I have no more questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask

questions of this witness?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May the witness be handed GB-262 (Document

Number 3258-PS). My Lord, that is the same document of which an extract

has already been handed up to the Tribunal while I was cross-examining

the last witness.

Witness, I want to be quite clear as to what you say about the Deutsches

Auslands-Institut. Do you say that that institute had no connection with

either Hess or the Auslands-Organisation?

STRÖLIN: The Deutsches Auslands-Institut had no connection with Hess.

The connection with the Auslands-Organisation was due to the fact that

the Auslands-Organisation had its meetings at Stuttgart.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So that the fact that the Auslands-Organisation

and the Deutsches Auslands-Institut both had their meetings at

Stuttgart, that is the only connection between the two organizations; is

that so?

STRÖLIN: The Auslands-Organisation, to my knowledge, did not consult the

German Auslands-Institut on practical matters, for it had its own

collection of material. The Auslands-Organisation was, as far as I know,

created in the year ’32, and...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I do not want to stop you, but if you can

answer my question “yes” or “no” it will save us all a great deal of

time. I will repeat my question in case you are not quite clear about

it. Do you say that the fact that both those organizations held their

meeting in Stuttgart is the only connection between the two? Now you can

answer that “yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that with “yes” or “no.” I must say that the

connecting link was the fact that Stuttgart was the city of foreign

Germans and so to speak the representative of Germans abroad, because of

its past history.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you read English?

STRÖLIN: A little.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 461 of the book that you

have? At the bottom of Page 461 you will see reproduced a copy of an

article from the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ of 21 September 1933.

The Tribunal will find the extract on Page 4 of the translation.

That article describes the annual meeting of your institution, after its

reorganization in 1933 when the Nazi Party came to power. I want to read

just four short extracts from that article 2 and ask you for your

comments.

“The chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut, Lord Mayor,

Dr. Strölin, opened the celebration.”

That is yourself presumably; is that so?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Among those present, he greeted in

particular, Minister President and Minister of Religion in

Württemberg, Mergenthaler, as the representative of the

supervisory authorities; General Haushofer of Munich as

representative of Rudolf Hess, who has been entrusted by the

Führer with the supreme direction of all matters concerning

Germans in foreign countries....”

Did you say that?

STRÖLIN: I cannot remember having said that. Haushofer was for me the

representative of the VDA, and I cannot conceive how he could have been

the deputy of Hess at this occasion. However, it is probably true.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think the Tribunal is safe in taking it

that the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ on the day after that celebration

would accurately report what you said in your opening address?

You need not look at the rest of it for the moment. It is not likely

that that article is untrue or incorrect, is it?

STRÖLIN: No, the article is probably correct, but I did not

remember—now looking back—that Haushofer was at that time the deputy

of Hess, for Rudolf Hess had no connection with the Deutsches

Auslands-Institut as such.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It appears that you are saying there, and you

are saying it in a speech, that Haushofer is representing Hess, and that

Hess has been charged by the Führer with the supreme command of all

matters concerning Germans in foreign countries. Do you understand what

you are saying there?

STRÖLIN: Yes, it may have been put that way at that time, but in

practice, it never happened that I received a directive of any kind from

Rudolf Hess.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Your institution could correctly be said to

concern itself in matters concerning Germans in foreign countries, could

it not?

STRÖLIN: I did not understand the question.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your institution, the Deutsches

Auslands-Institut, concern itself in matters concerning Germans in

foreign countries?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I shall leave that. Will you look

down the page and omit the next...

STRÖLIN: I would like to add to this point. It was the first time that I

made a speech for the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the speech was, of

course drafted with the approval of the personalities who were to be

welcomed there. I cannot longer remember that Haushofer was present in

that capacity on that occasion and can merely repeat my statement that

as the honorary president of the Institute I know nothing of Rudolf Hess

having given directives to the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may have known nothing about it, but you

were the new chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut at that time,

were you not?

STRÖLIN: No, I was not the chairman. The chairman of the Institute was a

special leader. In my capacity as Lord Mayor it was merely one of my

many extra duties to act as president of the Institute. It is quite

impossible for me to remember which personalities I greeted at the time,

and how I did it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Please confine yourself to answering the

particular question I put to you: Were you or were you not the chairman

of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut on 20 September 1933?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I was appointed to that position at that time.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had just been appointed because you were a

good Nazi and the Nazi Party had come to power and was reorganizing this

institution.

STRÖLIN: I was appointed to this post because I was Lord Mayor of

Stuttgart and because later the city of Stuttgart was called the “City

of Germans Abroad” since, because of its history and tradition it had

always had very close connection with Germans abroad.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, now, we will go on. Will you miss

out the next short paragraph and look at the paragraph which starts off,

“Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing Dr. Goebbels, stated the local

Party leadership...”

STRÖLIN: What page is that on?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is on the same page.

STRÖLIN: Page 461?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, it is on Page 462. And it is

the third paragraph in the center of the page.

STRÖLIN: Yes, I found the place.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing

Dr. Goebbels, stated, ‘The local Party leadership (Gauleitung)

is prepared to co-operate through thick and thin with the new

officers of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.’”

Hess, you know, was in charge of the Party leadership, wasn’t he—the

Gauleiter? We will go on:

“National Socialism will demand the blood unity of all Germans

as its historic right.”

Will you look now at Page 463—we will leave that—Will you look now...

STRÖLIN: May I say something in connection with this?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you please, yes.

STRÖLIN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Schmidt, was here purely in his capacity

as a deputy of the Gauleiter, but he was not the Deputy of Rudolf Hess.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No. But the point I am putting—I will make it

quite clear—is that the Gauleitung which came under Hess was going to

co-operate with your institution through thick and thin. You appreciate

that?

STRÖLIN: That is obvious.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Page 463, and on the second

paragraph:

“In his address the new director of the DAI, Dr. Csaki, stated:

‘We followed with deep distress the inner disunity of the German

people. Now since all that has been overcome, since we see that

all the German Folk (Volksdeutsche) organizations are standing

in one line, we are filled with a feeling of pride for our

German mother-country, a feeling of happiness: Germany is

united.’

“‘The feeling of adherence to the German people gives us a happy

consciousness. In the course of centuries this or that position

has been lost. We must prevent any from being lost. It gives us

a feeling of pride and self-confidence that we are bridges for

the German Lebensraum.’”

Was that in fact what the purpose of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut

was?

STRÖLIN: Dr. Csaki said in this quotation that the Germans abroad were

bridges to the German Lebensraum. This German Lebensraum also applied,

for instance, to the Germans in Hungary and Romania and to that extent

it is true when he says the Germans are “bridges” to this Lebensraum,

that is, the space in which Germans live. This has also always been the

attitude of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut; to build bridges to the

Lebensraum in which these Germans live.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, have you ever read a book by

Dr. Emil Ehrlich, or seen it, entitled: _Die Auslands-Organisation der

NSDAP_? You need not look at that. Have you ever read that book? A title

of that kind?

STRÖLIN: I do not think so.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that Dr. Emil Ehrlich was the

personal adviser to Bohle?

STRÖLIN: I believe he was Bohle’s adjutant at one time.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 305 of the book that you

have in front of you—My Lord, this passage appears on Page 5 of the

document the Tribunal has—and that is a reproduction of Dr. Emil

Ehrlich’s book. Would you look at the second paragraph on Page 305, half

way down that paragraph, starting:

“On 27 August 1936 the Führer designated Stuttgart as the ‘City

of Germans Abroad,’ and the Gauleiter of the

Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP assumed protection of this

beautiful city, which also houses within its walls the German

Auslands-Institut, which works in hearty co-operation with the

Auslands-Organisation.”

Would I be right in saying that throughout the whole history, from 1933

onwards, the Deutsches Auslands-Institut was working in the heartiest

co-operation with the Auslands-Organisation?

STRÖLIN: This is not correct, inasmuch as there was no practical or

scientific co-operation between the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the

Auslands-Organisation. The hearty co-operation, as I have already

mentioned, referred to the fact that the Ausland Germans had their

meetings in Stuttgart. That was the hearty co-operation between them.

There was no co-operation in practical matters since it was not

necessary.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 127 of this book? I want

you to tell me, looking at the last paragraph, whether that is an

accurate report, “All persons who in the future...” this is, I beg your

pardon, a confidential report on the special schooling work conducted by

the DAI for the foreign organizations. You did in fact, did you not,

assist the foreign organizations in training their Landesgruppenleiter

and other leaders abroad?

STRÖLIN: May I ask who signed this article or report?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I cannot tell you who signed that report. I

asked you a question. Did the Deutsches Auslands-Institut assist in

training leaders for the Auslands-Organisation abroad?

STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just turn over to Page 128, second

paragraph, which I read to you quite shortly:

“The Auslands-Institut plays a part in determining the

curriculum for the training camps (Schulungslager) as well as

serving as an intermediary between the party authorities who run

these camps and the Germans from abroad who attend them.”

You still say that that report is...

STRÖLIN: May I ask the date of this report?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I told you it is a report...

STRÖLIN: I had no knowledge of this report.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I just want to ask you one or two

very short questions on the evidence that you have given about the

Defendant Von Neurath. You have told us that he was a man of peace, with

an excellent, kind character. Do you know that on the 5th of November

1937 he attended a meeting at which Hitler addressed the leaders of his

Armed Forces? Did you ever hear of that meeting, on the 5th of November

1937?

STRÖLIN: No, I did not hear of this meeting, at least not until I was

imprisoned.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well then, perhaps I could tell you quite

shortly what took place. Hitler said at the meeting, among other things,

that the only way out of the German difficulties was to secure greater

living space, and he said that that problem could be solved only by

force. And, having said that, he then went on to say that he had decided

to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia. You never heard of that meeting?

STRÖLIN: No, I have not heard anything of that meeting, and concluded

only later that...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But...

STRÖLIN: May I finish my sentence?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know...

STRÖLIN: I said just that Von Neurath indicated to me that he had

serious differences of opinion with Hitler. That was toward the end of

1937. It was only later that I realized that he must have meant the

conference with Hitler and the attitude which he took on 5 November;

however, it was only when I was in prison that I heard through the

newspapers that such a conference actually took place.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I shall come to all that in a moment. I just

want you to get a picture of what happened at this meeting, and I quote

four lines from the minutes of that meeting:

“Hitler believed that very probably England and presumably

France had already secretly abandoned Czechoslovakia and were

satisfied that this question would one day be cleared up by

Germany.”

And Hitler then went on to say that the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and

Austria would constitute a conquest of food for 5 or 6 million people,

and that he visualized the compulsory immigration of 2 million people

from Czechoslovakia.

Now, that is what took place at that conference. Do you know that some 4

months later—on 12 March 1938—Von Neurath was giving an assurance to

M. Masaryk, and among other things he assured him, on behalf of Herr

Hitler, that Germany still considered herself bound by the

German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of 1925? Do you know that he

said that?

STRÖLIN: I do not recall it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Can you understand, now that I have told you

that that is a fact, can you understand anybody who had been at that

conference and had heard what Hitler had said on 5 November giving an

assurance to Czechoslovakia 4 months later in terms of that kind? Can

you understand any honest man doing that?

STRÖLIN: I cannot judge the situation prevailing at that time. I do not

know from whom Von Neurath might have received an order.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not asking you to judge at that time. I am

asking you now what your opinion is of a man who can do that sort of

thing. I want you to tell the Tribunal.

STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that because I do not have a comprehensive

picture of that situation.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must under any circumstances

object to this type of suggestive question. It is not permissible to put

such a question to the witness without giving him the complete picture

of how this assurance was given. The fact is, and it is correct, that in

the speech of 5 November 1937, Hitler for the first time developed plans

which were no longer in accord with the peace policy of Herr Von

Neurath, and Von Neurath took the opportunity—I believe in December or

early in January—to discuss this thoroughly with Hitler and point out

to him the impossibility of the policy which he apparently wanted to

embark upon and to persuade him not to carry it out. When from Hitler’s

reply he was forced to the conclusion that Hitler would nevertheless

insist on this policy which would lead to aggression in the future he

submitted his resignation. On 4 February 1938 Herr Von Neurath was

permitted to resign. He no longer participated in active politics.

On 11 or 12 March, when the invasion of Austria took place, an invasion

of which Herr Von Neurath had no inkling until that day, Hitler called

him...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly wait? The question was

put about the 5th of March 1938, whether a man who had heard the

conference of the 5th of November 1937 could have given the assurance of

the 5th of March.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I can also clarify that statement, if I may.

The question put by Minister Mastny was whether any military action

against Czechoslovakia was intended immediately or soon after the

invasion of Austria, and Herr Von Neurath believed that he could,

honestly and as a gentleman, answer this question in the negative.

We have to take into consideration the circumstances under which this

statement was made. First, Hitler, in his speech of 5 November 1937,

spoke of the years to come. When he marched into Austria on 12 March,

that is at a time which from 5 March...

THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment. We do not want to have all this

argument. The question was what was this witness’ opinion of a man who

had done that. That was all the question that was asked, and that

question is put to credit...

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I beg your pardon; no one can

answer that question unless he knows in what connection it was put. Mr.

Mastny asked whether the march into Austria would entail any aggressive

action against Czechoslovakia and Von Neurath answered that question. No

more and no less. He did not want to give an answer regarding the

future. The Minister wanted to know whether in connection with the march

of the German troops into Austria any military actions against

Czechoslovakia were intended. According to the information which my

client had, he could in the given situation answer this question in the

negative with a clear conscience. This question is admissible only if

the witness is informed about what I have just said. The point is not

that he declared once and for all Germany will never march into

Czechoslovakia, but that he merely answered the Czech Minister Mastny’s

question: Is there any danger that in connection with the march into

Austria, military measures will also be taken against Czechoslovakia?

This question he could answer the way he did. Therefore, the question in

the form in which it was put by the British Prosecution is in my opinion

not admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question properly admissible.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we will not pursue the matter. I ask you

just this one further question, so that I make myself quite clear. You

said in your evidence, as I wrote it down, that the Defendant Von

Neurath was well thought of, dignified and of noble character. Having

heard what I have told you, are you still prepared to tell the Court

that you think he is well thought of, dignified, and of noble character?

Is that your opinion now? I just want to get the value of your evidence;

do you see? After what you have been told is that your opinion?

STRÖLIN: It is still my opinion that Herr Von Neurath is a man of

distinguished and decent character. I cannot judge under what

circumstances he acted at the time and what considerations prompted him

to act this way.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say that he was in favor of peace and did

all he could to avoid a war. Do you call a deceit of that kind doing

everything possible to avoid war? Is that what your idea of a peaceful

policy is—giving assurance 4 months after you know perfectly well that

the German intention is to overrun their country? Is that what you call

doing everything to avoid war?

STRÖLIN: I would like to state once more that I do not sufficiently

understand the essential points and ramifications of this question to

form a proper opinion on it. But obviously things cannot be as simple as

they have been pictured here.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me turn to another aspect of this matter.

We have been told at great length that he disapproved of Hitler’s

policy, and that he resigned. Do you know that, having resigned, he was

appointed Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939? Do you know

that?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was after the remainder of Czechoslovakia

had been overrun, occupied.

STRÖLIN: I said previously that Von Neurath told me that he accepted

this post very reluctantly; that he had twice refused to accept it but

later he believed that he had to make a sacrifice in order to achieve

his ends; and, as the State President Hacha told me later, Von Neurath’s

personal influence was of great benefit because, as Hacha told me, Von

Neurath’s activity undoubtedly had a balancing and conciliatory effect.

As I said before, he was recalled because he was too mild.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you have already said it, and we have

heard it, and we have remembered it, so it is quite unnecessary for you

to say it again. Do try to answer my question shortly. Let me ask you

this question. Have you ever thought that the reason for that

appointment might have been as a reward for his assistance in the

occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia that had followed so shortly

before?

STRÖLIN: No, I never thought of that. However, if I may mention it, I

have read quite a different version in the book by Henderson, that is,

that Von Neurath had been put into that post so that his international

prestige could be discredited. I wanted to bring in this version in

order to point out that there were other possibilities that might come

into question.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember that you described him as a

disciplined, humane, and conscientious man?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at that poster.

[_The poster was submitted to the witness._]

My Lord, I regret that I have not got a copy of this for the Tribunal.

It is a very short matter. It has been introduced in the Czechoslovak

report on the German occupation. I will give Your Lordship the number:

Document Number USSR-60.

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you see that this is signed by the

Defendant Von Neurath, the humane and conscientious man?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I see that the Czech universities were closed for a period

of 3 years, and that nine culprits were shot. This announcement,

however, does not say, as far as I can see, exactly why this was done.

Consequently I cannot pass judgment on the announcement, because I do

not know what Von Neurath proclaimed in it. The announcement does not

tell me anything, if I do not know the reason why the announcement was

issued. That universities were closed and nine culprits shot must have

been for convincing reasons.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I add the following? I would

like to say this in order to save time. This question of Czechoslovakia

and of this poster, with which I am also familiar, will, of course, be

dealt with, in connection with Von Neurath’s case, and at that stage of

the proceedings. I will then have the opportunity to bring the proof

that this poster did not originate with the Defendant Von Neurath. This

witness was not in Prague and can relate only things which he did not

know of his own experience, but which Herr Von Neurath told him.

Therefore, I believe that this question is not appropriate and is taking

up time unnecessarily, for I would have to raise objections and describe

the actual situation. We should not put questions to the witness which,

though put in good faith, are positively incorrect, that is, questions

which are based on inaccurately reported facts which actually occurred

in a different manner. I shall prove that at the time when this poster

was drafted and put up, Herr Von Neurath was not in Prague and was not

informed of what was going on during his absence.

Therefore I believe that we should not deal with this question today,

since, as I have said, the witness cannot know anything about it from

his own observation.

THE PRESIDENT: It will be open to you to show that this poster was put

up when Von Neurath was not at Prague, and that he gave no authority for

it. That would clear him with reference to this poster; but what is

being put to this witness is: Assuming that this poster was put up by

Von Neurath, is it right to describe him as a humane man? That is all

the cross-examination means.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But, the witness knows nothing of this poster. He

cannot answer the question correctly if he does not know the

ramifications, if he does not know that this poster actually did not

originate with Herr Von Neurath.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness was examined at great length by you to show

he was a humane man and had a very good character. Under such

circumstances it is up to the Prosecution to put to the witness

circumstances which would indicate that he was not of that humane

character. That is all that is being done.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that case the most this witness could say would

be “I do not know,” or “if it is true, one cannot call it humane.” Any

one of us can say that. The witness does not need to say it.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can say, “If this is correct it is

inconsistent with what I knew of Von Neurath.”

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He cannot and he will not say that either, for the

simple reason that he does not know the circumstances under which this

poster was published. Frankly I cannot see the purpose of this question,

for if the question is put in that way, every decent individual will say

that it is inhumane; but this would not alter the fact that the witness

would be judging facts which do not exist and which are not true.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, don’t you think this is really

taking up unnecessary time, if this witness doesn’t know anything about

it? I quite see that it is the proper purpose of cross-examination to

discredit the witness.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to the Tribunal. The point of

that cross-examination was, perhaps I might be allowed to say, this:

This defendant has produced a witness to give evidence on his oath

before this Tribunal. If that evidence is unchallenged, then it goes

down on the record, and there is nothing to stop this Tribunal from

regarding this witness as a man who is in a position to give reliable

evidence of that kind. This cross-examination is rather to show that

this witness, whether he is saying it truthfully or untruthfully, is

certainly inaccurate. The evidence he has given as to the good character

of this defendant does not bear investigation—that is quite clear—and

the Tribunal is not saying we are not entitled to cross-examine as to

character. However, I do not think I need occupy the time of the

Tribunal with that.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. AMEN: Witness, when were you last in New York City?

STRÖLIN: I was in New York in 1936.

COL. AMEN: At that time you made a speech at Madison Square Garden; is

that correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: That was a rally in the Garden?

STRÖLIN: It was for “German Day,” on 6 October 1936.

COL. AMEN: A “German Day” rally, correct?

STRÖLIN: It was the annual meeting of the Germans which took place on 6

October.

COL. AMEN: And a great percentage of the German-American Bund, is that

correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: In fact, that whole rally was held under the auspices of the

German-American Bund, was it not?

STRÖLIN: The fact is, a festival committee had been commissioned by all

German clubs—I believe there are all in all two thousand of them in New

York—and these 2,000 German clubs had united in one festival committee

which organized the “German Day.” I did not know the composition of this

committee in detail.

COL. AMEN: And it was at the solicitation of the German-American Bund

that you made your speech, was it not?

STRÖLIN: No, it was at the solicitation of the festival committee of the

German clubs of New York.

COL. AMEN: Yes, and on that committee were numerous members of the

German-American Bund; is that true? “Yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, there were many of the members of

your organization at that time who were active members of the

German-American Bund; is that correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And you personally had had several conferences with them,

both here in Germany and in New York City, correct?

STRÖLIN: No, that is not correct.

COL. AMEN: Well, what is correct?

STRÖLIN: It is correct that I was invited, but there were no further

conferences.

COL. AMEN: But you do not dispute that many of the members of your

organization were at that time members of the German-American Bund?

STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.

THE PRESIDENT [_To the witness_]: I have just taken down that you have

said that was so.

COL. AMEN: Precisely.

STRÖLIN: Please repeat the question.

COL. AMEN: Did you not just tell me a few moments ago, in response to a

previous question, that many members of your organization were members

of the German-American Bund at the time of your speech at the rally in

Madison Square Garden?

STRÖLIN: When you speak of an “organization,” do you mean members of the

German Auslands-Institut?

COL. AMEN: “Your organization” is the way I put it.

STRÖLIN: I had no organization; I had an institute.

COL. AMEN: Exactly. And under whose auspices were you making this speech

in Madison Square Garden?

STRÖLIN: I was asked to make this speech because I had shortly before

been appointed Lord Mayor of the City of Germans Abroad. I was Lord

Mayor of that city, and therefore I was asked to deliver the address.

Stuttgart was made the City of Germans Abroad, since the Swabians

furnished most of the emigrants, and for that reason Stuttgart was to be

the home city of foreign Germans.

COL. AMEN: Well, is it not a fact that many members of the

Auslands-Organisation were at that time also members of the

German-American Bund? “Yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Is it not also a fact that at that time many members of the

Institute were also members of the German-American Bund? Yes or no.

STRÖLIN: Yes, some of these Germans had come from America; they were

students who had studied in America and returned to Germany.

COL. AMEN: And is it not also a fact that many of these members of the

German-American Bund, who were likewise members of the

Auslands-Organisation and of the Institute, were indicted and tried and

convicted for various espionage offenses in the Federal courts of the

United States? Yes or no.

STRÖLIN: No, I know nothing about that.

COL. AMEN: You never heard that?

STRÖLIN: No, I never heard about it. I know of the case of Kappe, but

that has no connection with the Deutsche Auslands-Institut.

COL. AMEN: That is one case, as a matter of fact; now, you know some

others too, don’t you?

STRÖLIN: I wonder if you could give me particulars.

COL. AMEN: I could, but I am asking you the questions rather than trying

to tell you the answers.

STRÖLIN: I cannot remember any other case. Please question me.

COL. AMEN: No, I will go to another subject now, because it is getting

late. Are you acquainted with a Mr. Alfred Weninger—W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r?

STRÖLIN: I did not understand the name. Alfred...

COL. AMEN: Alfred Weninger, W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r, or however you pronounce

it.

STRÖLIN: Weninger—yes I am familiar with that name.

COL. AMEN: Who is he?

STRÖLIN: Alfred Weninger is, to my knowledge, at present in France. I

believe he is a jurist.

COL. AMEN: Well, don’t you know? Don’t you know whether he is a jurist

or not?

STRÖLIN: Yes, he is employed as a jurist.

COL. AMEN: What is his nationality?

STRÖLIN: He is a Frenchman.

COL. AMEN: Is he a friend of yours?

STRÖLIN: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Did you intervene on his behalf on at least one occasion?

STRÖLIN: I provided for his release from prison.

COL. AMEN: That was in March 1943?

STRÖLIN: No, there must be some misunderstanding. I mean the Alfred

Weninger who is a Frenchman and whom I helped during the war so that he

was not sentenced to death, and was later released from prison. However,

that took place during the period from 1942 to 1944. I do not know

another Alfred Weninger. There may be two Alfred Weningers.

COL. AMEN: No, that is correct. He was sentenced along with 12 other

comrades for espionage and intelligence with the enemy.

STRÖLIN: Yes, and he is the one whom I helped.

COL. AMEN: And you intervened with the Attorney General at the People’s

Court?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I intervened with Freisler.

COL. AMEN: And also, at the Ministries of the Interior and Justice in

Berlin?

STRÖLIN: I submitted to the Ministry of the Interior a memorandum

regarding conditions in Alsace, at the time, in order to have the

Alsatians pardoned.

COL. AMEN: And as a result of your efforts, these people received

temporary suspension of their sentences; is that correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes. I would like to mention expressly that I asked Herr Von

Neurath to intervene and it is due to a letter which he wrote to Hitler

that these Alsatians were pardoned.

COL. AMEN: So that this individual, to put it mildly, is under a

considerable obligation to you at the present time? Correct?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I imagine so.

COL. AMEN: Well, you saved his life in effect, did you not?

STRÖLIN: I also saved the lives of many others; I do not know if the

people are grateful for it or not.

COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, I take it you do not question the truth

of what he might report as a conversation with you, correct?

STRÖLIN: I do not doubt that he would remember this.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall having a conversation with him in June of 1940?

STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot say unless you tell me what it was

about.

COL. AMEN: Well, I will tell you what you are reported by him to have

said and I ask you whether you recall having said that to him, either in

the exact words which I put to you, or in substance. Do you understand?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand.

COL. AMEN: Here are the words: “I warn you against National

Socialism, which does not recoil before anything, and which

makes justice its servile agent. They are criminals and I have

but the one wish—to get out of it.”

Did you say that to Weninger in words or in substance? “Yes” or “no”?

STRÖLIN: I did not quite understand what you said. Will you please

repeat it?

COL. AMEN: You understand English, don’t you, Witness?

STRÖLIN: Some. I understand just a little.

COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, you were interrogated in English by one

of our interrogators, were you not?

STRÖLIN: I spoke a little English only on one occasion, but I believe

that he did not understand me correctly.

COL. AMEN: And you understood perfectly well what I just read to you,

did you not?

STRÖLIN: I did not fully understand the German translation of what you

said and the substance of your question is not clear to me.

COL. AMEN: Well, I shall read it to you again. But I suggest that you

are merely taking this time in order to find out what answer you want to

make. I ask you again whether you said to Weninger in words or in

substance, in June of 1940, the following:

“I warn you against National Socialism, which does not recoil

before anything, and which makes justice its servile agent. They

are criminals and I have but the one wish—to get out of it.”

Do you understand?

STRÖLIN: Yes, I understand but I do not recall having made that

statement.

COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement when I tell you that

Weninger so states—Weninger, whom you have just told us has every

obligation to you?

STRÖLIN: I do not remember it. It may be true that I made critical

statements, but I do not recall the wording.

COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement? Answer yes or no.

STRÖLIN: I deny the statement. I deny that I made it in this form.

COL. AMEN: Did you make it in substance; did you make that statement?

STRÖLIN: I cannot remember the conversation at all.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall having made another statement to Weninger in

1936 in Strasbourg—were you in Strasbourg with Weninger in 1936?

STRÖLIN: At the moment I cannot recall.

COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?

STRÖLIN: I cannot recall.

COL. AMEN: It is quite possible?

STRÖLIN: It is possible, but I cannot recall it. I cannot at a moment’s

notice recall the date I was there.

COL. AMEN: And did you not say to Weninger in Strasbourg in 1936, in

words or in substance, the following: “When I am abroad I am ashamed to

be a German”? “Yes” or “no.”

STRÖLIN: It was entirely out of the question at that time, since in the

year of 1936 I was very proud of the fact that I was a German.

COL. AMEN: And then, do you deny having made that statement to Weninger?

STRÖLIN: I am quite certain that I did not make that statement in the

year 1936.

COL. AMEN: When did you make it?

STRÖLIN: I do not recall having made such a statement to Weninger at

all, at least not in 1936.

COL. AMEN: When did you make that statement to Weninger or anybody else?

In what year did you decide to make statements like that?

STRÖLIN: I cannot recall having made such a statement at all.

COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?

STRÖLIN: I frankly admit that there was a time when one was no longer

proud of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the other Prosecutors wish to cross-examine?

DR. SEIDL: I have no questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. [_The witness left the

stand._]

Does that conclude your case, Dr. Seidl, or have you got any other

evidence to offer?

DR. SEIDL: Yes. First, I have to read into the record the questionnaire

of the witness Alfred Hess which has arrived in the meantime. The

Tribunal has admitted his testimony in the form of a questionnaire. I

would then like to refer to various documents in Document Book Number 3,

but before going into that and to conclude today’s proceedings, I would

like to establish upon the request of the Defendant Hess—this refers to

Volume 2 of the document book—that Lord Simon came to the meeting as

the official representative of the British Government; I therefore read

a few sentences from Page 93 (Volume II, Page 93):

“Lord Simon said: ‘Herr Reichsminister, I was informed that you

had come here feeling charged with a mission and that you wished

to speak of it to someone who would be able to receive it with

Government authority. You know I am Dr. Guthrie and therefore I

come with the authority of the Government and I shall be willing

to listen and to discuss with you as far as seems good anything

you would wish to state for the information of the Government.’”

That was what I wished to state in completion of my reading of the Simon

minutes.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you be able to finish tonight if we went on for a

few minutes or not?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the answers on this questionnaire are rather

long. The witness was cross-examined and I assume that the Prosecution

also intend to read the particulars of the cross-examination and I do

not believe this would be possible today.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

NINETY-FIRST DAY

Tuesday, 26 March 1946

_Morning Session_

MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, Defendant Streicher will be absent

from this session of the Court.

PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, I now turn to the reading of the

interrogation of the witness Alfred Hess.

THE PRESIDENT: Where shall we find it?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I received this transcript of the

interrogation of the witness only last Saturday, and it has thus not

been possible for me to incorporate it into the document book as yet.

This witness was interrogated at Bad Mergentheim on 19 March.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that we haven’t got copies of it?

DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the General Secretary, from whom I

received this transcript, has supplied a copy for the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you had better go on then. Go on.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. Before answering the first question, the witness made a

few preliminary remarks which are as follows:

“It should be noted that I had to terminate my activity in the

Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP after the flight to England

of my brother Rudolf Hess, Deputy of the Führer. Therefore, the

following statements are valid only for the period up to 12 May

1941.

“Question 1: ‘What were the tasks and the purpose of the

Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP?’

“Answer: ‘The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was the

cultural, social, and economic care of all German nationals in

foreign countries, regardless of whether they were Party members

or not. The Auslands-Organisation in this sense was to be a

bridge between Germans abroad and the home country. Its purpose

was to foster and maintain love for and ties with the distant

home country and to keep alive understanding for the fatherland,

as well as to awaken the understanding of Germans at home for

the hard battle for existence of their compatriots all over the

world. The German abroad, through his dignified, upright

bearing, was to make himself popular in the country of his

adoption, and thus act as the best representative of his

fatherland.’

“Question 2: ‘Who could become a member of the

Auslands-Organisation?’

“Answer: ‘The question is not understandable. There was no such

thing as a membership in the Auslands-Organisation; just as

little, for example, as there was a membership in the Foreign

Office of the Reich or in a Gau of the NSDAP in the Reich.’

“Question 3: ‘Is it correct that on the membership card of each

Reich German Party member the following principle was printed as

a ruling principle of the Auslands-Organisation: “Follow the

laws of the country whose guest you are, let its people make the

internal policy of that country, do not interfere in this, not

even in conversation”?’

“Answer: ‘It is correct that the above principle, among similar

ones, was printed on the membership card or on its cover. If I

am not mistaken, underneath this principle there was the warning

even of expulsion from the NSDAP if this principle was not

observed. This latter is to be ascertained without great

difficulty by procuring a cover, which was in the possession of

every Party member in a foreign country.’

“Question 4: ‘Did the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP develop

any activity which could appear as Fifth Column?’

“Answer: ‘“Fifth Column” is not a clear concept, uniformly used.

In general, it would probably mean secret espionage or sabotage

activity. According to its guiding principles, the

Auslands-Organisation could not have carried on any such

activity.’

“‘I remember that the slogan “Fifth Column” of the foreign press

was considered in the Auslands-Organisation as a clever bluff of

the antifascist propaganda, and it caused genuine amusement.

Seriously, no state could conceive that such a widely known,

rather suspect and vulnerable organization could be suited for

any service in the nature of the Fifth Column. I consider it

natural that some individual Germans abroad had secret missions,

services such as other nationals performed likewise for their

fatherland, but the Auslands-Organisation was certainly not the

giver of such assignments nor the intermediary for such agents.’

“Question 5: ‘What kind of instructions and directives did the

Deputy of the Führer give the Auslands-Organisation for its

activity?’

“Answer: ‘The instructions and directives of the Deputy of the

Führer for the activity of the Auslands-Organisation are such as

those mentioned in my answers to Questions 1 and 3. He pointed

out again and again, with special emphasis, his strict

instructions that the groups abroad were not to do anything

which could be detrimental to the countries affording them

hospitality, or which could be considered an interference in the

affairs of those countries. The basic principle must also be

that National Socialism was a purely German movement, not an

article for export which one wanted to force on other countries

as suitable for them.’

“Question 6: ‘Did the Deputy of the Führer give the

Auslands-Organisation any directions or orders which could have

caused them to carry on an activity similar to that of the Fifth

Column?’

“Answer: ‘The Deputy of the Führer not only never issued any

such directions or orders, but as stated above in Answer 5, laid

down principles which absolutely prohibited any activity of the

sort carried on by the so-called Fifth Column.’

“Question 7: ‘Is it correct that, on the contrary, the Deputy of

the Führer took meticulous care that in all circumstances

interference in the internal affairs of the country of adoption

was to be avoided?’

“Answer: ‘I can repeat only that it was a chief concern of the

Deputy of the Führer to direct the work of the

Auslands-Organisation abroad in such a way that no interference

of any kind should take place in the internal affairs of the

country of residence. The few insignificant offenses, which were

unavoidable with the then very large number of German nationals

abroad—already amounting to several million—were

correspondingly severely punished.’

“Question 8: ‘What were the tasks and the aims of the Volksbund

für das Deutschtum im Ausland (League for Germans Abroad)?’

“Answer: ‘The Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland had the

cultural care of the so-called Volksdeutsche. Volksdeutsche are

racial Germans who had lost their German citizenship either

voluntarily or through the laws of other countries, that is, had

acquired the citizenship of another country, for instance,

America, Hungary, Transylvania, _et cetera_.’

“Question 9: ‘Did the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland

ever, in particular however before 10 May 1941, develop any

activity which could have given it the appearance of a Fifth

Column?’

“Answer: ‘I must state in this connection that the activity of

the Auslands-Organisation did not have anything to do with the

Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, so I can have no

insight into its work. But I consider it entirely out of the

question that my brother could have given the Volksbund tasks of

a Fifth Column nature. It would neither have fallen within the

jurisdiction of the Deputy of the Führer, nor have corresponded

with his views as to the mission of the Volksbund für das

Deutschtum im Ausland.’

“Question 10, and last question: ‘What kind of directions and

instructions did the Deputy of the Führer give as to the

activity of this Bund?’

“Answer: ‘Directions, _et cetera_, which my brother gave as to

the activity of this Bund are unknown to me, for, as already

stated, my activity in the Auslands-Organisation was in no way

connected with the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im

Ausland.’”—Signed—“Alfred Hess. Sworn to and subscribed on 19

March 1946.”

The witness Alfred Hess was then cross-examined in connection with his

interrogation. I assume that the Prosecution want to submit this

cross-examination themselves to the Tribunal. But if this

cross-examination and the questions belonging to it have not yet been

translated, it might perhaps be practicable if it were done directly, in

this connection.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If

it please the Tribunal, we have received the cross-interrogatories but I

suggest respectfully that, rather than take the time to read them, we

offer them and if the Court will permit us, have them translated into

the four languages. It will take another 10 minutes or so to read them

and we are not interested in doing it unless the Tribunal feels that we

should.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Mr. Dodd.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I do not know whether the

affidavit of Ambassador Gaus submitted by me yesterday has been

translated and whether the Tribunal has received these translations

already. Yesterday at midday I gave six copies to the information office

and have heard nothing further since.

THE PRESIDENT: Can the Prosecution inform the Tribunal what the position

is?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the Prosecution has not had a copy of

this affidavit yet so we do not know what is in it. We suggest that

perhaps Dr. Seidl could postpone the reading of that until we have had a

chance to consider it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am afraid that must be postponed.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. Now I turn to Volume 3 of the document book.

If it please the Tribunal, this volume of the document book contains, in

substance, statements and quotations taken from books and speeches of

foreign statesmen, diplomats, and political economists, regarding the

history and origin of the Versailles Treaty, the contents of the

Versailles Treaty, the territorial changes made by this treaty, such as

the question of the Polish Corridor, and above all the disastrous

economic consequences which this treaty had for Germany and also for the

rest of the world.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have read the documents in this book

and I should like just to say one or two words about them.

They are opinions expressed by a great variety of gentlemen, including

politicians, economists, and journalists. They are opinions that are

expressed polemically and some of them journalistically, and with most

of them one is familiar and knew them when they were expressed 15 to 25

years ago.

Now, while I submit, as I have submitted to the Tribunal, that the whole

subject is too remote, I have a suggestion which I hope the Tribunal

will consider reasonable, that the Prosecution should, as I suggested

yesterday, let this book go in at the moment _de bene esse_ and that

when Dr. Seidl comes to making his final speech he can adopt the

arguments that are put forward by the various gentlemen whom he quotes,

if he thinks they are right. He can use the points as illustrations,

always provided the thesis that he is developing is one which the

Tribunal thinks relevant to the issues before it. That will preserve for

Dr. Seidl the advantage of the right to use these documents subject, as

I say, to the relevancy of the issues, but I suggest that it would be

quite wrong to read them as evidence at the moment. They are merely

polemical and journalistic opinions and directed to an issue which the

Prosecution has submitted, and I do submit, is too remote.

However, I am most anxious that Dr. Seidl should have every advantage

for his final speech. Therefore, I suggest it would be convenient if

they were put in without being read at the moment and were left subject

to the limitation of relevancy, which can be considered when all the

evidence is before the Tribunal, for him to make use of in his final

speech.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I shortly...

THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, Dr. Seidl. We will hear you in a

moment—perhaps it would be better to hear what you have to say now. Do

you think the suggestion made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe would be one

which would be acceptable to you?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, at first glance the suggestion of Sir David

Maxwell-Fyfe seems to be very reasonable. But I believe I must say that

if the matter is treated in that way great difficulties will arise for

the Defense. For example the arguments on relevancy, which in their

nature belong in the presentation of evidence and must be heard there,

will be postponed until the final speech of the Defense. This would mean

that the defense counsel in his final speech would be interrupted again

and again; that he would have to argue for the relevancy of his

quotations; that perhaps whole parts of his speech would fall by the

wayside in that manner; and that in that way the danger would arise that

the cohesion of the speech will be broken completely.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is a danger which every advocate

has to meet, that certain portions of his speech may not be deemed

relevant, but I thought that that might be a helpful way out. But if it

is not accepted, then the Prosecution must respectfully but very

strongly submit that the issues of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles

are not relevant to this Tribunal.

I have already argued that and I do not want to develop it at great

length. I do want to make it clear that the questions which are raised

by the quotations here were, of course, the subject of political

controversy in practically every country in Europe, and different

opinions were expressed as to the rightness and the practicality of the

provisions, especially the economic provisions of the Treaty of

Versailles. I am not disputing that that is a matter of controversy, but

I am saying that it is not a controversy that should come before this

Tribunal. I myself have replied to practically all the quotations from

the English statesmen here as a politician over the past years, and I am

sure many people in this Court must have taken one view or the other,

but that is not a relevant issue to this Tribunal, and, of course,

especially is it wrong in my view to put forward as evidential matter

opinions expressed by one side in the controversy. Every one of these

speeches, as far as they were English, was either preceded by matters to

which it was a reply or was followed by a reply, and I should think the

same applies to those of Senator Borah in the United States.

These matters—this is my second point—are not really evidential, and

this is a point for argument; and it will have to be decided what is a

convenient time for the Tribunal to decide on whether this is a relevant

issue. But that was why I put forward this suggestion that it was better

to decide it when the whole of the true evidence of fact had been put

before the Tribunal. But I do want, apart from my suggestion, to make

quite clear that as regards relevance, the Prosecution unitedly submit

that the rightness or practicality of the provisions of the Treaty of

Versailles is not a relevant matter. The other argument—I want to

distinguish between the two—the other argument has been adumbrated by

Dr. Stahmer as to the actual terms of the preamble to the military

clauses. That is quite a different point which we can discuss when, as I

understand, certain propositions of law are to be put forward by one of

the defense counsel on behalf of the Defense. But, as I say, the

rightness and practicality of the Treaty and especially the economic

clauses is a subject of enormous controversy on which there are

literally thousands of different opinions from one shade to the other,

and I submit it is not an issue before this Court, and, secondly, I

submit this is not evidence. It is not evidential matter, even if it

were an issue.

DR. SEIDL: May I perhaps reply briefly?

THE PRESIDENT: Then, Sir David, your proposition would be that Dr. Seidl

could not quote from any of these documents?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, certainly, yes, on my premise that it

is irrelevant matter, he could not.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. They are not admissible.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are not admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My original suggestion was of course, leaving

over the discussion of whether they are admissible until all the

evidence had been filed, but if that is not accepted, I submit bluntly

if I may use the word with all respect—that they are not admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: May I reply briefly, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

DR. SEIDL: It would indicate a complete misinterpretation of my

intentions if one were to assume that by the submission of this document

book I wanted to show whether or not the Treaty of Versailles is an

expression of statesmanly wisdom. I am not concerned with that here.

With the submission of this document it is to be shown, or rather there

is to be brought under discussion:

Firstly: Whether the opposite side at the conclusion of the Treaty, in

the preliminary negotiations—I call your attention to Wilson’s Fourteen

Points—was not guilty for its part, of violation of the general treaty

obligations, whether a _culpa in contrahendo_ is not to be assumed here.

Secondly: The presentation of the documents should show whether the

opposite side complied with the obligations arising from the treaty, in

order to establish—that is, to give the Tribunal the opportunity of

establishing—in this way the legal inferences which Germany might draw

from this.

Thirdly: The Treaty of Versailles and its violation by the defendants

forms the nucleus of Count One of the Indictment, namely, the Conspiracy

charged by the Prosecution. The Prosecution, in replying to a question

of the Tribunal as to when the conspiracy may be said to have started,

has said that the date might be set as far back as 1921.

Fourthly: The Prosecution has extensive...

THE PRESIDENT: I have not the least idea what you meant by the last

point. I do not understand what you said in the last point in the least.

DR. SEIDL: I wanted to say that for the beginning of the Conspiracy

alleged by the Prosecution, the Treaty of Versailles played a decisive

part, and that there is at least some causal nexus between the origin of

this treaty and the alleged Conspiracy. Before there can be talk of

illegality and of guilt, the facts have to be established which were

causative for the Conspiracy charged by the Prosecution.

Fourthly: The Prosecution has submitted extensive evidence on the

development of the NSDAP. Numerous document books were submitted to the

Court to show the growth in membership, to demonstrate the increase in

the Reichstag mandates. Now, if this evidence was relevant, it is my

assertion that also the circumstances and the facts that first enabled

this rise of the Party at all must be relevant, if only from the

viewpoint of causal nexus.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it your contention that the opinion of a journalist

after the Treaty of Versailles was made, stating that, in his opinion,

the Treaty of Versailles was unjust to Germany, would be admissible

either for the interpretation of the Treaty or for any other purpose

with which this Tribunal is concerned?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I admit that of course the isolated opinion of

a foreign journalist has not in itself to be a relevant document. But I

do maintain that the opinion of Secretary of State Lansing on the coming

about of the Treaty of Versailles and his connection with the history of

this treaty must be of some evidential relevance. What weight attaches

to his opinion is a question which cannot yet be established at this

point. This question can be decided by the Tribunal only when the

complete evidence has been submitted. I maintain further that the

opinion of the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the

Senate of the United States on the Treaty of Versailles, about its

formulation, about its effects within the Conspiracy alleged by the

Prosecution which purportedly is said to be directed chiefly against the

Treaty of Versailles can _prima facie_ have value as evidence. The same

applies to most of the other statements quoted in this document book. I

would like to call attention to Gustav Cassel, to John Maynard Keynes,

the official financial advisor of the British Government, and to a

number of others.

THE PRESIDENT: It is your contention that because of the provisions of

the Versailles Treaty or because of an infraction of those provisions by

the signatory powers, Germany was justified in making an aggressive war?

DR. SEIDL: I cannot answer that now definitely, so long as I have not

heard the evidence of the other defendants. I do assert, however, that

by violation of the Treaty of Versailles by the opposite side, under

certain circumstances Germany or the defendants could infer the right to

rearm, and that is an infraction of the Treaty of Versailles with which

the defendants are charged. As far as the right to an aggressive war is

concerned, I should not like to make any positive statements at least

until such time as the Tribunal has taken official notice of the

affidavit of Ambassador Gaus.

THE PRESIDENT: One more question I should like to ask you: Are you

saying that the Fourteen Points which were laid down by President Wilson

are admissible evidence to construe the written document of the

Versailles Treaty?

DR. SEIDL: I do not say that the Fourteen Points of Wilson, _per se_,

are admissible evidence. I do assert, on the other hand, that the

connection between these Fourteen Points of Wilson and the Treaty of

Versailles, and the contradiction resulting therefrom are of causal

significance for the Conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you are really saying that the Versailles Treaty,

insofar as it departed from the Fourteen Points, was an unjust treaty?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, whether the treaty was just or not is a point

which I do not wish to prove with this document at all. Whether the

treaty was unjust or not is in my opinion a fact which perhaps is beyond

the scope of these proceedings. I do assert, however, that the treaty,

at least in many of its terms, did not bring that which the victorious

states themselves expected of it.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: Not at this point.

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Since it is a very

fundamental question which has been raised now for discussion by Sir

David, and since the Defense must always calculate on the possibility

that the Tribunal, even at this point, may make a decision on the

question of whether and how far such documentary material as that

discussed can be produced, I consider myself duty-bound to add to the

statements of my colleague, Dr. Seidl, with whom I agree fully, just a

few supplementary words. And I would like to reply to the very precise

question of Your Lordship which starts, “Do you consider it

relevant...?” I believe—and I will avoid any repetition—that a very

vital point as far as relevancy is concerned has not been brought out

yet, and that is the subjective aspect; that is the relevancy of the

investigation of evidence and of facts regarding the subjective state of

the individual defendant, that is, of the facts as seen from within.

If, for example, one of the defendants committed an act which was,

considered purely objectively, a breach of the Treaty of Versailles,

then, as far as criminal law is concerned and looking at it from the

subjective view, it is of great significance whether in the opinion of

reasonable, just, and educated men of all nations, he acted with an

attitude and with a viewpoint which was not merely his special

viewpoint, but that of the most serious men of the various nations and

also of those nations which fought against Germany in the years 1914-18.

In order not to be too abstract, I should like to cite a concrete

example:

A defendant holds the opinion that he is entitled to rearmament—not to

aggressive war; I will not touch this question. He considers rearmament

justified, either because the treaty has not been kept by the other side

or because owing to _expressis verbis_, or to some action, it is to be

considered obsolete. In my opinion it is of decisive relevancy whether

this defendant with this point of view, which explains his action, is

alone in all the world, or whether the opinion which guides his action

is held by men who are to be taken seriously, and who belonged to other

nations, even to those who in the years 1914-18 stood on the other side

and were his enemies.

Rearmament according to the Prosecution, as I understand, is not a

crime, as such, but is merely used by the Prosecution as a charge for

the proving of the crime of having carried on an aggressive war. If,

now, a defendant can prove that he acted from clean and decent views,

views which, as stated, were held by such men of other nations as I have

described, and acted conscientiously and with a clear conscience both as

regards international law and international morals and also as regards

the needs of his country, then this material, which contains opinions,

literary statements, speeches, that coincide with the views of the

defendant in question, is not only of relevant, but of entirely decisive

significance. This viewpoint I ask the Tribunal to bear in mind, if it

desires to decide now the question of principle which Sir David has just

now raised for debate, and which he had to raise, as I fully recognize.

Moreover I am also now in the agreeable position of being able to agree

with Sir David in the practical handling of this matter. I too—and I am

speaking now for myself only—would prefer to have the decision on this

question postponed until the time suggested by Sir David. As far as I am

concerned I will accept the disadvantages, which Dr. Seidl is right in

seeing, because an advantage will result if the Tribunal decides this

question at that time, since it will then have a much larger view on all

questions and shades which are important for the decision. And at this

point I am not at all in a position to speak comprehensively about them,

for I do not want to make any summarizing speech, but just to treat one

aspect of this question of evidence.

DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): I should like to

add a few remarks to those made by my colleague Dr. Dix. I request the

Tribunal...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how many of the Defense

Counsel think that they are entitled to address them. If Dr. Horn wishes

to add a short argument, the Tribunal are prepared to hear it, but they

are not prepared to hear all the defendants’ counsel upon points such as

this, at this stage, and if any of the other defendants’ counsel desires

to address them, they will decide now whether they will hear any more or

not.

It is understood, then, that Dr. Horn alone will address a short

argument to the Tribunal. If it is not, then the Tribunal will decide

whether they will hear any more argument upon the subject.

DR. HORN: I cannot encroach on the rights of my colleagues in this

question, naturally, Mr. President. I should like personally to make

only a very brief statement on the legal points.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you must consult your colleagues then.

DR. HORN: If you wish a decision on this question now, Mr. President, I

must ask my colleagues beforehand, of course.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._]

DR. HORN: May I make first a preliminary remark, Mr. President, to what

has just been said to me by my colleagues. Firstly, this decision has

for the Counsel for the organizations a very particular interest.

For myself personally I would like to make the following remarks: The

Prosecution...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I asked you to consult the other defendants’

counsel and ascertain whether they were willing that you should be

heard, and you alone. That is the only terms upon which I am prepared to

hear you.

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Defense conferred._]

DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, my colleagues are agreed that I shall make

the last statements on this point.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment—very well. Go on.

DR. HORN: There is no doubt that the Prosecution, as far as vital

questions are concerned, base their case on infractions of the

Versailles Treaty. To these treaty infractions, it is absolutely

necessary, in my opinion, to submit the facts which allow the legality

of this treaty to be judged. There is no doubt that this treaty was

signed under duress. It is recognized in international law that such

treaties from the legal point of view have grave deficiencies and are

infamous. In my opinion we must be allowed to submit the facts that

serve to show the soundness of this assertion and legal viewpoint. A

further question—and if I have understood correctly, this is Sir

David’s point—is that of the polemic analysis of the legal, political,

and economic consequences of this treaty.

I do not wish to make any further statements on this point, but I would

like to ask that my first request be granted, that the legal documentary

facts be allowed which would permit a judgment on the legal value of the

Versailles Treaty.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, if I might deal

first with the argument which Dr. Dix has put forward. As I understood

his first main proposition, it was this: That if a defendant has

committed an act which is an infraction of the treaty and can show that

in the opinion of reasonable and just and educated men in the states who

were the other parties to the treaty, the treaty was so bad that an

infraction was justifiable, that is a permissible argument.

I submit that it is, with great respect to Dr. Dix, an unsound argument

and baseless, from any principle either of law or of materiality. Once

it is admitted that there is a treaty and that an infraction is made,

and it follows from the example that Dr. Dix was dealing with that,

these are the conceded facts. It is no answer to say that a number of

admirable people in the countries which were parties to the treaty

believed that its terms were wrong. The treaty is there and the person

who knowingly makes an infraction is breaking the treaty, however strong

is his support.

In his second point Dr. Dix moved to quite different grounds. He said

that this evidence might be relevant in the special reference to the

question of rearmament because it might show that the treaty was

considered obsolete. Now, it is a rare but nonetheless existing doctrine

of international law that treaties, usually minor treaties, can be

abrogated by the conduct of the contracting parties. I would not contest

that you cannot get examples of that, although they are very rare and

generally deal with minor matters. But this evidence which is before the

Tribunal at the moment is not directed to that point at all. This is, in

the main, contemporary polemic evidence saying that certain aspects of

the treaty were bad, either as regards political standards or economic

standards. That is a totally different argument from the one which Dr.

Dix admirably adumbrated—which is one which if it came up would have to

be faced—that a treaty has become obsolete or that the breaches have

been condoned and that, therefore, the terms have really ceased to

exist.

My answer to that is that this evidence is not directed to that point at

all.

Now, if Dr. Dix will forgive me, and I am sure the fault was mine, I did

not quite appreciate what he termed his subjective argument. But insofar

as I did appreciate it, there seems to be a very good answer: that if he

seeks to suggest that a defendant’s guilt may be less because he, that

defendant, believed that the treaty was bad, that is essentially a

matter which can be judged by the Tribunal who will hear that defendant

and appreciate and evaluate his point of view. It really does not help

in deciding whether the Defendant Hess acted because he thought that the

Treaty of Versailles was a bad treaty, to know what the editor of the

_Observer_, which is a Sunday paper in England, expressed as his views

some twenty years ago, or the _Manchester Guardian_ or indeed, with all

respect to them, what distinguished statesmen have said in writing their

reminiscences years after a matter occurred. The subjective point

is—this is my submission—an important point in deciding on evidence.

The subjective point can be answered by the defendant himself, and the

view of the defendant which the Tribunal will receive.

Now, Dr. Horn has opened up a much wider question, and one which I

submit is entirely irrelevant and beyond the scope of these proceedings.

He wishes the Tribunal to try whether the Treaty of Versailles was

signed under duress. Well, that, of course, would involve the whole

consideration of the Government of the German Republic, the position of

the plenipotentiaries, and the legal position of the persons who

negotiated the treaty.

The answer to that is that this Tribunal is concerned with certain quite

clearly stated offenses, fully particularized, which occurred at the

time that is stated in the Indictment; and all the evidence that is

given as to the actions of the pre-Nazi German Government, and indeed of

the Nazi Government, shows that for years Versailles was accepted as the

legal and actual basis on which they must work, and various different

methods were adopted in order to try to secure changes of the treaty,

and I need not go into, with the Tribunal, the whole frame work of the

Locarno Treaties, recognizing Versailles, which were signed in 1925, and

which were treated as existing and in operation by the Nazi Government

itself.

With that, these actual facts, it would, in my submission, be completely

remote, irrelevant, and contrary to the terms of the Charter, for this

Tribunal to go into an inquiry as to whether the Treaty of Versailles

was signed under duress.

As I gathered, Dr. Horn was not so much interested in the economic

clauses and their rightness or wrongness; but I should respectfully

remind the Tribunal that that is a matter which is before them at the

moment—that here we have, as I have pointed out before—and I do not

want to repeat myself—a number of opinions expressed by people of

varying eminence and with varying degrees of responsibility at the time

that they expressed them. And while strongly maintaining the position

which I have endeavored to express with regard to the treaty, I do

equally impress my second point: That to accept as matters of evidence

statements which in the main are made from a polemical standpoint,

either in answer to an attack or in an attack with background of the

politics of the state in which they were made, is simply a misuse of the

term “evidence”. That is not evidence of any kind, and I equally—not

equally because the first point is one of primary importance, which I

respectfully urge to the Tribunal—but I also suggest that to tender in

evidence matters of that kind is a misuse of the term “evidence,” that

they are matters of argument which an advocate may adopt if the argument

is a relevant one, but they should not be received in evidence by the

Tribunal for that reason.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Sir

David, is there anything in the Versailles Treaty that either calls for

disarmament by the signatories other than Germany or which looks to such

disarmament; and, if there is, could you give us the reference to it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is the preamble to the Military Clauses.

That is the point which is usually relied on. It is about four lines at

the beginning of the Military Clauses, and, in quite general terms, it

looks to a general disarmament after Germany has disarmed. Of course,

the position was that—I think I have got the dates right—disarmament

was accepted. Whether, in view of the evidence in this case, it should

have been accepted does not matter; it was accepted in 1927. After that,

you may remember, there were a number of disarmament conferences which

examined that question, and eventually in 1933 Germany left the then

existing disarmament conference.

Now, I am trying to be entirely objective. I do not want to put the

Prosecution view or the Defense view, but that is the position.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not quite clear. When you say

“accepted,” you mean that the extent of the disarmament called for had

been accepted by Germany?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, the other way around: that Germany’s

response to the demand of Versailles was accepted by the Allies in 1927,

and the Disarmament Commission which had been in Germany then left

Germany under, I think, a French General Denoue.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then, what I understand you to argue is that

nothing contained in this folder has anything to do with that possible

issue.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is the point.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is not on that issue. I mean we will deal

with that issue when we come to it. I rather thought from some words

that Dr. Stahmer dropped that that would be one of the points which we

should meet in the general argument on law which will be presented,

which the Defense Counsel...

DR. SEIDL: I believe that Sir David is under a slight misconception. In

Book 3 of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a

number of citations of foreign statesmen that refer to this military

clause in the Versailles Treaty and in which it is stated that Germany

fulfilled her obligations in the Versailles Treaty, but that the

reciprocal obligations in it for the opposite side were not fulfilled.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am sorry. I did not remember any. I have

read it through, and there may be some collateral matters dealing with

that, but—and I do not think that I am doing Dr. Seidl’s great industry

in collecting these matters an injustice in saying that if they do exist

they are collateral and the main point of this is an attack on the

political and economic clauses of the treaty. I hope that I have done

him justice. I certainly intended to do so. That is the impression made

on me.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, may I report that the Defendant

Streicher will be absent from this session of Court.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that evidence as to the injustice of

the Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is

inadmissible, and it therefore rejects Volume 3 of the documents on

behalf of the Defendant Hess.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors. Since Volume 3 of the document

book for the Defendant Rudolf Hess is not admissible as documentary

evidence, I am, so far as the submission of documents is concerned, at

the end of my submission of evidence. Now, we are further concerned only

with the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, which I have already submitted,

and I ask you not to decide on the admissibility of this document until

I have had opportunity to present arguments on the relevance of it and

of the secret treaty. But I should like to point out that with this

affidavit only the facts and the contents of this secret treaty are to

be proved; and therefore I shall read only excerpts from it, so that

other events and the history prior to the treaty are not to be

demonstrated by me.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, we understand that this affidavit of the

witness Gaus is now being translated and is going to be submitted to the

various prosecutors. They will then inform us of their position, and we

shall be able to see whether it is admissible or not, and the

Prosecution will likewise be able to tell us whether they want to have

the Ambassador here for the purpose of cross-examining him.

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: So we must postpone that until we get the translations.

DR. SEIDL: I had then the further intention of calling the defendant

himself as a witness. In view of his attitude as to the question of the

competency of this Court, he has asked me, however, to dispense with

this procedure. I therefore forego the testimony of the defendant as a

witness and have no further evidence to put in at this point.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Then the Tribunal will now deal with the case against the Defendant

Ribbentrop.

DR. HORN: Your Lordship, Your Honors, my client, Joachim von Ribbentrop,

had instructed me to make the following statement for him at the

beginning of the evidence:

“As Foreign Minister for the Reich, I had to carry through the

directions and orders of Adolf Hitler concerning foreign policy.

For the measures of foreign policy undertaken by me I accept

full responsibility.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought defendants’ counsel knew that the

rule which we have laid down is that at this stage no speeches shall be

made, but that the evidence should be called, the oral evidence should

be called, and the documents should be briefly referred to and offered

in evidence. Did you not understand that?

DR. HORN: I did not know, Mr. President, that one might not submit a

statement on behalf of his client.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has laid down on several occasions, I

think, verbally and certainly once in writing, that no speeches can be

made now, but that speeches can be made at the time laid down in the

Charter. The present opportunity is for all evidence to be given and for

documents to be offered in evidence, with such explanatory observations

upon the documents as may be necessary.

DR. HORN: The former Foreign Minister for the Reich, Joachim von

Ribbentrop, is, according to the general Indictment and according to the

trial brief of the British Delegation and the verbally presented special

charges, held responsible for all crimes cited in Article 6 of the

Charter of the International Military Tribunal.

Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in the session of the International Military

Tribunal of 8 January 1946, described the facts of the case against my

client as follows:

Firstly, the using of his offices and of his personal influence and

intimate connection with Hitler to facilitate the seizure of power

through the NSDAP and the preparation of wars.

Secondly, the participation in the political planning, and preparation

of the National Socialist Conspiracy for Wars of Aggression...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, are you again making a speech or what are you

doing?

DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I am just enumerating on one page how I

plan to arrange my evidence, and I ask to be allowed to divide it in

this way.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. HORN: Secondly, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe adduced the participation in

the political planning and preparation of the National Socialist

conspirators for aggressive war and the wars in violation of

international treaties. He accordingly bears the responsibility for the

execution of the foreign policy planned by the political conspirators.

Thirdly, participation in and approval of Crimes against Peace, War

Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, especially crimes against persons

and property in the occupied territories.

The Defendant Von Ribbentrop has declared himself not guilty of all

crimes charged against him. To refute the charges made against him, I

will begin now my presentation of evidence.

The honorable prosecutor at the beginning of his statements quoted from

Exhibit Number USA-5, Document Number 2829-PS, and brought out that the

Defendant Von Ribbentrop was an SS Obergruppenführer. The honorable

prosecutor asserted that this rank was not an honorary one. In

opposition to this, the defendant asserts that the rank of an SS

Gruppenführer and later of Obergruppenführer, bestowed by Hitler, was

bestowed upon him only on an honorary basis, because Hitler wished that

the members of the Government should appear on official occasions in

uniform, and the rank of an SS Gruppenführer appeared in keeping with

the official position of the defendant. The defendant neither served in

the SS nor led an SS unit. Neither did he have any adequate military

training and preparation for this high military position.

To demonstrate this I will submit evidence from the defendant himself as

a witness.