatest emergency was

he called upon. In my opinion, Von Papen made himself available only

because he said to himself, “I have still got a certain amount of

credit, I am a good Catholic, and accordingly I represent an attitude

which is opposed to all inhumanity, _et cetera_. Perhaps I can, through

my intervention, exercise some influence in that direction.” I myself

never attended a meeting or a conference which took place between Hitler

and Von Papen, but, particularly from my liaison officer with Hitler, I

often heard that Von Papen, in his smooth way, often told Hitler many

things which no one else could have told Hitler and I believe that

through his manner he prevented a number of things, at least for a time.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, you have stated

that Hitler, because of the terrible bombing attack on Dresden, intended

to issue an order according to which thousands of prisoners of war were

to be killed in reprisal.

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Do I remember your testimony of yesterday correctly, that all

you have said about this matter is information from, or based on

information from Herr Von Ribbentrop?

VON STEENGRACHT: No.

DR. NELTE: What do you know from your own personal knowledge?

VON STEENGRACHT: From my own personal knowledge I only know that our

liaison man with Hitler called me on the telephone and told me that

Goebbels had proposed to Hitler that 10,000 or more British and American

prisoners of war be shot in reprisal, and that Hitler would agree or had

agreed. I immediately reported this to Von Ribbentrop, and he went there

at once and told me after half an hour that the order had been

withdrawn. About Field Marshal Keitel I know nothing at all in that

connection.

DR. NELTE: You do not know, therefore, who was the originator of that

order?

VON STEENGRACHT: No.

DR. NELTE: Who suggested it, I mean.

VON STEENGRACHT: The suggestion for that order evidently came from

Goebbels according to the information which I received.

DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop, do you mean?

VON STEENGRACHT: Who?

DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop?

VON STEENGRACHT: No, Von Ribbentrop had nothing to do with that.

DR. NELTE: Then from Herr Hewel?

VON STEENGRACHT: Herr Hewel told me that. He called me up and told me

that.

DR. NELTE: And you know nothing about the participation of military men?

VON STEENGRACHT: I know nothing at all about the participation of

military men.

DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the

German Armed Forces): Witness, I have only one question. Did you, as

State Secretary, or did the Foreign Office regularly inform military

offices, for instance, the Army High Command or the High Command of the

Navy, with reference to pertinent matters of German politics?

VON STEENGRACHT: No, they were not informed.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the British Prosecutor wish to cross-examine?

COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom):

Witness, you told us yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop was against

the persecution of the churches, was against the persecution of Jews,

and did not know what was going on in the concentration camps. You have

told us that he was not a typical Nazi. What are the qualities of a

typical Nazi?

VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical National Socialist, I mean a man who

fanatically acknowledges and represents all the doctrines of National

Socialism.

Herr Von Ribbentrop, as I said, followed Hitler personally, but he

really knew uncommonly little of any of the other ideology and never

bothered about it. He never spoke at meetings, never participated in

large rallies, and therefore, he really knew extremely little about the

people and the mood of the people.

COL. PHILLIMORE: By “a typical Nazi,” do you mean someone who was

persecuting the churches?

VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I will repeat it. By “a typical Nazi,” do you mean a

man who was engaged in persecution of the churches?

VON STEENGRACHT: At any rate, someone who, if Adolf Hitler considered it

right, did not state his personal opinion on the matter.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And a man who would take his full share in persecution

and extermination of Jews?

VON STEENGRACHT: That I would not like to say either. That was limited

to a certain circle of people. A large number even of fanatical Nazis

knew nothing about these atrocities and repudiated them and would have

repudiated them, had they been properly informed of them.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I understand you to say that you knew nothing of them

yourself. Is that so?

VON STEENGRACHT: That I knew nothing?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes.

VON STEENGRACHT: In my position as State Secretary and because I read

foreign papers, and particularly since I had contact with the

opposition, I knew of many things connected with concentration camps. In

all these cases, as far as it was in my power, I intervened. But

regarding the things which I have heard here now, I knew nothing at all.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you about another matter. You have

told us that Ribbentrop had no responsibility in the occupied

territories. Your words were that “the Foreign Office lost

responsibility at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the

frontier.” Is that right?

VON STEENGRACHT: I said that at that moment at which the German bayonet

crossed the frontier the Foreign Office lost the sole right to negotiate

with foreign governments everywhere. Beyond that, in most countries, the

Foreign Office did not have the right to have even a diplomatic observer

without authority, particularly in Norway and the Eastern Territories.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You have said the Foreign Office had no right to have

an observer there, and that direct relations with occupied territories

were withdrawn, is that right?

VON STEENGRACHT: No, I said that in all occupied territories the Foreign

Office no longer had the sole right to negotiate with the government,

since there was then either a civil administration in those countries or

a military government with auxiliary command offices and a military

administrative head, and that these offices themselves then approached

the foreign governments and their executive organs in the countries

occupied at that time. Consequently one can no longer say that the

Foreign Office had the sole right to negotiate with the governments. But

in some countries, as in the North and the East, we no longer had any of

our people at all, and Hitler had issued the order that we withdraw our

observers from the other countries, such as Holland, Belgium and so on.

However, we did not do so.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You say that in France you had an ambassador reporting

direct to Ribbentrop, did you not?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And his duties included advising the Secret Field

Police and the Secret State Police by the impounding of politically

important documents and securing and seizure of public property;

further, of private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the

basis of instructions especially given for the matter. Isn’t that right?

VON STEENGRACHT: I already emphasized yesterday that only since 1943 had

I anything at all to do with political affairs. If I understood your

question correctly, Mr. Prosecutor, you are of the opinion that the

Secret State Police and the German executive organs in France were under

our jurisdiction. That is incorrect.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. I asked you if the

Minister Abetz had not got those duties.

VON STEENGRACHT: He did not have the assignment of confiscating any

French property or carrying out any action against the Jews. No orders

of that kind went through my hands during my time, and he could...

COL. PHILLIMORE: [_Handing the document to the witness._] Will you look

at Document 3614-PS.

My Lord, that was put in as French Exhibit Number RF-1061 on the 4th of

February. It is a letter dated the 3rd of August 1940, signed by

Ribbentrop, to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

(OKW). It reads:

“The Führer has appointed the former Minister Abetz Ambassador

and after my report has decreed as follows:

“I. Ambassador Abetz has the following tasks in France...”

then it sets out a number of tasks and Number 6 is the one I put to the

witness:

“6. Advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police

in connection with the impounding of politically important

documents.

“7. Securing and seizure of public art property; further, of

private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the basis of

instructions specially given for this case.”

Then the concluding paragraphs:

“II. The Führer has hereby expressly ordered that Ambassador

Abetz is exclusively responsible for the handling of all

political questions in Occupied, and Unoccupied France. Insofar

as his functions touch military interests, Ambassador Abetz will

act only in agreement with the Military Commander in France.

“III. Ambassador Abetz is attached to the Military Commander in

France as his Commissioner. His seat remains Paris as

heretofore. He receives instructions for carrying out his tasks

from me and is responsible exclusively to me on these

matters.”—Signed—“Ribbentrop.”

I want to ask you one or two questions about the Jews. You have told us

that you and the Defendant Ribbentrop...

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal would like to know why

this witness told them that Ambassador Abetz did not have the task of

confiscating property.

[_Turning to the witness._] Why did you say that?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz had no executive powers, and he was

expressly forbidden to intervene in French internal affairs. He could,

therefore, address himself exclusively to the French Government, and if

the French Government did anything by means of their executive power,

then that was a transaction on the part of the French Government but

never a confiscation carried out by Abetz.

COL. PHILLIMORE: That is not an answer to the question. The question is

why, when you were asked whether Abetz had the task of advising the

Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police on the impounding of

politically important documents, did you not say so?

VON STEENGRACHT: I said that no order went through my hands, since I did

not become State Secretary until May 1943. This is an order of 3 August

1940. But here we are concerned only with an official directive

addressed to Ambassador Abetz.

COL. PHILLIMORE: At this time you were Ribbentrop’s personal adjutant,

weren’t you?

VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, but not political secretary. I was

only...

COL. PHILLIMORE: You were adjutant?

VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, that is to say I was concerned with

technical matters. At that time I never presented a political report to

him. But I should add, if I may, this concerns a directive to Ambassador

Abetz and this directive was completely outdated by actual conditions.

Because advising the Secret Field Police...

COL. PHILLIMORE: How do you know that, if you were only personal

adjutant and not acting in political matters?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz was ambassador until May 1945.

Therefore from 1943 to 1945 I continuously corresponded with him, and

during that time Ambassador Abetz continually fought against the

measures which were carried out by the Secret State Police anyway. It

was a bitter struggle and he was personally threatened in all possible

matters. One can talk about advice, but whether people heeded him—he

had no power—that is quite another question.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Does it come to this, that your answer about occupied

territories applies only after 1943?

VON STEENGRACHT: From my own experience I can speak only about the

period after 1943.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to turn to the question of Jews. You have

told us that you and Ribbentrop, by adopting a policy of delay,

prevented the holding of the Anti-Jewish Congress in 1944; is that

correct?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you were against the policy of persecution of

the Jews.

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And so was the Defendant Ribbentrop?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I want you to look at Document 3319-PS. [_Handing the

document to the witness._]

My Lord, that is a new document. It will be Exhibit GB-287.

[_Turning to witness._] Now you have got a photostat there. Will you

look at Page 4 of the German—that’s the first page of the English. That

is a letter dated the 28th of April on the subject of anti-Jewish action

in foreign countries. It is marked at the bottom of Page 4.

VON STEENGRACHT: I have not found it.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you look at Page 4, marked in a black square at

the bottom of the page. You see a letter dated the 28th of April 1944,

Subject: Anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, and it is addressed to

practically every German legation and mission abroad.

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Turn to Page 10. You will see that it purports to be

signed by you; is that correct?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You remember the letter? I will read you the first

paragraph to refresh your memory. “The Reich Foreign Minister...”

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: “...has ordered the creation of Information

Department XIV (Anti-Jewish Action Abroad) under the leadership

of Envoy I. K. Schleier, whose task it is to deepen and

strengthen the anti-Jewish information service abroad by the

incorporation of all experts of the departments and working

units of the Foreign Office who have an interest and take part

in the anti-Jewish information service abroad, in close

co-operation with all offices outside the Foreign Office which

are engaged in anti-Jewish work and with the German missions in

Europe.”

Then you set out the co-workers, number of departments of the Foreign

Office, and then one permanent representative of the Reich Security Main

Office—that’s Himmler’s office, isn’t it?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And one representative of the office of Reichsleiter

Rosenberg. That department just up above “Inland II,” that is the

Foreign Office which had liaison with the SS, isn’t it?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: At that time the chief was a man called Wagner and the

assistant chief, Von Thadden?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you still say that you were against the policy of

persecution of the Jews?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I maintain that now as before. I also say, as I

have already said during earlier interrogations, that even the holding

of an anti-Jewish congress in its effect would not have been directed

against the Jews because what was happening in Germany was all taking

place under the seal of secrecy and no one was informed in any way. The

Jews disappeared. But if there had been an international congress, one

would have been forced in the first place to bring up the question:

where are these Jews anyway? What is actually happening to these Jews?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Is the point this, that you wanted to put off an

anti-Jewish congress because that would be known to the world, but you

were quite prepared to set up an organization in the Foreign Office?

VON STEENGRACHT: Gentlemen, we must separate two completely different

problems here. The one problem is this: There were offices in Germany

which conducted and carried out anti-Jewish measures. These

organizations also reached abroad and there, without the knowledge and

without the participation of the Foreign Office, did away with the

people in foreign countries. Consequently, an improvement and a policy

guided to some extent into normal channels could exist only if some

German department had really assumed responsibility for these things at

that time. For we did not hear of these matters; we always heard the

complaints which we received from foreign mission heads about events

which took place. But we had no means of control. If I applied to the

inner German offices...

COL. PHILLIMORE: Was this set up to control the anti-Jewish policy, this

department?

VON STEENGRACHT: Apparently we are discussing two different matters here

today. The anti-Jewish congress had been ordered. The fact that

Rosenberg’s office was holding an anti-Jewish congress...