“You are to report everything that comes to your notice, even
though it may at first appear very insignificant. Rumors
suddenly arising also come in this category, however false they
may be.”
Do you remember your members in Romania being told to report everything?
Everything they saw?
BOHLE: Yes, of course.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “An important section of both your work
and that of your comrades’ work must be industrial concerns,
business enterprises, _et cetera_. Not only can you spread your
propaganda very well in this way, but it is precisely in such
concerns that you can easily pick up information concerning
strange visitors. It is known that the enemy espionage
organizations are especially active in industrial circles both
in gathering information and carrying out acts of sabotage.
Members with close connections with shipping and forwarding
companies are particularly suitable for this work. It goes
without saying that you must be meticulous and cautious when
selecting your assistants.”
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have some more to read from this document? If so,
we will adjourn now until 2 o’clock.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is absent
from this session.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Witness, will you look again at the document we
were reading before the Court adjourned. Would you look at the paragraph
which commences “as everywhere else it is extremely important to know
where the enemy is and what he is doing.” My Lord, I am not absolutely
certain that I did not start reading.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, you had read that and the next one and the one
at the top of Page 3 in the English text. At least I think you have. You
read the one beginning “An important section.”
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps I can start the paragraph commencing
“An important section.” Have you got that?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “An important section of both your work
and that of your comrades must be industrial concerns, business
enterprises, _et cetera_. Not only can you spread your
propaganda very well in this way, but it is precisely in such
concerns that you can easily pick up information concerning
strange visitors. It is known that the enemy espionage
organizations are especially active in industrial circles, both
in gathering information and carrying out acts of sabotage.
Comrades with close connections with shipping and forwarding
companies are particularly suitable for this work. Naturally you
must be meticulous and cautious when selecting your assistants.
“In this connection a reference to interstate organizations and
exchange organizations is relevant.”—I particularly want you to
note these next lines:
“It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as
camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of the
Foreign Intelligence Department.”
Witness, doesn’t that exactly describe the way in which the
Auslands-Organisation was carrying on its business? Read it again:
“It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as
camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of the
Foreign Intelligence Department.”
Doesn’t that fit in with the directions that this Landesgruppenleiter of
yours has been writing to his members in this document?
BOHLE: On the contrary, I find that this is clear proof of the fact that
the organizations mentioned here were in a foreign espionage service and
not in the German espionage service. My interpretation is the exact
opposite of that of the British Prosecutor.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you not giving instructions here, or is not
your Landesgruppenleiter giving instructions, to carry out
counterespionage—the work that is carried on by the intelligence
service? Isn’t that what the writer is writing about so far?
BOHLE: The letter, with which I am not personally familiar, apparently
instructs Germans abroad to turn in a report whenever they encounter the
intelligence service at work. I do not think that any objection can be
raised to that in time of war.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. We will not go on arguing about it.
I understand that you know nothing about the instructions which are
contained in that letter. This is the first you have ever seen or heard
of it; is that right?
BOHLE: No, this letter is new to me, and I do not know whether it is
true, for there is no original here.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it then that, of the countries
around Germany in which your organization worked, you have no knowledge
of the activities that they were carrying out in Belgium? You have no
knowledge of the activities that they were carrying out in Norway, none
about what they were doing in Spain, and not very much about what they
were doing in Romania either; is that correct?
BOHLE: No, that is not correct. Of course I knew of the activity of
these groups abroad; but the particular activity that the British
Prosecutor wishes to point out as the aim of the Auslands-Organisation
is not quite clear to me.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you had knowledge of any of their
activities—I understand from your evidence that you had none of the
activities about which your own Auslands-Organisation Yearbook publishes
a story. Both in Norway and Greece the activities were recounted in
those two stories. You knew nothing about them at all; is that right?
BOHLE: I did not know about the activity in Norway. I have already
testified to that effect. I was very familiar with the activity in
Greece which was along perfectly normal lines.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I want to leave that, and I just
want to ask you two questions about another matter. Am I right in saying
that the information—and I am not going to argue with you now as to
what type of information it was—but the information that your
organization sent back, was that passed on to the Defendant Hess?
BOHLE: Sometimes yes and sometimes no. It depended upon the nature of
the information. If it was information on foreign policy it was, of
course, sent to another office.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were in fact acting as a pool of
information, were you not? Let me explain myself: You were forwarding
information that you received, to the SS?
BOHLE: Sometimes, yes; if not to the SS then probably...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: To the Foreign Office?
BOHLE: Sometimes also to the Foreign Office.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And to the Abwehr, were you not?
BOHLE: Very seldom, but it happened occasionally.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say very seldom. Did you not have a liaison
officer attached to your organization from the Abwehr?
BOHLE: No. I had only one assistant who maintained an unofficial
connection with the Abwehr, if the occasion arose.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps we are talking about the same
gentleman. Did you not have a Captain Schmauss attached to your head
office in Berlin?
BOHLE: Mr. Schmauss has never been a captain but he was a political
leader and honorary SS-leader. In the Army, I believe he was a sergeant.
Moreover, he did not come from the Abwehr; he was chief of personnel of
the Auslands-Organisation and his function as liaison was purely
unofficial.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say he was not a liaison officer between
your organization and the Abwehr?
BOHLE: No, he was not an officer at all. He was not a member of the
Wehrmacht.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I do not want to quibble with you about his
rank. Was he, in effect, whatever he was, acting in a capacity of
liaison between you and the Abwehr?
BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, in addition to the information
that Hess obtained through your system of reporting, that is, the
Auslands-Organisation, did he also obtain information from those
organizations which were dealing with the Volksdeutsche, that is to say,
non-German citizens, racial Germans abroad who were not members of your
organization, because you allowed only German citizens to become members
of your organization. But others—Volksdeutsche, I think you call
them—did Hess receive information from other sources about their
activities?
BOHLE: I could not say, because I did not discuss it with Hess, and the
affairs of the Volksdeutsche were entirely out of my field.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Dr. Karl Haushofer was for some time in 1938
and 1939 president of the VDA, was he not?
BOHLE: I believe so.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Which was an organization dealing with the
activities of the Volksdeutsche in foreign countries. Is that correct?
BOHLE: Yes, I believe so. I am not familiar with this field.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And, as you know, Hess and Karl Haushofer were
great friends, were they not?
BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Haushofer had been Hess’ pupil at Munich
University; did you know that?
BOHLE: It was the other way around.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you not know that Hess received information
from Haushofer as to the activities of these other organizations?
BOHLE: No, I know nothing about it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, I do not want to catch you out. Is
that your answer? Are you being honest to this Tribunal?
BOHLE: No. I wanted to add that the Deputy of the Führer very
painstakingly separated the “Auslandsdeutsche,” that is, citizens of the
Reich who worked abroad, and the “Volksdeutsche,” and with equal care he
made certain that I should have nothing to do with the question of
Volksdeutsche. Therefore I knew nothing of these matters.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Hess as Deputy to the Führer was in fact in
charge of all matters concerning Germanism abroad; was he not?
BOHLE: Yes, that is so, because he was born abroad. However, to my
knowledge, he did not take charge of these matters in his capacity as
Deputy to the Führer. I do not believe that there was any connection.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling the Tribunal that just because
he was born in a foreign country he had charge of all matters concerning
Germanism abroad?
BOHLE: I believe so, because any other Reichsleiter of the Party might
just as well have taken care of these matters. However, I assume that
Hess took over these functions simply because he was familiar with
foreign countries.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to be quite clear. Whatever the reason
was, he in fact did have charge of them. That is your evidence?
BOHLE: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I just want to remind you of a passage in
your interrogation in this building on the 9th of November. Do you
remember that you were interrogated on the 9th...
BOHLE: [_Interposing._]: September?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On 9 November last.
BOHLE: November, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were interrogated by a Lieutenant Martin,
the afternoon of that day.
BOHLE: By Lieutenant Martin, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me read a short extract from the transcript
of that interrogation and ask you whether, in fact, it is correct. You
were being asked about the information which came back through the
Auslands-Organisation.
“Question: ‘He would have to rely on you for his information on
matters of that kind?’
“Answer: ‘Not entirely; I think Hess had a great many
connections in Hamburg through which he obtained information
which he did not relay to me.’
“Question: ‘What were his connections in Hamburg?’
“Answer: ‘The shipping companies.’
“Question: ‘Rather like your Landesgruppenleiter instructions in
Romania?’
“Answer: ‘I think he knew a number of people there. I have
always been convinced that he knew them.’
“Question: ‘Is that Helferich?’
“Answer: ‘Helferich was one, but then there were many people
from whom he received information. I believe from Professor
Haushofer, his old teacher, with whom he was very friendly. But
he always made it a point not to inform us of anything that
concerned the Volksdeutsche; he said, “It is not your affair at
all.”’”
Is that correct?
BOHLE: That is quite correct, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And as you have said it there, is that a
correct description of the position that Hess was in with regard to
information from abroad, from agents abroad? Does that correctly state
the facts as they were?
BOHLE: So far as I can see, it is probably correct. I myself can judge
only to the extent to which the reports concerned the
Auslands-Organisation. About the others I can make only a guess; I
cannot give definite information, because I was not acquainted with
them.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps I might
get the exhibits in order, the ones that I have referred to.
The Yearbook of the Auslands-Organisation from which the stories about
Norway and Greece came, becomes Exhibit GB-284. The two translations
that you have are numbered Documents M-153 and M-156, both of which
become Exhibit GB-284.
The secret wireless telegram, which was Document Number M-158, becomes
Exhibit GB-285; and the letter from Landesgruppenleiter Konradi, which
was Document Number 3796-PS, becomes Exhibit GB-286.
BOHLE: May I add something to a point which was brought up by the
British cross-examination?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
BOHLE: May I begin?
THE PRESIDENT: You may give a short explanation. You are not here to
make a speech.
BOHLE: No, I do not want to make a speech. I merely wish to say the
following on the question of secret transmitters which was brought up
this morning: Although I am not familiar with the technique of these
secret transmitters, I assume that a secret transmitter would be of use
in a foreign country only if there were a receiving set in Berlin.
I am quite certain that to my knowledge there was never such a receiving
set, either in my office in Berlin or in any other office of the
Auslands-Organisation, and therefore I may assume that such a receiving
set did not exist.
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United
States): Do you recall being interrogated on 11 September 1945, by
Colonel Brundage?
BOHLE: Yes.
COL. AMEN: I want to read you a few questions and answers from your
interrogation and ask you whether you recall being asked those questions
and having made those answers:
“Question: ‘Now, when you started, your immediate superior was
who?’
“Answer: ‘Rudolf Hess, until 1941 when he left for England.’
“Question: ‘Who succeeded him?’
“Answer: ‘Martin Bormann. Martin Bormann automatically succeeded
Hess, but he did not really fill Hess’ position, because Hess
had been born abroad in Egypt, while Martin Bormann understood
nothing about foreign affairs. He paid no attention to them at
all, but of course, he was my superior.’
“Question: ‘But he was nominally your chief?’
“Answer: ‘He was technically my chief, but he gave me no orders,
directives or similar instructions, because he did not
understand anything about these things.’
“Question: ‘So that everything that was done in your office, you
would say you were responsible for?’
“Answer: ‘Absolutely.’
“Question: ‘And you are willing to accept the responsibility for
that?’
“Answers ‘Naturally.’”
Do you remember being asked those questions and having made those
answers?
BOHLE: That is absolutely correct.
COL. AMEN: And were those answers true when you made them?
BOHLE: Absolutely true.
COL. AMEN: And are they still true today?
BOHLE: They are still true.
COL. AMEN: So that you accept responsibility for everything which your
office was conducting, is that true?
BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.
COL. AMEN: Who was Von Strempel?
BOHLE: Von Strempel was, I believe, counsellor to a secretary of a
legation (Gesandtschaftsrat) in the foreign office, but I do not know
him very well.
COL. AMEN: Was he not the first secretary of the German Embassy in the
United States from 1938 until Pearl Harbor?
BOHLE: I cannot say definitely. I knew him only slightly and had
absolutely no contact with him.
COL. AMEN: Well, he was interrogated with respect to the support of the
German-American Bund by the Auslands-Organisation prior to 1938, and I
want to read you just one or two questions and answers which he made and
ask you whether they conform to your understanding of the facts. Do you
understand?
BOHLE: Yes.
COL. AMEN: “Question: ‘Was the German-American Bund supported by
the Auslands-Organisation?’
“Answer: ‘I am positive that it was connected with the foreign
section of the Party. For example, the Bund received
instructions from the Party on how to build up their political
organization, how, where, and when to hold mass meetings and how
to handle their propaganda. Personally, I do not know whether it
received financial support.’”
Does that conform with your understanding of the facts?
BOHLE: No, that is a completely false representation. The
Auslands-Organisation gave no financial support whatever and had no
connection with the German-American Bund. I have stated that clearly in
many interrogations here in Nuremberg, and have signed an affidavit to
that effect.
COL. AMEN: I know you have. So that if Von Strempel has sworn that that
is a fact, your testimony is that he was not telling the truth. Is that
correct?
BOHLE: I am of the opinion that if Von Strempel was legation secretary,
or secretary of another office, he could not have known of the matter
and he therefore testified about something which was not quite clear to
him. In any event, what he said is not true.
COL. AMEN: Are you familiar with the fact that in 1938 an order was
issued prohibiting members of the German embassies and consulates to
continue relations or connections with the Bund?
BOHLE: It was a general order for German citizens abroad to resign from
the Bund if they were members. But as far as I know, that order was
issued some years previously about 1935 or 1936, by the Deputy of the
Führer upon my request.
DR. SEIDL: I object to this question; it has no connection with the
evidence for which the witness Bohle was called. During his direct
examination he was not questioned on any subject which has the slightest
relation to the question of the activity of the German-American Bund. I
do not believe that this form of interrogation is designed to test the
witness, as it has not the slightest bearing on the subject.
COL. AMEN: It seems to me to have a very direct bearing on whether or
not this organization was engaged in espionage work abroad and within
the United States.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly; in the opinion of the Tribunal the questions
are perfectly proper.
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that in spite of that order the foreign
section of the Nazi Party nevertheless continued to support the Bund?
BOHLE: No, I was not aware of that and I consider it to be impossible.
COL. AMEN: Now I would like to read you one or two further extracts from
the interrogation of Strempel and ask you whether these statements
conform with your knowledge of the facts:
“Question: ‘Did the foreign section of the Party continue to
support the Bund after the order you mentioned before was
issued?’
“Answer: ‘I am sure that Mr. Draeger, consul in New York City
and representative of the foreign section of the Party, did
continue to have relations with Bund officials.’”
Does that conform with your recollection of the facts?
BOHLE: No. In my opinion, that does not correspond to the facts.
Naturally, I cannot say whether the consul, Dr. Draeger, maintained his
contacts against my order, but there was an imperative order to withdraw
completely from the Bund, because from the very beginning I objected
strenuously to the activities of the Bund and was supported in my
objections by the Deputy of the Führer.
COL. AMEN: You were acquainted with Draeger, were you not?
BOHLE: Yes.
COL. AMEN: What was his position in the United States, insofar as your
organization was concerned?
BOHLE: He was a liaison man (Vertrauensmann) of the
Auslands-Organisation for the individual Party members in the United
States.
COL. AMEN: He was what was known as a confidential agent, was he not?
BOHLE: No, he was not, naturally, but we had...
COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, you called him a “confidential
agent” in your interrogation, did you not?
BOHLE: No. I called him a “Vertrauensmann,” and this was translated into
“confidence man.” I did...
COL. AMEN: Well, I will accept that correction. He was a confidence man
for your organization in the United States. Correct?
BOHLE: Correct, yes, that is true.
COL. AMEN: And in addition to him there were other confidence men of
your organization in the United States? Correct?
BOHLE: Yes, correct.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what their names were and where
they were located?
BOHLE: One was Wiedemann, consul general in San Francisco. There was
also Consul Dr. Gissling in Los Angeles and Consul Von Spiegel in New
Orleans I believe, but I do not know; perhaps it was Boston. It was one
of the two. I believe these are all.
COL. AMEN: And each of those individuals made reports from time to time
which were forwarded to you through Draeger. Is that not a fact?
BOHLE: No, they made no reports to me. I cannot recall that I ever saw a
report from Wiedemann, Spiegel, or Gissling. That was not their job.
COL. AMEN: Draeger made the reports to you, did he not?
BOHLE: Draeger made the reports to the Auslands-Organisation in Berlin
or to me personally. Mostly to my office.
COL. AMEN: And contained in those reports were various items of
information collected by other confidential agents? Isn’t that correct?
BOHLE: I do not know, because I am not familiar with these reports and I
cannot say whether there was anything to report. We had no Party
organization in the United States, because it had been dissolved by
Rudolf Hess in April 1933.
COL. AMEN: So you say; but you nevertheless had an individual in Germany
whose duty it was to read and pass upon these reports from Draeger as
they came in. Is that not a fact?
BOHLE: So far as I know, and I believe my information is correct; the
reports that we received were of a purely technical nature. We merely
had few Party members in the United States whose card index and
membership fees had to be looked after in order to preserve their
privileges as Party members. Political activity in the United States was
forbidden and did not actually exist.
COL. AMEN: But I am suggesting to you that in spite of the order the
activities of your organization nevertheless continued. Now, is it not a
fact that there was an individual in your organization in Germany who
received these reports from the United States regularly?
BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe, who...
COL. AMEN: I beg your pardon?
BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe.
COL. AMEN: Correct. Why didn’t you tell me that before when I asked you
about the individual who read these reports from the United States as
they came in?
BOHLE: Please repeat the question. I did not fully understand it.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will withdraw that question. After Grothe received
these reports from the United States regularly, to whom did he report
the substance of those reports?
BOHLE: So far as I know, he usually kept them, because they contained
nothing of interest and he himself was not in a position to use them.
Mr. Grothe had an honorary position with us because of his advanced age
and took over this branch of the office because it was of no importance
at all in the Auslands-Organisation.
COL. AMEN: So that you were in no position to know what was contained in
those reports? Is that correct?
BOHLE: That is for the most part correct.
COL. AMEN: So you do not know whether they were important or not and you
do not know whether they contained information relative to espionage
matters or not. Is that correct?
BOHLE: I am sure that if they had contained such information, Grothe
would have submitted them to me.
COL. AMEN: Well, outside of that, you have no knowledge of it
whatsoever. Is that correct?
BOHLE: That is correct.
COL. AMEN: Now, let me just read you one or two more excerpts from the
interrogation of Von Strempel:
“Question: ‘These relationships seem to have violated the order
you mentioned before. Did you report these violations to the
Foreign Office?’
“Answer: ‘Yes, several times. In reports that I drafted for
Thomsen when I was in the Embassy, we called the attention of
Berlin to the fact that this relationship to the Bund was very
detrimental... and stated that the continued support of the Bund
by the foreign section of the Party was harming diplomatic
relations with the United States.’
“Question: ‘What action was taken in Berlin to halt the
activities of which you complained?’
“Answer: ‘I know of no action.’”
Does that conform to your knowledge of the facts?
BOHLE: I have not the slightest idea of this report by Herr Von Thomsen.
This is the first time that I have heard of protests from the Embassy in
Washington regarding prohibited connections between Dr. Draeger and the
Bund.
COL. AMEN: You know who Thomsen was, do you not?
BOHLE: Thomsen was Chargé d’Affaires in Washington.
COL. AMEN: And you know that from time to time various officials of the
Bund came over here and had conferences with representatives of your
organization and of the Führer, do you not?
BOHLE: I have heard that they visited the Führer but they did not visit
me and we had no conferences of any description.
COL. AMEN: I did not say with you. I said with representatives of your
office; perhaps your friend, Mr. Grothe?
BOHLE: That might be possible but I cannot say definitely because he did
not report to me on this matter. They could not have discussed any
official matters with Grothe, because he knew very well that I
completely repudiated the activities of the German Volksbund in America.
COL. AMEN: In any event, however, you accept responsibility for
everything which was done in your organization. Correct?
BOHLE: Naturally.
THE PRESIDENT: Do either of the other Chief Prosecutors wish to
cross-examine? [_There was no response._] Then, Dr. Seidl, you can
re-examine if you wish.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have already answered a question that I intended
to ask you, that is, that there was no secret transmitter in Germany
which would have been in a position to broadcast secret communications
to foreign countries. I ask you now, did you yourself have a transmitter
in Germany?
BOHLE: I myself had no transmitter.
DR. SEIDL: Did the Auslands-Organisation have such a transmitter?
BOHLE: I consider that to be absolutely impossible; if there had been
one, I would have known of it. I never saw one.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that in order to communicate with Germans
overseas by radio you yourself did not use code on the German network?
BOHLE: That is correct.
DR. SEIDL: You stated previously that the Deputy of the Führer, Hess,
was your immediate superior?
BOHLE: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Were the directives given to you by the Deputy of the Führer
of a general nature, or did he go into the details of the work of the
Auslands-Organisation?
BOHLE: The Deputy of the Führer gave only general directives and left
all the details to me because I had his complete confidence. In his
general directives he impressed upon me repeatedly in the sharpest terms
the fact that it was my duty to avoid any measures by the
Auslands-Organisation that might be detrimental to foreign relations.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[_The witness left the stand._]
DR. SEIDL: Your Honors, before I go on to my next witness—that is the
witness Strölin—I should like to submit the suggestion or rather the
application to the Tribunal that the affidavit of the witness Gaus be
handled in the same way as the interrogation of the witness Bohle. Gaus
has already been admitted as a witness for another defendant. However,
the Defense Counsel for the other defendant waived his right to call
this witness. The situation is the same as it was in the case of Bohle;
therefore it would be preferable, in my opinion, to hear the witness
Gaus now and to read his sworn statement to him during his examination
as has been done in other cases, for instance in the case of Blaha.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet and submitted in
the various languages to the Chief Prosecutors?
DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the translation is complete. At any
rate, this noon I submitted six copies of the affidavit to the
Translation Division.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell me, Sir David or Colonel Pokrovsky?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not seen this affidavit, and, My
Lord, with regard to the last one, we got it hurriedly translated into
English, but it was only by the kindness of my Soviet colleagues, who
allowed the matter to go on without a Russian translation and left it to
my delegation to deal with, that the matter went on. Otherwise, my
Soviet colleagues would have asked the Tribunal to have it put back.
It is very difficult when these affidavits are sought to be put in at
the last minute without having given us a chance of seeing them.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky could tell me whether he has
seen this affidavit or had it translated yet.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.):
Members of the Tribunal, I fully share the viewpoint of Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe. It appears to me absolutely unacceptable to have this
document presented immediately to the Tribunal.
If I understood Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe correctly, he did not receive
this affidavit. The Soviet delegation is in the same position. Besides,
I would like to remind you that the question of this witness has already
been discussed, that it has been definitely solved, and it seems to me
there are no grounds for a further revision of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal considers that the course which
must be taken is that that affidavit must be translated and submitted to
the Tribunal for their consideration, for this witness was allowed to
the Defendant Ribbentrop, I think, and then he withdrew his application
for the witness. You have not applied for the witness Gaus, and I would
point out to you and to the other counsel for the defendants that it is
very inconvenient that documents of this sort—after all the question of
witnesses and documents has been thoroughly gone into by the
Tribunal—should be presented at the last moment and without any
translation whatever. But we will not go into it now, and it must be
translated and submitted to the Tribunal in the three languages.
DR. SEIDL: Perhaps I might make one short remark in regard to the last
point. Up to now I was always under the impression that a formal
application to call a witness would not be necessary in the case of a
witness who has already been admitted by the Tribunal for another
defendant. That was undoubtedly so in the case of Gaus who was named as
a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. Consequently I had no reason
to make a formal application, since I would have the opportunity to
interrogate the witness in cross-examination anyhow.
I have just been informed by counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop
that, as his representative said last Saturday, he will forego calling
the witness Gaus, and now I, in turn, apply to call Ambassador Dr. Gaus
as witness regarding the statements in his sworn affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean by saying you call him. You
can apply to call him if you like, but you do not call him until you
apply.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: When we have seen this document, we will determine the
question.
DR. SEIDL: The next witness admitted by the Tribunal for the Defendant
Hess is the witness Karl Strölin. In order to save time I have also
prepared an affidavit for this witness, and I ask the Tribunal to inform
me whether we will follow the same procedure with this witness as with
the witness Bohle, or whether the Prosecution agree that only the
affidavit should be presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they seen the affidavit?
DR. SEIDL: I gave the affidavit to the Prosecution this morning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have got an English translation of the
affidavit. There are one or two questions the Prosecution want to put to
the witness, so I suggest that the most convenient course would be if
Dr. Seidl did as he did with the last witness, to read the affidavit,
and then after the affidavit is read, the few questions that the
Prosecution desire to be put can be put to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well.
COL. POKROVSKY: I must report to you, Mr. President, that as far as this
document is concerned, the Defense Counsel has violated the procedure
you have established; the Soviet Prosecution received this affidavit
only a very short time ago—about 1 or 2 hours ago—and it was not
received by us in Russian but in English. Therefore, I had the
opportunity of familiarizing myself with it only very slightly, and I
ask to have the presentation of this document postponed until such time
when the order of the Tribunal is complied with, in other words, not
until we have received our document in Russian.
THE PRESIDENT: But, Colonel Pokrovsky, in the interest of the time of
the Tribunal, wouldn’t it be better to get on with it now? Sir David has
apparently seen the affidavit and read it in English, and if he is
satisfied upon that, wouldn’t it be better to go on with it now rather
than to postpone it?
You see, Dr. Seidl has actually been allowed this witness, so that it is
only a question of time, doing it by way of an affidavit when he can
call him, and he can then ask him questions.
COL. POKROVSKY: I must repeat that I have familiarized myself with this
document very slightly. As far as I can understand, it is of no
particular interest to the Soviet Delegation; it is of greater interest
to the British Delegation...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you see the witness was allowed to Dr.
Seidl. Therefore, Dr. Seidl could have put him on the witness box and
could have asked him questions, and the only reason for doing it by way
of an affidavit is to get the matter more clearly and more quickly. So
if we were to order that this affidavit was not to be used, we should
then have Dr. Seidl asking the witness questions, and probably, I am
afraid, taking up rather longer than it would to read the affidavit, and
you would not object to that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps the Tribunal would find it advisable to have Dr.
Seidl ask the witness those questions which have already been answered
in the affidavit? It seems to me that that would give us an opportunity
to reconcile this contradiction, especially since there are only a few
questions, and the first three, as far as I can understand, are mostly
of a historical nature and connected with the organization of the
Institute in Stuttgart in 1917.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have not read the affidavit yet so I
am afraid I am not in a position to present the question which you wish
me to present.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right, I withdraw my objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Call your witness then now.
[_The witness Strölin took the stand._]
What is your name?
KARL STRÖLIN (Witness): Karl Strölin.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were last Lord Mayor of the City of Stuttgart;
is that correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: In this capacity were you also Honorary President of the
German Auslands-Institut?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: You signed a sworn affidavit this morning which I shall now
read to you.
“1. The German Auslands-Institut was founded in Stuttgart in the
year 1917. The fact that Stuttgart was chosen as the seat of
this institute is connected with the fact that the Swabian
district has always furnished a particularly high percentage of
emigrants. That is precisely why there arose in Stuttgart the
need to create an institution for the purpose of preserving the
national ties between the old and the new homeland. The German
Auslands-Institut was to serve this purpose. It had the
following aims:
“(a) Scientific research on Germanism in the world.
“(b) Maintaining cultural connections with the emigrants.
“(c) Informing the people at home about Germanism abroad and
about foreign countries.
“For scientific research the German Auslands-Institut had a
library of more than one hundred thousand volumes on folklore
and an archive for newspaper files concerning Germanism abroad.
For this purpose nearly all newspapers which were published
abroad in the German language and a large number of newspapers
in foreign languages were subscribed to and their contents
evaluated. An extensive collection of pictures was in one filing
room. As the Germans abroad became increasingly interested in
the homeland, genealogical research took on ever greater
proportions.
“In addition to its activities of collecting and registering,
the German Auslands-Institut also had advisory and
representative functions. The question of emigration was also a
subject for consultation for a long time. This required that the
German Auslands-Institut be informed regarding the living
conditions and the possibility of finding employment in the
individual areas favored by emigrants. The records of the German
Auslands-Institut were placed at the disposal of the various
offices and organizations upon request. The representative
activities of the German Auslands-Institut consisted mainly in
organizing exhibitions. The center of this activity was the
Museum of Germandom Abroad, in Stuttgart.
“The scientific work of the German Auslands-Institut found
expression particularly in the books, magazines, and calendars
about the homeland which it published. The connections with the
Germans abroad were maintained by sending out such publications.
The guiding thought of the German Auslands-Institut in its
relations with the Germans abroad was that these Germans abroad
were to be the connecting links between nations in order to
strengthen mutual understanding and the desire for co-operation.
They were to be the envoys of friendship between their old and
their new homeland.
“As President of the German Auslands-Institut, I particularly
emphasized this thought in the speech which I made at Madison
Square Garden in New York City in October 1936 on the occasion
of German Day. Moreover the German Auslands-Institut had no
agencies or representatives abroad acting as liaison for these
corresponding members. Direct or individual care for Germans
abroad was not the task of the German Auslands-Institut. The
welfare of German nationals abroad was taken care of by the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. Relations with the
Volksdeutsche were maintained by the Volksbund für das
Deutschtum im Ausland (League For Germans Abroad).
“2. The German Auslands-Institut never engaged in any activities
which could be termed Fifth Column activities. No one has ever
made a request of this nature to me or to the Institut.
“3. Rudolf Hess, the Deputy of the Führer, did not exert any
influence on the activities of the Institute. He issued no
directives or instructions which could have induced the
Institute to undertake any activity along the lines of Fifth
Column work.”
Witness, are these statements correct?
STRÖLIN: These statements are correct.
DR. SEIDL: I have at the moment no further questions to direct to the
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions of this witness?
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath):
Witness, with the permission of the Tribunal I should like to ask you a
few questions.
First, from when to when were you Lord Mayor of Stuttgart?
STRÖLIN: From 1933 until the end of the war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how long have you known the Defendant Von
Neurath? What was his position at that time and what was his reputation?
STRÖLIN: I have known Herr Von Neurath since the first World War. At
that time, at the end of the first World War, he was Chief of the
Cabinet of the King of Württemberg, and his reputation was excellent. In
my capacity as Lord Mayor I met Herr Von Neurath frequently. In 1938 Von
Neurath became an honorary citizen of the city of Stuttgart.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you enter in still closer relations with him
later when he returned from Czechoslovakia?
STRÖLIN: When he returned from Czechoslovakia Herr Von Neurath retired
to his estate of Leinfelden in the vicinity of Stuttgart, and here I had
closer and more active connection with him.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about his ancestry, his family,
his education, his personality, in general?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath comes from an old Swabian family. His father was
Lord Chamberlain of the King of Württemberg. His grandfather and his
great-grandfather were ministers. Von Neurath was very much respected as
a high-minded character, a distinguished personality, always ready to
help, extraordinarily humane, very conscientious, straightforward and
frank.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During his activity as Foreign Minister and
possibly later, did you have an opportunity to discuss politics with him
and particularly his views on foreign policy?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath repeatedly discussed these matters with me, but of
course, only in general terms. As Reich Foreign Minister he was
convinced that Germany would succeed in getting by peaceful means the
place in the world which she deserved. He rejected any other way. He
strove to build up and strengthen relations of mutual confidence with
other European powers, particularly with England. He was convinced that
it was precisely in this field that he had done everything possible.
Later, I had occasion to examine with him Henderson’s book _Two Years
with Hitler_, which particularly emphasized how extremely popular Von
Neurath had been in London at that time. I recall that we also discussed
the sentence written by Henderson, that he acknowledged Von Neurath’s
honest devotion to peace and to peaceful and friendly relations with
England. Von Neurath was also greatly concerned with the cultivation of
better relations with the United States. I recall that he discussed the
subject with me after my trip to America and said that I had done well
to emphasize in my various speeches Germany’s desire for friendship with
the United States. I also remember how severely Von Neurath criticized
the tone of Hitler’s speech made in the beginning of 1939 in reply to
Roosevelt’s message. He said at that time that the international tension
had been increased by that speech. Then Von Neurath spoke of the Munich
Agreement, in which he had been an active participant. Later he very
frequently spoke of the tragedy that was implicit in the fact that,
despite all efforts, the relation between England and Germany had not
remained one of continuing confidence. He pointed out how tragic it was
for Europe and for the world. All my conversations with Von Neurath
convinced me that he desired an understanding and a peaceful settlement,
and that he would never have pursued a policy that might lead to war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the reasons for his appointment as an
honorary citizen of Stuttgart? This happened after he resigned his
office as Reich Foreign Minister, did it not?
STRÖLIN: He was appointed in 1938, on the occasion of his 65th birthday
on 2 February 1938. This appointment was to express to Von Neurath the
gratitude and appreciation not only of the people of Stuttgart but of
all Swabia for his manifest love of peace and the calm and prudence with
which he had conducted foreign affairs. It was also a token of respect
for his honest and incorruptible character.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, the British Prosecution assert that Herr
Von Neurath repeatedly assured foreign governments or their
representatives that Germany had no military or aggressive intentions
toward these states, but that these assurances were, in fact, given for
the sake of appearances, in order to lull these states into a false
sense of security, because even then Von Neurath knew and approved of
the fact that Hitler actually had aggressive intentions toward these
states.
From your knowledge of his personality do you consider Von Neurath
capable of such infamy?
STRÖLIN: No, I do not consider him capable of such action.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath inform you, at the time, of
his resignation from his position as Foreign Minister?
STRÖLIN: By chance, I was with Von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry on 4
February 1938 at the very moment when his resignation was accepted. He
described how this resignation came about. He said that until the end of
the year 1937 he had been convinced that Hitler was completely in
sympathy with the foreign policy which he was pursuing and that Hitler
as well as himself had not wanted to chance an armed conflict, but at
the end of 1937 Hitler had altogether unexpectedly changed his attitude;
he had suddenly struck a different note, and it was impossible to decide
whether it was to be taken seriously. Von Neurath went on to say that in
a personal conversation with Hitler he had attempted to persuade him to
give up this altered view, but that he had the impression that he had
lost his influence over Hitler, and this prompted him to submit his
resignation.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After, or rather simultaneously with his discharge
from the foreign ministry, Von Neurath was appointed President of the
Secret Cabinet Council. Do you know anything about this appointment—how
and why he received it and what he did in this capacity?
STRÖLIN: He received this appointment as President of the Secret Cabinet
Council at the same time that his resignation was accepted, but this
Cabinet never convened; this was also true of the Reich Cabinet. The
Secret Cabinet was to be convened by Hitler personally, and Hitler had
simply not done this. Von Neurath believed later that he had been
appointed to this post as president only in order to conceal from
foreign countries that the former Foreign Minister no longer had any
influence on the policy of the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, I do not see how this witness can know
whether the Secret Cabinet Council was ever called. In any event we have
already heard it from Göring, and presumably we shall hear it again from
the Defendant Von Neurath, in which case it is grossly cumulative. I do
not think we should waste the time of the Tribunal with it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you occasionally speak to Von Neurath
regarding his attitude and relations toward the Nazi Party?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath’s attitude toward the Party was critical and
disapproving; at first he disapproved and waited to see what would
develop. His relations with the Party were bad. The Party was of the
opinion that Von Neurath was not a National Socialist.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever discuss with him the policy of the
Nazis toward the Christian churches, that is, the Catholic and the
Protestant Church?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath was a faithful Christian and disapproved of the
policy of the Party toward the Christian churches. He particularly
supported Bishop Bohr’s efforts to maintain freedom of religion. He
repeatedly used his influence to see to it that seminaries which had
been requisitioned were released. Following a discussion with Von
Neurath I visited Minister for Churches Kerrl personally and discussed
with him the question of the policy toward the Church. I discovered that
Minister for Churches Kerrl was making every effort to represent and
carry out the ideas of positive Christianity. However, he did not
succeed because his work was continually sabotaged, particularly by
Himmler and Bormann.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Later, when Herr Von Neurath retired to his estate
of Leinfelden, did you discuss his activities as Reich Protector with
him?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath said that he took the post as Reich Protector in
Bohemia and Moravia most unwillingly, and that he had refused it twice,
but finally decided that he must make this sacrifice. He believed that
it was precisely there that he could act as an intermediary and bring
about reconciliation. He had personal difficulties with Himmler and
Frank; he told me of his efforts to gain better treatment for the
Czechs, and of the protests which he made to Hitler in vain. Once, when
I visited Von Neurath in Prague, I was invited to visit President Hacha,
who told me emphatically how pleased he was that Von Neurath had been
sent to Bohemia and Moravia, for he enjoyed fullest confidence and
performed in every respect a conciliatory function. Von Neurath told me
that he was recalled and replaced because in his treatment of the Czechs
he was too mild for the Führer, who preferred a particularly trustworthy
SS-leader in that position.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Who was to be appointed to that post?
STRÖLIN: That was Heydrich.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was that Herr Von Neurath’s reason for resigning?
STRÖLIN: Evidently.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, Von Neurath was also an Honorary
Gruppenführer of the SS. Did he tell you how he attained this—let us
say—honor?
STRÖLIN: He told me that he was appointed honorary leader of the SS
without having been consulted. When he asked the reason, Hitler told him
that Mussolini was soon to pay a visit and that he, Hitler, wanted
everyone in his attendance to wear a uniform. Since Von Neurath had no
uniform he appointed him an honorary leader of the SS. Von Neurath said
he did not intend to become one of Himmler’s subordinates. Thereupon
Hitler told him that that was not necessary; it was merely a question of
wearing a uniform.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward war?
STRÖLIN: On the first day of the war I saw Von Neurath to the railroad
station. He was depressed and rather dismayed. He called the war a
terrible disaster, a gamble with the existence of the nation. He said
that all his work from 1932 to 1938 had thereby been destroyed. I
understood that during the war he saw the Führer occasionally, and on
each such occasion he used the opportunity to ask Hitler to consider the
idea of peace. That he, Neurath...
THE PRESIDENT: How can the witness say this? He was not present at these
meetings; how can the witness tell us what the Defendant Von Neurath
said to the Führer?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As you will understand, that is what the defendant
told him. That was told the witness by the defendant directly.
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath told me so repeatedly. He told me...
THE PRESIDENT: It will be all extremely cumulative.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I do not believe so. The witness himself needs
only to corroborate this to the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal imagines that the
Defendant Von Neurath will give this evidence himself, and the Tribunal
does not wish to hear evidence from witnesses that was told to them.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, I shall dispense with any further
questions along those lines. I should like to ask only one more
question.
[_Turning to the witness._] Did not Von Neurath, with you and other
people, make an effort to put an end to the war and to the Hitler
regime, or at least consider the possibility of doing so?
Now these are facts that the witness knows from his own observation.
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath discussed this question with me on several
occasions after his return from Prague. He tried particularly to bring
about a meeting of the Reich Cabinet, as did the other ministers, but he
did not succeed, since Hitler disapproved of this Reich Cabinet as a
“defeatists’ club.” As a preliminary step for ending the war Von Neurath
tried to bring about a change of ministers and the appointment of a
Reich Chancellor, which was also widely demanded. This also failed.
During the year 1943 Neurath became more and more convinced...
THE PRESIDENT: This is the same thing over again—nothing about what Von
Neurath did but all about what Von Neurath said to this witness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I beg your pardon; these are only preliminary
remarks to clarify what is to follow.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had one last question?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, we come to that now. The question shows the
attempts he made to carry out his intentions.
STRÖLIN: When Von Neurath failed in his attempts at reform, that is,
when he saw that it had miscarried and that Hitler’s attitude was
negative and intransigent, Von Neurath came to the conviction, at the
beginning of 1944, that the saving of Germany from complete destruction
must not be wrecked because of Hitler. He considered the question of how
to speak to Hitler once more and persuade him to end the war. He thought
of Field Marshal Rommel and asked me to discuss the matters with him.
Rommel was at that time very popular in Germany and abroad, and Von
Neurath believed that due to the position he held, Rommel was the right
person to replace Hitler, if necessary. In the beginning of March 1944,
I went to Field Marshal Rommel and discussed the matter with him. Rommel
was just as critical of the situation. I knew him from the first World
War, so that I could speak to him frankly. He was also of the opinion
that if the war could not be won on a military basis, unnecessary
bloodshed and senseless destruction...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, we really do not want all this
conversation between this witness and Rommel. We do not want it. We will
not hear the conversation between this witness and Rommel.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Nor do I want the witness to discuss this matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you stop him then? Why don’t you stop him?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not want to hear it from the defendant
himself, but from the person who was employed by the defendant to take
these steps. That in my opinion has more weight than if the defendant
makes the statement himself. That is why I asked the witness about it.
But it is almost finished now.
THE PRESIDENT: When we come to the defendant then we will not hear him
on these subjects.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, that is not intended—moreover, as far as I
know, the matter will be finished with just a few words. Please,
Witness.
STRÖLIN: Upon Von Neurath’s instigation, Rommel wrote a letter to Hitler
saying that because of the military situation he believed that it would
not be possible to continue the war, and that he, Rommel, suggested to
Hitler that he start political negotiations. Consequently, as he told
me, after his accident Rommel fell from favor for this reason, and thus
Von Neurath’s attempt to end the war with Rommel’s aid also failed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then came 20 July and soon afterwards the end.